israel (1990) - epistemology and sociology of knowledge

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Epistemology and Sociology of Knowledge: An Hegelian Undertaking Author(s): Joachim Israel Source: Sociological Perspectives, Vol. 33, No. 1, Critical Theory (Spring, 1990), pp. 111-128Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1388980Accessed: 07-05-2015 14:37 UTC

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Sociological Perspectives Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 111-128 Copyright ?c 1990 Pacific Sociological Association ISSN 0731-1214

EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE:

An Hegelian Undertaking JOACHIM ISRAEL University of Lund

ABSTRACT: The relationship between epistemology and the sociology of knowledge is discussed. It is asserted that epistemology is logically basic to the sociology of knowledge. Epistemology in turn has to be founded in the analysis of the nonformalized logic inherent in everyday language. The relationship between epistemology and the sociology of knowledge is discussed and exemplified, first, by an analysis of the concept of false consciousness. If discussed in an epistemological context, it is argued, the analysis of false consciousness leads to unsolvable difficuilties, whereas its treatment as a sociological problem of knowledge is adequate. A second illustration contrasts the two approaches and involves an analysis of the Neo-Kantian foundations of Durkheimian and Weberian sociology. Finally, attention is directed towards Habermas's theory of commuinicative action. Whereas Habermas tries to abandon epistemological problems and give his theory a sociological anchoring, it is argued that a theory of language and communication must make its point of departure from an epistemological analysis in order to avoid an abstractive fallacy.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY'

Historically speaking, sociology originated in philosophy, and as sociology found its own identity, two different relations evolved between it and philosophy.2 The first was characterized by its attempts to develop sociology into an independent and positivist science. As a consequence, sociology tried to cut its umbilical cord to philosophy. As the science of sociology developed, many took this "end of philosophy" to be a challenge and summons. On the one hand, sociologists found in philosophy's "death" the temptation to declare the Aufhebung [sublation] of philosophy and tried to transform it into a field of sociological inquiry. These sociological aspirations, founded upon the notion of the social roots of knowledge and upon the

Direct all correspondence to: Joachim Israel, University of Lund, Mattssonsliden 23, 413 18, Gothenburg, Sweden



112 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES Volume 33, Number 1, 1990

"sociologization" of the philosophy of science, aimed at replacing epistemology with the sociology of knowledge.

As a consequence of these efforts, the following dilemma has arisen: if, on the one hand, we accept the assertion that all knowledge is socially conditioned, then the classical problem posed by self-defeating relativism becomes paramount. For if all knowledge is socially relative-or speaking in terms of a crude Marxist interpretation, class-dependent-then we must allow for the possibility that the very assertion of knowledge's relative truth is itself relative in its truth value. That is, if one agrees with the assertion that all knowledge is relative, then the assertion is true only under certain social circumstances and false under others. On the other hand, if we reject the assertion as being false, we cannot assume that all knowledge is relatively true. For if it were, we would have to assume that there exists knowledge which is absolutely true.

So much for the first direction which sociology's attempted emancipation from philosophy took. The second direction involved the transformation of Kantian transcendental philosophy into a problem of the logic of validity- one in which the fundamental processes of social interaction and the struc- tures they themselves generate become the new grounding for epistemological validity. Such an approach attributes to society itself a quasi-transcendental function for validating ideal social configurations, as well as moral values. An early sociological champion of this approach was Durkheim, while, more recently, a similar synthesis has been attempted by Habermas in his theory of communicative action. As I argue later, this attempt to find a foundation for epistemology in sociology is plagued by the general problems which any foundationalism in epistemology raises. Moreover, as seen later in our analysis of Habermas, this particular attempt of foundationalism in sociology also raises the question of where such a foundational sociology will itself estab- lish its own epistemological criteria.

This paper discusses the strengths and uncertainties of both epistemology and the sociology of knowledge and the ways in which each has used the other to solve its own pressing problems. My method of argument takes the form of a series of demonstrations as to how each approach has addressed certain issues which have been crucial in shaping sociological discourse. I begin this set of illustrative comparisons by showing how epistemology and the sociology of knowledge have handled the problem of false consciousness. Then, the discussion moves to a consideration of the different paths which Durkheim and Weber, adhering to the Marburg and Heidelburg Schools of Neo-Kantianism, respectively, took as they studied society at the turn of this century. Finally, I conclude with a brief, critical appraisal of Habermas's communicative action theory, the foremost contemporary expression in modern sociology of the sociological approach to foundationalism.

Before beginning, however, I would like to present four theses which guide my argumentation concerning the relationship between epistemology and the social sciences:



EPISTEMOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 113

1. Myfirst thesis rejects the scientistic claim which identifies scientific knowledge with knowledge in general. The acquisition of scientific knowledge is not an instrumental matter in the sense that the use of correct methods is sufficient to ensure the scientific value of the empirical results obtained.

2. The second thesis claims that the sociology of knowledge on the one hand, and epistemology as a branch of philosophy on the other, represent different and separate fields of knowledge, and that the two should not be confused.

3. My third thesis is related to the second in that it asserts that epistemology is not only basic to the sociology of knowledge, but that this relation is a logically necessary one.

4. Finally, the fourth thesis is that the problem of the foundation of epistemology itself can be resolved without recourse to transcendental philosophy.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I want to mention how I use the term "epistemology." In German philosophical discourse, the term Erkennt- nistheorie often is reserved for Kantian transcendental philosophy, i.e., investi- gating the transcendental presuppositions for the possibility of Erkenntnis, or "productive knowledge." Since, for logical reasons, I rule out transcendental approaches of any kind, I use the term "epistemology" in a much broader sense, to refer to those efforts that in general try to answer questions such as: "What is knowledge?"; "How do we obtain or construct knowledge?"; "What is the meaning of the distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'?"; "Does it make sense to speak of 'tacit knowledge'?"; and so on.

THE NOTION OF FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS We can best appreciate the radically different visions of social reality which epistemology and the sociology of knowledge provide by comparing the Leninist and Hegelian-Marxist conceptions of class consciousness. Having played an important role in Marxist theorizing, as well as in political praxis, the concept of false consciousness is a natural vehicle by which to illustrate the confusions in both thought and action which come from mixing up problems of the sociology of knowledge with problems of epistemology.

Let me begin by reminding the reader that the word "consciousness" in classical German philosophy is often used synonymously with "knowledge." Hence, "false consciousness" is habitually used to mean any "false knowledge" which might influence a person's actions. Keeping this usage in mind, we can better grasp what is at stake when theorists maintain that the Leninist interpretation of the concept places analysis in an epistemological or quasi-epistemological framework, whereas its opposite, Hegelian-Marxist interpretation, places it within the sociology of knowledge paradigm.3 Thus, in the Leninist interpretation the opposite of "false consciousness" is "true consciousness," whereas in the Hegelian-Marxist interpretation false con-




sciousness' antipode is "class-consciousness." The Leninist interpretation is based on two assumptions:

1. The scientistic belief that truth can be achieved through science alone, that Marxism not only represents historical and social science per se, but that its theoretical assumptions by and large already are verified and therefore can be applied to daily political life. It goes without saying that this scientistic orientation is contradictory to the Hegelian notion of Marx- ism as critical science.

2. A scientific understanding of the social world, e.g., the nature of capi- talism, can only be mastered by intellectuals, trained in scientific methods.

From these two assumptions of Leninist thought can be derived the notion that the working class cannot through its own efforts achieve a true consciousness. Moreover, working from these same premises, it can be argued that certain intellectuals who appear to be radical, but have an incorrect scientific stance, actually contribute to the creation of false consciousness. The line demarcating "false" and "true" consciousness, then, is drawn using canons of a naturalistically and positivistically conceived science. Thus, the Leninist interpretation, by counterposing "false consciousness" against "true" scientific knowledge, places the problem in a quasiepistemological framework. This line of reasoning, however, contradicts the Leninist version of the copy theory of knowledge, and exposes an unsolvable set of difficulties within the Leninist theory of false consciousness.4

In an Hegelian-Marxist interpretation, the problem of "false consciousness" is treated as a sociological reality which is rooted in a specific social and historical context. In order to speak of "false consciousness" from this specific sociology of knowledge perspective, the theorist must presuppose a theory of class, one which maintains that society is divided into different classes and assumes that these classes have opposite interests and goals. Once having acquired knowledge of these interests and goals, how they relate to the existing social structure, and the constraints which are imposed by it, a person ought to be able to act in accordance with the interests of the class to which he belongs. Possessing this knowledge and being able to act accordingly is labeled as action based upon "class-consciousness," the opposite of which is "false consciousness."

The main characteristics of this approach is that class-consciousness as well as false consciousness are correlative concepts. Their content depends on the social context in which they are developed and used. Furthermore, they are integrated into a specific class theory. These two characteristics- the relativity of the concepts and their placement within a sociological theory-situate this approach within the field of the sociology of knowledge external to epistemology's problematic. The theories of Lukacs (1971) and Gramsci (1971) exemplify this latter approach to the study of false conscious-




ness in that both base their work upon an Hegelian epistemology. That is, both accept the fundamental notion that "natural" consciousness is grounded in sense experience, that as it develops it evolves its own contradictions, and, finally, that through a dialectical development utilizing critical reflection and reconstruction this "empirical consciousness" is raised to self-consciousness. The Hegelian-Marxist approach to the problem of consciousness thus sees class-consciousness as well as false consciousness as being mediated. Medi- ation, however, though socially conditioned in the concrete, is also a category of Hegelian logic. It is, therefore, meaningful in an epistemological context, especially in its ability to distinguishes between essence and appearance.

The conclusion I want to draw from this first comparison is the following: in the Leninist conceptualization of class-consciousness, a problem which ought to be handled within the framework of the sociology of knowledge is treated as a quasi-epistemological problem. In doing so, the problem of class-consciousness is rendered both untestable and unsolvable. In the Hegelian-Marxist approach, however, the same issue is conceived and treated as a problem of the sociology of knowledge, being in turn rooted in Hegelian epistemology and logic. Once defined as a problem in the field of the sociology of knowledge, class-consciousness can be formulated as a sociological problem-one that can be empirically formulated and tested. In this latter setting, the solution arrived at depends on the adequacy of the sociological analysis employed. Moreover, this solution to the problem of class- consciousness is such that it can be grounded in an epistemological theory that treats both the sociology of knowledge and the problem of epistemology as two distinct, but related, elements of a unified conceptual strategy. As such, social science and philosophy remain functionally differentiated and interdependent. The one cannot replace the other.

NEO-KANTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES The second direction which the sociologization of philosophy took can be traced to the Neo-Kantian transformation of Kantian critical philosophy. Traditionally, it has been assumed that in classical sociology, e.g., in the works of Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber, we still find a close connection between sociology and epistemology. In elaborating upon this theme, Rose (1981) has put forward the bold hypothesis that "the very idea of a scientific sociology, whether non-Marxist or Marxist is only possible as a form of neo-Kantianism" (1981:1-2). Without going too far into the way she substan- tiates this idea, let me quickly give a short account of it. Rose argues that critical, Kantian transcendental philosophy was transformed into a neo- Kantian methodology which expressed itself as a logic of validity. She distinguishes between two such methodologies. One method concerns itself with the nature of Geltung (validity) and gives this question priority over a second issue which preoccupied the Neo-Kantians-that of Werte (value).




The emphasis on problems of validity was preeminent in the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, while the so-called Heidelburg School gave priority to the question of values. Within classical sociology, Durkheim represents the first stance, while Weber exemplifies the second.5

For both schools, criticism of Kant changes the Kantian question of the validity of judgments concerning experience, morality, and beauty into the general question of the nature of validity. The neo-Kantian approach did not, in contrast to Kant's classical formulation of the critical method, base its foundation upon the unity of consciousness. In simultaneously rejecting the philosophy of consciousness and endorsing a critique of psychologism, both schools developed their own versions of a scientific sociology. Among those who followed the Marburg School, e.g., Durkheim, "consciousness" and the "individual" were replaced by notions such as "collective representation," while the theoretical constructs of "society" and "culture," as exemplified by Weber's approach, guided the Heidelburg School. For both schools, society in one form or another, instead of individual consciousness, became the quasi-transcendental condition for assessing the validity of theoretical and moral judgments. Thus, Rose maintains: "It was the ambition of sociology to substitute itself for traditional theoretical and practical philosophy, as well as to secure a sociological object-domain sui generis" (1981:14). Neo-Kantian sociologists of both schools grounded their concerns for validity in a quasi- transcendental sociological domain. In the case of Durkheim, it was society, now elevated to a sui generis reality; in the case of Weber it was culture. Both "society" and "culture" were thought to confer validity on social facts as well as on moral values. Rose elaborates her thesis by maintaining that "the development of the idea of a scientific sociology was inseparable from the transformation of transcendental logic into Geltungslogik, the paradigm of validity and values" (1981:13).

This transformation of Kantian transcendental epistemology into a series of methodologies concerned with ascertaining the basis of validity implied that epistemological problems could be transformed into problems of the sociology of knowledge. This assumption is exemplified in the works of Durkheim. As he tried to conceptually construct the validity of moral values from the study of society itself, he gave the question of validity priority over the question of values. For him, moral values and judgments obtained their validity through the fact that they were a product of society and that society was itself a sui generis phenomenon. That is, moral authority gains its validity not from the fact that it is society that formulates moral rules, but from the opposite fact-that society a priori possesses a moral authority which enables it and it alone to formulate moral rules. Moral and judgmental validity, in other words, obtains because society warrants it.

Durkheim on several occasions not only points out that his critical questions are of a Kantian kind, but offers them as alternatives to Kant's mapping




of practical reason. For example, he attempted to create a synthesis between an aprioristic and an empiricist position of his day. "Society is a reality sui generis," he says, but we should not forget, he continues, "that even if society is a specific reality it is not an empire within an empire; it is a part of nature and indeed its highest interpretation. The social realm is a natural realm, which differs from the others only by a greater complexity" ([1915] 1976:18). As a consequence, socially created categories, according to Durk- heim, "are not devoid of all objective value" (1976:8) since they also apply to "nature" and are even founded in nature.

But "nature," the "social realm," and their interrelationship are in this context subjective, not objective. That is, they are cognitive constructions, or as I prefer to say, "ways of talking." As such, they are a part of Durkheim's attempt to transform Kantian epistemology into a sociology of knowledge. Thus, his references to "nature" confer upon his "categories" neither more nor less "objectivity." Instead, Durkheim attempts to unify apriorism and empiricism in order to save his sociology of knowledge from relativism, for if the latter is allowed to go unanswered, it would have contradicted his apriorism. Durkheim claims that his solution "keeps all the essential princi- ples of the apriorists, but at the same time it is inspired by that positivist spirit which the empiricists have striven to satisfy" (1976:19). Contrary to all his efforts, however, Durkheim could neither save apriorism from relativism, nor relativism from apriorism. Rather, he opened himself up to the full set of criticisms which are leveled against both positivism and quasi-transcendental epistemologies.

Weber, by contrast, gave priority to values and used them as a sociological lever for studying the legitimacy of social orders. He makes it clear that cultural phenomena presuppose Wertideen, ideas concerning value. "Der Begriff Kultur ist ein Wertbegriff" ["The concept of culture is a value concept"], he says (1968:28) and continues this theme by asserting that empirical reality only becomes "culture" because and insofar as it is related to ideas concerning values. Thus, aspects of empirical reality gain significance for us because they are related to cultural values. Finally, Weber makes it clear that a transcendental precondition for any cultural science is the fact that human beings belong to a culture and for that reason can take a conscious position toward the world and transmit meaning to it (1968:33).

Rose concludes her discussion with a critique of the Neo-Kantian problematic by suggesting a corrective to the validity problem. Working from a Hegelian position, she points out that "a paradoxical result of Durkheim's granting priority to validity over values and of Weber's granting priority to values over validity, is that Durkheim produced an 'empirical' sociology of values (moral facts) and Weber produced an 'empirical' sociology of validities (legitimate orders)" (1981:21). As a remedy, she recommends the application of three ideas basic to Hegelian philosophy to the study of society. Using a modernized version of Hegelian thought, she advocates: (1) a phenomeno-




logical analysis of our knowledge, (2) the consideration of the absolute Sittlichkeit (i.e., ethics, or socially created moral norms, which for Hegel differs from individual morality as such) in order to bridge the gap between theoretical and practical reason, and (3) developing a logic for overcoming the dualism between consciousness and actuality-or as one would phrase it today-between language and reality.

This latter suggestion, because it is grounded in something as fundamental as language, shows especial promise, for as Hegel noted:

Was wirklick ist kann wirken; seine Wirklichkeit gibt etwas kund durch das, was es hervorbringt. Sein Verhalten zu Anderem ist die Manifestation seiner.

[That which is actual can act. Its actuality comes to light, through that which it accomplishes (or creates). Its conduct in relation to other things is the manifestation of itself] (1969:208).

It is by means of our actions that we construct the world both cognitively- linguistically and materially, and it is through acting on the world that we encounter the reaction of the world to us and our acts. The notion that we actively, but not arbitrarily, construct the world becomes central to Rose's suggested reorientation of sociology. This means that we must begin with the assumption that knowledge is created in an ongoing process instead of assuming that it is obtained passively, e.g., by representation of the world mirrored in our consciousness. This position provides us with an epistemological starting point. This is a well-known position in the philosophy of praxis as developed, e.g., by Kosik (1967). A second, related requirement entails the reconstruction of a logic inherent in our everyday language. Our point of departure must be, as I will argue later, the analysis of our everyday language and its inherent non-formalized logic. In order to speak about society as sui generis or to treat culture from a quasi-transcendental point of departure, we must already have acknowledged in the very act of speaking that most elementary, if implicit, premise concerning the human condition: that we possess a language and are able to use it correctly.

The primordial position of language relative to things social and cultural can be formulated in a different way. When Durkheim speaks about "Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse" or when anybody else speaks about anything being elementary, we first ought to ask what elementary facts of speaking enable us to speak correctly about things which are themselves "elementary." In other words, if we want to speak correctly about elementary forms of society, about transcendental conditions of knowledge, or about consciousness, we must begin with that most simple and elementary epistemological fact of all: that as a condition for saying anything at all, we must first possess a language and be able to use it correctly.




Nothing goes beyond, before, or outside language. Everything we want to say presupposes language and its use. This is so obvious, and is such an elementary fact, that it has often been either overlooked or not sufficiently problematized. Language forms the necessary epistemological basis for any scientific endeavor and is the sine qua non for any sociology of knowledge. In order to bring out this position and the premises in which it is grounded, let me compare it to the theory of communicative action recently developed by Habermas.

THE COMMUNICATIVE ACTION THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS

In the foreword to the revised edition of Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (1982), Habermas states that his theory of communicative action,

hat mit dem Primat der Erkenntnistheorie gebrochen, behandelt die Presup- positionen verstandnisorientierten Handelns unabhangig von den transzen- dentalen Voraussetzungen der Erkenntnis.

[has rejected the primacy of epistemology, treats the presuppositions of action oriented towards mutual understanding independently of the transcendental preconditions of knowledge].

It would appear that in this context Habermas is using the term "Erkennt- nistheorie" in the limited sense of Kantian transcendental philosophy.

It is correct that the "linguistic turn," which his theory of communicative action announces, implies a rupture with Kantian transcendental Erkenntnis- theorie [epistemology] as well as with the monologically oriented Bewusstseins- philosophie [philosophy of consciousness], the origins of which can be traced back to Descartes. It also rejects the subjectivistic premises of individualism without, however, joining the "postmodern" attack on humanism. Despite these rejections, however, communicative action theory cannot avoid the critical question of the epistemological embodiment of the rationality of communicative action.

Habermas adds to the sentence just quoted that he has doubts concerning the implicit premise that methodology and Erkenntnistheorie are the royal road for the analysis of gesellschaftstheoretische Grundlagen [the theoretical foundations of the science of society], a doubt we do not share with regard to a nontranscendental epistemology which makes its point of departure from the invariant logical conditions inherent in everyday language.

The position favored by Habermas raises two questions: (1) When he speaks about the presuppositions of actions oriented towards mutual understanding, we inquire as to the methodological or epistemological status of such presuppositions since they are not of a transcendental kind; (2) if Erkenntnistheorie does not provide the means for the analysis of the founda-




tions of the social sciences, then what does? This is especially pertinent if we refuse to be satisfied with a general social theory which presents no more "than a historicist contemplation of the varieties of forms of life in the muses imaginaire of the past" (McCarthy 1984:VIII).

Habermas does not present an explicit answer to the question of the status of these aforementioned presuppositions. However, since he says that communicative actions lead to mutual understanding and that these acts are the preconditions for the very existence of a social order, one can assume that communicative actions are themselves functional prerequisites in the Par- sonian sense. Three of these "Habermasean prerequisites" and the "utopian" presuppositions they embody are of interest to us:

1. There is the assumed necessity for individuals to integrate their actions by means of communication, which in turn presupposes a consensus model of society rather than the conflict model of theorizing, e. g., Marxist.

2. Next, there is the assumption that the rationality of communicative action has as one of its normative ideals herrschaftsfreie, the nonauthoritarian and nonhierarchically structured relations between participants in a dialogue in which, as a second ideal, only convincing arguments can be used.

3. Finally, and perhaps the most important of the three, is the presupposition that mutual understanding (Versta1ndigung) is based upon the intersubjectivity (Verstandnis) of language.

This latter presupposition, however, suggests that in Habermas's approach Erkenntsnistheorie-in the Kantian sense of the term-has been replaced by a version of Geltungslogik. Let us see how this works. To begin with, the theory of communicative action has three goals:

1. First and foremost, it is a theory of society. Its emphasis does not, as in Marxist theorizing, center around both instrumental and noninstrumental activities so that we may grasp the production and reproduction of both the material and social conditions of society. Instead, the emphasis is, as already mentioned, placed on the communicative action through which individuals integrate their interactions by means of mutual understanding. This, in turn, is viewed as a precondition for the creation and mainte- nance of a societal order. Thus, mutual understanding is not just a normative goal; it is a functional prerequisite for a sociological theory that views society as being divided between a consensually validated, linguistically constructed lifeworld and a self-regulating system of instru- mentally oriented, institutional complexes. As such, social consensus between actors is fundamental to both the functioning of society and to the possibility of a discursively validated social theory.

2. The second goal of the theory of communicative action is to develop a theory of modernity "that explains the type of social pathologies that are today becoming increasingly visible" (Habermas 1984:XL).




3. The final goal evokes our special interest. This is the development of a philosophical theory concerning the concept of communicative rationality and its delimitation in regard to other conceptions of rationality. Closely related to this goal is the idea of a universal pragmatics of language. While it is true that recently Habermas's theoretical interests have moved away somewhat from the theory of universal pragmatics, nevertheless, its central problem, the Allgemeingaultigkeit [general validity] of communicative rationality is still a pressing one. For Habermas, the universality of communicative rationality has to be defended; to do otherwise would risk having his theory dismissed as "being limited from the start to a particular, culturally, or historically bound perspective" (Habermas 1984:137).

Therefore, Habermas must put forth a "universalistic claim" concerning the objectivity of the structure of the process leading to mutual understanding: "If the requirement of objectivity is to be satisfied," Habermas writes, "this structure would have to be shown to be universally valid in a specific sense." And he adds: "This is a very strong requirement for someone who is operat- ing without metaphysical support and who also no longer considers that a rigorous transcendental-pragmatic program, claiming to provide ultimate grounds, can be carried out" (1984:137). In claiming universal validity, Habermas says that he is "taking on a sizable burden of proof" (1984:137). The solution to this burden takes the form of a Geltungslogik. Universality can, according to Habermas, be guaranteed through anchoring communicative rationality in three types of intersubjective validity. The three types of validity are those of propositional truth, the normative rightness of the assertion, and the authenticity which the actor displays during the speech act. A fourth validity claim, concerning the understandability of the speech act itself, is also added. In this context, understandability for Habermas means mainly a demand for grammatically and syntactically well-formed sentences.

But note that by this last criterion even contradictory or nonsensical sentences can be syntactically and grammatically well-formed. If we are to avoid such an absurdity, it is obvious that the criterion of understandability, if it is to remain coherent, must imply more than a formal correctness; it must also entail the speaker's acceptance of that logic which is inherent in our everyday language. I discuss this point more extensively in the final section.

As stated above, Habermas maintains that in the concrete act of communication an actor has to defend his or her arguments against criticism by referring to three validity claims. One can ask, however, why communicative rationality should be justified by means of exactly these three types of validity and no other. Habermas's answer is of an ontological and psychologi- cal kind. He argues that the three types of validity are related to "three worlds" to which actors must orient themselves: (1) the objective world of "fact," (2) the social world of norm and value, and (3) the actor's own subjective world. When the three-world division is attacked as being formal




and not material, Habermas says that the differentiation can be explained by reference to basic attitudes.6

Two major objections can be raised against this threefold validity-world scheme. The first is: if in this type of Geltungslogik the notion of three worlds is a necessary presupposition in order to derive the three types of validity, it fulfills a quasi-transcendental function comparable to Durkheim's society "1sui generis" and Weber's "culture." This quasi-transcendental grounding is itself a contradiction to Habermas's own declared position. The second objection is more important. Despite all claims and efforts to the contrary, the universality of the theory of communicative action cannot be guaranteed by reference to validity because sentences formulating validity claims themselves must be constituted by correct speech acts. This, however, implies that correct speech acts, whether they are concerned with validity or with anything whatsoever, have to be based on a system of rules inherent in our everyday language which makes intersubjective understanding possible. We must be able to reconstruct, at least partially, such a rule system. It is not sufficient, however, for these rules merely to state how we can produce grammatically or syntactically well-formed sentences. They must also specify what we in our linguistic praxis cannot do if we want to speak in a noncontradictory and meaningful way. Those rules have to be formulated in such a way as to make it possible, in principle, to discover when and how they are violated. But why violation? Because the violation of a rule first enables us to grasp fully when, how, and to what extent we are following rules in the first place. These rules form the epistemological basis for the communicative rationality of the type Habermas wants to develop.

Die Universalpragmatik [says Habermas] hat die Aufgabe, universale Bedin- gungen moglicher Verstandnis zu identifizieren und nachzukonstruieren (1984a:353).

[The universal pragmatics . has the task to identify and to reconstruct a posteriori the universal conditions of possible mutual under-standing].

We agree, and do not wish to argue against the possibility of constructing-or more precisely-of reconstructing a universal pragmatics.

I believe, however, that Habermas does not pursue his analysis far enough. He does not indicate how the assertorical rationality inherent in communicative action can be reconstructed, since he neglects the basic epistemological problems of language: what does it mean to possess a language, and how does one go about using it correctly? To choose, as Habermas has, validity, and not language, as a basic or quasi-transcendental point of departure is, therefore, to commit what Apel (1987) has called "an abstractive fallacy."




CONDITIONS FOR DESCRIPTION

Returning to the organizing motif of this paper, we can say that Habermas's theory of communicative action should have approached language from the perspective of epistemological concerns. I would like to pursue this line of thought further by suggesting that many of the problems which we en- countered in the last section can be ameliorated, if not overcome, by treating language from an epistemological perspective. Having explored Habermas's communicative action theory and noted those problems which arise from his approach to the study of language and its "validity orientation," I begin by suggesting an alternative formulation to the problem of communicative rationality. I suggest that there is a nonformalized logic inherent in our everyday language which orders communicative processes and the rationality that resides in them. In the brief space remaining, I reconstruct, in skele- tal form, the system of rules that I believe regulate everyday language. These rules are framed in order to deal with relations between expressions, not singular elements or those atomic facts which many believe are the universal building blocks of logic.

Let me be7gin with a short explication of the two ways I use the term "language." First, I speak of language as the speech acts of a person, finding himself or herself in a concrete situation. This is a reference to linguistic performance or the pragmatic aspect of language. Second, language is a system of institutionalized logical, but not formal logical, rules. These rules state which speech acts we cannot perform, if we do not want to contradict ourselves or use expressions arbitrarily. These rules are a reconstruction of what we, in fact, do when we speak correctly, i.e., in a noncontradictory and meaningful way. They form the constitutive ground for intersubjective understanding.

These two usages of the term "language" are related to each other in the following way: on the one hand, in concrete situations we cannot speak correctly if we do not follow this system of rules; on the other hand, when we reconstruct these rules and make them explicit, we can do so only by means of concrete speech acts. They cannot be derived a priori. In other words, the two ways in which I use the term "language" presuppose one another. I argue that four presuppositions can be derived from this double usage:

1. Since language is defined as the speech acts of persons, it implies the existence of a reality independent of language. This reality must consist of at least the persons so engaged.

2. Since a person using language finds himself or herself in a concrete situation, we can conclude that each speech act is embedded in a "lifeworld" or "form of life."




3. Since we speak of an "institutionalized system of rules" we imply presupposed intersubjectivity. Consequently the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is not something to be explained but is presupposed. What has to be explained are the circumstances in which intersubjectivity breaks down and the reasons for this.

4. We must follow these rules since we do not wish to speak in a contradictory way. Thus, we presuppose the universal validity of the law of contradiction. The law itself can be formulated as one condition of description, i.e., as a relation (see Israel 1989) it can be grasped in its conditions for description.

These four implications should not be understood as transcendental presuppositions. First, we cannot meaningfully speak about the "transcendental presuppositions" of language because we should have then asked in which particular language these "presuppositions" of language could be expressed. In other words, in order to talk about presuppositions of language, we must already possess a language and be able to form correct sentences. The contradiction involved in speaking about "presuppositions" stands out as an obvious one as soon as we shift from the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language and use language as the basis for epistemological analysis. Second, since these four implications must be expressed by means of concrete speech acts we always find ourselves within language and are not able to transcend it. Through a phenomenological analysis in the Hegelian sense we can make explicit the implications of our ways of defining language. But this must be done through concrete speech acts. Third, these implications themselves can be reconstructed as rules, as parts of the institutionalized rule system. Following the Danish philosopher Zinkernagel (1962), we will call these rules "conditions for description."8

Zinkernagel describes the role of everyday or ordinary language in the following way:

Ordinary language serves the purpose of describing the world in which we live and through an analysis of the experiences we describe in that language, we acquire knowledge of the most general conditions for describing our world, and of our position in that world (1962:9).

He adds that by talking about the logical conditions for describing our experiences "we risk a conflict with that philosophical tradition which purports to make a sharp distinction between logic and language on the one hand and reality and experience on the other" (1962:9). Speech acts are, if they are not about language, about something which is not linguistic. We may call it the "world" or "reality" and say that the relation between language and reality is of a linguistic-logical kind. This is in sharp conflict with a dualistic position, but in agreement with an Hegelian one. The logical relation between lan-




guage and reality means that we cannot speak about reality without possessing a language and we cannot use a language correctly without talking about reality. It is a logical fallacy, entertained by traditional dualism and by radical empiricism, that language and reality are causally related or that language is only a representation of the world or that language mirrors that world. It is also a logical fallacy to assume that we could compare our asser- tions about the world with the world itself, as if the world were "out there" already well described beforehand, i.e., before we had done it. "The world does not speak. Only we do," says Rorty and adds, the world "1cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only other human beings do that" (1988). But we cannot speak arbitrarily about the world if we are concerned with the consequences of our speech acts. Sometimes we are forced to speak in a certain way if we do not want to speak in a contradictory or nonsensical manner.

Referring to observations of experiments in physics, Zinkernagel states: "We simply cannot make precise and well-defined use of the words 'we see' without referring to the independent existence of things" (1962:7). From this conclusion we can derive a rule or conditions for description of the following kind (Israel 1989):

We cannot deny without contradicting ourselves that there exists a linguistically and logically necessary relation between expressions referring to bodies and, therefore, also to things and the personal pronouns by which they are referred to. This rule reconstructs our factual linguistic praxis as manifested in concrete speech acts. It is a contradiction to say: 'There is a thing or an object, but we cannot use personal pronouns and nouns in relation to it'. We can say: 'this is a thing, but we do not know what we can do with it.'

Another, related condition of description connects the expression "thing" with "possibilities of action" implying the double conclusion that we always can do something with things and that things can impose constraints on our possibilities of action. In general, conditions for description can be defined in the following way:

Conditions for description are rules specifying relations between expressions, which are from a linguistic-logical point necessary and which we cannot disregard in the concrete speech acts of our daily communicative praxis, if we do not want to contradict ourselves (formally or performatively), or . . [have] ... the implications of such speech acts lead to contradictions. These rules are neither tautological nor analytic sentences. Nor are they synthetic sentences which can be empirically proved (Israel 1989).9

Thus, conditions for description are rules of the language we use when we talk about reality. They are the result of an ex post facto reconstruction of knowledge that we use daily without reflecting upon it. In fact, any




epistemological-linguistic analysis must be performed on the basis of a reconstruction which of necessity already presupposes some prior knowledge. If we do not accept that we must possess knowledge in order to be able to speak meaningfully about knowledge, i.e., about epistemological problems, we contradict ourselves. This is in accordance with the Hegelian critique of Kant's transcendentalism. However, the presupposed knowledge being referred to here is not of a transcendental kind. It is instead expressed in concrete speech acts and is therefore part of our ordinary linguistic praxis. In fact, to possess a language means that we can make certain correct statements. If we deny that we are able to formulate certain correct statements, such a denial must be formulated in terms of a correct statement. Hence, the very denial implies what Apel calls a "performative contradiction" (1987:275): we deny what we are actually performing.10 If we can utter correct statements, then we possess some knowledge. In other words: when we have learned a language, we have learned to know things.

I have recently formulated a number of similar conditions for descriptions (Israel 1989). They are concerned with what we cannot say if we do not want to contradict ourselves when we speak about relations between persons and things, between persons and persons, and about society. For example, we can mention a logical relation between the expression "person" and the physical thing, and between the person and a psychologically predicated object. Within the same framework, we can also talk about relations between "fpersons," as their being related in terms of both an "identity" relation as well as a "difference" relation.

SUMMARY

Within this limited context it is not possible to go further into details, so let me summarize. Conditions for description are rules which state relations between expressions which we necessarily must consider as dependent on each other. Such conditions form a basic, general, and universal relational system. They are a network of rules which cannot be further explained since all explanations presuppose speaking in accordance with these very rules. However, we can show that if we violate these rules, we contradict ourselves or speak nonsense. These rules express a nonformalized logic, a logic in the Hegelian sense that they are inherent in the substance of our ordinary language. Following this logic enables us to formulate correct speech acts. If we want to dispute this line of reasoning, we have to do so by means of correct, i.e., noncontradictory speech acts. The ability to formulate correct statements implies the possession of a certain amount of knowledge which has been acquired in the course of learning to use language. Since we have reached in our discussion of everyday language a point beyond which we cannot go, we must conclude that here we find the basis for epistemological analysis as well as the foundation for communicative action. Our argument,




if correct, must give pause among those of our colleagues who today advo- cate communicative action theory and its consensually-based problematic as a framework for understanding modern society.

NOTES

1. A draft of this paper was presented at the International Symposium on "Philos- ophy and Sociology," Warsaw, October 28-November 1, 1988 2. This development was paramount in Sweden where the first chair in sociology was instituted after World War II. Its first incumbent was a philosopher who left his chair in philosophy. 3. This problem is extensively treated in an interesting analysis by Eyerman (1981). 4. The modern version of this attitude can be found in the Althusserian interpretation. This argues "that Marxism left behind its ideological and pre-scientific speculative (Hegelian preparatory) stage and became truly scientific, when Marx adopted the natural scientific mode of thinking and applied this to the study of society" (Eyerman 1981:101). 5. "Both Durkheim and Weber," she writes, "were educated and worked within neo-Kantian circles" (1981:14). Weber's relation to Rickert is well-known. Durk- heim, on the other hand, was associated "with the leading French representatives of German neo-Kantianism." On Durk- heim's relation to neo-Kantianism, see also Lukes (1974:54ff). 6. McCarthy (1984a) has formulated another objection against the three-world concept. He says: "For Habermas the different worlds are conceived formally and not materially. Thus the distinction between the objective and the social world is not the usual distinction between the object domains of nature and culture. Rath- er it is derived from a distinction between basic attitudes" (p. 181), attitudes being held by subjects in relating to the world. McCarthy indicates this by quoting Haber-

mas. In this case, however, the division into three worlds is not only of an ontological kind. As a way of relating to the world it becomes an epistemological problem, which with regard to a postulated "objective" vs. "social" world presumes a tradition dualistic position. 7. The following considerations are more fully developed in my book Sprache und Erkenntnis (1989). I wish to thank Dr. Peter Zinkernagel, University of Copenhagen, who originally developed this approach and with whom I had the privilege to discuss it and to cooperate for several years. 8. Zinkernagel takes the point of departure of his analysis from the epistemological problems raised by Niels Bohr and quantum mechanics. The term "conditions for description" originated in his attempt to formulate rules concerning the logical conditions for describing our experiences by means of our ordinary language. "Log- ical" does not refer to "formalized logic," but to "general conditions for description" by which is meant "certain rules for the use of our concepts, rules which we are forced to obey if we want to give unam- biguous descriptions" (1962:29). Condi- tions for description are not rules of language, as distinct from reality, but rules for language when we talk about ourselves and the world. This implies that language and the world are different, but that their relation is of a conceptual-logical type. 9. We do not dispute the usefulness of distinguishing between analytic and synthetic sentences. But we reject a theory which holds that all sentences either are analytic or synthetic. 10. A performative contradiction is a special type of self- referential statement. Self- referential statements usually lead to para- doxes because they deny what they state,




e.g., "There is no truth and this statement is true." The paradox comes into existence if the law of noncontradiction is not respected. If it is, as in our example, then the self-referential statement does not lead to a paradox.

REFERENCES

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Eyerman, Ron. 1981. False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory. Stock- holm: Almquist and Liksell, and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities.

Durkheim, Emile. [1915] 1976. The Elemeni- tary Forms of the Religious Life, translated by J.W. Swain. London: George Allen and Unwin.

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Israel, Joachim. 1979. The Languiage of Dia- lectics and the Dialectics of Language. Cop- enhagen: Munksgaard, and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities.

. 1989. Der Logizitat der Sprache. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Press.

Kosik, Karel. 1967. Die Dialektik des Kon- kreten. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Lukacs, Georg. 1971. History and Class Consciouisness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lukes, Stephen. 1975. Emile Duirkheim. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

McCarthy, Thomas. 1984a. "Forward." Pp. v-xxxvii of Juirgeni Habermns, The Thle- ory of Communnnicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of So- ciety. Boston: Beacon.

. 1984b. "Reflections on Rationali- zation in the Theory of Communicative Action." Praxis Initerniationial 4,2:177-199.

Rorty, Richard. 1988. "The Contingency of Language." Lonidoni Rezviezw of Books, April 17, 1988.

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