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Women in Jordanian Islamic Movements: A Broad View of the Religious Motivations Behind Patriotism, Politics and Duty Noor Meher Ahmad Academic Director: Dr. Raed Al-Tabini Project Advisor: Dr. Dua’ Fino University of Wisconsin-Madison International Studies, Middle East Studies Amman, Jordan Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Jordan: Modernization ad Social Change, SIT Study Abroad, Fall 2011 [email protected]

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Page 1: ISP Noor Meher Ahmad

Women in Jordanian Islamic Movements: A Broad View of the Religious Motivations Behind Patriotism, Politics and DutyNoor Meher Ahmad Academic Director: Dr. Raed Al-Tabini Project Advisor: Dr. Dua’ Fino University of Wisconsin-Madison International Studies, Middle East Studies Amman, Jordan Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Jordan: Modernization ad Social Change, SIT Study Abroad, Fall 2011 [email protected]

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Abstract

With Islamic politics on the rise in the Middle East, religious political groups are growing in number and popularity. The women who participate actively, whether directly with Islamic political parties or independently, represent a unique religious and politically motivated population. In Jordan, widespread political apathy coupled with social taboos makes women doubly unlikely to have any sort of involvement in politics, Islamic or otherwise. The women who are politically active are, thus, an anomaly. This study attempts to take a broad look at women in Islamic politics in Jordan. The expected outcome of the study was to uncover a strong emotional link between religion and patriotism. The results were largely in keeping with my original predictions, but with an added narrative of feminine duties and roles added into the mix. These women’s passion for politics stemmed from their religion, which they believe implores them to actively support and aid their country, all while reconciling gender inequality in their home lives. ISP Topic Codes Gender Studies, 507 Political Science, 523 Religion, 403 Regional Studies: Middle East, 521 Acknowledgements First and foremost, I’d like to thank Dr. Dua’ Fino. Without her honest and frank guidance, or vast number of contacts, I would not have a completed study. Dr. Raed Al-Tabini was also instrumental in this regard. Both Dr. Dua’ and Dr. Raed provided essential feedback when I doubted the scope and focus of my study and my capability as a researcher. I’d also like to thank Jeremy Menchik, whose enthusiasm for political Islam gave me motivation to explore themes he presented in the classroom.

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Copyright release The author hereby grants the School for International Training the permission to electronically reproduce and transmit this document to the students, alumni, staff, and faculty of the World Learning Community.

The author hereby grants the School for International Training the permission to electronically reproduce and transmit this document to the public via the World Wide Web or other electronic means.

The author hereby grants the Student for International Training the permission to reproduce this document to the public in print format.

The author hereby grants to the School for International Training permission to reproduce either electronically or in print format this document in whole or in part for library archival purposes only. Student Noor Meher Ahmad Signature (typing here acts as a digital signature): Noor Meher Ahmad Date: 2 December 2011

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Table of contents

Abstract………………………………………………………………………..2

Copyright release………………………………………………………….2

Introduction……………………………………………………………………….5

Literature Review…………………………………………………………………...9

Methodology………………………………………………………………………15

Findings………………………………………………………………………………20

Gender in Politics………………………………………………………...20

A woman at home and a woman at work……………………22

Entering Politics…………………………………………………………24

The Islamic vision………………………………………………………......30

Patriotism through an Islamic lens……………………………...32

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….35

Limitations…………………………………………………………………………...36

Recommendations for further research……………………………......36

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………..…..36

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Introduction

When images of the Arab Spring erupted onto American television screens, amidst

the anti-union busting protests bubbling in my own back yard in Madison, WI, my

campus was enthralled with the participation of the everyday man in protests that swept

the Arab world. Seeing the everyday man involved caught my attention, of course, but

with each sweeping view of Tahrir Square or glimpses of the streets of Tunisia, I noted

women standing shoulder to shoulder with men, standing united against corruption and

the status quo.

The women were not designated to dole out food or sweep after the men. And while

these women were, for the most part, veiled, they were by no means hidden in the

massive upheavals that determined their future. Contrary to the Western perception of a

veiled woman, these women were shouting anti-Mubarak slogans regardless of the fact

their heads were covered, a symbol perceived to be that of oppression in the West.

As I watched these moving images of women protesting and sleeping in Tahrir

Square, I was actively researching Islamic political movements in a Political Islam class I

was taking at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Of the wide expanse of movements I

studied, I found a strong link between three of them: The AK Party of Turkey, Hamas in

Palestine and The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The literature I studied in the duration

of the course asserted that the lower and middle class made up the foundation of these

Islamic parties in each of the respective countries. However, the combination of the Arab

Spring and my interest in the class-based politics of Islamic groups linked the idea of an

upheaval “from below” and Islamic parties.

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The culmination of these interests was the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to

Yemen’s Tawakkil Karman. As a woman adherent to her faith, she defied every Western

notion of what a Muslim woman can do. Karman stated, during her tour of the United

States, that she is “of the people and for the people”(Tarman). What is evident, from the

palpable pride the Yemeni and Arab people have for Karman, is that she represents the

pulse of the revolutions.

The lecturers that came and presented their various topics to my classroom in

Amman, Jordan covered a wide range of issues Jordan has faced in the past and will face

in the future. While I appreciated the frank honesty of the speakers, whenever I

approached them about women in politics or women interested in politics, I was told

dismally that they were, for the most part, uninterested and uninvolved. Whenever I

mentioned Toujan al-Faisal, who is considred one of if not the most notable female

Jordanian politician outside of Jordan, she was brushed aside as irrelevant and

inflammatory.

So where are the women like Tawakkil Karman? Do they exist in Jordanian society or

was she an anomaly in the Arab world? The distinct lack of women involved in politics,

Islamic or other, felt unsettling and rather difficult for me to comprehend, given the

increasing rate of women enrolled in universities across the country, I imagined that

women would be more interested in their political fates than those that are uneducated.

What I found, from my casual encounters with Jordanian women of upper middle

class or upper class economic status, women were largely disinterested in politics. Those

of the middle and lower class I found to be much more active or at least watchful of

politics. The phenomenon fit in perfectly with the populist theory of Islamic politics,

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which I will elaborate on in my literature review. With my research, I sought to discover

whether populism in Islamic politics applies to middle class women of Jordan.

The women I interviewed were from the middle class, a parameter that was

determined not by their salary but their personal view of which economic class. All of my

subjects were women, so as to make the study focused primarily on women and their

personal views of their political actions. Given the short period of time available to

conduct the study, this research is a basic overview of women involved in multiple forms

in Islamic politics. It seeks to examine how and why these women became interested and

involved in politics. All of the women are Jordanian citizens, and all but one are Muslim.

All are somehow involved in politics, whether it be directly through a party or

independently.

The theoretical framework for this study is based around the schemas created by Nira

Yuval-Davis in “Women, Citizenship and Difference,” which asserts the following:

a comparative study of citizenship should consider the issue of women’s citizenship

not only by contrast to that of men, but also in relation to women’s affiliation to

dominant or subordinate groups, their ethnicity, origin and urban and rural residence.

It should also take into consideration global and transnational positioning of these

citizenships (Yuval-Davis, 4).

Thus, the women interviewed are not compared solely to men in their political

participation, but asked about their political narratives, giving depth to their political

interest and history.

The Islamic movement, and the women in it, is especially pertinent in today’s volatile

political scene. The Arab Spring has brought about a political upheaval from below, and

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these women are part of the middle class that has been suppressed and is now finding a

voice. Tawakil Karman is not an exception to the rule; instead she is a taste of what is to

come. Islamic movements are the populist movements of the modern Arab world, and the

women in these movements are a vision of the Arab future.

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Literature Review

The literature published on the subject of women in the Arab world is expansive,

but focused primarily on the women’s movement as a movement for women’s rights, as

opposed to an analysis of direct involvement in the government. The readings that I have

researched during the course of this study are separated into two main themes: traditional

Islamic values and their constraints on women, and demands of the modern world and

their constraints on Islamic values. The literature I studied linked the two together using

Islamic politics, thus supporting my claim that women of the middle class enter Islamic

politics because it fulfills both traditional values and their modern desire to be involved in

politics.

Asma Barlas, in her book “Believing Women in Islam,” builds the religious

foundation that many Islamic women use to unshackle themselves, so to speak, from the

arguments derived from the Qur’an, which could prevent them from entering politics.

Using words that the author claims are often misinterpreted, she re-examines suras from

the Qur’an to derive claims of equality, which she contrasts with similar interpretations

that claim the contrary. For instance, she describes the difference between the ontological

and biological descriptions of man and woman in the Qu’ran as such: “As the Qur’an

describes it, humans, though biologically different, are ontologically and ethically-

morally the same/similar inasmuch as both women and men originated in a single Self,

have been endowed with the same natures, and make up two halves of a single pair”

(Barlas, 133). Thus, the argument which Muslim scholars often revert to when

questioned about women’s political participation, which is that man and woman are

created differently therefore women are somehow incapable of making political

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decisions, is answered with an argument that asserts the biological differences but

focuses instead on ontological differences.

Barlas extends her reinterpretation of the Qu’ran into the political sphere using

her theory of Islamic vice-regency. She quotes Ayah 33:72: “Verily, we did offer the trust

[of reason and volition] to the heavens and the earth, and the mountains: but they refused

to bear it because they were afraid of it. Yet [humans] took it up” (Barlas, 107). She goes

on to build upon the interpretation of Merryl Wyn Davies, which derives trust to be

placed in the khilafah, who are all men and women, therefore entrusting vice-regency

equally amongst men and women.

The equality of men and women in Barlas’ reinterpretation, while meaningful in

that it frees the Qu’ran of the misogynistic light it is often delivered in, holds little

relevance in the reality of a male-dominated Islamic political scene. The fact of the

matter is, women in Islamic politics must navigate through a thick and interwoven

network of male-dominated power structures. These structures can be analyzed utilizing

theories in Nira Yavul-Davis’ article entitled “Women, Citizenship and Difference.” The

author argues that citizenship has to be understood using a multi-tiered analysis, which

involves examining intra- and supra-national loyalties. The article examines women, in

particular, and how their roles in society affect their relationship with state structures.

Although the article focuses primarily on lower-class American females, a section

addresses familial relations and their resulting change on citizenship in Arab countries:

Political, social and… even civil rights might depend on the familial position of

the particular citizen (Saudi Arabia or Jordan are probably good examples of such

a state but in more diluted forms this phenomenon is spread more widely,

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especially when looking at ruling parties’ elites). Traditional social, and especially

familial relations continue to operate and often women have few or no formal

citizenship rights (Yuval-Davis, 15).

The schemas of familial and traditional obligations bind women to certain roles, which

are denoted using interpretations of the Qu’ran. Yuval-Davis’ schemas frame citizenship,

especially that of women in Arab countries, in a digestible form, thus explaining the

intricate web of traditions and family values.

While Yuval-Davis frames citizenship so that it may be analyzed vertically and

horizontally, her article does not display these schemas in actual scenarios. Here, Sally K.

Gallagher’s study entitled “Agency, Resources, and Identity: Lower-Income Women’s

Experiences in Damascus” fills the gap. The study examines, as the title suggests, lower-

income women in Damascus and how they manage economically and politically.

Gallagher exposes, through a series of interviews and observations, the obstacles these

women contend with given their economic position. Throughout her study, she references

various life decisions that these women face and places them in an economic context:

Trenchant and popular models of gender as managed and negotiated, or the notion

of bargaining with patriarchy in which women receive “protection and security in

exchange for submissiveness and propriety” (Kandivoti 1988, 280) draws on

language that suggests human action can best be described using economic

metaphors and rational choice (Gallagher, 231).

With this in mind, it can be said that for these women, decisions such as marriage have

economic value attached to them. Forbidden from participating in any sort of

moneymaking activity, even if allows for them to stay at home, forces women into taking

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on the role of a financial burden. As such, their only opportunity for agency is potentially

picking the home in which they will be a weight, financially.

How does this translate politically? Lisa Blaydes and Safinaz El Tarouty frame

Egyptian women’s voting habits in the same economic light Gallagher placed Damascus’

impoverished women. In “Women’s Electoral Participation in Egypt: The Implications of

Gender for Voter Recruitment and Mobilization,” Blaydes and El Tarouty shed light on

the vote selling phenomenon in lower-income parts of Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood

makes use of women’s unique social standing, which allows them to make social calls in

the homes of other women to recruit voters (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 371). “According to

Makarim al-Diry, female activists with the Brotherhood use their existing social networks

to ask for votes for their candidates, emphasizing the honesty and integrity of the

Brotherhood members. They are able to talk to other women, convincing them of the

importance of political participation and the need to support Muslim Brotherhood

candidates who will help eliminate corruption in the state” (Blaydes and El Tarouty,

372). The Brotherhood also utilizes female activists during especially violent

demonstrations as a shield of sorts, protecting male activists because of the social taboo

of ever attacking a woman (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 372).

Thus far, the literature regarding the economic decision-making of Muslim women

has been limited to their actions, political or otherwise. However, an integral study,

which links economic conditions to personal opinions and viewpoints of Islamic

idealism, explains the mentality of lower-income and middle-income women of Muslim

countries. In “The Political Economy of Women’s Support for Fundamentalism in

Islam,” Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer conducted a sweeping survey of women in 18

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Muslim countries regarding their views on various gender and value issues rooted in

Islam. The results gave insight into the political decision-making of women in Islamic

countries. For instance, the study quelled any notion of fundamentalists being

“stereotypical slum dwellers” and found their primary base to be “well-educated,

upwardly mobile young men” (Blaydes and Linzer, 578).

The study reinforced the idea of economics playing a role in decision-making, as

articulated by Gallagher. Blaydes and Lizner claim financial insecurity as “a key

determinant of the propensity to adopt fundamentalist beliefs and preference” (Blaydes

and Linzer, 580). They go one to state, “For women, fundamentalist views that perpetuate

patriarchy and that are associated with conservatism, religiosity, and piety are traits

valued in the marriage market and society writ at large” (Blaydes and Linzer, 592). They

cite examples of veiled women failing to adapt to the modern job market, and the stigma

associated with veiled women in increasingly modernizing Muslim countries. The

authors contend that women who adhere to more conservative interpretations of the

Qur’an choose to do so because of the material bias that displaying traditional

conservative values plays in the marriage market and in their social sphere.

Blaydes and Linzer place the mobile Islamic women in the state of mind I find

them in my research: “in a double-bind” (Blaydes and Linzer, 585). Their traditional

values, on one hand, prevent them from actively participating, whether economically or

politically, but the modernization of their countries demands them to somehow sidestep

these traditional values. Jordan is a prime example of a country sitting on the fence

between modernity and traditional values, and the state of its politically active Islamic

women is a prime example where these theories, regarding everything from religion,

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politics and economic agency, collide.

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Methodology

The method by which I chose this subject was through a series of evaluations of

subjects within Jordan that interested me. I was intrigued by Islamic politics, partly

because of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt post-Arab Spring, but also

because I had studied Islamic political groups in the past and understood the basics of

their parties. Jordan is a special case in Islamic politics, however, because even though

the majority of the population supports Islamic political groups, a disproportionately

small number become involved directly with these groups, partly for fear of government

crackdown.

Women, then, are even more difficult to encourage in politics. Women’s issues in

politics appealed to me, during the course of the thematic seminars, because it seems that

often times the burden of the contradiction between modernity and Islam falls of

women’s shoulders. Societal, political and religious values are focused on the woman

and her importance in the family. As such, it is understandable that few women chose to

enter politics, Islamic or otherwise.

I knew, because of security reasons and the kind of connections many of my

colleagues have in Jordan, that it would be quite a struggle to find poorer women

interested in Islamic politics. My predictions came true, in this sense. Not only was it

extremely difficult to find women who were from the lower class, it was next to

impossible to find women who were directly involved in Islamic politics. This brought

me to the realization that little to no women from the lower class were involved in

Islamic politics at all, which is when I utilized all of my resources to focus my attention

on the bulk of women in Islamic political groups, who are from the middle class.

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I approached the process of determining the subjects I was interested in

interviewing by taking advantage of every contact I was given by my more than helpful

adviser, Dr. Dua’ Fino, who had a number of women from a wide array of political

interests in backgrounds. I eventually settled on interviewing women from a few distinct

categories of Islamic politics: Hizbut al-Wast or Moderation Party women, Islamic

Action Front women, and women who are politically independent. This allowed for my

study to survey women in Islamic politics under a broad stroke. The women from each

group by no means would represent all women from each party, but allowed for the study

to touch on differences between each party’s stances on Islamic politics, and highlight the

similarities between all of the women’s narratives.

Once I determined my targets, I arranged for appointments with the women at

locations of their convenience. The first interview I conducted was with a member of the

Islamic Action Front named Eide Hqanah. A resident of Irbid, she was in Amman

attending an IAF convention. The interview questions I prepared were intended on

focusing on her entry into Islamic politics and how she determined the IAF was a party

she would like to support. The interview itself was a bit strained, due almost entirely to

the setting of the interview. We sat down during a break between meetings in a hallway

entrance to the main ballroom. As such, it was very noisy and IAF members were

constantly passing by, drinking tea and talking all around us. Although Ms. Hqanah

spoke excellent English, hearing one another was quite difficult in this setting. On top of

this, we were interrupted several times by IAF passerby’s who wished to stop and say

hello to my interviewee. The nature of the environment led Ms. Hqanah to be very

distracted, and while her answers were direct, they often times sidestepped the question

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or addressed a topic which she seemed more comfortable speaking about. She was also

pressed for time, as she was a member of the shura council of the IAF, which began its

meeting near the end of our interview.

My second interview fared much better, because of the copious amount of time I

had with my subject. Dr. Adab Al-Saud, an ex-Member of Parliament and Dean of

Student Affairs at the Islamic Science University (Jam’ea al-Uluum al-Islamia), hosted

me in her office after an hour-long meeting. Since I arrived in the midst of this

emergency meeting, I spent a good deal of time preparing and finalizing my the

direction of the interview. Dr. Al-Saud was again very articulate in English, but

sometimes took her time to find the correct words. This gave me opportunity to reflect on

her answers and build further questions in this regard. We were interrupted a number of

times by students and faculty members, but the interruptions were minimal and Dr. Al-

Saud was excellent in answering the questions and allowing for adequate elaboration on

each subject.

Kanaar Sweiss was helpful in this manner as well. Her excellent command of the

English language made the interview free of any miscommunications or need to utilize

simple vocabulary for the ease of the subject. Again, we were interrupted several times,

but with my note taking, I was able to direct her back to her train of thoughts quickly and

seamlessly.

The questions I prepared for the group interview I conducted with six women of

the Islamic Moderation Party, or Hizbut Al-Wast, were few in number. This was

purposefully done, because in group settings, the subjects tend to engage in conversations

with one another and build thoughts collectively as opposed to answering only to me one

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by one. Given that I had an excellent translator, the questions were completely

understood with little to no difficulty. The order of the questions was created to lead the

interviewees from a broad subject to more general topics, and the result was exactly as

intended. The conversation was fluid from question to question, and differences in beliefs

resulted in conversations between the subjects.

Before beginning any of my interviews, I explained to my subjects, along with the

consent form I produced before each interview, that they had the option to refuse any

questions, to remain anonymous or to decline participation in the study if they so desired.

Each of the subjects consented to the requirements on the form, and to be recorded for

accurate statements. I took notes while the recording of the interview was being recorded

so that I could reference any points they had made in the past, and also ensuring that I

had quotes in case of technological malfunctions.

The questions I asked all of my subjects were designed to answer various aspects

of interest in my study. Firstly, I wanted to determine exactly how each of them arrived at

her current political position. This allowed for the subject to create a narrative of their

political experiences, beginning with their initial interest in politics. The story-telling

aspect of this question allows for the subject to give a history and depth to their political

experience. Questions after this point stem from the direction the interviewee leads the

interview to, which is naturally what they would like to tell me as highlights of their

interest or activity in Islamic politics.

Frequently, the subjects who were official members of Islamic political parties

gave me answers to questions I was not asking. In these cases, it was clear that the

women had given speeches or prepared some sort of answers prior to the interview. In

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these scenarios, I allowed for the women to thoroughly answer questions I did not ask,

but found one specific point of their answer to direct them back to topics of my interest.

This allowed for the interview to retain its fluid nature while continuing in extracting the

data I was interested in. The prepared speeches also gave me insight into what the

subjects anticipated I would ask, or issues that affect their role in the party enough that

they would prepare and answer.

The most difficult obstacle for me to overcome during the course of the study was

reassessing whom I could feasibly interview. I became very frustrated and disillusioned

when I was unable to come in contact with lower-class women in Islamic politics, the

women I had intended to study. However, when I came to the realization that very few

were directly involved in politics, I reassessed my scope and purpose of my study and

found new questions to answer from a middle-class perspective of Islamic politics. If I

had foreseen the difficulty in getting in contact with lower-class women, I would have

planned much further in advance, in retrospect. However, given the time constraints of

the study, it was pertinent that I change the scope of my topic, and given the results, it

was ultimately beneficial that I did.

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Findings

The women I interviewed were all, in some shape or form, linked to Islamic

politics, with the exception of one Christian woman. The Muslim women were involved

in various parties, except for one who was an independent ex-Parliamentarian. Each of

the subjects brought a religious narrative to their political experience, which will be

examined thematically in my findings section.

Gender in Politics

Of the women I interviewed, all touched in one way or another the topic of

equality. The Islamic women, especially those linked to parties, were very eager to

express their unique interpretation of equality as described by the Qu’ran. On one hand,

all were adamant that women were equal in the political sense of their participation.

Dr. Adab Al-Saud, a former Member of Parliament, Islamic political independent

and current Dean of Student Affairs at the Islamic Science University of Jordan, asserted,

“There is no difference in the house of representatives between women and men. We are

treated as representatives. [There is] no difference because of gender. Men didn’t treat us

as if [we] were women, they treat us because of what we do, not who [we are]” (Al-

Saud). She placed the legitimacy of women in politics with religion as such:

I explain that Islam does not refuse a woman’s share. There is a history with our

Prophet, and in the Rashidun, the women shared executive authority. There are

ministers and [proof] that our Prophet Muhammad also took the opinion of

women when he wanted to make big decisions and he agrees with the decision if a

woman suggests it. [The public] is convinced, and they accept these explanations,

and now this question is not found (Al-Saud).

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The textual evidence of women in Islam was also referenced by Hyaat Al-Masimi,

current head of the Women’s Committee of the Islamic Action Front of Amman. “Al-

Mominoona wa al-Mominaat (Believers are men and women). Both men and women

should do m’aroof(good deeds). Allah asks me… He asks for myself as a woman… He

asks me to do khyer(good)”(Al-Masimi). The very same sentence from the Qur’an was

echoed by all women from Hizbut al-Wast. “Allah spoke to us as a group of believers,

not as a single believer” (Abu Ali, et al).

Part of the contextual evidence which Al-Masimi and Al-Saud reference is

intended to free the Qu’ran of misinterpretation. Their arguments placed any blame for

misinterpretation or practices that limit women on factors outside the Qu’ran, much like

Asma Barlas in her “Believing Women in Islam.” Al-Masimi acknowledged that women

had in fact been suppressed in Arab countries, but this was due to the rule of the

Mamluks:

In the Rashidun Khalifa, the women were there. But later on, in the Mamluk time,

the women didn’t go outside and had no [authority]. [The men] protected the

women because there were many wars. We are making women as they were

during the Prophet Muhammad’s life. We’re taking off the cover from Islamic

rule (Al-Masimi).

By placing the blame on outside rulers, Al-Masimi shifts the burden of misinterpretation

and waywardness from the Qu’ran on outside factors, shielding the holy texts from

implicit problems. Rawad Islimaan of Hizbut al-Wast went so far as to explicitly state

Islam the religion is convoluted with misconceptions, and cites her desire to separate the

two as one of her main reasons for entering politics in the first place (Abu Ali, et al).

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A Woman at Home and a Woman at Work

The assertion of equality in political aspects, though a common thread between

several interviews, was coupled by the repeated reference to the importance of a woman

in Islamic home life. All the women I interviewed, including the Christian subject,

brought up issues of a women’s responsibility to her home and how that affects notions

of equality in society.

Al-Masimi’s view of women’s equality was challenged when asked to reconcile it

with the Islamic Action Front’s unanimous rejection Jordan being a signatory of the

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW. Al-

Masimi argued, “Everything that is good in CEDAW is in Islam,” but that “it is based on

equality between women and men, the complete equality. We believe that men are

different.” She clarified that being different does not make one less than the other, but in

the case of total equality, the burden will fall more on women. “I am pregnant, I have

children and a house, and at the same time I do everything at home. My husband comes

home from work and he does nothing, especially for the children.”

By designating the role of a woman intrinsically as that of a mother’s, Al-Masimi

makes all arguments of gender inequality in the scope of familial matters. Sousan Al-

Momani of Hizbut al-Wast, considers her role of a mother continuing on into the political

realm: “My role as an activist is as important as my role as a mother. Working as a

mother is the same as working for society. My job in politics has more momentum than

just raising my children” (Abu Ali, et al). Considering these women believe their roles as

mothers are inseparable from their role in politics, it is understandable that Al-Masimi

places the CEDAW convention not into the realm of the state and employment, as many

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believe it to be understood, but instead into home life. In fact, she goes on to say that

equality in Islam is in almost all respects with the exception of home life: “We are equal

in origin, we are equal in working well, we are equal in many things. The differences in

Islam are in the family. They have different roles in the family. We have the same

political, social and economic rights.”

Al-Masimi’s disdain for CEDAW, it seems, stems from her interpretation of the

convention. While she acknowledges that part of it is in congruence with Islam- “The

right of life, the right of teaching, the right of choosing your husband...”- she states that

the convention promotes hostility between man and woman: “CEDAW makes man and

woman’s life as a conflict. [As if] if the women should have their rights, they should go

to court. Why? Allah said sakeen (peace), so that the life between man and women

should be peace” (Al-Masimi). As such, Al-Masimi’s understanding of the role of women

in politics and women at home, when examined side by side, holds home life to a

different standards than to all other aspects of a Muslim woman’s life.

She was not alone in doing so. Kanaar Sweiss, Assistant Principal of Al-Alandi

Latin School and lecturer with Al-Khayma, explained the average Jordanian woman’s

disinterest in politics by asserting she barely has time for politics outside of her home life.

Sweiss, as a Christian, provides a foil to the views of the Muslim women I studied during

the course of my research, but her views on home life were largely congruent with that of

the Muslim women:

If I’m going to speak about myself, as a housewife, I will go to work from 7am to

3pm. Then I go to the university because I have lectures there. At 6pm, I go back

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24 Ahmad

home. I should feed [my kids], I should teach them, I should clean the house, and

then after that I will just go to sleep. Our day is tight, very tight (Sweiss).

The schedule of a Jordanian woman, then, is packed with responsibilities. While Al-

Masimi references that a man will do nothing when he returns home, Sweiss went further

to explain his attitude: “The mentality of the men is if you have a wife, she is the one who

will run the home… He is the one with the free time, it is not the woman” (Sweiss).

The women of Hizbut al-Wast, however, had an entirely separate concept of

motherhood. Reem Al-Nasser, member of the Hizbut al-Wast Amman greater

municipality board and mother of three, stated clearly and assuredly, “Jordanian women

have the power to multi-task, and when you’re successful, you’ll be a successful mother

and successful in politics” (Abu Ali, et. al). Rawad Islimaan Riyadaat, president of

Hizbut al-Wast’s central women’s committee echoed her colleagues thoughts: “A well

educated woman can balance between housework and political work, and she will be able

to manage her time” (Abu Ali, et al)

Regardless of whether they feel a woman can manage both her work and her

house, none of the subjects rejected that housework is work exclusively for women. It is

with the burden of running a home, then, that the Jordanian woman enters politics.

Whether explained through roles Muslims ascribe to, or through male mentality on

housework, these women distinguish themselves as unequal in this regard.

Entering Politics

The women’s movement in Jordan, when broken down into the experiences of

individual women, is a series of obstacles, both legal and societal, which a woman must

overcome before participating actively in politics. From the stories each of these subjects,

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the path to becoming directly involved in politics involved first awakening a political

conscience, which is societal anomaly for a woman, to say the least. All of my

interviewees addressed Jordanians’ general lack of interest in politics, but stressed that

women are especially apathetic to the political ongoing in their own country.

Of the women directly involved with a party or as Members of Parliament, all

began their journey in politics through previous organizations. Al-Masimi and Al-Saud

were both active in university organizations, and Hqaneh was a social activist for many

years before formally becoming a member of the IAF. Al-Saud, when asked how women

could be encouraged to enter politics, stressed the importance of university activities: “At

first, to be involved with activities in the university and in the society, with the NGO’s or

with the committees and so on, and by discussing with [women] about the women who

have success stories, then to encourage them to challenge the situation in the frame of our

society and our religion” (Al-Saud).

Al-Masimi, who began to be involved in Islamic politics from a relatively early

age of 23, felt that she was the youngest from her group of politically active peers at her

university, partly because younger women rarely find interest in politics. “I had many

friends who were older than me. I started to work with people different from me. They

had opposite opinions. I think this was the most important part of my life” (Al-Masimi).

She attributes her age difference and experiences with people different other than her as

the reason she is able to compromise in politics today, a trait she finds lacking in many.

Continuing with her thoughts on political apathy, she mentioned the environment in

which Jordanians find themselves as a main proponent of the widespread problem:” You

know people in Arabic countries, and Jordan is one of these countries, don’t believe in

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26 Ahmad

political life and they don’t want to work in politics, because of the many factors that are

around them. Working in politics is a problem.” For women, this political impassivity is

doubly potent, as they feel “no, it is not your place. Leave it for men, they can do it” (Al-

Masimi). Several women from Hizbut al-Wast mirrored Al-Masimi’s sentiments, but

their views brought about a heated discussion about who is to blame for the lack of

female involvement in politics. Half of the group insisted that the female quota in the

parliament stifles women’s participation in politics, while the other half blamed women

for not having the initiative to break into politics on their own. “The government is

pushing for women to get involved, yet they are resistant,” said Al-Momani, while her

colleague, Asma Al-Rowaneh, vehemently opposed. “It is society that is reigning them

in. I don’t believe that Jordanian women aren’t interested in politics. Jordanian women

understand politics, but don’t practice it because of the customs and habits of Jordanian

society” (Abu Ali, et. al). For Al-Momani, who began involvement with political

organizations at the age of 18, the duty to enter politics was fueled by her saying, “Do not

curse the darkness, but light the light” (Abu Ali, et. al).

As a member of the shura council, and one of the original 311 founding members

of the IAF in Jordan, Al-Masimi has come far from her first foray into politics. She

overcame societal taboos for women in politics partially, she says, to her father’s

willingness in letting her. “My father was afraid for me. He said this will bring problems

for you, but he likes me a lot. I was living with him because my mother was dead, and he

let me do anything I wanted to do” (Al-Masimi). Convincing others of their political

legitimacy is a major source of power for these women. As it is seen as inappropriate or

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at the very least out of the ordinary, by overcoming the societal obstacles, they have

already labeled themselves as outliers within their community.

Conversely, even after overcoming the perceptions of women’s role in politics

within the Muslim community, these women find themselves fighting another battle: the

perceptions of secular politicians. Al-Masimi said her time in the parliament, from 2003

to 2007, was the most important interval for her to “work, really work, in political life

and for people to change their mind from what [they thought] an Islamic woman can do

in politics” (Al-Masimi). She went on to say that the misconceptions stemmed from a

belief that Islamic women “can’t do anything, that if they cover their hair they also cover

their mind. In the 4 years in parliament, I tried to change this idea… I speak English, so

that when I leave Jordan they can see that an Islamic woman can talk, she has opinions.”

The path to politics for these women involves obstacles from all ends, and as trailblazers,

they were the first to swat away the issues that women perhaps will not face in the future.

Al-Saud, as a former Member of Parliament, was one of the first to pave the way

for women in formal governmental positions. Her stance as an independent made her

campaign even more out of the ordinary. “I spoke directly to the people, door by door. I

knocked on the doors and enter, despite if they are lower class, upper or middle. We

looked at the district as a whole that I will talk to” (Al-Saud). Her grassroots campaign

was built upon social meetings, which Blaydes and El Tarouty mention in their article as

one of the many advantages of women in Islamic politics (Blaydes and El Tarouty, 373).

But despite her unique status as a woman her decision to even run for election

was openly refused:

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28 Ahmad

The first time I said I want to run for election, they are surprised and deny that. I

convinced them [that] the law of the election allowed for the quota for the

woman. Why not, if I can take a chance, an opportunity? In the second election, it

looks like normal, so the society accepts that women can be decision makers at

the highest level… But I think I opened the road for more women. They could

come without any obstacles because I went first (Al-Saud).

Al-Saud’s bold foray into politics, thus, normalized women in elections. As part of the

first wave of women in Islamic politics to rise to positions of power, such as

parliamentary positions, Al-Saud’s experiences directly affect the next wave of women to

follow behind them. Al-Masimi commented on the differences between the two

generations:

I think the environment around us has changed, and the women themselves have

changed… I think now, in 2011, the women try to change and come to the IAF

and attend activities and become members… We have increased the number and

type of women. In the first time, most of the women in the party are sisters and

wives of the men. But now, no, we have women decide to become members of the

IAF even if her brother and husband our not members (Al-Masimi).

Separating themselves from their wali’s, or keepers, perhaps removes the mental block

that my interviewees reference Jordanian women experiencing.

Conversely, while these women were bold enough to enter politics when it was

socially taboo, confronting these taboos legally or abruptly is largely looked down upon.

Hqaneh, while adamant about applying the Islamic vision and confronting the

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government as such, shifts her views completely when discussing women’s official rights

in politics:

We have problems with the laws, we have problems with the social taboos. But

slowly and gradually, we are trying to curb these problems and to remove them

from our way. And I think Jordanian women succeeded to a large extent. We took

it gradually and we did not confront the taboos and, let’s say, the social

establishment. We dealt with it gradually and we kept moving, but surely without

confrontation. Had we confronted from the very beginning, maybe we not

succeeded. We succeeded because of this gradual basis (Hqaneh).

Her gradual approach to women’s rights is hardly in congruence with her more motivated

manner of addressing Islamic politics. As part of the IAF stance, she states, “We are

fighting against corruption, we have so many issues to tackle using Islamic politics.”

Such aggressive language is far from the “step by step” process she condones in terms of

women’s rights. “If we attack the system, we will break bridges,” Hqaneh said, in

response to what a more confrontational women’s rights movement would look like

(Hqaneh). Al-Masimi’s view on CEDAW convention laws, which were referenced

previously in my findings, echoes the same slow-paced development and rights outside of

the court (Al-Masimi). Perhaps this can be explained by the aforementioned perceptions

of women’s roles within Islamic homes, but each of my subjects reconciled their

aggressive tactics of Islamic politics with their passive views of the women’s movement

without acknowledging any disconnect.

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The Islamic Vision

While these women overcame major obstacles to enter politics, their views are

largely in consensus with the official views of their respective parties and Islamic politics

at large. Eide Hqanah and Dr. Hyaat Al-Masimi of the IAF answered well-prepared

answers of the vision of their party. Hqaneh spoke at length about the importance of

Islam in politics:

We think that we want to see the Islamic vision and principles implemented in our

country… and we want to implement these principles on the basis of equality, on

the basis of dignity as Islam propagates these values and principles (Hqaneh).

Al-Masimi compared the rule of Islamic law by using the United States as a comparison:

For example, in America, your laws are coming from the Greek and Roman

culture, and it is also related to something. We are not cut from a tree. We should

be related [to something]. According to this, we believe in implying shari’a. It

doesn’t mean that all girls will wear hijab, or that we will kill all the people that

are not Muslim. We are not Taliban. For example, you have the Hamas

experiment in Gaza. The people there are linked to Islam (Al-Masimi).

While Al-Masimi implied that shari’a rule would not mean Islamic laws would be

implemented on all citizens of Jordan, she did not clarify the difference between drawing

principles from Islam and direct shari’a law. When asked why she chose to join IAF of

all Islamic parties, Al-Masimi claimed other Islamic parties are not “as Islamic as the

IAF,” a point which she did not explain further. However, she linked the IAF with the

Muslim Brotherhood, which she asserted as “the movement that is really working for

Islam. And this party, coming from the Brotherhood, is working for Islam” (Al-Masimi).

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The independent Al-Saud countered Al-Masimi’s assertion of the IAF being more

Islamic than other parties. While in the same strain of Islamic policies, Al-Saud said she

found separate Islamic parties to be centered around people instead of policies:

As a whole, the majority of these parties, while they have similar visions, they

have only differences in their names and titles, so why are they not together? Why

do we have 35 when we need 4 or 5 at maximum? Because everybody wants to be

the boss. I can’t be an instrument to be someone’s boss (Al-Saud).

Al-Saud’s formal separation from Islamic parties makes her an outlier in a group of

outliers. But her position, in terms of Islam’s role in Jordanian politics, is essentially the

same as that of the IAF’s Al-Masimi and Hqaneh. Like Al-Masimi, Al-Saud mentions

that Islam is declared the religion of the country. The problems, however, lie in the

implementation of the Islamic vision.

The women of Hizbut al-Wast presented a unique stance among the women I

interviewed. None mentioned shar’ia at any point, but stressed the importance of

moderation in Islam, hence their party name, the Islamic Moderation Party. Their goals

were largely cultural, such as separating fundamentalist rhetoric from laws, and moving

towards a more humble and responsive state. “I want minsters to go down to the street

and not stay in his office. In Islam, the responsible man goes down and asks about [the

people’s] needs, he tries to solve their problems. The citizens have to have access to their

leader,” said Zakia Rawajdeh, Vice President of Hizbut al-Wast’s women’s committee.

According to Al-Masimi, the IAF has four major goals in Jordanian politics:

“Justice, social development, economical development and implying shari’a”(Al-

Masimi). The first three were echoed by her colleague Hqaneh, but the latter never

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32 Ahmad

asserted the implementation of shari’a, only that the rules should be drawn from it, as Al-

Masimi referenced in her example with the United States. “All rules should be in

congruence with Islam,” said Hqaneh, “Anything that is not in congruence with Islam, it

is a direct violation of the constitution” (Hqaneh).

Thus, of the Muslim women I interviewed, all found that their parties took no

issue with the Jordanian constitution, as it asserts the country to be an Islamic nation.

However, these women envision a heavier appliance of shari’a in law making. Their

vagueness in the matter suggests several interpretations, all of which are only

interpretations. Al-Masimi implies shari’a law would not apply to all, but none of the

Islamic women mentioned religious minorities in the least. However, as representatives

of Muslims in the government, their views are unsurprisingly in support of an increased

interconnectedness between religion and politics

Patriotism Through an Islamic Lens

While their vision for Islamic politics stems from their belief in the implication of

shari’a law, the women I interviewed attribute their interest in politics to a religious duty.

Al-Masimi mentioned the sura in the Qu’ran, which implores both male and female

believers to do good (“Al-Mominoona wa al-Mominaat”), but she asserts that her own

involvement in politics is part of her da’wa, or her religious duty to preach and spread

Islam (Barlas, 44). “The most important thing for me is working for Islam. I told [my

husband], this is the most important thing for me, da’wa. If you accept this, okay” (Al-

Masimi). This was in response to whether her husband supports her in her political

endeavors. By answering with “da’wa,” she implicates that her political activity is as

such an extension of her da’wa.

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Hqaneh of the IAF echoed a similar sense of duty. “As Muslims, we are ordered

to good and negate the vil. This is Islam. It is part of our duty as Muslims to give services

to our community and to [be] involved in the daily life of our society.” She continued

with by stating, “all things are related to politics. Whatever you do. Education is politics.

Bread earning is politics, running the state with all of its details is politics” (Hqaneh). Her

all-encompassing view of politics mirrored her all-encompassing view of religion,

making the two intertwined and inseparable. “I believe that working in politics is a major

aspect of working in Islam,” said Al-Masimi, and she added “and it is an aspect which

many people don’t work in, especially in our [Arab] countries.” Al-Saud, however,

refrained from making the connection between her duty to her country and her religion:

“I always felt responsibility towards my country and my nation” (Al-Saud). Al-Saud’s

views were the most secular, due entirely to her rhetoric and narrative. Perhaps this is

why she remains independent of any official parties, but her goals align with those of the

IAF. When asked how she would change the government, her response was, “At first, to

fight corruption. It is a big problem. And this is opposed to the general development.

Second, make a new development plan concerning the economic situation, because most

of our problems are based on the economic situation” (Al-Saud).

As a member of the IAF, Hqaneh stated similar concerns, but with an Islamic

perspective:

We are fighting against corruption. We have so many issues to tackle, by

implementing Islamic principles. If you are an Islamist, surely you are against

corruption; surely you are against dictatorship because you believe in dignifying

human beings, because God has dignified all human beings. To be silent and to

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34 Ahmad

shut up, and to accept and to be ruled by dictatorship, this means you are violating

a basic principle of Islam (Hqaneh).

Hqaneh articulates what Al-Saud and Al-Masimi liken with their views on Islam in their

motivation to join politics. In her opinion, corruption and dictatorship fall under the

category of “munkir,” or bad, as labeled by Al-Masimi (Al-Masimi).

The women of Hizbut al-Wast expressed a range of answers within the same

scope of Al-Masimi, Al-Saud and Hqaneh, stating that their religion demands them to

apply themselves fully to every endeavor, whether that be raising their children or aiding

their country. A concept that was never mentioned in other interviews was that of ajur, or

a bonus for the Judgement Day. Several women asserted taking an Islamic route in

politics will earn them ajur, which will ensure their entrance to heaven (Abu Ali, et. al).

In all other regards, however, the women of Hizbut al-Wast were in the same stream of

religious duty their peers were in. Al-Momani essentially repeated exactly what Al-

Masimi referenced earlier with her take on spiritual motivations behind politics: “We are

called upon to do a good job and to prevent others from doing bad, m’aroof and munkir.

The Qu’ran obligates us in politics to encourage people to do good and prevent bad

actions. As soon as you go to Islam, you become and activist” (Abu Ali, et. al).

The morality of these women’s politics is stemmed from their religion. All the

flaws the subjects find in the government are not only unjust, they are anti-Islamic. For

the subjects, duty to their nation is inseparable from duty to their religion.

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Conclusion The women of Jordan’s Islamist movements are deft maneuverers within an

intricate system of Islamic and modern ideals. The Arab world has been struggling with

the friction between modernity and Islam, and how the two can coexist within the same

society. The group of women I interviewed is living example of Islamic modernity. Their

political forays are becoming normalized, but only after this generation paves the road for

the women of the future. In the meantime, their political consciousness is being awoken

not only by their surroundings, but by a frustration stemmed from their society’s

confines. While they do not go so far as to overthrow the structure in which they live,

they navigate the social landmines with a perceptiveness and earnest.

Islamic identity is inseparable from these women’s political identity. Their

religious motivations are not limited to their private lives, and their beliefs, as they

understand them, implore them to care for their nation and their people. In a time where

the Arab world has a chance to create a new identity for itself, it is clear why these

women choose Islam as the banner under which they enter the political world.

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36 Ahmad

Limitations

As a basic survey of women in Islamic politics, this study by no means fully

covers the depths and differences of the movement within Jordan. My subjects, few in

number, were all from metropolitan areas. While covering two major Islamic political

parties and an independent, the opinions of these women cannot represent the views of

women throughout the entire movement. Their individual experiences by no means can

be projected onto all women active in Islamic politics. However, the study is a basic

glance at the opinions and motivations behind a sampling of women from these various

groups.

Recommendations for further study

Because this study is an introduction to women in Jordan’s Islamic politics, there

are several avenues through which the topic can be expanded upon. Admittedly, one of

the major shortfalls of this study is my lack of interviews with women from the Muslim

Brotherhood. Expansion on their activities would contribute greatly to the study. In

addition, a comparative analysis of women in the two major political parties, the Islamic

Action Front and Hisbut Al-Wast, could highlight differences between party stances and

their effects on women. Second, a more extensive look at the formation of Islamic ideals

in government independent of party loyalties is worth examining. I am most interested in

this aspect of my study, and if I had further resources and time, I would examine the

creation of Islamic political morals via mass surveys or questionnaires.

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Al-Saud, Adab. Personal Interview. 23 November 2011.

Hqaneh, Eide. Personal Interview. 20 November 2011.

Sweiss, Kanaar O. Personal Interview. 28 November 2011.

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