itthipon and amnat

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TitleItthiphon and Amnat : An Informal Aspect of ThaiPolitics(Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Issue)

Author(s) Tamada, Yoshifumi

Citation (1991), 28(4): 455-466

Issue Date 1991-03

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/56422

Right

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

Textversion publisher

KURENAI : Kyoto University Research Information Repository

Kyoto University


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Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No.4, March 1991

Itthiphon and Amnat: An Informal Aspectof Thai PoliticsYoshifumi TAMADA*

In the study of Thai politics, th e bureaucraticpolity model formulated by Fred W. Riggs morethan two decades ago remains th e dominantconceptual framework [Neher and Bidhya1984: 1]. Riggs [1966: 396] defined a bureaucratic polity "in terms of th e domination of th eofficial class as a ruling class." It was th eweakness or absence of extrabureaucraticforces capable of controlling th e bureaucracyeffectively that gave rise to th e phenomenon ofth e bureaucratic polity [Riggs 1966: 131; Girling 1981: 10]. It is widely recognized, however, that significant changes have occurred inThailand since th e Sarit regime (1958-63) thatnow challenge th e model. Th e present king hasgradually emerged as a significant political institution. Rapid economic development hasgiven rise to another important extrabureaucratic force, i.e. , political parties supported bybusinessmen who once were characterized aspolitically powerless "aliens" and "pariah"entrepreneurs by Riggs [1966 : 251-252].Businessmen's increasing political role is evident from th e number of MP s and cabinetministers with business backgrounds [Pisan andGuyot 1986: 30-36].

Were businessmen really so politically powerless before t he r ec en t development of repre-sentative democracy? Without electoral poli-* .:E. il l7i9::!., The Center for Southeast AsianStudies, Kyoto University

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tics, were they as powerless as farmers? Itdoes not seem plausible. Bureaucratic politytheorists, especially Thai scholars, seem tomake too much of the institutional or formalaspects of Thai politics, perhaps because theyoverestimate th e idea of amnat, which usuallymeans power. However amnat also means authority which derives from any official positionor is sanctioned by law. More important is thatthe Thai usually us e this word without clearlydiscriminating between power and legal authority. They often think of power as somethingderived from official authority. Th e word of"power" invokes among the Thai th e image ofthose who hold an official position and ar e givena certain authority by law. Thus, for th e Thai, aman of power is man of amnat. Governmentofficials (civil bureaucrats and military officers)head th e ranking, followed by politicians(cabinet ministers, members of parliament, provincial assemblymen, and municipal councilors),with kamnan (commune chiefs) and villageheadmen in the third place.On t he o th er hand, th e power which a man in

authority exerts beyond his authority or which aman without an official position exerts is calleditthiphon rather than amnat. Fo r example, th etop military brass often intervene in politics,even under a civilian government. Insofar astheir intervention is not based on law, they useitthiphon rather than amnat. A businessman

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who gives financial support to a political party ormilitary leader in order to influence thedecision-making of the government is not aphu-mi-amnat (a man of amnat) but a phu-miitthiphon (a man of itthiphon) because he has noofficial position. Power has a strong connotationof amnat or legal authority. While it is not easyto discriminate strictly between amnat anditthiphon, they are not identical. In a sense,amnat is formal power and itthiphon is informalpower.

This distinction has implications for the studyof Thai politics. It must be quite easy for theThai to accept the bureaucratic polity theoryjust because, according to Thai idea of amnat,bureaucrats have power a priori. The simpledichotomy of the model that government of-ficials are politically powerful and the.nonofficialare powerless coincides with the Thai conception of power. A man with an official positionhas amnat but a man with no position can haveonly itthiphon.

Riggs [1966: 339-346] rightly emphasizesthat influence (itthiphon) is very importantwithin the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he doesnot mention that the nonofficial can haveitthiphon and exert it over the official. Suchitthiphon often emerges in the form of a personal relationship. The clientelist framework oftenused in the study of Thai politics has the criticalweakness that it assumes that bureaucrats arenecessarily the patrons. 1) If we pay more atten-1) The larger Chinese businessmen maintained asymbiotic relationship with the 1bai elite fromthe 1930s to the 1970s. Generally, this relationship is thought to have resulted from thebusinesmen's powerlessness and defensive mo-tives. But they were not at the bureaucrats'mercy. Thai officials could serve on the boardsof Chinese firms "only so long as they remained

tion to itthiphon, it will become clear thatbureaucrats are not always patrons.

There are various types of itthiphon andphu-mi-itthiphon. Phu-mi-itthiphon try to exertitthiphon on phu-mi-amnat (government of-ficials) in order to pursue their own interests.This may be called polites of itthiphon, which isquite different from capital city politics (i.e.coups or parliamentary politics), which is run bypeople striving for amnat. Among phu-miitthiphon, businessmen are most prominent. 2)Businessmen have the most important sourceof itthiphon, i.e. , economic power, and canexert itthiphon over almost any bureaucrat atany level. They usually do so covertly, whichmakes it difficult to perceive. However, theitthiphon of the owner of illegal business overprovincial or district officials, who are fieldofficiers of the national bureaucracy and comeinto contact with local people daily, is comparatively easy to detect.

politically powerful and thus useful to theirChinese friends" [Cough1in 1976: 138]. Moreover, businessmen were not so weak that theycould not manage their business without thisrelationship. Not all businessmen resorted to it.There were few Chinese firms which went intobankruptcy when their 1bai partners suddenlylost power in 1973. On the contrary, businessmen were willing to enter into a close relationship with Thai officials just because theycould derive various privileges from it. For example, Sungsigh [1980: 154] quotes a famouseconomist's words: "[These] companies wouldnot pay more than what was due to them, so thatthey could receive a net benefit from the protection. " Such a relationship does not point tobusinessmen's powerlessness.

2) The ministry of interior has considered localphu-mi-itthiphon dangerous to social fairness andorder. It has advocated that they be suppressedand once classified them into 13 types, most ofwhich were businessmen [Thai Rat August 6,1985].6 -


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Y. TAMADA: ItthipJum and Amnat: An Informal Aspect of 1bai PoliticsA study of businessmen's itthiphon over pro

vincial and district officials (including the police)will serve to give a clear understanding of theimportance of itthiphon, as distinct from amnat,in Thai politics. I believe it will become clearthat businessmen are far from politically powerless, and that their power does not necessarilyderive from their significant role in electoralpolitics.

Economic ItthiphonThere is a wide gap in income between

businessmen and bureaucrats. A commentmade by a businessman in a small town pointsto the gap. "I want my children to receive ahigher education to win respect. I want them tobe merchants rather than bureaucrats becausethere is a wide gap in income between merchants and bureaucrats. One day's income for amerchant may be comparable to one month'ssalary for a bureaucrat" [Wanphen 1983: 69-70].Bureaucrats can, however, supplement their

low salary with money and services provided bybusinessmen. When a businessman wants abureaucrat to discharge his official dutiesswiftly, he needs to offer a bribe as lubricatingoil (yot namman).3) Bribery of this type is sowidespread that a newspaper calls thebureaucracy a commercim company collecting3) Riggs [1966: 249-254] explained the flow ofwealth from businessmen to bureaucrats in the1950s and 1960s in terms of extraction orsqueezing (nt-that). But the flow is not only theresult of squeezing, and can be classified intoseveral types. Simply, these are lubricating oil,open bribery (sinbon) and donation (borijak) fromthe standpoint of businessmen. From the stand-point of officials, they are squeezing and soliciting

(riarm).- 7

lubricating oil on the authority of approvm andlicense [Sayam Rat july 22, 1985]. It is noteasy, however, for bureaucrats to compel anordinary businessman to pay more than lubricating oil. Although the owner of an illegal business needs protection and is liable to extortion,he is usually willing to pay more without compulsion. Capitalizing on bureaucrats' avarice, hetries to make them collaborators in his illegalbusiness by providing them an economic in-terest. That many officials readily accept bribesis apparent from many cases where bureaucratshave connived to help or helped businessmenpursuing illegal interests. For example, officialsof the Deaprtment of Customs have assistedsmugglers [Thai RatMay 24, 1985]; officials ofthe Departments of Land, Local Administrationand Forestry have assisted in the illegal acquisition of title deeds [Dao Sayam june 9, 1985; SuAnakhot july 27, August 11, 1985]; officials ofthe Department of Forestry have cooperatedwith sawmill owners in the illegal lumbering offorests [Thai Rat February 10, 1985; BanMuang February 14, 1985; Daily News October 12, 1985]; officials of the Ministry of Defense have helped those eager to escape conscription [Matichon April 3, 1985; Naeo NaMay 3, 1985; Neher 1969: 319]; and officialsof the Department of Religious Affairs havehelped a businessman dig and steal the earth inthe compound of an uninhabited temple[Matichon june 15, 1984]. Some businessmenwith illegal businesses go farther, offering regular rather than one-off bribes, and paying protection money to the police in order to escaperaids on their businesses. Typical cases involvethe owners of casinos or brothels and managersof illegal lotteries [Thai Rat April 14, September 8, 1985; Matichon Sutsapda April 22,

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1984].Cases where bureaucrats are bribed by

businessmen and cooperate with them in anillegal business are too numerous to list. Abribed bureaucrat can enrich himself and dividesome of his bribes among subordinates to enhance his authority. Although he is a beneficiary, he must comply with bribers' various demands and, in fact, gives in to bribers' economicitthiphon.

This phenomenon would, of course, disappear if bureaucrats did not take bribes. Buteven unselfish bureaucrats tend to give in toeconomic itthiphon when they receive a donation from businessmen. It is also difficult forbureaucrats to manage without receiving donations. For example, provincial bureaucratsmust hold a lavish reception or farewell partywhen a colleague is transferred or a seniorofficial of the central government visits theirprovince. In many cases, government fundsand their own spare money are insufficient topay for the party and they must therefore asklocal people for their cooperation [Sayam RatSapdawijan October 6, 1985; Matichon Sutsap-da May 27, 1990]. Another good example ispublic construction projects. When bureaucratsplan a construction of a road, a bridge, or aschool and ask the central government for fund-ing, the central government does not alwaysallocate enough funds. A bureaucrat who iseager for rapid advancement must then raisefunds for the project locally. If he succeeds insoliciting contributions and carrying out the project with no or little expense to the government,he rises in the estimation of the central government [Haas 1979: 73; Krom Kanpokkhrong1979: 80-86].

In soliciting these contributions, a bureaucrat

cannot expect much of fanners, who usually arepoor and can contribute only voluntary labor.So he asks help of wealthy businessmen residing in a city or town and who are easy tocontact. In response to his request, businessmen contribute money, land or constructionmaterials, accommodate automobiles or construction machinery, and, in the case of hotel orrestaurant owners, provide servies at specialprices or free of charge [Preecha 1980: 93-94; Wanphen 1983: 68].

Businessmen make generous contributionslargely because they expect reciprocation fromthe bureaucrat concerned.4) The bureaucratfeels bunkhun (a debt of gratitude) and namjai(thoughtfulness, in this case, of the businessman toward himself) when he receives an indispensable contribution. If he materializes hisgratitude for their favors, businessmen will contribute more; but if he does not, they will showa negative attitude. Therefore he must repaytheir favors if he wants to solicit contributionson future occasions. A generous contributorwill receive prompter service when he visits adistrict office to apply for or register something.In addition, bureaucrats often bend the regulations and overlook dubious activities by contributors. According to Haas [1979: 79],businessmen "are glad to purchase it [the goodwill of the district officer] for a few thousandbaht in aid to the district's work rather than risk4) There are various reasons why businessmencontribute resources to the government. Theseare 1) religious merit-making; 2) social fame,

especially the prestigious decorations the kinggrants to generous donators; 3) benefits expected to result directly from the plannedproject; 4) reciprocation from the officials concerned. However, these contributions will decrease if officials do not reciprocate.8 -


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Y. TAMADA: Itthiphon and Amnat: An Infonnal Aspect of Thai Politicshaving to pay several times the amount in taxesif they are investigated." When bureaucratspurchase or construct something at governmentexpense, they may select contributors as contractors.

More important is that giving to bureaucratshelps businessmen build a close relationship(sensai) with them, especially such high officialsas district officers and provincial governors.Such relationships are significant because thesubordinates of the official concerned mustavoid letting their superior lose face and therefore may not disclose illegal activities of thoseclose to their superior. This means that illegalbusinesses or other activities by those whohave established close ties with high officials areoverlooked as long as the high officials themselves do not take a strong objection towardthem. For example, an acting police inspectorcould not arrest a constructor using illegallumber because a provincial governor asked him forspecial treatment [Thai RatOctober 21, 1984].There are frequent cases where a suspectabout to be arrested manages to avoid arrest byclaiming close ties with district or provincialhigh officials, military officers or politicians. Aphotograph taken with a high official or theofficial's calling card with signature is evidenceof a close relationship and often functions as auseful talisman.Although contribution is less binding onbureaucrats than bribery, it is an expedientmeans for businessmen to buy a close relationship with high officials. Firstly, they canoffer contributions openly because contributionslack apparent illegality. Secondly, the recipientof contributions is a high official who is responsible for various projects and functions.Lastly, a high official receiving repeated con-

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tributions assumes a debt of gratitude and willhesitate to expose or suppress irregularities onthe part of contributors, even though he maynot actively cooperate in them. Contribution isa safe and easy way to build a close relationshipwith a high official. Once a businessman succeeds in this, he can invite high officials toprivate family functions, such as funerals, weddings or birthday parties, and to an inaugurationceremony of his business. Also he may beinvited to various functions and parties held bythe high officials. These are good opportunitiesto show his close relationship with high officialsand to discourage their bureaucratic subordinates from meddling in his illegal activities. I f asubordinate meddles without his superior's permission, his superior loses face and may retaliate against him angrily [Matichon Sutsapda June10, 1984; Matichon September 27, 1984].Moreover, a businessman can use this closerelationship as a channel for bribery. If hesucceeds, the lured official will become an active cooperator with the businessman in pursuing illegal interests.

Former prime minister Prem Tinsulanon saidin 1978 when he was the deputy minister ofinterior: "Corruption for the most part resultsfrom groups of itthiphon and bureaucrats yielding to them" [Krom Kanpokkhrong 1979: 15].In this speech he admonished bureaucrats ofthe ministry of interior against receiving economic benefits from those pursuing illegal in-te rests and yielding to their itthiphon. Thegovernment has given warnings like this repeatedly. Moreover, the government providesthat bureaucrats cannot remain at the samepost for more than four years, partly to preventthem from yielding to itthiphon. But a wealthyChinese businessman boasts: "There is nothing

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impossible in Thailand as long as dogs [=bureaucrats] continue to eat [excrement, i.e.,small sums of money]" [Sawaeng 1971: 225].McVey [1984: 119] is right in observing that"the visible symbiotic relationship between district officials and Chinese merchants (the for-mer providing protection and permission, thelatter cash) showed that at the urban elite levelpeople were divided between those who couldbe bought and those who did the buying."Businessmen who exert economic itthiphonover bureaucrats and use them as collaboratorsin pursuing interests will not disappear as longas bureaucrats need bribes and contributions.To be sure, not every businessman pursues hisinterests in this way; and not every bureaucratyields to economic itthiphon. But businessmenwho can use bureaucrats as accomplices in il-legal activities are widespread in most parts ofthe country. This shows at least that businessmen are not the powerless subjects of bureaucrats' amnat.

Political ltthiphonBusinessmen can reinforce economic itthi

phon with political itthiphon. Here, the politicalitthiphon of businessmen means that businessmen can utilize the itthiphon of politicians, especially MPs, over bureaucrats.Bureaucrats fear politicians as the disbursersof reward or punishment. They can expose abureaucrat's irregularities in parliament [DailyNews August 27, 30, September 7, 21, 1985;Ban Muang September 20, 1985] or a provincial assembly Matichon May 9, 1985; DailyNews September 7, 1985]. As we have noted,many bureaucrats are involved in corruption.And in order to avoid exposure, they try to

cultivate good relationships with politicians.Secondly, a member of parliament can some

times have a say in the promotion or demotionof a bureaucrat [Lak Thai October 8-14, 1990;Matichon Sutsapda October 7, 1990]. As forsenior officials of the central government, it issaid that "officials who are not close with politi-cians cannot get posts, and those who are notobedient to politicians cannot get power.

. An official who is not close to or has nosensai with politicians cannot become directorgeneral" [Matichon October 7, 1984]. In-tervention by MPs in personnel administrationis not limited to the appointment of seniorofficials of the central government. Thaibureaucracy is highly centralized and senior of-ficials of the central government have the au-thority to appoint officials at provincial and district level. So an MP can put pressure on thesesenior officials to promote or demote local of-ficials [Matichon Sutsapda March 25, 1984]. Apoliceman said: "I ordered my men to inspect atax evasion. Later I knew that a powerfulpolitician was involved in this case. . . Mythree subordinates were dismissed from office

. at a high official's request" [Sayam RatSapdawijan July 7, 1985]. MPs cannot alwayspromote or demote bureaucrats as they please,because the bureaucracy does not welcome outside intervention. But it seems that the potential ability to reward or punish bureaucrats isawesome enough to make them obedient.Thirdly, politicians frequently meet with high

officials and can build close relationships withthem comparatively easily. Therefore bureaucrats are afraid of politicians and dare not prevent their illegal activities. For example, whenan exceptionally honest provincial chief of policeordered his men to arrest an MP who gambled

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Y. TAMADA: Itthiphon and Amnat: An Infonnal Aspect of Thai Politicsillegally at his house, some of his men disobeyed the order for fear of revenge, preferringto be transferred to another province ratherthan make the arrest [Matichon December 12,1984]. This case shows well how bureaucratsare afraid of politicians.

A businessman can use politicians' itthiphonin two ways other than by lobbying politicians.He may himself run for election and be elected,or he may play a critical role in an electioncampaign. Many businessmen are elected toparliament [Anek 1988: Table 1], a provincialassembly or a municipal council [Hsing-hsienJih-pao August 5, 6, 9, 31, September 9, 1985]because of their economic power. 5) In Thaielections, people called hua-khanaen (electioneers commanding a number of votes) playan important role because of the rarity of blockvotes of interest groups or political parties.Those who by some means can control theelectoral decisions of many people become huakhanaen. Kamnan, village headmen, teachers,landlords, nak-leng (tough guys who are kind totheir friends and cruel to their enemies) canbecome hua-khanaen. Candidates must compete for able hua-khanaen because the result ofan election depends on them so heavily, in fact,that some of them are murdered during electioncampaigns. Besides persuasion and/or intimidation, candidates' money to buy hua-khanaen and5) Most of these elected businessmen are ethnicChinese. Since the revision of the inunigrationact in 1950, which reduced the annual quota forChinese inunigration drastically, "many Chinesebusinessmen and industrialists have become Thaicitizens through the process of nationalization,while many more, as time passed, have departedor retired due to old age" [Pisan and Guyot1986: 22]. Thus most businessmen enjoy suf-frage, although some whose father is a foreigner

are still subject to a few minor restrictions.-11

to facilitate their gathering of votes is critical inthe struggle for hua-khanaen.

However, most businessmen do not stand forelection. Many provide candidates with electioncampaign funds in order to build close relationships with them. Some are also able to behua-khanaen who command a large vote. Atypical case is that of a trader of agriculturalproducts in a town [Preecha 1980: 216-219].He tries to buy crops in large quantity bygetting as many as possible of the farmers whofeel obligated to him, mainly because of economic dependence, to sell crops to him. Hemay well own several hundred rai ( l rai=0.16ha) of agricultural land with many tenant farmers. At the same time, poorer farmers mustrely on him for money, seeds, fertilizer, rice,medicines and transport facilities. Thus, he caneasily mobilize tenant or indebted farmers inelections. Moreover, he uses people in a villageas his agents and facilitates their buying ofagricultural products by providing them withcapital, information and other services. Theseagents can also be mobilized with their dependent farmers. As about 70% of labor force isengaged in agriculture, the ability to mobilizefarmers is very important. Siri [1985: 20]points out that: "Candidates in elections eitherto parliament or a provincial assembly will havea stronger possibility of being elected if theycan get local middlemen [agricultural traders] astheir hua-khanaen."

If a businessman successfully plays a criticalrole in an election campaign, he can form a goodrelationship with the politician concerned anduse his political itthiphon. Above all, a sponsoror hua-khanaen of MPs can exercise a greatitthiphon over bureaucrats. For example, anowner of a large-scale rice mill, who is an

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immigrant Chinese without political rights, summoned an honest policeman to his house anddemanded that he apologize for having fined atruck driver of his mill for violating the trafficlaw. The policeman refused the demand because he had done nothing wrong. The ownergot angry and threatened to have the policemantransferred to another province. His threatcame true shortly after, when a deputy ministerof interior who owed much to the mill-owner forhis election ordered the transfer. This caseshows vividly how a businessman can use political itthiphon. It is natural that bureaucrats areafraid of businessmen who have close relationships with politicians. For this very reason,some businessmen try to use politicians'itthiphon to the full. They run their clients, whoare often obscure persons, in a general electionand get them elected to parliament under theirown auspices. These MPs are at their beck andcall. Businessmen nicknamed Sia Leng, Kam-nan Po, the late Sia Yae and Sia Jiu are mostwell-known among them.

To be sure, some businessmen refrain fromintervening in politics because open politicalactivities may make them enemies and affecttheir business. Some have no interest in politi-cal itthiphon. However, a lot of businessmensupplement their economic itthiphon with political itthiphon.

Politics of Itthiphon and ElectoralPolitics

General Chawalit Yongjaiyut [1985: 7], a former army chief, referred to businessmen'sitthiphon in 1981: "[Some] capitalists are huakhanaen of MPs or cabinet ministers. Theypatronize government officials with whom they462

have direct or indirect relationships. To sumup,. . [they] are nothing but owners ofsovereignty pursuing interests with selfishpoliticians and bureaucrats as their representatives." Businessmen have such strong itthiphonover bureaucrats at the local level as to give aleading military officer cause for concern.There are some businessmen whom even aprovincial governor, who is thought to have thebiggest amnat in his province, cannot match.6)

Undoubtedly, the itthiphon of businessmenhas been augmented remarkably by the economic development since the Sarit regime,which has widened the income gap betweenthem and bureaucrats. Wealthy businessmenhave proliferated almost everywhere, even in6) A columnist of the most popular newspaper in

Thailand quoted a remark made by a provincialgovernor of Uttaradit province. "A provincialgovernor is no more than a spokesman for hisprovince. He cannot match local phu-mi-itthiphonin barami (grandeur) and power. They fell treesin the forest without authorization. They killanyone who obstructs them. Nevertheless, theyare socially prominent. Government.officials visitthem when the need arises. Officials ask themfor financial supports, borrow automobiles, askthem to be sponsors of a welcome party forsenior officials from Bangkok, and lastly askthem to procure girls for attendants to the seniorofficials. Their cooperation becomes namjai andbunkhun which officials should repay but cannotdo completely. Many high officials in the province becomes decorations and servants of phumi-itthiphon. For example, these officials areobliged to attend opening ceremonies of theirshops or funerals of their parents as main guests.They become big bugs in the province. Moreover, in Thai society wealthy people can buygreatness by donating money to charity. Theybecome famous and respected by donating only10 or 5 thousand baht to someone. In addition,they become close with people with high positionand increase their barami by donation [Thai RatJuly 18, 1985].

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Y. TAMADA: Itthiphon and Amnat: An lnfonnal Aspect of Thai Politicssmall townS. Akin [1983: 47] notes: "Recentchanges within the last one or two decadeshave affected the relationship in a number ofways. First, status of merchants which oncewas low has made a substantial gain. Wealtheven without bureaucratic status has come tobe accepted as the source of power. Withwealth as the sole resources, the capitalist magnates can even become the patron of thebureaucratic elites who are underpaid. It is theexchange between wealth and power of makingpublic decisions."However businessmen's itthiphon does not

seem to have arisen only within past one or twodecades. It has always derived from theirwealth. Coughlin [1976: 136] conducted fieldresearch in Thailand in the 1950s and reported:"I t is commonly said that the Chinese can buytheir way around almost any restrictions. "Bureaucratic corrupt ion and the close relationship between bureaucrats and businessmen,both of which were indivisibly related to latter'seconomic itthiphon, were even observed in thenineteenth century [Kanjani 1976] and are notnew phenomena. 7) Rather, they have becomeincreasingly conspicuous as a result of recent

7) For example, Luang Norakitborihan [1977: 1925] who later became director-general of thedepartment of local administration referred to abusinessman of itthiphon in his memoirs. In1927 when he was a district officer of Bangphlidistrict, Samutprakan province, a police inspector of the district was shot. The suspect was awealthy Chinese who owned a market and a ricemill in the town. He was a kamnan and theleader of an ang-yi (Chinese secret society).Because the suspect had a strong itthiphon overofficials of the district, Luang Norakit could notarrest him at once. Luang Norakit had to com-municate with senior officials of the central gov-ernment secretly, bypassing the provincial gov-ernor, to transfer a few district officials before he

economic growth.Businessmen's political itthiphon, on the

other hand, has been augmented great ly because political parties supported by businessmen have, since the mid-1970s, gained sufficient power to compete with the military.MPs under military or military-dominated governments had far less itthiphon than now. Butthis does not mean that MPs, provincialassemblymen and municipal councilors had noitthiphon at all. It was still better for bureaucra ts not to come into conflict with them. Moreimportantly, at this time, businessmen coulduse the itthiphon of military officers stationed invarious districts. Businessmen could mobilizematerial interests to build personal relationshipswith these officers and deploy the ir s trongitthiphon over civil officials [Matichon 1984:26-32]. Therefore , i t should not be thoughtthat businessmen have acquired both economicand political itthiphon over bureaucrats only inrecent years. They have continuously strengthened their itthiphon through untiring efforts formany decades.

In the study of the political role of businessmen in Thailand, most scholars tend to focus

could arrest the suspect with the help of 24policemen sent from Bangkok. In order toescape conviction, the suspect bribed witnessesand tried to offer the district officer a bribe of asmuch as 20 thousand baht. Failing in this, heundertook a campaign for the transfer of thedistrict officer. When the minister of interiorvisited the district, he firstly tried to offer theminister a gift in order to secure an audiencewith him to ask for Luang Norakit's transfer.Secondly he mobilized many people in the townto petition the minister for his transfer byslandering him. Although this attempt failed too,this incident shows clearly that a wealthybusinessman could exert itthiphon over bureaucrats at that time.

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only on their direct participation in electoralpolitics or trade associational activities. Bureaucratic polity theorists overestimate bureaucrats'amnat and argue that this should be limited byparliament, political parties or interestgroups. They make too much of the fonnal orinstitutional aspect of Thai politics and pay lessattention to its infonnal aspect. Even thosewho use the clientelist framework tend to com-mit the error of regarding bureaucrats a priorias patrons of businessmen. Businessmen withclose ties to bureaucrats are seen as the powerless who beg favors of the bureaucrats. Forexample, Jacobs [1971: 48] writes: "At best, aprivate individual who believes he has a politicalgrivance or interest to pursue can only hope toestablish some personal, individual (i.e. , patrimonia!) patron-client relationship with an of-ficial to insure that authority will not operate tohis disadvantage, especially at a time when he isleast prepared to deal with it." Yet how canthose businessmen who exert itthiphon andmanipulate the bureaucrats at will be powerless? If they cooperate with bureaucrats because of political powerlessness, the increasingpower of political parties supported bybusinessmen must decrease their cooperation.On the contrary, the development of parliamentary democracy has added fuel to the fire. Theemergence of political parties as a significantpolitical force has encouraged businessmen toexert itthiphon over bureaucrats more frequently and strongly. This means thatbusinessmen's use of itthiphon does not resultfrom their political powerlessness at all.Rather, their itthiphon is a sign of their politicalpowerfulness. They are the privileged class andare often patrons of bureaucrats.

It may be argued that businessmen exert

itthiphon mainly at the stage of policy imple-mentation rather than policy making, that theyinfluence policy making only to a limited extent,and that direct participation in parliamentarypolitics is more effective. However, itthiphon atthe implementation stage is no less importantfor businessmen who wish to protect and fur-ther their interests politically, for at least fourreasons.

The first reason is that government officialsat the local level do not necessarily implementpolicies or orders of the central governmentfaithfully and often mutilate them. Riggs [1966:361] notes: "It was only the formal authoritystructure that was highly centralized in the Thaibureaucratic polity. To a considerable degree,each of the subordinate agencies of the government was relatively autonomous in actual operations. The effective control of the center overits subordinate operating units was not verylarge. In other words, the real pattern of power.distribution was highly equivocal." The implementation of government policies is relativelyuncertain because of such autonomy on the partof bureaucrats, their deliquency, their selfinterest, or, in some cases, the infeasibility ofthe policies. "So basic a governmental functionas law and order is personal and not universal:it is extra clout that is made available to thosewho have access to (for example) the chief ofpolice. The idea of 'rule of law' is not natural toThai society; laws are seen merely as descriptive decrees, and to activate them one musthave a specific arrangement, effectively a contract between an individual and an officer orofficial" [McVey 1984: 116]. Even Sarit, whois famous for exercising the most authoritarianand certralized rule in modem Thailand, couldnot control the bureaucracy completely. For

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Y. TAMADA: Itthiphon and Amnat: An Informal Aspect of 1bai Politicsexample, he ordered the metropolitan policecommander and all provincial governors to suppress hooligans (anthaphan). Thousands ofhooligans were arrested and many of themwere sent to a reformation center in Bangkok.However some of them were not hooligans.Moreover, several provinces defied the orderand did not send hooligans to the center [SaphaWijai 1964: 96]. We can conjecture that, underother prime ministers, there must have beenever more room to bend state policies at theimplementation stage.The second reason is that the politics ofitthiphon waged between puh-mi-amnat (mainlybureaucrats) and phu-mi-itthiphon (mainlybusinessmen, but also others) is fairly stable.The famous vicious circle of Thai politics-acoup, a dissolution of parliament, a new constitution, a general election, and another coup- h a s shaken parliamentary politics seriously.But it has neither engendered an extensivereshuffle of the civil bureaucracy nor greatlyaffected local officials or the politics of itthiphon.Moreover, the transfer of all officials of a province or district to another place at one time,which would surely undermine the politics ofitthiphon, is inconceivable in any circumstances.

The third reason is that the politics ofitthiphon is accessible to many people. I t develops at every level of the bureaucracy.In some cases businessmen must bargainwith permanent undersecretaries or directorgenerals of the central government. But policyimplementors at the provincial or district leveltend to cooperate with businessmen because oftheir self-interest and because they are morevulnerable to itthiphon than their counterpartsin the central government. Therefore, manypeople can readily participate in the politics of

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itthiphon, according to the size of theiritthiphon. In addition to wealth, information,sensai with a high official, an ability to mobilize anumber of people, or even violence can be aneffective source of itthiphon.

The fourth reason is that bureaucrats respond immediately and certainly to successfulwielders of itthiphon. The size of benefits thatcan be achieved through the politics of itthiphonis usually smaller than that through parliamentary politics. However, policies and laws formulated in parliament must await implementationand may not be implemented to the letter.Thus, as a way of pursuing interests , the poli-tics of itthiphon can be said to exceed parliamentary politics in stability, accessiblity, im-mediacy and sureness.

Businessmen can translate their wealth intopolitical power through the politics of itthiphon,and as such constitute a significant part of Thaipolitical elite. That they are among the politicalelite is evident when we compare them withfarmers, who have little resources for itthiphonover bureaucrats. The politics of itthiphonmakes bureaucrats very partial and widens thegap between the rich and the poor. The politicsof itthiphon does not obviate the need for electoral politics for phu-mi-itthiphon: they canpursue more interests through parliamentarydemocracy. But it should be noted that theycan exert itthiphon even without parliament andeven under a seemingly bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. They can dispense with parliamentary democracy. The politics of itthiphonis a significant reason why a Thai political system characterized by weak legislature has survived. Under such a system the military andcivil bureaucracy may monopolize politicalamnat. However, they are not, as many

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bureaucratic polity theorists argue, strongenough to monopolize political power becausethey must share it with phu-mi-itthiphon.Furthermore, it is difficult to be optimisticabout the democratization of Thai politics, be-cause it is these participants in the politics ofitthiphon who are the main supporters of in-creasingly powerful political parties. It is un-pleasant for those enjoying various privilegesthrough the politics of itthiphon to endorse thefurther development of representative democracy or the realization of politics which canreflect the interests of the powerless masseswho are unable to participate in politics ofitthiphon.

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SawaengRattanamongkhonmat. 1971. Klwn Itthiphon.In Sat Kanmuang, edited by Chaianan Samutwanit, et al., pp. 210-237. Bangkok: Thai Watthanaphanit.

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