Islamic Research and Training InstituteIslamic Development Bank

Financial Distress and Bank Failure

Lessons for Strengthening Islamic Banks

Salman Syed Ali

Bank Failures Episodes

• S&Ls Collapse• BCCI Closure• Barings• East Asian Crisis• Many others

Costs• Fiscal (not a real cost)• Dead-weight Loss• Diversion of Economic Policy• Slow-down of Islamic Finance

Why Banks Fail?

Structural Reasons Asset-Liability Problems External Factors What Theoretical Models Suggest

Can Islamic Banks Fail?

Stability Theories Asset-Liability Link

What is the Cost of IB Failure?

Dead-weight Loss Stop to Islamization Slow-down in development of new

instrument

But Islamic Banks have failed!

Experienced Financial Distress Closed Down

• Examples:• Ihlas Finans (Closed)

• Bank Al-Taqwa (Closed)

• Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt (Survived)

• Dubai Islamic Bank (Survived)

Why Islamic Banks Face Problems?

Structure of Evolution Reasons Common to Conventional

Banks Reasons Unique to Islamic Banks

Macroeconomic Factors

Microeconomic Factors

External to Bank Internal to Bank

• Banking strategyBanking strategy• Poor credit Poor credit assessmentassessment• Taking interest Taking interest rate or exchange rate or exchange rate exposuresrate exposures• Concentration of Concentration of lendinglending• Connected Connected lendinglending• Entering in new Entering in new areas of activityareas of activity•Internal control Internal control failuresfailures• Operational Operational failuresfailures

• Supervision Supervision problemsproblems• Inadequate Inadequate infrastructureinfrastructure• Financial Financial liberalization liberalization policiespolicies• Political Political InterferenceInterference• Moral Hazard Moral Hazard due to deposit due to deposit insuranceinsurance• Lack of Lack of transparencytransparency• Fraud and Fraud and corruption corruption

• Macro-economic Situation

CAUSES OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS

Let us go to Case Study

Case Study

Ihlas Finans House

Contents Background Macroeconomic Factors Factors Internal to Banking Sector Factors Internal to SFH Sub-sector Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans

• Balance Sheet Analysis• Role of Ownership Structure• Control Failures• Management Failures• Fraud• Strategic Failures• Regulatory Failures• Support Failures

Lessons

Background

Parent Company: Ihlas Holdings started as social oriented business in 1970s

Ihlas Holdings: The parent company

Ihlas Holdings(1970s)

HousingConstruction

Electrical Appliances

Media &Publishing;Insurance &many others

Ihlas Finans(1995)

Ihlas Finans (the subsidiary) Started in 1995 Objective: to provide interest-free investment

opportunities Registered as SFH in Turkey Four Incumbents IFH was the only domestically owned SFH It grew into the largest (40% of) SFH 682 Billion TL through IPO (150m shares) Market Cap 6.5 Trillion TL (1996)

More branches than all other SFHs Deposits of SFHs not protected by Central

Bank A banking crisis took place in Turkey Many banks collapsed and taken over by

regulators (BRSA) Ihlas faced run on its deposits (last qrt 2000 &

early 2001) License of Ihlas Finans cancelled (Feb 10,

2001).

Table-1: General Information About Special Finance Houses

December 31, 1996Establishment Date

Nom. Cap.

(Billion TL)

No. of Branches (Dec. 31, 1996)

No. of Branches (Dec. 31, 2001)*

1 .Al-Baraka Türk O. F. K. A. S.

1984 750 16 22

2 .Faisal Finans Kurumu A. S.

1984 500 11

3 .Kuveyt Türk Evkaf O. F. K. A. S.

1988 1,185 10 30

4 .Andolu Finans Kurumu A. S.

1991 350 13

5 .Ihlas Finans 1995 1,000 24 36

6 .Asya Finans Kurumu A. S.

1996 2,000 1 25

What Went Wrong

We Seek Answers in

Macroeconomic Factors Factors Internal to Banking Sector Factors Internal to SFH Sub-sector Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans

Macroeconomic Factors (Turkey 2000-2001) Sustained double digit inflation Excessive debt (foreign and domestic).

Foreign debt 197% of export earnings, budget deficit 14.5% of GDP

Depreciation pressure on TL which was then pegged.

Projected GDP growth rate (-ve) 4% Financial liberalization taking place Contractionary fiscal and monetary policies

(inflation down from 70% to 40% in one year)

Factors Internal to Banking Sector

Financial repression Accumulated bad debts Financial liberalization taking place Reduced credit and rising interest rates due

to contractionary fiscal and monetary policy By Nov. 2000 (8+2) banks had failed and

transferred to SDIF In Dec. 2000 11th bank failed

DomesticBanks

Govt. Foreign Investors

Borrowing in FXBuying Govt.

Securities

High interest income

Principal + Interest in FX

Assets in TL Liabilities in FX

Banks Using Interest Rate Arbitrage

Banking Sector Factors (Contd.)

Banking Sector Factors (Contd.)

Investigation against the failed banks resulted in arrests of several prominent bankers and businessmen

Foreign investors started to dump both treasury bills and shares in the market

Squeeze on liquidity Overnight interbank rate went up to 1,950%

in one night Many more banks failed (large ones)

Banking Sector Factors (Contd.) Erosion of depositors’ confidence CB lost over 10 billion dollars trying to maintain

crawling peg exchange rate 10billion $ IMF rescue package announced but

it proved insufficient Row between President and Prime minister

over privatization process Anti-inflationary program abandoned and TL

left to free float on Feb 22, it depreciated over 40% in just 3 days

Banking Sector Factors (Contd.)

Sharp depreciation worsened the balance sheets of the banks including SFH.

Summary of Banking Sector Factors

Exchange rate shock coupled with liquidity crunch eroded depositor confidence in the banking system.

These were the factors external to SFH sub-sector that affected IFH not by rendering it insolvent but by creating liquidity crunch and run on its deposits.

Factors Internal to SFHs Sub-Sector

SFHs were not affected in the previous crisis of 1994

In 2001 SFHs constituted

3.1% of total banking deposits

4.7% of total banking investment

The small size implied limited scope of shock absorbing capacity

Deposits of SFHs were not protected by SDFI

Factors Internal to SFHs Sub-Sector (Contd.)

SFHs were not affected in the beginning because they did not have govt. securities in their portfolio

However, they suffered the domino affect of collapse of so many conventional banks

Factors Internal to SFHs Sub-Sector (Contd.)

Two observations to support domino affect hypothesis• Conventional banks withdrew their deposits

from SFHs between Sep and Nov. 2000

• Big fall in deposits of SFHs came about in Jan 2001 two month after that of conventional banks when SFHs lost 900 trillion TL deposits.

Financial Stability Indicators for SFH Sub-Sector

Cap Adequacy

=Equity/Total Assets

5.6% in 2000

At par with foreign banks

Asset Usage

=Loans/Total Assets

70% for (1990-2000)

Higher than conventional banks (39%)

Financial Stability Indicators for SFH Sub-Sector (contd.)

Asset Quality

=Non-performing/Total loans

Increased during 2000

Higher than foreign but lower than domestic banks

Management Efficiency

=Employ expenses/Total assets

Gradually increased after 1995

Similar to other banks

Financial Stability Indicators for SFH Sub-Sector (contd.)

Earnings(ROA)

=Net income/Total assets

Very low Less than ROA of other private banks

Liquidity =Liquid Assets/Total assets

Very low Lowest wrt foreign & private banks

Summary of Financial Stability Indicators for SFH Sub-Sector Cap Adequacy : At par with foreign banks Asset Usage: Higher than conventional banks

(almost double) Asset Quality: Poorer than foreign but better than

domestic banks Management Efficiency: Similar to other banks Earnings: Less than ROA of other private banks Liquidity: Lowest w.r.t. foreign & private banks

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans• Balance Sheet Analysis

• Role of Ownership Structure

• Control Failures

• Management Failures

• Fraud

• Strategic Failures

• Regulatory Failures

• Support Failures Lessons

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Capital Adequacy Ratio• Proxy for CapAd = Shareholders’ Equity/Total

Assets

• IFH 5.39% < other SFHs 7% < 8% recommended by BC (as of 31-12-2000)

• IFH followed an expansionary strategy through leveraging of capital

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Gross Income to Total Assets Ratio• Proxy for Survival

• IFH 18.5% > all other SFHs except for Asya FH = 20.6% (as of 31-12-2000)

• In past years too this ratio for IFH was not bad In isolation it does not tell why IFH collapsed

while others survived

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Composition of Deposits• Ratio of Current Deposits to Total Deposits =

3.7% at IFH < 8% to 13% at other SFHsIn order to give returns IFH needed to maintain high fund utilization ratioIncrease in liquidity-, credit-, and economic risk by over investment in limited investment opportunities

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Liquidity Ratio• Ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets = 4.22%

at IFH < 11.01% at KTEFH < 15.8% at AFH in 1999

• During the crisis this ratio sharply went down to 0.53% for IFH << 7.5% at AFH < 10.39% at KTEFH in 2000

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Maturity Mismatch• There has been a

significant maturity mismatch long before the crisis

• Short-term liabilities exceeded short-term assets

Maturity Gap/Asset

IFH(1998)

KTEFH (1999)

0-1 month

-35.7 -30.2

1-3 month

-26.7 -5.7

3-12 month

+33 +26.8

> 1 year +0.4 +1.6

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Duration Analysis• In theory it measures timing of cash flows. For lack

of data we assumed cash flows are timed to maturity. Therefore it gives maturity gap in number of years

• DG for IFH = +0.452 years (1998) > DG for KTEFH = +0.261 years (2000)Net value of bank will decline in response to increase in interest rate

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Balance Sheet)

Currency Risk• Exact data is not available

• We expect exposure to forex risk since considerable investment existed in construction & vacation housing sectors which are sensitive to economic uncertainty and exchange rate movements.

• Gap between US$ denominated payables and receivables became 39.33 million US$ in 2000 for Ihlas Holdings

What Next? How Much More?

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Role of Ownership)

Ownership Structure:• Most diversified of all SFH

• 36% shares publicly held

• IDB had 10% share

• Parent Ihlas Holdings had 50.27%

• But ownership of the Parent Co Ihlas Holdings was skewed in favor of one individual with 40.85% shares, 54.94% were publicly traded and 4.2% held by other minority holders

• This makes one person influential

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Role of Ownership)

Local Ownership:• Ihlas Finans was domestically owned while

other SFHs were foreign owned

• Other SFHs had better internal reporting and control system as they were predominantly controlled from abroad

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Control Failures)

Rubber stamp board of directors Board members not-motivated and some

lacked experience Institutional members also passive

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Management Failures) Not prepared for changing regulations

• Required SFHs to increase their capital to 20 trillion TL in 2 years from 1999.

• Req to pay 10% of min req cap towards the insurance Fund

• Min Cap-Adq raised to 8% from 2% for SFHs• Investment in subsidiaries limited to 10%• Lending limit to a single party = 25% of equity• New disaggregated reporting system

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Management Failures) Given the existing allocation of

funds/investments of IFH it was unable to abide by new limits on connected financing and concentration• E.g., New reg permitted max 15% of bank’s own

funds in non-financial co. Tried to raise cap by retaining dividends for

2000 and 2001 but it was not sufficient

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Management Failures)

Hired an executive from previously failed bank.• The executive came under BRSA

scrutiny thus affected the customer confidence when it was needed most.

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Fraud)

Tried to hide financial problems by fraudulent practices, hoping to rectify them in due course• Example: Agency financing done in the

name of fictitious parties in order to address the internal financial problems

Factors Internal to Ihlas Finans (Strategic Failures)

Allowing withdrawals from Investment Accounts• No rationing

• Lost US$200 million cash in few days

• Abrupt stop to convertibility-loss of confidence-calls for liquidation-BRSA stepped in

• Other SFHs used better strategy

Other External Factors (Regulatory Failures)

First Lax Supervision, then Drastic Application of Rules Lacuna in Supervision Law

• Does not specify what to do if SFH violates banking law

• Stopped the operations but what next? Unclear Scope or Confusion on Deposit

Protection Law

Other External Factors (Support Failures)

Lack of Active Support• Slow response on IFH’s application to raise its

capital (1998-1999)

Lesser Financial & Technical Support than Conventional Banks

Other SFHs survived by foreign help

So the Lessons are!

Lessons to be Learned …

Despite their stability Islamic Banks can fail.

Corporate Governance and Internal Controls are key issues.

Rethink organizational and institutional framework of IBs. (representation in BOG/BOD is not enough)

Lessons to be Learned … …(contd.)

Multiple subsidiaries in too many lines of businesses increases the likelihood of reputation damage.

Diversification is important but without controlling shares

Lessons to be Learned … …(contd.)

Increasing monitoring costs limits the scope for diversification.

Need for business rating companies which sell monitoring.

Until then focus on diversifying within few business lines.

Lessons for strategy

Invest through market—assume mutual fund management role.

Offer different services to suit risk-return profile of various kinds of depositors and customers.

Lessons for corporate governance

Enhance role of institutional investors to improve corporate governance.

Liquidity management is difficult issue for IBs.

Lessons for regulation

Need institutions and infrastructure to handle liquidity crunch.

Laws and Regulations should be clearly specified without ambiguity.

Insurance of depositors against fraud is needed.

Thank You

Task Ahead

The End