islam political islam and america

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Is Brotherhood with America Possible?

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ISLAMISTS

Is Brotherhood with America Possible?KHALIL AL-ANANI, Egypt

Alone at the Ballot Box: American Rejection o IslamistsATEF ABOU SAIF, Palestinian Territory

Trial and Error: Washington and Iraqs ShiiteIBRAHIM AL-BAYDANI, Iraq

The Cold Embrace: U.S. & Islamists in North AricaMOHAMED EL-GHALI, Morocco

ISLAM OUTSIDE THE MOSQUE

Islamic Roots o Good GovernanceMAZEN HASHEM, Syria

Islam and Human Rights: Revisiting the DebateJUMANA SHEHATA, Egypt

A Response to Western Views o Islamist MovementsRADWAN ZIADAH, Syria

Separation o Islam & Political Islam: The Case o MoroccoHOSSAM TAMAM, Egypt

InsightIslam, Political Islam and America

Bringing Middle Eastern Perspectives to Washington

Vol. | No. SPRING 2007 | ISSN 936-8984

Ara


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PUbLISHERBruce G. Bair

EDITOR IN CHIEFMohamed Emenshawy

ASSISTANT EDITORPau WusbergMANAGING COPY EDITORWhitney ParkerADDITIONAL COPY EDITORS

Ashey HomanUgochukwu Iteogu

SPECIAL ADvISORHesham SaamMEDIA INQUIRIES

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ISSN 1936-8984

Bringing Middle Eastern Perspectivesto Washington

Arab Insight, an innovative journa that eatures

authoritative anayses rom Midde Easternexperts on critica regiona issues, seeks toimprove the reationship between the UnitedStates and the Arab word by cutivating a bet-ter understanding o the compex issues acingthe Midde East among Western poicy-makersand the pubic at arge.

Artices in Arab Insight do not represent anyconsensus o opinion. Whie readers may agreeor disagree with the ideas set out in these ar-tices, it is our purpose to present a diversity oviews rather than identiying with a particuarbody o beies.

The anayses, interpretations and concusionsexpressed in Arab Insight artices are soeythose o the individua authors and shoud notbe attributed to the Word Security Institute orany other individuas or organizations in theMidde East or the United States.


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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND ISLAMISTS

Is Brotherhood with America Possible?Khai a-Anani, Egypt

Interview with Dr. Issam al-Iryan,

Chie o the Muslim Brotherhood Political Department

Conducted by Khai a-Anani

Alone at the Ballot Box: American Rejection o IslamistsAte Abou Sai, Paestinian Territory

Trial and Error: Washington and Iraqs ShiiteIbrahim a-Baydani, Iraq

The Cold Embrace: U.S. & Islamists in North AricaMohamed e-Ghai, Morocco

ISLAM OUTSIDE THE MOSQUE

Islamic Roots o Good GovernanceMazen Hashem, Syria

Islam & Human Rights: Revisiting the DebateJumana Shehata, Egypt

A Response to Western Views o Islamist MovementsRadwan Ziadah, Syria

Separation o Islam and Political Islam: The Case o MoroccoHossam Tamam, Egypt

InsightAra

Bringing Middle Eastern Perspectives to Washington

Vol. | No. SPRING 2007


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AlTHOUGH THE FACTORS accounting or the deterioration o Americas reputa-tion in the Arab and Musim word ater Sept. 11 are numerous, the U.S. position

vis--vis poitica Isam remains an important actor in reinorcing the negative

view o America. An important issue that has driven much o the anti-Americanism

we observe in the region today pertains to an evident contradiction between U.S.

discourse on democratization and poitica reorm on one hand, and its negative

response to the eectora gains made by groups ike Hamas in the Paestinian Ter-

ritories or the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt. As a resut o this discrepancy, many

observers have proposed aternative ways or Washington to advance the cause odemocracy in the Arab word. One o the proposed ideas invoves hoding-o on

caing or immediate eections, and ocusing instead on promoting other prereq-

uisites o poitica reorm. Others suggested empoying new strategies that woud

guarantee the deeat o poitica Isamists at baot boxes.

Undoubtedy, there is a soaring need or a better understanding o Isamist

movements in the region, given the undamenta dierences among such groups.

Moreover, many Isamist movements are experiencing a process o change that

warrants a revision o the existing conventiona wisdom about poitica Isam. Not

ony that, but many o those groups remain unknown in Western, particuary

American, discussions o Isamist movements. Thereore, ormuating a construc-

tive and eective American poicy toward Isam in a broad sense, but more speci-

cay toward poitica Isam, wi require a new and a more nuanced inteectua

mapping o contemporary Isam and poitica Isam in the region.

Given these various demands, the editoria team oArab Insight took the initia-

tive to shed ight on the topic o American poicies toward both Isam and poitica

Isam. The topic is presented in two sections:

Section I presents severa Arab responses to American poicy toward Isamists.

Editors Note

5


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It begins with an artice examining the Egyptian Musim Brotherhoods view o

the United States. Missing rom this artice are aegations o secret taks between

the U.S. and the Brotherhood. Rather, the author ocuses on how the Brotherhood

perceives the United States and its poicies. Section I aso presents a short interview

with one o the eaders o the Brotherhood, Dr. Essam a-Iryan. The three other ar-

tices in the section grappe with the question o why the United States accepts (or

toerates) the activities o some Isamist movements and not others. The rst artice

addresses seeming U.S. rejection o Isamist groups in Egypt, lebanon, and the Pa-

estinian Territories. The second artice ooks at U.S. reations, or ack thereo, with

Isamist groups in the Maghreb region. The third artice anayzes the reationship

between the United States and Iraqs Shiite Isamist groups, ocusing on the sources

o tensions in this reationship.Section II provides an overview o the position o

Isamist groups and movements in their respective societies. This section covers

Isamic views on issues o governance, human rights, and reations with the West.

The rst artice attempts to dene Isamic governance, in ways that transcend

conventiona understandings o phrases ike Isamic rue, impementation o

Shariah or impementation o democracy. The second artice grappes with the

question o whether there is a comortabe t between Isam and human rights.

The third artice anayzes Western views o Isamist movements. The ourth artice

examines the important transormations exhibited by the A-Tawheed Wa-Isah

movement in Morocco over the past years.

6 Arab Insight


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Is brotherhood with America Possile?*

khalilal-anani

THERE IS NO CHANCE OF COMMUNICATING with any U.S. administration so

ong as the United States maintains its ong-standing view o Isam as a rea danger,

a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have

no pre-conceived notions concerning the American peope or the U.S. society and

its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no probem communicating with

the American peope but no adequate eorts are being made to bring us coser,

said Dr. Issam a-Iryan, chie o the poitica department o the Musim Brother-

hood in a phone interview.

A-Iryans words sum up the Musim Brotherhoods views o the American peo-

pe and the U.S. government. Other members o the Musim Brotherhood woud

agree, as woud the ate Hassan a-Banna, who ounded the group in 1928. A-

Banna viewed the West mosty as a symbo o mora decay. Other Saas an Is-

amic schoo o thought that reies on ancestors as exempary modes have taken

the same view o the United States, but ack the ideoogica fexibiity espoused by

the Musim Brotherhood. Whie the Musim Brotherhood beieves in engaging the

Americans in civi diaogue, other extremist groups see no point in diaogue and

maintain that orce is the ony way o deaing with the United States.1

* This artice was written beore the U.S. House Majority leader Steny Hoyer met with the Brotherhoods

pariamentary eader, Mohamed Saad E-Katatni in Cairo. On Apri 5, 2007, Hoyer and E-Katatni metonce at the pariament buiding and ater at the home o the U.S. ambassador to Egypt.1 Teephone conversat ion with Issam a-Iryan on Feb. 2, 2007.

7

Specialist in political Islam and author o the orthcoming The Poitica Rise o the

Musim Brotherhood in Egypt, to be published in Cairo.


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8 Arab Insight

The way the Muslim Brotherhood views the United States

Unike other Isamic poitica groups, the Musim Brotherhood is a pragmatic

movement that reates in a eve-headed manner with regiona and internationa

powers. However, the nature o its reations with the United States can be viewed

as a somewhat specia case. The Musim Brotherhood has proound reservations

about the United States. And Musim Brotherhood ocias doubt that they can

maintain a norma iaison with the U.S. government or nd a way to promote com-

mon understanding. Nonetheess, this artice is about the Egyptian chapter o the

Musim Brotherhood, not oth-

er branches o the same group

that exist in other Arab coun-

tries, or each independent

Musim Brotherhood group

deas with the United States

according to its interests and

goas. In act, some Musim

Brotherhood groups have a cordia reationship with Washington, incuding those

o Kuwait, Syria, Jordan and Morocco. The Egyptian branch o the Musim Broth-

erhood, however, takes a grim view o the United States or historica, ideoogica

and poitica reasons. That doesnt mean that there are no backdoor channes o

communication between the two entities. But the mere act that communication

goes unpubicized is a sign o the ragie nature o reations between Egypts Mus-

im Brotherhood and the U.S. government.

Severa actors infuence the Musim Brotherhoods attitude toward the United

States. One is Washingtons poitica attitude and perceived eve o trustworthi-

ness. Another is the degree to which Washington may be wiing to make the

Egyptian regime stop harassing the Musim Brotherhood and aow the atter to be

egay integrated in poitica ie. Besides, Washington may be using the MusimBrotherhood as a too to scare the Egyptian regime, and that itse cannot be good

or the Musim Brotherhood reputation.

Doctrinal and other considerations

The Musim Brotherhood sees the United States rom more than one ange,

some o which are infuenced by the doctrina beies o the Egyptian group and

its history.

a. The doctrinal angle: The Musim Brotherhood sees Isam as a hoistic sys-

The Muslim brotherhood iews the Unit-

ed States as an occupation orce in Iraqand Aghanistan, and it supports despotic

regimes in the Ara World.


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Is Brotherhood with America Possible? 9

tem incorporating ie, man and the word together. This is a vision that

Hassan a-Banna, the groups ounder, put together rom its inception. A-

Banna wanted Isam to ead humanity toward security, reedom, equaity

and justice. Thereore, the Musim Brotherhood sees the West as a riva that

has usurped this position o eadership. It aso beieves that Western civiiza-

tion, incuding American hegemony, is nearing its end.2

b. The civilization angle:A-Bannas writings remain the main source or the

Musim Brotherhoods views o the West. A-Banna criticized Western civi-

ization in the strongest o terms, accusing it o decay and unbrided deca-

dence. For him, Western civiization is a materia civiization devoid o

spiritua and mora substance.3

Athough a-Bannas origina teachings were centred on European nations,

rather than the United States, his views were adopted, amost verbatim, by

current Musim Brotherhood eaders in reation to the United States. The

current Musim Brotherhood supreme guide, Mohammad Mahdi Ake,

says in one o his weeky etters that the new internationa system ed by

the United States is an od imperia system using new toos combining

seduction with repression, intration and domination with aegations o

partnership ... and breaking up countries whie caing on nations to ray

against hegemony. The United States is inciting minorities, provoking bor-

der troubes, and encouraging ethnic and sectarian sedition as we as civi

war. It is trying to separate Arab societies rom Musims societies. It is doing

so through anning nationaism, targeting the minds o youth, undermining

the vaue system, and spreading eeings o rustration.

The West pretends to be benevoent, but it has divided the word into twoparts. One is the West itse that must remain strong, rich, armed, conquer-

ing, and productive. The other is the rest o the word that must remain

weak, poor, disarmed, invaded, occupied, and consuming. The West is try-

ing to impose its vision through orce, just as it is perpetuating disparity

2 Hassan a-Banna, Coection o the letters o the Martyred Imam, Message to the Fith Conerence. (A-exandria, Dar a-Daawa, 1988).

3 Hassan a-Banna, The Fundamentas o Isam as a Socia System,Al-Shihab 2, no. 14 (1947).


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0 Arab Insight

among nations. The orms o expoitation may have changed, but the system

remains the same. It is a system based on racist concepts. It adopts the ideas

o Darwin and Nietzsche, with the West aways acting at the center, aways at

the hem. It is surviva o the ttest, and the West wants a others to remain

unt, says Ake.4

Musim Brotherhoods Dr. a-Iryan concurs with this overarching view o the

West and expresses the oowing opinion o the United States: It is dicut to

speak o a civiization in the usua sense when taking o a country thats no more

than 200 years od. Even assuming that the United States is a civiization, it is one

that has been born out o excusionist tendencies and through the eradication o

the Native Americans. It is aso a materia civiization based on the twin piars o

money and power, he says.5

The same view is echoed by Dr. Mohammad Habib, rst deputy o the Musim

Brotherhoods supreme guide, who beieves that the U.S. civiization is based on

surviva o the ttest as we as on doube standards, especiay when it comes to

the issues o democracy and reedom.6

The Musim Brotherhood views the United States as an occupying orce in Iraq

and Aghanistan, and it supports despotic regimes in the Arab Word

c. The political angle: The Musim Brotherhood views the United States as

an occupying orce. Mahdi Ake, the Brotherhoods supreme guide speaks

o the United States in the same tone a-Banna used when taking about the

British, French, or Itaian occupation o Arab countries. In act, a-Banna

once wrote that the days o hegemony and repression are over. Europe can

no onger rue the East with iron and re. Those outdated practices do not

tay with the course o events, with the deveopment o nations, with the

renaissance o Musim peope, or with the principes and eeings the warhas created. Ake coud use the same words today, but ony in reerence to

the United States.

Both a-Iryan and Habib agree that the United States wants to manipuate the

Arab region to promote its own interests. The invasion o Aghanistan and Iraq are

4 The weeky address by the Genera Guide, rom ikhwanonline.com, Jan. 3, 2007.5 Teephone conversat ion with Issam a-Iryan on Feb. 2, 2007.6 Teephone conversat ion with Mohammad Habib on Feb. 3, 2007.


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Is Brotherhood with America Possible?

seen as evidence o U.S. intentions, the two woud argue. The Musim Brotherhood

is critica o the United States cose inks with Israe and beieves that the United

States and Israe share the same poitica agenda. Ake rais against the United

States and Western bias towards the Zionist entity. Habib says both America and

Israe were ounded on an ethos o expansionism and cooniaism. A-Iryan puts it

bunty, One o the main reasons or our negative opinion o the United States is

its ties with Israe. Its ties with Israe wi remain a dening actor in our reations

with the United States.

The U.S. support o des-

potic regimes in the Arab

word and its doube standards

in matters reated to reedom

and democracy oer another

stumbing bock in the cur-

renty sour reationship. The

Musim Brotherhood has aways espoused the view that the West bosters the

ruing regime in most o the Isamic word whie using them to promote its own

interests. Musim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau member Mahmoud Izzat says that

the poicy o the United States in the Arab word is to support tyranny. U.S. deeds

confict with its rhetoric insoar as democracy is concerned.7

Habib equay has itte regard or U.S. rhetoric on reedom, democracy and

human rights. The United States is interested not in democracy but rather in its

own schemes in the region, he says, reerring in particuar to U.S. poicy towards

Hamas. The United States is not a charity organization or a reorm agency.8 In

recent years, the doube standards issue suraced oowing the end o the Egyptian

pariamentary eections, in which the Musim Brotherhood won an unprecedented

20 percent o the seats (88 out o 454 seats). When the Musim Brotherhood was

ater subjected to various acts o persecution and harassment, the United Statesturned a bind eye.

The course o relations

Reations between the Musim Brotherhood and the United States go a the

way back to Word War II, when the United States was about to inherit the Brit-

ish Empire and the Musim Brotherhood was one o the most popuar movements

7 Interview with Mahmoud Izzat by the Washington Post on June 27, 2006, cited by ikhwanonline.com.8 Teephone conversat ion with Mohammad Habib on Feb. 3, 2007.

Up until the conclusion o the Palestinian

elections, the United States was sending

positie signals to the Muslim brother-

hood.


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2 Arab Insight

in the region. The British, acting with U.S. bessing, wanted to estabish a riva

group to compete with the Musim Brotherhood. The new group, named Freedom

Brothers, was supposed to attract the youths with its cutura, socia, and ibera

programs, but never quite made it. Aterwards, the United States began firting

with top Isamic gures in Egypt. At one point, a U.S. Embassy ocia taked with

a-Banna about cooperating against the prevaiing communist threat, but the gap

in views proved too wide to bridge. In the ate 1970s, the U.S. sought the hep

o Musim countries in organizing jihad-stye resistance against the Soviets in A-

ghanistan. The Americans wanted Anwar a-Sadat to get the Musim Brotherhood

to ght the Soviets in Aghanistan, but the Musim Brotherhood was none too

enthusiastic.

later on, the Carter administration needed hep with the hostage crisis in

Tehran. The U.S. Embassy asked Omar a-Temesani, then Musim Brotherhood

genera guide, to intervene and use his good oces with the eader o the Iranian

Revoution, Ayatoah Khomeini. With a-Sadats permission, a-Temesani asked

the Iranians to et him come to Tehran or taks. Tehrans answer was brie. Youre

most wecome, but were not going to discuss the American hostages. The visit

didnt take pace. The Iranians waited ti Carter ost the eections to Ronad Reagan

and then reeased the hostages.9 In the 1980s, reations between the United States

and the Musim Brotherhood improved as the United States, with Saudi mediation,

sought coser ties with Isamic poitica groups in the region as part o its quest to

drive the Soviets out o Aghanistan.

However, the Sept. 11 attacks represented a watershed in the reations between

the Musim Brotherhood and the U.S. administration, so much so that one can

speak o both a pre-Sept. 11 phase and a post-Sept. 11 phase in their reations.

1. The pre-Sept. 11 phase: This phase covers most o the 1990s. In 1995,

the Musim Brotherhood won some seats in the Peopes Assemby, and reportsspoke o exchanges between the Musim Brotherhood and the U.S. Embassy in

Cairo. Former U.S. Amb. Danie Kurtz said that he met Musim Brotherhood o-

cias or peope representing them. Some Musim Brotherhood members denied

the reports at the time, but others conrmed them.10 The taks didnt amount to

negotiations, since the Musim Brotherhood had nothing to negotiate about, but

9 Riaat a-Said, Egypts Musim Brotherhood and the Americans the Bogeyman,Al-Sharq Al-Awsat,

Dec. 16, 2005.10 Mana lut, The Musim Brotherhood and America How the Doors o Diaogue Opened and WiThey be Cosed?Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Jan. 15, 2007.


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invoved an exchange o views as Musim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mamoun

a-Hudeibi said at the time.11

Furthermore, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak conrmed the meetings

when he said in 1995 that Washington had exchanges with the Musim Brother-

hood, which he described as a terrorist group.12 The Egyptian regime consistenty

attempted to undermine any orm o rapprochement between the Musim Brother-

hood and the United States. The same year, the Egyptian government arrested a

arge number o Musim Brotherhood eaders and sentenced severa Musim Broth-

erhood eaders to three to ve years in prison, incuding the current supreme guide

Mahdi Ake, a-Iryan, Habib, and Khairat a-Shatir.

2. The post-Sept. 11 phase: In this phase, the United States turned against

many Isamic poitica organizations, mainy those engaged in unbrided acts o

vioence. But the dierence between moderate groups and vioent ones was not

aways cear or U.S. poicy-makers. When Hamas won the Paestinian eections,

the United States reversed its earier rhetoric about democracy. Up unti the con-

cusion o the Paestinian eections, the United States was sending positive signas

to the Musim Brotherhood and a moderate Isamists. President George W. Bush

and Secretary o State Condoeezza Rice both suggested that a moderate Isamic

government anywhere in the Arab word woud be acceptabe to the United States.

Here are a ew sampes o this view:

Speaking to the U.S. Counci on Foreign Reations, Richard Haass, direc-

tor o poicy panning or the U.S. State Department, said that the United

States does not oppose Isamic parties and knows that democracy may

bring Isamic parties to power, due to the act that the atter were the best

organized opposition groups around.13 The remarks were in recognition

o the poitica gains the Isamists were making in Turkey, Morocco andBahrain.

The Rand Corporation reeased a report by Chery Benard about the possi-

biity o the United States supporting ibera Isam in the Midde East. The

11 Dr. Hassanein Tawq Ibrahim, The Egyptian Poitica Regime and the Musim Brotherhood in Egyptrom Toerance to Conrontation, 1981-1996, (Beirut: Dar a-Taiaah, 1998, 87).

12 Ibid., 44.13 Richard N. Haass, Towards Greater Democracy in the Musim Word, Address to the Counci onForeign Reations, Washington, D.C., Dec. 4, 2002.


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4 Arab Insight

report impied that moderate Isamists were about to become part o the

mainstream poitica process.14

Foowing a Midde East tour, Rice, speaking on June 23, 2005, hinted that

the United States was not aarmed by the prospect o an Isamist victory

in ree eections anywhere in the Arab word.15 Ater the Musim Brother-

hood won about 20 percent o the Egyptian pariamentary seats, some

U.S. ocias seemed in avor o communicating with moderate Isamists,

incuding the Musim Brotherhood. But the White House hawks and the

neoconservatives were not in avor o such a course o action.

For its part, the Musim Brotherhood didnt mind hoding meetings with U.S.

government ocias. A-Iryan says that the Musim Brotherhood was wiing to

engage in diaogue with the United States, reerring to simiar statements he made

to Agence France Presse to this eect, oowing the 2005 pariamentary eections.

The Musim Brotherhood position is that we beieve in diaogue and in coopera-

tion among civiizations, so ong as it is conducted on an equa ooting. We aso

beieve that there are common vaues that bind a cutures and nations.16

Nonetheess, the Musim Brotherhood insists that a representative o the Egyp-

tian Foreign Ministry be present in a Musim Brotherhood meetings with Ameri-

can ocias, as Ake tod A-Sharq A-Awsat in December 2005. Any such meet-

ing shoud be arranged through the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, he said.17 This

precaution is designed to aay the Egyptian regimes ear o exchanges between the

group and the Americans. The Musim Brotherhood aso wants to make sure that

the Mubarak regime is not going to use its contacts with the Americans to tarnish

its reputation. No direct diaogue existed between the Musim Brotherhood and

the Americans in this phase, but the reations between the two were raught with

optimism. The U.S. and the Musim Brotherhood sought out ways to circumventthe regimes reservations, perhaps through the intercession o Musim Brotherhood

pariamentarians.

However, things changed ater Hamas won the Paestinian pariamentary eec-

14 Chery Benard, Civi Democratic Isam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies, Rand Corporation, SantaMonica, Cai., 2003.

15 Secretary Rices Trip to the Midde East and Europe, June 17 to June 23, 2005, mutipe speechesavaiabe at http://usino.state.gov/mena/midde_east_north_arica/rice_trip_june_2005.htm.

16 Originay inAl-Sharq Al-Awsat, Dec. 11, 2005; pubished in Engish at: Al-Ahram Weekly Online, IssueNo. 773, Dec. 15-21, 2005, http://weeky.ahram.org.eg/2005/773/eg5.htm.


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tions on Jan. 26, 2006. The Hamas victory revived od U.S. ears that a tide o

radica Isam was sweeping over the region. Since then, there have been no reports

o U.S.-Musim Brotherhood exchanges. Hamas originay started out as an Mus-

im Brotherhood group, so the United States hardy caims to be on good terms

with the Musim Brotherhood in Egypt but unabe to tak to Hamas. Interestingy

enough, the United States rerained rom denouncing the arrests o Musim Broth-

erhood eaders in Egypt oowing the groups impressive perormance at the March

2006 eections. For the time being, the United States seems to be revising its ideas

about democracy in the Midde East.

The impediments o dialogue

Even i the United States and the Musim Brotherhood were serious abouttaking to each other, severa issues sti hamper the chances o having a ruitu

diaogue:

a. The lack o trust: Musim Brotherhood eaders are not convinced that the

United States is serious about taking to them. They aso question the U.S. com-

mitment to promoting democracy in the Arab word. Writing inAl-Sharq Al-Aw-

sat, a-Iryan said that the United States must make its position cear on a ew mat-

ters beore hoding a diaogue with the Musim Brotherhood. First o a, it shoudrenew its commitment to internationa aw, rerain rom interering in the interna

probems o other countries, and respect the nationa sovereignty o other states.

Aso, the United States must accept democracy even i it were to bring its adver-

saries to power in other countries. Washington, he added, needs to show more

respect or other cutures and or the interests o other nations.17 Undoubtedy, the

Musim Brotherhood has strong doubts about the true intentions o the United

States. For exampe, is the United States reay interested in engaging in diaogue

with the Musim Brotherhood, or is it just caing or diaogue so as to pressure theEgyptian regime into taking sides with it on Iraq, Paestine and Sudan? The United

States aso has a history o turning the opposition against governments o the re-

gion, as happened in Iraq and Syria, with devastating resuts. This is something

that the Musim Brotherhood doesnt want to be part o, expains a-Iryan.

b. The popularity actor: The Musim Brotherhood knows that the pubic

mood has turned against the United States, and it doesnt want to risk its own

17 Issam a-Iryan, In Search o legitimacy and an Agenda,Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Dec. 16, 2005.


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6 Arab Insight

popuarity by associating with the Americans. Aso, the Musim Brotherhood does

not want the Mubarak regime to use such diaogue to deame it, something which

has happened in the past. A-Iryan recas that in 1954, the Musim Brotherhood

conducted taks with ocias o the British Embassy and this was done with the

knowedge and support o Gama Abde Nassers government. Aterwards, the re-

gime accused the Musim Brotherhood o hoding secret taks with the occupiers

just to tarnish its image. But in actua act, the Musim Brotherhood had been

taking a hard-ine stance in the taks with the British in order to strengthen the

regimes hand, a-Iryan notes.18

c. Ideological dierences: The greatest impediment to diaogue is that the

Musim Brotherhood and the United States have a signicanty dierent word

view. The Musim Brotherhood beieves that the United States is seeking word

domination. Meanwhie, the Musim Brotherhood says it is dedicated to Isamic

reormation and renaissance across the word. In his above-mentioned artice, a-

Iryan says that the Isamic project or renaissance aims at iberating Musim and

rom a orms o oreign domination and at reorming governments in Isamic

countries and estabishing Isamic reedom and democracy.

d. Fear o reprisal: The Musim Brotherhood has a precarious ega position,

or it is sti treated as a banned group. This position puts it at the mercy o

the Egyptian regime, which oten cracks down on groups with ties to the United

States. The Egyptian regime doesnt want anyone taking to the Americans behind

its back, i at a.

Prospects o dialogue

The impediments mentioned above woud seem to precude a diaogue be-

tween the United States and the Musim Brotherhood. But the need or the UnitedStates and the Musim Brotherhood to tak with each other may prove greater than

a existing impediments. It is true that the ideoogica dierences between the

United States and the Musim Brotherhood are unbridgeabe, but se-interest may

eave much to tak about. Sti, any uture diaogue woud remain unikey un-

ess a ew things happen rst. One is that the United States woud need to tak to

the Egyptian regime about its repression o the opposition, incuding the Musim

18 Ibid.


17/112


Brotherhood. Another is that the United States shoud acknowedge yet again

that democracy may bring the Isamists to power. Aso, the United States woud

have to distance itse somehow rom Israe, or no Isamic group woud want to

associate itse with Israes ater ego.

The United States has two reasons to tak to the Musim Brotherhood: (1) it

knows that the Musim Brotherhood is a ikey poitica aternative in the event o a

sudden power vacuum deveoping in Egypt, and (2) an improvement in U.S. re-

ations with the Musim Brotherhood may soten the view that other Isamists have

o the United States. So ar,

there seems to be three pos-

sibe channes or taks be-

tween the United States and

the Musim Brotherhood:

1. U.S. ocias can actuay meet with Musim Brotherhood pariamentar-

ians, which is aready happening, but a interaction can occur on a more

reguar basis. This is because the U.S. Congress can, or exampe, invite

Egyptian pariamentarians, incuding Musim Brotherhood members, or

an ocia visit.

2. U.S. academic institutions and think tanks may engage in diaogue with

Musim Brotherhood ocias. This is something that Musim Brotherhood

eaders wecome, but it can ony happen i the regime reaxes restrictions

on Musim Brotherhood trave.

3. The United States may exert pressure on the Egyptian regime into egaiz-

ing the Musim Brotherhood. This may sound ike a ta order, considering

the regimes resistance to intervention in interna aairs. But the UnitedStates can argue that the Musim Brotherhood is aready in Pariament and

is a peaceu movement.

end part

The United States has two reasons to talk

to the Muslim brotherhood.


18/112

8 Arab Insight

Q: How does the Musim Brotherhood see the United States?

Al-Iryan:

This question can be answered on three eves. The rst eve is the way the

Musim Brotherhood sees the U.S. government. We beieve that the United

States embraces a pre-conceived idea, one that successive administrations

have embraced, to the eect that Isam is a rea danger. This idea is being

transated into a strategy that the United States is currenty pursuing with

regard to the Musim word. Thereore, I dont think that there is any chance

o communicating with the United States so ong as it has this pre-conceived

idea, or this idea puts it in the same boat as the Zionist enemy Israe. The

second eve is in reation to the Musim community in the United States.

Here, one can say that there are two main options or communication. One

is through Musim activists, such as the Musim-American Society, which has

recenty been estabished by some Pakistanis. The society used to be an arm

o the Pakistani Isamic Group, but has recenty become independent. We are

hoding consutations and coordinating with this group, but this is not tak-

ing pace on an organizationa eve because this woud be inconvenient or

both o us. The other option is to communicate with the rest o the Musim

community in America and earn more about their aairs. The third eve has

begin part 2

Interiew with Dr. Issam al-Iryan

Chie o the Muslim brotherhood PoliticalDepartment

Conducted by Khalil al-Anani, Feb. 2, 2007


19/112


to do with the U.S. media. Since Sept. 11, there has been a growing interest

in the Isamists and especiay the Musim Brotherhood. Athough U.S. media

ocuses more on domestic aairs, I have been interviewed repeatedy by U.S.

networks, incuding CNN. The U.S. view o this region is quite negative, un-

ike Europe which has a more impartia outook, mosty because it is a cosmo-

poitan society.

Q: Concerning U.S. society and peope, how do you see them?

Al-Iryan:

We have no pre-conceived position against the American peope or the U.S.

society, its civic organizations, or think tanks. We have no probem commu-

nicating with the American peope, but no adequate eorts are being made to

bring us coser.

Q: Does this mean that youre in avor o unocia communication with the

United States?

Al-Iryan:

Yes, there is no probem with unocia communication conducted through

non-governmenta organizations or think tanks, and the Musim Brotherhood

doesnt have any reservations in this respect. We are uy prepared to com-

municate with any unocia U.S. organizations and to accept invitations we

may receive in this regard.

Q: What do you think o U.S. civiization?

Al-Iryan: It is dicut to speak o a civiization in the usua sense when taking o a

country thats no more than 200 years od. Even assuming it is a civiization,

it is one that was born out o excusionist tendencies and through the eradica-

tion o the Native Americans. It is aso a materiaistic civiization based on the

twin piars o money and power.

Q: How about U.S. ibera vaues, dont they oer a democratic mode worthy o

respect?


20/112

20 Arab Insight

Al-Iryan:

Pease excuse my candor, but democracy in the United States is a mere aade.

It is hard to speak o a U.S. mode o democracy which is comparabe with

that o the United Kingdom, France and Germany. There is a big dierence.

The U.S. eections are a commercia phenomenon repete with media cam-

paigns designed to ater pubic perceptions. For exampe, there are not equa

opportunities or the candidates, because the massive campaign expenditure

is beyond the abiities o any ordinary individua. Besides, the ibera vaues

have ebbed since the 1960s and there is nothing appeaing anymore about the

American mode which i you ask me is hard to repicate esewhere any-

way. It is a mode based on manuacturing poiticians, or as Noam Chomsky

pointed out, the Americans dont choose according to what they want, but

to what they see. The worst part about U.S. democracy is that it is a oca

democracy with no interest in oreign aairs. The American peope cannot

determine their countrys oreign poicy, or this is the job o the edera gov-

ernment.

Q: But the U.S. society is a muti-ethnic one and as such oers inspiration to

others.

Al-Iryan:

I beg to disagree. The U.S. view o others is negative, unike the European

view, which is more cosmopoitan.

Q: But America is a cosmopoitan society.

Al-Iryan:

Yes, but it is a oca rather than an externa cosmopoitan society. Americanoreign poicy has one dimension rather than many dimensions and visions.

Q: How does Israe t into your view o the United States?

Al-Iryan:

One o the main reasons or our negative opinion o the United States is its ties

with Israe. Israe wi remain a dening actor in our reations with the United

States. end part 2


21/112

THE PARTICIPATION OF ISlAMIC PARTIES in the democratic process in Arab

countries is one o the centra issues in discussions about democracy that are taking

pace among the regions promoters o democracy, as we as within Arab capitas

and in academia. For decades, Isamists were excuded rom participating in state

institutions or chose not to do so. Internationa actors and advocates o democracy

aike did not avor the incusion o Isamists and did nothing to encourage their

participation. The United States, with its ong history o intervention in the region

and riendy reations with many o the Arab regimes, as we as vita interests at

stake, has generay opposed the participation o the Isamists in the democratic

process in the ear that they wi gain contro o their respective governments. Thearger the Ageria scenario ooms in American poicymakers minds as the night-

mare to be avoided at a costs, the more U.S. poicy is parayzed; recacitrant Arab

eaders are quick to see this, wrote Tamara Coman Wittes, a research eow or

the Saban Center or Midde East Poicy at the Brookings Institution, in 2004. The

prevaiing wisdom behind this rejection is that Isamists were thought to oppose

American interests in the region. This ear deepened ater the Sept. 11 attacks, and

the mistaken inkage between Isam and terror became stronger.

Paradoxicay, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks opened the eyes o democracy pro-moters, incuding those in the United States, to the dangers that autocratic regimes

Alone at the ballot box:

U.S. Democracy Promotion and Rejection o Islamists

atefabousaifAte Abou Sai has a Ph.D. rom the European University Institute in Florence in Italy.

He is a regular contributor to several Palestinian and other Arabic language newspapers

and journals.

2


22/112

22 Arab Insight

pose to internationa security. Many poicy-makers and oreign observers have

come to beieve that bad poicies, poor economies, under-deveopment, and cosed

poitica systems are the best circumstances or recruiting young terrorists. In ight

o this, absence o democracy was identied as a threat to American security and

to American interests abroad.

On the other hand, Isamists have become more interested in running in poiti-

ca eections. They reaize that in the post-Sept. 11 era, cards are stacked against

Musim movements. The

best way to avoid interna-

tiona anger is to gain egiti-

macy through eections. In

many countries, they have

done so. It remains true,

however, that Isamists rep-

resent the ony viabe opposition orce in undemocratic regimes. Finay, there is a

growing reaization that true democratization in the Arab countries cannot happen

without the incusion o Isamist poitica parties.

However, this reaization has not been uy transated into poicies. The Unit-

ed States, or exampe, sti opposes the integration o the Isamists in democratic

processes. A arge number o Isamist organizations remain incuded on the State

Departments ist o terrorist groups. The undamenta mistake by American po-

icy-makers is assuming that any and every Isamist group is inherenty vioent or

a-Qaida-oriented.

The American rejection o the Isamists adds to the negative perception o U.S.

poicies in Arab countries and esewhere, and discourages any possibiity o orging

true democratic processes in a region that has ong suered rom autocracy and

the absence o basic reedoms. Tak about Isams incompatibiity with the require-

ments o modernity, the instrumenta use o democracy by the Isamists, and theopposition o Isamist-ed governments to internationa conventions, a add to a

deteriorating image o democracy in the region. In the eyes o the Arab community,

the worst among those promoting democracy is the United States.

The oowing anaysis considers the U.S. rejection o Isamist groups in three

specic countries to refect a genera picture o American poicy in the region.

Thus, lebanon, Egypt and Paestine wi be the oca point o the discussion. Be-

sides Syria and Jordan, these three countries constitute one regiona unit very much

at the heart o the Arab-Israei confict. Syria and Jordan have been excuded romthe anaysis within this essay or a ew key reasons. First, oreign poicymaking in

The American rejection o the Islamists

adds to the negatie perception o U.S. poli-

cies in Ara countries and elsewhere.


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Alone at the Ballot Box 23

Jordan is not o the mandate o the government, but rather that o a very power-

u constitutiona monarchy, and any change in the government wi not bring a

radica change to Jordans internationa or regiona poitics. Second, the Isamists

participation in the Syrian eections is not a reevant question as democracy and

eections are not issues there. Contrary to this, in the three countries under scru-

tiny, Isamists participated and managed to secure some success in the eections.

In one country they became part o the government (lebanon), in another they

ormed by themseves the rst pure Isamist cabinet in the Arab word (Paestine),

and in the third, they constitute one-ourth o the Pariament and are ikey to in-

crease their presence in the coming eections (Egypt). More important, in the three

countries examined beow, the incusion o Isamists is expected to bring about at

east a ew oreign poicy changes. In at east one o these countries, the changes

may be dramatic.

It is not accurate to characterize the American poicy toward democratization

in the Midde East as a genera U.S. rejection o Isamists in Arab poitica processes.

Instead, I propose here that the U.S. poicies are better understood by studying the

context o each case separatey. The discussion shoud transcend the ubiquitous

arguments that there exists a cutura rejection o Isam, or that Isam cashes

with ibera systems, Western vaues or civiization. I wi imit this discussion to

the American position towards Hezboah in lebanon, the Musim Brotherhood in

Egypt, and Hamas in Paes-

tine. These three groups are

the most prominent Isamist

parties or movements in their

countries. Moreover, each

has some experience partici-

pating in recent eections.1

Hezbollah: a long history o rejection

The United States not ony rejects Hezboah as a poitica actor in the leba-

nese system, but it aso perceives the party as a target or potentia U.S. attacks.

Hezboahs reations with the United States has receded rhetoric provocation. As

eary as 1983, 241 American Marines, participating in a mutinationa peace group

From the ery eginning, Hezollah was

categorized as part o the axis o eil, which

now includes Iran and Syria.

1 For instance, Isamic jihad did not participate in the genera eections in Paestine. Aso some jihadistmovements did not do so in Egypt.


24/112

24 Arab Insight

were attacked by a suicide bomber. The American Embassy in Beirut was bombed

in 1983 and 1984.2 In both cases, Hezboah was suspected o paying a roe. As

Danie Byman noted, ong beore Sept. 11, Hezboah has caimed pride o paces

as the top concern o U.S. counterterrorism ocias.3 This being said, it is not

possibe to detach the U.S. position toward the party rom the overa American

strategy in lebanon and the Midde East.

First, Hezboah is active in lebanese poitics. It represents a arge segment o

the countrys Shiite popuation. Athough Shiites are underrepresented in the Par-

iament when compared to two o the other argest groups, Christians and Sunnis

(Shiites have 27 seats compared to 64 or the Christians and 27 or Sunnis), their

participation in the poitica ie o

the country is vita.4 The Israei oc-

cupation o South lebanon contrib-

uted to the ascendance o the sects

roe given that the South is a strong-

hod o the Shiites. As Hezboah ed

the miitary resistance, the Israei

withdrawa rom the country gave momentum to the partys interna poitica as-

pirations. less than ve years ater the Israei withdrawa, another poitica event

hit the country and has infuenced its poitics ever since. lebanese Prime Minister

Raq Hariri was assassinated Feb. 14, 2005, dividing the country into two arge

poitica camps: the March 14 coaition,5 and Hezboah-orchestrated opposition.

The turbuence in the lebanese poitica system has not gone unnoticed by the

United States.

Apparenty, the United States does not avor any change to the lebanese con-

essiona poitica system. Such changes, i they happen, woud mean more en-

gagement o Hezboah in the making and shaping o lebanese poicies. Whie the

The staility o the Egyptian political

system means the security o the oil

supply through the Suez Canal.

2 This is in addition to other actions that Hezboah was accused o organizing, such as the hijacking oTWA fight 847 and the death o an American Navy driver in 1985.

3 For exampe, Bush decared that any war against terrorism must incude Hezboah. Even some Ameri-can ocias ranked Hezboah as team A whie a-Qaida was considered part o team B among terroristorganizations. Danie Byman, Shoud Hezboah be Next? Foreign Aairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 54-5.

4 Shiites represent around 34 percent whie Sunnis represent around 20 percent o the popuation. Thetota Christian popuation stands at 36 percent; Druze, 8 percent; the remaining sma sects amount to 2percent. Figures are based on data provided in Ared B. Prados, CRS Issue Brie or Congress: lebanon,Congressiona Research Serv ice, updated June 8, 2006, 2, Tabe 1, http://pc.state.gov/documents/orga-

nization/68811.pd.5 The March 14 coaition was named or the date o a huge pro-Harari, anti-Syrian protest, caed the CedarRevoution, one month ater the saying o the popuar prime minister in 2005.


25/112


lebanese government handes their interna conficts careuy, earing the spread

o civi war ike those they have suered in the past, it is ikey that this confict

wi bring with it dramatic changes to the distribution o power within lebanese

institutions. Change is what the United States ears, and it is very much interested

in infuencing whatever changes do occur. I Hezboah ais to reaize its demands

and i Fouad Sinioras government passes the test, this wi impact negativey on

the position o the party. The United States ceary supports the governments re-

quest that Hezboah miitia must be integrated with the nationa army and that no

party hijacks the poitica uture o the country. This means that the party is not

permitted to open a war with Israe whenever it ikes.

Not surprisingy, the U.S. administration is supporting the March 14 coaition.

From the very beginning, Hezboah was categorized as part o the axis o evi,

which now incudes Iran and Syria. Syria and Iran are beieved to be the partys

main suppier o arms and money, and thus its most infuentia sources or poicy-

making. Accordingy, the American war against the Iranian and Syrian regimes is

viewed as a war against Hezboah.

The United States woud preer that the lebanese government not be ead by

Hezboah aies or severa reasons. There is a growing concern in the Sunni Arab

word regarding the increasing roe o Shiites in Arab poitics. Neither the United

States nor countries ike Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gu countries a-

vor such a scenario. From the Sunni Arab perspective, Americans were mistaken in

empowering the Iraqi Shiites and disempowering their eow Sunnis. Obviousy,

the creation o a Shiite bet (composed o Iran, Iraq, northern parts o Saudi Ara-

bia, Kuwait, Qatar, as we as South lebanon) is not a positive deveopment in the

regions poitics. Americas Sunni Arab aies are very aware o and sensitive about

the issue. Thus, the stabiity o the lebanese system is o regiona interest and an

American concern as we.

Equay important to the United States, Hezboah is part and parce not onyo lebanese poitica ie but aso o the Midde East confict. The roe o the party

in conronting Israe during the ast three decades gave the party popuarity out-

side lebanon. In the demonstrations in the streets o Cairo, Amman and Gaza,

the circuation o photos o Sayyid Hassan Nasraah, the secretary genera o the

lebanese Hezboah, were signs protest against American poicies in the region.6

6 In a survey conducted by Ibn Khadun Centre or Deveopment Studies in Cairo, Hassan Nasraah was

chosen rst in a ist o 20 pubic gures in the Arab word as the most popuar pubic Arab, Isamic andEgyptian gure. Avaiabe at http://www.eicds.org/engish/activities/programs/poproject.htm (accessedFeb. 2, 2007).


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26 Arab Insight

The partys suspected support or and nancing o the Paestinian resistance has

been a persistent compaint o U.S. poicy-makers. likewise, it proves the atters

accusation that the party breeds goba anti-Americanism.

Many Arabs beieve that the centra reason Americans have rejected Hezbo-

ah is because o the partys roe in ghting Israe. The prevaiing sense in the Arab

word is that the ony common thread o American poicies in the region is the

protection o Israei security. It is thus not surprising that the majority o the Arab

popuation considers American hostiity towards Hezboah as part o American

support or Israe. The party understands this and uses it, as Hamas does, in its

media campaigns to accuse rivas o being backed by the American government.7

Furthermore, the aiure o the Israei war against Hezboah in 2006 was con-

sidered by the party a deeat o American infuence as we.8 To put it bunty,

America and Israe are two sides o the same coin. For instance, one party eader

beieves that America wants to turn this country into a coony; a poitica, security

and miitary base.

Utimatey, as the previous anaysis shows, the American rejection o Hezbo-

ah is inked to arger regiona and internationa poitics o which reations and po-

sitions towards neighboring countries rank as the most sensitive eements. Given

that, the oowing question deserves a careu attention. I Hezboah had engaged

in a peace dea with Israe, woud it remain perceived by Americans as a terrorist or-

ganization? Though many other conditions may be proposed by the United States,

it is beieved among the Arab inteectuas and citizens aike that a peace dea wi

be enough to move Hezboah rom the boc o enemies to that o riends.

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: a sot rejection

Musim Brotherhood is one o the odest poitica opposition groups in Egypt.

Founded in 1928, the movement has managed to survive the ups and downs o its

reations with Egyptian regimes or neary eight decades. Though the movementsinvovement with some vioent actions in the past is evident, currenty, it does

not seek to contro by orce. legay banned, it succeeded in winning 88 seats

out o the 454 seats in the 2005 pariamentary eections. The groups reationship

with the United States has never been riendy despite some unconrmed reports

7 For exampe, Hezboah accuses the Siniora government o acting on the U.S. ambassadors instructions.Am Saad-Ghorayeb, In Their Own Words: Hezboahs Strategy in the Current Conrontation, Policy

Outlook, Carnegie Endowment or Internationa Peace, Midde East Program, Washington, D.C., January2007: 3.8 The U.S. considered the Israei war part o its goba war on terrorism.


27/112


about consutation or taks between American dipomats in Cairo and eaders o

the movement. Three concerns underie the U.S. rejection o the movement: stabe

reations between the United States and the Mubarak regime, the secure passage

o oi and suppies through the Suez and other trade routes, as we as the need or

overa regiona stabiity and peaceu reations with Israe.

Egypt is the argest Arab recipient o American aid. American aid to Egypt

amounts to around $2 biion annuay. In 2002, it reached $1.9 biion; in 2003,

$2.2 biion; and in 2004, it was $1.87 biion. O a o this aid, annua miitary

support is stabe at $1.3 biion.9 It is beieved that U.S. administrations have, or

many years, preerred to support riendy regimes in Egypt rather than gambe on

true and genuine eections that might bring up new eaders who are opposed to

American interests in the region. Thus, American endeavors to bring about demo-

cratic transormation in Egypt have never been wecomed by either the Isamic op-

position or the regime. Whie the Isamic opposition is aware that they wi not be

supported by the Americans even i they win eections, the Egyptian regime under-

stands that democratization eorts are simpy a poitica means to exert pressure

on the government to give up on certain regiona issues. Accusing Washington o

not being serious in its democracy eorts, the genera guide o the Brotherhood

wrote that the movement perceives the United States as the heir o the Western

coonization.10

A riendy undemocratic regime is better than a noisy democratic one. The

record o the United States in supporting regimes that are ar rom democratic is

teing in this regard: cases range rom latin America to the Midde East. Thus even

when the United States and other oreign democracy promoters show interest, they

imit their intervention to reorming the ruing Nationa Democratic Party, and

negect other existing poitica parties.

Notwithstanding this, one must not orget in a this anaysis that Egypt might

be a unique situation. Washington cannot and is not wiing to push or a seriousdemocratization o the argest Arab country and to toppe a regime that is one o

its aies in the region. Much o the security o the oi suppies depends on Egypt.

The stabiity o the Egyptian poitica system means the security o the oi suppy

9 Figures are aggregated rom Abed Monem Said Ay, An Ambivaent Aiance: The Future o U.S.-Egyp-tian Reations, Saban Center Anaysis, no. 6, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., January 2006: 33,Tabe 1.

10 See his artice in Arabic on the ocia website o the movement. A etter rom the Genera Guide Moha-mad Mahdi Ake, Our Ca between the Originaity o the Thought and the Honesty o the Position,http://www.ikhwanonine.com/Artice.asp?ID=13234&SectionID=210 (accessed on Jan. 20, 2007).


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28 Arab Insight

through the Suez Cana. The United States may not be abe to accept a regime that

might backmai the internationa community by disrupting the passage o sup-

pies through the cana.

Furthermore, Egypt is the most infuentia Arab country in the discourse o the

Arab-Israei confict. The Musim Brotherhood opposed the Camp David Accords

between Egypt and Israe and opposes the normaization o reations between the

two countries. It might ca or suspension o the treaty when it contros the egis-

ature or even the presidency. This is not very ar rom the White House and State

Department thinking.

Nevertheess, the Brotherhood has never used this position to mobiize upris-

ings or riots in the cities. In the ast decade, the movement has instead ocused on

interna issues ike constitutiona reorm, civic rights, pubic reedoms and socia

services. Whie the movement opposes American poicies in the region and shares

the majority o the Arabs beie that the United States is not an honest broker in

the Midde East (and rather avors Israe), it does not portray Washington as an

enemy. In principe, it woud not reject an invitation coming rom Washington or

taks or consutations.

Aso, there is a growing concern in American circes on the need to reconcie

with the Isamists in Egypt. There is a good chance that they wi become part o

the government. On the other hand, encouraging the regime to crack down on

them wi harm the aready fawed image o the White House as an advocate or de-

mocracy. U.S. invovement wi be integra to encourage the movements peaceu

integration in the poitica system. Its integration wi push the movement toward

more pragmatism. In turn, this might ead the movement to be more modern and

fexibe in its treatment o internationa and interna issues. The Turkish Justice

and Deveopment Party wi serve as a mode or the preerred path o the move-

ment. But or this to happen, the eaders o the movement must not ee as though

they are excuded rom ega participation in the system.The American government wisey does not excude the possibiity that the

Musim Brotherhood may ascend to dominate Egyptian poitica ie. Athough the

American administration woud not wecome such an event, they wi be prepared

to dea with the new reaity i it happens. Undoubtedy, the Brotherhood move-

ment is the argest and most rooted Egyptian poitica opposition.

Thus, it woud not be surprising i the United States decided to engage in an

open diaogue with the movement on the uture o the country at some point. O

course, major issues ike reations with Israe, positions on the Camp David Ac-cords and perceptions about a asting soution to the Arab-Israei confict wi come


29/112


to the surace. The same questions that Hamas, the Paestinian wing o the Musim

Brotherhood, has aced, their Egyptian Brothers wi ace. Some argue that poiti-

ca issues and reations with Israe wi not be o much importance or the Musim

Brotherhood. Keeping their regime together wi be much more important.

Hamas: conditions frst

There are no other Isamic movements in the Arab countries that have aced

as much pressure as Hamas. Now dominating the Paestinian legisative Counci

ater the January 2006 eections, Hamas ormed the rst pure Isamic government

in the Arab word. Emerging in 1987, the movement gained an increased popuar-

ity in the Paestinian streets through its engagement in the nationa strugge against

the Israei occupation o Paestine. From the very beginning, Hamas opposed the

peace treaty between the PlO and Israe and denied the egitimacy o the Paes-

tinian Nationa Authority because it was estabished as a resut o the treaty with

Israe.

Though Washington abeed the movement as terrorist and ocia taks or

diaogue with the movement is egay prohibited, the U.S. administration has et

some o its ormer Centra Inteigence Agency (CIA) agents and dipomats meet

with representatives o Hamas. low-eve meetings took pace with Hamas in

1993; in eary 2004, an American convoy met secrety with the Hamas eaders in

Gaza; and in 2005, meetings between the two groups took pace in Beirut. Appar-

enty, Washington was exporing ways to tame the movement. This is what an Arab

writer sardonicay reers to as containing and taming Hamas through its incusion

in everyday poitics.11 According to one Hamas research center, the movement

was oered a roe in exchange or accepting the peace deas.

The main thrust o the U.S. rejection o Hamas is based on the atters use o

vioence against Israe attacking civiians through suicide bombings, sheing the

Israei viages aong the border o the Gaza Strip with sma scae rockets. Hamashas never exported its actions outside the borders o mandated Paestine. It aways

emphasized that its ony enemy is Israe and that its main goa is to iberate the

homeand and estabish a state. Nevertheess, the movement does not use riendy

rhetoric in reerence to the United States, though it has never abeed it as an en-

emy. The U.S. position and its rejection o the movement were aways perceived by

Hamas sympathizers and within the arger Arab communities as one o the admin-

11 Moumin Bessisso, ihtwa hamas syasian: iihan amrici [Containing Hamas Poiticay: An American?],Islamonline.net, Oct. 27, 2005, http://www.isamonine.net/Arabic/poitics/2005/10/artice13.shtm.


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30 Arab Insight

istrations strategies to support and deend Israe. Most o the Paestinian resistance

movement, incuding the miitary wing o the Abbas-ed Fatah, A Aqsa Brigade,

are abeed terrorist by the State Department. In the words o another pubication

o the above-mentioned Hamas research center, the American rejection o Hamas is

another expression o the American rejection o Paestinian rights.

When suddeny, though expectedy, Hamas announced its intention to par-

ticipate in the nationa eections in January 2006, the United States opposed the

move. The United States expressed worries that what it abeed a terrorist group

woud be taking part in a

democratic process. It made

such participation conditiona

upon the movement denounc-

ing vioence. Ater an interven-

tion rom President Mahmoud

Abbas, Hamas was approved

to run candidates in the eec-

tions. At that time, nobody incuding Hamas eaders expected that the move-

ment woud dominate the majority o the legisative Counci. But it happened; the

diemma o the United States was that Hamas came to power through eections

that were supervised by the internationa community. Thus, the new government

is now ed by a group abeed by the U.S. government as terrorist.

Washingtons way out was orchestrating internationa sanctions against the

Hamas-ed government, starting with the cutting o o internationa oreign aid,

stopping dipomatic communication at a eves, and most importanty imposing

a set o conditions that the movement woud have to meet to have the sanctions

ited. The Quartet on the Midde East, composed o the United States, the Euro-

pean Union, Russia, and the United Nations, stipuated the three conditions to

Hamas. First, the movement must recognize the state o Israe. Second, it mustrenounce vioence as a means o poitica action. Third, it must accept the peace

treaties reached between the PlO and Israe. It was beieved that economic hard-

ships caused by the sanctions woud ead to socia upheavas and thus push the

government to change its position. During the 11 months o the Hamas-ed gov-

ernment, none o those conditions were accepted by the movement.12

It was beieved that Hamas woud not easiy give in and adhere to the interna-

tiona conditions. From the American perspective in this scenario, though it won

12 The government resigned on Feb. 15, 2007.

When suddenly, though expectedly, Hamas

announced its intention to participate in

the national elections in January 2006, the

United States opposed the moe.


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the eections, Hamas was unabe to govern. In other words, Hamas was not thrown

out o the government because the United States wanted it, but rather because the

Isamic movement did not stand or quaity government. When internationa mon-

ey does not fow and when economic hardship makes peopes ives unbearabe,

then it is the government that must have the poitica skis to secure a better ie

or its popuace. From this perspective, the rst experience with an Isamic Arab

government was a big aiure. Moreover, it wi not be easy or other Musim par-

ties to caim that they can do better. These perceptions wi impact the preerences

o the voters. A previousy quoted pubication about Hamas writes that the United

States is not interested in the success o the Paestinian (democratic) experience,

which means the success o a undamentaist Isamic state. This, as the pubica-

tion proceeds, goes against American interests in the region.

On the other hand, i Hamas had accepted the internationa conditions, the re-

sut woud have been avorabe or the Americans. The acceptance woud have ed

to a pethora o changes in the movements poitica stands. The American experi-

ence in taming Hamas woud have set a precedent or taming other Isamic parties.

In other words, had Hamas accepted the conditions to recognize Israe, join the

peace process and denounce vioence, the Midde East confict and the reevant

questions woud not have remained obstaces in reation to other Isamist parties in

the neighboring Arab countries. Moreover, other non-Arab Isamic countries, Iran

in particuar, woud no onger have a reason to intervene in the region. Ater a, no

one can be more Cathoic than the Pope.

Despite Hamas seeming reusa to consider the internationa demands, the

movement has graduay moved towards imiting the goa o its strugge to estab-

ishing a state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This change was documented in

the Nationa Consensus Initiative proposed by the prisoners and endorsed by the

movement. As Khaid Haroub argues ater reading three main recent documents

o the movement, it was a considerabe departure rom their origina position.Though they did not meet the conditions, the movement reached a point where

interests undering those conditions were met: basicay accepting a two-state sou-

tion. In the Mecca Agreement on a nationa unity government, concuded on Feb.

8, 2005, Hamas impicity accepted the estabishment o a state on the West Bank

and Gaza Strip adjacent to the state o Israe.

Values versus interests

The U.S. rejection o the Isamic poitica parties in the three countries dis-cussed refects a genera pattern. In each o these three countries the issue o se-


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32 Arab Insight

curity and poitica stabiity is the rst priority or the U.S. administrations. The

preerences o the Isamists are aso inked to regiona security issues incuding the

Midde East confict (Hamas, Hezboah and to a esser extend Musim Brother-

hood) and oi suppies (Musim Brotherhood), which expains in part the admin-

istrations hesitation in accepting the democratic incusion o the Isamists. Ironi-

cay, these are the same reasons behind the Isamists ack o trust in the American

poicies in the region.

In essence, the United States

proved ready in certain moments

to cooperate with Isamist parties

when it satised its interests. The

ormer Iraqi Prime Minister Ibra-

him Jaari, coming rom the A

Dawa Isamist party, was backed

by the U.S. administration. Simu-

taneousy, Washington was expor-

ing ways to tame Isamists. Hamas and Hezboah participated in taks aongside

other Isamist parties, ormer CIA agents and ormer British dipomats in March

2005.13

I democracy in the region is vita to American nationa security, as Sept. 11

taught, then Isamist parties shoud be encouraged to join the poitica process. No

true democratization in the Arab word can take pace without the genuine partici-

pation o the Isamist parties. long years o oppression and imprisonment ed to

the growth o a strong Isamist network that ed vioent groups with supporters. To

counter that history, Isamists have to integrate into the poitica system and must

have u reedom to participate in state institutions.

Washingtons diemma is the meeting o two seemingy contradictory interests:

its own nationa security and the incusion o Isamists in regiona poitics. Aterneary one year in power, Hamas tes an interesting story rom which the United

States can earn. For instance, once in power, Isamist parties wi earn to behave

according to certain norms that secure the continuity o their regime in the inter-

nationa system. In other words, whie interna support matters or winning eec-

tions, externa actors, incuding reations with regiona and internationa actors

wi matter more once power is secured. This was evident in the essons earned by

I democracy in the region is ital to

American national security, as Sept.

11 taught, then Islamist parties shoulde encouraged to join the political

process.

13 The other two Isamic parties that participated are the lebanese Isamic Group (Sunni) and the PakistaniIsamic Group.


33/112


Hamas. However, it is notabe that unike the Paestinians, not a Arab countries

are dependant on externa aid, which the Hamas-ed government did not manage

to secure rom other sources. Nevertheess, when economic pressure became un-

bearabe, Hamas did not choose to give up the Cabinet and mandate independents

or technocrats to govern; rather it chose to bargain with what were or a ong time

its unquestionabe and sacred positions. These positions were associated with va-

ues such as hoiness, and, the state and reations with Israe. Hamas was advised

by many Arab inteectuas and anaysts to eave the government i these positions

were unbending.

However, the U.S. position toward the Arab-Israei confict and the unimited

support Israe enjoys rom Washington is worrying not ony or the Isamists but

aso or ibera Arabs as we. For instance, Washington recenty aunched a mas-

sive war and invaded an Arab country (Iraq) and seems ready to strike another

Musim country because o its attempt to acquire nucear capabiities (Iran). Ad-

ditionay, it supports Israe nanciay, miitary and dipomaticay despite Israes

reusa to adhere to many UN Security Counci resoutions, its occupation o the

and o three Arab countries, and its acquisition o nucear capabiities. Summariz-

ing a view expressed in the Arab press, Marina Ottaway concuded that the eorts

exerted by Washington cannot be taken seriousy uness it renews eorts to bring

the peace process in the Midde East back on track.

In a simiar vein, the presence o the American troops in Iraq and the rag-

mentation o the country harms the American image, incuding its credibiity as a

poitica partner and as an advocate or democracy. In sum, Washington has to be

more sensitive to the poitica issues that concern the Isamic parties and toward

the Arabs in genera.

Finay, Washingtons position on the participation o the Isamists in demo-

cratic ie in the three countries has to be considered careuy. As much as de-

mocratization has an externa dimension, it is an interna process when it is donewe. Washingtons intererence in the detais o the democratic process, and in

particuar its support o one party whie attacking the others (Isamists), harms

the process itse. On the other hand, Isamists and iberas aike must ee that the

United States is honest in its support or democratization and that it is not a oreign

poicy too used to bring American riends to power.

In this regard, the United States shoud consider the disarmament o Hezbo-

ah as an interna lebanese issue, and that achieving disarmament is inked to

setting peace agreements between Israe, Syria and lebanon. By so doing, Wash-ington can transorm Hezboah into just one more lebanese poitica raction,


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34 Arab Insight

according to Byman. Simiary, Washington must not interere in the detais o

Paestinian poitics. Interna tension between Hamas and Fatah wi bring the two

movements position coser, as was apparent during the negotiations at Mecca. The

United States must end credit to its desire to bring democracy to the region by

demonstrating poitica wi. likewise, incusion o the Musim Brotherhood in the

Egyptian system shoud be seen positivey. It wi hep in changing the movements

positions towards goba and regiona issues. Isamist groups do not deny the uni-

versaity o the ibera vaues; they do ee uneasy, however, ike the majority o

their eow Arabs, in accepting the universaity o American interests. Vaues can

buid common interests, but not vice versa.


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THE UNITED STATES DID NOT COME TO IRAQ with the goa o achieving

democracy and guaranteeing human rights. Rather, its occupation o the country

was the resut o regiona and internationa motivations, goas, and interests de-manded by its oreign poicy ocused on securing soe goba eadership. It sought

to secure its poitica, economic, and strategic interests that woud ensure its rue

over the word and dominance over internationa reations in combination with

their interest in oi and the security o Israe. In addition to these motivations were

the mistakes and crimes committed by Saddam Hussein that oered a pretext or

and created conditions aowing the United States to reach its goas; it expoited

the regimes mistakes and empoyed them to meet its aims. Now, the occupation o

Iraq has created a massive poitica vacuum that must be ed, and so the UnitedStates can neither overook the opposition parties outside Iraq nor the various

components o Iraqi society and its infuentia orces.

When the United States was examining the opposition orces that coud the

poitica vacuum created ater the ouster o Saddam, it coud not ignore the Shiites

in the South, who orm 65 percent o the popuation and whom they abandoned

in 1991. Yet, it coud not hide its apprehension about estabishing a regime con-

troed by the Shiites whose eadership ived in Tehran and the act that a Shiite

regime woud have cose ties with Iran. This is the source o its ear o the Shiites,whom the United States views as being tied to Iranian intervention and which

Trial and Error:

Washington and Iraqs Shiite

ibrahimsaidal-baydaniDirector o the Strategic Center or Research and Studies. Baghdad, Iraq

35


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36 Arab Insight

coud utimatey end with the estabishment o a reigious state.

The new poitica situation in Iraq requires recognition o the injustice and

oppression Shiites in Iraq have been subjected to, incuding the despotic measures

imiting their participation in government and banning some reigious rituas. This

situation has ed the Shiites to seek a greater roe or the Naja seminary in the

new Iraq. This institution hods an infuentia position in the ie o Iraqi citizens

and has enjoyed the support and mobiization o Iraqi communities in the South

and the centra Euphrates region.

Decision-makers in the United States

have been orced to acknowedge its

important position or the major-

ity o Iraqi citizens. In addition, it

is necessary to note that the Shiites

roe in modern Iraq has a nationa

basis and has not been isoated rom

other movements in Iraqi society it has had not a sectarian hue, but rather a

nationa character.

The United States appears uneasy about a Shiite eadership roe in Iraqs po-

itica process given its ear o an Iranian roe in post-Saddam Iraq. U.S. ocias

beieved that major reigious and ethnic orces in the country were characterized

by a ack o trust and sometimes hatred or the other caused by years o oppression

by Saddams regime. The United States was thus prepared or the depoyment o

internationa orces in the regions where vioence was expected to break out. In

act, it did not hide its concern that a neighbor (Iran) might seek to gain contro o

certain areas in the north and south o Iraq.

Iran may be acing thorny issues in deaing with post-Saddam Iraq. On the one

hand, Iran views the a o Saddam as deiverance rom a despotic regime opening

new horizons or Shiite expansion. Iran aso beieves that a reigious state modeedon its own may be estabished in Iraq, given Shiite eectora dominance. On the

other hand, Iran is worried about other consequences, such as the seminary in

Naja regaining the reigious position it ost due to persecution experienced under

the rue o Saddam. The re-emergence o the seminary in Naja wi weaken the

infuence that Iran enjoyed over Shiites around the word thanks to its seminary in

Qom. Furthermore, some Shiite schoars avor the reviva o an Arab eadership or

the Shiite reigious authority in Iraq.

We cannot, thereore, deny the reaity o Iranian motivations and interests re-ated to intererence in the Iraqi situation. These motivations are connected to

The new political situation in Iraq

requires recognition o the injustice

and oppression Shiites in Iraq haeeen sujected to.


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Trial and Error 37

Irans poitica and reigious roe in the eadership o the words Shiites. At the

same time, however, the Shiites in Iraq cannot be treated as though they are ony

ed by Iranian infuence.

Approaching secular Shiites

The ormation o the governing counci and interim government in Iraq stirred

up doubts and accusations due to its sectarian approach. The process took into con-

sideration the socia, ethnic, and sectarian composition o Iraqi society and might

bear positive resuts through the creation o an opportunity or coexistence, dia-

ogue and coective eorts. However, the ear is that it wi become a set approach

in the poitica process, excuding competent nationa payers and causing poitica

and nationa probems. The ormation o the governing counci was appropriate

or the interim period, athough the country sti remains in the throes o a rebirth,

as an appropriate mechanism or rue has not yet been estabished. Athough the

ormation o the rst government did not entirey refect the reaity o society, it did

express the incumbent necessities o the transition period. However, it aso created

a tense baance, and did not represent a strong, cohesive government.

The ack o U.S. support or an Isamist Shiite eadership is evidenced by its

attempts to nd a secuar Shiite aternative. The United States seected Iyad A-

awi as the rst head o an Iraqi government oowing the tria experience o the

governing counci. A White House spokesperson commenting on his seection as

the head o the Iraqi government stated that Aawi was undoubtedy a good eader

and enjoyed wide support among Iraqis.

Whie news agencies were reporting the seection o Aawi as prime minister,

British newspapers were discussing his reationship with the American and Brit-

ish inteigence agencies. Among these was The Independent, which suggested that

Aawis mission woud be to convince Iraqis and the word that the occupation

had ended despite the presence o thousands o American sodiers in Iraqi territory.The mission woud aso be to try to convince other states that he woud ead an

independent government, a dicut eat given his reationship with American and

British inteigence. The newspaper stated that his strong ties to the West might

weaken his reputation among Iraqis, though he may have been seected as prime

minister to secure a baance between domestic Iraqi parties whether within Shiite

society or even with the Sunnis who et marginaized at that time.

The United States paced its bets on the secuar Aawi in order to contain the

rising infuence o the Shiite reigious cerics. The seection o Aawi came oow-ing its aiure with Ahmed Chaabi. The United States tried to use Aawi as a bridge


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38 Arab Insight

to buid a reationship with the supreme Shiite reigious authority, a-Sistani, but

this attempt aied due to a-Sistanis wariness about deaing with Aawi and his

American protectors.

This context o poitica activity certainy refected on Aawis poitica roe

and perormance. Aawi retained his position among Iraqi citizens and became an

important choice in the Iraq arena; his party was abe to garner an impressive 40

seats in the Nationa Assemby. Aawis poicies eventuay estranged him rom the

majority o Shiites, and contrary to expectations that he woud make urther gains

in the December 2005 eections, Aawi ost ground.

The American agenda aso refected on Aawis perormance. The United States

has deat extremey severey with the Sadrist movement during its conrontations

in Naja, as it considers the poitica and miitary agenda o Muqtada a-Sadr to be

a major chaenge to its overa strategy. For strategic purposes in the context o

imiting Iranian infuence and the reigious authority in Naja Aawi moved to

orm an aiance with the Baathists and Sunni reigious orces. This isoated him

rom infuence in Shiite circes, bady hurting him in the December 2005 eections,

and weakening the overa trend o secuar Shiism, the United States preerred

choice.

The path chosen by Aawi oowing the announcement o the eection resuts

cannot be separated rom the assumption that they were disappointing to the Unit-

ed States. Aawi ed a oca and internationa campaign questioning the eection

resuts and ormed the Maram boc, which rejected them. He reappeared on the

scene rst as part o the nationa reconciiation program, then in the Nationa Se-

curity Counci, and then as opposition to Ibrahim a-Jaaari, assuming eadership

o the new government, and nay caing or the ormation o a nationa savation

government. The goa behind a o these positions was weakening the Shiite roe

in the upcoming government and bypassing the eection resuts. This was a cear

expression o U.S. hatred o the Isamists and their unwiingness to support a re-igious Shiite eadership.

In response to the resuts gained by the United Iraqi Aiance in the January

2005 eections, ormer U.S. Deense Secretary Donad Rumsed downpayed ears

o Iranian infuencing spreading in Iraq. He expicity stated that the Shiites in Iraq

were Iraqis, not Iranian, and brushed aside concerns that a reigious government

modeed on Irans was ikey to appear. His opinion was supported by Vice Presi-

dent Dick Cheney, who said that there was no justication or the American ear

that the Iraqis woud embark on something that did not meet American approva.Despite the resuts o the January 2005 eections and the Shiites advance, the


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Trial and Error 39

United States considered Iraqi citizens engagement with democracy to be a cha-

enge to terrorism and an important step towards opposing the ideoogy o extrem-

ism and hatred. It was seen as a chaenge to the approach adopted by a-Zarqawi

and the Takris, who decare their enemies to be unbeievers, and an opportunity

to buid a unied, democratic Iraq.

Secretary o State Condoeezza Rice expressed comort with the emergence o

the Shiites in Iraq because they represent the majority o the popuation and had

ong been oppressed. However, she did not hide her ear that Shiite dominance

in government as a resut o their overwheming victory in the January 2005

eections might refect on the ormuation o the new Iraqi constitution and its

reiance on Isamic aw, which she v

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