4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

!able of Contents

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. Task Organization 2• Supporting Forces J. Intelligence 4. Figure One, Staging Areas 5. Mission 6. Concept of Operation 70 Execution 8. Figure Two. Operational Area 9, Figure Three. Base Area 702

10, Results 11. Logistics 12. Civil Affairs and PSYOPS 13. Engineer 14. Signal 15, Information 16. Commander's Analysis 17. Observations and Lessons Learned

ANNEXES

A - Terrain Analysis Appendix 1 (Climatic Conditions) Appendix 2 (Fields) Appendix 3 (Military Installations & Fortifications)

B - Letter of Instructions.Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Bri~ades and Supporting Units Appendix 1 \Rations) Appendix 2 (Class IV Supplies) Appendix 3 (Ammunition Stockage Objectives)

TAB A (Ammunition Stockage Objectives for NPD) TAB B (Ammunition Drawn from ASP 342)

C - Leaflet Drops D - OPORD 16-70 (U)

Appendix 1 (Annex K Deployment Schedule) E - OPLAN 19-70 (U)

Appendix 1 (Annex A Intellie;ence) TAB A (Zone 6 Guerillas)

Append~x 2 (Annex C Fire Sup~ort) Appendix 3 !Annex D Engineer) Appendix 4 Annex E Logistics) Appendi x 5 Annex G Civic Act ion/PSYOPS) Appendix 6 (Annex H Communications- Electronics)

F - FRAGO 34- 70 (U)

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AVDDH-GC- MH

D l DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION APO San Francisco 96262

21 July 1970

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (RCS MACJ3-32 (R2)) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (c) NAME OF OPERATION: BINH TAY I

2. (c) DATES INCLUSIVE: 5-25 May 1970

3. (C) LOCATION: Base Area 702, CAMBODIA (See Operation Map).

4. (c) CONTROL HEADgpARTERS: 4th Infantry Division (us).

5. (u) REPORTING OFFICER: Major General Glenn D. Walker0

Commanding General 0 4th US Infantry Division.

6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:

a. Task Organization as of 5 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div 3-506th Inf (Abn) 1- 14th Inf 3-Bth Inf

vis on Troo s 2-Bth Inf Mech) C-75th Inf Rangers K-75th Inf Rangers 7-17th Air Cav 2- lst Cav 1- 10th Cav

2d Bde. 4th Inf Div 1-12th Inf 1-22d Inf 2-35th Inf

b. Task Organization change effective 11 May 1970:

1st Bde, 4th Inr Div RECEIVE 1- 12th Inf 2d Bde. 4th Inf Div

RELEASE 1- 12th Inf

c. Task Organization change effective 14 May 19703 Di vision Troops 3-12th Inf RELEASE C/J-l2th Inf 1- 10th Cav RECEIVE C/J-12th Inf

AVDDH GC- MH SUBJECTS Combat Operat i on After Action Report (RCS MACJJ- )2 (R2 )) (U)

d. Task Organi zati on change effective 16 May 1970 :

1st Bde 0 4th Inf Di v RELEASE A/t~14th Inf

Di vision Troops 2- Bth (Mech) RECEIVE A/1- 14t h Inf

e . Task Organization change effective 17 May 1970 &

Division Troops 1- 1oth Cav RELEASE C/ J- 12t h Inf )-12th Inf RECEIVE C/ J 12t h Inf

f . Task Organization change effective 18 May 1970&

1st Bde 9 4th Inf Div RECEIVE J- 12th Inf RELEASE 1- 12th Inf

Division Troops 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div RELEASE ) - 12th Inf RECEIVE 1- 12th In!

g. Task Organization change effective 19 May 1970s

1st Bien 4th Inf Div RELEASE J- 506th Inf (Abn) to IFFV RELEASE B/J=12th Inf (J- 12th Inf) 1-14th Inf RECEIVE B/J- 12t h Inf

h. Task Organization change effective 21 May 1970&

Division Troops RELEASE A/2-tst Cav OPCON 3=506th Inf

1. Task Organization effective 25 May 1970s

1st J3de o 4th Inf Div 2d Bde 0

4th Inf Div 1-14th Inf (-) 1- 12th Inf J-Bth Imf 1- 22d Inf )-12th Inf (B/J=12th RELEASED 2=J5th Inf

OPCON from 1- 14th)

Division Troops 2-Bth Inf (Mech) (A/1- 14t h Inf) 1-lQth Cav i,:1st Cav (- )

?5th Inf Rangers C-?5th Inf Rangers (RELEASED OPCON 4th Inf Di v)

?.. (c) SUPPORTING FORCE.Sa

a. Artill er y Support

(1) Arti llery i t . on 4 May 19?0 b

0un s i nitiated moves to s uppor t Oper ation BINH TAY I

Y P sitioni ng i n f orward areas from which they could be

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AVDDH-.• GC • MH ( ( ) ) ( ) SUBJECT J Combat Operation After Ac t1o n k1epor1. }{CS 11ACJ _) · )2 ... R2 U

i nserted with maneuver force~ .. Thi s gave t.he addHionaJ benef i t of reduc ing

t f time requl.red to lift the uni t.s int o sel ec~.ed f 1 re support the a11oun o . Aft r the planned occupation of fl re bases by t.he light a.nd medium

bases. e · (B/ 4 2d A t ) 1 +. d •thi h artillery uni ts0

only one battery . ··4 r y was re oca .e w~. n t e Thi s move was predicated on the der.1sion to increase the troop base area.

densit in the 1st Brigade AOo W1th this one excepti~n ~ all artillery elemen{s remained in positions 1nH3.ally occupied until wi thdrawal from CAMBOD!A. In conjunction with the w1+.hdrawal of forces ~ the 2d Ranger Group (ARVN) inserted two battali ons into the old 1st Brigade AO" To support the Ranger operations elements of the 1st Brigade established two fire support bases t o the i mmediat e east of the CAMBODIAN border cont aining one 105mm howitzer ba.ttery and one 155mm howi~zer pl atoonu

(2) Several unique situations devel oped during BINH TAY I that required additional l iaison parties over and above those normally provided by the artillery. The additional parties were provi ded in a. variety of wavrso

(a) The SF/CIDG Camp at NEW PI.EI DJERENG was fUrnished an around the clock liaison party for grid clearance purposes ( personnel from HHB 0

4th Div Arty and 5-16th Arty).

(b) The ?~1st Cav was furnished a liaison party for fire support of its LOC security mission. (Per~onnel from HHB 0 4th Div Arty and 4-42d Arty) .

(e) 52d Arti llery Group furnished a liaison party to handle ~roblems of the Group Artillery units (A/1~92 Arty 0 A/7- 15 Art.y 0 4=60 Arty) .

(d) The most important liaison party was provided by personnel of the 52d Artillery at LZ SCC1rT. The party JMlrformed liaison dut ies between the 2d ARVJi Ranger Group and artillery support provi ded by 6-29th Artillery reinforced by A/1~92d Artillery. All fires in support of ARVN were processed by this lia!son party.

(e) The 52d Artillery Group also provided a permanent liaison party with Division Artillery Tactical Ca.mmand Post at NEW PLEI DJERENGo This party was necessary and effect i ve in providing assistance on all items concerning elements of the 52d Artillery Gr oup working wi th t he 4th Infantry Divisionc

(3) The most critical operational problem faced by Division Artillery thx'oughout the entire opera.t i on was ammun1.t1on resupply . Two problems c~eated initial difficUl.ties ~ est abli shment of the temporary ASP and :=~ckage of 'the ASP was not i n ac:cor-d with r ecommended stoc kage obiectiveso ~·~ result was over- st ockage of l55l'llln and eight i nch ammunition. ~A cr~tical shortage of CLY was avoi ded due t o a one day del ay of the initial combat assault of the maneuver el e ments0 An added diff1culty was prompted · by . the initial del ay in e s 'tabli.shing the ASP which prompted t.he artillery ~its to rel y on thei r organ1c t r ansport.ation t o move ammuni tion from the

EIKU ASP. This in turn aggravated 'the shortage of wheel ed vehicles~ Complicating probl ems also concerned e xpenditure gul.dance (from nor111al

) CONflDENTIAt

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AVDDff-GC- fllH . ( ( ) ) ( ) SUBJECT• Combat Operation After Action Report RCS MACJJ-J2 R2 U

.xpend.itu.rea to ll&XillWll possible expenditures when the Division withdrew tt> & ~ £ire situation once back i n VIETNAM) to normal expenditures. Ol#l-Gllaly projecting and planning to meet the desired stockage objecti'V'es

lred 1ntena1ve .coJmaDd staff emphasiso The rea.l 11.miting factor 0 then 0 ~etCUifling. the ability of Division Artill ery to :t"espond to the guidaltce to malcit naxiawt expenditlU'e of the artillery wa.a. the ability to retaU da14ie!7. _.umn1tion tnm the ASP to the f'i~e bases, a.rid th,ts was in tu111 tot&l.11 ~ent · upoa non•d1v1s1onal helicopter resources. Air delivery of a id.t1al QLV stock might have ~levia"\ed initial. diffic.ulties aD;t nn· ~ely HllI>Orted tile planned scbe11~ of llal\euver.

b. Air S11pport t-.. . .. . . . ' . . · · {aJ . Taa .Mr,-~ ·in C.AKBODIA began on 5 M&i .19?0 ".r1_tn a total. of

4!1eftbt$ £'Olar :f'i~ 69,rli.eso .. 'l'ba.se we;re controlled by n,1ne Cider · .,AC' a. lid.tially they new in excess of six hours ea.ah. This compares to a ridntal f'l.JilngdWle_oft a~~l.¥ .tnr. hour•.• Ozi .6 Kay these -~ F~'s cOJltrol..l.:iltl a S.Otal 1Jf. UQ· f~er ~orti~. . Be&l~ng that. thi s ra.te ~ould not be au.stained , the D.1.vision ALO requested anc}. i:ec~ved an a\lgmetit at1on Of a1rczaf't and P1C;s from other units in II Corps and I Corpso . ·on 7 llay • total: ·of 96 f'~t~ :s•rt~ .,ere coJ).trolle.~ bv tM,rteen FAC' S o. whll~ on

. ·• . -~ '8 •$~~ "eN~1co.~~9tl.ed , :,l>Y .twen$.i ,1'~ $ S o Tot.~ . Tac~~ca'l, _Ai1; . . ~o~fesdarin.g the period 5 May through 15 L.; totalled 522 includiilj 464 ~,· d . .5S, t.me1U1iote str"eso ·

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(?) I;r\ addit·i;n to ·~ac Air~ a total of ·?2 B- 52 strikes d'eli 'Ve:t&d over at4Sb W •4D4 ·wt-tb t.bree ~r$~1f ·~.r t~get ~ l.J~o~µ,nately 0 grolllld ~~- 1l~ not · tC}P,~~uct~- .J~iat~lY. after a.ny c;4 the twenty~:follr st~\>, . •b:e¥eJ1. ~ :aPA ~g~ec:l :Pi t .l)e 7 ... 17th Ai~ Cavalry w~tMp ~

t 'actU: .fttl1-Jint ene . ~.t~~ J?&V~al~ heavy recent aetivity.in the strike ~. bu.t no. eneJJY casua.ities were found . .\l:l strikes were targeted a.g&iftst the best intelligence ava.ilable 0 and as subsequently not4'd 0 seve1"81 US •:.~· wilts :1ilJJcove'!ed ~.a.eQes in the target ~as~ .

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Ce. ·· "~~OJI. Supppri;

(t) ~neral

11~~~~ _lnit!Jal a.Dd l!letst diffieu;J.t pha~f3 of the operation involved air Jiii ~twi:. l ft:f,.,ntry Pr~gades ~n4 s~pporting artille~y by bel1copte~ fr~~ t~·. l nit1-.J. ~G,9 BVN to obj ective ~fi'a.G locat ed withi n CAMBODIA. During "1.r~ra.tt. e .n.eerttensv !!&eh brigade was allocated apl>roximat aly sbt;y lif't Av§.atton·v ..!::!eea gLtn$1ps o and sixteen hooks t o accomplish their aissiono '1'be 1?tb ·O.Uf t ." wen proviqed by the 17th Combat Aviation Group (CAG) . overall h . i -~ed the 52d Combat Aviati on Bat talion (CAB) to provld(t "'11 port!Qg :be ~:~~~:n~QJP!ander a.rul to control all i ?t h CAG airc~a.:f't Sul>-

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AVDDH.GC~MH ( )) { ) SUBJECT~ Combat After Action Report. (RCS MACJJ-32 R2 . U

(2) Control of Aircraft

INe to the large number of aircraft involved in the operation, control · jor problem 0 Aircraft supporting the dlvlsion came :f'rom several

;as ~1~!s some as far altay as OAM RANH Bay. This situation made it e:~1:/ d1fffot.tlt to assemble aircraft at the proper plac.e and time to bt!gin :~a.ch da~.-~ s . operation. . Aircraft were Often late due to w:eather cond1tiops existing at po1'nts of departure . Initially aircra.ft were requ~ to check ln nth tht: 52d a~ Mission,,. Cc:mi-r.:o~ Center (.MgC) ,prior to reporting to the supp~:Med units· at NEW PIJ;I DJ..it.i~G . The 52d Mee and the Division Army Aviation Element (AAE)r. both located nea!.' .PLEIKUo were th~; ..c,o~t~lin~ eleme~t.s 1.or, .. aviation support. Clos~ coordination. was eft'ecteji lietwe~n i:1hese elenrcmts via radio and land line _ commwtlcat.ions. Du:ring~the fits~ two 4~s of .the operation c, aircra£t frequently failed. to check in W:ith . t'b;e· .52d MCC and dOnf'ilsion prevailed as ·tQ What aircraft had aetuaJ.]3 .rp,ported ·to sapport the ·4tv1s.i"On. Direct cont~t ·with tbe brigade a.via.tlon secti'ol;i~ was necessary to ascertain what aircraft were o.Q. irta.t.ion. 'i'bis pl'~ed to .·be Ve~ t~Jlre consunting since COlfilllWliCatoJ~otls :frequently · _ i»rese. n~.:.:4 l~ci;bf~m ?· ~i '·became a:pparent that an .ai.J:'Craft fol.'Ward eontrol element "(FQE) . w~~ ~eeded.. a:t NEW PLEI DJERENGd · The llllviS,ion ~asked the 52d CU tg. pnj'i~ ' su~~ . ~· .. ~l~l!'ent at NPP',ifith a. com~unications eapabili ty '! This cd,e.-~n\ ..;~~. $tUfed by. the 52d LNO arui a.ii officer from · the Di-r;i.sio~ AAE., Ga ~~· . :~h'-f.~ ~~Y of ih~~ operation ai. t-cra.ft w:ere required to ch~c;:t 11}. by ~b·-•'-tb ;l;>pth ~h~ 52d MOO' and the FeE. at lU'D. Close eoordinatio~ . between ~~s~ . ~ wp: !fl.Eri!ieli'ts was effeeted via radio. and land. li»e eo•~n,ica~1.onso Cont:rol pr()j:>b~P.le' ~.it.re ¢onaiderably reduced af!ter tais arrangem~nt began opera.Uons~ · ·· ·

"1(; ~, ~~.rfi~ld P.a,e~lrt~es j,

. ~· :PLjfl( ·~~ ai~}!=!id was· the only facility established llil the AQ: . for refueling a.nd reariti1ng of supporti'ng aircraft. The division was a~­JDented_ .Kith .AA ·~~1; "ff;raffic control team from the 165th Aviation Group. ~,,:J~ ~q .~µipiii.ent prov:itled were· sufficient 0 bllt c:ontrol 0£ t5ffic vas bail~. b,r . ~ll~' ~per:at1o~a.l environment' Th:e la.r~ number of hel.1c<>:pttn"·S iQvo~y~ 1'Jl t,he . inj,:tial: l>hase of the operation c:rea:ted a 1Uajq.:z: dli't'ic.ulty for t~ ~r ~:ra/f~ controllers". Close coo:rd1nation betl(een tbe &vision and. the .ri~ tra.ff~o ·eon,trol elemen-t wa.s a contin~ous requirement ~ Q~e~ that P~.t:"ity :pf.r~:fl!~ling and rearmament could be effectively controlled. !;t~,3.~ ~-~~tJ.ort~ were .hampered in ma.Ily insta,nces due t.a the mi~ture

· da.ire~at~ P.~rtic~patt~~ in the operation. Excessive delays in refueling an. ~~~111$ 9f' .~:iJ:>craft ·were dso caused by the severe dusty ac;mditlons ~:pe$fK:ed ~~ NEW !'LEI PJ~NG. The dust suppr.essa.nt progra.111 WCls

itia.ted on the ~irst day of the operatioR 0 but was contintuuly twJlpc;t~d. by aircraft operations during the remainder of the ope.rat.ion. .:Perj,oqica,l.ly

0 .~J:' Foree ,f1X(td wine; cargo l3,i:z;-craft used the airfield at .NEW PLEI DJ~G. ~~ created h~voc with helicopter operations at the airfield anq in mqst

C.it.6-SS helicopt.er operations ha,d to c:ease while these aircraft were opq:ra.ting in and 01,1t of' the airfield. .· . ·

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:~;~··~ombat Operation After Action Report (RCS MACJJ- 32 (R2) ) (0)

B. (0) INTELLIGENCE.

. In order to accurately assess .the enemy situation in CAMBODIA~ the enti;; 4lvisio~ G-2 SectionD the 4th Military lntelligence Compa,ny 0 and th~ 374th Radio Research Company directed their research efforts to Base Area 702. The object of this ooncentrated effort was to produce an anel.yzed picture of the enemy as soon a.a possible to allow commanders o:f msneuver C!!l~nts time for planning and briefing. In a.ddit~on to infdl"ina­t .l•I. oh rue 0 · infonation was obtained from G2 IF.Fl/ and from the .52.5th m.11~ 1-ntelllgence Group. Mach of the most current data was fro111 a BQI Cffd'lt interrcsga.tion report dated 15 September 1969.

b. '!t :wa.a ·tmGAm tha-t headquarters 0 NVA &.. J ~ant had ope~ted, r:rom the Tri Bd?d'.ftr .Q!ea. (~DIA~ LAOSo . VIEl'NAM) since 1965. Base Area 702 l:n CAIBt»U i ncltlded elements of B- 3 Front. headquarters a11d a n~nber ·of -r• stat•· (ColnaOdLta.ison) and "Q" _stat.ions (Suppl..y ) . Ka.jor WA combat mt:~ test aAd ·rQ'fit in the Kea 0 .but in May 1970 no iia.jor combat ullits wex-e tmo,-1 io 'be 'in: »a.'58 Area ?92. It was estimated ~hat a ~tlt¥ of i~OQ-~~ ~· 1'tlitary . -personnel lfe~e 1-n ~he area, at the be~~ning ~ 'Ilfll tAf ·1 OP.'8.•~ions., These · persennel w~re expected ~o . avol.d cCiU,ltac;t o

~~e~1 ~a:·opeJ;ations coJ!imencedo tbs. ·•memy d.id def'.end lantling z~nes l(n pa.f:t(elit$.'r td!~h" ground to a.ir fir~ . ~n the north c;entr~ part of '\\he lia•· ~~ .. ~~y·-"•lements atte111pt\fJ<i . d.elqing actions Khile seJ:Vl.ce ~nits ~'1:~rf# ·tq. the ·nort•~st. ::tbe ' ~~QIY~ s ~epla;pement system a.nd supply

i::~Pt!~·· ~<·ill~~pteri to. some extent v . and llV A base_ camps were destro;red .., t\t,.Ja~' .a"loWG!ll"': :!be lillited d)d'.,,.U .. on. of Cliv1~ion operations did not, · •ev•ro 8.1.low for co111plete destruction of facilities to the enemy.

. Do A doc.ament captured by the 4th Inf'antry Division on 8 MCf3 in Ba,se ·~ _ 70? . ~bowed the enemy had expected operations because of a bhange in .cAIOJOP~:· ~ts.. The docW11~n'j; w~s .a t.Jpewrij;~en me.sS<iLge frQJI the ~1¢ ~t~. Olli.de of B-J F.t:-o~ a;nd w8$: dat&d 17 ftfai.cb. 1·970 i It rea£i"a

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i ·J. ~~~tng 'to the inf'.Grmatitm· .~bt.aj.n8d, the ene~y (FWMAF/RVNAF' will be. ~~114-~ tn :our base El.rMo: AU the ~.ci.phes and trc;>op l9~at·ia~s ·must be Wttll· ~O:Q:Q.~@4: :so t:he enemy cloee nQ_1; di:aeover them. If the enemy <toes find.. _-r ·ot t~~e 1'-PCations we m~;;tt s~pa.;ra:te our forces and evacuate the IP"ea• ~elite- ll!Ust be pa.eked ·ud be re~y foi; eva.cuatiQn at any timeo

est .. ~ .e'aclte IU.'eae and troop locati.o.ris.0 i~cluQ.1,r;ig dispens~e:;5 0 must to ~!11~ a 'PBrJ!la,ner_it security gucu-do. Pat rols must be established in orde:r . ~ th.e. enemy situation at all t1meso All l.ocatlons ~ust be k:ept

secret• . ~\iios ·will not be played loud . No hunting or fishing wUl be allowedaro~!Pi area X6 XQ.5 or around the TA BOP River. No weapons will 'be t':l'r~ in 'b4se -camp areas.

tAll ea.di-a a.rui tr09ps must be tralned to obey these orders. Lbn ' t be

da.p ared or al.l · - · · f i """t ~ t ow aoeumentso weapons ~ o:r: caches to be captured. Do not ~· ~~ns the eneny. Instead 9 flee from them. "

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CONFIDENTIAL 6

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AfDDH-GC-MH t A tion Report (RCS MACJ)•)2 (R2)) (U) SUBJECTa Combat Operation Af er c

d. The following enemy units •ere identified in Base Area 7021

(1) Production C~ll/Rear Service Section/B-J Front

(z) K-S and K-6 Transportation Battalions

(J) TA GIAC froduet1c;n Unit

(4 ) 26th Signal Battalion

(5); .CO 5 Di,spef1Sary

(6) 211 Hospital (AKA 84th Hospital)

(7) Jd Company/D2076 Infiltration Group

(6) BIRJ!' 1'!iAM 'l'HUNG Il&pot

( 9) BIXH TRAM TRUNG Dispensary

(10) c.,,15 Transportat1o~ Company

qi> .c(~-?t~ . ~i>laceaent Battalion

e. l"ortlfications

(1)" f~ ~3Q'0 • .25 l':uakers 'd.tla ·two teat :b,J t hree f'ee"t openings and tWD f8't OHa :wit within· pa.st 24 hours (7 lfa.y 1o)o two AA ~iteso ~ indirl.d.l&als in green uniforms.

{z) ' ?A 6Z9J57;9 25 bunkers with twa feet by three feet openi,ngs·q . .. . , . .

(J) '!A 5046450 30 huts , JO bunkers-0 )0~40 individuals in a;r.,._. }4) Y4. 49'f61Jo· 1)0 structu).;'es (ten f'eet by twenty feet) , one mess

hall 't50•·xtoo0')0 iirie s-tr.acture with six sides 0 50° across with 40° high

?!C>Ofo 75 Ounkers (ten feet by twenty feet) with no OHC.

($' ~A· ,~1'9,65.5-i 25 huts 0 one mess hall 0 ten bunkers. . . . .. {6) YA .5864070 twelve huts (1Z0 x100 ° ) 0 NVA equipment.

(7) YA 66a44oo thirty bunkers with two feet by three feat 0 openings and three f~et r;tHa 0

(S) YA 5)0469» eight structures (ten feet by fifteen feet) 0 eight bunke~.t defensive positions in oval shape around structures.

(9) YA 4J0405u 15 huts (12 °x20°) 0 25 bunkers wi th two feet OHC 0 one AA tsite.

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;~~~~~nbat Operation After Action Report (RCS MACJJ-32 (RZ)) (U)

(iO) YA 714100o zo huts with trenches connecting them to bunkers.

(11) YA 4714.590 20 buts· (1,5Dx18 u ) o 20 bunkerso

(i2) tA $24J84o 50 huts 0 ,50 bunkers.

(!J) YA SOJ4J2v 18 huts (20 °x60° ) 0 five huts (1.5°XZ01 ) p f'ive huts

(8 ' rl0°) 0 15 bunkers.

(14) 'f.A 390518 0 cam bunkers along river.

(15) YA 5)1499 0 one structur e (40°x1.50° ) o J.5 structures (ten feet by· t"enty feet) cam with nets, 40 bunk.erso

(16) YA 4154950 cam bunkers along- rl,vero

(17) YA .55.54750 50 trenches o \Ulder ground ""'~ers, ~~ ~-~~ at-pear$ a.band.oned .•

(16) YA .6352250 battalion size base area0 huts and bunkerso

f. Muitar,y Installations

(1) YA ?i206.50 huts, bunker s , two AA positions, two .Ocku:ps o£ wooden ~it.-rs,0 in revetments.

(2)r .. tA·~'IV1551J.O t'llO; cla~C>Q•s. '•tgb~. f ·e.et. bJ ~ven~y ~1 ve f~t) . 'ltitb 24·•· il.ong":'&iaclieSi !liess 1*J.l ~th •o (tVenB· and f!v~ ·tables I! firlDg ra.~ . obstacle eourseo - . · . · · ·

(J) Y4' '6Sm'~ 2', .. hlltts·;( fiftua .feft : by· ten. :f«;t!3t ~ eignt fe~J.~ WQ cl~$..rDO•$ ¥Uh benches t ·o seat th.1rty people 0 one bunker, foUr two &!le&t u.t~o C•h .

( If.) ~!t.J" ~1)" 2j hlltt1·,· 75 bunkers., 11ock, ~p cC)nC0~rtina ~ 0 m~el .~ jei 0 10'0\w:aet1.c:e' ~l.-ecJm • gre~ei.;., f'i.ve practice ~tcb~ cwges'o fo!U' .aan else targets. ··

(,S) I.4. ~1563D 15 huts· (;four.te,en !eet. by twenty- two feet P,y su f'ee,t) W$flty beds ·per hU:to transfusi on mach1ne 9 500 rolls of gauze 0 10g000 poamtiis pf riee.

( . (6)'. · YA· 5164670 three huts (eight feet . by twenty :feet) 0 two puts si x feet PY eight feet) 0 two chicken coopsg one small gene~tor0 one

fl.u.orose.oJ»eo 111i scellaneous surgical and dental tools8

Chicom field phoneo thJ:ee SlfS -·rtne15•

(?,) YA ~573Q ~ 70 huts 0 200 men.

(6) YA 4966350 possible co• pany location~ five hospi tals.

A ~··· t1 -. , .. . , ' . ~ I ., ·: r ·t '. "' ! I • ,J a • · ·, ... ii " , ,; ,, 8

• CONFIDENTIAl:.

I' 1.-,

I. I

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)

CUNflDENTIA~

NEW -· PLEl DJEREN(J

PLEIKU • eJAC.\<.50\\l

. HOLE . ·

• MER~DITH

NOT TO . 5CALE

AVDDH..GC-MH ( { )) ( ) StIBJ~Tt Combat Operation After Action Report RCS MACJJ-J2 R2 U

<) . (C) IaSSION. The _4th Infantry Division conducted opera.t1ons in CAMBODIA in north~rn iase Area 702 to locate a.nd destroy enemy resou:r:ces 0

1nstallation.s and co111111&nd fac1lit.1es.,

100 (C) . . CONC§Pl' or OPERATION. The 4th ln:f'antry Di.via.ion initially . re- . es11ii~ t"o 1n£antZl'Y brigades in th~ vicinity_ of NEW PLi!I DJUENG rn ~pa:tlitdon tott ·11ult1-batta.U.on combat assaW. ts into the ObJective area.

On.e 'battalion 'It&& chopped to -division control to provide security for Ca.mp Radcliff while one mechanized infantry battalion provided LOC security. from LZ OASIS to NEW PLEI DJERENG until its relief by the 2- lst Cavalry., At that ttme t1ie ba.ttalion reverted to ·division reserve and p:ovided seclll'ity for the''dtvlsion 1'iQ ~- and LSA~ Each iafantry brigade ~ one air cavalry troop •:iJ:l._ ~ttet?t · _support o

11.. (C) 1iiJECtn'ION. Beceipt of a ·warning order on the aftel.1loOJ;l of 2 '1 initiated 4th Division plans for subsequent operations in CAMBODIAo Two. )llajor ~~'·sf:zecf opemtions 'W-ere .in progress at the time• attd ~hese actJdttes b.Ad , to 'be tera1na.ted a.lcmg with the closeout of ~~ral Fii:e SUpport WeA• '..· ~- 2000, boo.rs 2 Jfa.y 0 tt>e bdgades had :received their w~~ng a.ri~ to pe~e.:-~c.r operdiens. 1n Base •ea 7020 . .

The follolJinp; morning0 ) Ma.y p the initial redisposition of" forces began •1:th;~tae:..·~~6th . Mn Ba.ttal.ton of. the, 1~t :Btigade. which AS o~ttng- .li•: tfte .~·l'AIOO' Q'8&6 a.irllft~ from~ ~ M4Tm. to ,C~p : Bad·cl.ift'~jAtfcmE.;1 ·The 1 ... 22. Inf11 2~.35_ Inf(.,. ):11 and 1-12 Inf'( ... ) of. t,~ 2d lll'igade'X.Mi5o'! begtiJ.11n their· 11ove' 1ntb Camp ia.dcUf:f o Ori. 4 , ~ 11 )-1at.h .. In_r, ~ing !n.-. thi!.- DAK, .P.U0U · (ve Valley) a.r .e&.'!J w:tth is.t, pi-igade- el~e11;t~,• revert.M--·w·Dl.frl~l(}n : control ~- ·returned- to Ca.mp RaJJel..tff to cond\leot base. eup aec~rity operations.,. lit a.ddttion0 tbe 1st· :B~~e '+AC CP ai:r;lli"tef.\ .. te) iiiDf PLEI DJEBENCo lfhile the r$1baining elements· of its CP group and the 3- S06 AbQ.C,._ttULQn..- emivoyet:l cnerl.a.nd to . Camp Hollowci.y nei:U" PLIUJ,W.. The 1-.14 Inf-' JmV:ea::-ever],..a. amt: cl:OSed, int-~ .lt£ ~:JlITH0 and. tnen pr~ too ccmtini'e-' the --~1•- orove th.et a:e~ day to N-,lilW PloSI DJ~G where 1 t wo~cj ~b· '1.:t11.,~ba't -••atdt.. the ),...8 Inf reJll$.1ned at Camp Radcliff .ne. cont~ p~ti:OJls f'or. the ap~ration~ ·

'l'he :f~ni.l~~-ed!epb.s1tion .~ forces continued throtJgh 6 May wi.th 24 R.rigad'e"ll!e\ell't'e "¢-~Y!.tm tz -MEREDITH0 L.Z JACKSON ~OLE, a.nd 131 OASISo . {See Fi~:·r~n~lo · The J..S Inf .of the 1st Brigade- .convey~d Gve.rland on 5 Ma.f fw:lm et\Dip aadcli.ff- al'ld. C'losed LZ Wl:HlimITH and prepared to combat a.tr asttalll t 00 6 Mayo . . . . .

All · ~~'1"il"1i "n 5 Ma.y • 1}...Dccy v were dedicated to. the. s).ngll\' lift Qi one ba.ttal.i.?11 at a ·ttmeo This 1nvol vt!!d the use of so.me si~ty l!ft ships tQ :ive:, ~the 3-.~_06 :4'bn Infantry battalion to the fU'st objective ar~8 in thfJ

e!nlty af. ¥A 4:52535. At 0915 hours the battalion co-111mander renorted his lift W -1 bo ' · r · · -, as- a r .. rne and on the way ., Elvents ~ere soon to prove tha.t the pri-111ary I& wae too hoto The first aircraft approaching. the ).anding zone

i;, ~eeelved heavy enemy fire from well concealed . 51 caliber mac hineguns.

9 CONFIDENTIAt

! j·

''j ! ;.

AVDDH-GC- MH ( M ( ) ) ( ) SUBJECT; Combi.t Operation After Action Report HCS ACJ)-32 .R2 U

1 tr1Jte.s us~ to "prep" the LZ had not totally cleared Obviously ~ a r s 1 t .r t nd f tore~ ·fro~ the area. Because of time d s a.nee .... ac ors a . uel enemy 1· t . decided to abort the lift and return the J-506 Abn to. problems was l di t alt t LZ tnW Pl.EI DJEREN-G,. rather than to attempt a an ng a an . . erna e . · • lfhen the n~gftt retltt'nel<I the helicopters landed on the a.ir9t:rip. '?his becaae ·ttitt ifirit seriotJs problem of the operationD 111ak1ng it 1mpo~s1ble to wt.ng 'i'n e...130 a.1tc:ra:rt with needed . POL. The pg.ss1b1lity that all tbrie' S<:~~led 'c<J11iba.t assaults Mould be completed that da,y was elMtlate<i. . . ·

·.,q·-~te' of tne: c&~sttort on the airst-:tit>-o difficulties 1.n ~era.ft contril'~ ' d\i;st D ·'8ftd 'the i.nadiq_Uat.11 ·tlUJD'ber 'Of refuel/reaftJ poin'!.i~t --~89 aajor attempts were made on S May to insert the 3- 506 Abn.. ..~ s -·i'1nally m$ed ~.T the battalion were in the vicinity of YA 413537 and YA 415545· flh '6fia1 ies~l! "~& met at eitner lGCatlon.. , __ . ._ . .

. Olli· j . . ~ . .J .... :C;eJJ. .,.~, : . 1;:' · . · . _ , · ·

'l'he~·1..;1i4 Inf met thc:t .. Sa.Jie stcblDorn resistance as. the 3-506 AO~ ~·'' a.rid ~b@f =ifere ~a.JSij iurneci-<baclt f~m ·their planned inserlion poi.8:ta: ~ ..U.fttmt0 : a.ti• al te:tnate 1attdiA$ 'llOae. proved to be too h&t ~ s~ tbii, .b1o.1i- : ff.liqn w~. not able to pu.t a.iv ·troopa in .the. operationcµ ~.e,a,u~1l

6 ~. ic. ~ . _ ... : :_ . _(..:. J . · . . . . .

'31 the - of' ~pg;. thetr; iftl;y ·o~e l)a.;ttaliCl>n with its ~pporling . ~l~nts w~,rat!.~&l"tn:Ca\D©~ -··.h : retrospeet>~ the· erlgl\aal c~~e.p\ of the P~l!on ~a.lll!~~ for !bbe b8.tta11on§ to be-mGVed to· the· '1>'bje~t~ve ~~ ~it~ua'f.64• th a s1i'lgl;e ·~~ift. (a. new, .. experieoo,e £~r. ~~ (l'i!i:il.~8•.h.~ .. ,.18cliuee ~ ttl,&re "~ so ·Utt.le tbe ·:to.- po8.1tioJi· all (;l;l.~~· t~ f~Wtllt1Pl.'1·1~•at~-~the short t4;me; s.}>an ma.de it. 11c11po~Lbl.~'. :~t> ·. •• W"Wits{t~~~;,ta~stions in execution. . . . < _ -·

st.~~ ~~ ~! .. 'i (~ :,: ~:;;' .: I _' \ l •. ,•

. .. ~~.~. ~"~11\,i;~ t&t""Brlg!i;d'e~- ~nitn~ed ; to , inserl i-t·~ !o?'Ce~ lni;,e :\h~ : .1

''- •

~--t'."·17·:,, .. _fli'e se?i8ftl),t ~red the in~rt:l.o» of iha~ ) ... 8t&-. t l1!Jf'f¥1t~p t~~1/ J!t'i'\t$t~l~s - ve!te ' uttatl>le to: suppre~ the. ~0111¥ fll'eo Art~ f'i:~- t;,&e: eneiay • fire'<· too hwaavy 0 the ba.ttalion · cogfµ!ldEt'.~ ll1.r~t~d th.e sb:i:PS ta an a1-ternate LZ at YA 482649,. H.ow<ever o. .af'te;J;" .th.e. insertion ()£ 0~1' ~~r '!!~ ~ al).:e a.5.rcraft was shbt down in the LZ. Another try at itt~t~··~)~·· was m~'.8:o ·and resulted b two 11o:re aiI"IU'a.ft badly d~1h'· · ·ft~l)"-'a. d\t'Bt~ff'· attempting to ectra.ct tn~ ~ounded .w;ae.· driven off ·hr ~~wt.•. e~ fi:teo As tne day ended t~.e 3 .. a J:nf had only sJ...xty men on tfte Sl°'Qttndi and had· suffered one KIA and tvo itIA. Tbe 1-.14 Inf' had done BQl!lewha.t better 0 and was able to insert about 75% of 1..ts :f'orees =~:: ·!lli .LZ at YA 4J0591. Light enemy activity with elements of the J-506 91

co~l~ed t1'le. ilEWs activities ~ The 1st Brigade completed the m~ve-ent ()f its 111aneuv~r elements on ? May wi-ehout further ineident. '.ll\e ~if"1e -h~ u·sed: only twelve a.1rcraft for the :final. moves~ a,nd the balance 2d ~ bel.1eopterso forty=etght 0 were ded.lcated to completing moves of :the Int b g~e. New fire bases were established by the 1~12 . 1- 22 0 .and 2-J. 5

.·· att~H.e.ns at YA 598445~ YA 519472 0 and YA 600400" {See Figure Twc:)) •

. 1l1Ttt130AIA0) 10 CONFIOENTIAt ~

' CuNfF~-,~TiA. ---r :)

Ftgure Twoo Ope:t-a'tionai. Ar-ea

·: .~.:,~,.;'Ii~~) . . .. r . "•.:.n~u

NOT TO SCA.LE

CONFIDENTIAL

.. t -~ ~Jf ... .

.... .JJ

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SCALE

. -- ~ .

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. A. ~ ~

~~~~f:- ~ombat Operation After A<-tion Report (RCS MAGJJ-32 (RZ)) (U)

Coincident with the moveftlent of the infantry , artillery units were sitioned in forward areas from which they could be inserted with the

~aneuver elements. This significantly reduced the amount of iime required to lift the units into selected fire support bases. All light artillery units ~ere positioned ln Base Area 702 during the period 5-7 May. l'tediu• and heavy artillery were pcsitioned along Highway 19V and Highwa,y 509, and also to provide fire support in the area of the LOC to NEW PL&! .DJERENG which was the LSA and major staging area. With only one exception 0 all art'fi1ery units remained in positions initially occupied until with­drawal. fr~!D CAMBODIA. (See Figure 'lhree).

s1gtt'Uicant1y 0 ground and alt' opera't.ions conducted against enemy fc;>rces 1n CAMBODIA were moderate to- light actions. These contacts resulted in SOiie 212 911emy KIA with approximately 5.5% resulting from infantry contacts and 14. efed;ited tt> the air cavalry.

Several significant cache discoveries were made during the course of operationsi the first on 9 May. 11.ements of the 3-506 Abn discovered 0

after a brief exchange of fire 0 a huge rice cache estimated to gontain over .500 tons of rice 0 much of which was destroyed by the battalion.

By 11 May, the 1-14th Infantry had penetrated into a hospital complex containing a variety of medical equipment. Two companies of the }-8th lnfa.ntry located another medical f a.clli ty containing some twenty beds and other medical items.

'!he following day o 12 Ma.Y- 5 C Company 0 3- 506 Abn Inf 9 in the vicinity . of YA 4845.500 fo11nd the largest cache of the operationo Numerous crew served and individual weapons were tound along with large amounts of assorted a.mmunition.

Because of other contingency missions , 2d Brigade elements on 12 May, with the exception of the 1-12th Info began preparing to disengage and return to RVH in the vicinity of Camp Radcliff 9 RVNo The 1=12th Inf had chopped to 1st Brigade control on 11 May because of a decision made to increase the troop density in its A00 This decision was based upon the nW1ber of enemy contacts and cache discoveries made in its area of operations o

By 13 "4y the 2d Brigade had airlifted its remaining two battalions0

the 1-22 Inf and the 2~35 Inf ~ from Base Area 702 and returned to Ca.mp Radcl~ff for a b.rier standdown. Enemy activity remained light for the duration of t ·he operation in the base area.

On 15 May instructions were given to the 1st Brigade to prepare for f~~her deploy11Jent back to RVN. Since the cache area originally developed ~v:he 3-506 Abn ~ had not been ful ly exploited. plans ' were made for the

2d Banger Group to deploy two battalions into that immediate area to

I .. 11

CONFIDENTIAL

'

• \A..: '·-f ' · i:'\ ~r · .. v,1~ra .' ·r '\ '{( i'4.,

AVDDH-GO-MH stra.raeT1 Co11bat Operation Af'hr Act1G>n Report (RCS MACJJ-JZ (RZ)) (U)

:· •continue o-pera.tiMB amt exploitation. That sa11e d~, the 1-12 Inf was a1rl1fted from ~ultiple pickup zones to NEV P.LEI .DJERENG,where it remained oYernight _.a1t1ng transportation so that on 16 ~ it could move over land to c.-p Re4cl1ff. In addition, both the J-8tb Inf and the J-506th Abn be8aft ' elos1tag out operations at their respective fire bases. Fifial.17 on 16 1'a,y all 1at Brigade elements •ere extracted. from CAMBODIA and returned to lmfo

. ~ , .

Bec&Use of the continuing A.BVN operations in Base ATea 702 0 both the J..Sth In! and the )-.5o6 Abn established fire bases adjacent to the CAIG30DIAI· bo1'i2er in the l'Lli:I TRAP Valley f'roa which they conducted local natch and 4Mttor operation&. 'l'he 1:-14 hf conducted local security at lllV J?Lll DllBl!rG as 1H4l ae loeal clearing operations.

Bven though the BINH TAY I operation was to cont.i.®e through 25 _Jfq, the •ajor tactical. effort was co•plete with the withdrawal of the 1st Bri~e ·wtt-:t-s on 16 ~ 1970•

12. (C) '@ULTSo .. - - · • ,.;

r, _of 1e:z·•nn•l and equpaent l oaaesa

us ICU . I ..

US VIA

IVA ·nA· ., ... • J "' :! ~ . , •I • .. • : \•

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V-.ppna and Equipment . , , . I .

. CB:. ireapana ~ . . .. .. . -

st •ea.pons .. . :·· ..

Riee.·'CU: .

St~etu~es Destroyed

~ult.ion

12

4J

118

212

7

20

859

.591 Tons

2 o1S7

100797 Rounds SA

717 .Rounds Mortar

141 Bounds RR

612 GX'Elnades

224 Rounds B-40

.··

CONFIDE.NTIAt

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COllflDENJIAl

.AV DL\1.,;l~ - MH {· ,,;,~,·..; !·l,\.C:.J~ - J"- (Rz)) ~ • . · !3 LfBJgc'f ~ ;;,, rrba1. l~perat.l.on Aft.•:!r Ar:·t. ic-n Rr:>port ~ - - ~ ,, ~

st r.c k ...... ~ _,£ Gla::. :: IV a1. 1.h E LSA "'as p•o::-nd':?d by fll.:>COi·I. The 451:.h ~&4 Suj:'}.'l.'rt ,-:;rC"·!.l F aJ so aut,J11er.T.e d 1.h t? LJ.•.r S :J pp l y and Tr.;.n~por+. Bat+.alion tn mee1.1 ng 1.hE 111visic.n t.ra.nsport.at.ic.n req111rement.s ,. Class V was provided bv t.he FSU (l 34 ~.h Ordnar,ce Batt .:i.l 1 on). The t?x1.ens1on cf t.he Main Supply R~uie (MER) t.o c c -.rEr "'.".he division new ::i.rea. of cperar.1ons necessit.ated t he pre -posHicning ·;;:t supp:i:.es and e s1 .. abl'.tshment. cf stockage objec.tives at

NEW PLEI DJERENG ·'

(z ) Supplies

(a ) Class I. A rat.ion5 .. C rat.ions ,. LRP ra1.ions and sundry pack··· used to prov1dF. CJ..a s s I support. t.o di vi slon t:r oops during the operat ·· . The stock.age level f e r packaged rations was f lve days. Issue of A rat .· was based on a head count. of 6 .. 000 from 5- 16 May and J ,. 500 from 17- 26 (See Append1x I t .C> Anr.ex B for i ssued Hems). · ·

( b) Class Ill .. POL suppor t. consisted of ,TP4 o 70r000 gallon capacity with th.i.rteen refuel points~ di esel 1. 20 oCOO gallon capacity; MOGAS 0 10 0 000 gallon capaci"ty; and AVGAS ~ 2 .,000 gallon c apaci"ty . There were ten line items of pac.kaged petrole·um product.s stocked by the LSA at NEW PI.EI DJERENG.

- The. original plan i:alled for one ,JP4 refuel point to be established on the sout.h s ide of t.he runway on t.he west. end of t,h.e airfieldo As a result of the seriotis dust problem that developed early on 5 May 1970 0 the point was split with five 10 0 000 gallon bags and si.x nozzl es being installed on the east end of t he airlleld and two 10,, 000 gallon bags feeding five nozzles and one 50000 ga l l on tanker feeding two nozzles fer a total of seven points on the west end of the ai rfiE-ld , To insure adequate supply of JP4 to commence the operation ~ ten 50 000 gal l on tankers arrived at NEW PLEI DJERENG on 4 May . Additional tankers were programmed i n on 5 May to br i ng the on hand qt:.anti t.y up to the requl.red l eveL On t wo different occasions JP4 was flown 1r. v1a C~lJO bladder bird when t he on hand quantity reached a dangerously low level 9 but a t no ~ime during the oper ation did the LSA rur, out. of JP4.

(c ) Cl ass IV, See Appendix 2 ~o Annex B for issued items.

(d) Class V, The initi.al s"tockage objective of Class V at NEW PLEI DJERENG was based on a three day intensiv-e combat r ate . This was later reduced t.c a "two day intensive combat rate because of the increase in the 45th General Support Group resupply capability 0 There were 109804 short tons of munitions issued by the forward ASP at NEW PL~I DJ~RENG from 5 May t.hrou.gh 27 May 1970, Durlng the phase out of t.h1s operation D 56304 short. tc,n::, of these rnuni tions were backhauled t o the ASP at PLEIKU, (Set:, Appenchx 3 t,o Annex B) ..

c.. Servic.es

( l) Ma.int.enance ' Haim,enance support. was pre. p ded by C and D Companies, 704th l.fa.i ntenance Battalion , C Company operat.ed a1. NEW !:'LEI DJE..'"iENG. D

14 (ONFIDENTIAL

CUNflD·tNTIAt. ~~~~~- M~ornbat Operation After i\c:tion R<!port (RCS MACJJ- 32 (.R2)) ( U)

. 0

rated at PLEIKU., The 62d Light Maintenan.ce Company of the 45th Compan,y ~ rt Group ass1.111ed the maintenance support of the 2d Squadron, ;:~e~&l~ffect1v4! 15 May . This greatly reduced the operational load of' D Compa1'lJ'o 104th Matntenance Battali.ono

(2 ) Medical Services a C Company , 4th Medical Battalion provided •edical support for all units operatin~ out of ~~~-~I DJCEBENG

1• Medevac

support was ·provided by the Z8Jd and 47'-'th Air -~ance ompa.n es.

. (J) Graves Kegistrations The 4th Sappl7 and Transport Bat'Ml.ion e~tabl1shed -a re•ains collectign point at NEW Pl.EI DJEBENG. Operational problems with the reef~r unit necessitated the ·expeditious moye11ent of r811&1ns to PLEIICU where the7 were processed by the .57Jd Field Senice Coapany at PLEIKU. A Graves Registration representative from the 4th Supply and Tran~port BattalloR wae ~ollocated with the 5?Jd Field Service Coltpan)' at PLB~KU. There were f~t7 nine human re11a1ns processed by the 57Jd Field Service Company' during this operation.

(4) Bath Services·! The 4th Supply and Transport Bat talion p~vided bath eerviees wlth the use 0£ ro11r mobile shower unitso

(5) TransporiatiBR'

Ca.) ~ initial 11ove111eat of-th~ Di.vision from AN Kijg to :K:SW PLEI ~C required the total t'l'ans~rtation a,esets of the 4th S\i-pply and ':franepuri-&.ttilioft-o · It was ·neeessary to request additional transporta..tion '3\lppoit f'tooll.· the 8th0 Tt-&nsportatio,n Groupo After completi.Qn of the deplo,.ent of the D.l:<ri.sion to NEW PLEI PJEaENGo regular co11vq1s vere run ~tween NBll PLEI DJEBEHG and PLEDCU by the 8th Tr~sportation Group. QJ.19E was initially secured frOll PLEIICU to NEV PI.EI DJERENG by the 2-8th Infantry (Mech}; the 2d Squadron 0 1st Cavalry assumed security of the road on 5 Jt&y. · - ..;, , .

. (: ,· :

(9); · 1he 1nitial. land transportation reeouJ:ces wEtre the lim:Ung and controlling factors that deter•ined the rate of build~up in the forward areao The .rate of redeploy•ent to the division base camp from the for~ard area at t~ end of Bilfff 'IA'! I was al.so determined by tbe aao'Qat fJf waeel.ad •ehicle1;1·~¥d.la"bleo ~ •inute changes in plans {the cancellation of t.he 1'1.aued •vnent- by C-130 to NEW ~ DJERENG at the beg:inQ!,ng of th.e o-,.,eration and tb.e inability to forecast the act ual schedule for extraction at the end· ~f the ~pe:raU.on} :resµl ted 1.n additional 0 unprogrammed l!Sbortages in vehicle <requ1re111tmtso The a.vailability o'f wreckers at bot.h terminals of the re.ad aove11ent became the determini ng factor controll i ,ng the efficiency of the artillery moves

0

(.6) La11ndry1 Laundry suppori was given t he Division by the Oa.l>p ::h111idt contract laundry. A total of 1 0 ) 09 individl.lal. bundles and ·

th,561 bl.Ilk lau.ndry pieces were laurxiered for divi sion personnel during is operation. ·

CONFIDENTIAl .

:~~~~~~M~ombat Operation After Action Report (RCS KACJJ- )2 (R2)) (U)

{ ) Administrative and Personnel Supports Approximately .500 division 7 provided b1llets0 messing and office qpace 1n the PL&l1CU area troops :•: ~neral Support Group and other 1st Logistical Co11111and wiits. }! :::1trono motor pool and maintenance shops were provided for division

units.

d In addition to the nQrmal. combat service support mlssiono the (:omm~1ng Off1cer0 DISCOM0 11as given the mission of coordinating securtt1 for Mi'W PLBI .D.fBRBMG as well as N!'Uling the base ca1tp. Considering that the Sllpport requirement alone was a 11onumental tasko the addition gf the iDStal.lation coordinator provided a host of complex problems. Selected significant expttrienees 1r111 be found in lessons learnedo,

l4o (U) · QI*IIL AFFA!BS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

a 0 Gen.eral

PsyChologica.1 operations in -support af Operation BINH TAI I were . inlt:1.al.ly geared toward the exploitaticm of HOI CHA.HHSo supply amd w:e~pons c~hes(I and significant victories. When the nwaber of enemy personnel in the ~a proved to be limited 0 enough to lessen the possibilit7 ef HO~ C.HANltS and aajor tactical victories0 pl'OJllLg&nda efforts were shitted toward tbe 1 ~X';lo!\a .. tiott ·1'f·a1scnered supply and weapons cacbeso Loafleta nre ·al~ · dttvei'flPed to•-inf'on the civilian populace of the purpo~e of the opercttf.on° &itit to· tell· ·tt:ie• how to. protect thease-lve&o A total of 4 0 J2G0 000 11!.t"lets l'.ere ar•ppe:d< in l'ase Area 70.2 during the condu.ct of the opera:iiODo

· 18·0o000.ef thltse-- l'eafi-ets were directed- a.t the civlltan p~pllla:Uon.

,. -(t) Du.ring the period 7-11 May 1970 more than three llillion leafleta

were dre:pped in CAMBODIA. They were JUSPAO leaflets and were a standard -su~~j:-711¥ fdx., ·· CHIEU MOI leaflet.a could not be used because there was no CHn,;U~llK ~~11 1n CAMBODIA., . .

Cizf ·;-.net e-peratiofis ware alsa eondu.cted in YmNAM in the. 4t~ 11.h!slCJn ~a Of. o-perations. Leaflets ¥ere developed by A Comp~0 8th JIS~OP. Ba.tt~l.J.Qnj) JUL\ TRANG ~nd targeted against co•munis.t force~ 1.n RVN.

. ()-) . The· following special leaflets and ta.pee targeted against th.e :~t"Yt and the _civilian popUla.ce were developed by B Company, 8th PS.YOP ~ a.lion in PLEnru s

MOHTl~,~~142-70 leaflet and tape message directed toward JARAI ti living in CAMBODIA. A total of two hours aerial loudspe~er

1lle wu conducted. on 12 and 1 J May.

(b) Three special leaflets {8-B=-141-?0" 8~B~ 14)-70P and 8-B-144-70)

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CUNflPtNTIA~ AYDDH-GC~Nff ( ( ) ) sUBJJOOTt Co•b&t Operation After Action Report RCS K\CJJ- '.32 R2

were developed and en1ployed against eneiay troops in CAMBODIA to aploi t ihe fact that they were no longer safe in CAMBODIAN sanctuaries. US and ABVlf forces were now 1n CAMBODIA and .would remain so there was no choice except surrendero

( ) A rtce denial leaflet (8- B-1l.t8- 70) was developed ~ d1saea1nated t..-.:io1t. the capture of more than 500 tons of ene•t ric~ by ARY1 and US ·ele.ment.s;.,. .

~ b : Lowlapeaker UtUba.ti on

.. , ~. P5YQP. ~ i• ~ available at the d1v1s1on fett-warcl 1'SB at llll PLII ~- (or. 1.mmecliate dep1o~nt _to CAMBODIAi; The t,am 0 fro• ~ · CollpatJ7 a Btia . •icw. ~tt'"11Pllo 11~ . ~u1p.ped with !!L . 2,50 watt back ~Jt loudspeaker g~~- for- uae. in &roupQ, o~ra.t1on.s a.lid . also a 1a000 watt lou~· f<>~~ ~sroimd o~ra.tions \iJ.d ~so . a 1a000 wat·t _ loudspeaker­for t&Slt- -la. ae~ speak-er operations.o ~ teaa . ~as not depl~ed 1.nt:o ~.JJQ cius to th& non-ay&ila'bility of airer~ ,and a lack ~ targets or ttrlStl.Y coDQentr.a.U.~ns requk!Ag inediat.& priority reacttono

is. Cc) •cimma· ~amRr. a ,,_. . ~~: ·20j;~· ~ee~ ~t,alion wa8 in g.en~~a:;i. support of'. thS:. 4th

Wan• ~elem t~q~ttf! :th• operlo¢ion • . Ille 'battalion pl'oVided one compuw•j ~~ ·Mt9 .:1SQO .GPH .~4i!~ po~nt ~o~· th~ di'f'iaion at !£ OIBIS. · ·'nit~ co•~· ·•$ al~ :@.~n, ~be JttS~b,n qf ~t&\ning lt1.Sh:w<J¥ 19lf froli 't}\e junction ~. ~ J.9 -~ lh.gh.waY, .14 •to vic1ri1tt ma COD Iii add'itlon· 1;~ compa.w Q.OhS~~ -~ ~ ~fl.lel fac11.it1es ~placed pen~i• .. f"'or dust contl!Dl .. t me .~ . . . . . - .. ... . ~ . .,. - .. - ,. .... ~ . ;. • ·. _· I . • .

. - ;, .. Qw. pla~n pf_ t}?.e 2.9.9th llCgineer Battalion was attached t.o the 3- 5()6tb W Batt_alion (A~n) tfiroughout the operat.ion. The platoon prowJtea···· di • .c_.t '@\&~ ~O: tha ~~Jalion 'by c_utti~ l~ding zones 0 clearina ~~ otL~re •. ~ CPl).Stru~~1%a4J fi~~d fortificatioU,s.

(:9 The 4th &gineer Battalion (- ) moved from Calip Badcliff te the Bllfll ~y ~ ·witb. o~ p,ne cQ11p~ placed in direct support of eacb brigade • wh1i.}lf118 :¢~1'P.M,V v~ .~ac~. in ~ o.£ the divi$1on with. the •ission of •~U..~~ -~\.lttt. 114-i ~ cQn~ttu.ctlilg the division logistics ba.se0 The ~dp <;.~JA1 . ;al.oea:te~ to ~Jj:IlqJ -.,~el'e it · re•a1,ned at Enginear 1{111 and RPI>P*4 tl\Q. 41.visi.on d .tq t\ia-vy eq,uipment ~ tactical bridging ~d 'min~ =~aping Whil.• . ~a.tnta.inine; the e~pabi.11 ty to provide f'loat bridging. 'l'tiEt

'~l~J..9n AA~'-:n~~trative elements :t"emained at Camp Radcliff.'~ ·

de -d: . On ihe mP.rning o,f 4 liq 1970 the 4th Engineer Ba-tt<!-1'.ion h~qtJart1U'fJ . Pb)'~ w~-;tl the. '+th lnfani;ry Division ele11ents to the vici.~tty · q:t ·P.LiI.Jru.,.: ' ,,. .. ~ ho~lf'~ on 4 Mct,y, the batt~U.on headquarters (f'o~ud.} · . ..,,,.,.,.~iisl\414 at gi.neel:' lfil.l.o J:ILEllOJo RVN. Subsequently p on 11 May t~e · 4th: :·~eer :Battalion Headquarters deployed with the divisi on headquarters to NEW P.I.iI

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AVDDH-GC-MH ( ( ) ) ( ) SUBJECTS Combat Operation After Action Report RCS MACJJ- 32 B2 U

DJERENG 'lhe 4th Engineer Battalion (- ) o subsequently returned to Camp Radcllff on 16 May with the division headquarters, thus terminating tactical suppart activities in CAMBODIA.

~ (1) Company B0

minus one platoono and Company Co 4th inglneer Bat-talion provided direct combat engineer support to each maneuver ba.ttalio~ . within the \>rigades 0 while the company headquarters remained with the brtgade · hea.dquarterao 1/A/Z99th Engineer Batt~ion provided the third engineer platoon for support of the 1st Brigade s three maneuver pattalionso Primary tasks included clearing landing zones o constructing field fortifications and clearing Jdnes and booby traps. Landing zone cleal!'ance was accomplished througtl amployu~i ~£ rapelling teams 0 using chainsaws and eXplosives 0

f.ollowed" bT the Case 450 a1Jhaob1le doz&r on battalion fire bases. ~h platoon deployed 0 ~d returned with the infantry battalion to vhioh H provWed di.rect engineer $upp0rt. Similarly 0 the company headquarters reaained .aA<i 111av~d with the bri.ga.de headquarters. Company C returned with the 2d Brtgade ~uarter.s and ll!aheuver elelDents on 15 Ma.y 1970. Co:mpan.y B retGrned with the 1st lk!ga.de elements on 26 Ma.y 1970 with the exception of one squad which remained to close NEW PLEI DJERENGa This task was· .co•pleted on 29 May 19?0p and then the squad returned to Camp Radcliff.

(2) On J May 19701 Comp&JJY, D11 4th Engineer Battalion0 minus one platoon 0

wa.s placed 1n. ~rie:ra.l support ot the. d1vis1on 0 with the exception of one sriuad. ,tfhi.eh .•.a. p~~ed ·in dir~ct sµpport of the 2-Btb Infantry ba.ttalioa (Mech) ~r .. lfivision control ~ · The company headquarters w1 th one plat.oon mPY.84: t~ l'...z ~~Ii· This ~ompa.ey 0 supplement·ed with n..7 dozers and graders fro• ep,.,~. I,. was g1 yen tne task of maintaining Route 14B from the junction of 14B and 191 to PLEI DJERENG. The remaining platoon 11<>ved to Pl.BI DJBBi:NG and assisted Com~ E in dust control operations. wh11.e const~lna ~tel4 .i'ort1f1cations for the division logistics area. '!he co~ .C4?1lPlete4 1~~. 111ssion a.nd returned to Camp Radcliff on 15 ~ 1910.

- ()} Co11pany Eo 4th ingin:eer Battalion began moving elements f'ro11t Camp Ba.dcU:ff on 3 May 1970. ·The entire company minus certain items of engineer equipmeqt P4d ciisplaced to Eng1~eer Hill by 5 Kay 1970 •

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One QP$-t engineer vehtcle (CEV) :with blade l(a.s pl~ed in direct . suppor,t, of tb.e 2...Bth Infantry .Battalion (Mech) . The other two CEV0 s wfth mine r9l1~ at.t.achments we~e pl~ed in e;eneral support of the division and 6iven the Ja~,~G.ion of eon~ucting daily minesweeps on QL-191i and Route 14B to .PW:I DJ-G.. T!fo armored vehicle launchers (AVL) and three armored ~h1cle launched bridges (AVLB) we.re provided to support the operation f e AVL a.nd two AVL:ll ' s were stationed at NEW PLEI DJERENG in reserve aiid to ~Uit~t• 11ove111ent of the route security forces . The bridge platoon with

!....~ ~h of 1141;'6 float bridging were baaed on Engineer m.11 on 5 May l970a ~~ pla~9n was held at ilngine~r Hill until 14 ~ 1970p in an alert status i~ ~ ~asll;>le ~~i~e mission. With the cancellation of the bridge misslonp

Pl~ ~P~ ret~rneq the bridge tQ Camp Radcliff and its trucks were

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AVDDK-GC-MH ( · ( ) ) ( ) SUBJ.IOOTa <Jc.11bat Operation After Action Report RCS MACJJ- 32 R2 U

t hed to MEW PLEI DJ£Ri!:NG with the mission of transporting elements of dis~-~hh Infantry from NEV PI.EI DJERENG to Camp Radcliff. This mission the • 1 ·ted .....,. 16 M~ .. 1970. By 17 May the bridge platoon and its was co .. p e .. ,, ··-., equipment had closed Camp Radcliffo

(4) 1he heavy equipment platoon departed Camp Badcliff on .5 Bay and closed the same day at &lgineer Hill. Due to the la.ck of ten ton tractors and trailers

0 four da3"S were requir&d to shuttle the ll..7 dozers and graders

to Comp&DT D to support the road maintenance effort on QL-14B0 while two asphalt d1&tr1bu.tors and the water distributor along with two D-7 dozers were . ii.aced at NEW PLEI DJEWG for the construction of helicopter pads, refuJ- ·pG!ntll aftd. for dust suppression. The ma.jori ty of the heavy equipm&~~ platoon ~ in eapp0rt of tbe operation until 23 May 1970 when it retumed to Canp Radcliff. The remaining elements stqed at Ngw PL.El DJERiilRG with Compa.ny B until the conclusion of the operation on 26 1'a;y' 1970.

e. ·a~• B11 20th Jagj.neer Ba.tta.11.c>n a.ss11111ed the mission of maintaining QL-!9'f. 'ftola .-14 to- llJC CO on ·4: ~ 1970. In additiono on 6 ~ l.9700 the . c:o•paDt ·(:oniStructed. POL ber11s0 a rearm point and an ~~ti.on supply point· at DUO•~ On t-6 May~ the co.mpany took qver the maiQtenance of ~ute 14B tM»Go•P&a1'· ·Dn 4th .~gi:aeer Battalion. B Company contin~ed to maint~ bOtb Ql.-19i aild Route 14B until 29 ~ 19700 when it retllX'?led to Engineer Hill.

f. P:l.anni.nga 'l'be planning t1.1'e fn tne pperation was short , however . adequate plua .Jr.ere made and executed for the necessary direct engineer auppoitt· .f!J2t,, tbe· ~,er ele•ents..o

g. lllst Control• 'll'le problem of dust control was underestimated 0

·iftt'tklty rel!Rll t -ing .in the ~t·e dust probl.e111 at NEW .PLEI DJE:.RE:NG0 which :made the peneprime operation extremely important o n.ie to heavy air and road traffic, peneprlming operations could only be accomplished during d!lrlmesso The lbaited .. equd.p111'9ll'.t' ava.U·l[l.Ql~ t,o the divisian engineers, ceapled with the lack of ad~quate peneprime stock0 hampered the ability to cope vi-th ·the probl:.em.

h. ~ring the latter part of the operation, rains seriously hampered ove,,,.lad supply effcn-ts. ~he rQ\lte selee.ted for an MSR was censtrueted o.f the 'l-GCIAl ._sidtie ·sou o the suti'a.ee of . which rapidly 1:urQEld into a SQl.lPY Qd llltdar the eem'bination Qf rain l'Uld heavy veQ.icular traffic . The.re wa.s no adtqoat~ .r.ock soiarce no:r fil,.l lllaterial available with which the road base ~ould .~ 1$}'gJ!aded. liad tbe OPE!rati~n continued with no change l.n the weather,

t!BUpply operations by r1>a.d would have ~en drastically reduc~d "'

thisi~ '1'he CEV with expe~dable m~e rollers proved extremely valuabl.e .fQr th peration. By using two m;tp,e rollers 0 one at ~itber end of th~ MSB,

· ~ engineers were able to clear the entire MSR within an hour during dry lf'ea.ther. illitn the ad.v~nt of heavy r~s0 hllWever 0 the offb1eac,1' •t the

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:~~~-~ombat Operation After Action Report (RCS MACJ)- )2 (R2)) (U)

ll Was greatly reduced due to mud collecting in the road wheels. •ine ro er · di t l This condition was alleviated somewhata by procee ng a a s ower speedo Howevero the mud caused excessive wear on the bearings of the mine roller itself'.

16. (C} SIGNAL SUPl'OHTo

-a, <:ener&l

Signal planning for Operation BINH TAY I commenced on the evening of 2 ~ i9700 Knowing the objective areao the signa.1 staff identified ke7 communications center locations and relay points. l'rOfiles we:re prepared ~ a letter of 'instruction was written to the 124th Signal Battalion outlining couun1eations requirementso

bG Vith the identification of PI.EI.ICU as the initial location of the div1.~~on co•mand post and NEW PLEI DJERENG as the opera.ting base for at lea$t one brigade, Dragon Mountain was determined to be need.ed £0.r a relq site. On ) May 0 a coordination visit to PIJi:IKU was necessary to fix the exaet location. of the command posto The signal officer had recOllJDended ilngitteer Hill as the ideal location for the command posto Several reuens .for tllis selection were s ·

(1) Adequate cable pairs to the dial central office were readily availal>le to ~atisfy telephone requirements.

(2) VHF couunications were possible from Camp Radcliff to lihgineer Hill.

(3) Adequate real estate wa.s available for the deployment of communications vans.

(4) '1'he 'Old engineer group headquarters building was vacant.

This recommendation was not a.ccepted9 a.nd & decision was made to locate near J;I Corps headquarters.

e., After fhe $election of the command post location was made, it va..s ~ces~~,to coordinate telephone service thro~gh the 1878th Communications ~uadron Air Force) which operates the PLEIKU Telephone Syste110 The

n~availability of unused cable pairs presented the first serious communication.s problem. This was solved by the availability o:f a fifty pair cable 1-1.anglng to the 43d Signal Battalion

0 which had been installed

~t~k ~~ for- the P'LEII<IJ Communications Center. It was virtu&lly free c o~y ~ palm in use. Phone requirements were passed to the o•~1cat1ons squadron and 1nstallat1Bn began on 5 Kay.

BATT' d, ii ~e division signal ba.ttalion deployed on 4 May to PLEIKU. Although t k ~" M voice co1111un1cations were quickly establ i shed 0 VHF installation 00 "°~• tilll6o Local keying lines had to be run~ relays had to be placed

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CONfl·DENTIAL AVDDH-GC-MH ( ( ) ) ( ) SUBJECT• Combat Operation After Action Report RCS MACJJ-)2 R2 U

on Dragon Mountain and the brigades had to get in place before commwiicationa could be satisfactorily installedo By doctrine the signal battalion installs its o~n loo&l wire. Tbis waa done for the local switchboard and keying 11 but other keying lines and the dial telephones, which fol'lled an im:::tant part or the system were installed by another unit. Considering that this 1.uait bad never supported an inf'antry division before,the cooper­ation of the unit was excellent. Communications del&¥a in PLlilXU could be attributed to several factors. These weres

(1) 1he clec1a1ori to locate in the MACV co•pound.

(2) . 'lbe dependence on a unit which was unfamiliar with the division modus operandi.

(J). 'l'he i~~xperi~ace of: personnel within the division signal bat­talion who had never been to the fleld with the division.

(4) The l~ation et ~h' VHr tel,"lllinal at . m ~ DJERENG in an ~ 1'emoved f~~m t~ }>ripd, .he.adquarterso ·

' ,,.~ -).DJ ·~ ' ,,~ t~e si~ litaff was ~eried of a pos811~1• !love. forflam of the 41vi.~ion . ~oDlll)ud post . t .e NBif J.'LEI D.JEBDG. Sine• co••UOicatione were b~ing- ~O:. e~&pi~lze, this requi.rec) new: plannirig and a. mted for add1ti~ 9'..~P•9'Dt to ·support the new concept of· O·perat1on. The signal estim'-'lt ;_l'{~ . t~ee clqs needed tG establish couUnic.ationa at a sati,!sfac'\or; level. ;t'til,,s_ 4~t~ ;was met b11t not ..,1 tbout complicat~o~s0 . Co•al!ld i)Ost wt~ lines w~J.'@ li~~r!lp.te~ . b:J ~pgi?,Uter ~~ track veh1cles0 which C$1i~ numerous delays and disr.~pt4td comm~ica.~1ons be:\11een . the 2d Br194e0 DISCOJI and . the division c«Jmmand post o ·

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r, '. .. lfqq._u'i~a.tioJl . ~· _tq the - Qf the .d1v~s~on sign~ battalion, •, over the IWSt th~e,. w.-e:h-1f Years, to ·~~dle g~ison type operatiqn,s, serJ..~"'lcY ))$.Q.dered th~ coli11111in1i:ations operatic:ms of tht't cUvision... Mc;>billty bad ·been,,redueetlo th11$ ~n1;roduc1ng delqs. in instalh:Uons. Tbe DISCOM hea.dquartpf5 wa..15 l~kil1g 1~ . col!lmunica.tlons ~ upport because no platoon was available ,t .o . meet 1ts noe!l~.

gp Inexperience on the pa.rt of signal personnel contribtited to commun1.cat:\.1)n~ 0."lc.~s. Heve;r before had the battalion been tasked to deplox . vi,tb the div1s~on eo111mand po~t 9 and many 1;echu1ca.l deficiencies ver~. '~IWl!~ed wh:ich have since been correetedo

h 0 The 2d Brigade used radio set All/GRC-16) to talk with two of its ~:ital.!0:8• . Tb115 equipment Wal!J new P but due to the inc:luatrious.ness Qf the to :: ignal. officer o it provided the commander with telephone co11•wrl.cations · . ba.ttalio~s ,_n C~ODIA. Tnb marke4 the fir~t time thb equipm@t

•ti.~ used 111. the uvish>J'). between a 'brigade and itia lllu'bo?dinate battalions.

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CONFIDENT1Al AVDDH..GC-MH ( J ( ) ) ( ) SUBJSCTt Co•ba.t Operation After Action Report RCS MAC 3- 32 R2 U

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(C) INFORMAT!ON •

a. 'lbe 1nfor111ation office took the following steps to provide adeq~ate internal press coverage and support of civilian correspondents in the field. 'nte llst ant! 14th Public Information Detachments were attached to the 1st . and 2d Bt~adea J:e&pectivel.1 and given the additional tas~ of press support at NEV PI.EI DJERENG and if need be 0 in CAMBODIA. The PID s were augmented by the division information office with ho personnel and a vehicle.

b The division information officero along with a driver and one other orne~o established a forward infomation office at the Press Camp at Ca•p Schmidt in Pt.E:tKU. '!be Press Camp was equipped to house and feed as well as lend other support to correspondents which alleviated the burden 011 the 4th Division. At the .Press Campo the division information officer, or his representative, briefed all correspondents before they went to the field and arranged transportation forward.

c 0 t>tfielal annowieement of the operatioe was made by the llfACV Iaformation Office at 1500 hours on 5 Mayo and bJ 1700 hours there were \tdrtee~ ciyi,lian correspondent15 representing all the :major news se~ces at the ~Dttt ~ss ~P~ These p.eople were bousedo feda and jointly briefed 'hT the 4th DfvlS~Ci>tt IP and the II Corps ARYN IO that evening. By the fol­lowing ~ ~~e~.tµitliber ot correspondents both civilian and 111litary11 had iec~~ ~~ . ~~\>i'Ox111iat$1~ t~1r~y.;..f1ve, which taxed the facilities of both the ~~ ·~ ~ the 4th Di.vision to the limito The scarcity of aircraft am th~ .Im• ~r correspondents caused the information eff'ice operations to slaw .do~0 J;>~t:, the 1118.j~J:-~ty qf correspondents were able to get oat a.nd obtain storl:ese 11(» seriOllS conrplaints were recei Yed by the press,.

d 0 By 1;~ end of the operation 0 fif'ty=five correspondents had checJced ln vlth,,~~_,4!~ D.1.vision Iz:trormation Office at PLEIKU and had gone forward. 'Ibis f~ goes not ~ncliltle 4th Division writers and photographers. and other ·~•· lfarlne pte~orial teams which covered the action for. Dspartilent Of llefeQ.~ q~t Al:i eoyeri.ge Of the OJ>E!rcltion was favorable. After the Ci.~st tluiee daYiso very little press interest was shown. There were two •Jor reasons for this~ first the start of new operations by other units in CAMBODUo ~ the less~m1n~ of the news value of the .BINH TAY I operationo

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• At tne eM . ~! the operation0 the public information detachments · tayed with and deployed w1 th their respect! ve brigades and the information Office element at PLEIKU returned to Camp Radcliff. · The division information Office ret~:!'!'Jl~d to base camp with the PLEIIQJ element .

1&, (c) 90~·s ANALYSISo

Ope?"a.tion Blmt TAY I resulted in not only a very successful effort conducted against a dedi ted 111ovement . . . . . ca enemy~ but an extensive logistical and air

· · deployment never before attempted by the 4th Infantry Division.

Using US Air Fore i lift and e~ractions t ~ a r o overl~nQ convoys 0 and helicopter air assaults operation in a fo w~ rigades and their supporting elements conducted an

re gn country about which ver:y .:d ttle was knowno The

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~~~~-~mb&t Operation After Action Report (RCS MACJJ- 32 (HZ)) (U)

valuable experiences gained by commanders both tactically and -logistically in CA1'8QD'IA will be well .remembered.

In teI'llS of logisticsu the operation in CAMBODIA demanded the utllO&t in sup)>Ot't and preparatio~0 Without it 0 obviously the units would have been ~e to meet the e~~ctations placed upon them. ~~n the liAes of canmiunicaUon ~e mended .into im unknown areao. these Loe s are not f noo.61. if they are not supp~rted and imp:toved upono It is realimed t=~ there is always a great dependence upon aviation support which in turn ls subject to a great number of variables. However, all units should plan to be self- sustaining for at least three da,.ys 1n the field_ wi~ Class I 0

~and a limited aaount of Cl.ass III. A case 1n point 'Was "the intense he&t and scarcity of water to be found 1n the SE SAN Base Area.

'w : J:ogtsU.cal reSYppl¥ q-t; tbe . ground uni ts must be as carefully planned as th&' te.ctical plaia. If .1. t.- i~ Q.ot 0 then t~~ ~ound ttni t SimplJ' 11U9t wait for the smpplt&st to·. •catcli MP"~-ctuite certai.nly a poor salution ..

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This is true also of aviation support. The assets must be j11dttiollsl7 . allocated to support the committed unit as well as the next assaul.Ung Wlit• Control of ab:craft nst.. rellaj..R ~t the u~r level.

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·· fJ!he e~e··lift · cOileept _ (s~-~j;~ep~s in~ertion . ~- all batta.:u.on· ma»ellver elem.ts ,:i.o.s the direct support artillery Da.tterj'} •as used by the d»ision for~·ttie ·l-fftt -.1,.··.tn· :CAKBOD-IA... 'nlis c~ept. , ~comes ve-ry difficult to contnli' ftf·:t"1::i. Wa ~~. 'll;i,~ __ ,cpneept sbou.ld be· uSed when 1Jitetl.B.~ 1nd1cates the like11booo ·of hot ~-· ~ i.~ aiaall 0 w·hen flight time is · :Eela~ivel7 short 0 and when the establ1sh8d refuel system is adequateo

<'.I · t r.· i"t . .

Flelabiliit ill ·pla.Ming while •-on the move• an~ an organization strtU?tllf."8.d · ind :traiw in q-uick reaction ·move~ent ts essential· to· the suo­c~Ul. accoapl1.sbJaent of the mi~si~. A.rtill~~ JJqst be able to move qtd . .ck,17, ~~t a,ccurately and provide the co1J1111and and control required. ~stf'ea'jta~H.~\es ha,Vi!I :'been .uerc1se4 and qeveloped qqring the past months 1:n B'UJ..f!~. O_f "bP.galie and battalien oper~tions. 'l'l1ey ~re used ill the sue 'll!Mnei d'itd!!g operatloi\S. in. CW!BODIA, except on a ~uc;h larger scale .. Be.cp.ae the JDethods e111ploy:ed r.e11aJ.n13d unchcµJge4 0 the a.rtll?eryD1en eiecuting the p).~ •ew not required to change their ~ormal operating 111ethods.,

'1'be ~stabl.1shA13nt of an AN/GRC-16J multi- channel radio- telephone :onunic_at1.F" system frt>• brigade to battalion headquarters greatly enhanced ~ ~P~Dd 8.n!i ·control -of comba.~ elements during the operation. This

SVf?teil )irovided l!elatiV".ely secure vqice co111munications and substantially reduc~d the traffic on co-mand radio n~ts0

·ia ~~~ · a.r~a ~f intelligence it was noted that the recovery of collated ~~a~itn in one 4ay's time empha~ized a weakness in the Army system of

1. t n ell!gence. Information on Ba:?e Area 702 had been collected by ~11 t~ i ntelligence agencies over a number of year s. However

0 when the

·j

23 CONFIDENTIAl., ;

AVDDH-GC~ MH ( SUBJEC'fi Combat Operation After Action Report (~CS MACJ}-)2 (1<2)) U)

infor11ation was needed quicklY n there was no single packet of Base Area inform&tion on file o nor one point where all the information was stored tit rapid readout .

Whether a successful operation is measured in terms of number of ene•y tilled or captured D enemy equipment found or efforts expended logistically over & great distance 0 the results achie•ed in all categories point to victory on the battlefield in CAMBODIA for the 4th Infantry Division during Operation BINH tAY I.

19. (C) Ol3SKRVATIONS AND L~SONS LEARN&>. . .. ·\~,.: _;;~ ~ ! ;.,~ -! •

a. Artillery ··· ~~'"h"A (1) The relatively drastic changes in expenditure guidance (froa no- ·:·;·~ ... "'.·~ .'

expenditures to maximum possible expenditures when the division was ordere4 ... . ,.: to Ml.thdraw to a cease fire situation in VIETNAM to normal expend1tul1t8) . --~ complicate tbe problem of projecting and planning to meet the desired ·· stocltage objectives.

(z) The limiting factor in determining the ability of division artillery to respond to insuring maximum expendi ture of artillery is the ability to ret&il deliver ammunition from a temporary ASP to the fire bases.

(3) Ll&iao11 teams can be formed from any qualified resources available. Addition&l liaison tea.ms will noru.lly be required whenever any bat-talion sized unit is working in close coordination with the division .

(4) Allllluni tion expenditures are greatly dependent upon transpor1l;&tion resources. Ammunition resupply requires intensive staff manaaement a..nd continuous attention. Air delivery of an initial. stock aay al.leviat• initial prcble111s., and support the scheme of maneuver.

(5) ihen an installation as large as HEW PI.li:I DJE.RENG is established 0 at least a battalion liaison team should be· tasked to perform the fire support coordination functions0 The liaiscin team should be the team f1:Qa ~he battal.1en that provides security for m<Lneuver forces.

b. Aviation

(1) In large airmoblle operations involving more than one brigade 0 ~e supporting aviation unit should provid!e a full time liaison officer b ;se sole reaponsibility is to ensure that proper coordination is effected

e ween the supporting aviation units and supported units.

when(~) UH-tH aircraft should use differ•ant helipads than the C!$-47/CH-.5'l~ CH-S4 arge quantities of supplies are to bo moved. llhen UH- lH and CH-47/ of theu~e t~e sa.me Pad D the UH-1H cause delays and reduce the efficiency

eav4 er helieopters.

24 CONFIDENTIAL

: .

I

' 1

f

1 "

I' ··- _,,_

COHflDENTIA~

A YDDH-GC-MH ( ( ) ) ( ) SUBJJiX:Ts Collbat Operation After Action Report ROS MACJJ-J2 B2 U

()) Improv~.ment·s to airfields that are necessary to elilt1nate sa.fet7 hasards should be accomplished prior to 1n1tlatlon of an operationo 'lbis le particularly true or any dust suppressant eff"orto

(4) JU.xing of helicopter and fixed wing operaUons at a s•all airfield co•plex: is unsatisfactory in conducting large tactical operationao

(S) hr.t aYailable •eana •ust be used to closely control large ainobile opentioaa, eapecially Mhen aircraft assets are provided. by several aviation a1te operatiq from dli'ferent locationso

(6) n ta yery dlfi'1cult to start dally operations •• u .. when airc:nft 11USt co• tro11 •&111 locations. Units must have alternate plana to productively atUbe UMNle aircraft that do arrive on ~heduleo

(7) '?be d1vlaion ~7 aviation eluent should ha.ve an ele11e11t as far f'orwazd as practlcal to aasiat in controlling large a1r11ob1le operationao

(8) Al.~hough the FM:" a assigned to the division are able to control a .-&Ql.7 ~II nUilber of sorties for a few d~0 the llWlber of fl.71ng ~ cu reach a. critical sa.fet7 factor and aug111entation 11:'5 required ..

(9) tlbere a large n11111ber of aircraft are in"iolved in. an operation0

40lltrol pn•l••a can be greatly reduced 'b,y using 11Qre than one facil1't7 or abfie111 for refueling. ~d rearming of aircrafto A teduetion in air eftft cJmud:ty !ls tbe. .greatest advantage to be derived from this arrangeamto

Co Intelligence

. Ila.pa llWSt be inventoried at battalion level on a regular ba.ais, ~ t<> &0"- DD an opera.tion11 map loads should be checked to insure maps are incl~ in ac.cd•p&l'lY'ing supplieso

d_. Logistics

V-. .. p1071D& the •ajGr portions of the div1sion 0 operational eat pab11.f.t1e8 will be det~1'1!11n•d by the availability 0£ non~divisional. ~spol"tatio!l "sources.

CFTj .A.Ge Asst AG

2; (0NflDENTIAl -

·---·

'

t \~£:1.lf~. tt!fl .':I. ~111111 · .C~'t IM-.

ANNSX A(Analysis of Area. of Operations for BINH TAY I) to

4th Infantry Di v1S1on BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

1• (U) TBRRAIN ANALYSIS

o..-- 1 To analyze MACY Base Area 702. a. • .... yose

b. Jllission 1 To enter Base Area 702 and to seize and destroy or evacuate a11 enemt supplies fottnd 1n the area, and to destroy ~ enea7 f4>rcea found in the area. Time av&1labl• ten to fifteen da,ys. Advanoe into CAMBODIA rill be no farther than the western boundary of Base Area 702,

2. {C) GllWlAL DBSCRIPTION OF TH1i: ABKA

a. Climatic conditions• See Appendix 1 , this annex.

b., Terrain

(1) Belief' and ira1nage systems. Base Area 702 is bordered on the nst by the TOILB SAi Bivaj,· on the :ao.utheut by -i.he S& SAi ilY&r,,. and Oil the north west by the SONG TAPOA Biver which flows into the TONI& SAN. '1'be 'l'OlltB su varlets' ~fi1 width from 7-5 ZMter,,s to 400. aeters, while both t~ SES~ and SONG TAPOA vary from 50 to 100 meters in width. ltiver depth va.rl&S tt1th -thEf monsoon seasonD but the .J"ive:ca. are- navi,gabl.e. £.,or sba,lle>v draft vessels all year long, Rapids are fol:lnd in the southern portions of the rivers. Possible fords are at YA 6102',54~ YA · 522.J.541

IA 1141409. and YA 483360 along the TONLE SAN and SE SAN. River b&nlis along the '.1'0NLB SAN and SE SAN are generally gradual ¥-it.h some are~. of ~parse ·vegetation. Numerous jungle streams fiow from the high ground in the c~nter of the area into the TONLE SAN or SE SAN Rivers. These s.t.realllS generally have steep banks0 are narrow 1D width, two feet to six feet' in -depth and with dense vegetation along the banks. Al.Qng ~- J.PNLE 5.6.N R~ver there are two areas of swamp 20% underwater. Centers of these swanpy areas are YA 42.44 and YA 40;6. The first is & s:t..rip foux ~UqaetEtrs wide while the second is eight kilometers wide. Relief in Base Area ?02 l!'anges from a. high point of 671 meters in the north at YA .5051 to a, high point Qf 3?8 meters 1a the south at YA 6J440 The terrain in the northern portien of the base area is •ounta1nous with ridge lines running generally

" -~~ti to, squt~. aeHef in this area averages ten meters. In the southern · pa..'i'ts of the '·'ba1549 area ·the terrain is 11ode:z:ately rolling with µeas of

flatlaiS,4~. Belief here averages forty •eters.

1 ~.? ' Yf}g;tit..~toir. · In the nerthem parts of the base area, the v~etation o! ti~aa•p~'ed' jungle with ti ense underbrush. StrE!a.!11 banks are. densel,.;r tb:r _gi;-o.h ~ the entire area is pr111arlly jungle. To the south and east

J~e is 'B!ngle canopy with clearings and grass landsg To the vest a.J'e SVa.DJp tA.rea.as of scrub underbrush. Along the eastei-n portions of the •~ea al'e nuaeroua fieldsD and rice paddies are located in the southwestern corner S a.. . · · . • -ee <tPpendix 2 P Fields 9 this annex.

A- 1 CONFIDENTIAt

' ~~ · ·~ . -· J .. ' f" .-: t • l~ .. ~ ,, . ~. ·""~

ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINK TAY I After Action Report (U)

(3) Manmade features

(a) Roads and trails (omitted)

(b) Bridges. Bridges are located at the following locatione1

1.· YA 468J.54o .50 meters long0 ten metem wideo constructed •f logs 0

capablt of track traffic•

~. YA 5611940 20 meters 1 ong o ten meters wide.

l · YA .549J15o 30 meters long o ten meters wide.

!,. YA 4.576760 foot bridge 0 bamboo construction.

i · YA ,5o6~2 0 five meters wideo 40 meters long.

2,.·· TA 433So9"' foor meters wide, ten ·meters long.

z.. ra. ~17'9 :four lliet·ers wide~ 75 meters long. constructed of wood. ~. : ~ ' :

(c) · Vi.lla;ges. ·Villages are located at the following .loca.tionaa

lo PLJI ''.J.'AlfGo YA :$84)49 ~ .. -

~. PLBJ' KTAKGO IA 64.5245

-1 • . ~ Bi YAo YA '657407

~. ID.AB 5A1iG0 YA §84272

i.. ·~ PHI , YA ·61+5335

g_. ~o YA. 3901,SG

Z, t.JlQC, YA 580408 ·

(d) KiUtary Installations and Fortifications. See Appendix Jo this Annex.

. (4) Additional Characteristics - Populationa People of two ethnic ba.ckjW(>ttnds live in Base Area 702 0 CAMBODIANS and MONTAGNAllDS. Since the rec~t. change in government in CAMBODIA, the aajority of CAMBODIANS ha.ve v1thd~~wn from the base area into an area west of the TONLli: SAN Biver. ~:.MOJITAGHARDS in the area work for, but do not necessarily supPQrt the

CONFIDENTIAl

~X A (Analysis of Area of Operations for BINH TAY I(6)to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report

,. (C) Mil.I'l'ARY ASP~r.? OF THE AREA

a . Tactical Aspects

(1) Observation and Fire

(a) Weather conditions. Good ground and air obserYation is present tlntll the 11oneoo1u1 begin 0 then air obsenation is not possi,ble and growi.d observ-ation is very 11111ted.

(b) Belief. In the northern parts of the base area., ~be aountainoua terrain limits observation and fields of fire . In the flatlands along the 'l'OlltE sA1:·u1f .. SB ·SA!f· Bi.era and in. the sotithern portio~ of· the area, observaHail and ·tteldS- of f.1r e are· less limited.... llependen.t •pall ..-egeta,tioug indirect fire weapons are eff'ect-i ye .. througbeu~ :tae area.

(e1 .. · ~ .. \a~i~~' Th~ dens_e · ~e8*'a~on 1,n ·the norl)lerll portion of tlle uea tlitverel7 1.'bits observati on ·and fields of .f'i;r&,o .. ~.._ r~ fqr both is ihd.titd'' '€~ t-en '1.et-ers or leas in- •all.1 ar.easo ~- of '.~es. a.ad 11-19 fire iB limited because of the po.aei.:'b111ty; of "~q-~e,-~Iis• 0 d1l.e t.Q

·the thick underbr\ish. The triple canopy 11,q provide some protection froa light indirect .tire weapons. In the south and al.oq ibne rl.ve-i:s, the gr;iaas ~'•; p~tt_n:t ~~ lialta~1ons on observation or fields of :fire. Scrub b\,i'Sh ' Uf ·~ l~attcaa· i1m1t• ebservat.1.on and fire..o bµt all: ar~ ~"' unl.11Q.~o4, in: the use of indirect f i re and grenades. ·

. . . . . . . ~ . . . . .

(d) Xaaa&de features. iell cuoufla.ged bunkers tha.t a.re hard to 4etect and destro-y are plentiful in the base area.

(4) -~!J:C_8-~~"1t an4 .~over · -· • • 1· • •

(a,) Relhf 0 .The MUntainous areas affo~ a great deal of cover a.nd c0%1Ctl&l11t1Rt fro• both ah' and ground observati on. The rolling te-rrain in the seuth Cll:ffera limited cover and concealme~t .

(b) Vegetation. The dense jungles and th;l.ck unde~brush offer excel­lent coveJ;' and concealmentp ~einy use of camouflage further ·N'hUoea the natural cover and concealment. To the south the open graJ;s lands a.nd t-.ps offer little coveJ't> .and conc:eal11ent is dependent upon grass height . n the shrub brush and single canopy j angle both cover and concealaent a.re ~in excell~nt .

(J) Obstacles

U . 1 (a) Belief• Moveaent by foot tr.oops 1n the mountainous areas ls !.m. ::d and l').eeess!tates a sl ow pace. Vehicle tratflc in this area 1~

po . 1bleo In tile so11tn tall graRlies slowed f oot aoveaeat while the

l' . /:) · .. : · .. . t : . ! ,J .A. l r ., ·· . . ,. ,. .. .

A-J CONFIDENTIAL I

.ANllXX A (Ana11e1s of Area of Operations for BINH rAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

single canop7 jungle li•ited use of n.hicles to roads.

(b) Draina.89• The TONL& SAN and S8 SAJ llivers present obstacles to micle traffic aaking bridg1J18 necessary. The swurpa in the western part of the base are& also limit both foot and •ehicle •OYe•ent.

(c) llamrade teat.ares. Pu.nji stakes and huts are placed on possible I.Z' a to Hait air •'bile operations.

(~) ~7 Terrain Fe.tuns'

(a) RUl 6'J7 (TA S0.59 ). 'ftlls hlll controls observation OTer the northeastern portion of the base area. Dense jwigles and steep slopes •ake this aa extremely dUfieul. t area of eperation.

(b) lllll 6o9 (YA .5152). This h1ll controls the center of Base Area 702. ot.seuation of the CA.llBOUli-YIB'l'JIAll b,order is possible as is obser­Yat1GU of tbii9 low lams te the ... th. Operationa in this area are bi.n­derecl tr,r tbe jimgl.e and •olliltain slopes.

(5)' A .... s of Appl:'CJ8Ch

la) ·Crdand a~h is liaited to two ueaa• Jlighvay .509 and Higbvq 19.

lbJ 'l'bere &re numerous LZ• s for aiI'llObile operations throughout the base area.

l6) Coa'bat Service Support Aspects

Logistics. All logistical support 11Ust be provided by helicopters.

~' : . ~l :: ! , · •

CONFIDENTIAL

CYNflPtNTj'4

Apt)end1~ 1 (C11Matic Conditions) to ANNlilX A (Analysis of Area of Operations for ~ulfl tAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report {U)

1. (C) <eneral

a T1:ae tra.nsition from the northeast monsoon season to the southwest mOll&·~ wbl~h· ~- in lfatch is complet.eci 1n May. The air of the sout~­west 110n59on originates in part as a warm o dryo stable air mass over Australia and merges with tropical. air as it moves northward over the Indian Ocean. Ihring passages over warm tropical waters, the air lb&Ss is npidl.y modified by the addition o:f heat and moistureo It arrives ovttt th~ area as a very moist, unstable tropical air aass which produces extensive convect.ive clouds 0 heavy rainahowera and thunderstorms over :most or the area, eapecla.lly on the windward side of the mountain slopes. Qiring tbe ao11tbwest monsoon 0 the lift {air blowing up the side of a apuntain) prov.ided by these aountains auglliants the process of comecti ve 1netab1lity (unstable air implies rai.nsbowers/thunderstorms) to produce mw:b cloudiness and he&V7 ra.inshower activity on the westward windward Slopes a.s a dimt res11lt a:f topography.

1>. Small changes in locatit>~ can ca.11se .. l&X'ge cbanges in the observed weather.. Surges do occur in tbe soathweat liOIU!Oon wldch ca.uses an increase 1q. the reco~ed surface w1n4-o Wind gusts to twenty knots a.re common and gusts will occasionally exceed thirty knots Q i..rse local va,riation ia ,,..ind dir~ction and sp~ed will occur in .11oli'e lll~lln1ai·nQus :\~ain0 due to the channeU.ng ef'febt of val.ley-s and ri-e$ •.

2. (eJ ~ ht9Cipltatinn

a... Ma.y is 11. wet season month. Bain:fall increases everywhere and is primarily afternoon ~ evening rainshowers and thunderstons. 'Ille J>rinci~e, ~if.Cto~ -~uencing the amounts of precipitation is exposure to the •1~ ~Jld now. 111.gher elevations receive 110r~ preteipl.ta.tion • . ,,

. 1t.-- ~~~1:tati<0n. can be elX:peetad ten tc;> fifteen -days per JJontb -.for tbe f'llowi1'g' · tota;lsl . ·

Ci> MQnthly mean 9• (2) Monthly maximum 20"

~~' Moilth1y illird . .um 2.8'' (4) 2.4 Haur Mcud11n1m -4"

3. (c) ·Cl:outUness

baae:· 3 ~~~ uounh continue to increa~e in Ma.y. Convective cloucls witih . P Brm during the day, late morning and a.fternocm ca_ilings ~~

' . :-. .. · .. : .. , A-1-1 .... __ ... _· -- . ....

t.J

( Conditions) to ANNEX A ( Analysis of Area of Operations Appendix 1 Cl.Ii)mtati4c th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U) for !!NH TAY o

May skies are cloudy 65% of the time and the table below common. Duringt ~f cloudiness that makes up the total. desceibes the ype

tIME ftocal)

0700

1000

1300

1600

1900

All Hours

All fburs

CONDITIONS HEAN NUMB~ OF DAYS/KON.TH

(No ceilings below 10 0000 feet and visibility greater than five miies)

"

"

" (Days ~otal -0loud cover less than )a,C-no ceiling)

·(DaY'6 total cloud cover · forms a ceiling at .some

time during the da¥)

11

10

5

7

15

5

2J

b. Generally 0 ceilings will be 30 000 feet above ground level except during Sl,lrges and afternoon rainshowers/thunderstorms.

·~ . ' .

4. (c) Visibility

lo significant improvement in the visibility Qccurs in Ma,y. AJ.though the smoke ~ haze is decreasing, the increase in convective cloudiness decreases the slant range visibility for aircra.ft and rainshowers/thunder­storms will lower the visibility one to three miles in local areaso Occ11rrenee of fog is decreasing with an average of one fog day per month.

5. (C} 'lhunderstorms

a. A thunderstons day is defined a.s a. day on which thunder is heard at the location. Precipitation does not have to occur. The statement "a.n average of one to two thunderstonn days'0 means that any specific location in that area averages one to two days per month with thunderstonns. The area in concern has twelve thunderstorm days per month during May. The duration of individual thunderstorms is one hour~ however, continuous thunderstorm activity at any station often lasts longer than one hour due to development of additional thunderstorm cells. Typical thunderstorm weather observations are as follows& 1000 scatteredp 2000 broken, visi­bility two miles in thunderstorms (implies heavy rain), winds variable at fifteen gusts to thirty-five knots.

Nfi"°'"

. i I, ~. ' • I ; ' . )lr ,,.;r., -• J A-1-2 CONFIDENTIAL

t·· '{>. ' ~ :' '

f .. L. l(' I \'' !

' .. I .

l. t: f-. ; .

• .. .. .' -_; :·

CONflDfNTIA~

Appendix 1 (C.Hmatic Conditions) to ANNEX A (Analysis '>f Area Of Operations for SINH TA'! I) t-o 4th Infantry D.1.vision BINH TAY I Arter Action Report (U)

'b In more severe thunderstorm gusts can be as high as fifty kllotso a.i~l,y0 hail does not reach the surface from tropical th~nderstorms, but can b(l round &bove .and near the freezing level which is at 140 000 feet 411X'ing Ma,. Tornadoes occiir rarely with tropical thunderstorms and do not poo a !MriOUS t .hreat in VIETNAM.

6. (C) ''.re11pera.t1i1res

'l'Wperatures to-r the montbl7 averages indicate cooler weather due to gradual lncre.aees in the amo1mt of cloudineas during the month.

~.l!Blle 1rinill~

1... Cc). Jatati~ Ilm1:dity

100 (F")

90

70

62

SPEED (SURGE)

SW 8 25 knots Sf 8 20- 25 knots

W· 10 20-JO knots WSW 7 no data

S 5 no data

4 ?• J)iu.J.ng sqrges i>- wind direet1ons and speeds will vary co.nsiderably .,:~61) t .he:. e~fU.'llleltn.g e:ffect of Dl0Untain ridges and valleys. OccasioJ;l~y. ~A.. Wil.l be 1.ssue<i for bigh gusts qnd turbulence. .

~ ~ -.rt A-1- J ~ ~~ CONFIDENTIAL,·

• .• . . J

.....

...... u.

'~·

, l J~~ t · . .

~ . u .fit,.

• ••• u= , .. =e··~ • • IA . i . " == . ,,. .. ...... , .,. .. . ,,,,,..

· .. I , ...

(0Hf1Df t111AL

ApptH\d1x J (Jlf111tary Installations and Fortifications) to ANNEX A (Analysis of Area of <>,;>eratiot1s for BINH TAY I) to 4th Infantry Division BI.NH TAY I After Action Report (u)

CAMP SI'I'Ii5 I

rox HOLES,

COORDINATi'S

YA 561,546 YA 561566 YA .564.566 YA 57.537.5 YA 4,54645 YA 47J,58J YA 4?668J r' .48 s-560 tA 4906)0 YA ·_so3;53 fA .Sf>,5683

't&'~6@.6 TA 5314?8

:tA 532696 IA 1f48.· TA 62,5295 CHI PLA YA 694257 YA 625447 YA 514367 YA .51.5546 YA 466605 YA 545322 YA 41.5355 YA 551JJO YA 4_50420 YA .55.5224 YA 5456 YA 420.55.5 YA .591J19 YA 42723.5 YA SS06oo YA 635482 YA 660365 YA 575325 '!A 553646 YA .584273 KNOLL SANG YA 454685 YA 475555 TA LAV YA 555475 YA 425599

YA 425687 YA 559468 YA 572571

YA 575574 YA 594501 YA 61ZJ71 YA 617.516 IA 618511 YA 6~72 YA 600642 IA 601531 YA 576612 IA,.69_5:508 YA 609526 YA 562,543 YA 62.5605 YA 562625 YA 684517

.- ~A 677518 YA 685546

AA PSN I '!_A '.560535 YA 442595 YA 438560 YA 532547 YA 5JJ.548 YA ~544 YA 446528 YA 476519 'IA SJJ.501

. YA. .SJ6.502 YA ~1.492 YA .516498 YA 5'.3i490 YA .5J9479 YA .556460 YA 5~74 YA 57P4?4 YA 5JQ4J8 YA 6Q7.5JJ YA 620488 YA 625487 (four ~s) YA 6)8366 YA 690451 YA 639483 YA 635482 (two psns) YA 635485

' r. I 1-, . .,..J. t ~ i

A-3-1 -CONFIDENTIAt ·

" .Ji ' . • . . ·~'.I. ·

(Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2d ANNEX B S rti g Units) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Brigades and uppa n Action Report (U}

Dli:PART!mfr OF THi ARMY HiADQUARTERS 4TH INFAllTltY DIVISION SUPPORT COJIMABD

APO San Francisco 96262

J May 1970

SUBJECT& Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units

SD DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference• 4th Infan-try Division Field Standing Operating ~~e for use 1n the Central Highland p RVN (FOUO)o ·

-. - :::· - ~' : . . . 2

0 Purposet To provide guidance and infonation concerning logistiqal.

support for all units participatlng in operation order 16-?0o

'.h General• 'l'hia letter provides for supply P 111aintena.rtce and service · support for &1.1 units participa-:ing in order 16-70.

4o ·Supply Support 1 'lbe 45th Cenera.l Sttpport Group will eaY.blis.tl and operate a logistical support a:tivity (I.SA) at New P!ei Djerengo

a. Cl.ass Ia 'lbe I.SA will provide supply point distribution. Untts will provld.e the Class I supply pc1.nt a seven d~ forecast for operational rations.

(1) LU rations will bt progranmed and stocked for one me<µ per d~ for fa'17Jfard maneuver ele11en~ e but must still be requested by using unit.

{~) . MCI~ s• A three da~ supply will be stocked for all supported unitso

(3) A rations wil,l be available for units subsisting at New P.l.ei Djerengo

t4) Sundry Packs w11.l be issued wi tn the X'ations QB the basis of one pack per 100 nen per day .

(5) Batteries will al.EO be issued with the rations on a two- two-three cycle.

(6) .liliergency req_uire1ents will be filled as req_uired.

b. Class II1 Clothi~ and eq_uipment will be available on a direct exchange ba.sis at the 88th S&S Bn Qass II point in the logistical center 0 PJ.eiku. Items not available throu~ the 88th S&S Bn will be obtained by unit PBO' s

B-1 CONFIOENTIA

; I . .. .

' \~· -· . - ·

*j ~"" · 'r<~•~ ·q ~ , ·····.. .• .....

AVDDE-SJ SUBJECTs Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units

from DSupO at Ca11p Radcliff. Paperware and plasticware will be issued through the Class I supply point at New Pl.el Djereng.

c. Class III 1 The l.SA of the 45th Caeneral Support Group will operate a Class III supply point for JP4 o DF2o MOGAS, AVGAS m4 cemmon pagk.aged

prod I.lets.

(1) Stockage of bllk fuel•

(a) JP--4 - 50 0000 ga.l

(b) DF-2 - 200000 gal

(c) MOGAS - 100000 gal

(d) 11/GAS - l o.500 gal

(2) Packae;ed J>roducts to include heat ~ablets 0 will be available as i'olloWSI

(a) OJi: - 10

(b) OJi: - JO or 92.50

(c) 01 - .50

(d) 7808

(e) Gil

(f) LAD 2

(g) Solvent

~ (3) Bottle gas will be on direct exchange l:asis at the 88th S & S ~n in P.l.eiku .

d. Cl.ass IV1 Initial stockage of class IV items will be accomp11$hed as follows.

( 1) 4th 5 & T Bn

Band bags 2000000 {a)

(b) Si x foot pickets

CONFIDENTIAt

CONflDENTIA~

AVDDE-SJ ( ) S 1 SUBJli:CTs Letter of Instructions LOI Logistical upport for st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units.

(c) Three foot pickets 4 0000

(d) Bar wire 200 rolls

(e) C ~ wire ) 0000 coils

(1) LSA - Stockage Objective

(a} Sand ba.gs 1500000

(b) Six f•ot pick-ets J,000

(c) Three foot pickets 20000

(d) B - wire 100 rolls

·(e) e - rire 1 0 500 coils

Timbers and other required Class IV items will be made available through the tsA · Upiorl request .. ·

e. Cl.a.ss V - Ammunition resupply will be through a Field storage UnU (FSO) at New Plei Djereng. This FSU is an extension of ASP )41 located at l'I•Hm. '!'he. ·IW) will have a r.epreSt)ntat+ ve a.t tQ.e FS.U and ASP .)41 to 11oni tor issues to 'Diyisicm units-. Bequest fO:'(: i~sue ~ ~urn ~ .-.Q.11 be effec~ed on DA Form ,581 in accordance with tab D to App J to Annex G to 4th Division Field SOP.

fo · ·aiass Yla Po.st .exchange is not available and sundry :packs wiJ,.l be issued. See para a above. . .

_g, Cl.ass YII1 11ajor nd itus will be requisitioned an~ 1s~ed through !'BO' s . at Ca.np Ra.deli.ff o

h., Cl&Bs YIII1 Medical resupply will be effected through .DMSOo 4th Med Bno at New Plei Djerengo Emergency resupply through any (just off. aircraft.

1. Class !Xi Bepair parts supply will be furnished through C and D Comp~iee o 704th Maint Bn for 2nd and 1st Brigades units respectlvelyo Back ~ supply support to 704th Maint Bn will be through the 62nd Maint Bne ~.1.eiku o on a fill or kill basis. . .

~04t~~ie~ce a Direct Support Maintenance will be provided by D Companyg n n for 1st Brigade units and by C Compa.ny 9 704th Ka.int Bn for

B-J

CONFIDENTIAl

AVDDE-S' SUBJECTs Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units

2nd Brigade units. {Support not covered by the above will be published on 6 flay 70 and involved units advised). Bquipment not repairable will be retrograded through the supporting maintenance unit to US Aray Depotp ~1 Nhon.

6. Servicess

a. Medical sut>port is provided by C Company 9 4th Kedical Battalion, for all units. Six (6) dust off aircraft will positioned for area coverage with two at Pl.eiku 0 two at Pl.el Djereng and two circling near objective areao C Compan;r, 4th Medical Battalion will operate a clearing company with an under­ground treatment facility at Pl.el Djereng. Ji.'vacuation will be through the ?1st Bvacuation Hospital, Pl.eiku, in accordance with current SOP.

b. Graves Registration 1 The 4th S & T Bn will establish and operate a GRREG collection point at Plei Djereng. Backup support will be provided by 68th. .. ~ & S B.n!; P.l.e_iku.

o. Bath a Two portables eight head shower uni ts will be operated at P.liei Dje~, S...pport will be on an area basis with schedules coordinated witt.h . ~ppoiited · uritts. · · . ... '' . .

. : .. ,;~ •. ~.'l.a:u~-i:Y;i Laundry sertice will be provided by the co11D1ereial c_ontract l q»:~ctiy at qaap SC~idt 0 P.l.eiRu. · ll'hree day service will be available ..

e. Transportation

(1) " ir8qulrements exceeding unit capability will be passed to Dl'O office at Cup Scha1dt, Pleiku,

(2) Air tra.ns~brtation between Camp Badcliff and Pl.ei Djereng will be established for mail replacements and high priority cargo ~ .DTO will publish · ~~-"l" . ~ .s~n as it is confirmed.

7.-· Task O?-gant~ation Forwards

DE'l' .• "HQ. nrsaoM (Pl.ei Djereng) - four Officers four EM

DET, ~ DISCOM (Pleiku) - three officers three EM

llli:r o A Co o 4th S & T Bn (PJ..ei Djereng) - eight EM

DE'l', HQ ?04th Ma.int Bn (Pl.el Djereng) - two officers five EH

C Co (-) ?04th Ma.int Bn (Pl.el Djereng) - three officers 83 EM

. ·._.,, . B-4 CONflDENTIAl

f . •· ..

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical. Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades a.nd S11pporting Uni ts

D Co (-) 7Q4th Pia.int Bn (Plei Djereng) - five officers 70 EK

m:r, E Co 704th Maint Bn (Holloway) - two officers eight EM

C Co (-}, 4th Med Bn - five officers 42 EM

8. DISCOM will coordinate all logistical services from it-. forward cemmand post at Pl.e1 Djereng. Queries concerning combat service support sho'11d be addressed to the DISCOM SJ; DTO or DAO as approprlateo

FOB THE aOMKANDERs

DlSTRD3UTION ·s Special

/a/ James Co 1i11.lett /t/ JAMES Co JtULLi:TT

Captain, Armor Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFf NTlAI

,. "

<ONFt0fNT1AI Ll-1

' ~·

.. . '

(ONFIOfNTf .~l Appendix 2 (Class IV Supplies) to ANNEX B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2d Brigades and Su-eJ>9rting Units) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report ~U)

na ISSUliID

Barbed Vire 4J2 rolls

Concertina io2J2 rolls

Jenee Post li:ight Foot 4,J.21 ea.

Fence Post Six Foot 1,944 ea

Fence Pos-t Three Foot 10916 ea

SandO;ags 167,200 ea

PSP 630 pcs

CulTert 60• 600 pcs

Luber P'oiµ.- by Four 19,782 :BF

Luti~~ Four by Twelve 140576 BF

Lwa0er ~t by &ight 60390 BF

Lua'ller Assorted Sizes 50254 BF 1'1;1.1.ls eOD 550 lbs

Jfalls 20D 950 lbs

CONFJDENTIAI B- 2-1

I

·1

I i I : - ·~ · ·.I •. .

. r·-­··1·· :• :... . . .

• I

• ' r I r , .. I i r i

. . -·1 •.

• '1 · :·· t.·· .. . . 'I• •, . .... 1 ••• •

• 'I.

~~-~~ .. ~i·

CONFIDENTIAl Appe!tdlx J (Ammunition Stockage Objectives) to ANNEX B (Letter of Inatructiona (WI) LQgtstical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigades and Supporting Units) to 4~la tnfantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

'the allll\IDltion stoclcage objectives listed in Tab A, this appendix were •fllliaed durlrig BIBH TAY Io The recommended S/O column was utilized during the tw.o b:r1gade phase of the operation. This S/O was established based ol'l ttut interusive combat rates listed in USA.RPA~ Reg 710-15 with few 4eda.tionsD And the Commanding Of.ficarp 184th Ordnance Battalion 1n conjunction atth .th.a DNJ agreed to these figures and shipped ammunition :fro.m QUI I.HON~

Dae ti!fal .s-tocltage objective colwm wa.s utilized during the one brigade j;ot't1Gt1 ~f· WR TAI I and was a.rri ved at based on the sustaining coabat n.tea ~c~~ in USARP.AC Beg 710-15. Thi·s S/O was established by the iW) ..i ~ to lJy' G-4 and DIVA.BTY. The S/Q. in effect was never used as a -~~ ~0010 since, 11e<tual stockage in most cases 1Jas •ch higher .aJJd ~a.ti~- ~~ets vere uot. aYa.Uable to r.ed:l.lee 0 nor lfU 1:\ cRB1.dencl ~t -to 4G u., 'the tE!~ati;On date raf the Operation occ.urr.ed prior to ~-H.,_OJi ib'r1qing the 0/H figures in l,1De wi~h the S/O, .

CONFIDENTIAl B-J-1 .· .L.·

,., . ... . . 'r-1' \,,;~ ..... - .... ... __ 1/~'.:· ·

•

JA;-. .

CONflDENTIA~

TAB A (A119Qnit1on Stockage Objective for N~W PLEI DJ~G) to Appendix J (Ai!nlun1t1on StockSl)e Objectives) t o ANNEX B (Letter of Instructions (LOI) Logistical Support for 1st and 2nd Brigade s and ~rting Uni ts) to 4th Infantry Di•1s1on BINH TAY I Aft er Acti on Report (U)

DO DIC lfONDCLATUB. RECOM S/O PilfAL S/O

1. A068 S· 56111• Tracer 280800 20200

2. A07~ 50.56•• Ball 1320000 200000

). A1)0 7.62•• Ball 5/Cl.ip 50040 0

4. A1)1 7.62.. lkd 1600000 100000

s. A16S Jlini Gun 2160000 10,000 .· .

60 A557 50 Cal Ucd 2.520000 5,000

7o A.S?4 50 Cal Spotter 800 0

8. B5JI+ 40.. APEBS 20592 , . 250

9. B535 40mm VSP ·~ ·,..

880 440 i .

10. B5J6 40n llfSC 880 440 ..

u . B567 4011• cs 192 0

t2. B568 40m• HE 90120 1oJ20 1J. B4?0 40u Lied B,ooo 10000 ?..

14. C226 8 b 11 IUwa 900 180 15. 02;6 81a11 HI 20860 . . ·. 720 16. 0276 81•• 'ilP J16 72 17. a705 4 . 2'" Hil 2 ~ 1J2 408 16. C706 4 . 2• Iuwa 468 68 19. C715 4 . 2" if}> 400 0 20. C266 90nm HE 748 0 21. D.505 155mm Illum

2J2 40 22. D506 155lllll It!

196 8

.B... J .. A- 1 CONFIDENTIAl : · •

CVNfjf}tNTIA ..

~ NOMENCLATURE .@COM SLO FINAL S/O

23. D,540 15 5m11 Prop Chg GB JOO 90

24. D,541 155mm Prop Chg iB 10 000 4J2

25. D)44 155mm HE 10200 488

260 X•547 155mm Green S111k 44 0

27. D.549 155mm Red Smk JO 0

28. D551 155mm Yellow JO 0

29. D550 155mm liP 1)6 J2 JO. D561 155mm ICM 68 16

J1 . '1381 Frag Gren ) 0 000 4oo

J2. G900 Gren Inc 6o 0

JJ. G911 Gren Offensive 1,200 560

J4. G924 Gren CS 1 0000 0

35. G940 Gren Smk (Green) 10200 90 J6. G945 Gren Smk (Yellow) 1oJ96 180 J?. G950 Gren Smk (Red) 900 80

38. G955 Gren Smk (Violet) l o 000 140 J9. G963 Gren C/S 520 0 40. H555 66111m LAW 840 JO 41. H490 2. 7500 Bkt (#10) 4 0000 200 42. H534 2o75"' Rkt (#17) 10000 100 43. K14J Claymore w/acc 2 0044 188 44. L)06 RSC

972 0 45. L307 wsc

972 Bo 46. LjlO GSP

972 0 47. L)ll RSP

972 0 48. L312 WSP

1u944 200 . "

B-J-A~2 (0NfiDENTIAt

.:., . .-... ~ . - ·· ........ .

' j' ' r r: JI,' , r I ·

,I

i· .

1,· ...

l .~ '....'. .

'· l· :". ~': · ' '

• t ••• ' ... .. ·, ,

" -·~·-·.·\ •1'.1 I ·· , o 'f ,.. . -· .

OODIC

...,. L)14

. ,Oo t.)40

Stb L)IJZ

~,. L)41

,,,. t.'4.3 ,rt .. i.413

~5· ~95

. '6· 1'o2J

llJ,. .. j4

6S,.. ~

~" 116?0

~. Jl'/66

6.8., 'IWl8

''"' '1'37.Q

70, 1127&'

7t. B))S

n .. 11331

1'· ... 12

74 .. RI+??

1s. 1523

i'«,/., . -------· 1i- . . • .. - -...n ... - .. t_., .. ' ' .. .. . ti .....

GSC

Sig S!lllt llhi te

S1g Slilk. Red

Sig Smk Green

Sig S111k Yell,otr

Aja Flares

Tt1p Fla:te

AO CrateriAC

Jaec· Biasti~ Cape

~n 11.eetric

115: S/C

40· S/c

~g&l,.ot'e$·

Det, C!QJ!l'

XU ~a1aite

Ttm(! ~

:"'15~ i..t,h"t~:r

~eieHTs~

F11ze MT6Q

Fuze me;.

Flsee n Fuze PD

F11ze Prox

Pr!mer Pe:re

hilaer Pere

B~J-A-J

972

240

240

240

240

200

4 0000

100000

4 0000

90

20000

40000

120

80

90

1-44u000

100000

180000

600

1.58

?O

252

5,026

172

206

85

20554

10916

FINAL S/O

0

0

0

0

0

0

JOO )62

16o

5

0

0

5

5 g,

J.~000

0

600

104

100

0

200

ao~O

16

?O

JS

240

240

CONFIDINTIAl' 'I

..

CONflPtNTjA" ~ .1'0fmiroLATl1Ri ~

2J. D,541 155mm Px-op Chg VB 1400

24. D~ 15,51!• Hi 6,54

2s. D548 1551111 HC 100

26. D.5.50 15.5ma VP 112

?:f. DS6t 1SSU ICll 24

28. D67S 8 • Prop Chg Ml 50

29. D676 a· Prop Chg Jll2 128

)0 .• D68o 8" HE 162

)1. D684 8" ICJI 48

)2. l881 Gren Frag 660

J)o G940 Gren Hc1 Smk ( Grieri) 96

)4. ~5 Gren lid Siak (Yellow) 688

JS. G95.5 Gren lid Smk (Violet) 4J2

)6. H490 2o 75 Bkt (#10) . J24

31. H459 2. 75 P'leshette · 192

)6. H5J4 2,75 Bret (117)' 2J.5

39. H555 66ma ltt (LAW) 1.5

40. LJ12 VSP 1148

41. 14?3 A/C P1.are 96 4~,. L495 Trip Flare 864

4'3. IC143 Clay111ore w/acc 144

44. Kt4:5 Cla.ya9re w/o ace 108 45. Mo26 Buga.lores 149 46. M1J1 N/ Electric Blast Cap 5000 47. M420 #15 S/C 12

B- )-B-2

CONFIDENTIAl

"-" ... .

ANNi:.:X c; (I,e.-..fl et Drop&) to l.it..h Infantry Dl vision BINH TAY I After Action

Report (I.I)

t. Leaflet Number& 2767

Front•

DO YOU KNOW THJI: TRUTH?

To the VC/N'fA Cadre and Soldiers. What is happening to the talks in Paris between Hanoi and the UdS• new? What is the tr~tb about it?

Back• . : ..

1fA7 have,.~-.~~- ~--rl>ic;l4en:. ta ·11sten to the Free World radlo ~ts? You need .t..o. .. l!:now ~hit ·~roth about the Paris talksp ~au.se the o,t.coae detendn• yoiat, ~- .(a.te. :In dtder to help you t.o know ~h~. triith about the Paris talks'° ,e, otf°el: to~ t;~te ·scnedale « ra.d1o news brouca.Sts from the hee Worl~. -~ittl cai(_ \ear' thls. B'cheditte off a.nd keep it for YO:U.l' ~- use. . .. ~ . .· . . ·.

Meter Bands

12 14 -17 t9 Z5 31 42

.. . . . . . ~ . : . -- I'

) .•. I ......

VOA

BBC

C- 1

Time

iQ6JO ·bo~ 12)0 bou~ 1900 hours. 0730 hours 2100 hours 2200 . hour~ 2400 . ho.airs

· Time

1930- 2000 hours 19JQ-2000 hour$ 19J0-20QO hours 1930- 2000 hours 19J0-20QO hours 1930-2000 hours 1930- 2000 hours

2. Leaflet Numben 2.547

Si de One : To All Snldi·~rs i'J rio Came Int o the South from the North

You learned day by day as you moved into the South that your leaders were not telling you the truth. You are the cream of the nation' s youth. Your hands and your minds should not be used to destroy but to rebuild your country after 20 years of war. It will te tragic if you are killed. The Vietnamese people have strong hands and excellent minds. Your hands and the weapons in them are only being used to kill. Think what do your sacrifices do but help the Communist destroy the country?

Side Two1

If the Communist doctrine is ideal then why do the South Vietna111ese and indeed many Vietna.11ese in the North oppose it? If this war will last 20 years or more 0 as Ho Chi Minh said 1t woaldD what does the future promise for your country and your people? Do you think you will live that long? If the Co11111un1st doctrine brings happiness to the people 0 why doesn't the govern­ment of the North a.llow a free and open economy as the South does? No 0 they ase force to invade the South with their "liberation• program. If you think about the answers to these questions 0 you will know the truth.

Jo Leaflet Numbers T-2'.3

Side Ones Soldiers in the North Vietnamese Armys

Why do you continue to fight in the South? Your leaders have proclaimed that you are winning, that you are only in the South as reinforcements for the victory which ls nearo If that is true p why has your Uncle Ho often stated that the war will last ten or 20 years?

'hat is the truthD then? The truth is that the NLF is losing all over the south. The people ~~ not trust the NLF and therefore do not support them. The Liberation Army is seriously short of manpower--that is wh,y you infiltrated into the South.

How that you are in the South you will see the truth. Look for the chance to escape from the NVA ranks. The South Vietnamese will welcome you with open arms.

Side Twos Instructions From Liberation Army Headquarters•

~r~ is an excerpt from instructions sent out by NLF Headquarters a In ianuary 1966 the number of deserters increased dramaticall y. The deserters ncluded both soldiers and admi nistrative members This high desertion

r;te has created aany serious problems such as th~ following: a shortage 0

lllanpower; the defeat of the Be A Soldier Campaign • a loss of combat spirit; •any soldiers desert to return home . and man,;. rally to the GVN.

~e foll owing instructions 1s given & local governments must develop a P an and take positive action to prevent deBertion.

C- 2

4. l•e.\f! e1. Number s 74

The peop]e of South VN do not want tr; be r1.1l~d by the Lao Dong Pa.rty. Although the Party is using force to try to ta.ke over ~outh VN . the South people are determined to resist Paxty Control . They know what 11.fe under the Party means in the North. They ~ant to live in freedom in the South.

Ip the South *There is freedom of mov~ment and no "letters of introduction•. *There is plenty of food 0 clotho and consumer goods for a.11. There is

no rationing. *There are no compulsory political meetings. Everyone 0 s free time is

his own. " " • " *There are no "three postponements o three readies o three respon-

sibilities•. One leads his own life. *The South is open to the rest of the worldo the South people have free

access to news and information from the outside world. The northern people are not allmred to have free access to the world outside. How many people in the north know what is going on in China since last year where political unrest 0 large scale purge 0 mass slaughter have been triggered by Mao Tse­Tung0 s "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"?

*People are not suspicious of each other0 do not spy on each other. *All religions are encouraged and protected. *People can sell all that they raise or ma.ke. *Peatsants and handicraft workers are free and independent. There a.re

no cooperatives and required deliveries. *Workers are ptotected by trade unions. There a.re no norms 9 no emulation

ce:illpa1gns 0 no movements to have "one man does two men's work" as in the North.

THE. SOUTH IS FREE 0 THE NORTH IS NOT THE SOUTH FIGHTS TO PROTECT ITS FREEDOM

5. Leaflet Numbers 76T

WHY IS THERE WAR?

Other people do not want to be controlled by the Communists. The people ~f South Vietnam resist the control of the Party. The Government of South ietna.m has asked the United States and other countries to help defend the

countrJ against Lao Dong aggression. There were no Americans fighting in South Vietnam when the Party started sending large numbers of North Vietnamese troops south. Because the Party sent large numbers of troops southG many Americans had to come to help the GVN.

Because your leaders are not satisfied just to rule North Vietnam you are being sent to a senseless death in the South. Thousands have died already ~nd many thousands more will die to satisfy the aguressive ambitions of the arty leaders unless they will stop t heir aggressi~n. This is the era in

which s·.1ch aggression is doomed to failure.

Side Two1 Everythi d 1 ng you o to help ths Pany make war makes the war last

onger. mak~s you suffer l onger and more. This ls the Party 0 s war , not ~~~~n::~· eek the flr·st oppor·tunity to gjve up t o your brothers in South

r:

6. f,eoflet lfom t. .. , 1 ~ 8A-2 ·i2 · T.!

S1de One '

Taking over the political dispute in Cambodiao the CommWlist leaders of Hanoi have created a political adventure by ordering you to attack and sabotage the neutrality of this small country.

This is serious breakthrough of the international agreement of the defense ~protection of Cam~dia' s neutrality,

Side _Two r

The Free World .Forces must stop the dark plot of yours. The Free World Forces have cooperat ed 'trith the ARVN forces to strike all the sanctuaries which are located inside Cambodiao 'lhere will not be -any sa.fe place for yoti to rest; resettle or resupply for you and other units in the Scutho ' . . .

· · · t~medi~t~l;y stop your illegal aggression, Drop yeur ·wea.pons down and r&l).r ~~ tl:l~ ~e World Forces or the ARVN" s.

; . . . ' '

7. ~--net Nµmber• BA-251- 70 ·•.. . .

Side One a SOLDIERS AND CADRE OF THfil VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST

To ~top the warlike activities of t1'le communist who broke into the neutral cQUJit:cy of Ca.Dbodia 9 the ARV~ and Allied Forces a.re opening the operat.ion~ Uli'.'?li8hout _·the boundary 1n order to erler11inate th~ sa.t'ety bases ef' yours

- . i!,nd Wf.11 d~stroy all of yo·u whO' are Using Wea.pons to opp-reas the n$1gb"r countries. There will not be any safe place for you in either Vietnam or Cubodia.

Side Tvoa

Be smart and rally to the ARYN and American Forces to live in freedom and happiness in the South.

8,, . Le~l'l!:t Nun'ber·a BB-142- 70

: · -~.t ·• t~ _U~, and ARVN are earnestly appealing to all of you , do not 'be afraid ot_ ~~e soldiers. Stay in your villages and show a. white flago '.l'hey Will .n°.t _hai:m, you. They come to help cast out the VC who steal your rice, c"ttleo and hide in your vUlages. So 1£ you aee US/ARYN soldiers, you 11ay report these soldiers so that they can protect your things and yourself.

9., Leaflet lfu11bar1 SB- 141-70

Side Onea The only way you can save your life ls to surrendero

Side Two 1 To Comm~nist T:roops in Cambodia•

You have just come under att ack by the battle- hardened troops of the

C-4

. · the Al.lies. Your illegal sanctuaries are being overruns your AJNN ~ers a.re bei ng captured. Your units are disorganized and now have head.q · to hlde There is no way you can escape that will bring you no piace ur h~me and loved ones. Your only hope of ever seeing then ~10~:r1:

0t~osurrender to the ARYN and Allied Forces. You must make your ~ision quicklfp for the time of the Comm11t11st aggression grows short. Surrender now0 or die a useless death.

10. Leaflet Numbers 8B-14J- 70

Side One 1 Where can you hide now?

Side Two• Communist Soldiers in Cambodia

The ARVN and US Forces have launched massive attacks against your base areas in Cambodia. Now a the whole situation is changed. There is nowhere you can hide. You can retreat for a while , but you must stop soMewhere. Then you will be caught.

If you are smart , you will quickly surrender to the ARVN a.nd Allied Forces in your area. There is no sense in dying uselessly in a cause you Ira.ow is lost.

11. Leaflet Number• BB-144- 70

Side One 1 You Have Been Cut Off

Side 'l'wot Communist Soldiers in Cambodia

The AHVB and Al.lied ~orces have launched large attacks against your base ~as in Cambodia. The result has been to cut you off fro• your means of rein.for.cement and resupply. Now your unit will wither0 like leaves on a branch when the branch is cut from the treeo I:f you wish to escape a useless death 1n a hopeless cause you have but one choice a Surrender to the ABVN and Allied wdts in your area. That is your only hope.

12. leaflet Number 1 SB-148-70

Side Ones NYA in Cambodia. and South Vietnam

The ARYN 40th Regillent and the US 4th Division have swept into Cambodia and have captured more than 500 tons of your rice . 'Illey will certainly find more. What Will you eat now? Surrender to them. You will be given food and good treatment .

Side Two• NYA in Cambodia and South Vietnam

Are you hungry? Do you have enough rice to eat? Do not expect to ~~eive as ml.leh rice in the future as you are now allotted . ARYN and

lied Forces have invaded your ~tuarlee in Cambodia and have captured over 500 tone of your rice. And they will certainly find more.

C-5

·. r

Your situation grows ~orse with every d.ay . If you are i n South Vietnam you can rally to the GVN. If you are in Cambodiao your only hope of returning alive to your family ls to surrender to the ARVN or Allied Forces. You will receive food and good treatment .

l..

(UNflDcNTIA1 ANNEX D (OPORD 16- 70 (BINH TAY I) (U)) to 4th Infantry .Division BIMH TAY I After Action Report (u)

OP'ORD 16-70 (BINH TAY- 1) (U)

•terence• Ma.po CAllBODli, and VIETNAMo 11,SO,OOOo sheets 6437 II & IIIo 6436 I • IV, 6537 IIIP 65)6 IV. Task Organigation•

1st Bde

3-8 Inf 1-1;. Int J-,506 Am

' . .

. ' •J .. .

1. (a) SITUATION1

2d Bd• 1-12 Inf 1- 22 Inf 2-J.5 Inf

· ·" ,. ... =~· ... · ..... y -'F'Gl.'Ceso Annex A0 Intelligence.

· ... · b~ :rrtendlf Fo.rces.

(l) ·Curreat Sitrep.

Div TrPl1.

2-8 Rech D/7-17 Air Cav{OPCON)

2-1 Cav 1-10 Cav J-12 Inf C/75 Inf K/7.5 Inf 7-17 Air Cav

t(:!) ··224 AINN DiY conducts securob and destroy operation$ witb s~ b&ttal.1ons in southern BA 702 during the period 5- 12 May 70 • . · ~· : · .. , .. ,·

·· 2·~ ·• (e·) iHS&t01·1.·

Efff!¢tive 5 May l9?0D 4th Inf Div conducts search and destroy operations 1.n northeiit llA 702. ·

3. (c) EXECUTIONa

a9· Ce~~ettt, of Opera.tfon. Annex B0 Ope.ration Overla.;r.

_(1) JiJ,,,neuver. 4th Inf Div in coordination with 22d ABVN Div deploys to vicinity ~ev Plei Djereng and conducts combat assault with two brigades af t~~ee battalions eaeh into BA 702 to destroy enemy resources 0 installationso and conmand factlttles.

(2) Fireso Annex 00 Fire Support .

Group 4 DOilNGRADED AT 3 YRAH INTl!lliVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 mARS.

([J l'f flDtNTIAl

I '

CONflPtNTIA .. OPOlU> 16·70 (BINK TAY~t ) (U)

b. 1st Bdes

(1) Deploy to Pleiku Provi nce 4 and 5 May 70 in accordance with Annex ( 0 Deployment Schedule.

(2) On 5 Ma.1 700 conduct combat assault with three battalions into assigned AO.

(J) Priority of objective a.reass Ao B, Co DB and Eo

C c 2d Bdel

(1) Deploy ~o Plei.ku Province 5 a.nd 6 May 70 in accordance with Annex K, Deployaerit Scheduleo

(2) 9n 6 f1a.Y 70 0 conduct combat assault with three battalions into assigned AO.

(J) Priority of objective areas• Ri:D, WHITE, BLUli: and GOL.Do

do J-12 Inf•

Kay 70.

(1) CHOP from 1st Bcle to Division Control effectiYe ~()800H Kay ?O.

(2) Release OPCON one rifle company to 1=l.0 Cav ef''fective 040800H

. . . . . (3) E.f.fective 4 Mv 70 0 provide one rifle company to !De Calip Ridclif'f tor .ct>If Cou;-se secar1'ty ·aetween 1700 and 0700 hour,s dally.

(4) Maintain ready reaction capability with one platoon prepared to deplo7 in fifteen aiaatea0 ene co•p&ny' in one hotir0 allti bai~alien •inua

~:· .. ~· ~~e. i.,grs. . . . . . .. .

(5) Conduet operations vicinity Camp Radcliff es duec1;ed.

e • 2-8 Mech s

(1) Secure LOC from <>&sis to New Pl.ei Djereng until relieved by ~l Ca.vo: Have roa.d open for traffic by 0?)0 hours on 5 a.ad. 6 ~ ?0.

(i) Receive OPCON D/7~1? Air Ca.v effective 050700H ~ ?Oo

R • (3) Upon relief by 2~ 1 Cav 0 revert to Division Reserve vicinity ew ~Lei Djereng.

(4) Secure brigade CP0 s and ~A vicinity New P.l.ei Djereng as ~ected "b:J C00 D!SCOM.

COHFIDENTIAl

' ' f . ,·;.,t ·

CONflDfNTIA~ OFCRD 16...70 (BINH TAY~1) {U)

r. 1- 10 Cav s

(1) Continue present mission.

g. order.

(2) Receive OPCON one rifle company J~12 Inf effectiYe 040800H Kay 700

2 ... 1 Cavs Assu11e respona1b111ty for LOC security from 2-=-8 Jlech on

ti. 7- 17 A!r Cave

(1) CHOP D/7-17 A!r Cav to 2..8 Mech effective 050?00H Mq ?0.

(2) Place one air cav troop in direct support of each brigade. Squadron minus reaains under Division Control.

io C/75 Rangers I

(1) Deploy to Pleiku Provilice on 7 ~ ?Oo

(2) Be prepared to insert up to 50 percent. Of deployable teus en 8 Kay 700

j. K/75 Rangers3 Conduct operations. 1n ~as to \Iii designated (initially 1~ Binh Dinh Province)o . .

k. Ooo%dinat1ng Instructions•

,(1) Operations in BA 702 will be conducted so as to destroy all eneay !8f111ties bl -A.Os by 20 Kay 1970.

·. . {2) DIBLAU'l'H and directed ALCOX.

;(3) COo DISCOH Installation CoQJ!!dinator New Plei Djereng.

'(4) DAVIO coordinate PZ control at Ca.mp Holloway 11 LZ .Meredith0 and lfew PJ.~ Djereng0

(5) Priority of movement on liiway 19ED 19WD and 14S to ~nita •oving to Pl.ei ·Djereng/Pleiku 0 then to empties returning to CR fer additional. troop/ equipment 11.f't.

4. (U) SERVICE SUPPORT

Annex Ji: 0 Servie:e Support 0

5° (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal. Annex H~ Co•111unications/El.ectronicso

COHFIDENTIAL

CUNf IPtNTJAA. OPORD 16-70 (BINH TAY- 1) (U)

b. Couand. Division Forward CP P.leiku.

VALOR KG

CITICIAL1

/.e/.Pril~. /t'/PB.IWWd

c,

anexes• A -- Intelligence (TBP) B -- Operation <>Yerlq (LIMIDIS) C - J'ire S11ppqrt {?BJ>) n· .. ..: lrigineer (DP) B -- Semce Suppert (TBP)

! .. • I r -- Av1at1Qri Suppert (Omitted)

.... <l _.., Cidl Af'fairi (TBP) ll -- Commun1cat1ons/Bl.ectronica (TBP) K -- Deployment Schedule

D~~Ol1 - . . . ' ..

Im 2 DS.l II Corpe 2 SA 22cl ADI Div 2 1~t Bcle 1 24 Bcle 1 ·.

.)~~~ - 1 - ~ ... 1 ·cay 1

1-io Ca• 1 . ~~i. ~ 1

15 · . . 1

i. J'. /)1 /J .

~.~ W v Ur

1./75 Int 1 7-17 Air Cav 1 DIYAB'tl' 1 DISCOK 1 4th ilngr 1 4th Am 1 124th Sig 1 4th KP 1 G..1 1 Q..;2 1

G-) .5 G-4 1 G-,5 1 AlB 1 .AIS> 1 ADAVNO 1 i'SQI 1 M'O 1 .DJIC 1

CONFIDENTIAL .

j

i I I

I

r j.

I ) I .

L. t ... ' . i: • .

,'-- • I '

'; ••"

- 'l. ) .

:.'f! ·· t· ·~ .. .

· .. '!.

. ' . ~ ·' '. >r I :.

'ONffDENTJA~ Ap~ndix 1 (AnneA K D&ployment ~~hedul.f') t o ANNEX D (OPORD 16- 70 (BUH TAl I) (UJ to 4th Infantry Dlvielon Bi NH TAY .r Af~r .Actl.on Report

4 IU.Y '708 1st Bn tet Bdt>s OL to Holloway0 trks return Cli. 2d Bn 1st Bd~~ OL to Meredith 0 trks ROlfo

.S KAY 701 1st Bn 1st Bdes CA fr Holloway to obj area (JIZ 06)0) 2d Bn 1st Bde s OL fr Meredith to lf P.D !S:P O?)O) 0 trka return CP1

0 CA f'r NPD to obj area n. &ppr 11)0). ·

)I Bn tat Bde a OL fr CPR to lfered1 th SP 0100). 'lA tr Meredith to "b.1 area. {l'Z app.r l)JO ).

1st Bn 2d .Bde a AL fr CPR te IP» 2d Bn 2d Bde• OL tr C1I to Merec!ita

6 llAY 701 1st in 2d .Bde1 CA fr NPD to o-bj area .(n 0830). 2d Bn 24 ~e'i CA fr ~redith to obj area (IZ 091,5). )l Bn 2d Bde a OL tr CPB to Meredith (SP O?OO) 0

CA tr Meredith to o'Qj area.

CONflDEtlf'I&

. .

CONf ID EN TIA~ ANNEXE (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (u)

OPLAN 19-70 (U)

References Map0 VI~AM0 1 t 50p000 0 sheets 6636I and IIo 6737 Ill and IV 0

66)7 I and II a 67J7 III and IV.

fas~ Organizations

1st BIB .. 3-8 Inf , .. 12 Inf 1-14 I~

1. (c} · SITU~TIOl1

2d BJB 1-12 Int 1-22 Inf' 2-35 Inf

a. Bnuy Forces. Annex A~ Intelligenceo

b. Friendl.Y Forces.

(1) ·· Current sitrep.

Div '?rps 2-8 Beeb 1-10 Cav K/75 Bgr

C.~) II ARYN Corps terminate• OPEBA'.l' lOJ BINl:l TAt 1.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

. (1) 2-t 6av {-) and C/75 lgr J;evert to OPOON D'F'I 11pon termination or:· 2.;a lec:h: ~1asion vic1n1t7 Plelku City.

fa' One rine company· -i- 14 4f reverts to OPCON 1.~t Bde "1>o• t~J'lli?lj:lt1Pn . of' 2-8 Mech vicinity Pleiku City.

d. Assaptions.

(i.) OPBRATION BIHH TAY 1 will ter1111nate on or about 2.5 May 70.

{2?.. 4th inf Div will retain OPCON 2- 1 Cav (-) until closeout of ll1'~PQrt 1-se at BEV PLEI DJERENG. .

(3) 4th Inf Di.v trill lose respondbility for securing HMy 1911 con­current with loss of OPCON 2~1 Ca.v (- ).

D......... (4) 2-8 Mech will be available for emplOYJlent in Binh Dinh .. .rovUc:e upon r ·eturn of 2.d ARVN Hange.r Group.

GROUP 4 DOWN GRADED AT J YiliR INT&RV ALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS •

CONFIDENTIAL

CONf IPtNTIAi. OPLAN 19- 70 (U)

2• (C) MTSSION1 On order 0 4th Inf Div continues present mission , with­draws forces from Pleiku Province o initiates combat operations against 95B NVA Regt , and prepares for future operations against VC Gia Lai Provincial Unito

3. (C) E:Xa:UTIONs

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) Maneuver0 ht Bde extracts maneuver battalions from BINH TAY 1 AO covers closeout of support base at NlilV PLEI DJERENG9 standdow:ne for to~r dqe at Cup Radcliff 0 and initiates operations against 9.SB NVA Begt. 2d Bde continues operations against C2 Co o 40?th NVA Sapper Bn and unidenti­fied enemy to~ces operating northwest of An Xhe. 4th Bngr :Bn and 2-8 Rech (after standdown at Camp Radcliff) initiate upgrade of Route .508 and H!LL 666 in preparation for future operations against VC Gia Lai Provincial Unit. '1./75 Bgr develops ground intelligence for future targeting against YC Gia Lai Provincial Unit.

(2) Fires. Annex C0 Fire Support.

b. 1st Bde s

(1) Continue cttrrent mtss1cm. On orde~0 re1:ea.se OPCOI C/?5 Bgr to Im 0 Cl)ver closeout of support base at New Plei Djereng0 and redeploy to Ca11p Radcliff for four d~ standdown.

· (2) On orderg initiate operations witb three infantry battalions against 9,513 NVA Regto AO as followes F:t-o• Ba 030492 E &long line two b s of_ QL 19 to BR 26644o SB to BB 5002oos to BR 500070 w to BB 060070 N to BR 060100 V to BR 000100 N &long DAK AYUNH Biver to BR OJ0442 N to start.

(J) On orderg receive OPCON one rifle company 1- 14 Inf from 2-8 .Mech.

c. ~ Bciea

i .. ._ ~_1) Contini.le current mission. On orderp constrict current operation 0 area'ifest Of a line par•llel to and two km west Of RoQta 5o8o

(2) .. Be prepared to react to K/75 Bgr intelligence and to assume responsibility for K/75Rgr A0

0

d. 2-8 Meehs

(1) Continue current miss ion. On order0 release OPCON one rifle company 1- 14 lnf and redeploy to Camp Radcliff for four- day standdown.

CONFIDENTIAL

I

~ I I I j i

l· . ' i t

I I

~ ' I

I I t

t I 1

i ( ' I

t .

CONFIDENTIA~

OPLAN 19--70 (U)

(2) On order0 1nit.1ate operaUene to secure ~uer work .,.niea l.lpgrad1ng Route 508 and const ructing forward opera.t.ing ba8e on Hlld. 666. AC) as followss ham BR 482532 NV along line parallel to aDi ta b II of Ro.ate ,508 to BR 352672 N to BR 3507JO SE to BB 540690 S8 to :S~ .570600 Sil to start.

•• 2- J. Cav (-) i Continue c.tU"rent mieeion. On "~'' ~evart to OPOOlf In"( 0

t. 1 ... iv Cava Continue ~ mission. ~ ,I :.·. :; ' . .. .. "': ·, . ; ~

&• 4th: Bngr a COntinu&: ~J.'811't mission o On order, resu~ ; ·~ ~, ~. of loute S<IJ and constnction .:er>~ (orward operating ~e on HD.t 6~.. ..· , .

~ - - .,.~ f ·.; 0 ;; • : '. : ( • l : ·, 'I·~ r $> , ~ h. I/7j Bgr 1 Con.t1mae curre., aission. On order; g1 ve p~9f. , ! ... :

II! err.rt 'tilt &athe~ inf'Oft!Ltioa. on current opera.tipns of TC ·~ W. t>;. ~1al ~t. in AO ae f'ollowst J From Bll 0.50680 .& tp :&It 176680 K a.i9· ... ~noe w-.marr to :s~ 218688 ~ Ba 320870 v to 1' 1 '79870 s al.,. ·~ ~ pmrinc& 'bQbndatf to Bil 185840 :;f'iJlo BR 0.50840 S to st~. '. .. ·; ·

~., \. . ! ·~.._,\ I '•.' • •

1. ~i'Jla.tiq Instruct1o11411 ... .., . · · . l IY:i\1 ~ ' I f,< . , .. ...

.. (1)1 •f:ect1ve for pl.am~ cm receipt and e~cution as OJIOBi> "( ~;< 19~?0 c,il orde~.

(?J :OIRLAU'l'H ALC.01.

'" (a) SIJW~eE; SUP!OR'l'i Alm.ex Jt, Service Support ..

S. (C) COJ8LUD AID SIGIALs

a.. Stgaal. Annex H, Co111munications - Electronics.

~ ao.w. l>J.-v CP ~•ains Camp Badcliff.

~lerip

WALKER MG

... . 'l : ~ - r .

\ .. ~·-i· ':',. '. :•. ,.~ ..

·'·

I JA~T~ .. ,.. .. . ·~ ••• .,. ., .. .. j +. . • r-.. 1.'\•J ~. b .. r . . CONFIDENTIA. -- ~-- .. ·---.. ' - .~· -· ..

j~J··

CONf IDi:NTIA&. OPLAN 19-70 (U)

Annexes• A - Intelligence B - Ope:i-ation ~erla.r (omitted) c - nM Support

- D - lbgineer _ a - Serrlce Slapporl F - AY1at1on Support (omitted) G ~ CiYil Affairs K ... Co•llltln16atione - ilectroaice

Il'FV 2 'K/75 Bgr I1'Ff AirrY 1 DIVARTY Jill II Corps 1 DISCOK PSA---a~: · 1 4"h ilngr 11th CAC - •· 1 4th AVlf ~ jr\7 Gp 1 1.24th Sig

17)1 Alri ••··· 1 Q1 524 IND Bil .• -1- G2 CB :- • ! ~ -1 . GJ

1st • . . t Gi 2d. Bde 2 . . :f'SOi z .. 1 Cav (-) 1 Am 1-10 Oav 1 mo ~b~ . . 1 I1l'O

'I • \ ' ' l cs '

1 5 1 1 1 1 1 s s 1 1 1

· l 1 1.

lONflDENTIAt

...... .

CONflDfNTIA~ Appendix 1 (An.nex A. Intelligence) to ANNEX E (OPLA(N )19- 70 (u)) to 4th Infantry D1v1s1on BINH TAY I After Act.ion Report U

Annex A (Int.elUgenr.:e) t.o OPLAN 19~70 (u)

Reference 1 Maps0

Seri.es L6o7 Vietnam o F.di.tion l. o 1•50 o 000 Sheets 6636 I Chu Rpan

66J6 II Phu Thien 6636 III Phu Nhon 66)6 IV Pleiku 67J6 lll PJ.ei Djama 67)6 IV An Tue 67J7 III ~ang An Tue 6637 IV Kontum 6617 III Ple1 Neh 66J7 II Binh Dinh Da.k Quon 6637 I Kon llahal

Time 7.one Used Throughout the Order a HOTEL

1. ( C) SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

a. The Gia Lai Provincial. Committee is the probable control headquarters tor a recent series of village attackso abduction$ 0 and sapper attacks in P.l.eiku Province and western Binh Dinh Provinceo The Provincial. Coami ttee has also impressed a number of Montagna.rd families into pto<iucing food and punji stakes for use by NVA and VC/V'l'IJ unitso

b. The 95B NVA Begt has the mhsion or interdicting Hwy 19 between An lhe and PJ..eiku and disrupting GVN pacification effortso Presently the K2 Bn reinf'orced wlth the X1'3 &lgineer Oo 0 Hl5 II Bnu and Regimental Support Companies ~s been active west of the Mang Giang Pass attacking haillets arid conducting st'afld-of'f attacks an US convoys and stro~ pointso East of the Mang Giang Pass other Regimental. Support Companies. and the Xl 7 Iihgineer Qom~~ ~ve conducted extensive road mining plus aborted sapper activityo . Merale is high due to reports us 4th Inf Div has de.~ed Pl.eiku Provinceo

e. See Cttrrent !N'rSUMo'

2. {e) JilSSENTI:AL· ELlilMENTS OF INFORMATION

&o Essential Elements of Information. Where are company size elements of NVA 95B Regt? Where is the Regt CP of 95B Regt? Where are weaPQDSu a.JJlmunitionR and food caches of the Gia. Lai Provincial Unit located?

b. other Intelligence Requirements. lihere will 95B Regt withdraw i: when pressured by US elements? Where are the training centers of Gia 1 Province and wha.t type of training is conducted? What trails and

;:des of transportat.ion are used to move supplies? Where does Gia Lai · ovince obtain med:i.cal supplies?

E-t-1

DOWNGRADED AT J YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR .5200.10

Ct •NFIDENTIA

CONflPtNTIAl (C) JNTELLIC3NCE ACQUISITION TASKS

a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units.

( t) 1st Bde report as o bt&1ned a

~·, ' • I

· .. 'b•

ibe11Y contacts. Nev trail networks. Food cache sights. Location of enemy command posts.

(Z) Co K0 75th Inf report as obtained•

'b) Location of enemy couand posts.

la) i:ne117 contacts.

c) Details on cacbes found. d) Details on trails folMldo

(3) 1st/1oth Cav report as obtained a

ta) Movement of enemy wrl. ts into present AO. b) Ground t• air fire. e} Location of freshl7 cultiva$ed areas •

.. th Avn Bil report. as o'.13~'-ed •

(a) Ground to air fire. (b} LZ· 1nf•rmatloa.

llqaffts te Hlgher0 Jdjaeeat · ud Co.opera.ting Uni.ta. ' ·. \

. II C'!l''ie req-·sted te, provide information on 9.5B Begt. fro• c;aptured ~~~~'- JV'•··· and' Hoi Cb.nha.

If.. (G:) -.sum J,OR HAHDliIRG ~WilL·o DOCUMENTS, AND JATERIAL

a. See Di v1 sion SOP. b. Detainees shotlld be considered long-time VC/YKC and sho'll.d be

expected to attempt to escape. c. The eapture of signal deeW1ents should be repo~ted im~~t•ly

fol! timely evacuation and evaluation.

5. · ('U): 'DOCUIEMTS ANO/OR BlQUlPHlll!IT BEQUI.RED

See D.l.v1s1Gn SOP

CONFIDENTIA

;.. ·~ .

COHflDENTIA~ 6, (C) COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

a. See Division SOP b. Gia Lai Provincial Unit controls sapper uni ts and they can be

expected to conduct Reconnaissance of friendly positions for sapper targets. c, See Appendix 1.

7. (C:) REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

a, Reports' See Division SOP b• Distribution• Same as OPLAN 19- 70

8. (U) MISCELLANEOUS

None

Appendices 1 1 - 7.one 6 Guerillas 2a - Trail Overlay, Gia Lai (LIMIDIS) 2b - Trail Overlay 0 9,513 Regt (LIMIDIS) Ja - Ha.rd Target Overlay, Gia Lai (LIKIDIS) Jb - Ha.rd Target Overlay0 95B Regt (LIMIDIS) 4a - Probably Enemy Locations 0. Gia Lai (LIKIDIS) 4b - Probably Enemy Locations 8 9.5B Regt (LDIIDIS) 5 ~ L1ght and Weather Data (To Be Published)

CONflDENTIAl .·

cuNftDcNTIAl A endix 2 ( ARNEX C (Fire Support ) ) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th I~~antry D1~1sion BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

ANNEX C (Fire Support ) to OPLAN 19-70

1. (C) SITUATIO~'

a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence)

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) OPLAN 19-70.

(2) Seventh Air Force supports the 4th Inf Div with tactical air and AC 119 Shadow aircraft.

(J) Artillery Support. .52d Artillery Group; GS FifMAF

2 (C) MtSSIONa Artillery and other fire delivery elements support 4th r:U- .Div elements in ops directed against 9.5B0 Gia Lai Prov HQ, and 40?th Sapper ·Bn· ~ an\i support engineer ops along Hwy ,508.

3. (c) EXECUTIONa

a .. Concept of Operation. OPLAN 19- 70

b, Air Support.

(1) Al.locations. 7th AF provides two sorties tactical air daily against preplanned targets. Sorties for immediate missions allocated by 21st TASS on the basis of fighter availabili ty.

(2) Miscellaneous. Air :requests per SOP.

c . Artillery Support ,

(1) FA

(a) General. Division Artil lery continues current mission of providing l i ght o medium 9 and heavy artillery fire suppa:rt to Division operations. Upon termination BINH TAY 1 u artillery uni ts di.splace to support future operations i n Division AO.

(b) Organizati on for Combat .

l • 6- 29 Arty

a• ns. 1st Ede

~- Q.. Release elements 1-92 Arty to control of 52d Arty ~~ upon closure of 1- 92 Arty elements at N~W PLEI DJE.RENGo

GROUP 4 XlWNGRADED AT ) YEAR INTERVALS ~

~.;;cLAS3 IFiillD AFTBH 12 etlNflDENTIA E-2-1

CUNflP·cNTIA~

t:. Sel:?ct and report. positions for one pl.+. 155mm How ) · t Bd AO P!'·obabl'-' mission of plt o GSP 6- 29 Arty. (Towed l n n~w 1s e ' - J

~. 4 -·42 Art.y

OS. 2d Bde

!.• GS

:e,. Prov-lde DS to 1- 10 Ca'Y' w1 th a minimutn of one 155mm

c. Provide .00 to 2 EB !nf ( Mech) ll'it h one 15 ,5llltn btry (- ) • On order inc~ase-a.rty IB t-o 2 .. 8 Inf (Mech) to one 155mm btry.

. Q..,. .Provide o.r:e 155mm plt (J t~bes) GSR to 4-42 Art.yo .. •t '

(c) '.Miscell~o~s. App 1 D Arty Fire Supt 'l'BP as applicable •

(2) ADA. Per SOP0

d. Chemical Support. Div Chemical spts with non- persistent a,nd persistent CS upon request .

e, Coordinating Instructions.

\ . · .. " .nJ · 'M~· advisorla~o ·.

(a) Air advisories continue to be posted in current AO~s w1 thout change .

(b) In new 1st Ede AO ai r advisories for Pleiku Province to be posted with BLACKHAWK ADVISORY.

(c) A.11 other air advisories in new 1st Bde AO to be posted with 1-'Q~~HQUS~ AN TUC~

. .C?) Political cl earances obtai ned through Div FSCEu

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION ~AND LOGISTICS& Annex E (Servfoe Support)

5e (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL s

ac Si gnal . Annex H (Communications ~ Electronics) .

b . Command.

( 1)

(2)

FSCE - Div CP

Div Arty CP - Camp Radcliff

E-2=2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONflDGNldAk ·i 11'hJJ endix J (Annex D Engineer) to ANNEXE (OPLAN lY-70 (u)) to 4th Infantry

~~ision BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

AN (iJ) Annex D ~ngineer to OPL 19- 70

REF~RENCE i Sue as basic PLAN•

TASK ORGANIZATIONs See basic PLAN.

1o (C) SlTUATIONt

a, Bn.emy Forceso Annex Ao Intelligence.

b. Friendly Forces. 9J7th &gr Gp continues to maintain QL-19i a.nd 14B.

2. ( C) MISSION. 4th Engl." Bn and 9J?th Engr Gp continue present a1ssions, Sllp'port withdrawal of 4th Inf Div from Pleiku Province and ,4th Bngr Bn supports 4th Inf Div Co111bat Operations against trYA/VC, constructs forward operating base on Hill 666, and upgrades Rte 508.

), ( C) li!XECUTION.

a. Cance-pt of Operations. 4th Engr Bn suppo-rts 1st Bde in extraction from Binh Ta.y 1 A00 closeout of support base at New Plei Djereng 0 operations against 958 NVA Regt, and continues to support 2nd Bde operations·. 4th &igr Bn constructs Brigade sized forward operating base on Hill 666 and upgrades Rte 508 to sust~in division loads.

b. 4th F.ngineer Bn0

(1) Continue present 11ission.

(2) On order, clear firebase on Hill 666 and improve to Bde sized forward operating ba.se 0 concurrent with upgrade of Rte 506 to sustain division load.

(3) Support each bde with one combat engr Co (-).

(4) ~e prepared to provide additional support as necessary.

c. Coordinating Instructions. Request for engr support from Bde &igr to Div Engr.

E-J-1

GROUP 4 OOWNGRADED AT J YEAR INTERVALS TlECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONflPl.:NTIA-.

4. (U) SERVICli: SUPPORT. Annex Ev Service Support.

,5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a . Signal . Annex Ho Communications - Electronics.

b. Co11111a.nd

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONflDENTIA~ A ndix 4 (Annex E Logistics) to ANNEXE (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to 4th Infantry ni~sion BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

Annex i (Logistics) to OPLAN 19-70 (u)

1. (C) !:!:HERAL

&o This t.nMx proY1des for Co11bat Service 5"pport for the 4th In:f'antry

Division and attached units in support of OPLAN 19-70.

b. Ass1i1mptions

{1) Operation Binh Tay 1 will terminate on or about 25 May 70.

(2) 1st Bde elements will s'tand down for approximately 4 d~s at

Camp Badcliff.

CJ) 4th &igineer Bn and 2/8th Inf will standdown at Camp Radcliff,..

(4) Proposed operations mentioned in Basic OPLAN 19-70 will be

initiated.

(5) 45th GP will close LSA. at New P.lei Djereng on order.

c. DlSCOM1 Be prepared to support standdown requirements of the 1st

Bde, 4th &igr Bn and 2/8th Inf upon request.

2. Cc) MATERIAL AND SERVICES . ·. ·.

a. 2/1 Cav - no change, \

b, 1/10th Cav - no change.

Co 4th Bogr - no change.

d. Z/8th Inf - AU supply and se~ices will be fro.111 per111anent

facilities at Camp Radcliff upon relief of present mission.

e. 1st Bde

(1) AU supply and services will be from permanent facilities at

Ca.mp Radcliff.

(2) Transportation : Movement of troops and supplies from New Plei

Djereng (TBA) . Submit requirements to DTO. DOWNGRA.DJ!;D AT ) YEAR I.NTli:RVALS lll!;CLASSIFIED AFTER 12 ~·

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.. CONf IDcNTIAl

~ ' Annex G C~vtc Action/ PS'fOPS) t o ANNEXE (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) to ~i~~~i:nt~ Division BINH TAY I After Action Report (U)

ANNEX G (Civ i c Action/ PSYOPS) to OPLAN 19- 70 (U)

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. f,nemy Forces.

( 1) Current Intsum.

(2) Annex A0 Intelligence. I ;(o

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) See Basic Plan.

(2) B Co, 8th PSYOP Bn.

(3) "C" Flt, 9th sos.

2. (C) MISSION1 Conduct CA/PSYOP in ·support of OPLAN 19-70.

Jo (C) EXECUTION a ·"·

a. Concept of Operations.

(1)" .. . Civic Actions Civil Affairs teams will continue to operate i n the Ca~p ·· aadclif"f TAOR in accordance with OPORD 41-70.

(2) PSYOPSs Conduct PSYOP against the enemy stressing Chieu Hoi theme - Malaria treatment available through Chieu Hoi Program. &nploy ground loudspeaker teams as the situation warrants. Exploit all events such as ralliers, tactical victories and enemy losses as such occur.

b . 1st Bde:

(1) One loudspeaker team attached .

(2) Continue present CA/PSYOP missi on as directed by OPORD 41- ?0u

c . 2d Bde:

(1) One loudspeaker team attached.

(2) Continue present CA/PSYOP mission as directed by OPORD 41- 70.

E- 5- 1

GROUP 4 OOWNGRAD.l!:D AT J YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS .

~ONFIDENTIAl

CUNflP.cNTiA~

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Obtain adequate supply of malaria theme leaflets from Office of ACofS, G5.

(2) Maintain close liaison with intelligence sections to insure timely eXJJloitation of Hoi Chanh, PW, and PSYOP targets of opportunity.

()) Observe PSYOP policy guidance as outlined in JUSPAO and MAcv directives.

(4) Use of .PW in PBYOP will be 1n accordance with MACY Di~ctive 52S-207, dtd 15 October 1969. .

4. ( C) ADJIIBISTRATION AND LOGISTICS 1

a, Reports.

(1) Daily PSIOP SITRl:P to this HQ A'l'TN1 PSYOP Officer, ACot'S, G.5 to include 1 .. ..

-,, ·-

(a) Tara.ts~ ~ets ~r ~~d~peake:i,-9 NUJ1ber Of Leaflets D.r.ppad, Loudspeaker time. ·

(b) Balliers• Name, rank, NVAo VC, VMC, unit, tarp\1 Uni& picked up, place, and unit receiving ral.lier. ifas he ~XJJ+!lit~d and br wbat media.

Ccl'·' (J~{iV~ :-~X9~tAcrt;lv~~ie' .1· . . ~~~~ when, target, tilne, media, . audience and theme.- ~~· it$ •n'ott~ ~t count~r. PJ:"O~da if enemy employs PSYOP. ·

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5. (u) COMMAND AND SIGNAL I See Basic Plan.

ACJOrollLEixzJ

·.

OWICIAt•

CUNFIDENTJAt

. ;.. ,·. •· ·'"'·

CONflDENTIA~ A pendix 6 (Annex H Communications - E.l.ectronics) to ANNEX E (OPLAN 19-70 (U)) t; 4th Infantry Division B!NH TAY I After Action Report (U)

ANNBX H (Communications ~ Sl.ectronics) to OPLAN 19-70 (U)

1. (U) SITUATION1

a. lihemy Forces. Annex A Intelligence.

b.. Friendly .Forces. Para 1 b OPLAN 19-70.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Para 1 c OPLAN 19-?0.

d. Assumptions. Para 1 d OPLAN 19-70.

20 (U) MISSION1

Listall, op_e;rate and maintain the division communications system to major elements of the command.

). (C) EXECUTION1

a. Ooncept of Operations

(1) Z/1 Cav (-)

(a) Be prepared to release HTT personnel and equipment to 54th Sig Bn when unit reverts to OPCON IFFV.

(b) Be prepared to release VHF personnel and equipment to 124tn Sig Bn when unit reverts to OPCON IFFV.

(z} 124th Sig Bn

(a) Continues present communications support to 1st Brigade, 2/8 Inr, 2/1 Cav and DIV TAC CP.

(b) Be prepared to deactivate communications systems in support Pf 1st Brigade, 2/1 Cav, 2/8 Inf and TAC CP and return personnel and e~uipment to Ga.mp Radcliff for standdown.

GROUP 4 DOWNGRADED AT J YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFT~R 12 YEARS •

(OHFIDENTIAt .