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Islamist perceptions ofthe United Nations and itspeacekeeping missions:Some preliminary findingsBrynjar Lia aa Researcher at the Norwegian DefenceResearch Establishment ,Published online: 08 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Brynjar Lia (1998) Islamist perceptions of the UnitedNations and its peacekeeping missions: Some preliminary findings, InternationalPeacekeeping, 5:2, 38-63, DOI: 10.1080/13533319808413718

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319808413718

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Islamist Perceptions of the United Nationsand Its Peacekeeping Missions:

Some Preliminary Findings

BRYNJAR LIA

The portrayal of Islamic fundamentalism (Islamism) as the new security threat to theWest has coincided with a considerable build-up of Western military capacity forhumanitarian interventions and peacekeeping. Presumably, the juxtaposition of thesetrends adds to the legacy of Western domination and will affect negatively Westernparticipation in peacekeeping in the Muslim world. To address this issue, this articlediscusses Islamist perceptions of the United Nations and its peacekeeping missions. Itis argued that despite the vehement denunciation of the West by the Islamists, thishostility is not automatically extended to the UN, nor to its peacekeeping missions.Experience shows that UN peacekeeping missions can find a modus vivendi with theIslamists.

Since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the perceived Sovietcommunist threat, Islamic fundamentalism in its various permutations hascome to be seen as the looming threat to Western security and well-being.Although scholars on Islam and Middle Eastern politics have cautionedagainst pitting Islam against the West1 there is a widespread concern thatfuture security challenges might emanate from conflicts involving Muslimcountries on the one side and parts of the Western world on the other.Islamic fundamentalist movements and states, the so-called Islamists, arenot to be equated with Muslims in general. Radical Islamists are seen asparticularly threatening because of their excessive anti-Western rhetoric andtheir alleged, and sometimes well-documented, involvement in internationalterrorism. However, just as not all Muslims are extremists, so not allWestern powers are regarded alike by the Muslim world. Thus theCanadians and Scandinavians are regarded differently from countries suchas the United States that have given strong support to Israel. Indeed,exaggerated characterization of the two camps does little to shed light on therelationship.

Further, despite the almost excessive preoccupation in the West with 'the

Brynjar Lia is a researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.

International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.2, Summer 1998, pp.38-63PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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ISLAMIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN 39

Islamic threat' in the post-Cold War era, little academic attention has beendevoted to the issue of Islamist responses to peacekeeping missions. This iscurious given that Western participation in peacekeeping missions in theMuslim world represents perhaps one of the most immediate arenas ofencounter between Western military forces and Islamist elements.

This article presents preliminary findings of an ongoing research projecton Islamist perceptions of the United Nations and its peacekeepingmissions. It is argued that despite the vehement denunciation by theIslamists of the West and Western policies, this hostility is not automaticallyextended to the UN, nor to its peacekeeping missions in the Muslim world.Although the UN is often castigated for being a vehicle of particularWestern powers, led by the United States, and acting in concert against theMuslim world, this view is not unanimously shared by all Islamists.Moreover, experience from peacekeeping missions where Islamistmovements and Islamist states have been one of the parties to the conflictshows that the peacekeeping mission can find a modus vivendi with theIslamists. The approach in this article is three-fold. First, a brief outline willbe given of possible consequences of the build-up of Western militarycapacity for humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping at the same timeas Islamism and 'Islamic fundamentalism' are often portrayed as the futuresecurity challenge for the Western world. Second, examples of Islamistdiscourse about the West, the 'New World Order', the UN, internationalinterventions and peacekeeping are presented. Third, the discourse analysiswill be complemented by a case study of Islamist encounters withpeacekeeping missions, namely the Hizbollah-UNIFIL relationship insouthern Lebanon.

Juxtaposing the New Interventionism and the 'Islamic Threat'

International peacekeeping has become a prominent concern for militaryplanners and defence politicians in the post-Cold War period.2 After theCold War a significant restructuring of European security institutions hastaken place to prepare for participation in peace support operations andhumanitarian interventions. NATO's planning for 'out-of-area' operations isonly one of several manifestations of the new interventionism thatcharacterizes the post-Cold War era. The ongoing establishment of theCombined Joint Task Force is designed to enhance NATO's ability todeploy forces for peace support operations.3 The southern Europeancountries Spain, Italy, France and Portugal are in the process of forming anaval force, EUROMARFOR, and an infantry force of some 15,000-20,000forces, called EUROFOR to be used in humanitarian and peacekeepingmissions in the Mediterranean area.4 The humanitarian intervention in

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40 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Albania in 1997 by a multinational European coalition led by Italy appearsto strengthen the trend towards a greater willingness to commit troops topeacekeeping missions on the part of the European countries. If the UN-sanctioned, NATO-commanded peacekeeping operation in Bosnia isdeemed successful, it is likely that international peacekeeping withininternal conflicts with a significant element of military enforcement will beemployed in conflicts in the Muslim world, in particular in areas believed tobe important for Western security and interests.

As the military in the West prepares for future humanitarianinterventions and peacekeeping operations, there is a growing fear in theUnited States and southern Europe, particularly, of imminent 'civilizational'conflicts between the West and the Islamic world. Concerns aboutrevolutionary Islam have roots back to the Islamic revolution in Iran in1979, but recent events have nurtured an increasing concern about anexpanding militant Muslim fundamentalism, such as the Islamist coupd'etat in Sudan in 1989; the resounding election victory by the Islamists inAlgeria in 1991, after which the discredited regime staged a military coupd'etat? and the subsequent atrocities in the ongoing civil war; theappointment of the first Islamist prime minister in the pro-Western andsecular Turkey in 1996; the Hamas suicide bombings in Israel; the Islamistchallenge to Mubarak's pro-Western regime in Egypt; the advances of theextremist Taliban guerrillas in the Afghanistan civil war; and the Islamistinfluences in Chechnya and Tadjikistan.

Another growing but clearly misplaced concern is the alleged'fundamentalization' of Europe's Muslim population. The 'Islamic threat'debate gained momentum from the uncertainties produced by the collapseof communism, the traditional focus of Western threat scenarios. Moreover,in the Gulf War, stereotypes of Muslim extremists were coupled withWestern political concerns about unstable, anti-Western and unpredictableThird World regional powers. In the aftermath of that war, instability in theMiddle East and North Africa was construed as dangerous to Europeansecurity, in the sense that it represented an example of 'unpredictabledevelopments that are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, butthat can have direct implications for our security'.6

On 7-8 November 1991 in Rome a new and extended security conceptwas defined for NATO, stating that in the absence of a conventional militarythreat from the former communist bloc, threats to allied security willprobably come as 'unfortunate results of instability' which entails seriouseconomic, social and political problems, including ethnic and territorialdisagreements.7 An evidently slippery and vague security concept,revolving around the fear of instability along Europe's southern borders, hasdirected more focus on Islamic fundamentalism as a potent source of

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ISLAMIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN 41

instability and therefore an imminent threat. In February 1995, NATOSecretary-General Willy Claes unleashed a storm of protests from theMuslim world by a statement about Muslim fundamentalism as being'Europe's greatest security challenge since the end of the Cold War'.8

Although he was forced to retract his statement, the fear of Muslimfundamentalism did not abate. A report on security in the Mediterraneanregion by the political committee of the Western European Union in 1996voiced 'very strong apprehensions about militant Islamic fundamentalismas a hostile force seeking to overturn the existing political order not merelyin certain southern Mediterranean countries but even in Europe itself'.9

These statements were certainly coloured by the spillover to France fromthe civil war in Algeria, leading to a spate of terrorist bombings during1994-95 by radical Algerian Islamists.

There is no doubt that the populations in southern Europe are highlyconcerned about the violence and atrocities across the Mediterranean,fearing waves of immigration and 'boat refugees' from North Africa,terrorism by Islamist groups, and weapons of mass destruction in the handsof radical Islamist governments.10

Clash of Civilizations?

The debate about 'the Islamic threat' has received strong impetus fromSamuel Huntington's article, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', published inForeign Affairs in 1993, which predicted that 'the fundamental source ofconflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarilyeconomic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating sourceof conflict will be cultural'. He further asserted that 'the most importantconflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating thesecivilizations from one another', referring to Bosnia and the Caucasus asexamples." These conflicts, Huntington maintained, will be 'the most likelyto escalate into major wars... The next world war, if there is one, will be a warbetween civilizations'.12 Of the world's civilizations, the Islamic andConfucian civilizations were the potentially most threatening to Westerninterests, according to Huntington. He therefore advocated:

greater co-operation between countries within the Western civilization,to incorporate into the West societies in the Eastern Europe and LatinAmerica...limit the expansion of the military strength of Confucian andIslamic states, moderate the reduction of Western military capabilitiesand maintain military superiority in East and Southwest Asia...toexploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states,strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Westerninterests and values...."

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42 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Undoubtedly, this could be interpreted as a variant of Kennan's famousarticle 'X' which recommended the strategy of containing communism,which in turn became the core of Western policies during the Cold War.Indeed, the idea of a new Islamic threat supplanting communism was takenup by influential policy-makers in the West, among them Willy Claes asalready referred to, and former US Vice-President Dan Quayle.14

However, the danger of the Western Feindbild of Islam is that it becomesa self-fulfilling prophecy. Although a number of prominent scholars in theWest have hastened to refute, demystify and ridicule the clash-hypothesis,hostile statements by Western policy makers about Islamic fundamentalismhave fuelled Muslim countries' suspicion and distrust of the West. Indeed,there are widespread concerns in the Islamic world even at the official levelabout the growing 'Islamophobia' in the West. This has manifested itself inseveral resolutions by the Organization of Islamic Conference, condemningthe efforts at 'distorting the image of Islam' in the West. Western mediacampaigns against Islamic fundamentalism cannot but strengthen theIslamist cause by demonstrating the inherent hostility of the Western worldtowards Islam.

A widespread belief in the West that future threats to our security willcome from the Islamic south, coupled with intensifying preparations forhumanitarian interventions, peacekeeping missions and even peaceenforcement operations in ethnic conflicts raises several importantquestions which have been left largely unaddressed. Fuller and Lesser havetouched upon this issue when noting that 'the prominence of radical Islamicterrorism in Western perception may...influence the extent and thecharacter of the United States and European role in peacekeepingoperations, many of which are likely to be conducted in Muslim countries'.15

Clearly, Western countries will be hesitant to commit troops topeacekeeping missions in conflict areas where they believe they will betargets for Islamist radicals. The crucial issue, however, is to what extent apeacekeeping mission, led by Western countries or with a strong Westerncomponent, to a conflict area in the Islamic world, will be seen as alegitimate expression of the will of the international community, rather thanas partisan intervention, a perpetuation of Western imperialistic efforts atworld domination, or even a 'continuation of the Crusades'.

Given the intense 'Islamic-threat' debate in the West and the Muslimresentment of European Islamophobia, what are the responses of theMuslim world likely to be to Western participation in humanitarianinterventions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations? What arethe Islamists' reactions likely to be, given their often expressed anti-Western sentiments? Peacekeeping has traditionally been understood ascomprising forces that are acceptable to the host authorities. However, the

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ISLAMIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN 43

new peacekeeping has assumed a more interventionist and less consensus-oriented character. Either way, the question of the legitimacy of the UnitedNations as a conflict resolution mechanism, including UN peacekeepingmissions, assumes particular importance since most Islamists are strongly atodds with their national authorities and represent the strongest oppositionmovements in a number of Muslim countries. Moreover, the growingnumber of Islamist states (Iran after 1979, Sudan after 1989, and morerecently Afghanistan) ensures that the Islamists in one way or another willhave an impact on UN peacekeeping involvement in the Muslim world. Anoutline of Islamist perceptions of 'the West' will now be presented, since thedegree of Western dominance and control of the United Nations appears tobe an important factor in determining the Islamist position. Then we shallreturn to Islamist perceptions of the UN.

Islamist Perceptions of the West and the New World Order

Islamism, and the set of movements that refer to it, is usually defined as anideology. Thus, Islamism must not be confused with Islam, which referssometimes to a religion and religious practices, sometimes to thecommunity of Muslim believers, and sometimes to a distinct cultural andhistorical experience identified as 'Islamic civilization'. The Islamistideology is based on two pillars: the conviction that Islamic law, Shari'a,provides an organic and comprehensive system for the regulation of allaspects of life. Second, it argues that a society of good Muslims can only beachieved if the political organization of society (that is, the state) isIslamic.16 Thus, the Islamists' interpretation of Islam, though far fromuniform, stresses the political dimension of Islam and rejects any divisionbetween the spiritual and worldly spheres. As has been noted in manystudies, the theoretical-ideological dimensions of Islamism are stillrelatively underdeveloped and suffer from theoretical inconsistencies.17

Moreover, the Islamist movement is a diverse and multifariousphenomenon, and consequently a variety of positions on the West and theUN can be found. Most scholars acknowledge, however, that an importantdistinction has to be made between moderate and radical Islamists, and thattheir respective perceptions of the West vary.18 While moderate Islamists aremore willing to work within the political systems in their respectivecountries, radical Islamists completely reject the legitimacy of the rulingelite, irrespective of their policies of Islamization, and make no essentialdistinction between the 'Crusading West' and their own 'collaborationist'regimes.19

As has been argued by the Egyptian scholar Ibrahim Bayoumi Ghanim,20

the Islamists' rejection of the West should not be dismissed as a mere

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xenophobic fear of the Western world, but should be seen in the context ofspecific Western policies in the Islamic world.2I The Islamist perception ofthe West is grounded on three pillars: Islamic dogmas, the historicalcoexistence of the Western and the Islamic worlds, and current politicalcircumstances. To a certain extent, Islamic tenets such as the universalmessage of Islam, the unity of mankind, the obligation of holy struggle[jihad], and the coming universal hegemony of Islam are elements whichinfluence the Islamists' perceptions of the West in the sense that Islamismin principle challenges the Western hegemony over world affairs onreligious grounds. A radical Islamist has stated, 'The Muslims have beenordered to establish the rule of God's law on God's earth for God'screatures; we will not let any sect on the face of the earth rule peoplewithout God's law'.22 These hegemonistic claims are certainly a response tocenturies of Western domination and colonialism, perpetuated througheconomic and military domination in the post-colonial era. It would bewrong to interpret them as a commitment to conquer the world by force, asthe Islamists first and foremost see individual Muslim countries and theMuslim world as their primary area of operation. Even the radical al-Jama 'a al-Islamiya in Egypt has reiterated: 'We do not aim to commit anyactivity in Europe or any other country. Our goals are open and clear, tobring down the Egyptian regime'.23

In Islamist discourse on the West one finds that Western policies towardsthe Islamic world are described as 'imperialistic', 'racist', 'crusading',synonymous with 'exploitation', 'looting and plundering', 'aggression','tyranny', 'arrogance'. The labels used for the Western world range from'the Christian world', 'the Countries of Unbelief and Heresy' [duwal al-kufrwa'l-ilhad], 'the Crusading-Zionist-Imperialistic Alliance' [ta'aluf salibisahyuni isti'mari] and 'the Loathsome West', to 'the Civilizational Enemy'[al-'aduw al-hadari].14 The last label is interesting as it fits well into theHuntington clash-of-civilizations theory. It underlines the curiousparallelism between neo-Orientalism and Islamism which has been noted byseveral scholars.25 Indeed as an Egyptian Islamist stated after the Gulf War,'the reality of the West's relations with the Arabs and the Muslims, thepatterns of its culture, its way of interfering in their [the Muslims'] affairswhich have been confirmed throughout the last centuries, all confirm thatthe West is the civilizational enemy of the Muslims'.26 Of the numerouscrimes perpetrated by the Western world towards Islam, Islamistsemphasize the destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate in the aftermath of theFirst World War, the 'implantation' of the Zionist state in the heart of theIslamic world, the continuation of support for Zionism financially, theexploitation of natural resources of the Islamic world and Western militaryaggression against the Islamic world, in Iraq, Bosnia, Libya and Lebanon. It

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ISLAMIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN 45

is notable that support for Islamic radicalism has been high where theinfluence of the 'Christian West' has been considered strongest inundermining a once-great Islamic civilization and culture. Iran, Algeria andEgypt are cases in point.

Also, despite some propensity for gross generalizations, the UnitedStates and Israel are considered the main enemies, 'the culmination ofbarbaric imperialism in the modern age'.27 The United States, in effect, isseen as the heir to British and French colonialism in the Muslim world.Current political circumstances do not allow for much reconciliation,according to the Islamists. The Islamists find abundant evidence in recentevents to support their claims of this imperialism. The West's doublestandards on human rights issues are frequently referred to, illustrated bythe lack of action against abuses perpetrated against the Islamist oppositionin the Arab world. The massacres of innocent Muslims in Srebrenica weretaken as a proof of Europe's intention to annihilate the Muslim presence inEurope. The immediate rally of a multinational coalition to expel Iraqiforces from Kuwait, while having accepted the continued Israeli occupationof Arab land for decades, is another popular example, as is the tacit supportfrom Western countries for the coup d'etat by the Algerian military junta toabort the Islamist election victory in December 1991. The Islamists are alsodeeply critical of the 'societal illnesses' of Western societies. A deeply feltgrievance is that these 'illnesses' are spreading to the Islamic world,exemplified by the calls for secularization, the division of state and religion,a 'blind imitation of Western ways of life' and 'calls for the emancipationof women'. This 'cultural and intellectual invasion' is being facilitated bythe revolution in information technology and has 'a destructive effect on theidentity of our societies'.28

Given these strongly negative perceptions of Western policies andinterests among the Islamist movements, it is no wonder that the Islamistsare deeply resentful of the current relationship with the West, and arepessimistic about the prospects for peaceful coexistence between theIslamic world and the West. There is, however, a significant differencebetween moderate and radical Islamists in this respect. The radicalsmaintain that the general basis for the relationship with the West is'struggle' [sira], and that this struggle is a part of the 'eternal strugglebetween good and evil until the Day of Judgement'. The evil has beenpolitically embodied in the 'Alliance between the Star and the Cross'. Thefuture relationship between the West and the Islamic world will becharacterized by 'a comprehensive struggle and confrontation' [sira' shamilwa sidam], not through coexistence, according to the radical Islamists. Themoderates, however, disagree with the confrontational strategy of theradicals. The Islamic message should be spread through 'calling and

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46 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

persuasion' [al-da'wa wajidal bi-allati hiya ahsan]. Peaceful coexistenceand not aggression is the basis for relations with non-Islamic societies andstates, according to the moderate Islamists. However, faced with repeatedand organized aggression against the people of the Islamic world by theWest, first of all the United States and Israel, Muslims in many parts of theIslamic world are left with no other choice than to struggle to repelaggression and defend themselves.29

The 'New World Order' was envisaged in the aftermath of the Gold Warand the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War as an international order securewithout the threat of force, with an enhanced role for the UN and securitythrough multilateralism and collective institutions. While the Islamistswelcomed the downfall of the atheist Soviet Union, they were apprehensiveabout the effects of the rising global hegemony of the United States. AsHaddad has noted, the New World Order was perceived by the ArabIslamists mainly in the context of the Gulf War against Iraq. As such, it wasseen as another and evidently more violent stage of Western policies againstthe Islamic world. The inequitable divisions of 'the Islamic body' inseparate states since the First World War was reinforced by the West afterthe Gulf War by the 'dismemberment of Iraq'. This divide et impera policyis aimed primarily at maintaining Western interests through themaldistribution of wealth and resources in the region, according to theIslamists. It is coupled with a Zionist strategic vision for the 'Balkanizationof the Arab World', that is, to 'seek to divide the region according toreligious affiliation, ethnic origin, nationalist identity, regional and sectarianinterests, in essence recasting of the whole area as a mosaic of minorities'.30

Thus, the New World Order is mainly seen as a new way of legitimizingWestern power politics in the Middle East, keeping the Islamic umma[nation] weak and subservient to Western interests. Yet Islamist Iranwelcomed in principle the idea of a New World Order, which it interpretedas 'collective participation and human development' where 'internationalrelations [are based] on justice, tolerance, rule of law, cooperation, andtransparency' including 'a paramount position' for the UN.31 The greatestobstacle to a New World Order, the Iranian Islamists argued, was the globalhegemony of the United States, its 'arrogant unilateralism' and itsaggressive policies towards the Islamic Republic of Iran which preventedthe creation of a world order based on collective participation.32

Islamist Perceptions of the UN and UN Peacekeeping

Islamist perceptions of the United Nations are to a large degree influencedby their lack of influence over the decision-making process in theorganization's power centre, the Security Council. In this, the Islamists join

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ISLAMIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN 47

the Third World camp in the UN, which resents the European dominance inthe Security Council. Despite the fact that Muslims comprise around a fifthof the world's population, no Muslim country is permanently represented inthe Security Council. From an Islamist perspective, the Security Council inwhich four European powers," in addition to China, have permanent seatsand the right to veto, cannot be perceived as an impartial arbiter in worldaffairs. Despite this, Islamist Iran does not withhold its support for the UNor deny it any legitimacy among the Islamists. As with most other countriesIslamist Iran judges the UN on the basis of whether membership contributesto the enhancement of its national interests. The Iranian Islamists need,however, religious guidelines or at least religious legitimation for theirforeign policies. Thus, Islamist Iran has drawn upon the principle of NafyeSabil [the Pragmatic Way] to justify membership in internationalorganizations:

Like other international players, the Islamic Republic of Iran operatesin an arena which mostly consists of nations, states, and internationalorganizations...Among the rules and regulations governing an Islamicsociety's foreign relations is the nafye sabil rule which rejects anyshape of relations with foreigners based on domination. Membership ininternational organizations is also based on this rule and as such anykind of membership in organizations that impose their conditions ordomination on the Islamic society or Muslims is rejected on" this basis.34

The nafye sabil principle provides the religious ground upon which theIslamic Republic of Iran can base its activities in the UN. As such,membership in the UN must be rejected if the UN 'imposes conditions ordomination on the Islamic society'.

There are other ideological obstacles, too. A fundamental part of theIslamist vision is the unification of the Islamic world. The present statesystem of Muslim countries is seen by most Islamists as illegitimate and ahistorical artificial construct, imposed by Western imperialism. AbdelSalam Yasin, one of the principal leaders of the Islamist leaders in Morocco,stated for example that 'the Nation State is a Western invention. It is aWestern fixation which was imposed upon us, and which we inherited fromcolonialism'.35 In theory, this brings the Islamists into opposition with anumber of paragraphs in the UN Charter, in particular the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and the sovereignty of states. However,moderate Islamist movements see the unification of the Islamic world onlyas a long-term goal, which should be brought about peacefully and little bylittle, thus representing no violation of the principle of sovereignty of states.On the other hand, the Islamist regimes in Iran and Sudan have been on badterms with a number of Arab countries exactly because of their violation of

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the principle of non-interference, mainly by their attempts to 'export theirrevolution' through open and covert support for revolutionary Islamistmovements abroad.

Ironically, the new interventionism on the part of the UN in theaftermath of the Cold War has questioned seriously the established principleof non-intervention and state sovereignty. UN peacekeeping • andhumanitarian interventions in civil wars have produced strong concernsamong Third World countries which fear a trend towards less respect for theclassical guidelines for peacekeeping: 'respect for the sovereignty of theState, non-interference in matters under the domestic jurisdiction of a Stateand the requirement of consent of all concerned parties for suchoperations'.36 These concerns are also shared by Islamist regimes who fearWestern military interventionism disguised as humanitarian interventionand peacekeeping operations. The Islamists are particularly apprehensive ofthe concept of 'peace enforcement' since it is viewed as a measure tailoredto bestow legitimacy on partisan interventions in the Muslim world byhostile Western military powers.37 Again, the Islamists are in agreementwith many Third World countries which voice concerns over the use of theUN to sanction enforcement operations. Egypt, for example, has warnedthat 'when adopting enforcement measures, the Security Council shouldstrictly follow the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. Expanding thedefinition and scope of what may constitute a threat to international peaceand security to justify enforcement measures could have negativeconsequences for the UN's credibility and stature'.38

The Islamists have often drawn upon UN resolutions to support theirpolitical objectives, especially in the General Assembly which for years haspassed strongly worded resolutions condemning the Israeli occupation ofArab territory,39 and as such the UN's legitimacy has increased in the eyesof the Islamists. On the other hand, Islamist perceptions have beennegatively affected by the UN's inability to respond effectively to preventthe atrocities in Bosnia during the civil war. The tragedies of Bosnia havegiven increased support for the position of radical Islamists who tend toview the UN as 'nothing less than a body sanctioning oppression andlegalising aggression which the West practises against Muslim and Arabpeoples in places like Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, and Libya'.40 The renownedMiddle East journalist Robert Fisk observed in the aftermath of theSrebrenica massacre in the summer of 1995:

It is the United Nations itself in which the Arabs have always placedfaith that has infuriated Muslims throughout the Middle East. For theEgyptian government newspaper Al Akhbar, the United Nations is nowno more that 'an impotent scarecrow'. History would show, it said,

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'how a hired gang of murderers, thieves and rapists succeeded inbringing down the pillars of the United Nations' .41

Islamic countries then viewed the inaction of the United Nations as'Western hypocrisy toward the Muslim world', especially in light of theswift, decisive end brought to Iraq's adventurism in Kuwait. AyatollahEmamikshani, a senior Iranian cleric, expressed the prevalent view that: 'Ifthe United Nations seeks to take things seriously and declare itself to be theorganization of nations...and not an organization of arrogant powers...itmust rush to the aid of those being tyrannized' ,42

The Islamists' perception of the United Nations as an instrument of thegreat powers was also reinforced by the UN sanctioning militaryintervention against Iraq in 1991 without waiting for other solutions to thecrisis. The largest Islamist group in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers, issued anumber of statements during the crisis in which they strongly condemnedwhat they conceived as Western attempts to exploit conflicts in the Muslimworld to their own imperialistic interests. They confirmed 'their completerejection of any form of intervention and foreign presence on theArab-Islamic scene', including a UN force, and urged the Muslim world to'close any window of opportunity for foreign infiltration and intervention'.4'In a communique, released shortly after the invasion, the Muslim Brothersdemanded an 'Arab-Islamic solution to the crisis', proposing inter alia theformation of an Arab-Islamic military force.44 The proposal for an Islamicalternative for the United Nations is the logical consequence of thewidespread perceptions among the Islamists that the great powers dominateit. Partly for this reason, the Muslim Brothers have stressed the formationand strengthening of Islamic international bodies, to further the interests ofthe Islamic world. In principle, they still advocate the return of the Caliphateabolished in 1924, and the establishment of an Islamic League of Nations,in conformity with Hasan al-Banna's thinking, the founding father of themovement.

Rejection of the UN because of superpower dominance within theorganization has not become the policy of Islamist Iran, however. Since theturn of the decade and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran has abandonedits fierce radicalism and sees the UN as a vehicle for furthering its foreignpolicy objective of breaking out of the isolation imposed on it by the UnitedStates. Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati has on several occasionspraised the UN:

It embodies the hopes and aspirations of the entire membership of theinternational community, and as such, provides a suitable frameworkfor collective, transparent and rule-based international decisionmaking and implementation geared toward the promotion of the

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common good and resolution of common ills. The convening of manyinternational conferences in the past decade to articulate and codifyfurther norms of behavior for an orderly new system, the relativesuccess of the United Nations machinery to prevent and de-escalatemany international and regional conflicts, and the constructive debateto reinvigorate the General Assembly and reform the Security Councilare positive examples providing hopeful signals in this direction.45

On another occasion, however, the same foreign minister was quoted assaying that 'the Iranian people believe that the United Nations is under theinfluence of superpowers and operates in their interests'.46 The IslamicRepublic of Iran has expressed deep resentment over what it perceives as'superpower influence' on the UN regarding human rights. Indeed, the UNhas assumed a larger role in human rights monitoring in recentpeacekeeping operations, as the UN's missions in El Salvador, FYRMacedonia and Eastern Slavonia illustrate. Iran fears that the UN's humanrights agenda will be instrumentalized by hostile great powers, in particularthe United States, to interfere in Iran's domestic affairs, impose sanctionsand further isolate the country. But instead of rejecting the UN's legitimacy,Islamist Iran has advocated the reform of the UN Security Council, and anenhanced role for the General Assembly:

the Council needs fundamental and substantive reform andmodification particularly in its rules and decision-making procedures.The realities of today's international scene are so different from thoseprevailing in the aftermath of the Second World War that it debilitatesthe Security Council with its present structure and prevents it frommeeting the new challenges. On the other hand, the General Assemblyenjoys greater credibility in view of its relatively universal, democraticand transparent character. This supreme body of the Organizationshould not become the forum for general and inconclusive discussions.The Assembly, in accordance with the Charter, must assume its rightfulplace as the primary decision-making body on important internationalpolitical and economic issues.47

Parallels to Iran's mixed, but all the same relatively positive, perceptionsof the UN 'as a suitable framework for the collective, transparent and rule-based decision-making'48 can be found among the numerous Islamistopposition movements in the Arab world, such as the illegal Centre Party[Hizb al-Wasat] in Egypt.49 The party has formulated a position on the UN'srole from an Islamist perspective in its programme, published in 1996,50

where it acknowledges the notion of an 'International community' [jama'adawliyya], and international law.51 The programme does not dismiss the UN

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or international law as 'un-Islamic'. On the contrary, both are particularlyimportant for protecting the rights of people in the Third World. However,new principles of international law should be created to reflect 'the rights ofpeoples' [huquq al-nas], rather than merely the rights of individuals:

the party attaches particular importance to the creation of principles ofinternational law, tied to the rights of people, such as the right of peopleto self-determination, not to prevent people from choosing their,representatives, or conduct free and fair elections...and not to let apeople be exposed to siege and imposed famine, the legitimate right toself-defence, and not to prevent a people from opposing aggressors.52

The Centre Party is also concerned about the dominance of certain countriesat the United Nations. Thus, the UN's role should be enhanced to reflect theinterests of all members of the international community:

We are anxious to remind the members of the international communityof the need for co-ordination and mutual understanding between freecountries to bring the United Nations [forward] to a degree of powerwhich enables it to undertake its international obligations withneutrality and objectivity, so that it becomes more effective andcredible.53

It is interesting to note that the role of regional Arab and Islamicorganizations, such as the Arab League and the Organization of the IslamicConference, have in fact been given secondary importance compared to thatof the UN. The unequivocal support for an enhanced role for the UN by theIslamist Centre Party strengthens our assumption that it is Westerndominance in world politics which the Islamists oppose, rather than thenotion of a universal organization. It is evident that despite the fiercerejection of Western influence on the part of the Islamist movements, suchhostility is not automatically extended to the UN.

Muslim Participation in Peacekeeping

A few Muslim countries have a long history of participation in UNpeacekeeping operations. Egypt, for example, participated in the Congooperation back in the 1960s.54 Since the end of the Cold War a growingnumber of smaller pro-Western Muslim countries have begun participatingin UN peacekeeping, including Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan.55 Thegreater participation of these countries in peacekeeping operations isundoubtedly a reflection of their desire to enhance their international status,and to demonstrate, as a Jordanian Major General stated, 'a commitment tointernational code of political conduct through productive involvement in

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collective efforts aimed at achieving regional and global peace' .56 For thesesmall and vulnerable Muslim states in North Africa and the Middle East,peacekeeping operations are seen in the context of building a close alliancewith the military in the West. Other political motives are also discernible,especially concerning the participation in the UNPROFOR, and later in theNATO-led operation in Bosnia. For many Muslim regimes with a strongIslamist opposition, the participation in peacekeeping in Bosnia has beenparticularly sought after because it served to undermine domestic critics ofthe regime's inability to defend the Bosnian Muslims.

The dilemmas faced by many Muslim states are the relativeincompatibility between the desire to play a more active role internationallyand the tendency, particularly among public opinion, to consider that thegreat powers are in a sense imposing a right to interfere throughhumanitarian and peacekeeping operations.57 The perception ofpeacekeeping as a vehicle for Western policies is reinforced by the fact thateven traditional contributors to UN peacekeeping charge that therecruitment to the DPKO personnel does not 'truly reflect the principle ofequitable geographical representation', and that 'officers from developingcountries are underrepresented on the staff of the Department', reinforcinga tendency that 'developing countries are providing the bulk of troops in thefield, while developed countries predominate in the Headquarters in NewYork'.58 The perception of peacekeeping as an instrument of Westernpolicies is also reinforced by the fact that almost all European countries (25as of March 1997) are represented in UN peacekeeping operations, but noneof the traditionally anti-Western radical Arab regimes of Syria, Libya andIraq, or the Islamist states of Iran and Sudan, or the conservative IslamicGulf states, are found among the troop-contributing countries.59

While the participation of moderate pro-Western Muslim countries inpeacekeeping operations has generally been welcomed by the great powers,Islamist Iran was rebuffed when offering troops to the peacekeepingoperation in Bosnia. At the height of the Bosnian crisis in early 1994, UNofficials stated that they desperately needed more peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina to monitor ceasefires, protect Muslim 'safe areas' and aidconvoys. A report released in March 1994 put the immediate need at about12,000 more peacekeepers. Yet UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declined troop offers from Iran, and the move was also blocked byPresident Clinton.60 However, getting any more help from the West wasproving very difficult, and additional contributions offered by Westernpowers fell far short of the anticipated needs. The troops offered by IslamistIran were rejected because Iran was considered a strong supporter ofBosnia's Muslim-led government and thus too biased to participate.

This illustrated a dilemma in UN peacekeeping. The UN's unwritten

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policy of avoiding troops from nations that are neighbours or that havestrong ethnic, historic, or religious ties to any side in a conflict affectspotential donors, because without some vested interests nations are unlikelyto offer troops. But any perceived bias by the warring parties damages theUN's reputation for neutrality. This policy was strongly supported byexperts on peacekeeping such as General Indar Rikhye, who stated the UNshould continue to be selective about troops because contributors with apolitical agenda often work hard to influence UN policy at every level. TheUnited Nations should therefore avoid accepting Iranian troops in Bosnia,because Iran 'has a strong political agenda which is likely to filter down toits forces' .6I

True, a presence of Iranian troops in the UN peacekeeping force inBosnia in 1994, would undoubtedly have strengthened the credibility of theSerb nationalist propaganda that Bosnia was being taken over by 'Islamicfundamentalists'. However, this was not the only reason for rejectingIranian peacekeepers. At the time of Iran's offer of 10,000 troops, the 1994Bosnian president wrote to the United Nations to protest against thebehaviour of Russian soldiers who had arrived recently to a warm Serbwelcome. And despite hesitating to accept troop offers from Islamist Iran,the UN Secretary-General accepted, at the same time, offers from otherMuslim states such as Egypt, Pakistan, Malaysia and even Turkey whosehistorical tie to the Bosnians was unquestionable. The reluctance to acceptIranian troops in UNPROFOR was obviously motivated by the desire tokeep Islamist Iran out of the Balkan conflict.

The influence that Iran had gained through the war efforts of itsmujaheedin who fought alongside the Bosnian army during the civil warwas seen as a threat to European security. Several Western observers notedthat the United States and NATO's decisive intervention in Bosnia in 1995was prompted partly by the fear that 'Islamic fundamentalism' shouldspread through Bosnia into Europe. An important element of the Daytonaccord was to ensure the departure of the mujahideen who were seen as aterrorist threat to the NATO-led forces. It was widely believed that 'Iranrepresents a conduit for continued fundamentalist Islamic influence inBosnia'. A journalist wrote in March 1996: 'Many observers cast Bosnia asan unwitting battleground where the United States is trying to keep Bosniafrom becoming a springboard in Europe for a militant Islamic regime'.62

Needless to say, participation in peacekeeping cannot be separated from thenational interests of the participating countries. UN peacekeeping and UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations would appear illegitimate, however, inthe eyes of most Islamists if these operations are seen as another vehicle ofgreat-power politics aiming at excluding and marginalizing the Islamists.

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Coexistence and Clashes between Islamism and UN Peacekeeping:The Case of Hizbollah and UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon

So far, our study of Islamist perceptions of the UN and its peacekeepingmissions has relied mainly on Islamist discourses, with only cursoryreference to peacekeeping operations where Islamist states or Islamistmovements have played, in one way or another, an important role in the areaof the operation of a UN peacekeeping mission. Because ideologicalrhetoric is seldom implemented directly without undergoing sometransformation, shaped by the practicalities of life, it is vital to draw uponhistorical evidence of Islamist encounters with peacekeeping missions. Inaddition to the difficult situations in which UN forces have encounteredIslamist forces, as in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is important todemonstrate from a study of an earlier encounter that Islamists are nothostile to peacekeeping per se.

The Hizbollah-UNIFIL relationship in southern Lebanon represents oneof the longest Islamist encounters with peacekeeping missions, and is avaluable empirical source to complement our analysis. The overall pictureis that the relationship between Hizbollah [God's Party] and UNIFILappears to have been determined by three factors. First of all, it seems tohave been a function of Hizbollah's rivalries with the Amal movement forsupremacy in the Lebanese Shi'ite community. Second, Hizbollah's closerelationship with Iran played a role in the 1980s when Iran's own short-liveddispute with the UN led the Hizbollah's spokesmen to condemn the UN andthereby UNIFIL's mandate for favouring Israel. Third, the relationship wasgrounded on practical considerations, as UNIFIL was mandated to preventarmed infiltration, thereby putting obstacles in the way of Hizbollah'smilitary activities.

The UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon was established in theaftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978. Its mandate wasestablished by Security Council Resolution 425, mandating UNIFIL toconfirm the withdrawal of Israel troops, restore international peace andsecurity and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return ofits effective authority.63 The UN force in southern Lebanon faced numerousdifficulties, not only because of the absence of a central government in thearea, but also because of a lack of international backing for the fulfilment ofthe mandate. As the United States failed to put pressure on Israel towithdraw completely, Israel established a security zone in the south inwhich authority was handed over to the Israeli-backed militia of SaadHaddad (later the South Lebanese Army, SLA), instead of to UNIFIL andthe Lebanese authorities. This situation has in effect remained until thepresent, interrupted by the Israeli invasion in 1982-85 as well as frequent

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military raids and attacks against various Lebanese and Palestinianresistance movements.

Hizbollah is one of these resistance movements, which emerged in thewake of the Israeli invasion in 1982 as a radical alternative to the Amalmovement, a Shi'ite militia which had been formed at the outbreak of theLebanese civil war in 1975. The Amal movement was a nationalist Shi'itemovement, seeking political and economic parity for the underprivilegedShi'ite community in the multiconfessional Lebanon, as opposed toHizbollah which sought to establish a radical Islamic state with pan-Islamicpretensions after the Iranian pattern. When the leadership of the Amalmovement, Nabih Bern, agreed to participate in a National SalvationCommittee in 1982, shortly after the Israeli invasion, he was accused ofcollaborating with Israel, producing a split in the movement. The combinedeffect of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Israeli invasion radicalizedthe Shi'ite community in Lebanon, and with the support of RevolutionaryGuards from Iran (their numbers ranging from 200 in 1982 to about 2,000in 1989),64 the Hizbollah movement became prominent. During the 1980sthe numerous Islamic groups associated with Hizbollah became notoriouslyknown for terrorism, such as hijackings, hostage taking and suicidebombings, in particular the fatal suicide attacks on American and Frenchtroops of the multinational force in Beirut, MNF II, in 1983. At the end ofthe 1980s, as the Lebanese civil war ended and the militias were disarmed,Hizbollah's military arm, the Islamic Resistance [al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya] and partly the Amal militia were left intact, as long as theirmilitary efforts were directed against the Israeli military occupation in thesouth. From now on, Hizbollah began to play an increasing role in resistingthe Israeli occupation.

When Hizbollah began to challenge Amal in the mid-1980s, Amal hadalready established a close relationship with UNIFIL. In the summer of1980 UNIFIL formally recognized two Amal officials as liaison officers,reflecting the growing influence of Amal in the south and in Beirut. ForAmal the new relationship with UNIFIL was important and sensible, as inthe absence of a legitimate Lebanese government the UN presence in thesouth stood for legitimacy. Moreover, in the light of assiduous Israeli effortsto undermine UNIFIL, they had certain interests in common. Lastly, theUNIFIL zone gave a certain degree of protection. Amal officials strove to'wed themselves with the UNIFIL', which at times created strains in therelationship as Amal often attempted to go too far. Despite this, thepragmatism shown by the Amal leadership usually contributed to quellingproblems in the relationship with UNIFIL.65 Many observers inferred thatthe tranquillity of southern Lebanon in the latter part of the 1980s was 'theproduct of a discreet pattern of co-operation that has evolved between

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UNIFIL and Amal', which had become the de facto government in southLebanon:

Fearing Israeli reprisals, Amal has been a force for stability in southernLebanon, thwarting attempts by local Palestinians and the pro-Iranianradical Hizbullah from using south Lebanon as a corridor to attackIsrael. Amal's efforts have been abetted by UNIFIL's network ofobservation posts, checkpoints, and roving patrols, erected to stop themovement of armed people across the UN zone. Violators, UNIFILsources say, are routinely turned over to Amal.66

This pattern of cooperation was threatened by the radicalization of theShi'ite community as it became evident for the moderate Amal leadershipthat political (and even physical) survival necessitated a less moderatecourse in the resistance movement. By the end of 1984 Hizbollah wasmaking significant inroads among the Shi'ite community in Beirut. TheIsraeli retreat from most of Lebanon and the withdrawal of the Americanand French forces in Beirut enhanced Hizbollah's image as the mosteffective defender of Shi'ite rights and interests. Amal made efforts to stemthe advance of their rival, and was initially successful in preventingHizbollah from gaining a foothold in the UNIFIL zone. In the aftermath ofthe Israeli withdrawal to the south in June 1985, a process of fragmentationand radicalization marked the Amal movement, however. It facedincreasing difficulties in finding a middle way between limiting attacks onIsraeli or Israeli-allied targets (which precipitated massive Israelicounterattacks) on the one hand, and avoiding being slammed for beingIsraeli collaborators, on the other.

With the rise of Hizbollah, the UNIFIL-Amal relationship naturallyendangered the impartiality of the UN force. For radical Shi'ite elements,the UNIFIL presence was perceived as a force serving Israeli and Westerninterests by performing the task of preventing infiltration from the north.Both Iranian and Hizbollah spokesmen rejected UN Security CouncilResolution 425 as 'an example of superpower arrogance' that justified theprotection of Israel, not Lebanon.67 The reason for this hostility was partlyfound in the Iranian political scene. Iran was being pressured by the UnitedStates to end the Iran-Iraq War by accepting a ceasefire which Iranperceived as unfair. When UN Security Council Resolution 598 wasadopted on 20 July 1987 calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal to theinternational borders, it was much criticized by Iran for its 'fundamentaldefects and incongruities'. Iran only grudgingly accepted a ceasefire andResolution 598 on 3 July 1988. Ayatollah Khomeini described the decisionas 'worse than taking poison'. Iran's own disagreements with the UN spilledover to Hizbollah's relationship with UNIFIL. (On one occasion Hizbollah

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declared a jihad against the United Nations.) UNIFIL repeatedly tried toestablish a liaison with the Hizbollah as it had done with other militias inthe south, but was often rebuffed by the Hizbollah who on several occasionsaccused UNIFIL of cooperating with Israel. Unlike the Amal-UNIFILcooperation, only a tacit and precarious modus vivendi existed between theUN peacekeeping force and the Islamist militia of Hizbollah.68

What made the situation worse for UNIFIL, was that its French battalioncould be seen as a part of French designs for a Maronite-dominatedLebanon. Due to its past colonial relationship with Lebanon and the fact thatthe Maronite community traditionally looked to France for patronage andprotection, the French presence could hardly be seen as impartial by theMuslim community. This largely explains why French troops in themultinational peacekeeping force in Beirut (MNF II) were subjected toattacks by radical Islamic groups, associated with Hizbollah. When theFrench launched military attacks against the Hizbollah in the Bekaa Valley,they were thus no longer peacekeepers, but in effect a party to the conflict.69

In the Shi'ite community the resentment of the French presence'was notlimited to Hizbollah, but extended to Amal.

In August 1986 two members of the Amal-movement, one of them alocal leader, were killed by a French sentry in a confrontation at acheckpoint near the village of Abassiya. This led to a serious escalationduring which a number of French UNIFIL soldiers were killed. Theconfrontation with the French UNIFIL battalion did not subside, and inSeptember several French UNIFIL soldiers were killed by roadside bombs,widely believed to be set up by the Hizbollah.70 In the aftermath of thisconfrontation, the French battalion was withdrawn.71 Although largedemonstrations were staged by the Shi'ite community in support of theUNIFIL after the Abassiya clashes, the radicalization of parts of the Shi'itecommunity did not bode well for the UN presence in southern Lebanon inthe latter part of the 1980s.

The disagreements between Hizbollah and Amal in the late 1980s withregard to the UN presence in southern Lebanon were only a part of theoverall competition between the two for supremacy within the Shi'itecommunity. Apart from the basic ideological differences (Lebanese Shi'itenationalism versus radical pro-Iranian pan-Islamism), a number of issuesdivided them: Hizbollah's challenge to Amal's self-proclaimed role ofmaintaining security in the south, the tactics of hostage-taking, the scope ofthe anti-Israeli resistance in the south and their opposite views of the UnitedStates and the West.72

In 1988 and early 1989 the Amal-Hizbollah rivalries escalated intointensive fighting, during which disagreements over the relationship to theUN presence in southern Lebanon played an important role. In fact, the

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Shi'ite 'civil war' was triggered by the abduction in February 1988 of theAmerican Lt. Col. William Higgins who was an officer in the UN ObserverGroup Lebanon (a unit of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, UNTSO,but attached to UNIFIL)." In view of the abduction and subsequent killingof Higgins in 1989 the well-known scholar of Islam, John Esposito, deducedthat Hizbollah 'viewed the UN presence (in Lebanon) as another form offoreign (American or Israeli) intervention'.74 This appears to beexaggerated, and belies the fact that Hizbollah's operations targetedAmerican, French and Israeli forces in Lebanon rather than the UnitedNations per se. Hizbollah and its associated groups were conducting acampaign of hostage taking, notably American hostages, in order to bargainfor the release of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.75

Higgins' tragic fate, abhorrent as it was, was not a result of his UNaffiliation, but of his American citizenship. In January 1989, with thesupport of Syrian and Iranian efforts, Hizbollah and Amal had in factreached an agreement which committed both parties not to harm UNIFILmembers.76 The execution of Colonel Higgins in August 1989 was justifiedin Hizbollah's eyes by their claim that he was a CIA agent. He was thereforekilled in retribution for the Israeli abduction of the religious Shi'ite leader,Shaykh Abd al-Karim Ubayd.77

Despite the Higgins affair, the legitimacy of the UN peacekeeping forcein Lebanon in the eyes of Hizbollah's supporters appears to have beenrelatively greater than the declared enemies of Islam - the United States andthe West. A UN survey of serious confrontations between UNIFIL and theparties to the conflict since 1985 until 1996 shows that the most seriouschallenge to the UNIFIL came from the Israeli occupation forces and inparticular its proxy army, the SLA.78 Friction between 'armed elements' andthe UNIFIL at checkpoints were not rare occurrences, however. InDecember 1988 and September 1991, for example, dangerousconfrontations occurred between UN personnel and armed elements fromvarious resistance movements, leading to fatal shooting incidents.

Although the involvement of Hizbollah in these confrontations isunknown, a serious incident occurred in June 1994 as a result of a UNIFILpatrol (from FIJIBATT) intercepting guerrilla soldiers belonging toHizbollah's military wing. Exchange of fire ensued in which one UNIFILsoldier and one guerrilla soldier were killed. Following that clash a numberof UNIFIL positions came under intense fire from Hizbollah.79 A lessserious incident involving Hizbollah occurred in the Norwegian battalionsector where a Norwegian team came under fire from Hizbollah during anight patrol. The response from Hizbollah to the latter incident was that 'theNorwegians watch us too much', referring to NORBATT eagerness inconducting night patrols, which most UNIFIL units do not.80 While the

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gravity of these occurrences should not be underestimated, they nonethelesssuggest that Hizbollah attacks against UNIFIL are motivated by mainlymilitary considerations, that is, to signal that UNIFIL should not impedethem in conducting guerrilla warfare against the Israeli occupation byintercepting their patrols or disclosing their presence to the Israelis. This islinked to the inherent inconsistencies in the UNIFIL mandate whichinstructs the force to prevent infiltration through their area of operations, butat the same time, in the absence of an Israeli withdrawal, does not empowerthe force to prevent any Lebanese from conducting a war of liberationagainst the Israeli occupation.

In sum, despite occasional incidents and clashes involving armedelements from Hizbollah's Islamic Resistance, UNIFIL in southernLebanon is not perceived of as one of the tentacles of Western imperialismsupporting Zionist expansionism. Hizbollah's relationship with UNpeacekeeping in Lebanon appears to be less determined by ideology than bymilitary and practical considerations. It remains to be seen, however,whether more serious conflicts with the UNIFIL will occur if Israel agreesto an unconditional withdrawal and the UNIFIL redeploys southwards tothe Israeli-Lebanese international border.

Conclusion

Despite fierce anti-Westernism on the part of the Islamist movements andtheir condemnation of Western (and in particular American) policiestowards the Islamic world, this hostile attitude is not automatically extendedto the UN. Although the United Nations is sometimes castigated for being avehicle of the major powers — 'nothing less than a body...legalisingaggression which the West practises against Muslim and Arab peoples inplaces like Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, and Libya' - this view is not unanimouslyshared by all Islamists, some of whom in fact advocate a strengthening ofthe United Nations to make it more effective to protect the rights of peoplein the Islamic world. As a result of the Gulf Crisis, the Islamist movementappears to be extremely suspicious of any international actions which couldbe interpreted as Western attempts at infiltration and intervention. Despitethis, the record of the Hizbollah - UNIFIL coexistence in southern Lebanonshows that the UN forces are for the most part not associated with Westernimperialism, which has to be expelled. Nevertheless, national contingentsfrom countries which Hizbollah perceive as a party to the conflict, such asthe United States, cannot expect the same courtesy. The nationality of troopsand observers in UN peacekeeping forces is not irrelevant to the Islamists.Clashes between UNIFIL and Hizbollah appear to stem mainly frommilitary considerations, as the UN forces impeded, but only to a limited

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extent, Hizbollah's war of liberation against the Israeli occupation. Thissuggests that anticipated Islamist responses to international peacekeepingshould not be derived solely from the Islamists' perception of the West, butfrom a detailed assessment of the actual conflict, the mandate and theinterests of the troop-contributing countries.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is a revised version of a paper presented to the PhD-seminar, Normative Islam andSocial Reality, sponsored by the Norwegian Research Council (NFR) at Hoor (Lund) in Sweden,11-15 June 1997.

NOTES

1. See, for example, John Esposito, The Islamic Threat, New York: Oxford University Press,1995 and Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in theMiddle East, London: IB Tauris, 1996.

2. The Nordic countries, for example, have recently conducted a military manoeuvre (calledNordic Peace) in simulated 'ethnic conflict situations' with earmarked forces for peacesupport operations in coordination with NGOs.

3. Madeleine Andersson, 'The European security policy and its institutions' (in Swedish) inForsvar i nutid, 1/1996.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy/Susanna Agnelli, 'The Mediterranean and the Future ofEurope' (Statement to Johns Hopkins University, 8 November 1995).

5. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of the parliamentary elections inDecember 1991. The second round was never held as the military intervened in January1992.

6. Lene Hansen, 'NATO's New Discourse', in Birthe Hansen (ed.), European Security 2000,Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1995, p.124.

7. 'The Alliance's New Strategic Concept' (In Norwegian), in NATO håndboka, Brussels:NATO's Information and Press Center, 1993, p.155

8. Quoted from Rienk W. Terpstra, 'The Mediterranean basin as a new playing field forEuropean security organisations', Helsinki Monitor, Vol.8, No.1 1997, pp.41-58.

9. de Lipkowski, Security in the Mediterranean Region (Report submitted by PoliticalCommittee of the Western European Union, 4 November 1996, document 1543), part 2, p. 11.

10. Lecture by Vice President of the European Commission Manuel Marin at the Nobel Institutein Oslo, 23 May 1997. For security implications of immigration, see, for example, PaulSmith, 'Immigration Alters Military Role', Defense News, 12-18 May 1997.

11. Samuel Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, No.3, Summer1993, p.25.

12. Ibid., p.39.13. Esposito (see n.1 above), p.189.14. Ibid., pp.48-9.15. Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West,

Boulder: Westview Press/A RAND Study, 1995.16. Laura Guazzone (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in

the Contemporary Arab World, Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995, pp.4, 10.17. Ibid., p.12.18. Despite the proliferation of literature on the 'Islamic threat', there are few systematic studies,

based on primary sources of Islamist perceptions of the West. Two exceptions are a study byGhanim (in Arabic) and Haddad. See Ibrahim Bayumi Ghanim, 'al-Gharb fi ru'yat al-harakaal-islamiyya al-misriyya' (The West in the Perception of the Egyptian Islamic Movement),

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ISLAMIST PERCEPTIONS OF THE UN 61

in al-Qahira, Cairo, September 1993, and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, 'Islamist Perceptions ofUS Policy in the Middle East' in David W. Lesch (ed.) The Middle East and the UnitedStates: A Historical and Political Reassessment, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

19. An example of the distinction between moderates and radicals is the three main Islamistmovements in Egypt: Muslim Brothers [al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun], the Islamic Society [al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya], and the Islamic Holy Struggle [al-Jihad al-Islami]. The MuslimBrothers are a moderate political movement with a broad popular following and had aparliamentary representation during the 1980s when the Egyptian regime partially opened upthe political system to Islamists. They have repudiated the use of violence since the 1970s.The other two, however, are radical movements with military wings, forming the core of theguerrilla movement against the police and security forces in Upper Egypt.

20. Ghanim (see n.18) p.65.21. This view is supported by a number of other scholars on Islamism. The rejection of the West

by Islamists and 'their declarations of war' against the West must be seen as a defensivestrategy of Third World communities, struggling to defend their interests, values and culturein the face of a much more powerful West. According to the acknowledged French scholaron Islamism François Burgat, Islamism can be seen as 'the third phase of decolonisation',following 'the political - the independent movements - the second economic - thenationalisation of the Suez Canal in Egypt, or oil in Algeria, the last phase is cultural'. AsBassam Tibi and others have shown, Islamism exhibits defensive features symptomatic of astruggle for survival. Islamism seeks to define Islam as a common discourse and an identityin a time in which traditional societies are dissolved or dissolving, and the features of themodern society have not yet been consolidated. It can be assumed that 'once this survival isguaranteed, more creative attitudes may be expected to develop among the Muslimleadership'. See François Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in NorthAfrica, Austin, 1993; Bassam Tibi, The Crises of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture inthe Scientific-Technological Age, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988.

22. Asim Abd al-Majid, Mithaq al-'Amal al-Islami [Covenant for Islamic Action] quoted fromGhanim (see n.18).

23. Interview with Sheikh Rifa'ey Ahmad Taha, an official from al-Jama'a al-Islamiya inNida'ul-Islam, Vol.18, April-May 1997.

24. Ghanim (see n. 18), p.71.25. See, for example, Mona Abaza and Georg Stauth: 'Occidental Reason, Orientalism, Islamic

Fundamentalism: A Critique' in International Sociology, Vol.3, Dec. 1988, pp.343-64.26. Abd al-Min'am Salim Jabara, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Azmat al-Khalij [The Muslim

Brothers and the Gulf Crisis] Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi' wa al-Nashr al-Islami, undated, p.18.27. Ghanim (see n.18), p.62.28. Ibid., p.64.29. Ibid., p.66.30. Ibid., p.429. Again, Huntington has placed himself close to the Islamists' worldview, albeit

from the opposite perspective. He depicted the post-Cold War optimism about a New WorldOrder and the World Community as essentially an instrument for Western hegemonisticdesigns: 'the euphemistic collective noun (replacing 'the Free World') to give globallegitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers.See Huntington, (n.11 above) p.39.

31. Speech of the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs before the 51st Session of the UN GeneralAssembly, New York (23 September 1996) (http://www.ipis.org/pub/ijia/velayati.html).

32. Ibid.33. Russia is seen by the Islamists as essentially a part of the aggressive West.34. Marziy-E Mousawi Far, 'The Principle of Nafye Sabil and Membership in International

Organisations', Journal of Foreign Policy, Tehran, Winter 1997 (http://www. ipis.org/pub/fp/fpl.html)

35. Quoted from François Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa,Austin, 1993, p.31.

36. Mats Berdal, 'Utover tradisjonell fredsbevaring?' [Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping]Internasjonal Politikk, Vol.53, No.1, 1995, p.72.

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62 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

37. Interview with Reza Nazaharani, analyst at Institute for Political and International Studies(IPIS) in Tehran.

38. 'Egypt's Participation in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Informal Talking Pointson Peacekeeping' (Paper presented at the conference 'Challenges of Peace Support into the21st Century', Stockholm, Swedish National Defense College, 26-27 September 1997), p.1.

39. The largest Islamist group in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers, have urged for a larger role for theUnited Nations in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the hectic diplomatic activities prior tothe allied war on Iraq in 1990-91, the Muslim Brothers submitted resolutions, calling uponthe international community and the largest powers to respect international law regarding thePalestinian-Israeli conflict. They called for an international conference of the signatories ofthe Fourth Geneva Convention to outline a plan to enable the United Nations to protect thePalestinian civilians in occupied Palestine. The Muslim Brothers further called upon theUnited States and the international community to stop the Jewish settlement campaigns aswell as to enable the Palestinian people to establish their institutions under the protection ofthe United Nations. See Jabara (n.26 above), pp.31-2.

40. Ghanim (see n.18), p.66.41. Robert Fisk, 'Bosnia Crisis: Arab View - Wave of Islamic Anger and Frustration Shakes the

Middle East', The Independent, 15 July 1995, p.8.42. Sassan Tabatabai, 'Frustration with UN Response Leads Some Islamic Nations to Aid

Bosnians', Christian Science Monitor, 11 May 1993.43. Jabara (see n.26) p.18. Still, the widely accepted idea that 'Islamic fundamentalist

movements universally supported Iraq rather than the Western-backed governments ofKuwait and Saudi-Arabia' (cited from Huntington (see n.11)) during the Gulf crisis isunfounded. Rather, the Muslim Brothers, in a communique released shortly after theinvasion, 'appealed to the leaders in Iraq to reconsider its acts . . . as the Islamic world andindeed the whole world unanimously condemn the invasion'. See Huntington (n. 11 above)p.35 and Jabara (n.26 above), pp.79, 42-4.

44. Jabara (see n.26), ibid.45. Speech of the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23 September 1996 (n.31 above).46. 'Brief on Iran', No.351, February 1996 (Representative Office of the National Council of

Resistance of Iran).47. Speech of the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs (n.31).48. Ibid.49. The Centre Party is a dissident group of the Muslim Brothers.50. The Centre Party was reportedly launched in protest against the political quiescence of the

ageing leadership in the Muslim Brother organization, but was denied political recognitionas a political party because the Egyptian authorities suspected it of being a façade for theoutlawed Muslim Brothers.

51. Rafiq Habib, Awraq Hizb al-Wasat [The Papers of the Centre Party], Cairo, 1996, p.89.52. Ibid.53. Ibid.54. Egypt and Tunisia have been particularly active in the efforts to establish a peacekeeping

capability for the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Through the capacity of the presidentsof the OAU in 1994 and 1995, these countries were strongly involved in taking steps toestablish an African mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and theyhave joined the efforts to establish an African peacekeeping force, following a trilateralinitiative from the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Tunis has proposed a similarconflict prevention mechanism for the Arab League, but little progress has been made so far.

55. By March 1997 the greatest troop contributors were in fact two Muslim countries, Pakistanand Bangladesh.

56. Major-General Marouf Nadir, 'Jordan's Participation in Peace Support Operations' (Paperpresented at the conference 'Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century', Stockholm,Swedish National Defense College, 26-27 September 1997).

57. Fernanda Faria and Alvaro Vasconcelos, 'Security in Northern Africa: Ambiguity andReality', in Chaillot Papers, No.23, September 1996 (Institute for Security Studies, WesternEuropean Union).

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58. 'Egypt's Participation in United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations' (Paper presented at theconference 'Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century', Stockholm, SwedishNational Defense College, 26-27 September 1997).

59. 'Monthly Summary of Troop Contributors to Peacekeeping Operations', at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/troop/troop/htm.

60. Fisk (n.41 above), p.8.61. Lucia Mouat, 'Need for Peacekeepers in Balkans May Force UN to Revise Its Rules',

Christian Science Monitor, 16 March 1994, p.3.62. Scott Peterson, 'Bosnia Weighs US Aid Against Loyalty to Iran', Christian Science Monitor,

12 March 1996, p.3.63. United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping, New York,

1996, p.83.64. Hussein Sirriyeh, 'Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict', Adelphi Papers, No.243, Autumn

1989, p.44.65. For example, Amal officials offered to assist UNIFIL militarily by conducting joint patrols

and by maintaining positions close to UNIFIL positions. The Amal militia also attempted toexploit their relationship with the UN forces by bringing weapons through the UNIFILcheckpoints, which the UN forces rejected. See Augustus Richard Norton, 'UNIFIL and theShiite Community', in Anthony Mc Dermott and Kjell Skjelsbæk (eds), A Thankless Task:The Role of UNIFIL in Southern Lebanon, NUPI-rapport No.123, December 1988, p. 118.

66. George D. Moffett III, 'Peacekeepers win Peace Prize', The Christian Science Monitor, 30Sept. 1988.

67. Norton (n.65), pp.119-21 and Bjørn Skogmo, International Peacekeeping in Lebanon,1978-1988, Boulder, London, 1989, p.53.

68. Skogmo, ibid., pp.52-3.69. Sirriyeh (n.65), p.58.70. Skogmo (n.68), p.53.71. In order to enable UNIFIL to respond more effectively to the worsening security situation,

the number of UNIFIL positions were reduced. In addition, the positions were fortified andan emergency force, Force Mobile Reserve, was formed.

72. As opposed to the unrestrained anti-Americanism of Hizbollah, the Amal leader Nabih Berricourted Western support and travelled regularly to the United States where his ex-wife andchildren resided. See Esposito (n.1 above), pp. 150-51.

73. Ibid., pp. 150-51.74. Ibid.75. By December 1988 Western hostages in Lebanon included nine Americans and six

Europeans. See E.A. Wayne, 'Infighting in Iran May Explain Higgins Threat', ChristianScience Monitor, 14 December 1988.

76. Sirriyeh (n.64), p.19 and Linda Feldman, 'Reported Killing Increases Level of MideastTurmoil', Christian Science Monitor, 2 Aug. 1989.

77. Feldman, ibid.78. 'UNIFIL under Fire', in United Nations (see n.63), 1996, pp. 109-10.79. Ibid., pp.109-10.80. Interview with UNIFIL's spokesman Timor Göksel, October 1996.

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