ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK:

Michael Somma

Professor Constance

May 7th 2011

Israel Seminar

The Israeli Intelligence Community: AMAN, Mossad, and Shabak

The Israeli Intelligence Community is the designation given to the complex of

organizations responsible for intelligence collection, dissemination, and research for the State of

Israel. The organizations are AMAN, Mossad, and Shabak. The Israeli Parliament overseas the

supervision over the intelligence community, specifically the Subcommittee for Intelligence and

Secret Services which is a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs and Defense committee which

supervises the entire Israeli Security Forces.1

The State of Israel has a history of tumultuous relations with its regional neighbors of

Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The largest portion of the conflict is primarily rooted within

the Palestinian community and the issue of a Jewish State. Since its inception in 1948, Israel has

been forced to earn its neighbors respect through the repeated establishment as a nation at arms.

Located in one of the most violent Arab regions of the Middle East, Israel must remain

constantly vigil about its border security and intelligence gathering. They are constantly under

threat from outside invasions and war, as well as foreign and domestic terrorism.2 In more recent

years, Israel’s relationship with Egypt and Jordan has improved, but tensions are still high with

its other neighbors, Syria and Lebanon. On a more global scale, their relations with the greater

Islamic world have suffered in the wake of the ongoing struggle with the Palestinians. In the

past, one of the major threats which Israel faced and will continue to face in the future comes

from Syria. The Syrian government has supported terrorist organizations which oppose Israel,

claiming that they are legitimate insurgent movements. Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian

Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) are some of the

1 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X083309342 (2011). CountryWatch. Israel: National Security. CountryWatch. Retrieved January 27, 2011 from http://0-www.countrywatch.com.library.anselm.edu/cw_topic.aspx?type=text&vcountry=83&topic=PONAS

many organizations which threaten Israel.3 These extremist organizations have attacked Israeli

interests over the years, including the use of violence against non-combatants. This commitment

to use terrorism to further progress political agendas continues to pose a major threat to Israeli

society. In addition to struggles associated with the Palestinian conflict, Israel is also a high

ranking member of potential targets for Islamic organizations, particularly al-Qaeda.4 The

response to living in such a desolate region is to create a reliable intelligence community.

The first of Israel’s intelligence arms is its central, supreme military intelligence branch

of the IDF, AMAN. It is divided into six branches: Air Intelligence Directorate, Naval

Intelligence Department, Intelligence Corps, Field Intelligence Corps, Sayeret Matkal – the

general staff reconnaissance unit, and the intelligence units of the four regional commands

(central, northern, southern, and home front).5 AMAN, which is short for the Directorate of

Military, was created in 1950 when the Intelligence Department was spun off from the IDF’s

General Staff. The Intelligence Department itself was composed largely of former members of

the Haganah Intelligence Service (HIS). AMAN is an independent service and not part of the

ground forces, navy, or the Israeli Air Force. It has a staff of approximately 7,000 personnel and

is currently headed by Major General Aviv Kochavi.6 The head of AMAN is the highest

intelligence officer in the IDF and engages in intelligence decision and policy-making at the

same level as the heads of Shabak and Mossad. Together, they form the three highest ranking,

co-equal heads of the Israeli Intelligence Community. The IDF intelligence branch specializes

3 (2011). CountryWatch. Israel: National Security. CountryWatch. Retrieved January 27, 2011 from http://0-www.countrywatch.com.library.anselm.edu/cw_topic.aspx?type=text&vcountry=83&topic=PONAS4 ibid5 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X083309346 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

mainly in SIGINT (electronic monitoring methods) through its 8,200 Signals Intelligence Units.7

By comparison these units are a small equivalent of the United States National Security Agency.

In addition, AMAN utilizes VISINT (visual intelligence) through an array of unmanned aerial

vehicles, special units responsible for aerial photography of enemy facilities, and numerous

satellites. Arguably, one of the most important assets of AMAN is its quality human resources.

Because of Israel’s compulsory military service, the intelligence branch enjoys a constant pool of

talented young people available to it in the computer and electronic fields as well as Arabic

fluent recruits who have specialized in Middle Eastern studies to serve in field intelligence units.

The gathering of quality intelligence is the first step to effectively respond to the threat of

terrorism. With the element of surprise eliminated, terrorists are unable to circumvent security

measures and prevent them from using the tactical methods of their choice. When effective

intelligence is available, security forces can be prepared to face threats and need not spread

themselves thin defending targets that are not under immediate threats. Compared to other

countries, Israel maintains such a large and resource rich intelligence community that a great

portion of its efforts are devoted to counterterrorism. For example, usually once a year, the

directors of the various intelligence agencies meet in order to set out intelligence objectives for

the following year. During these meetings, intelligence objectives from the past year are

analyzed, and objectives for the following year are laid out for potential. Directors from the

separate agencies take into consideration any changing circumstances and assessments received

from their units, then act upon the decisions. One of the major differences between Israel and

the United States takes place at this stage in the intelligence community. The United States is a

largely politically influenced nation; Israel on the other hand makes decisions with minimal

7 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

political interference. Agencies are granted a large measure of freedom regarding the operational

dimension of the intelligence information gathering.8

The second of Israel's intelligence bodies is Mossad (HaMossad leModi’in uletafkidim

Meyuchadim). Mossad is the national foreign intelligence agency of Israel and is also known as

the institute for Intelligence and Special Operations. The Mossad was formed on December 13,

1949, as the “Central Institute for Coordination” at the recommendation of Reuven Shiloah to the

Prime Minster David Ben-Gurion.9 Shiloah wanted a central body to coordinate and improve

cooperation between AMAN, Shabak, and the foreign office’s political department. In March of

1951, it was reorganized and made part of the Prime Minsters office, reporting directly to the

Prime Minster. Mossad is responsible for intelligence collection and covert operations which are

suspected to include targeted killings and paramilitary activities beyond Israel’s borders,

bringing Jews to Israel from countries where official Aliyah agencies are forbidden, and

protecting Jewish communities worldwide.10 Mossad’s operations have taken place in over thirty

countries including: the United States, Argentina, Uruguay, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Cyprus,

France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Norway, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Russia,

Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Tunisia,

Uganda, South Africa, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and New Zealand.11 Mossad’s motto is a quote from

the Bible; “Where there is no guidance, a nation falls, but in an abundance of counselors there is

safety,” Proverbs 11:14.

8 ibid9 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093410 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093411 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

In recent years, a prime focus for the Mossad has been global counter-terrorism, nuclear

weapons proliferation, and threats presented to Israel by Hezbollah and Iran’s nuclear program.

The largest department of the Mossad is Collections, tasked with many aspects of conducting

espionage overseas. Employees in the Collections Department operate under a variety of covers

including diplomatic and unofficial.12 Mossad’s field intelligence officers, called katsas,

meaning collections officer, are similar to the case officers of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Anywhere from thirty to forty officers operate at a time, mainly in Europe and the Middle East.

The Political Action and Liaison Department is responsible for working with allied foreign

intelligence services, and nations that have no normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

Additionally, the Mossad also has a Research Department, tasked with intelligence production

and a Technology Department concerned with the development of tools for Mossad activities.13

In addition to Israel’s military security service AMAN, and its foreign intelligence

service Mossad, Israel also maintains an internal or general security service known as Shin Bet.

Shin Bet is the English translation of Shabak, short for “Sherut haBitachon haKlai.” Shin Bet

maintains a motto, “Magen VeLo Year’e” which when translated into English means “defender

that shall not be seen,” or “unseen shield.”14 It is one of the three principal organizations of the

Israeli Intelligence Community alongside AMAN, and Mossad. Shabak is believed to have three

different operational wings under its umbrella. The first of which is the Arab Affairs

Department, which is responsible primarily for Arab related counter-terrorism activities in both

Israel and the Palestinian territories. The second is the Non-Arab Affairs Department which is

12 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093413 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093414 Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel

responsible for non-Arab security issues and cooperation with foreign security agencies. The

final branch is the Protective Security Department, which is responsible for protecting high-value

individuals and locations in the country such as government officials, embassies, airports, and

research facilities.15 Although Shabak is a security agency, it is not a part of the Israeli Ministry

of Defense, and its chief answers directly to the Prime Minister of Israel. Shabak is vital to

providing major internal security measures that safeguard the state of Israel from domestic and

foreign attacks. Shabak is responsible for exposing terrorist organizations, interrogating terrorist

suspects, and providing intelligence for counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip. In addition they utilize counter-espionage, provide personal protection of senior public

officials, secure important infrastructure and government buildings, and safeguard Israeli airlines

and overseas embassies.16

When Israel declared independence in 1948, Shabak was founded as a branch of the

Israel Defense Forces and was initially headed by Isser Harel, who would later head the Mossad.

The responsibility for Shabak’s activities was later moved from the IDF to the Office of the

Prime Minister. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Shabak’s duties included only internal

security affairs, but these obligations were extended to include counter-espionage and

surveillance.17 Shabak relies mainly on the gathering of human intelligence by foreign and

domestic agents. Shabak also utilizes informants from the local population in order to gather

intelligence about planned attacks or about the location of terrorist leaders. In addition, Shabak

is able to extract information through interrogation methods. In 1987, after complaints about

excessive use of violence, the Landau Commission prepared a report on Shabak’s interrogation

15 Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel16 Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel17 Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel

methods. In the commission, guidelines were drawn up condoning “moderate physical pressure”

when necessary. However, in 1999, the Israeli Supreme court heard several petition against

Shabak and their methods and ruled that Shabak did not have the authority to employ such

methods.18 Today, Shabak claims that it only uses psychological interrogation methods, although

groups like Amnesty International continue to accuse them of employing physical torture against

international conventions. Shabak also works tightly with the Israeli Air Force in order to carry

out successful precision air strikes against terrorist’s locations. Individuals or groups who are

most often targeted are field commanders and senior leaders of Palestinian militant

organizations. One specific example is Hamas, but other groups such as the Islamic Jihad, Al-

Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Fatah, and even al-Qaeda.19

Throughout Israel’s short, but tense, history, there has been a general issue about the

suitable structure of the intelligence community. Many questions and implications have arisen

over the years in response to the general security of Israel against outside forces. One such

question has been how to divide responsibilities and jurisdictions between AMAN, Mossad, and

Shabak. The division of labor among the agencies of AMAN, Shin Bet, and Mossad, is

established upon a geographical basis. There are interfacing and overlapping segments that are

often rather wide among the organizations. The level of coordination and inter-regional

cooperation has suffered in the past from fundamental shortcomings, hindering the effectiveness

of intelligence work on several fronts. The organizations repressed the necessity for the mutual

sharing of intelligence information and in synchronizing some activities. Another issue has been

the format of work for the three intelligence agencies in relation to the Prime Minister. Various

18 Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel19 Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel

commissions and individual inspectors were appointed throughout the years, whether from

traumatic experiences or as a matter of routine, in order to examine the issues and propose

recommendations. These commissions were the Yadin-Sherf Commission (1963), the Agranat

Commission (1973-1974), the Zamir Commission (1974), the Commissions of Aluf Aharon

Yariv (1984, 1986), and the Commission to investigate the intelligence network following the

War in Iraq (2004). The government was often tasked with the responsibility to inspect the

weaknesses of the intelligence community then report back to the Prime Minister in order to fix

problematic issues. Any issues that were discovered are submitted to the Knesset who will

ultimately come to a decision.

Israel is the only liberal democracy today in which a military intelligence service

functions as the leading national intelligence estimator, not only in military but also in civilian

affairs. Any issue considered being relevant to the state’s security, such as economic, political,

and social, is collected by a military intelligence service.20 Israel maintains a unique model for

their intelligence services – which is primarily directed towards the threat of a sudden

conventional attack. The IDF is relatively isolated from politics and subordinated to the civilian

government, unlike other countries. The IDF also plays a very substantial role not only in

security affairs, but also in all aspects of Israel’s nation-building. The level of military influence

which AMAN has on the national level of policy making in both security and non-security

matters and affairs is intriguing. Most scholars accept the Six Day War in 1967 as the event that

triggered the expansion of the army’s role in national security affairs.21

20 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

21 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

The Directorate of Military Intelligence is the institution which sets Israel’s national

agenda each and every year. There are two aspects of the relations between AMAN and its

civilian consumers which make Israel distinctive and make the study of the impact of military

intelligence on national policy making necessary.22 Developed democracies in other parts of the

world regard such an arrangement for unhealthy democratic life, primarily since it imbues the

military with too much power, weakens the power of civilian institutions, and blurs the border

between civilian and military authority. All of these concerns create a fear that including the

military in functions that are primarily non-security issues may lead to a military intervention in

politics. For this reason, democracies usually assign the mission of national intelligence

estimation to a civilian body such as the CIA in the United States, the Joint Intelligence

Committee in Britain, and the Bundesnach-richtendienst in Germany.23 Israel maintains two

explanations for such an arrangement of their intelligence agencies. The first reason is official

and functional, and rests on two facts. Israel is ranked at the top of the world’s order of

“fightaholics,” so dealing with military threats naturally dominates its foreign policy. The

second reason is to provide a warning against an incoming surprise Arab attack. The threat of a

coordinated surprise attack by the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria instituted the

main threat to the country.24 Therefore, providing a warning against such an attack against the

Israeli homeland is the most important mission for Israel’s intelligence community. The

argument during the Six Day War in 1967 was that since most indications of war preparation are

a military task, it is only natural that the military intelligence would excel. Unfortunately, this

argument has become less convincing over the past forty years. Certain factors have reduced the

22 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093423 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093424 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

threat significantly of a sudden coordinated Arab attack. Israel’s territorial gains in the 1967

war, the peace accords with Egypt and Jordan, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the

Soviet Union, and the American hegemony in the international system since the early 1990’s

have drastically reduced the threat.25 Two new types of threats have emerged since then. The

first is the new threat of terrorism, popular uprisings in the occupied territories, and low-intensity

conflict, mainly with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. The second threat is a growing

arsenal in neighboring states, the most important of which is Iran’s nuclear program.

Traditionally, military intelligence played a lesser role in dealing with sub conventional

and nonconventional threats, the general security services gained an impressive record in

combating terrorism, and Mossad played a major role in causing the failure of nonconventional

projects. Jewish and Israeli lessons of history have inspired a siege mentality, and a quest for

absolute security, both of which contribute to the belief that a military officer is the most capable

person to deal with security issues.26

One of the most remarkable success stories of Israeli intelligence came on the night of

July 3, 1976. On this night, an Israeli Defense Force commando unit gained control of the old

terminal of the Entebbe airport in Uganda.27 The mission was to free ninety-eight Jews and

Israeli citizens who were being held hostage there. These hostages were the passengers of Air

France Flight 139, a jet airliner that was hijacked the week before during a flight from Israel to

Paris. The hijackers were two Germans from the Red Army Faction and two Palestinians from

25 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093426 Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X0833093427 (ed.), James J. F. Forest. (2007). Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Retrieved May 9, 2011, from Praeger Security International Online database: http://0-psi.praeger.com.library.anselm.edu/doc.aspx?q=&newsearch=&c=&p=0&s=&newindex=1&orig_search=Mossad&adv_search=1&num=1&freeform=&op_0=&term_0=Mossad&index_0=words&d=/books/gpg/C9035/C9035-3989.xml&i=4

the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Palestinians joined the flight during a

stopover in Athens and forced the pilots to land the plane in Benghazi, Libya, where ten more

Palestinians joined the assault. The plane then redirected its path to Entebbe, Uganda. This

commando unit was from the elite General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (GSRU or Sayeret

Matkal).28 This is just one of the many missions and stories of heroic actions taken by Israeli

Special Forces to protect Israeli citizens worldwide. Until the days of hijacking, Israeli

intelligence in central Africa had been negligible. The success of organizations and their

operations in the intelligence community is measured particularly by the success and outcomes

of their operations. For example, the success in the fight against terrorism should be defined and

measured by a decrease in the number of terrorist events, the number of victims, and even the

complete eradication of terrorism. A close look at intelligence operations carried out by Israel

against terrorist organizations reveals impressive tactical accomplishments. Some of which are

the infiltration of terrorist networks in the far corners of the globe, effective gathering of

intelligence, and prevention of high profile attacks before they can be lifted off the ground.29

Israel maintains a large and resource-rich intelligence community that devotes a great

portion of its efforts to counterterrorism. Usually once a year, the directors of the various

intelligence agencies meet in order to set out intelligence objectives for the following year.

During these meetings, intelligence objectives for the following year are laid out for analysis.

Directors from the separate agencies take into consideration any changing circumstances and

assessments received from their units. One of the major differences between Israel and the

United States takes place at this stage in the intelligence community. The United States is a

largely politically influenced nation; Israel on the other hand makes decisions with minimal

28 ibid29 ibid

political interference. Agencies are granted a large measure of freedom regarding the operational

dimension of the intelligence information gathering.30 This freedom allows Israel to gather

intelligence and utilize methods of information gathering in ways which the United States

cannot.

Israel has a difficult job gathering intelligence on terrorist organizations and trying to

prevent attacks before they happen. Unfortunately for the intelligence community, the

operational maps of terrorist organizations are not as cut-and-dried as they seem. For example,

Palestinian groups frequently operate simultaneously in the occupied territories, in Arab lands

and in other countries, especially Europe and Africa. In addition, they most likely cooperate

with groups and other governments within those countries. If such a situation occurs, Israeli

intelligence agencies must expand their operations and may encroach on the territory of another

agency. For this reason the intelligence community is divided into different segments, and is

responsible for their own intelligence gathering.

The intelligence coordinators of the agencies are divided into defined sectors and are

responsible for enlisting collaborators and collecting information regarding the current situation

inside of their sector. For example, the interrogation methods of the general security service play

its part in HUMINT (human intelligence).31 Its agents utilize sophisticated methods of

interrogation in the field and in detention facilities to extract intelligence on the structure and

intentions of terrorist organizations. The methods used are based upon psychological stress and,

until the early 1980’s, included the use of physical force. In comparison, Mossad has been

entrusted with many tasks involving counterterrorism since the 1960’s. However, its HUMINT

methods are somewhat different. Besides the officer’s stationed around the globe who recruit

30 ibid31 ibid

agents or collaborators from within various terrorist groups, the agency also controls a network

of citizens in various countries who supply information.32 On the forefront of Mossad HUMINT

gathering activities are its agents, the regular spies who take on false identities and infiltrate

enemy countries or terrorist networks. Jurisdictional boundaries for the analysis and evaluation

of intelligence are also blurred among the intelligence community’s different agencies. In

contrast to the IDF intelligence, however, Shabak and Mossad are civilian bodies with an

extremely limited pool of human resources.33

A comprehensive look at the issues regarding the Israeli intelligence community reveals

that failure lies in the gap between the flexibility of groups that constantly change shape, place,

and tactics, and the inflexibility of most established and conservative intelligence agencies. The

tendency of agencies to be fixated on certain conceptions, the result of a combination of too little

information, and too much pressure to produce results and assessments creates an additional

problem. Gaps between existing information and assessments are frequently filled with

guesswork, dependence on superficial knowledge of the subject, and past experience. The fact

that only limited resources are available to the Israeli intelligence community only serves to

strengthen the conviction that each of the agencies should specialize in a certain field of

intelligence gathering, and then share its findings with other agencies. In actuality, each agency

does collect its own HUMINT and VISINT, and engages in research and operations.34 It is

responsible to suppose that a clear division of the roles of agencies and a central intelligence

body would bring about more effective and widespread information sharing.

It has been clearly established that quality intelligence is the first step in an effective

response to the threat of terrorism. Intelligence eliminates the element of surprise that allows

32 ibid33 ibid34 ibid

terrorists to circumvent security measures, and prevents them from using the tactical methods of

their choice. When effective intelligence is available, security forces can be prepared to face

actual threats and need not spread themselves thin defending targets that are not under immediate

threats. The Israeli intelligence community is critical to the effective evaluation and

dissemination of intelligence. The three main entities of their intelligence community strive to

analyze raw information as fast as possible in order to prevent attacks.35

Joseph, Uri Bar. (2009, May 29). Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator: The Case of Israel. Armed Forces & Society, 36(3) 505-525. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X08330934

Emanuel, Vald. (1992, December 12). The Wald Report: The Decline of Israeli National Security since 1967. Politics and Military in Israel

Lefebvere, Stephane. (2004). A Look at Intelligence Analysis. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 17(2) 231-264.

35 ibid

Gazit, Shlomo. (Summer, 1981). Risk, Glory, and the Rescue Operation. International Security, 6(1) 111-135.

(2011). CountryWatch. Israel: National Security. CountryWatch. Retrieved January 27, 2011 from http://0-www.countrywatch.com.library.anselm.edu/cw_topic.aspx?type=text&vcountry=83&topic=PONAS

(ed.), James J. F. Forest. (2007). Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. Retrieved May 9, 2011, from Praeger Security International Online database: http://0-psi.praeger.com.library.anselm.edu/doc.aspx?q=&newsearch=&c=&p=0&s=&newindex=1&orig_search=Mossad&adv_search=1&num=1&freeform=&op_0=&term_0=Mossad&index_0=words&d=/books/gpg/C9035/C9035-3989.xml&i=4