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Islamic and Comparative Philosophy

Introductory

Astheeditorsofthethematicblock“IslamicandComparativePhilosophy”,i.e.astheguesteditorsofaspecialissueofthejournalSynthesis philosophicadedicatedtothistopic, weareindebtedtotheauthorsofthepaperscollectedherefortheirvaluablecontributionswrittenforthisvolume.Contributionsincludedintothisvolumeareaimedatdeepeninginterculturalunderstanding,especiallybetweentheIslamicandWesternphilosophicaltra-ditions.Listing towards the traditionsof the“East-West symphony”or the“East-Westphilosophicalantiphony”, touseJimHeisig’ssyntagmaticcon-struct,theauthorshavefocusedoncommonhorizons,refugesofthought,byapplyingcomparativeandhistoricalapproaches,creativeforcesofconstruc-tiveengagement,orchestratingharmonyinthenetworkandlabyrinthoflife,while,atthesametime,movingforwardindecipheringitsmicro-macrodi-mensions.Itisabouta“LogosofLifephilosophy”developedbyAnna-TeresaTymienieckawhososkilfullyandadeptlyrevealedthemethodsandmodesofdialoguebetweenIslamicandOccidentalphilosophy, forinstance,inthevolumeentitledIslamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dia-logue: The Logos of Life and Cultural Interlacing (ed.byA.-T.Tymieniecka,N.Muhtaroglu,andD.Quintern,Springer,Dordrechtetal.2014).WealsoreceivedsignificantencouragementfromAliPayawhosentusacopyofhisbook,The Misty Land of Ideas and the Light of Dialogue: An Anthology of Comparative Philosophy: Western & Islamic(ICASPress,London2013)andconvincedusthatsuchaprojectispossible,hic et nunc,whilesufficientinsightsintothetopicwereprovidedbytwoseminalworks:OliverLeaman(ed.),The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy (Bloomsbury:Londonet al. 2015) andHansDaiber,Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy(Brill,Leiden1999).Comparativephilosophy is a formof dialoguebetweenphilosophers-com-paratists,a formof theirconstructive engagement (touseBoMou’s term).Whereasdialogueintraditionalbranchesofphilosophyusuallytakestheformof dialogue between the two, here, on the other hand,we have three col-locutorswhodonotnecessarilyhavetobecontemporaries,speakthesamelanguageorevenbelongtothesametradition.Moreover,theoneactingastheintermediarybetweentheothertwoisatruepractitionerandproponentofcomparativephilosophy,oraphilosopher-comparatist.Heisaninterpreter,acommentator,acritic,anexpertonwell-foundedphilosophicalargumentsandinterestingideas,aneducatorandcommunicator/presenter–allsimulta-neouslyandwithinthesameperson.Thus,thefollowingtitlescomeasnosurprise:Turning Point of Islamic Phi-losophy: Comparative Studies on Thought of Ibn Sina,aseminarheldon21

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA62(2/2016)pp.(229–248)

N.Kahteran,D.Bučan,Introductory230

December2013at theUniversityofTokyowiththeparticipationofHaruoKobayashi(TokyoGakugeiUniversity),ToshiharuNigo(KyotoUniversity),andHidemiTakahashi(UniversityofTokyo);Philosophy East / Philosophy West: A Critical Comparison of Indian, Chinese, Islamic, and European Phi-losophy,anamazingbookeditedbyBen-AmiScharfstein(OxfordUniver-sityPress,NewYork1978);The Epistemology of Comparative Philosophy: A Critique with Reference to P. T. Raju’s ViewsbyJosephKaipayil(CentreforIndianandInter-ReligiousStudies,Rome1995);The Problem of Defini-tion in Islamic Logic: A Study of Abū Al-Najā Al-Farīd’s “Kasr Al-Mantiq” in Comparison with Ibn Taimiyyah’s “Kitāb Al-Radd Alā Al-Manṭiqiyyīn”byZainalAbidinBaqir (International Instituteof IslamicThought andCivili-zation,KualaLumpur1998); andothers.Viewing this all fromadifferentperspective,itisalsonowondertoseetheemergenceofworkssuchasthoseby late professor ČedomilVeljačić’s daughter, SnježanaVeljačić-Akpınar,Buddhist Meditations on Islamic Contemplative Paths: Less Traveled Roads & Abandoned Junctions (Dharma Realm Buddhist University, Ukiah, CA2015); “SomeCommonFeatures of Islam andBuddhism:AConversationwithSnježanaAkpınarandAlexBerzin”,asomewhatrevisedversionof“TheDharmaofIslam:AConversationwithSnježanaAkpınarandAlexBerzin”(Inquiring Mind,Vol.20,No.1,Fall2003).AlsoworthnotingarethewordsofcautionbySeyyedHosseinNasr–argua-blytheleadingMuslimscholarofourtimeandprofessorattheGeorgeWash-ingtonUniversity,publishedinthemostprestigiouscomparativephilosophyjournal (“Conditions forMeaningfulComparativePhilosophy”,Philosophy East and West,Vol.22,No.1,January1972,pp.53–61)–thatitisimpossibletocompareeverythingortodrawanysortofcorrelations(i.e.thewarningcon-cerningthefundamentaldistinctionbetweenEasternmetaphysicsandmodernphilosophy).However,theprocessofcultivatingcomparativephilosophyinthefieldofIslamicphilosophyissurelyneededforabetterunderstandingoftheWest,ontheonehand,andthestructureofIslamicthought,ontheother.ComparativemethodscansignificantlyhelpinrefutingmisconceptionsaboutIslamicphilosophyasbeingnomorethanaphaseinthetransmissionofGreekideastotheWest.ItisforthisreasonpreciselythatthecomparativeapproachdeservestobeappliedtoIslamictraditionforitsnumerouspracticalbenefits,butalsobecauseitcanlargelyexpandourcomprehensionofaspectsthatre-mainedunexploredand/orwerepushedtotheside-lines.Comparativephilosophyisanambitious,butahistoricallynecessaryprojectforestablishingacriticaldiscoursebetweendifferentphilosophicalsystemsand scholars belonging to these different cultures and traditions, and it isaimedatbroadeningthephilosophicalhorizonsandpossibilitiesforunder-standing.Comparativephilosophyhasthespecialtaskofestablishinginterna-tionalpeaceandunderstandinginaspecific,practicalmanner,butatthesametimeanintellectualendeavourwithinmulticulturalcommunities.Therefore,we consequently speak of an intercultural, transcultural or global philoso-phywhichexhibitedavarietyofobjectives,methods,andstylesthroughthecourseof its history. It is assumed that bymeansof such scrutinywecanattainopennesstodevelopnewandbetterformsofphilosophicalunderstand-ing,whichisamega-trendinphilosophytodayandprimarilyaimsatredefin-ingthedefinitionofphilosophyitselfanddevelopingawarenessoftheneedforinter-traditional,intercultural,inter-system,integrativeandglobalstudies,or,inthecaseofSoutheastEurope,ascendingabovethemadobsessionwith



theethnic,i.e.beyondtheprevalentcultofnation.Insteadofbordersanddivi-sions,theauthorsofcontributionsinthisvolumestrivetowardsremainingatthe“cross/roads”,i.e.climbingthesteep“cliffsofthesoul”,the“Himalayasofthesoul”(ČedomilVeljačić’sterms),towhichtheirworksearnestlyinviteusandintellectuallyseduce,aswellastowardsouraspirationstoonceagainbecomeapartofthedemocraticallydevelopedworldwheremulticulturalso-cietiesarethenorm,ratherthanremainingobsessedwithandstuckinthetrapofethnocentrism.It is for these reasons that in ourMediterraneanbasin the Islamic culturalworldcarriessuchgreatimportance;thisthirdforgottenlinkbetweentheEu-ropeanandtheIslamicworld,asopposedtofanaticalabsolutism,withallitsdiverseandspecificculturalcontextsandfullyawareoftheresponsibilityforthemulticulturalworld,asocietybasedonhumandignitywherearticulationisachievedthroughdialogue,anentireintellectual,cultural-spiritualworldoftheEastandWest–withtheideaofphilosophicalresonanceandcomplemen-tarityofdifferentphilosophicalpositionsatitscore,orrather,ourcareforadiscourseridofdominationinthedialecticsofinterculturallogos.

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“AnIntroductiontotheComparativeStudyofIndianandEuropeanPhiloso-phy”istheintroductiontoČedomil Veljačić’s(1915–1997)doctoralthesisdefendedattheUniversityofZagrebin1962underthetitleKomparativno proučavanje indijske i evropske filozofije(Comparative Investigation of In-dian and European Philosophy),whichwasneverpublished.Itisprecededby the article “ČedomilVeljačić andComparativePhilosophy”,writtenbyhis daughter Snježana Veljačić-Akpınar (who also translated Veljačić’stext intoEnglish),which representsan introductorynote toVeljačić’s text.BothtextsarereasonablychosenasopeningchaptersofthisspecialissueofSynthesis philosophica,becausetheypreservehistoricalmemoryofthisphi-losopher-comparativistandperennialthinker.AllscholarsinthecountriesofformerYugoslaviaareindebtedtoČedomilVeljačićandhislegacyinEastern,comparative,andperennialphilosophy.Itisquiteobviousthat,accordingtohisapproachtothestudyofBuddhistandAsianculturesingeneral,Veljačićwasprimarilyacomparativephilosopher.OntheoccasionofthecentenaryofVeljačić’sbirth,wewouldliketoremindourselvesandinternationalcol-leaguesinthesefieldsthatitisreallyworthrevisitinghis“IntroductiontotheComparativeStudyof IndianandEuropeanPhilosophy”,notonly inordertoattempttoplaceabookendonVeljačić’slife,butalsotoassesshisinter-actionwithcontemporaryphilosophicalcurrents.Theconcludingstatementof hisCrossroads of Asian Philosophies (Razmeđa azijskih filozofija I–II,SveučilišnanakladaLiber,Zagreb1978)arguesthat:“Thereisaphilosophywhichcannotbethoughtunlessitislived.”Hewasalivingexampleofthiskindofphilosophy,aswerehissuccessorsRadaIveković,MislavJežić,andDušanPajin.Thepaper“HowConstructiveEngagementinDoingPhilosophyCompara-tively IsPossible” byBo Mou shouldbeplacedwithin the context of hisearlierworkonthesameissue.Unfortunately,thiscontextisnotwellknownto thegeneral public, but regardless, by reading this text one can formanopinionaboutthevalueandimportanceoftheauthor’sapproachandtheses.Theauthor’sambitionistopointoutwhathethinksareadequateconditions



thatmakeaconstructiveengagementoutofthe“doingphilosophycompara-tively”.Itshouldbesaidthatonecana prioriacceptthisambitionasvalidandjustified;thefinaljudgmentshoulddependonacceptingornotacceptingtheauthor’svisionofadequatemethodsinapproachingdifferenttextsorideasbelongingtodifferentphilosophicaland/orculturaltraditionsandcontextsinacomparativeway.Theauthor,inhismeticulouslyelaboratedpaper,laysoutprinciples,methods,andconditionsforanadequatewayof“doingphilosophycomparatively”, and illustrates hismethodological “system” of comparingphilosophicalideaspertainingtodifferenttraditionswithexamplesthathelpthereadertounderstandtheauthor’smethodologicalapproach.Theauthor’s“network”ofprinciples,methods,andconditionsrepresentalogicalwhole.Thepurposeof this is to reach a situation inwhichdistinct approaches inphilosophy“canconstructivelytalktoeachother”andthroughthisdialogue“makeajointcontributiontothedevelopmentofphilosophy”.SoasnottoburdenthereaderofthisreviewwiththedetailedpresentationofBoMou’sconstructionofadequatemethodology,webelievethatitisessentialtopro-ceeddirectlyto“passingjudgment”onthevalueofthispaper.Isitconvincingenoughinmakingthereaderaccepttheauthor’sviewofadequatemethodsinapproachingtextsorideasbelongingtodifferentphilosophicaltraditions?Theanswertothisquestionisdefinitelyaffirmative.Itcouldbesaidthatthemethodologytheauthorofthepaperadvocatesimposesitselfassomethingthatstandstoreason,somethingthatisamatterofcourse–itsadequacylaysincomplyingwiththematteritself.Theauthor’smeritlaysprimarilyintheverycompletewayinwhichheelaboratestheprinciples,methods,andcondi-tionsthatmakeupacompletemethodologicalwhole.Andifthegoalofcom-paringphilosophicaltextsthatbelongtodifferentculturalandphilosophicaltraditionsistorevealandexposethepossibilityoftheirjointcontributiontophilosophy,BoMou’smethodologyof“doingphilosophycomparatively”isundoubtedlyveryvaluable.Ali Paya’s paper“MuslimPhilosophies:ACriticalOverview”,astheverytitle suggests, presents an overview ofMuslim philosophies, which, forthereaderwhodoesnothaveadeeper familiaritywithIslamic(orMus-lim)philosophy,canbeofgreat interestandusefulness.The readerwhoisfamiliarwithgeneralinsightsintoIslamicphilosophywillprobablybefascinatedbythecriticaldimensionofthepaper,alsoannouncedinitstitle.Itshouldbesaidthat topresentanoverviewofsucharichtraditionandlegacythatfallunderthenotionofIslamicphilosophyisalmostanimpos-sibletask,anditisobviousthatPaya’spaperhasnosuchambition.Bearingthisinmind,onehastosaythattheoverviewpresentedinitsuccessfullypointsoutsomeofthemainachievementsandacquirementsofthattradi-tionandlegacy.Still,oneistemptedtosaythattheauthordidnotpaysuf-ficientattentiontoaspecificcorpusofIslamicphilosophywhichundoubt-edlydeservesattention–togreatphilosophersofWesternIslamdom.Thesephilosophers(e.g.IbnBaǧǧa,IbnṬufayl,IbnRušd)*areonlymentioned,sothatitcouldbesaidthatthereisacertainbiasinfavourofthephiloso-phersofEasternIslamdom.However,suchanobjectioncannotminimizethevalueofthepaper–itisstillaveryinterestingandusefulpaper.Themostinterestingelementofthepaperisthepartinwhichtheauthorgivesa

*Theeditorsrespectedeachauthor’schoiceoftranscription/transliteration,whichresultedindifferentmodesof transcription/transliterati-

onindifferentpapers;forexample,IbnBāğğaandIbnBajjah,IbnRušdandIbnRushd,IbnḪaldūnandIbnKhaldun,etc.



generalpresentationoftwomajordevelopmentsintraditionalIslamicphi-losophyofthe20thcentury(sectionVIofthepaper)andthepartinwhichtheshortcomingsof traditionalIslamicphilosophyarepresented(sectionVIIofthepaper).(Onecanonlyregret,again,theabsenceofsuchaper-spectiveon20thcenturyphilosophicalproductioninArabcountries.)Verypertinentistheauthor’sdiscussionofthepossiblefurtherdevelopmentofIslamicphilosophy;onitsfuture.Hereonefeelsthattheauthor“hasstruckthechord”bystressingtheneedfor“reconnection”withscience,aswellasstressingtheneedforencouragementandenhancementofthespiritofcriticalandrationalthinkingandopennesstoideasandviewsdevelopedinothercultures.Inconclusion,itshouldbesaidthatPaya’spaperdeservesfullattention,becauseitisbasedonabroadinsightintowhatiscalledIs-lamicphilosophy.AsforNader El-Bizri’s paper“Falsafa:ALabyrinthofTheoryandMethod”,the author’smain concern is how tomake studying falsafa fruitful in thecontemporarycontext.Thisiswhythepaperismostlydedicatedtodiscuss-ingmethods(andtheprinciplesofmethods)ofapproachingfalsafa inacon-temporaryway.El-Bizri’sgoalistodefinethepathforarenewalofpossibleinfluenceofclassicalfalsafatextsthroughphilosophizing;thisbeingtheonlywaytorecognizeitsuniversalvalue,beyondanyideological,sectarian,oranyotherlisting.Theauthorstartsbyexplainingthewaythis“heritage”livesonforus,stressingthat“whatsurvivesasatracefromapastorigininourlife-worldbelongsessentially,notonlytothecontextfromwhichitoriginated,butalsocommunicatesconstellationsofmeaningthatinhereinourownworld”.Hestatesitsgoalasfollows:“ourintentionistobeproactiveintheproduc-tionofknowledgeinviewoffoundingnewdirectionsinphilosophizingthatmayinpartbenefitfromrenewingtheimpetusoffalsafa”.Inordertoachievethathe stresses the importanceofhistoricalphilosophemesbeingcriticallyanalysedwithasenseofpresentismandbeyondthelimitationsofhistoricism.Studyingfalsafashouldmeanphilosophizing,anditwillbephilosophizingonlyifthepast(i.e.falsafa)acquiresitsmeaninginourpresent-livedexperi-ences.Thisispossiblebecause“whatsurvivesasatracefromapastorigininourlife-worldbelongsessentiallynotonlytothecontextfromwhichitorigi-nated,butalsocommunicatesconstellationsofmeaningthatinhereinourownworld”.Thisistheprinciplethathastobetakenintoaccountifa(philosophi-cally)fruitfulapproachtofalsafa isintended,because–asheputsit–“weareallmarkedbymodernity,andnotsimplyculturally,butmoreessentially[…]evenifweclaimtobetraditionalists”.Thequestionofrealrenewingfalsafaasaninheritedtraditioncannotbereadilyundertakenalongthepathwaysthathavebeenfollowedhithertobyrevivalists,reformists,activists,orintellectu-alswhoviewedheritageasasourceofinspirationforthoughtinthemodernera”,butbyapproachingitinamannerthatcould“informourcontemporaryintellectualconcerns”.Theuniversalvalueofthefalsafaheritageshouldbedecipheredthroughrenewalofphilosophizingper se,notthroughaphilolo-gistandhistoricistapproachtoit.Thismeansthatthetraditionalandthemod-ernshouldbe“co-entangledinthinking”.El-Bizriseesseveralhindrancestotheapplianceofthatprinciple:historical(i.e.positingfalsafaasexclusivelymediaeval), cultural (i.e. assuming that falsafa is oriental), textual/archival(i.e.studyingtextsexclusivelyascodices,manuscripts,epistles),andseeingthefalsafaas“Islamized”(i.e.resistingthe‘contamination’oftraditionalistIslamiclegacybynon-Islamicphilosophicalsources).Inanapproachtothefalsafa legacy one should be aware that falsafa was animated by tafalsuf,



i.e. that it is philosophizing.That iswhy the contemporary “epistemologi-cal,ontological,orlogicaltrajectories”shouldbecontextsforrethinkingandfruitfullyrevivingideasandleitmotifsofthehistoriclegacyoffalsafa.Ifsuchaheritageisstillthesourceofculturalinspirationforanumberof(Muslim)communitieswhichinmanywaysstillshapessomeoftheiroutlooksontheuniverse,theirunderstandingofthetruth,ofthegood,ofbeauty,ofjusticeingovernance, thisintellectualheritageshouldnotbeapproachedtrough“thenarrowchannelsofacademicexpertise indocumentingandcurating”. Inaword,El-BizriadvocatescriticalengagementwhenanalyzingIslamicphilo-sophicallegacybylookingforthe“potentialconnectionoftheirfundamentalelementswithcontemporaryconcernsinthinkingandpractice”.Theauthoralsoexposesprinciplesforcomparativeinquiries.WhenconcerningoneselfwiththehistoryofideasinIslam,thelinguisticandconceptualtransmissionfromGreekintoArabicshouldbetakenintoaccount.Notonlythat,buttheprocessoftransmissionsfromArabicintoLatinaswell.Suchshouldbetheprocedurethatdefinesthecontextforthecomparativestudyoftextsandofin-terculturaladaptations.Forexample,iftheobjectofsuchacomparativestudyisIbnSinaorIbnRushd,itshouldbecomparedwithitsGreekpredecessors.But comparative inquiryhas a role in the contemporary readingof falsafaaswell.TheauthortakestheexampleofAvicenna’sanalysisofthemodali-tiesofbeingintermsofnecessity,contingencyandimpossibility.Itcanbeapproachedbyignoringitsrootsintheemanationtheory,orbyignoringthecasualconnectionsandmovementfrompotentialityintoactuality,or–astheauthorputsit–withoutbeingconstrainedbyconceptualstructuresthatbelongtoscholasticthoughtandmediaevaloutlooksonreality;insteaditcanbe“un-dertakenintermsofcriticallyrethinkingHeidegger’scritiqueofmetaphysicsbystudyingtheontologyofAvicennism,andsurpassingbothtowardsanewdirectioninontologicalthinkingthatdoesnotfetishizeitssources”.Thisisanexampleofwhatthecontemporaryre-thinkingoffalsafaaccordingtoEl-Bizrishouldbe.Readingaclassicaltextisinitselfinterpreting.But,inread-ing,oneaccompaniestheactofreadingwithone’spriorknowledge,whichmeansthat themeaningofwhatisbeingreadarisesintegratedwithin“ourconfigurationsofknowledge,comprehension,andlivedexperience”.Astheauthorsays:“Wearemortalswhogatherthefragmentsofworldsthatpassed,whichleavetheirtracesasinherentthingsinourownworldlinessanddestinethemtoposteritythroughthewaywehandletheminourbeing-in-the-world.”Whatisimportantisthatatextwhichweapproachaslegacy“isrevealedasbeingmeaningfultous”,that“itspeakstoourconsciousness,toourepistemicpreoccupations,cognitiveframesofmind”.Thatshouldbetherealgoalofap-proachingandstudyingfalsafainafruitfulway.El-Bizri’spaperprovidesthereaderwiththeprinciplesandmethodsforachievingthisgoal.Osman Bakar’spaper(“TowardsaNewScienceofCivilization:ASyntheticStudyofthePhilosophicalViewsofal-Farabi,IbnKhaldun,ArnoldToynbee,andSamuelHuntington”)presents the evolutionofphilosophicalviewsofwhatisthe‘scienceofcivilization’,inwhichevolutionisreflectedinwhattheauthorcallsthe‘epistemicstatus’ofthatscience.HeremindsthereaderoftheAristotelianrootsofthatscience,butthemainfocusofthepaperisontheevolutionofitinIslamicphilosophy.Inordertodefinewhatistheepis-temicstatusofthescienceofcivilizationandwhatitsevolutionwas,theau-thorpresentstheviewsofAl-Fārābī,IbnḪaldūn,Toynbee,and(verybriefly)Huntington.Itseemsthattheauthorisconvincedthatthetitleofthe“fatherofthescienceofcivilization”belongstoAl-Fārābī,withIbnḪaldūnbeingthe



thinkerwhomadeanotherimportantstepinrefiningandcompletingthatsci-ence.AlthoughitmightbetruethatAl-Fārābīmighthaveintroducedthenewtermofal-‘ilm al-madanī,itseemstousthatanimportantdimensionofdefin-ingboththeconceptandthescienceofcivilizationhasbeenignored,i.e.theGreekcontribution,whichisthebasisoftheconceptitself.(Al-Fārābī’stermal-‘ilm al-madanīisnotarbitrarilychosen;madanīcomesfrommadīnawhichisArabicforGreekpolis.Ifwetakethisintoaccount,togetherwithPlato’sPoliteia andAristotle’sPolitika,thishastoraisethequestionastowhetherthereisanessentialdifferencebetweenthe‘scienceofpolitics’andthe‘sci-enceofcivilization’?).Butregardlessofthis,OsmanBakar’spaperisamostvaluablereminderoftheimportanceofAl-Fārābī’sandIbnḪaldūn’sthoughtsin this field.Especially important is theauthor’s stressingof IbnḪaldūn’scontribution,whichisnotacontributionamongcontributions,butanessentialinnovationonhowtoconceivetheconceptofcivilizationandlayingthebasisforanew,modernviewonhumansocietyandcivilization,forIbnḪaldūn’sconceptnolongerhasmuchincommonwithitsGreekfoundations.Oneistemptedtosaythathisconceptpertainsmuchmoretosociologyante litteram,whileboththeGreekandAl-Fārābī’sconceptsstillpertaintophilosophy.Al-Fārābī’simportance,onwhichtheauthorinsistswithreason,isinthathelaidthebasisforIbnḪaldūn’slatercreativecontribution,whichshowstheconti-nuityofIslamicthoughtinthatregard.Soonewouldberighttosay,whattheauthordoesnotsaybutimplies:withoutAl-Fārābī,therewouldnothavebeenIbnḪaldūn,andwithoutIbnḪaldūntherewouldnothavebeenfurtherde-velopmentofthescienceofcivilization.Bethisasitmay,MuslimPeripateticphilosopherswerenotmerelytransmittersofGreekthought;theyprovidedanessentialcontributiontoitsfurtherdevelopment.TheauthorrightlynoticesthatAl-FārābīplayedanimportantroleinrefiningtheAristoteliandefinitionof science and in defining the epistemological structure of a true science,althoughwecouldsaythatitisquestionablewhetherFarabiancontributionreallywas“epistemologicallycomprehensiveandfar-reachingenoughastobeunsurpassedby thesubjectmatterof IbnḪaldūn’s ‘ilm al-‘umrān”. IbnḪaldūn’sclaimthatheinventedanewscience,whichhehimselfcalls‘ilm al-‘umrān,testifiesthatheisawareofthenoveltyoftheobjectofthisscience,anditispreciselyforthatreasonthathegivesitanewname.IfitisrighttosaythatAl-Fārābī’sepistemologicalcontributionisbroadenoughtocomprehendthefurtherdevelopmentoftheconceptof‘ilm al-madanī,itisalsorighttosaythatIbnḪaldūn’s‘newscience’transcendstheboundariesofAl-Fārābī’scon-ceptbytakingintoaccount–astheauthorrightlystresses–whatAl-Fārābī“neglected”,i.e.the“physical,demographic,andhistoricaldimensionsofhu-mansocialorganization”.Thatiswhyhesaysthattheobjectofhisscienceis‘umrān.Astheauthorremindsus,itisinlightoftheideasconveyedbytheterm‘umrānthatIbnḪaldūn“wasabletospeakofcivilizationaldevelopmentandprogress”,of“twotypesofcivilization”.“ThetopicscoveredunderthesubjectmatterofIbnKhaldun’sscienceof‘umrānarefarmorenumerousanddetailed”becausehissubjectmatter isnolonger theoretical,asAl-Fārābī’swas.ThefundamentalassumptionsofhisnewsciencearenotbasedontheFarabianconceptanddoctrineofhappiness,which–theauthorrightlysays–“properlybelongstometaphysicalorspiritualanthropology”.Itisbecauseof this that the goal of IbnḪaldūn’s science is “a deep knowledge of hu-mansocialorganization”,anditisbecauseofthisthathe“providedamajorcontributiontothisbodyofknowledge,improvingvastlyontheknowledgecontributedbyal-FarabiandhissuccessorsintheIslamicphilosophicaltradi-tion”.Aftermasterlypresentingtheessentialoverviewofthedevelopmentof



the‘scienceofcivilization’withinIslamicphilosophicaltradition,theauthorproceeds topresentingmodern andcontemporary contributions, remindingthatArnoldToynbeeconsideredIbnḪaldūn’sphilosophyofhistoryandsci-enceofsociology“unsurpasseduntilmoderntimes”,fromthepointofviewof“epistemicconcernanddepthsofanalysis”.Toynbee’sworkA Study of HistorydoesnotextendbeyondthescopethatwasoutlinedbyIbnḪaldūn;Bakarseeshiscontributioninthedevelopmentofanewbranchofthescienceofcivilization,i.e.thestudyofcivilizationaldiversityandcomparativecivili-zation.WhileIbnḪaldūnstudiedonlyonecivilization–theIslamicone–theworkofWesternarchaeologistsandorientalistsmadeitpossibleforToynbeeto take into account a great number of human civilizations, bringing theirpluralityanddiversityintothefocusofscience.Thisisatheme–stressestheauthorofthepaper–which“seemstobegainingmoreattentionfromcon-temporaryscholars”, includingSamuelHuntington(whoisanotherscholartakenintoaccountbytheauthorinreviewingthedevelopmentofthescienceofcivilization).AnimportantremarkregardingHuntington’scontributionisthathe“approachesthestudyofthisthemeonthebasisofthecontemporaryglobalpoliticalconfigurations”.Thisisthereasonwhyhiscontributioncouldbe regarded as controversial.HisClash of Civilizations pretends to affordan insight intowhathecalls the“globalpoliticsofcivilizations”, referringmainly“tothegrowingcivilizationalrivalryduringthelastseveraldecades”,speculatingthatthisrivalrycouldbringaboutamajorclashofcivilizations.Althoughonemight bedisappointed that the author of thepaper doesnotpaymorecritical attentionbasedonananalysisofHuntington’swork,hisstressing that“inter-civilizational relationsandpoliticsneednotbeviewedonlyfromtheperspectiveofconflicts[…]sincetherearedeeperreasonswhyweneedtofocusonethicsinthepoliticsofcivilization”isveryimportant.There is a need to further refine and strengthen thepolitical dimensionofhumancivilization,andOsmanBakarseestheraison d’êtreofthescienceofcivilizationinhelpingtosecure“mutualcooperationamonghumangroups”forthesakeofthe“commongoodandtherealizationofhigherpurposesofhumanlife”.Massimo Campanini,inhispaper“OntologyofIntellect:TheHappinessofThinkinginAverroësandGiordanoBruno”,discussesthepoliticaldimensionofAverroës’sandBruno’sunderstandingof thegnoseologicalprocessseenas theprocessof realizingman’shappiness.Thepaper takes“forgranted”Bruno’sfamiliaritywithAverroës’swork(atleastDestructio destructionis),andtheauthorlooksfor–andfinds–theoreticalparallelisminthethoughtofAverroësandBrunoinrelationtothepoliticaldimensionofphilosophicalcognizance.Theauthor’sanalysisofAverroës’stheoryofintellectionasde-pendingoncontact(orconjunction)withthe‘ActiveIntellect’asthelowestofcelestialIntellectsthatproceedfromtheGodastheFirstMoverortheFirstPrinciple is based on traditionally established interpretations ofAverroës’sdoctrine.Regardlessofthepossiblequestioningofthoseinterpretations(see,forexample,DanielBučan’spaperontheissueof‘ActiveIntellect’ inthisvolume),theauthor’spointisthatAverroës(inhiscommentaryonAristotle’sNicomachean Ethics)stressesthatspeculativeknowledgeisnotonlyman’sultimateperfectionbutishisultimatehappinessaswell.ForCampaninitheinterestof thisassertionofAverroëslaysinitshavinggnoseological, theo-logicalandpoliticalimplications.Thehighestformofknowledge–which,accordingtoAverroës,isman’sultimatehappiness,andman’shappinessisthemaingoaloftheState–belongstothephilosopher;thatiswhytheright(oreventheduty)toruletheState,oratleasttoadvisetheruler,belongsto



the philosopher.Stressing that the political commitment ofAverroës “runsthroughouthiswork”,CampaninipointsouttheexampleofhisMiddleCom-mentaryonPlato’sRepublic,seeinginit“aplaidoyerforanIslamicgovern-mentinspiredbyphilosophy”.TheauthorofthepaperdoesnotforgetAver-roës’sexplanationsofanother–thehighestandultimate–formofhappiness,which is thesoul’sempyreanbliss.And theprerequisite for thishappiness(inbothitsforms,mundaneandempyrean),accordingtoAverroës,isreach-ingthehighestformofknowledge,whichisrealizedonlythroughcontactorconjunctionwith the ‘Active Intellect’.The author concludes the first partofthepaper,thepartdedicatedtoAverroës,bystressingoncemorethatthehappinessofthinkinghasapoliticaloutcome,whichinAverroësimpliesthephilosopher’s rightandduty to rule,or at least tocounsel the ruler. In thesecondpartof thepaper theauthorturnstoanothergreat thinkerwhonur-turedanelitistviewofphilosophy,inwhichheis,accordingtotheauthor,akin toAverroës.GiordanoBruno says that philosophy “opens the senses,contentsthespirit,magnifiestheintellectandbringsthemantotherealblisswhichhecanhaveasman”,andintellectualperfectiontransformsmoralityandmakespossibletheconquestofinfinity.TheelitistelementofBruno’sun-derstandingofphilosophyishisconviction(paralleltoAverroës’s)thatonlyrareindividualsaregiventhegiftofbeingcapableofphilosophicalthinkingandreachingthehighest,‘divine’levelofknowledge.Ontheotherhand,thepoliticaldimensionofhisunderstandingofphilosophycanbeguessedfromhisideaof“furioso”.Thephilosopherwhopassionatelystrivestoconnectandtounitehimselfwiththedivine,withthesupremeIntellect,inBruno’seyes,isa“furioso”whoseintellectualpowerrealizestheconjunctionwithGod–theintellectbecomesGodandGodbecomesintellect.CampaninipointsoutthatBrunoisawareofhisindebtednesstoAverroës,whichisexpresslystated:“ItseemstomethatPeripateticphilosophers(asAverroësexplained)meanthiswhentheysaythatultimatehappinessconsistsinperfectionthroughspecula-tiveknowledge.”CampaniniremindsthereaderwithinthisAverroistframe-workthatBrunoaddsagenuinelypoliticalfactor:his“furioso”hastobe–is–readytosacrificehisownlifestandingbyhistruth:whenhehimselfwasaskedtorenouncehis ideasordie,hechosedeath.So,althoughthepoliti-caldimensionofphilosophyinAverroësandBrunomightdifferintermsofexplicitnessandelaboration,therecannotbeanydoubtthatthisdimensionisobvioustobothofthem,thatbothofthemareawareofit.Campanini’smeritishispointingthisoutforus.Concludinghispaper,Campaniniprofesseshisownbelief:“Thepossibilityofachievinghappiness throughthinkinggivesconcretenessandnobilitytophilosophy.”Onemightsaythatthisistrue;thereisagreatnumberofexamplesofphilosophicaltextsthroughoutthehistoryofphilosophythattestifytoit.Campanini’spointinthispaperisthatAverroësandBruno, although belonging to different epochs and intellectual frame-works,arethinkerswhobearwitnessnotonlytotheintellectual,butalsotothepoliticalvalueofphilosophicalthinking,and–indoingso–areexamplesthatconfirmCampanini’sownbeliefastothe“concretenessandnobility”ofphilosophy.ThefirstpaperbyDaniel Bučaninthisvolume,“‘ActiveIntellect’inAvem-paceandAverroës:AnInterpretativeIssue”,makesthecaseforaninterpreta-tionofthenotionof‘ActiveIntellect’asdiscussedinAvempace’sRisāla iṭṭiṣāl al-‘ aql bi-l-insānandAverroës’Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect.The author’smain argument is that the explanationofthe ‘Active Intellect’ introducedby the twophilosophers fromtheWestern



flankofIslamdomradicallydiffersfromtheexplanationsproducedbytheircounterparts in theEastern flankof the Islamicworld, includingAl-FārābīandIbnSīnā.TheauthormaintainsthatwhilethelattergroupofphilosopherswereoftheviewthattheActiveIntellectbelongstothecelestialorderanditsconjunctionwithman’sAcquiredIntellectresemblesamysticalunification,the formergroup,while rejecting themystical interpretation,werearguingthattheActiveIntellectis,inmodernparlance,‘anemergentproperty’whichemergesfromwithinthesublunaryrealmandisnotpartofthesupra-lunarsphere.Asforacriticalanalysisofitsstrengthsandweaknesses,theauthor,atleastinthecaseofIbnBajjah,advocatesathesiswhichisnotsharedbythemajorityofstudentsofIslamicphilosophy,saveCharlesGenequand,whoseworktheauthorcitesfavourably.However,despitethisfact,theauthorhim-selfadmits that to furthercorroborateGenequand’sview,moresubstantivearguments are needed, and the only argumentwhichheproduces is a dis-cussionbasedonthemeaningoftheword‘aql,accordingtoS.M.Afnan’sdictionaryofphilosophicalterms.Butitseemstovalidatetheclaimmadeinthepaper,which,bytheway,appearstobeplausible,buttheauthorneedstodevelopmoresubstantiveargumentsbasedonAvempace’sownworks.Theauthor’sdiscussionof IbnRushd’sview ismoreconvincing.Moreover, inthe case of IbnRushd, contrary to the case of IbnBajjah, there aremorewriterswhosubscribeto thethesisdevelopedbytheauthor.AninterestingcaseinpointisDerekGatherer’s“MemePools,World3,andAverroës’sVi-sionofImmortality”(Zygon,Vol.33,No.2,1998,pp.203–219)wheretheauthorlikensIbnRushd’snotionof‘ActiveIntellect’toKarlPopper’snotionof‘World3’,theobjectiveworldwhichhasemergedasaresultofinteractionbetweenindividuals’cognitive-emotiveapparatuses(World2)withphysicalreality(World1).Bučan’spaperdealswithaninterestingissuewhichneedstobefurtherexplored,althoughitisawelcomeintervention.Snježana Veljačić-Akpınar’ssecondpaperinthisvolumeisdedicatedtoasearchfortheideasthatinIslamreflectwhattheauthorcalls‘skepticism’.Theauthor’ssearch–notwithout,althoughnotexplicitlyexpressed,reasons–givesthereaderaninsightintomotivesandmethodsofthegreatestseekerforcertainandindubitableknowledgeinIslam.WhatisessentialforAl-Ġazālī’s“case”isthathisskepticism,deeplyrootedinhismentalityoftheseekerforthetruth,ledhimtotheIslamicversionofmysticism–Sufism.Although–astheauthorputsit–Sufism“becamethelasthopeforAl-Ghazali”,althoughheacceptedtheSufi“motto”thattoattainrealcognizancemoraltransforma-tionisneeded(andaccordinglybecame,foraperiodinhislife,arealascetic),hispersonalversionofSufismischaracterized–intheauthor’swords–byaparticular“synthesisoflogicandethics”.ForAl-Ġazālī,ethicsmeansde-fining themoral constitution of the soul and themethod of controlling it.HisacceptanceofSufismdidnotmeangivingup rationalmethods,whichhe still saw as ameans useful for reaching “clear discernible perception”.Hiswork,entitledThe Just Balance,isdedicatedto“methodsforremovingdisagreement”,whoseaim,astheauthorofthepaperstresses,wastoremovedogmatismfromtheologicaldiscourse.OwingtoAl-Ġazālīhimself,Sufism–beforehimgenerallycriticizedforallegedunorthodoxy–founditsrecog-nizedplacewithinIslam,anditsinsistenceonimmediatespiritualexperiencewasrecognizedasanacceptablekindofcorrectivemeasure,bothagainstdog-matismandagainsta“magical”approachtomysticism.ThroughhisbalancedunderstandingofbothSufismandorthodoxy,dogmatictheologywasput“initsrightplace”.Ashehimselfsays(inKitāb al-ʻ ilm),theologyshouldbeseen



as“oneof thedisciplines thatareneeded[…]onlytosafeguardtheheartsofthecommonpeopleasithasbecomenecessarytohireanescortalongthepilgrimageroute”,andaccordingtothisunderstanding,thetheologianhasto“knowthelimitsofhisposition”.Veljačić-Akpınar’spaper,inspiteofitsverybasiccharacter,possessesthevalueofpresenting–inashortandsummariz-ingway–theessenceofAl-Ġazālī’spositionwithinIslam.Daniel Bučan, inhissecondpaperinthisvolume,“ThinkableandUnthink-able”, discussingthedivisionoftheBeing,remindsusofPlato’skhōrismos(separation,whichcharacterizesPlatonicphilosophy,aclearanddistinctsys-tematizationinthedistinctionbetween‘sensible’and‘intelligible’:thefirstone,which is second-hand reality, amixture of being and non-being con-demned tomerely“becoming”, theobjectofopinion, and the secondone,whichenjoysabsolutebeingand,inconsequence,istotallyknowable).Draw-ingthisparallelwiththedivisionofBeingas‘perceivable’and‘thinkable’,Bučanunderlinesaisthēsisasanoppositeofintellection(noēsis),understand-ingandpurethought,aswellasadimensionoftheunthinkablewhosebestproponentswereSufisandamongthemAbūHāmidAl-Ġazālī.InhisshortpaperontheunidimensionalityandpluridimensionalityoftheBeing(wherethe very first type of perception grasps individual and the second one theuniversalinindividual),theauthoralludestothementionedthinkerwhoim-pliesthedivisionoftheBeinginasensibledimensionandthethinkableoneinhisdoctrineof tasawwuf (Islamicmysticism).(HereoneshouldmentionMahmoudZakzouk’samazingcomparativestudyAl-Ghazalis Philosophie im Vergleich mit Descartes,PeterLang,Frankfurt/M.1992,whichwastranslatedintoBosnianbySulejmanBosto, aprofessor at theFacultyofPhilosophy,UniversityofSarajevo:Ghazalijeva filozofija u usporedbi sa Descartesom,El-Kalem,Sarajevo2000.ThisworkcanbehelpfulinunderstandingAl-Ġazālī’sepistemology.)Inpointoffact,BučandrawsacomparisonbetweenAl-ĠazālīandPlatoascomparablethinkersinthisregard:themostimportantforbothis theun-thinkable, the highest.SomeIslamicmystics, includingAl-Ġazālīhimself,interpretthisinamannerthatisincompleteaccordwithBuddhistdoctrine,aswellasHinduism,wherethethreespiritualwaysareknownasthethreemârgas:karma-mârga(“thewayofworks”),bhakti-mârga(“thewayofdevotion”),andjῆâna-mârga(“thewayofknowledgeorgnosis”).Afollowerofthewayofbhaktiisknownasabhakta (ordevotee),andafollowerofthewayof jῆâna isknownasa jῆânin (orgnostic).The threemârgas broadlycorrespondtothethreefundamentaldegreesorstationsofSufism:makhâfa(“Fear ofGod”),mahabba (“Love ofGod”), andmaʿ rifa (“Knowledge ofGod”).ItisinterestingtonotethatChristianmysticismhasbeencharacterizedbythe“wayoflove”,butthosewhohavemanifestedthe“wayofknowledge”includesuchgreatfiguresasDionysiustheAreopagite,MeisterEckhart,andAngelusSilesius.Accordingtotheauthor,bothPlatoandAl-Ġazālīstatethat“there is noway of putting it inwords” or thatmystic experience revealsthingsthatcannotbe“relatedinafullway”.Actually,bothofthemtestifytotheun-thinkabledimensionoftheBeing,testifythatbesideskhōrismosthatseparatesthesensiblefromthethinkablethereiskhōrismos thatseparatesthethinkablefromtheunthinkable,fromthatwhichcanbeonlyexperiencedspiri-tually,andthisisnotirrationalbutknowledgeofasupra-rationalcharacter.Mehdi Aminrazavi,inhispaper“ADiscourseontheSoulinLaterIslamicPhilosophy”,pointsouttheprocessofshiftfromdoctrinesofthesoulwhichfollowedandwerebasedonGreekphilosophicdoctrineofthesoultodoc-trinesthatcouldbedefinedasesotericandgnostic.Thequestionofthesoul



isoneofthephilosophicallymostintriguingissues;itcouldbesaidthatthecomplexofquestionspertainingtothesoulanddifferentdimensionsofthatquestionhave remainedoneof themost interesting throughout thegeneralhistoryofphilosophy.ThisauthorhasrepresentedthechangesinthetheoryofthesoulinIslamicphilosophyinthemostadequateandcongruousway,dedicatinghisinterestmostlytothedoctrinesofthe“later”Islamicphiloso-phy,whichisespeciallyinteresting.Thechangestestifytoaspecificcurrentofphilosophicthoughtforwhichthesubjectofthesoulisofprimaryinterest,reflectingtheveryessenceofthiscurrent.TheauthorbeginsbyremindingthereadersoftheQur’ānicconceptofthesoul,stressingthefactthatinthelaterIslamicphilosophicaltraditiontheconceptofthesoul,understoodwithinthemodernphilosophicalcontext,aswellastheconceptofthebodyasopposedtothesoulintheCartesiandualistictradition,doesnotexist.TheconceptofthesoulinIslamicphilosophicaltraditionis,accordingtotheauthor,basedontheQur’ānicconceptofrūḥ(=spirit).Followingthat,thepaperbrieflyre-viewsthetwofirststagesofevolutionoftheconcept:thetheological(kalām)stageandthephilosophical(maššā’īorPeripatetic)stage,andthenfocusesonthenexttwostages:theso-calledilluminationist(išrāqī)stageandthegnostic(ʻ irfān)stage.Afterpresentingthefirsttwostagesinaverycondensedway,theauthorshiftstoamoredetailedpresentationofthelaterdevelopmentoftheconceptofsoul.Thispresentationbeginsbystressingthatwhattheauthorcalls“mysticaltransformation”oftheconceptofthesoulbeginswiththelaterworksofIbnSīnā.HisbasicallyAristotelianunderstandingofthesoulwasintrinsicallyconnectedwithhiscosmologyofNeoplatonicinspiration(basedontheideasofatexttheArabsknewasTheology of Aristotle,whichactu-allywasaparaphraseofPlotinus’sEnneads).HisNeoplatoniccosmologyinaway“prepared”hismoreesotericconceptofthesoul,expressedinsomeofhislaterworks,includingthePoem of the Soul.StressingthatIbnSīnā’s“esotericunderstandingofthesoul”isbestseeninthatpoem,theauthorcitesthefinalpartofit.Still,itshouldbesaidthatIbnSīnā’sunderstandingofthesoulisstilldeeplypermeatedbytheideaofthebody–soulopposition,whichisstillseeninthecitedpoem.Theresultoftheologicalcriticismofthephilo-sophical(Greek)conceptionofthesoul,especiallyoftheideasofAl-Ġazālī,expoundedinhisworkThe Niche of Light,wasthetendencythatresultedinthemysticalandgnosticviewofthesoulgainingmoreandmorerecognition.Thefounderoftheso-calledSchoolofIllumination,ŠihābuddīnSuhrawardī,marksthenextstage.Intheframeworkofhis“PhilosophyofIllumination”(Ḥikmat al-ʻ išrāq)thesoulisseenasbeing(intheontologicalsense)moreorlessthatwhatitcan(andshould)be:itcanbemoreorlessluminous,depend-ingonhowfarithasascendedfromthedarknessofthebodytowardsthelightofitsdivineessence.Differentontologicalstatusesofthesoulconnectedwiththeideaofitsascendingtowardsitsdivineorigin,aredirectlyconnectedalsowiththeideaofmysticallove.ĠiyāṯuddīnManṣūrDaštakī’smajorwork,The Stations of the Gnostics(Maqāmāt al-ʻ ārifīn)speaksofthesoul’sascendancetotheDivinethrone,thegoalbeingtheannihilationoftheselfinGod.Themoverthatputsthesoulonthisjourney,whosegoalisunificationwithGodandsubsistenceinGod,islove.Anewstageofthephilosophico-gnosticviewonthesoulisepitomizedinanothergreatrepresentativeofthelaterIslamicphilosophy–MullāṢadrā.Inhisepistemictheory(basedonAristotelianism)knownas“unificationofintellectorandintellected”(whichisalsothetitleofoneofhisworks)–whenthesoulastheknowerreflectsuponGod,theybe-comeoneandthesame.Theevolutionofthesoul,accordingtoMullāṢadrā,isbothspiritualandontological.Thisevolutionisoneoftheexamplesofhis



theoryof‘substantialmotion’inwhichasubstanceissubjecttoontologicalchanges:therearechangesthatovertakenotonlytheaccidentsofasubstance,butalsothesubstanceitself.Whenasoulchangesfrombeinglessperfecttobeingperfect,itisgoingthroughsuchasubstantialchange.The“tenor”ofAminrazavi’spaperisevolutionwhichbeganwithAl-Ġazālīandresultedingnostic theoriesof thesoul. In thefinalpartof thepaper theauthorpointsout that Islamicphilosophy,beingheavily influencedby the “transcendentphilosophy”ofMullāṢadrā, reflects this influenceof thegnosticbranduptothepresenttime.Thereviewoftheevolutionofunderstandingofthesoulpresentedinthepaperallowsustoseesomethingwhichisnotexpresslysaid–thattheissueofthesoulreallyisoneofthecentralissuesofIslamicphi-losophy,becausethereisnorelevantMuslimthinkerwhohasnottackledthisissue,regardlessoftheschoolofthoughttowhichhebelongs.Itisnotbyac-cidentthatoneofthegreatest,IbnSīnā,who–accordingtotheauthorofthispaperandaccordingtomanyothers–belongedbothtotheschoolofmāšši’īnandtotheso-calledfalsafa mašriqiyya,beganhisphilosophicalcareerwithatreatyonthesoul,andendedhisphilosophicalcareerwithanothertreatyonthesoul;thisfacttestifiesthatforhimtheissueofthesoulwasthemostimportant philosophical issue. Ibn Sīnā’s universally recognized greatnessmakeshimapersonificationofIslamicphilosophyofsorts.Ibnal-‘Arabī, thegreatAndalusianmystic,canbebothafascinatingandafrustratingsubjectofscientific research.Sara Sviri startsherpaper(“See-ingwithThreeEyes: Ibnal-ʿArabī’sbarzakhand theContemporaryWorldSituation”) by stressing the frustrating dimension of her endeavour to un-derstandandtointerpretIbnal-‘Arabī’sconceptofbarzakh,his‘thirdprin-ciple’whichopposestheessentialbinarystructureofourcognitivefacultiesbydenyingit.Thefrustrationstemsfromtheunavoidablebinarycharacterofallourinsights,includingscientificones,andfromthequestion:Isscholarly(scientific)hermeneuticssuitabletosuchatask?However,attheend,asthereaderwillsee,thereisalessonthatwillbethefruitoftheendeavouroftry-ingtograspthemysteryofbarzakh–thestagebetweenthisworldandthehereafter.SviribeginsbycitingIbnal-‘Arabī’swordsinintroducingtheideaofbarzakh:“The‘middle’,thatwhichseparatesbetweentwosidesandmakesthemdistinguishedfromoneanother,ismorehiddenthantheyare[…].Weknowthat there isaseparating line there,but theeyedoesnotperceive it;theintellectacknowledgesit, thoughitdoesnotconceiveofwhatit is.”Insodoing,hestatesthatwhatis“morehidden”(morethanthetwodifferentsides itdivides)belongs to thedimensionof theunseen, to thatwhichcanberevealedonlybyimagination,becauseonlyimaginationcanaccountforsomethingwhichis–asbarzakhis–somethingwhich(havinganame)hasonticexistenceandis,atthesametime,somethingwhichisintelligiblebutofwhichrealexistenceisdenied(like,forexample,anintelligiblebutnotreallyexistentdividinglinebetweenblackandwhite,orsunlightandshadow).Byattributingtothebarzakhsuchcontradictoryattributes(ofexistingandatthesametimenon-existing)Ibnal-‘Arabī–saysSviri–“takesustothefieldofparadoxandapophasis”,i.e.tothesphereof‘unsaying’,butstill,saysshe,wecanaskhowtoseeandhowtoknowwhatisbetweentwoopposites,whichisthe‘third’,butwhichisnotobservablebyourbinaryperception.Wecanaskisthereanythingbeyondourbinaryperceptionand,ifso,whatisit?Therearemorequestionslike:Doseparateidentitiesofthetwooppositesmergeandan-nihilateinthisunobservabledividingthe‘third’whichisbarzakh,ordotheirontological identities remain intact? Sviri concludes that Ibn al-‘Arabī en-



couragestheponderingofthesequestions,whichseemunsolvableforbinarycognition.Hesaysthattheintellectacknowledgesit,althoughnotconceivingwhatitisexactly,andSviriconcludesthathesuggeststhatintellect“cangraspsomethingofthistertianuniverse,atleasttheenigmabehindourexistential-epistemologicalgraspofreality”.Theauthorcontinuesalongtheselinesandaskswhetherbarzakh(beingamaǧma‘,i.e.a‘place’ofjunctureorunion)isa‘coincidenceofopposites’,coincidentia oppositorum.SheremindsthatIbnal-‘Arabī’swritingǧam‘anditsantonymfarqarekeyconceptsforhisunder-standingoftherelationshipbetweenGodandCreation–theirjuxtapositionindicatesthecoincidentia oppositorum,towhichtestifieshispoeticverseinFutūḥāt:“theessenceof jam ʿ is theessenceof farq look/ inyouressence(also:withyoureye)for togetherness(ijtimāʿ ) inseparation(iftirāq)”.ShealsoremindsthatIbnal-‘ArabīoftencitesaSufisayingwhichstatesthatthequestion“BywhatmeanshaveyouknownGod?”isbestanswerediftheoneaskedsays“Godisonlyknownbybringingtogethertheopposites”.Askinghowdoes Ibnal-‘Arabīperceive this“coincidence”,howdoesheperceivethenatureof reality in the realmofbarzakh, andwhathappens to thedif-ferentiatedidentitieswhichareheldtogether,sheseekshelpinthetitleofthetwenty-fourthchapterofFutūḥāt,whichsaysthatitconcerns“theKnowledgethatderivesfromtheOntologicalSciencesandtheWondersthatitcontains”.Thereshefinds–andcites–apassagethatassertsthesingularindividualityandparticularityofeveryexistingthing,thatGodcreateseverysinglethingasunique,whichmeansthatnothingreallymergeswithanythinginaman-nerthatwouldbringaboutitlosingitspre-ordainedindividualidentity.Butdespiteofthislastingindividualidentity,allthingsareembracedbyGod.InthisembracementGodbecomesknownbecauseeachandeverythinghasitsplaceintheunityofopposites.Thecoincidentia oppositorumisthecoexist-ingofeverythingthatis,andthat–saysSviri–istheparadigmwhich“al-lowsforwondersandpossibilitiesbeyondthegraspofbinarythought”.Theauthorofthepaperfinallystressesthattheethicalimplicationsofthisvisionarefar-reaching,because“oursisaworldofbinarythinking,ofdichotomies,polarization,opposingopinionsandantagonisticvalue-systems”. In suchaworld“‘right’iscontraryto‘wrong’,‘good’contraryto‘bad’,‘just’contraryto‘unjust’,‘sacred’to‘profane’”.Ourculture–inthenameof‘identities’,ofvalues,ideologies,anddogmas–isa“cultureofblame,self-righteousnessandvictimhood”.Ibnal-‘Arabīteachesusthatbeyondourcultural,religious,moralandpoliticalviewpointsthereisalargerandwiderperspective,a“landofmarvels”where“thelargecanmountthesmallandthebroadthenarrowwithoutthebroadbecomingnarroworthenarrowbroad”.Itisamarvellouslessonweshouldalllearn.Theauthorof“TheConceptofGod’sUnityintheKitāb farāᵓid al-fawāᵓid fī uṣūl ad-dīn wa-l-ᶜaqāᵓidbyᶜAḇdīšūᶜbarBrīḫā”,Željko Paša, statesthegoalofhispaperas“firstlytopresentthestilllittleknownᶜAḇdīšūᶜ’sArabicworkKitāb farāᵓid al-fawāᵓid;secondly,toexposeitsteachingontheOnenessofGod,and,finally,toanalyseitsdoctrineontheThreenessofGodexposedinthedialoguewithIslam”.ʻAbdīšūʻ’swork,tothisday,“isoneexampleoftheexpositionofChristianteachingontheTrinityinadialoguewithIslam”,whichisatestimonyoftheneedofChristianstodefendthedoctrineofGod’sOne-nessinThreenessagainstaccusationsforpolytheismwithinthenewcultural(andreligious)context inwhich theyfound themselvesunderIslamicrule.Theauthorproceeds,firstly,bypresentingʻAbdīšūʻ’sworkwritteninArabic.Astowhomtheworkwasaddressed,theauthorofthepaperspeculatesthat(basingthisspeculationonthefactthatinʻAbdīšūʻ’sworkthereareanumber



ofcitationsfromtheQur’ān,aswellastypicallyMuslimexpressionslikeahl al-kitābandahl ad-dīn for themembersofmonotheistreligiouscommuni-ties)thattheaddresseeweretheMuslimcommunityandtheJews. ʻAbdīšūʻstartshisdefenceoftheChristianfaithbysayingthatthingsinitwhicharecondemnedbyMuslims(andJews)arecondemnableonlyfortheir(external)appearance.Theauthorofthepapercontinuesbycharacterizingtheworkun-derhisconsiderationasaChristiandogmaticandapologeticwork.ItpresentssevenprinciplesofChristianfaith,whicharelaterexplained,defendedandlegitimized.Pašastressesthat ʻAbdīšūʻchoseprinciplesthatarecommontoallmonotheisticreligions.Thefirstthreeprinciples(onOnenessofGod)aresuch,exceptthatthe̒Abdīšūʻ’sthirdprinciplecontainsthestatement“andHisAttributesoftheEssencearethree”,whichiscondemnablefromtheMuslimpointofview,andwhichisaspecificChristianbelief.HeexplainsandaffirmstheprinciplesofOnenessofGod,theprincipleoftheworldbeingoriginated,theprincipleoftheworldhavingtheOriginator,theprincipleoftheOrigina-tor of theworld beingOne.He legitimizes these principles reminding thereaderoftheMuslimtheologicalargumentswhichaffirmthesameprinciplesandusing,ashismethodofdemonstration,deductivereasoningbasedonAri-stotle’slogic.TheCreatoroftheuniverse,beingtheBeingitself,existingbyHimself,isaSubstanceexistinginHimself–Heisonlyonesubstance,butonesubstancehavingthreeAttributes.Astheauthorofthepaperstates,thisconclusionrepresents the introduction todiscussing the issueofTrinity. Insupportof thedoctrineofGod’s attributes, ʻAbdīšūʻ uses the argumentsofMuslimkalām theologyandcitations from theQur’ān (attributesasGod’sbeautifulnames–asmā’ Allāh al-ḥusnā),withtheintentiontoconfirmthatChristiansarenotpolytheistic.BycitingtheQur’ānicattributesofGod,heintegratedthemintohisteachingonTrinity,practicallyusingtheQur’ānasimplicitconfirmationofthedoctrineoftheHolyTrinity.TheseattributesareattributesofthetranscendenceofGod,attributesofthemajestyandpowerofGod,andso-called‘emphasizedattributes’(whicharetypicaloftheArabicstyle of Islam’s revelation).Besides the attributes of essence, there are at-tributesofaction,whichareindicativeoftherelationtootheressences:theattributeof theCreatorcalls for thenecessityofcreature,and theattributeof theOriginator thenecessityoforiginated. It isclear that ᶜAḇdīšūᶜ“usesthetheologyofattributes,withstrongQur’ānicexpressionsandtheIslamicterminologyofthePhilosophyoftheKalām”,statestheauthorofthepaper,inordertomaketheideaoftheTrinityunderstandable–and,thereby,moreacceptabletoMuslimsandJews.However,‘Aḇdīšū‘recognizesthat,inordertounderstandtheessenceofGod,oneshouldseeGod’sessenceasdeprivedofallattributes:thisessenceissubstancesubsistingbyitself,notbyanother.SeeninthelightofthethreepropertiesoftheEssencewhichisGod–Eternalinessence,Wise inessence, andLivingbyessence– theGodasOneandUniqueessencemanifestsHimselfonlybyhisown“properties”astheFatherandtheSonandtheHolySpirit.ThreeessentialattributesofGod–necessityofexistence,wisdom,andlife–arerecognizedbyMuslims:theycallGodal-qadīm bi-ḏ-ḏāt(=Eternalbyessence,byitself)henceofnecessaryexistence,al-ḥakīm bi-ḏ-ḏāt(=Wisebyessence,byitself),al-ḥayy bi-ḏ-ḏāt(=Livingbyessence,byitself).ʻAbdīšūʻcallseachoneoftheseessentialattributesqnoma(whichstandsforArabicuqnūm,i.e.forGreekhypostasis)anddefinesqnomaas“thereceiving[of]anEssentialAttributealongwiththeOnerepresented,theSelf-Existing”.Basedonthisdefinition,itcanbesaidthat“itispermis-sibleforustosaythattheCreator[…]isOnesubstance[and]ThreeQnome”,becauseqnoma isnothingelsebutpartaking(asaneternalprocesswithout



beginningandwithoutend)intheEssence.Christianshaveanameoftheirownforeachhypostasis.Theyare: theFather– theEternal inessence(al-qadīm bi-ḏ-ḏāt),theSon–Wiseinessence(al-ḥakīm bi-ḏ-ḏāt),andtheHolySpirit–Livinginessence(al-ḥayy bi-ḏ-ḏāt).Theauthorofthepaperstressesintheconclusionofthepaper ʻAbdīšūʻ’sconfidenceinthehumanintellect,becauseofwhichheuseslogicalreasoningindefendingandlegitimizingtheChristiandoctrineofTrinity,expectingtheaddresseesofhisworktoaccepthislogicalargumentation.AspecificvalueofPaša’spaperisthattheauthor–inaverythoroughandknowledgeableway–demonstratesʻAbdīšūʻ’sdia-logicalmastery,whichconsistsespeciallyinusing(asindirectargumentsandproofs)postulatesofMuslimtheologyandcitationsfromtheQur’ān.Suchamethodisthebesttestimonyofwhatistheoptimalwayofdialoguebetweendifferentcultures,religionsandtraditions–useofsharedvaluesandideasasabasisfordiscussingthedifferences.ʻAbdīšūʻ’sworkisanexampleofveryartfulimplementationofsuchamethodinamediaevalmulticulturalcontext.Alexander N. Chumakovstartshisfirstpaperinthisvolume,“CultureintheGlobalWorldandOpportunitiesforDialogue”,bystatingthatculturepen-etratesallspheresofthematerialandspirituallifeofasociety.Hestressesthisbecausemanyproblemsthathaveinternationalorevenglobalcharacterareconnectedwithculture.Thisstartingpositionmakesitpossiblefortheauthortodiscuss,inarelevantway,theopportunitiesfordialogueinthecontempo-raryworldwhosemaincharacteristicisglobalism.Theprocessofglobaliza-tionitselfisburdenedbymanyproblemsthatareofculturalcharacter.Thatiswhydialogueandmutualunderstandingbetweendifferentcultures–aswellasbetweendifferentsub-cultureswithinaculture–areofcrucialimportance.Culturaldifferences,differencesofvalue-systemsofthedifferentanddiffer-encesofsocio-culturalpatternsare(oreasilybecome)factorsofinstabilityandevenconflicts.Theauthorremindsthereaderof“globalization”ante lit-teram,showingthatevenintheeraofgreatgeographicdiscoveriesculturalexchangehadimportantconsequences:communicationandexchangeofide-asandtheirspreadingwhichgivesthemauniversaldimension.Inthatlight,theauthorremindsofdifferentphenomenathroughoutcenturiesofthehistoryofhumanitywhichhadthepotentialofimposingglobaluniversaltrendsandpatternsofsocialbehaviour.However,atthesametimehealsostressesthatnot all borrowed or accepted “cultural” patterns (or technological patternsthathaveculturalpotential)arepositiveassuch.Borrowinginhisargumenta-tiontheargumentsofIvanA.Il’in,withregardtoRussianculture,theauthorstresses thatnot all cultural (or technological) loansarecreative; therearethosewhichengendersocialstrainsandinspirecriticalevaluation.Still,theprocessofglobalizationisalmostanunstoppableforce.InillustratingsuchaviewtheauthortakestheexampleofChina.HeremindsthereaderofhowtheChineseemperor“lessthan200yearsago”rejectedtheBritishovertureandofferssayingthatChina“haseverything”andthatChinese“don’tneedthegoodsofyourcountry”,whiletoday’sChinaisopentotheworldandisacountrythattakesanactivepartintheprocessofglobalization.Oneoftheauthor’svaluablethesesisthattheprocessofglobalizationhas–generallyspeaking – two different dimensions: imposing certain values as universalandacceptedassuch,ontheonehand,andinstancesofconflict,ontheother.However–asChumakovputsit–“relationsofdialogueandconflictbetweenvariousculturesare theirnaturalattributesandevenneedfulformsof theirexistence, like, forexample,political struggleandpoliticalagreementsbe-inganinseparablepartofanypoliticalsystem”.Inaddition,hearguesthat



in some instancesglobalizationmade regionalproblemsglobal.He is alsospeakingofwhathecalls“moderncontradictions”,i.e.theclashoftwoop-positeprocesses–“theintegrationprocess,includingtheareaofculture,andthewishfornational,localculturestodefendtheiroriginalityandindepend-ence”.Theauthor’sviewis thatweshouldexpect increasingconfrontationintheforeseeablefuture.Atthesametime,heremindsusthatculturesthatremainisolated,aswellasthosethatoppressmulticulturalism,arepronetostagnationandeventuallydegrade.Arguingthatdialogueistheonlyefficientmeanstosolvingproblemsofthemodernworldwhichcausesinternationalconflictsorsocialproblems,Chumakovstressesthefactthatsuchaviewisstillnotdeeplyrootedinthepractisingofinternationalrelationsandpolicies.Thesolution,inhisview,istoreplacethepowerofforcewiththepowerofspirit,whichrequires“acertainlevelofdevelopmentofspiritualandmaterialculture”.Althoughonecouldsay that this isa toogeneralconclusion, it iscertainlybasedonatruthfuldiagnosis,i.e.thestatementthat“theageofglo-balizationhascausedaproblemfordialoguehavingnoalternative”.Finally,itshouldbesaidthathisthesesarebasedonanumberofrelevantexamplesfromthecontemporaryhistoryofmankind,whichgivestothesetheses–andtothefinalconclusion,howsoevergeneral–credibilityandmerit.ThestartingpointofAlexander N. Chumakov’ssecondpaperinthisvolume,“PhilosophyasaToolofAchievingtheWorthyLife”,isthedenialof(Vatti-mo’sandSwassjan’s) ideaof theendofphilosophy,and–more important–(Habermas’sandRorty’s)ideaoftheunquestionablevalueofphilosophy,whichmeansthatitcanhave“agrowingroleundermoderncircumstances”.Philosophy’simportancelaysinitspowertoreflecthumanessentialityandtodefinethehumanbeingasabeingthathasthepowerofcriticalthinking,doubting,andquestioning.Theauthorseesformulatingandaskingquestionsasanessentialfunctionofphilosophy;thisisitsdrivingforce.Philosophyad-dressesalimitlessspectrumofproblemsandsoittranscendstheboundariesofexistingknowledge.Itsvaluestemsfromitsself-sufficiencyandfromitsrejectingabsoluteauthorities.Itdoesnotdeal–arguestheauthor–withthetruth,butwiththetruthsofthisorthatphilosopher,i.e.withsubjectivecer-taintythatthephilosopher’svisionofessenceofthingsisadequate.Question-ingwhetherweneedphilosophyinourageof“highspeedandtechnology”,theauthorstatesthatsuchquestionsareansweredbylifeitself,whichmeansthatmodernman encounters numerous “philosophical problems”, someofwhicharenew,i.e.neverexistedbefore.Theworldoftodayis“asingleho-listic system”,which is a new quality andwhich “engenders questions ofsustainablesocio-economicdevelopmentandharmoniousrelationsbetweensocietyandnature”andestablishes“humane,goodneighbourlyrelationsbe-tween separate peoples”.Alongwith “eternal philosophical themes” thesequestionstakethemostimportantplaceonthesceneofmodernphilosophicalstudies.Basedonthisinsight,theauthorstressesthatnownotonlyseparatepeoples,buttheworldcommunityasawholeneedsphilosophy.Nevertheless,“wehavenosinglevisionofthesubjectofphilosophy”andthereisnocer-tainanswertothequestionwhetherphilosophycan“purposefullyinfluencesocialdevelopment”.Ifso,thequestionisinwhichwayitcandothis.Forthissituationtheauthorhasanallegoricimage:philosophy“doesnotfitthePro-crusteanbedofexactandcompleteknowledge”.Althoughthefactthatphi-losophyisnotaholisticteachinganddoesnothaveasinglemethodologyandcommonlawscanseemanessentialshortage,theauthorstressesthatthisisalsophilosophy’sgreatestadvantage,because,whenweareconfrontedwith



complicatedsystemsandwhenwehavesearchresolutionsforcomplexinter-disciplinaryproblems, rethinkingsuchproblems from thepointofviewofphilosophyisessentiallyvaluable.Philosophyaddressesproblemswithmuchmorefreedomforinterpretingthefacts,wideningthehorizonofourvisionoftheproblemand“initiatesnew,unusualapproaches”.Theauthorproceedsfurtherbyremindingusofthedifferencebetweencultureandcivilizationanddefiningtheirroleintheshapingofseparatenationsandtheworldasawhole.Peoplesaredifferentbecauseof theircultures;culturesdividepeoples.Ontheonehand,beingaunifyingbasisforseparatecommunities“isanecessaryconditionfortheexistenceofsociallife”;ontheotherhand,cultureiswhatdifferentiatesanddividespeoples.However,differentpeoplesdevelopcom-monformsoforganizationofsociallifeandcivilizationisreflectedintheseforms.Therefore,civilization“emergesasthemeansofsmoothingculturaldiversity”andisa“unifyingfactorofdifferentcountriesandpeoples”.Onemight say that theworld of today, representing “a single holistic system”,is, in fact,global civilization.Althoughdifferentpeoples enter theprocessofcivilizationalchangedifferentlyandwithdifferentspeed,“theessenceofglobalcivilizationdoesnotchange”.Itsbasiccontourswereformedbytheendofthetwentiethcenturyandwithuniversalandmassculture,engenderedbyglobalization,itconfrontsustodaywith“asingleall-humancultural-cum-civilizationalsystem”.Theresultisthatintheworldoftodaywearefacedwithtwoopposedforces:thecentrifugalforcebasedincultureandthecen-tripetaloneconditionedbycivilization.Thereisnodoubtthatthisisacom-plicatedissue.Bethatasitmay,astheauthorstresses,“itisnotpossibletoacknowledgethisrealityandbuildanadequateglobalworldoutlookwithoutphilosophy”.AfterhavingreadChumakov’spaper,oneistemptedtosay:theworldisnotsubjecttomerelyman’swilltochangeit;ratheronlychangedmancanchange theworld;andphilosophy is themainmeans tochangingman.IsthisnotwhatSocratesandhismoralphilosophytaughtus?Nevad Kahteran’spapershouldbeviewedasamanifesto.Itisapaperthatnotonlygivesgeneralinsightintowhathasbeenachievedwithinthefieldofthedialoguementionedinthepaper’stitle(“RecognizingaModelofPost-modernPluralismthroughLookingatIslamfromtheStandpointofFarEast-ernTraditions:ADialoguebetweenIslam,Hinduism,Buddhism,andConfu-cianism”),butitalsohasthevalueofaprogrammaticaddress–oranappeal–totheacademicworldofEasternstudies.Thisappealisduetoasituationthat theauthorpresentsinasinglebutweightysentence:“Forfar toolonghavethephilosophicaltraditionsoftheEast[…]foundthemselvesexcludedfromthemainstreamofphilosophy.”However,thepossiblebenefitofthedia-loguebetweenphilosophieswhichdevelopedwithindifferentculturesgoesbeyondthebordersofacademicscholarship,because–astheauthorstresses–“thedialogueofvariousculturesandtraditionsintheglobalworldbecomesaprerequisitefortheirsurvivalandthatoftheworldcommunity”.Withre-gardstotheacademicworld,“thehistoryofworldphilosophycannolongerignoreitsEasterncomponent”,although“thetreatmentoftheseEasterntradi-tionshasyettoemergefromtheverycrampedantechambertowhichitisstill,alltoooften,confined”.Theauthor’sdeepbeliefisthatthisshouldnolongerbe thecase, so thathepresentsanumberofexamples in thispaperwhichtestify,notonlytothepossibility,butalsotothebenefitsthatacomparativeinquiry into different philosophical (and cultural) traditions brings.TakingtheexampleoftheIslamictradition(bothculturallyandphilosophically)intoconsideration,theauthorfirstsuggeststhequestionsweneedtoaskourselvesin this regard.Thesequestions are:What constitutes the substantiality and



valueofIslamicphilosophicaldiscourse?Whatisthestandardmodeofthisdiscourse?WhatbecameofvisionsoflifeandrealitythatcanevennowbediscernedaspluralisticintheIslamiclegacy?HastheIslamicphilosophicalparadigm really lost its vitality and vision?These questions are importantbecause inasking themwecan learnhow to reconcilenewcontradictions,and–atthesametime–we“raisequestionsconcerningthetransformationofourMuslimidentityandvisiontowardsaglobalunderstandingofthehumanraceandtheworldasawhole”.Remindingthereaderthat,forexample,Is-lamdevelopeditsownwaysofapproachingIndiantradition,theauthortakesAl-Birūnī’sbookTarīkh al-Hindasanexampleoftheadoptionofamethodwhichpresents all the rudimentsofmodernprinciplesof religious studies.Thereare,ofcourse,manymodernauthors(suchasStoddart,Guénon,Pallis,andCoomaraswamy)who,beingso-called“perennialthinkers”,haveunder-stoodthatthereisa“commonground”sharedbydifferenttraditions.Theau-thorofthepapervaluestheworkofcontemporaryauthors,who–likeF.Muj-tabiandReza-ShahKazemi– lookintoculturaldiversityofIndiansocietyandHindu/Muslimculturalrelations,orseekcommongroundbetweenIslamandBuddhism.AllsuchendeavoursrediscoveratruththathasbeenalmostforgottenwithinIslamtoday,namely,that,astheauthorofthepaperstates,“Islamisdefinitely[…]abridgebetweenAsiantruthshiddeninthetreasuresofBuddhism,ZenBuddhism,Taoism,Confucianism,andHinduism,ontheonehand,andthetruthsintheAbrahamicfaithsofJudaismandChristian-ity”.Byregainingcognizanceofthis,theuniversalismoftheIslamicmodelofthinkingcanbeincorporatedwithintheworld’sphilosophicalheritageonanequal footingwithothergreat legacies.ThesamefruitsareaffordedbyinsightintotheChinese-Islamicencounterthroughphilosophyandreligion.Examplesofthisaregivenbytheauthor’spresentationofthecontributionofChineseMuslimauthorsinthisfield.Theauthoralsomentionshisowninitia-tiveforestablishingA Platform for Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the BalkansasaprojectaimedatbroadeningphilosophicalhorizonsintheBal-kansthroughthecooperationofphilosophersandotherscholarsfromformerYugoslaviaandthosefromChina.ThisisaninitiativethatshowsappreciationforwhatS.H.NasrsaidaboutBosniainthebestway;namely,thatBosnia,withitsIslamiclegacyandlivingIslamicculture,canplayanimportantroleas“abridgebetweentheIslamicWorldandtheWest[…]provideditremainsfaithfultoitsownuniversalvisionofIslam,threatenednowadaysbyforcesbothwithinandoutside itsborders”.Theauthor’spersonal“confession” isthattheuniversalistperspectiveofSufisinIndiaandoftheHan Kitabauthors(i.e.ChineseMuslimauthors)hashelpedhimavoidfallingpreytowhathecalls‘parochialphilosophy’.Avoidingsuch“narrow-mindedness”isbutoneaspectofthebenefitthatcomparativestudiesofdifferentculturaltraditionsandphilosophies canbring about.Ofprobablygreatervalue is thebenefitwhichgoesbeyondthepersonaldimension,onethatcouldcontributetothebetteringoftoday’severmore“smaller”butevermore“complicated”world.

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Asidefromsixteenpaperswithinthethematicblock“IslamicandCompara-tivePhilosophy”,inthesection“NotesandNews”wealsopublishareviewoftheInternationalConferenceComparative Perspectives: Islam, Confucianism and Buddhism(Ljubljana,December11–13,2015),writtenbyMajaVeselič,becauseitisofgreatimportance,especiallyfortheregionofSoutheastEu-



rope,thatJanaS.RoškerandNatašaVampeljSuhadolnik,sinologistsattheDepartmentofAsianStudies,UniversityofLjubljana,organizedaconferencededicatedtothecomparisonsanddialoguesbetweenthreemajorAsianreli-gionsand/orphilosophies–Islam,Confucianism,andBuddhism.Finally,wepublishfivebookreviewswrittenbyNevadKahteran:AliPaya(ed.), The Misty Land of Ideas and the Light of Dialogue (2013); OliverLeaman(ed.),The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy (2015);OliverLeaman,The Qur’an: A Philosophical Guide (2016);SnježanaVeljačić-Akpınar,Buddhist Meditations on Islamic Contemplative Paths (2015);andMassimoCampanini,Philosophical Perspectives on Modern Qur’ānic Ex-egesis (2016). AllofthemweconsiderasextremelyimportantcontributionstothestudiesofIslamicandcomparativephilosophy.

Nevad Kahteran Daniel Bučan

islamic and comparative philosophy - hrfd.hr · islamic and comparative philosophy ... , the...

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