Islam And Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,

With Special Focus On Jakarta-Islamabad Relations

I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana

This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Western Australia

School of Social Sciences

Discipline of Political Science and International Relations

Centre for Muslim States and Societies

2012

Abstract

This study explores the roles of Islam in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indonesia is a

country with the world’s largest Muslim community, where the political meaning of

Islam is contested in the process of nation-building. Islam has come under increasing

scrutiny by international relations scholars, particularly since Islamic extremism has

become one of the major challenges to the post-Cold War world order. Therefore, it is

important to research whether and how the religion has impacted the basic thinking and

making of foreign policy in Indonesia. To contextualize the analysis, the study pays

special attention to Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan as a major case study.

Chapter One examines the role of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy within three

dimensions; national identity formation, elite interest and domestic politics, and external

situations. The discussion on Jakarta-Islamabad relations are presented in chapters

organized based on the changing political regimes in Jakarta and developments of

international and regional Islamic-related issues, in a synthetic fashion. Chapter Two

demonstrates that under the Sukarno regime (1945-1965) there was a shift in

Indonesia’s policy towards Pakistan; from avoiding to using Islamic identity. This was

coupled with the change in Jakarta’s strategic interests in the relationships with Pakistan

and India. Chapter Three and Four report on the weakening of Islam’s role in Indonesia-

Pakistan relations, particularly as happened during the 1970s and 1980s under the New

Order of Suharto in Indonesia. Islam did not rate as an important factor because the

Indonesian government tended to pursue secular interests - with an emphasis on

discourses of economic development and regional stability. Chapter Five discusses the

growing interest between Indonesia and Pakistan to enhance cordial ties. Following two

decades of waning relations the commencement of re-engagement took place in the mid

1990s when Indonesia was performing a greater commitment towards the Muslim

world, at the same time as Pakistan was pursuing closer ties with Southeast and East

Asian powers. However, Islam was not reflected as an identity which Suharto wanted to

ii

construct in foreign policy alone, but as the consistent implementation of the

independent activism policy. Chapter Six explores Indonesia’s responses to the Kashmir

conflict, particularly since people uprising has shaken the state in the early 1990. This

chapter asserts that although Islam was not a factor in Indonesia favouring Pakistan on

the Kashmir issue, Indonesia maintains the position of impartiality. Chapter Seven looks

at how and why Indonesia views the importance of Pakistan in the global war on

terrorism. It demonstrates that the policy is made upon the mixed context of Islamic and

non-Islamic considerations.

This study concludes that Islam, to a limited degree, is used by the Indonesian

government to relate with Pakistan, but it has not become the major consideration and

real reference in shaping Jakarta’s foreign policy towards Islamabad. The role of Islam

is marginal. The relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan is dominated by secular

economic and political agendas. In contrast, policies taken by the Indonesian

government have in many respects differed with the Muslim people’s voices. The

Indonesian Muslims consistently articulate the Islamic identity to describe their

relationships with Pakistan; - especially in dealing with issues pertinent to Islam and

Muslims. This divergence surfaces because Islam has been significantly prevented from

influencing the making and implementation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The

constraints are set up by the state’s non-Islamic identity, the ruling elite’s material

interests, as well as the condition of external environments.

Keywords: Islam, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, Jakarta-Islamabad Relations.

iii

Table of Contents

Abstract i

Acknowledgements iv

List of Abbreviations vii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: Islamic Identity, Elite Interests And Foreign Policy In Indonesia 16 Chapter Two: Islamism And Secularism In Sukarno’s Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan 54 Chapter Three: Indonesia-Pakistan Relations Under Suharto During the 1970s 93 Chapter Four: Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And Soviet Invasion Of Afghanistan 127 Chapter Five: Indonesia’s Revitalized Relations With Pakistan: Islamic Identity and Economic Cooperation 160 Chapter Six: Muslim Solidarity In Indonesian Attitude Towards The Kashmir Conflict 192 Chapter Seven: Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And The Global War On Terrorism 229 Conclusion 266 Bibliography 283

iv

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to the many parties that have assisted me in

completing this study. The research has been ongoing since 2008 and the final stage of

writing was undertaken during the first semester of 2012. I wish to thank the Australian

Agency for International Development (AusAID) for granting me full financial support

under the scheme of Australian Development Scholarship (ADS) for my study at the

University of Western Australia and stay in Perth.

I am greatly indebted to my coordinating supervisor Professor Samina Yasmeen.

She has stood on my side since the very beginning till the end of my candidature, during

both good and difficult times. Samina is my Guru, colleague and closest advisor, an

indispensable source of ideas, inspiration as well as motivation, when I felt let down by

the lack of progress. I have enjoyed the privilege of learning from her brilliancy and

knowledge in international relations, political Islam and foreign policies of the Muslim

countries. I deeply value Samina’s never-ending empathy and understanding of my

complicated emotional situation when I lost my baby girl in December 2011, the most

difficult time in my life.

I would also like to thank to my co-supervisor Associate Professor Jie Chen who

guided me through the structure of the discussion in the thesis. I also owe lots of

gratitude to Associate Professor Roderic Pitty, Chair of Political Science and

International Relations, as well as Professor Van Ikin, Graduate Research Coordinator

School of Social Sciences for their kind help and advices during the difficult times of

my study.

I am also grateful to close friends who have helped me in one way and another

with regard to this study. In Australia the following deserve special mention: Ms

Deborah Pyatt AusAID Liaison Officer who has done lots of good things to ensure my

convenience while studying at UWA and staying in Perth; Mrs Julia Lightfoot and Ms.

Tessa Burkitt who with great patience has helped correct and improve my English

writing; Mr Graeme Rymill Humanities and Social Sciences Librarian at Reid Library

who has always been prepared to assist me with collecting materials for my research;

v

Mr Chris Massey Principal of Currie Hall who with a lot of generosity has provided

nice and comfortable accommodation for me and my wife during our stay in Perth; and

Ms Linley Hill, Administrative Officer, Political Science and International Relations,

for supporting me with learning facilities at the department.

I wish to express sincere thanks to Pak Peter and Ibu Gwen Graham, Pak Ken

Frewer, Win and Margaret Jones, Professor William Morgan of the Lions Eye Institute,

Claudio Cattaneo, John Tan, Will Lee, Frank Li, Adriaan Wolvaardt, Rizwan Zeb, Mas

Hartono, Mas Dekar, Heru, Edi, Bli Made and Mbok Luh for their help and friendship

during my stay in Perth.

In Indonesia I received help and assistance from the following: Dr Baiq

Wardhani, Dr Vinsensio Dugis, Dr Makmur Keliat, Dr Hariyadi Wirawan, Dr Anak

Agung Banyu Perwita, Mr Basis Susilo, Mr Djoko Sulistyo, Mr Joko Susanto, Mr Moch

Yunus, Mr Ahmad Safril Mubah, Ms Dewi Sartika, Ms Anne Gutinger, Mrs Siti

Rokhmawati Susanto, Mr Yosi Polimpung, Mr Armyn Gita, and Mr Yusli Effendi.

Finally I am most grateful for all the blessings and support I receive from my

family; Bapak, Ibu, Deni and Mangta. They remain my primary source of strength and

inspiration. I am very grateful to my beloved wife, Liana Dewi, for her love and

patience during my final stage of PhD period. She patiently endured my late-night

arrivals from the campus and long months of separation. I also highly appreciate her

great help with the technical aspect of my thesis. My love for her knows no end.

I, however, take full responsibility for the views put forth and for any errors that

may occur in this study.

Perth, 17 May 2012.

I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana

vi

vii

List of Abbreviations

APEC : Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

APHC : All Parties Hurriyat Conference

ASEAN : Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEM : Asia Europe Meeting

CENTO : Central Treaty Organization

CSIS : Centre for Strategic and International Studies

D-8 : Developing Eight

DDII : Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Islamic

Proselytizing)

DI : Darul Islam

FPI : Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic defender Front)

GAM : Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (the Free Aceh Movement)

ICMI : Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Indonesian Association

of Muslim Intellectuals)

viii

IGGI : Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia

IPECC : Indonesia Pakistan Economic and Cultural Coorperation

IPTN : Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (the National Aviation Industry)

IQR : International Qur’an Recital

ISI : Inter Services Intelligence

JI : Jemaah Islamiyah

JKLF : Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

KISDI : Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian

Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World)

KSF : Kashmir Solidarity Front

LeT : Lashkar-e-Toiba

LIPIA : Lembaga Ilmu Penetahuan Islam Dan Arab (the Institute for Islamic

Knowledge and Arabic)

LJ : Laskar Jihad

MNLF : Moro National Liberation Front

MUF : Muslim United Front

ix

MUI : Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Ulama)

MMI : Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin)

NAM : Non Aligned Movement

NEFOS : New Emerging Forces

NU : Nahdlatul Ulama

OAU : Organization of African Union

OIC : Organization of Islamic Conference

OLDEFOS : Old Established Forces

PAN : Partai Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party)

PBB : Partai Bulan Bintang (the Star and Crescent Party)

PD : Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party)

PDIP : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian Democratic

Party of Struggle)

PKB : Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the National Awakening Party)

PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party)

PKS : Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Justice and Welfare Party)

x

PNI : Partai Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party)

POLRI : Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (the Indonesian National Police)

PPP : Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party)

SAARC : South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation

SI : Sarekat Islam

TII : Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Army)

UNMOGIP : United Nations Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan

UNSF : United Nations Security Force

UNTEA : United Nations Temporary Executive Authority

ZOPFAN : Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

Introduction

This study explores the roles of Islam in the conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

Indonesia is a country with the world’s largest Muslim community, where the political

meaning of Islam is always contested in the process of nation-building. Meanwhile,

Islam has come under increasing scrutiny by the scholars of international relations at

large, particularly since Islamic extremism has become one of the major challenges to

the post-Cold War world order. Therefore, it is important to research whether and how

the religion has impacted the basic thinking and making of foreign policy in Indonesia.

In order to contextualize the analysis, the study pays special attention to Indonesia’s

relations with Pakistan as a major case study.

Islam and International Relations Study

In recent years, international relations academia has paid a great deal of attention to

observing the influence of religion as a social phenomena and political force on world

politics (Geislerova 2011; Juergensmeyer 2010; Sandal & James 2011). Islam is one of

the largest religions in the world and as such receives special attention. This is partly

related to the genuine revival of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world (Savage

2004). An increasingly large number of Muslim women are wearing veils, more Muslim

men are comfortable with growing beards, and more Muslim people appear to attend

Mosque more often. A report of the Gallup Centre for Muslim Studies demonstrates that

a vast majority of Muslim people - 86 percent of Turks, 90 percent of Indonesians, and

98 percent of Egyptians - confess that Islam underpins their way of life (Thomas 2010,

1-2). Daniel Philpott (2002), an international relations scholar, describes this happening

as part of a process of de-secularization of the world.

More importantly, what lures Islam to the centre-stage of world politics is a series of

events that has taken place in the Muslim world since the late 1970s. It started with the

1979 Iranian revolution, followed by the Gulf War in 1991, and culminated in the 11

September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) which led to the subsequent

2

American invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq less than two years later. These

events are important because they bring Islam and the West into antagonism

(Akbarzadeh & Saeed 2003; Harris 2006; Yasmeen 2005). Speculation arises that ‘the

clash of civilization’ is taking shape, a fact predicted by Samuel Huntington (1993).

According to Huntington, cultural factors, rather than foreign policy or economics, will

pre-eminently construct world politics in the future. The immense division amongst

humankind will be formed by cultures, and consequently conflicts in world politics will

manifest into the clash of civilizations. Huntington (1993) suggested ‘…the principal

clash will be between Western and non-Western civilizations…’. He underscored the

specific focus on the so called fundamental disagreements, actual or potential, between

the West on the one hand, and the Islamic civilization on the other. Regardless of

polemics on the validity of Huntington’s thesis, the practicality of the discourse of the

West versus Islam has increasingly given rise to the important position of Muslim state

and non-state actors in international affairs.

For its part, the Iranian revolution of 1979 highlighted Islam’s domestic political role

and the behaviour of Islamic states in the world arena. In the 1980s, studies on the role

and position of Islam in politics incrementally became an element of comparative

politics or political science itself - in addition to sociology and anthropology - and for

that reason focused first and foremost on the components of Islamist movements

playing out in domestic politics. Two fine examples of this scholarly enterprise are the

edited volumes by James Piscatori (1986) titled Islam in the Political Process, and John

Esposito (1987) titled Islam in Asia: Religion, Politics, and Society which respectively

presented a survey of the nature of Islamic religious life in some countries with a

Muslim majority, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,

Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey. In these two

studies, Islam is treated as a variable that along with other material motivations - mostly

control of the state’s authority and resistance to modernization and secularization -

drove the Islamist movement’s activism, both culturally and politically. The analysis is

3

concerned more with the effects of modernization and development in those countries

rather than the effects of Islam on peoples’ lives.

An interesting example of pioneering study on Islam in foreign policy is the edited

volume by Adeed Dawisha (1983) titled Islam in Foreign Policy. Drawing upon Islamic

countries, especially Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for case studies, Dawisha

and his colleagues argue that Islam can be seen as having multiple functions as a

domestic and ideological motivator, legitimacy, or simply a justifier for the states’

foreign relations. Furthermore, the role of Islam in foreign policy is derived from

constitutional and institutional structure of the state as well as the role of the religious

elite in the making and implementation of policy. In the case of Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq,

Malaysia, and Turkey, Dawisha’s work shows that Islam’s roles in foreign policy are

observable in the dynamic interaction between the secular ruling regime and Islamic

societal groups, and the contest between religious ideals and material interests in

domestic and foreign policy processes.

With the emergent academic attention to religion as a current force and factor in

international relations, literature on Islam’s role in foreign policy has also benefited

from the trend. The theme of Islam in foreign policy can be widely read in a variety of

cases. For instance, the contemporary survey encompasses foreign policies of the new

independent Islamic states of Central Asia (Shaffer, ed. 2006) and Muslim states in the

Balkan Peninsula such as Bosnia-Herzegovina (Messari 2001). These works are similar

to Dawisha and his colleagues, in trying to discover the roles and limits of Islam in

international relations for the selected countries.

Nizar Messari (2001, 237-46), who focuses on the construction of Islamic identity in

foreign policy with specific reference to Bosnia-America relations, argues that Islam as

a cultural factor distinguishes the way Sarajevo views relations with Washington and

the Muslim world in general. It particularly happened in the 1990s following the

liberation of Bosnia from Serbian oppression. Notwithstanding the need for human

4

rights protection and economic aid, which encouraged the Bosnians to consider the US

as important, they tended to feel more comfortable engaging with Islamic states because

of their shared identity, than with the Judeo-Christian Americans. On the other side,

Washington decided to intervene in the Bosnian conflict on account of Clinton’s

perceptions that American multiculturalist interests and security were both at stake.

Foreign policy in Bosnia was used to reinforce the image of the US as the guardian of

human rights, human security and tolerant values.

Brenda Shaffer (2006, 4-5) encounters Islam as a cultural factor which can influence the

ideals and implementation of foreign policies of Central Asian Muslim states. Islamic

identity is especially important for the ruling regime to avoid domestic political

redistribution. However, the role of Islam is not unlimited. The elite in power can

broaden identities in order to enable a large variety of policy options to be taken,

including ones that conflict with the state’s formalized Islamic identity. Islam, which is

essentially a universal connection amongst Muslims, faces constraints derived from

material interests. For example, the case of Central Asian states’ strong alliance with the

US against the Taliban regime indicates the sidelining of the universality of Islamic ties

by a politically-motivated action. To explain this decision to the domestic Muslim

public, Islamic identity is recreated into two categories; ‘good and true Islam’ and ‘bad

and false Islam’. The ostensibly good and true Islam is tolerant and originated in local

cultures. On the other hand, the so called bad and false Islam is intolerant and

contaminated by foreign extremism like that which originates in the Middle East.

Therefore, the reproduction of identity legitimizes the regime’s non-Islamic-oriented

external conduct.

In a comparative perspective on the phenomena of democratization shaking Arab

countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, called the Arab Spring, Islam was present

as a force of populist Muslims setting regime change and international policy

reorientation (Al-Rahim 2011). The process took place in three phases. First, Islam

emerged as the idea of change along with aspirations for democracy, human rights and

5

egalitarianism. Second, Islam became the unifying power for protesters with divergent

worldviews and strategies of movement. And third, Islam shaped the new ruling elte’s

policy towards issues pertinent to the Muslim world. To exemplify, the Egyptian

government has moved away from its moderate position into no cooperation with Israel

over the conflict in Palestine (Brown 2012; Cook & Stathis 2012).

Recent studies also explain that Islam is not only influential on the Islamic states’

international behaviour, but also present in the foreign policy perceptions of the most

secular culture-based governments of Europe and the US, leading to a particular type of

outcome. This is, for example, displayed in the study by Elizabeth Hurd (2007, 345-67).

Islam in the post 11 September 2001 secular culture and society of Europe and America

is described as a refusal to acknowledge the privileged status of public spheres and the

moral rule of the secularist categories of public and private. Hence, decision makers in

Europe and the US tend to develop a view of denying the compatibility between Islam

and democracy. It brings cynicism to the concept of world order in Islam, such as the

caliphate. The incongruity then nurtures conditions leading to parochialism,

exclusiveness, anti-modernism, and hostility towards others as seen in the ideology of

jihad. Policy options available in this context are limited, and can lead to tense

coexistence, violent confrontation or, to some extent conversion.

Nevertheless, amidst the resurgence of the study of Islam in international relations

neither Dawisha’s volume nor the more contemporary studies have produced agreeable

theories or approaches through which to analyse Islam’s roles in foreign policy. Instead,

they prefer to generalize that in spite of the fact that Islam is a significant factor in

shaping ideals of the Islamic countries’ foreign policy; it does not intend to be relevant

for entire external action. Therefore, the role of Islam in foreign policy should be

discerned in a case study basis.

Indonesia-Pakistan Relations as A Case Study

6

Some studies have been conducted to explore the role and position of Islam in

Indonesian foreign relations. They tend to focus on Jakarta’s participation in

international Islamic affairs of the Muslim countries in the Middle East region. One of

the most popular issues that the studies have looked at is how Indonesia has responded

to the prolonged Israel-Palestine conflict, and whether Islam is present in the responses.

It results in contending arguments. On the one hand, the Islamic factor is regarded as

only a secondary consideration of the Indonesian governmental policy with regard to

issues related to the Muslim world. The state’s foreign policy is accorded primarily on

material interests (Leifer 1983b; Perwita 2007; Sukma 2006). On the other hand,

Indonesia’s policy towards the Islamic world – especially the Middle East - cannot

simply ignore the important role of Islam. This is due mainly to the longstanding

Islamic connections which have been established between the Indonesian Muslim

community and Muslims in that region (Azra 2006; Sihbudi 1997).

Such a disagreement provides scope to undertake a new study on the role of Islam in

Jakarta’s foreign conduct by shifting the focus into Indonesian relations with an

important Muslim populous country beyond the Middle East - Pakistan. Thus far, this

topic has been overlooked by scholars studying Indonesia’s international relations. In

fact, Islamabad has played significant roles in the development of issues related to Islam

and Muslims, evident in its active participation in Islamic forum such as the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Pakistan is an important player in

regional security and strategic issues in South Asia, and the impact expands into

Indonesia’s Southeast Asia region.

Indonesia-Pakistan relations are important to research for a number of reasons. One

reason, for example, is demographics because Indonesia and Pakistan are the two largest

Muslim populated countries in the world. According to the Indonesian Bureau of

Statistics, the 2010 census indicates that in Indonesia there are approximately 220

million people – 90 percent of the population - who profess to practice Islam. Second to

Indonesia, the Population Census Organization of the Pakistani government reports that

7

in 2011 the country had about 174 million Muslims, or 96 percent of the population.

Theoretically, any relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan will involve Islamic

identity of the two largest Muslim majority countries worldwide.

It is also essential to mention that the links between Indonesians and Pakistanis occurred

prior to both countries gaining independence in the 1940s. Under the leadership of

Sukarno, Indonesian and Pakistani Muslim soldiers united in the fight against Dutch

colonial aggression in Indonesia. However, when Indonesia gained sovereignty in 1949

it launched onto the international diplomatic stage, intending to build closer relations

with India, with the ties with Pakistan relatively ignored causing them to slowly

diminish. As politics and the geostrategic milieu were dynamic, Indonesian-Indian links

waned, allowing Pakistan to enter into stronger relations with Indonesia. Relations

between the two countries were at their peak during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war over

Kashmir, in which Jakarta gave full support to Pakistan.

During the course of Indonesia-Pakistan relations, patterns of highs and lows have

emerged. The fall of the Sukarno regime in 1966 marked the emergence of the New

Order government led by Suharto which aimed to promote a ‘good neighbourhood’

policy. Indonesia’s ties with Pakistan were maintained although not excessively close,

and relations with India were subsequently repaired. It was only in 1996 that Jakarta and

Islamabad attempted to revitalize the links with economic cooperation becoming the

main interest. After Suharto, the development of Indonesia and Pakistan relations has

been occupied by issues such as the Kashmir conflict and global terrorism and

counterterrorism.

The Indonesian Muslim community also is associated with Pakistan’s international

affairs, particularly when Islam or Muslims are implicated. Islamist groups in Indonesia,

such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian

Council of Islamic Proselytizing, DDII), are noted to have vocally articulated their

views on the Kashmir conflict, the Afghanistan war, and the global war on terrorism.

8

Since intergovernmental and inter-societal relations are not isolated, it can be assumed

that they will have an effect on each other. Therefore, it is worthwhile examining, from

the Indonesian perspective, whether Islam’s role is significant in the shaping of

Indonesia-Pakistan relations.

Approach and Data Collection

Although there is no academic consensus on which specific theory and concept should

be applied in analysing Islam’s roles and limits in foreign policy, this study considers

that there are three important factors; identity of the state, elite interest, and external

situations which influence the state’s foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy is

defined as a set of official conducts of an independent actor (usually a state) towards its

external environment. The term ‘official’ is the key point to this definition as it allows

the insertion of all actions by the state government and its agencies, while maintaining

limitations on the scope of observations that can include the vast number of transactions

international actors do (Hill 2003, 3). The terminology of policy is, in a broader sense,

perceived as the decision delineating goals, mobilization of resources, and actions taken

to implement them. Hence, foreign policy is actually a process, and it encompasses

three distinct but interrelated areas - the influence on foreign policy, the making of

foreign policy, and the implementation and evaluation of foreign policy (Hudson 2005;

Snyder, Bruck & Sapin 2002).

This study does not aim to look at such policy processes thoroughly. Instead, it

concentrates on examining the actual behaviour of the state, and why the behaviour

occurs. With the focus on Muslim countries’ foreign policies, it is argued that identity,

elite interest, and external settings encompass ideational and material factors which

determine whether, and how, Islam is present in the states’ international actions. The

approach develops three propositions, as follows:

Firstly, the role of Islam in foreign policy is determined by identity of the state. The

state’s identity is formed mostly by the extant culture or religion of the society. Identity

9

of the state – which gives an idea of who we are and who the others are - is argued as to

inform what is the state’s national interests, and accordingly directs the conduct of

foreign policy to meet them (Houghton 2007; Kowert 2001). With this in mind, it is safe

to say that states - which are founded on the ground of Islam or which are

constitutionally accorded on Islam - are highly likely to pursue Islamic-related interests

in their international relations (Kostiner 1993; Moshaver 2003). On the other hand, in

the Muslim majority state which is built upon secularism, Islam’s roles face the formal

constraints in influencing foreign policy, in spite of the fact that there is sometimes a

juncture at which the role of leader with Islamic vision or the power of Islamic

movement has to some extent challenged the state’s secular identity and foreign policy

(Pope 2010).

Secondly, elite interest affects how Islam exists in the state’s foreign policy. This is to

argue that internal milieu, notably set out by national ideology, domestic politics,

geographical condition, degree of economic development as well as military capability,

provides tangible and intangible circumstances under which the elite’s view on the

country’s vital needs, or so called national interests, is shaped. Construction of the

perceptible national interest is commonly untouchable by the general public and is

dominated by the ruling elite, and thus it is closely associated with the regime’s interests

– chiefly political legitimacy and survival. Foreign policy is formulated and carried out

to serve the national interest (Brecher, et al. 1969; Kegley & Witkopf 2004). Within this

context, the presence of Islam in foreign policy is determined by the policy makers’

interest and preference. Whether Islam is accommodated or marginalized in foreign

policy depends on how the elite see its salience for the national interest (Barzegar

2010). In the practice of democracy, civil society association - which is particularly

expressed in public opinions - possesses an important place in the decision-making

process. However, in reality, they are still confined by the established domestic political

structures, especially those of the conservative proponents. Islam may be played as the

force of public pressure on the ruling elite, but its move is limited by the interests and

power of the dominant political structures (Bird 2007; Oguzlu 2010).

10

Thirdly, the dynamics of the external environment render the conditions for a regime to

use Islam in foreign policy. This is created by a complexity of international outcomes,

consisting of the behaviour of regional or global powers, transnational non-state actors’

movement, international norms and global issues (Klotz & Linch 2007), and crisis

situations (Brecher 1979). As foreign policy functions to respond to the changes of the

state’s international milieu, the patterns of regional or global politics will develop into

operative input influencing the way the decision makers carry out foreign relations.

Likewise, external circumstances are realities, and not those realities that generate

policy choices, but decision-makers’ perceptions as to how these realities impact on the

state that then leads to foreign policy (Brecher 1967; Kubalkova 2001; Novotny 2010).

Based on this understanding, Islam will be present in foreign policy when it is regarded

as a meaningful segment of the perceived international realities, such as ideological

threat, social movement, conflict, and international regimes (Jones 2002; Kepel 2002).

This study combines theoretical and empirical surveys. The sources of these

explorations were collected through bibliographical research and fieldwork. It began

with consulting books, articles, academic theses, and research reports available at

Australian libraries and research institutions, and also searching relevant

documentations and media, particularly newspapers, magazines, and the internet. The

fieldwork was conducted over a period of nine months. It was aimed at collecting more

data salient for the study in addition to what was available at libraries and online. The

fieldwork was carried out in Indonesia’s capital city Jakarta where additional primary

sources of information could be found in research centres, several universities and

government offices.

This study benefited from interviews with a number of Indonesian diplomats, military

staff and investigators (not less than 20 interviewees, including those active and retired),

and diplomatic officials at Pakistan, Indian, and ASEAN representatives office in

Jakarta, who were able to render information and to share their experience as well as

11

views relevant to the issues examined. Informal discussions were carried out with policy

consultants whose expertise is founded upon Islam in Indonesian politics and foreign

policy. This is important in terms of enriching perspectives on the issues investigated in

the study. No less import were conversations with Indonesian Muslim activists,

especially those who paid attention to issues such as the Kashmir conflict; their views

were an empirical source, useful in understanding how Indonesian Muslims perceive

and respond to the issue.

Discussion Chapters

This study argues that at a governmental level Islam is sometimes used as a tool and is

present as the consideration of Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan. Islam’s role

is marginal amidst the focus on material interests that shape Jakarta’s relations with

Islamabad. On the other hand, the Indonesian Muslim community constantly uses

Islamic identity to describe the relationships with Pakistanis, particularly in regard to

Islamic-related issues. In many respects however, the government is able to prevent

Islamic ideas from significantly influencing the state’s foreign policy. The lack of

Islamic credentials is part of the Indonesian governmental general attitude towards the

position of Islam in the state’s international affairs. The tendency is set up by the

constraints which are derived from the nature of the state’s identity, elite interests, and

international system.

Chapter One explains how the constraints prevent Islam from playing an important role

in influencing the discourse and conduct of Indonesia’s foreign policy. The chapter

begins by examining the pre-independence politics of national identity construction

which gave rise to Pancasila as the state philosophy and root of inspiration for foreign

policy, thus disallowing Islam to formally manifest in the state’s international relations.

It then shows that throughout the history of independent Indonesia since 1945, the

dynamics of domestic politics and the ruling elite’s interests have always prevented

Islamic groups from significantly influencing the government’s policies. In parallel, the

nature of international politics, especially during the Cold War, did not provide the

12

space for Indonesia to express the country’s Islamic identity. Accordingly, Indonesian

foreign policy was formulated and guided by a doctrinal principle of independent

activism (bebas aktif), suggesting non-Islamic ideas, but the pragmatic logic of the

pursuance of material interests. This feature of Indonesian foreign policy is maintained

after the Cold War.

In order to highlight the foreign policy impacts of the three factors mentioned above on

Indonesian relations with Pakistan, the following chapters are organised on the basis of

periodization of changing political regimes in Jakarta and developments of international

and regional Islamic-related issues, in a synthetic fashion.

Chapter Two analyses the extent to which Islamic identity was used by the Indonesian

government under Sukarno (1945-1965) to build links with Pakistan. The chapter

illuminates that Islam was useful for Indonesia’s diplomacy for independence and

international recognition. However, the focus on the nationalist struggle made Indonesia

balance its relations with both the Muslim League and the National Congress of India.

After gaining sovereignty in 1949, Jakarta’s foreign policy leaned towards New Delhi

for their similar emphasis on the nonalignment in the Cold War. Due to the changing

strategic interest of Jakarta towards India, Sukarno had begun to gradually articulate

Islamic identity in the relationship with Pakistan. It is seen in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan

war over Kashmir where Islam and the elite’s interests became the mixed context in

which Indonesia favoured Pakistan against India.

Chapter Three highlights the changing Indonesian South Asia policy under the new

leadership of Suharto, who replaced Sukarno in 1966 and built the New Order

government. Suharto abandoned Sukarno’s confrontational discourse and directed

Indonesia to foster good neighbourliness. Suharto used foreign policy as the means to

meet domestic interest, in particular with economic development. This goal required the

creation of regional political stability. Arguably, Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan

were driven in line with this policy orientation. Jakarta eschewed articulating Islamic

13

language in its relationship with Pakistan. It can be discerned in the way the Suharto

government responded to the East Pakistan crisis. The focus of Jakarta’s policy towards

Islamabad was on economic cooperation. However, the Indonesian government still

acknowledged the important role of Islam in Indonesia-Pakistan Muslim society links,

although with uncommitted support.

Chapter Four looks at Indonesia-Pakistan relations in the 1980s, which waned

politically. This is observable in the case of the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan

that became the most significant security problem for the Zia Ul-Haq government of

Pakistan. However, Jakarta gave only limited commitment to support Pakistan to

oppose the Soviets’ existence in its neighbouring country. The chapter presents the

contrast in Indonesia’s governmental and societal responses to the Afghan war.

Indonesia’s Islamic groups’ reactions emerged as jihad against the Soviets. But, the

government in Jakarta tried to bar the Islamists’ movement for the reason of

maintaining national resilience and stability. This triggered Indonesian Islamists to carry

out clandestine movements and develop international jihadist connections with

Mujahideens operating from Pakistan. Essentially, this chapter explains that during the

1980s the growth of Islamist activism in Indonesia was to an extent a counterpoise to

the government’s lack of Islamic credentials in foreign policy.

Chapter Five focuses on an important shift in Indonesian foreign policy under Suharto.

Jakarta showed a greater interest in participating in international relations of the Muslim

world. This new mode of external conduct began to take place in the early 1990s. The

chapter points out that the change was influenced by the activism of an Islamic group

called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian

Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI). The ICMI played an important role in upgrading

Indonesian status in the OIC from partial to full membership. To some extent the

country’s Islamic identity was featured, however the nature of interest underpinning the

policy remained secular, in the need for achieving economic benefit. In consonance with

this agenda, Jakarta revitalized its ties with Islamabad, which had waned. Indonesia was

14

not averse to talk of the Muslim world’s issues, but it tried to reframe them into at less

Islamic-pronounced agenda. This is noticeable in the establishment of the new grouping

Developing Eight (D-8), in which Jakarta and Islamabad defined their engagement in

economic terms, rather than the pursuance of an Islamist bloc. This chapter, to some

extent, also provides some background of the topic discussed in Chapter Six.

Chapter Six explores the Indonesian response to the Kashmir issue especially since

indigenous insurgency emerged in the disputed territory in the early 1990s. The chapter

indicates that Indonesia’s governmental attitude was passive and impartial towards the

Kashmir issue. Jakarta saw the development in Kashmir through the perspective of

material interests, and therefore ignored the Islamic nuance in the issue. On the other

hand, Muslim voices from Indonesia signified an adherence to Islamic solidarity with

the Kashmiri struggle against India, in a way suggesting a pro-Pakistan position.

Chapter Seven is an account of Indonesia-Pakistan relations with specific reference to

the global counterterrorism agenda. It became an important topic in the two countries’

links in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorists’ attacks in the US, and a series of

terrorist bombings in Indonesia afterwards. The chapter demonstrates that the

Indonesian governmental response to terrorism was shaped in the mixed context, that is,

between caution in the face of the Islamic factor and the imperative of retaining national

security. The latter context bought Jakarta towards fostering counterterrorism

cooperation with Islamabad, particularly following the uncovering of transnational

extremist networks – cells of terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah - operating between

Pakistan and Indonesia.

The conclusion of this study presents integrated analysis and summary of the important

findings of each chapter. In addition it intends to note the important contribution the

study has made to the ongoing debate on the role of Islam in Indonesia’s international

affairs. Finally the study proposes some significant and relevant topics for future

15

research on the role of Islam in Indonesia-Pakistan relations in particular, and Islam in

Indonesia’s foreign policy in general.

16

Chapter One

Islamic Identity, Elite Interest And

Foreign Policy In Indonesia

This chapter focuses on the role of Islam in the evolution of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

It demonstrates that Islam’s role has faced constraints shaped by the nature of the state’s

identity, elite interest and policy on Islam, and external situations. The formation of

Indonesian national identity was characterized by the disputation between religious and

secular expressions. The religious voice was represented by Islamic political groups

who aspired for the establishment of an Indonesian state based on Islam, or at least the

formal implementation of shari’a (Islamic law) for Muslims in the country. Against

Islamic identity, the secular movements favoured a state free from religious

identifications, including that of Islam. This manifested into prolonged ideological

debates which emerged during the pre-independence of 1945. Such vying was, in fact,

tactically and politically won by the secularists, and independent Indonesia was defined

as neither theocratic nor secular, but rather a Pancasila state. The Pancasila state does

not allow for Islam to become the official reference of Indonesian foreign policy.

In post-independence Indonesian domestic politics, which has been dominated by the

perceptible political interest of the secular ruling elite, Islamic voices and agendas are

marginalized. This, for most of the time, occurred under the governance of Sukarno

(1945-1965) and Suharto (1966-1998). After Suharto, the democratic moment rendered

an opportunity for Islamic political forces to become involved in the political process,

but their capacity to govern has been quite limited. The lack of space for, and power of,

Islamic political movements to play roles and influence governance, has resulted in the

minimal use of Islamic language in, and the focus on, secular agendas in the

government’s policy.

17

External settings also determine the way in which Indonesian decision makers formulate

and implement foreign policy. In this context, Islam has restricted scope to appear in the

state’s participation in international affairs. Under the world order formed by the Cold

War, Indonesian foreign policy was steered by the principle of bebas aktif (independent

activism) that had been essentially devoid of any mention of Islam. In post-Cold War

world politics, the feature of independent activism foreign policy has been maintained.

There are some occasions where Islam has noticeably been spoken of and used in

foreign policy issues, in particular with the Muslim world. However, Islam does not

constitute the main substance of interests, such as the commitment to pursue Islamic

solidarity.

Islam and the Making of Indonesia’s National Identity

Initially, the presence of Islam as a social and political movement in Indonesia needs to

be clarified. Islam in this country is not monolithic. There are various streams of

identities visible in distinct social and political associations. For analytical purposes,

Islam/Islamic movements in Indonesia can be compartmentalized into two inclinations;

traditionalists and modernists or reformists. Also one can envisage this as the divide

between santri (devout Muslim) and abangan (nominal Muslim). The difference

amongst such propensities is centred on profound interpretations of the way Islam

should be applied in a Muslims’ social and political life. This analytical labelling does

not necessarily mean they are completely distinct or separated. In fact, Muslim

individuals and groups in Indonesia frequently adjust to developments in their social,

economic, and political environments, making the border between such dichotomies

increasingly blurred.

Islam came to Indonesia from the Indian subcontinent through trade exchanges in the

15th century. Islamization of indigenous societies flourished due to marriages between

the traders and local women. Islam expanded peacefully throughout the Malay lands.

After Western powers, such as Portuguese and the Dutch, who invaded peoples in the

Indonesian Archipelago, Islam turned into a force of struggle against colonialism, for

18

example in the rebellion of Pangeran Diponegoro in Central Java and Perang Padri in

West Sumatra during the 19th century (Taba 1996, 115-23).

Prior to the 20th century, Islam in Indonesia specifically in Java had shared a common

peculiarity with the older Hindu-Buddhist-Javanese traditions in terms of the dominant

aspect of its tolerance and inclusiveness. At this stage, the friendly characteristic of

Islam was another catalyst for the process of Islamization in Indonesia; at least it served

as a nice introduction to Islamic teachings. Indonesian Islam refers to the followers of

customary Islam, illustrated by a combination of local practices and those that are

shared throughout the Islamic world. This mixed tendency is named traditional Islam of

Indonesia (Abdullah 1989, 58).

Nonetheless, by the late 19th century and the early 20th century, a serious challenge to

such a blended trait of Indonesian Islam began to rise as the ideology of Islamic

reformism from Egypt reached Indonesia (Laffan 2003). The emergence of the Islamic

reform movement in Indonesia contributed to the background of the divergence in the

modern Indonesian Muslim community, and the difference between the traditionalists

and the modernists or reformists. This split at the level of discourse was, and remains in

its place up to now, apparent in the form of the two largest Islamic mass organizations;

Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. It is the dominant approach to understand the

meaning of Islam in the country. The direct impact of Islamic reformism on Indonesian

Islamic society was that more Indonesian Muslims, particularly those living in urban

areas, confronted the adequacy of the traditional versions of Islamic life in the face of

modernity. Those who wished to reform and modernize Islam in Indonesia were

influenced by the economic changes taking place at the end of the 19th century,

especially those beginning in West Sumatra (Dobbin 1983, 141).

Reformist Islam opposed traditional Indonesian Muslims on two terms. Firstly, for what

modernists saw as syncretistic practices amongst traditional Muslims. Modernists

regarded them as the cause of decay in the faith (Ali 1971, 13). Secondly, Reformists

19

contested the traditional Muslims’ like of uncritical following of the dictates of religious

leaders without learning Islam creatively (Barton 1997, 324). The reformist Muslims

dreamed of creating a new image of the world and their position in it, that is, essentially

to be modern while remaining Muslim (Rahman 1987, 240-2).

This reform spirit spread quickly, first starting in Minangkabau in West Sumatra it soon

arrived in Java, the centre of traditionalist Muslims, from where is spread to become

more popular in the cities such as Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Bandung, and Kudus. The

carriers of the reformism were Indonesian Muslims with Arab descent, and to a smaller

extent those who came from the Indian subcontinent. Around 1900, about 18,000 Arab

Indonesian Muslims lived in the Indonesian Archipelago. They mostly originated from

the Hadramut region. This group continued to make contact with, and follow

developments in the Middle East. Many of them had graduated from madrasahs

(Islamic school) in the Middle East, especially those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For the

purpose of Islamic teachings, the Djamiat Chair was established in 1905, and eight

years later al-Irsyad madrasah was founded in Indonesia (Noer 1973, 68-80). The

flourishing modernism and reformism in Indonesian Islam gave birth to two Islamic

mass organizations; Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam.

Muhammadiyah was a modernist Islamic organization established on 18 November

1912 by K. H. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta. Since its inception, this organization had

been aimed at propagating the idea of Islamic reformism in Indonesia. Ahmad Dahlan

went to Mecca to study Islam with the Grand Imam of Masjid al-Haram Sheikh Ahmad

Khatib who was originally from Minangkabau. Ahmad Dahlan was in Mecca between

1903 and 1904 when he was introduced to the thoughts of Islamic reform by some

Middle East scholars, namely Ibn Taimiyah, Imam al-Ghazaly, Muhammad Abduh, and

Rasyid Rhida (Ma’arif 1985, 85). Upon returning home, Ahmad Dahlan had in mind

that the condition of his society needed to be changed, and to this end he was

encouraged and supported by other Arab Indonesian Muslims in Yogyakarta to build an

organization instrumental for reform, Muhammadiyah (Salam 1968, 9).

20

Muhammadiyah sought to purify Islam against the heretical doctrine and myths often

trained by Indonesian traditional Muslims, especially those in Java. It wanted to banish

superstition adhered to by elements of traditional Muslims (Rabasa 2003, 14-5). The

reform movement of Muhammadiyah embarked upon the idea of innovation,

restoration, renewal and modernization. Impressively, it succeeded in expanding

branches and activities in spiritual, social and educational fields through an extensive

network of youth and women’s associations, clinics, orphanages, and a large and

modern school system. By the early 1930s, Muhammadiyah had developed 557

branches all over Java and elsewhere. This impressive organizational advancement was

perhaps helped by the nature of the organization, which is not based on a certain ethnic

tradition in particular with the Javanese, but is an inclusive Islamic movement (Alfian

1989).

Unlike Muhammadiyah that was focused on social and religious movement for reform,

Sarekat Islam was founded as the first Islamic political party in Indonesia with the

purpose to liberate Indonesians from the Dutch colonial rule. Stemming from a

committee of local Muslim merchants who were facing competition from stronger

Chinese textile importers, Sarekat Islam transformed itself into a political group in a

congress in Solo 11 November 1912 (Ghani 1984, 12-3). This party leadership was

entrusted to a young Muslim intellectual H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto. In 1915, Sarekat

Islam developed its branches in Sumatra directed by Agus Salim and Abdul Muis. As a

political organization, Sarekat Islam was keen to promote an anti-colonialism

consciousness amongst Indonesians. It argued that people in the archipelago had to

leave their backwardness, and should not be passive against Western imperialism. In

Tjokroaminoto’s words, the ‘destiny of our people, free or colonized, is beholden to

ourselves…’ (Koever 1985, 271).

During the 1920s and 1930s, Sarekat Islam faced internal problems and a division of

opinion on what was an appropriate Islamic movement. This began when some

21

communists infiltrated the party branches, especially those in Central Java. The

communists were aware of Sarekat Islam’s ability to mobilize massive support, and

accordingly they used it as political vehicle. This communist move caused friction

within Sarekat Islam, between the ‘green’ Islamic and ‘red’ communists. In 1926, the

red faction incited an uprising in Banten West Java and in Silungkang one year later.

The Dutch took police action to terminate these insurgencies, and consequently Sarekat

Islam leaders were affected. Semaun and Darsono were of those who were exiled to

Tanah Merah Papua by the Dutch government (Noer 1973, 255-60).

Later, the new Sarekat Islam leadership under Abikusno Tjokrosujoso campaigned for

‘purification’ of the party. In fact, he ousted cadres who were holding positions in other

mass organizations. For example, Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo was fired as Sarekat Islam

executive because he was too an active chair of Muhammadiyah branch of Sumatra. The

sacking of Sukiman was followed by the resignation of Sarekat Islam members mainly

from Sumatra; amongst them was Mohammad Natsir, the then-chair of Masyumi

Islamic Party after Indonesian independence. This gave rise to the sentiment of Sarekat

Islam Java and Sumatra. In the Java circles, internal conflict occurred as well. Abikusno

was accused by Kartosuwiryo, a leader of the West Java branch, of changing the

orientation of the party to become more cooperative with the Dutch. Against this

accusation, Abikusno dismissed Kartosuwiryo in 1936; the latter then established his

own political base in West Java region known as the Committee for the Defence of

Truth (Ma’arif 1985, 88-90). In effect, the power of Sarekat Islam diminished.

The development of Islamic reformism, especially that invoked by Muhammadiyah,

was regarded as a threat by the traditional Muslim ulama (religious teachers) in rural

areas of Java. For the traditional ulama, Muhammadiyah’s spirit of reconciling Islam

with modernity was an implied denial to the teachings of great classical Islamic

scholars. The traditional ulama felt that it was necessary for a united response to the

reformism movement of Muhammadiyah. Nahdlatul Ulama was established in Surabaya

on 31 January 1926 to protect the existing way of life – the blend between Islam and

22

local cultural traditions – and in reaction to aspirations of the purification of Islam and

modernization carried by the reformists, whom the traditional ulama perceived had been

greatly influenced by the practices of Wahhabism fostered by King Abd’al -Aziz of

Saudi Arabia (Fealy & Barton 1996). Nahdlatul Ulama, therefore, was the

representation of the religious interest of chiefly traditional Javanese Muslims.

In response to the critics of the modernists, Nahdlatul Ulama, with its traditional ulama,

suggested a better adherence to the scriptural dictates, and above all obedience to

established sacred leadership (Riddell 2002, 70). Nevertheless, the traditional ulama

within Nahdlatul Ulama were not unwilling to change and reform. They quietly

implemented reform of their own; for example, by gradually decreasing dependence on

Malay and Javanese writings in religious schools, and inserting more recognized Middle

East literature. Reform in the madrasah’s curricula was also conducted with some

secular topics included in the teaching subjects. However, Muhammadiyah continued to

be perceived as a menace to traditionalist’ teachings, even though the gap between these

two Muslim groups had been narrowing. Nahdlatul Ulama lingered to adapt with newer

Islamic discourses developing in the modernists’ milieu (Van Bruinessen 1994).

The diversity in Indonesian Islamic groups was not just exemplified by the divide

between traditional Nahdlatul Ulama and modernist Muhammadiyah, yet it is popular

for academics to make other categorization of santri (devout Muslim) and abangan

(nominal Muslim) of Muslims, especially in Java Island (Geertz 1960, 172-90). Santri is

used to identify Muslims who strictly practiced shari’a and payed attention to Islamic

doctrines applied in social organizations or political parties. It is easy to discover that

devout Muslims are linked to madrasahs and societies surrounding them. Abangan, on

the other hand, tend not to obey Islamic doctrines as well, or use Islamic identity for its

social and political practices. In these identities, Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and

Nahdlatul Ulama represent a division within santri, while the nationalist Muslims like

Sukarno are known as abangan.

23

The Indonesian Muslim leaders were not unaware that the ideological disagreements

amongst them implicated disunity in the Indonesian peoples. An effort was made to

unite Indonesian Muslims or at least to mitigate the impact of their incompatibilities. On

27 September 1937, a new Muslim organization was formed, called Majelis Islam Al’a

Indonesia (MIAI). The initiators of MIAI were Mas Mansyur of Muhammadiyah,

Wondoamiseno of Sarekat Islam, and Muhammad Dahlan as well as Wahhab Hasbullah

of Nahdlatul Ulama. To avoid power rivalry amongst the Muslim figures, MIAI was set

up as a federative organization (Noer 1973, 261). Due to the strict watch from the Dutch

colonial master on potential Islamic movements, MIAI did not explicitly declare its

objective in political terms. However, a statement of the statute of MIAI implicitly

suggested that this federative group’s main goal was to fuse Muslim powers against the

colonialism of the Dutch (Ma’arif 1988, 20).

The establishment of MIAI was well accepted by Indonesian Muslims in general. This

was evident in 1941 when seven Islamic organizations committed to join the MIAI.

They were Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Partai Oemat Islam, al-Irsyad Surabaya,

Hidayatullah, Islamiyah Banyuwangi, and Khairiyah Surabaya. Nonetheless, Nahdlatul

Ulama rejected attaching formally with MIAI despite two of its leaders being the

originators of it. Again internal division was present in the Muslim movement.

Nahdlatul Ulama particularly disliked the Sarekat Islam leadership’s vested interest in

dominating MIAI (Taba 1996, 144-5). Internal contradiction amongst Indonesian

Muslim individuals and groups was responsible for their inability to effectively struggle

against the Dutch rule.

Parallel to the development of the Islamists, the seeds of secular nationalism grew in

Indonesian Muslims as well. The impetus was initiated by young middle-class students

who had attended Western education in Batavia (Jakarta). The secular nationalist

Muslims (or in shorthand secularists) were concerned about the prolonged internal

division amongst Indonesian Islamic groups. Therefore, they advocated nationalism and

unity instead of religious politics as the platform of the struggle for independence. The

24

spirit of nationalism impressively gained support from Muslims – from the Javanese

and other ethnic groups. On 4 July 1927, a group of Muslim students formed Partai

Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian National Party, PNI) led by Sukarno, this attracted

members from Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists, making this party the first national-

wide political movement with its membership representing plural Indonesian identities.

Sukarno announced that the goal of his party was ‘Indonesian independence, the

ideology was secular nationalism, and the territorial vision encompassed boundaries of

the Indonesian Archipelago under the Dutch colonial government…’ (Means 1947,

245).

The coming of PNI started politics that were preoccupied with debates between Islamist

political groups and the secularists in relation to the ideological base for the then-

Indonesian state. Debates revolved around whether independent Indonesia would be

founded on the grounds of Islam as the state ideology or a secular philosophical basis.

Hence, Islam as an ideology of struggle began to face challenges from non-Islamic

ones. Figures within the secularists had been more inspired by Western ideologies,

including socialism and fascism, whilst the others referred to the past golden age of

great kingdoms in the Indonesian Archipelago, such as Sriwijaya and Majapahit.

Nationalist leaders like Sukarno, Supomo, and Mohammad Hatta, although they were

Muslim, were socialized by the values of nationalist awakenings in other parts of Asia,

mainly Turkey, Japan, India, and China.

Sukarno was conscious of the superiority of the Dutch colonials and recognized the

weakness of the divided action, and hence urged that independence could only succeed

if all Indonesians were united. In response, Islamic political groups such as Sarekat

Islam, secular and Javanese cultural based organizations such as Budi Utomo, regional

political groups such as Jong Ambon, Jong Celebes, and Jong Andalas, as well as

Christian groups gathered with the secularist camp in the establishment of an

organization called Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (the

25

Agreement of Indonesian National Political Associations, PPPKI) (Dahm 1969, 29-34).

This group pledged to promote ‘unity in diversity’ to the struggle for independence.

However, the harmony within this association proved to be short-lived and superficial,

as the real differences in the ideological views of its elements came to light. Sarekat

Islam withdrew from the association because nationalist leaders rejected their proposal

for the recognition of Islam as the ideology of the people’s movement, and because the

traditional Muslims opposed their entitlement for the privilege of the urban Muslim

leadership with modernist discourse. For the secularists, religion and the state had to be

separated, an idea that could not be accepted by the Islamist groups. This hole occurred

between the Muslims themselves; on the one hand, secularists against the devout

Muslims, and the urban modernists against the traditionalist ulama on the other. The

association was finally dissolved in 1935 (Noer 1973, 340).

For the secularists led by Sukarno, Islam should not be the affair of the state, and the

identity of the independent Indonesian state should not be defined in terms of any

religion, including that of Islam. Sukarno argued that ‘reality showed the people of

Indonesia that the idea of integrating Islam in governance for a country which its

population not entirely Muslims would not be in line with democracy…’. To Sukarno’s

mind, a desire for an Islamic state was the creation of some Muslim scholars, and there

was no foundation for this in the Islamic teachings. Thus, it was not an obligation for

Muslims to establish an Islamic state. Moreover, the formation of an Islamic state in

Indonesia would engender problems with minorities (Zainuddin 2000, 18).

The secularist camp, represented by Supomo, further argued for a non-Islamic identity

by noting; ‘Islam is a personal matter, and thus it is not suitable to become the

philosophy of a state with pluralistic societies…Islam can be the subordinate of the

nationalism ideology…’. The position of Islam in Indonesian society was well thought-

out as equal to other religions even though they formed only the minority. It was also

common for the secularists to criticize what they viewed as the ‘backwardness’ of the

26

Islamic society, which was visible for instance in the practice of polygamy and

inequality between men and women. Islam was closely related to cultural conservatism

and an anti-democratic political system that impeded progress (Noer 1987, 27).

The Islamist groups objected to secularist’s notions. The spokesman of the Islamist

camp Mohammad Natsir (1955, 315) argued; ‘Islam is more than just a system of

theology, and Islam is a complete civilization comprising of general principles which

regulated the interaction amongst individuals and between individuals and the

society…’. Arguing further, Natsir contended that to make Islamic teachings and

directives operative ‘religion needed to be upheld by a system of authority like a

state…Hence, the accord between Islam and the state was an imperative…’. The Islamic

groups held the view that Islam had to be the integral part of the state, and in an

Indonesian context, it meant that Islam should shape the ideological basis of the

independent Indonesian state and should be explicitly stated in the constitution.

After Japan overthrew the Dutch colonists in 1942, it tried to manage the conflict

between Indonesian secular and Islamic nationalist groups. Between 1942 and 1945

under the Japanese governance, all political activities based on ideology were

prohibited. Instead, Japan approached both Indonesian secularists and Islamists to build

up the paramilitary, or people’s defence capabilities to protect their country. In fact,

Japan was not interested in the content of the debate between the secularists and

Islamists. Rather, it preferred to usher them for strategic purposes. Several local

combatant units were supported by Japan’s military. They were called Pembela Tanah

Air (the Defender of Nation, PETA), and were associated with the secularist camp. At

the same time, Islamic paramilitary groups were established, including Laskar

Syaifullah, Sabilillah, and Hezbollah in affiliation with Nahdlatul Ulama. The Japanese

ruler had no socio-religious vision to uplift such Islamic groups. It was genuinely aimed

at empowering local forces to aid its armed forces during the Pacific war (Benda 1980,

135-40).

27

When Japan began to suffer a loss in World War II, Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso

spoke at Ulimero Diet (parliament) meeting on 7 September 1944, promising

independence for Indonesia. This materialized in the founding of Komite Persiapan

Kemerdekaan Indonesia (the Committee of the Preparation for Indonesian

Independence, PPKI) on 9 April 1945, which was inaugurated on 28 May that year

under the aegis of the Japanese government in Jakarta. PPKI held two sessions of

meetings; 29 May – 1 June and 10 – 16 July 1945. The committee’s main task was to

design the constitution of the independent Indonesia (Yamin 1960, 239).

PPKI consisted of 68 members; 8 Japanese, 15 representatives of Islamist groups who

wanted Islam to be the basis of the Indonesian state, and the rest belonged to secularists

and regional representatives that were in favour of non-Islamic views. It was chaired by

Radjiman Wedyoningrat, a mystic Javanese aristocrat. The Islamist voices were

outspoken by figures such as Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Ahmad Sanusi, Kahar Muzakkir,

and Wahid Hasyim. Since the Japanese representative was not actively involved in

PPKI’s discussions, the Islamist camp was again face-to-face with the secularists (Noer

1987, 30-2).

The dissenting opinions over whether Islam would be the fundamental ideology of

Indonesia were repeated during PPKI’s meetings (Yamin 1959, 115-20). Supomo, who

delivered his speech on 29 May, struck the Islamist camp by arguing that the latter’s

demand for a creation of Islamic state in Indonesia was not supported by solid empirical

evidence. It was followed by the statement made by Mohammad Yamin on 31 May

arguing for the need to build a nation-state based on unity of all ethnicities, not of pre-

eminence by any one particular religion – this was certainly a reference to Islam.

Sukarno, on his speech before the committee’s meeting on 1 June, offered an

ideological formula called Pancasila, a Sanskrit (ancient Javanese language) acronym

for the five principles; belief in one supreme God, humanity, national unity, people’s

democracy, and social justice. Nevertheless, the spokesman of the Islamist camp

28

refused all these positions, and pressed ahead with their will to adopt Islam as the state’s

identity.

The deadlock resulted in PPKI’s meetings forcing the committee’s chair to form a

committee of nine to discuss a solution to the difference. This committee consisted of

Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Mohammad Yamin, Ahmad Subardjo, a Christian figure

Alexander Andries Maramis of the secularists, as well as Wahid Hasyim, Kahar

Muzakkir, Abikusno, and Agus Salim from the Islamist camp. Following intense

consultations, Pancasila was accepted as a compromise solution by both camps, with an

insertion of the phrase ‘with the obligation to implement shari’a for all Muslims…’

after the first principle of belief in one supreme God, in the preamble of the constitution.

This agreement is known as the Djakarta Charter, issued on 22 June 1945. It was also

agreed that the president of Indonesia had to be a Muslim (Zainuddin 2000, 19).

With such an agreement, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia

on the morning of 17 August 1945. Sukarno was appointed as the first Indonesian

president and Hatta as his vice president. To the surprise of the Islamist groups, on 18

August when the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was promulgated, the

clause stating the compulsion of the implementation of shari’a for Muslims, as well as

the provision that the president of Indonesia must be a Muslim, were omitted from the

preamble and the articles of the constitution (Zainuddin 2000, 20). This meant that the

Islamic expressions in the Djakarta Charter were not incorporated in the constitution.

This exclusion of Islamic ideas caused anger to the Islamists, as expressed by Natsir

(1955, 101) ‘the constitution has no legitimacy in Islam…’. However, the secularists

had their own explanation. For example, Hatta (1979, 458-60) acknowledged that on the

morning of 18 August, he talked with Ki Bagus Hadikusumo about the Protestant and

Roman Catholic leaders who entertained reservations about the constitution, and hence

in order to secure the unity of the newly independent republic, the Islamic articles were

removed. Beside this, Hatta wanted the Islamist groups to understand two crucial

29

situations; one was that the newly independent state had to have a constitution

immediately, and two was that the political temperature in Jakarta at the time was such

that prolonged contradictions would be counterproductive. Eventually, Hadikusumo

accepted Hatta’s arguments, and for Hatta this meant that the Islamist camp was willing

to give consent.

To the Islamists, especially revealed by Hadikusumo and Hasyim Asy’ari, one

important reason for their agreement with Pancasila as the ideology of Indonesia was

that Sukarno had promised to undertake general elections quickly after the declaration

of independence, and this would be followed by complete reformulation of the

constitution for the better. Islamist leaders were very sure that independence would by

all means bring about stability and tranquillity, so that general elections could be held

within six months. They were convinced as well that in the elections the majority of

Indonesians who professed to Islam (at that time about 48 million of the 60 million)

would vote for them. By winning the elections, the agenda of establishing a state based

on shari’a would be ensured (Noer 1987, 41-2).

The deletion of the Islamic expressions of the Djakarta Charter from the Indonesian

constitution formalized the identity of the independent state as being empty of Islamic

mentions. Indonesia was, according to the secularist leaders, neither theocratic nor

secular but a state based on Pancasila. The transcendental value in the ideological basis

was inherent in the first principle of belief in one supreme God. The history of the

construction of Indonesian identity demonstrates that the secular component was

leading. It, in many respects, will contribute to the way the post-independence

government creates the state’s international posture.

Islam, Elite Interest and Indonesian Politics after Independence

In the period after independence, the Islamist camp was given minority proportion of

government. Within the appointed legislative council, which comprised of 137

30

members, the Islamist camp obtained only 20 seats, and under Sukarno-Hatta

presidential cabinet, inaugurated in September 1945, which consisted of 26 ministries,

only Abikusno and Wahid Hasyim were assigned positions, as minister of physical

reconstruction and minister of religious affairs respectively (Boland 1985, 40).

However, the domination of the secularists raised new awareness amongst the Islamists

for the need to consolidate power through the creation of a more solid Islamic-oriented

party.

The newly shaped Indonesian government gave out an administrative instruction no. 10

on 3 November 1945 signed by Vice President Hatta, suggesting the formation of

formal political parties. It was welcomed by a variety of groups through the

establishment of their own political parties. Essentially, there were three main streams

of political orientations in the parties established; 1) Islamists represented by the

Masyumi Islamic Party which was supported by Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and

Nahdlatul Ulama; 2) secular nationalists still under PNI; and 3) Marxist/Leninists

adhered to by, for instance, Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist

Party, PKI) (Kahin 1980, 192-204).

Masyumi was created at an Islamic congress held in the office block of Mu’allimin

madrasah in Yogyakarta from 5 to 7 November 1945. It was decided at the meeting that

Masyumi would become the only Islamic political party in Indonesia that would

struggle on behalf of the aspirations of all Muslims in the country over the formation of

an Islamic state (Ma’arif 1988, 31). The structure of Masyumi leadership resembled

collaboration of the three aforementioned Islamist groups. In the Majelis Syura (council

of advisors) sat Nahdlatul Ulama figures, such as Hasyim Asy’ari and Wahid Hasyim,

whilst the executive board consisted of career politicians such as Abikusno,

Kartosuwiryo, Sukiman, Mohammad Roem, Agus Salim and Natsir of Sarekat Islam

and Muhammadiyah (Boland 1985, 41). With the composition of such a big Islamic

mass organizations, Masyumi was likely to become the strongest political force at the

time.

31

Nevertheless, Islamists continued to differ amongst themselves and engage in political

alignments that were not determined by their Islamic identity but by the need for power.

This started in 1947 when Sarekat Islam decided to withdraw from Masyumi and ally

with the socialist party under Amir Syarifuddin who needed an Islamic constituent to

back up his coalition government. Masyumi leaders were opposed to Marxist/Leninist

movements, and regarded Sarekat Islam’s move as an ideological betrayal. However,

the motive of Sarekat Islam was to achieve executive positions in the government, and

not an ideological shift as alleged by Masyumi leadership (Feith 1964, 138-9).

This friction worsened when traditional differences again arose between

Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama sections in Masyumi, which in turn led to the

withdrawal of the traditionalist ulama from the Islamist party. Originating from a

proposal, launched by Muhammadiyah members who dominated the executive board in

1949, to relegate the authority of Majelis Syura, the Nahdlatul Ulama supporters of

Masyumi protested to the modernists’ plan. As their request was not met, in 1952

Nahdlatul Ulama announced the formation of a new Islamic party separated from

Masyumi, the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (Marijan 1992, 62). The impact of such internal

fragmentation between the Islamists was seen later in their inability to place solid and

significant influence on the governance.

After the transfer of power from the Dutch colonial master to the Indonesian

government on 27 December 1949, Sukarno inaugurated the application of

parliamentary democracy in the country’s political system. It was constituted in the

temporary constitution ratified on 17 August 1950. The prime minister’s cabinet, which

was balanced by parliament, carried out governance, the president was merely a uniting

symbol of the nation. This system was coloured by the rise and fall of political parties

forming the government and local parties and people’s council, which were

mushrooming, fighting for greater autonomy from the central government.

32

The first cabinet was operated by Prime Minister Hatta in early 1950. The cabinet under

Natsir of Masyumi then replaced Hatta’s administration in 1951. Natsir’s cabinet

dissolved in 1952, and Sukiman of Sarekat Islam came to power. Between 1951 and

1952, Masyumi was a strong political power that formed a coalition government with

the secularist PNI. However, in the aftermath of the withdrawal of Nahdlatul Ulama

from this Islamic party, its capacity to govern was overwhelmed by PNI, and Masyumi

played an opposition role. The secularists took over government in 1952 under Wilopo,

followed by the cabinet of Ali Sastro Amidjojo, which began in 1953. The Amidjojo

government stepped down in 1955. The year of 1955-1956 was a short-term tenure, of a

cabinet led by Burhanuddin Harahap, its main undertaking was to hold general elections

(Lev 1966, 46-9).

The significant impact of disunity amongst Islamic political parties is observable in

their vote achievements in the 1955 general elections. Islamist parties, mainly Masyumi,

continued to campaign for the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia, whilst Nahdlatul

Ulama focused more on developments in the rural areas. In the elections PNI and its

secularist allies obtained 45 percent of the vote; Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama got

respectively 20 percent and 18 percent votes; and PKI gained the rest, 16 percent. With

these achievements, Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama were invited to form a coalition

government with the secularists. Masyumi came back to executive together with the

cabinet led again by Prime Minister Amidjojo (Noer 1987, 353-4). However, it should

be noted that the attainment of only 20 percent votes by Masyumi reflected the lack

popularity of its maintained political agenda for Islam.

The direct implication of the practice of parliamentary democracy for Indonesia was

nothing but political instability. Sukarno was unhappy with this scheme and with the

patronage of the military on 9 April 1957 the president appointed a new cabinet led by

Prime Minister Djuanda. Sukarno assigned himself to engage in governance, causing

protests, especially from Masyumi. In addition Sukarno created a representative council

known as the constituent assembly, to formulate a new constitution. This institution was

33

composed of 230 representatives of the Islamic groups (of which 112 were from

Masyumi) and 286 secular nationalists (Ma’arif 1988, 123). The old debates over the

nature of Indonesian state’s identity reappeared in the constituent assembly.

During the constituent assembly meetings, three drafts of state ideology were proposed

and debated, Islam, Pancasila, and economic socialism. By virtue the last draft,

economic socialism, was articulated only by a minority of 9 members of the constituent

assembly, it did not get significant attention during the discussions. As a result, the

debates were preoccupied by the pro-Islam and pro-Pancasila poles (Ma’arif 1988, 124).

The pro-Pancasila figures such as Suwiryo of PNI retained their long held argument that

if Islam were enforced as the state ideology, regions with non-Muslim populations,

including Flores, Bali, Kai, Maluku, Timor, and West Irian would no longer want to be

part of the republic, and therefore Indonesia needed to keep the place of Pancasila as its

basis. Fundamental to this position was the secularists’ draft of state ideology which

stated; ‘the Republic of Indonesia is desirous to build its society that believes in one

supreme God and protects the will of all religions; including Islam, Christianity, Hindu,

and Buddhism…’. On the fundamental principles of the state, it pointed to ‘the notion

of the supremacy of God, respect for humanity, maintenance of national integration,

implementation of people’s democracy, as well as the creation of social justice, which

were incorporated in Pancasila…’ (Anshari 1986, 96-7).

For those who were pro-Islam, such an argument was greatly unacceptable. For

instance, as conveyed by its faithful spokesman Natsir, ‘Pancasila is an empty ideology,

it can be easily misinterpreted as separating religion from social and political system

albeit acknowledging the existence of God…Indonesia, thus, requires a filled

philosophical basis which is clear, powerful, firm and alive in the soul of its people

majority adhering to Islam…’. Emphasizing the value of Islam, Natsir argued ‘the

principles conceived by Pancasila are by all means there in Islam, Pancasila is not pure

but it is originally part of Islam…’. Accordingly, Natsir advised the secularists to agree

34

to take Islam as the state ideology and national identity of Indonesia, and that there

would be no disadvantages of approving of Islam (Anshari 1986, 90-3).

Until the last session of the constituent assembly’s debate on 5 June 1959 there was no

agreement reached. President Sukarno, who was upset by this inconclusive argument,

froze the constituent assembly through a decree on 5 July 1959. With the decree,

Sukarno also reinforced the 1945 Constitution and reaffirmed the unchallengeable

position of Pancasila as the state ideology, and terminated the practice of parliamentary

democracy in Indonesia (Nasution 1992, 78).

Outside the political forum, the contentions between the secularists and Islamists were

reduced in regional politics, as the national Islamist movements retreated to regional

areas to strengthen their position. The regionalization of the Islamists, lead to more

extreme manifestations of their ideologies defying the legitimacy of the Pacasila state,

including ideas of revolution to replace it with an Islamic state. Darul Islam were the

most vivid Islamist rebels during Sukarno’s governance. Darul Islam (the house of

Islam) was a religious-political idea and movement promoted by Kartosuwiryo in 1948

(Awwas 1999). The main base of this Islamist group had initially come from West Java

Province. Before starting Darul Islam, Kartosuwiryo joined the central government in

Jakarta, where he was appointed as deputy minister of defence. There were two reasons

why Kartosuwiryo founded Darul Islam. Firstly, Kartosuwiryo was frustrated with the

diplomatic route taken by Sukarno when dealing with the colonial Dutch master.

Kartosuwiryo disapproved of Sukarno’s willingness to negotiate with the Dutch, which

had resulted in the Linggajati Agreement of March 1947 and Renville Agreement of

April 1948. According to these agreements, Indonesia was transformed into a

federation, a reality that Kartosuwiryo perceived to be a betrayal of the republic’s

constitution. Secondly and more importantly was that Kartosuwiryo, since joining

Sarekat Islam in the 1930s, had long kept in his mind the dream of creating an Islamic

state in Indonesia as his principal political objective. He accused the secularists,

35

especially Sukarno and Hatta, of committing crimes against Islam on account of their

consistent refusal to accept it as the state’s philosophy (Jackson 1980).

Kartosuwiryo built the military wing of Darul Islam on 7 August 1949, called Tentara

Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Army, TII). As the objective of Darul Islam

was to create an Islamic state in Indonesia, this movement expanded to other regions,

including Sumatra Island (in Lampung and Aceh), South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan,

and Central and East Java. Some believed that the ideal of Darul Islam received support

in these regions because of a combination of two factors; one was the regional dislike of

the over-centralistic governance in Jakarta, and two was the Islamic solidarity of the

paramilitary veterans in those regions, some of whom were members of Laskar

Hezbollah, with Kartosuwiryo, having been established there since the Japanese rule.

Darul Islam’s affiliates sparked insurgencies in Central Java led by Amir Fatah in 1949,

South Sulawesi under Kahar Muzakkar, and in South Kalimantan under Ibnu Hadjar

both in 1952, and in Aceh under Daud Beureueh starting in 1953 (Dijk 1981).

The central government saw the enhancement of the regional Islamic struggle as being

destabilising to the parliamentary democratic process, largely because of the presence of

more than one central power. By 1958, Sukarno had commanded police action

suppressing Darul Islam’s rebellious activities. Darul Islam was eventually contained

and neutralized in 1962 following the destruction of its central command in West Java

and the arrest of its ideologue Kartosuwiryo (he was later sentenced to death). Masyumi

strongly protested against Sukarno’s military operation. Consequently, Sukarno banned

Masyumi in 1962, because it was alleged to have connections with the unconstitutional

movement of Darul Islam (Dengel 1986).

Insurgency perpetrated by Darul Islam had adversely affected the position of Islamic

political movements in the country. The central government considered radical

expressions of Islam, and their zeal for building an Islamic polity, as a source of

political instability and potential disturbance to national integration. The disbanding of

36

Masyumi displayed another phase of marginalization of Islamic ideas and identity in

Indonesian domestic politics led by the secularists. Indonesian Muslims had to willingly

accept the reality that Pancasila was their state’s ideology and national identity.

In the wake of the dissolution of the parliamentary system, in 1959 Sukarno established

his own model of governance named the Guided Democracy. This was nothing more

than a kind of dictatorship, whereby the central political authority lay on one chief

figure, Sukarno himself. The president, however, did not entirely stop the process of

Islamization in politics. This was evident in the inclusion of religious representation in

Sukarno’s unifying formula of Nasakom (an acronym derived from nationalism,

religion, and communism) that provided an acceptable place for the religious parties’

content to exercise patronage on behalf of the faithful. Traditionalist Islam, like

Nahdlatul Ulama, was accommodated within Nasakom. Meanwhile, the modernists,

who were mostly linked with Masyumi, were kept at bay. Under the Guided

Democracy, Islamic groups found themselves divided and kept off-balance, by virtue of

the requirement to defer to the secular nationalist’s ideology in the fight against the

remaining colonialism, and to seek allies against the communists. As a result, during

this time of Sukarno’s governance, Islamic political movements were domesticated, and

were not in a position to confront the dominance of Sukarno’s Nasakom (Leifer 1983b,

147-8). Hence, Sukarno’s real interest was to accumulate his political power.

An abortive coup, allegedly masterminded by PKI between 30 September and 1 October

1965 paved the way for the ousting of Sukarno from power, and the rise of the New

Order government under General Suharto. The communists were heavily implicated.

Suharto and the army joined forces to counter the communist movement (Hering 1986).

Following the successful revision of the political system, Muslim parties expected a

political reward. Muslim groups could now form the majority government, they looked

forward to the practice of Islam becoming the way of life throughout the country, and

achieving the establishment of an Islamic state.

37

They were, however, disappointed. For instance, in 1966 the military leaders

supposedly identified Masyumi and the communist movement as deviants from

Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and rejected to rehabilitate it (Feith & Castles

1970). Moreover, the Islamists persisted on the reinstatement of the Islamic ideas of the

Djakarta Charter in the constitution. Nevertheless, at the session of the People’s

Consultative Assembly in March 1968, at which Suharto was confirmed as president in

place of Sukarno, the demand was again rejected. The military leadership under Suharto

generalized, based on the case of Darul Islam, that Islam still posed a danger to the

unity of the nation (Sukma 2006, 44-6).

Islam had no place in Suharto consolidated regime, which had the full backing of the

military, The New Order government designed policies on the containment and further

marginalization of Islam in Indonesia’s political system. All political parties were

disallowed to purse ideological agendas. Rather, the theme of political articulation was

directed at creating national stability for the success of economic development. Islamic

groups were allowed to advance their religious and cultural activities, but not to

influence the process of governance. Suharto assigned the Ministry of Home Affairs,

which was always led by an active army General, to administer all political movements,

conduct the function of political socialization, articulation, and communication to the

people. The space for political parties, including that of the Islamists, was limited (Taba

1996, 200-6). As a result, in the first general elections held by the New Order regime in

1971, Islamic parties obtained only 27 percent of the total recorded votes, only half of

the achievement in the 1955 elections. Whilst the New Order-backed political party,

Golkar, won the majority of 55 percent votes (Liddle & Emmerson 1973).

Further suppressing Islamic influences on the political system, the New Order

government instructed the fusion of all existing Islamic parties into one party called

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), in which the

symbol of Islam was not displayed. The PPP was inaugurated on 5 January 1973 in

Jakarta, comprising of sections from Sarekat Islam, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Masyumi

38

who had been prevented by Suharto from reviving their banned party. Because the

formation of PPP was engineered by the New Order and not a grass-roots wish by these

Islamist groups to merge their political power, internal incompatibilities reappeared and

undermined it. Nahdlatul Ulama decided to leave the party in 1984 because of its

opposition to the leadership of Sarekat Islam in PPP,. This resulted in the decrease in

popular Islamic support for the party since Nahdlatul Ulama’s masses were no longer

encouraged to vote for PPP (Haris 1991, 100).

Moreover, PPP faced two other problems (Haris 1991, 148). Firstly, this party faced an

identity crisis due to the government prohibition of the formal use of ideological symbol

for the party. The symbol of Ka’bah, which reflected its Islamic identity was not

accepted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, instead it had to identify itself with a star

which referred to the first principle of Pancasila; belief in one supreme God. Therefore,

the Islamic party could not express its religious identity. Secondly, PPP as a political

party had never got the chance to perform its political functions, especially in relation to

communication to the grass-root masses. This was because the role was dominated by

the government’s bureaucracy under the ministry of home affairs. The PPP cadres could

communicate with their constituents only during the general elections campaign. As a

result, the distance between PPP’s elite and the masses led to the lack of grass-roots

attraction to this Islamist party, and as a result in a way Islam became more

marginalized from Muslim public’s political narratives.

On the grounds of retaining political stability, President Suharto signed the Law no.

5/1985 insisting the government’s policy of Pancasila be the sole ideological foundation

for all social (including religious) and political organizations in Indonesia. This policy

had been announced in 1982, yet protests from Islamic groups caused its

implementation to be delayed. It was actually aimed at decreasing and, if not, removing

the influence of ideology and religion in politics (Prawiranegara 1984, 74-5).

Furthermore, the New Order regime wanted to homogenize political aspirations for the

stability of its power base. For the Muslim community and political parties, this policy

39

was conspicuously seen as an attempt by the New Order to prevent Islam from ever

again becoming an independent and potential political force (Taba 1996, 273-5). During

the 1970s and 1980s, the New Order ruler effectively paralysed Islam’s political power.

By the late 1980s and through the 1990s, a sign of change was visible in Suharto’s

policies toward relations with the Muslim people. Suharto tried to reengage with the

Muslim community. Suharto approved the establishment of an Islamic organization

called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Association of Indonesian

Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI) in December 1990, then led by B. J. Habibie who was

serving as minister of research and technology in the New Order cabinet. Despite

endorsing the creation of the ICMI, Suharto favoured the founding of Islamic Bank

Muamalat, the Abdi Asih Foundation, and the Centre for Information and Development

Studies in 1991 functioning as a Muslim think-tank. An Islamic-oriented newspaper

Republika linked to the ICMI was allowed to publish. Additionally, Suharto approved

the initiative by Muslim leaders for the banning of lottery games, as it was regarded as

gambling. Islamic propagation activities were upheld by Suharto’s foundation of

Pancasila Muslim (Azra 2006, 93-4). The ICMI attained the endorsement of Indonesian

Muslim community, especially the modernist Muslim figures, such as Amien Rais who

was chairing Muhammadiyah.

The establishment of the ICMI and Suharto’s favour for the various kind of Islamic

activism at that time did not reflect his growing Islamic credentials, but rather was

related to his need to retain legitimacy for his regime. Islam began to be viewed as

potential, and actual, additional source of power beside the regime’s large bureaucracy

and Golkar Party. The ICMI was founded by Muslim intellectuals whose political vision

did not suggest adherence to Islamic doctrine. It did not talk of the struggle for the

formation of an Islamic state, and its focus was on economic issues pertinent to

Muslims rather than politics1. Thus, the New Order leader could safely connect the

ICMI to the discourse of national development, and at the same time appear to be more

1 More details about the background of the ICMI and its roles in domestic and international affairs will be discussed in Chapter Five.

40

cordial with Islam. In parallel, Suharto felt that he was in a power contest with his

traditional ally, the military, which was perceived to have shown a decline in its

political backing to the New Order leadership (Suryadinata 1996). As a consequence,

Suharto considered that being seen as more Islamic in his appearance would be effective

for gaining Muslim support.

In May 1998, the New Order regime collapsed in the aftermath of social disorder

prompted by the government’s ineffective management of the economic and financial

crises that began in mid 1997. Subsequently, democracy was institutionalized to

supplant the three-decade long Suharto authoritarianism. Under the democratic system,

access to political participation was opened for Indonesian Muslims. During the

governance of Habibie, dozens of new political parties were established with various

ideological spectrums, including a number of Islamic-oriented and/or Muslim parties.

Muslims were allowed to form social organizations with Islam present in their formal

identity. Under President Abdurrahman Wahid, freedom of speech was guaranteed and

fortified by the law. Islam remerged as a legal political force in democratic Indonesia.

The successive governments of Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang

Yudhoyono strengthened the multiparty system in Indonesian democracy.

Since 1999 there have been about 20 Islamic-oriented and/or Muslim parties registered

with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. Based on their ideological reference and

membership characters, they can be classified as exclusive Islamist, and inclusive or

pluralist Muslim parties (Azra 2004, 140-1). The exclusive Islamist party used Islamic

symbols, including Ka’bah and Qur’an, as its official identity. Membership was

restricted to Muslims whose political views were identical, for instance the ideal of

implementing shari’a in Indonesia, anti-Suharto’s legacies, and democracy in Islamic

perspective. Several parties can be included in this category; Partai Keadilan Sejahtera

(the Justice and Prosperous Party, PKS), Partai Bulan Bintang (the Star and Crescent

Party, PBB), Partai Masyumi Baru (the New Masyumi Party, PMB), and PPP.

41

The inclusive or pluralist Muslim party kept Pancasila as its political ideology, although

identification with Islam was clear in terms of its major grass-root supporters

originating from mass Islamic organizations. Generally, the membership of this party

was not confined to Muslims. It was open to encompass members from other religions,

and had a tolerant attitude toward affairs concerned with Muslim and non-Muslim

relations. This party has showed a tendency to endorse non-religious agendas, for

instance, good governance and democratization. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the

National Awakening Party, PKB) supported mostly by Nahdlatul Ulama and Partai

Amanat Nasional (the National Mandate Party, PAN), which is affiliated with

Muhammadiyah, can all be considered to be pluralist Islamic parties.

Besides political parties, socio-religious Islamic groups have been mushrooming and

operate freely. The most dramatic phenomenon has been the emergence of radical

Islamic organizations, such as Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defender

Front, FPI), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin,

MMI)2. They are labelled as radicals by virtue of their unchallengeable belief in Islam,

which must be applied in its full and literal form without compromise, as set out in

Qur’an and Sunnah (ways of life exemplified by Prophet Muhammad) and their

penchant for reactive ideas, languages, and violent physical actions toward what is

envisaged as atheists, materialists and corrosive deviationist movements (Fealy 2004,

104). It is commonly known that the radicals have circumstantial connections with

exclusive Islamic parties.

Muslim political groups have benefited from the democratic moment. They are free to

express and promote ideas and activities in the political arena. However, Islam still

receives only restricted acknowledgement in governance. This can be discerned through

the continuing pre-eminence of the secularists’ features and interests. Pancasila has

sustained its position providing the basic philosophy and national identity for the state,

2 More information on the background and activities of these Islamists will be presented in Chapter Seven.

42

despite the fact that Islam has been used in social and political identities, and shari’a

has still not been implemented as national law governing all aspects of Muslim life.

This trend has perhaps been influenced by internal and external factors shaping the

weakness of Islamists. The internal factor has been that various Islamic parties

participating in the elections have had an impact on the attitudes of mass voters (Azra

2004, 141-2). Firstly, ideological contestation within the Islamic parties has bought

back political fragmentation amongst them. This has manifested into inter-elite conflict,

as well as clashes between fanatic masses during the election campaign. As a result,

Islam has not yet become the force that unites those Muslims.

Secondly, in internal party affairs, elites competing for individual political gain have

caused frictions. For instance, intense conflict between Yusril Ihza Mahendra and

Hartono Mardjono in PBB, caused a general split in the party’s management, which in

turn was followed by the resignation of Mardjono, and the subsequent establishment of

his new party called Partai Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Party, PII). This has

caused a decline in the party’s solidarity, and a subsequent reduction in its political

power.

Thirdly, the Islamic parties, especially radical Islamic groups and those with the

exclusive vision, have not demonstrated enough communication skills to argue their

agendas. To exemplify, during the 1999 election campaign PPP and Laskar Jihad

leaders urged the Muslim public not to cast their vote for party that was led by a

woman, the reference was to Megawati, because it was not in accordance with Islamic

interpretations of female obedience. The sentiment of gender bias behind these political

motives bought about political repercussions for the Islamic parties. More importantly,

Islamists wanting the realization of shari’a did not formulate the discourse with clarity,

and thus this appeared to the public as being more rhetorical than real.

The external factor is derived from the fact that secular political powers - such as the

established Golkar party, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (the Indonesian

43

Democratic Party of Struggle, PDIP), and Partai Demokrat (the Democrat Party, PD) –

performed stronger and were more capable than the Islamists in controlling governance.

In the parliamentary election of June 1999, the exclusive Islamic parties, such as PBB,

PKS, and PPP could obtain only 16 percent of the whole recorded vote, while the

secularists like Golkar and PDIP got of total 70 percent of the vote for both of them, and

the rest belonged to the inclusive Islamic parties PAN and PKB (Riddell 2002, 67).

Islam was less popular as a political platform than secularism and nationalism. The

issue of national reform and economic recovery pursued by the secularist parties as well

as pluralist Muslim parties proved to be more effective in attaining the political support

of the voters.

In the second general election conducted in July 2004, the exclusive Islamist parties did

indeed increase their strength from 16 to about 21 percent of the total vote. This

success, however, was ascribed primarily to the moderation of their Islamic rhetoric

before the election. Aware of Indonesian society’s reservations about shari’a

implementation, they downplayed their Islamic profile during the campaign. Their

candidates chose to fight on issues that Indonesians cared about, such as the eradication

of corruption, social injustice, job creation, and food prices, rather than discuss the

possibility of making Indonesia an Islamic state and implementation of shari’a (Eliraz

2007, 5). In the April 2009 elections, the achievement of the exclusive Islamist parties

decreased to 15 percent of the total recorded vote, whilst the secularists were able to

maintain an outcome of no less than 70 percent; the rest went to pluralist Muslims

(www.pemiluindonesia.com). This suggests the popularity of Islam in political ideas

and movement has gradually decreased amidst the persistent dominance of secularist

powers.

With this result, in order to get a ticket to participate in government the Islamists have

had to join a coalition with the secularists. Because the Islamists are weaker, their

ability to direct the government’s policies has been limited. In parliament their

performance has also been curbed by the voices of the majority comprised of secularists

44

and pluralist Muslims. All of these factors contribute to the enduring insignificance of

Islam in Indonesia’s domestic politics, and foreign policy. In contrast, the secularists

have remained able to dictate policies based on their favoured material interests.

Islam in Indonesia’s Foreign Policy

Guided by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, as well as perceptions about the nature

of external milieu, the secularist leadership of the newly independent Indonesia defined

the basic principle of the state’s foreign policy. Islam has been formally absent since the

very beginning of the Indonesian foreign policy formulation. This is visible in the

country’s 1945 Constitution, which was promulgated one day after independence on 17

August 1945. The constitution mandates that Indonesian foreign policy uphold universal

values, mainly anti-colonialism. As stipulated firmly in the first paragraph of the

preamble of the constitution; ‘independence is the fundamental right of every nation,

and accordingly colonialism must be opposed because it is not suitable with the values

of humanity and justice…’. The constitution also commands the nation to contribute to

the creation of international order based on independence, permanent peace, and social

justice (Alami 2007, 27; Singadilaga 1970, 4-5; Subandrio 1964, 5).

This assertion means that the values referred to are strongly inspired by the historical

background of being colonised nation. Therefore, nationalism and anti-colonialism, not

Islam, developed into the principal discourse of Indonesian foreign policy makers’

worldview (Weinstein 1976, 161). The spirit of anti-colonialism strengthened when the

Dutch colonial master wanted to reimpose colonialism upon Indonesia by launching

military aggressions in the country in 1947 and again in 1948.

In addition, the newly independent state encountered international politics that was

evolving into the Cold War. The world was polarized by the ideological and military

rivalry between the Western capitalist bloc of the United States (US) and the Eastern

socialist bloc of the Soviet Union. In response, Jakarta decided not to join either of the

blocs. In a speech on foreign policy direction entitled Mendayung Antara Dua Karang

45

(Rowing between Two Reefs), Indonesian Vice President and at the time acting Prime

Minister Mohammad Hatta, articulated this independent activism foreign policy (politik

luar negeri bebas aktif), which up until today continues to be the indisputable doctrine

of the state’s international relations. Before the meeting of Komite Nasional Indonesia

Pusat (the Indonesian Central National Committee, KNIP) at Yogyakarta on 2

September 1948, Hatta (1953, 446) revealed that the country would seek to find a

different way in the world that was divided by the two power blocs. Indonesia would

not act in consonance with neutral or allied policies with either American or the Soviet

Union blocs. Indonesia would not draw back from world affairs. It would seek to

participate in international affairs to contribute to the creation of a better world, yet

would do so without the commitment to alliances.

Hatta emphasized that every issue would be analysed on the ground of Indonesian

qualities, and in accordance with the state’s pivotal national interests. In this light, the

independent activism foreign policy reflected pragmatism in the obvious reference to

the importance of protecting national interests as its main course of action. About this

Hatta (1958, 484) affirmed, ‘the policy should be executed in line with Indonesian

interests, and must be resolved in line with the fact it has to face…’. Therefore, there are

three underlying values expressed in Indonesian foreign policy doctrine, anti-

colonialism, independence, and pragmatism (Sukma 1995, 306).

Although not formally mentioned as a reference for state foreign policy, in reality Islam

had a significant role in supporting the conduct of Indonesia’s international diplomacy.

This was especially the case when the Dutch attempted to use military action to

reoccupy Indonesia. The Indonesian government stipulated that the focus of the state’s

foreign conduct was to meet the twin needs of securing international recognition for,

and defence of, its independence. Islamist figures – such as Agus Salim and Mohammad

Roem – used their Islamic identity to approach the Muslim world to gain recognition for

Indonesia’s independence. As a result of this diplomacy, Muslim countries of the

Middle East were the first to recognize Indonesian independence. On ground level,

46

foreign Muslim soldiers, especially those from the British Indian army stationed in

Indonesia, fought with Indonesian nationalists against the Dutch aggression. Islamic

solidarity was echoed during the physical revolution3. In this capacity Islam was

factually instrumental in obtaining the state’s material interests.

During the time of parliamentary democracy, when governments alternated between the

Islamist-led and the secularist-led coalitions, Islam was absent in both the interest and

instrument of foreign policy. For instance, under the governance of Mohammad Natsir’s

Masyumi Islamic party, Indonesia promoted relations with the US and not the Muslim

world. Domestic needs dictated such a policy. The Natsir government was facing

problems of insurgencies in some regions. Hence, it needed to modernize and empower

Indonesian military, with assistance from the US. Prime Minister Natsir emphasized

that the Indonesian-American military cooperation being fostered was intended to

maintain integrity and sovereignty of the republic (Bintang Timur 11 March 1952).

However, this move was unpopular as both the public and elite regarded it as pro-

American, and afterward pro-Western imperialism. Accordingly Natsir was toppled

from the prime ministership, and was replaced by successive secularist governments

under Prime Minister Wilopo and Ali Sastro Amidjojo. In 1955 their narrative of anti-

colonialism culminated in the holding of an Asian African conference. Indeed, the most

important issue in Indonesia’s foreign policy during the 1950s was the recovery of the

western half of the Island of New Guinea (West Irian/Papua) (Sukma 2006, 31-2).

Under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, foreign policy served both collaboration between

Jakarta and Beijing, with their shared anti-imperialism, as well as the domestic function

of sustaining volatile political equilibrium amongst the nationalists, religious, and

communists. In August 1962, a stormy episode occurred when Sukarno rejected to grant

entry permits to Israeli and Taiwanese athletes at the Asian Games held in Jakarta. At

the time this double exclusions easily fitted into Sukarno’s anti-colonial rhetoric and an

appeasement of China. The barring of Israeli athletes did not show any indication of a

specifically Islamic cause. It could have been related to an attempt by the president to 3 This story will be developed more fully in Chapter Two.

47

sweeten ties with the Indonesian Muslim community, who together with the

communists, had expected to keep out Israeli participation (Leifer 1983b, 151-2).

Nonetheless, Sukarno demonstrated a slight leaning towards Islamic identity, especially

when supporting Pakistan against India in the 1965 Kashmir war. Essentially, this

attitude was not genuinely motivated by Islamic solidarity. The backing for Islamabad

was given as a part of Sukarno’s geostrategic calculation to counter India4.

During the years of Sukarno, Islam had occasionally been used in support of particular

foreign policy goals. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, Islam’s roles conspicuously

waned in Indonesian international relations. For one thing, this was in line with

Suharto’s policies marginalising domestic Islamic voices. Suharto inherited from

Sukarno a collapsed economy, partly caused by intense political conflict both inside and

outside the country. The new regime placed economic development and cooperation as

the highest priority of foreign policy. The need to reap international economic benefits

brought Indonesia closer to the Western-industrialized powers. Economic development

and cooperation required regional stability. Therefore, Suharto’s foreign policy was

focused on the management of a stable Southeast Asian regional order (Mehdi 1973,

20-44). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 to

accommodate regional political, economic, and security cooperation amongst Indonesia,

Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. One strategic aim of ASEAN was

to resolve regional conflict through peaceful means (Anwar 1994).

The behaviour of communist superpowers in Southeast Asia was the major concern of

Suharto and his foreign policy circles. It was foremost related to the danger that the

expansion of communism in North Vietnam posed to Indonesian domestic security.

Suharto and the military establishment held a common interest in countering the

communists, following the 1965 coup, allegedly engineered by the Indonesian

communists. Beijing was accused of assisting PKI; this resulted in the freezing of

Indonesia’s relations with China. Furthermore, the New Order held suspicious views on

the Soviet Union’s behaviour in the region. With this assessment, Suharto focused 4 Chapter Two will also look at this case in more detail.

48

foreign policy more on Indonesia’s immediate regional affairs rather than other

international issues, including those pertinent to the Muslim world (Leifer 1983a).

Indonesian foreign policy came to be dominated by issues associated with the creation

of stability and cooperation development amongst non-communist states in Southeast

Asian region.

Nevertheless, regarding the position of Islam, since the early 1990s Suharto had started

to show greater interest in fortifying Indonesia’s relations with the Muslim world. This

was in line with the New Order leader’s friendlier attitude toward domestic Muslim

expressions. Thus, it is safe to assume that Suharto used foreign policy as a tool to

support his domestic need to attract the support of the Muslim community. Islam was

not the main cause of the enhanced ties with the Muslim world. To exemplify, by 1991

the ICMI’s figures, with the approval of Suharto, were keen to upgrade Indonesian

status within the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) from observer to full

member. Within the OIC, Indonesia paid more attention to Muslim-related issues.

However, the policy was not designed to pursue international Islamic solidarity5.

Instead, with a secular and pragmatic logic, Suharto saw Indonesia’s relations with the

Muslim states in an economic context (Azra 2006, 101-3; Sihbudi 1997, 19-25). This

case again indicates that Islam played some part in foreign policy, if only a limited one.

Material interests continued to dictate the foreign policy of successive governments

after Suharto, Particularly the need to resolve economic problems left by the New

Order. But, in limited contexts Islam/Islamic ideas had begun to receive consideration in

the state’s international projection.

The short-term administration of President Habibie (May 1998 – October 1999) did not

place Islam as a discourse of foreign policy. Instead, Habibie indicated an interest in

prioritizing Indonesian relations with the US and international financial institutions,

namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with the primary

objective of mobilizing economic resources for supporting national economy, which 5 Chapter Five will analyse this case more fully.

49

was plagued by terrible financial crisis (Kivimaki 2000). Habibie was replaced by

Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999.

Under President Wahid, the tendency to focus on non-Islamic agendas in Indonesian

foreign relations was sustained. Wahid, who was known as an Islamic intellectual and

former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama during the 1990s, did not see the relevance of Islam

as the basis of governance in a multicultural country like Indonesia. Wahid recognized

there were Muslims who had became familiar with the formalization of Islam.

Therefore, they attached the entire manifestation of Islamic teachings to the creation of

a state system based on Islam. However, the presence of an Islamic state system in

Indonesia would automatically put people who were not Muslims or devout Muslims in

a defensive or even marginalized position. Hence, the insistence on establishing an

Islamic state as the framework of nation building in Indonesia was questionable (Wahid

2007).

In the foreign policy area, Wahid paid attention to the relationship between Indonesia

and the Middle Eastern countries in two areas. One was on political issues pertinent to

Israel-Palestine conflict and the second was on the need to reap more alternative foreign

economic resources to help ease the impact of prolonged financial crisis (Smith 2001,

520). Wahid’s Middle Eastern policy became controversial with the Indonesian Muslim

public, when he began preparing to open diplomatic ties with Israel. His argument was

that to effectively building peace for Israel and Palestine, Indonesia had to recognize

Israeli state existence, and advanced a formal relationship with Tel Aviv. By doing this,

when trade links with Israel were unlocked, Indonesia would also benefit from the

strong worldwide Jewish-businesses. For his unusual initiative, Wahid was widely

criticized by Muslim leaders and the public, including those in Nahdlatul Ulama, many

of whom accused him of begging for Jewish money and ignoring the sensitivities of

Indonesian Islamic society. Due to mounting opposition, Wahid backed down on his

plan (Panggabean 2004, 33). This case demonstrates that although the ruling elite did

50

not have an interest in incorporating Islam in foreign policy, it did not necessarily mean

that the other actors could not influence the decision-making process.

President Megawati came to power in July 2001. The government under the secular

Megawati did not alter Wahid’s policy direction. It persisted in paying more attention to

non-religious economic and political agendas. The government intensified efforts to

attain economic benefits from abroad by promoting regional economic cooperation in a

liberalization scheme, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which was applied

formally on 1 January 2002. This was coupled with other Indonesian initiatives that

further fostered the formation of an ASEAN Security Community, though which it

hoped to regain the primus inter pares status in Southeast Asian region, a status that had

been unclear since the country’s national power weakened in the aftermath of the

economic turmoil (Weatherbee 2005).

Nonetheless, amidst the preoccupation of material interests, the events of the 11

September 2001 attacks brought a consideration of Islam into Megawati’s foreign

policy, but it did not shape it. This was especially evident when international pressure

mounted on Indonesia to take firmer action on radical Islamic groups. Megawati needed

to respond cautiously, on one hand, the policy had to deal with radical Islamists who

posed a threat to national and international security, and on the other hand it could not

appear as anti-Islam or anti-Muslim. This caused dilemmas for the government. As a

result, Megawati took an ambivalent position, condemning terrorism but not making

significant efforts to counter domestic Islamic radicalism as requested by the US

(Perwita 2007, 160-5)6.

The successor of Megawati, President Yudhoyono who was inaugurated in October

2004, has tried to insert new thinking and view in Indonesia’s foreign policy. According

to Yudhoyono, nowadays Indonesian foreign relations are ‘navigating in a turbulent

ocean’. This statement was intended to be an encroachment upon Vice President Hatta’s

vision stated in 1948 that Indonesia should be ‘rowing between two reefs’ to manage 6 Chapter Seven will look at this issue more closely.

51

with the Cold War challenges. In the current context of changing global settings, the

independent activism foreign policy has to be able to adapt with and properly respond to

the challenges the state is facing, ranging from economic, social, cultural, security and

political issues. The turbulent ocean is a metaphor for an environment characterized by

these challenges (Tan 2007). The pragmatic nature of foreign policy has been

maintained, as the president suggested, independent activism should entail an

understanding of independence of judgement, and freedom of action (Anwar 2010, 44).

On 19 May 2005, Yudhoyono delivered his first foreign policy speech titled ‘An

Independent and Active Foreign Policy for the 21st Century’, before the Indonesian

Council on World Affairs (ICWA) meeting in Jakarta. The Indonesian leader stressed

the need to produce a constructive image of the country in the eyes of the international

society. It must be rooted in a strong sense of who Indonesians are; ‘We cannot be all

things for all peoples. We must know who We are and what We believe in, and project

them in our foreign policy…’. The president went on to define Indonesian identity, ‘We

are a proud nation who cherish our independence and national unity; We are the fourth

most populous nation in the world; We are home to the world’s largest Muslim

population; We are the world’s third largest democracy; We are a country where Islam,

democracy and modernity go hand-in-hand…’ (Yudhoyono 2005, 389-90).

The country’s Islamic identity has been articulated over and over again as the state’s

projection onto the international arena, including the main world economic forum of G-

20, in which Indonesia is the only representative from Southeast Asia. The current

Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa pointed out ‘as the G-20 has confirmed itself for

the status of the major forum on world economic issues, Indonesia is challenged to

carve a niche within the group that is unique to itself as the world’s third largest

democracy, the country with the world’s largest Muslim population, and a voice of

moderation…’ (Anwar 2011, 132). Compared to what Hatta (1953, 450) had mentioned

back in 1948, ‘Indonesian identity is not bound to either particular religiosity, yet

acknowledging the omnipotent and invisible power of God that controls human

52

actions…this is why the first principle of the state ideology of Pancasila refers to the

belief in one supreme God…’, the Yudhoyono government has openly spoken on

Indonesian Muslim identity, and as such has taken a firmer position on Islam.

Yudhoyono showed that he intended to play an important role in the Muslim world. For

example, he supported the Hamas-led Palestinian authority with humanitarian aid, and

further offered to mediate peace between Israel and Palestine. To advance Indonesia-

Middle East ties, the president appointed an Indonesian special envoy to the region,

Alwi Shihab, whose main job was to foster cooperation and peace (ANTARA 12

December 2005). Islam is also present as the perceptual context in which Yudhoyono’s

objectives are likely to be established. After the 11 September 2001 tragedy, the West

has held negative perceptions about Islam and Muslims. It had depicted Muslim

communities as being backward, committed to violence – including terrorism,

authoritarianism, and discrimination against women. Yudhoyono may attempt to show

to the West a better image of Islam, that is, its peace-loving face (Anwar 2010, 45). If

this campaign is effective, it will promote Yudhoyono’s personal, international and

domestic reputation. In other words, it is an image-building project rather than truly

motivated by Islamic ideas.

Beside this, Yudhoyono’s initiative is apparently limited by the lack of real international

capability, and therefore it appears to only be aimed at demonstrating that the

Indonesian government is trying to make efforts for peace, rather than doing nothing.

Indonesia has no concrete prospects to mediate peace for Israel and Palestine, by virtue

Jakarta has not had any official links with Tel Aviv. Diplomacy without a real vehicle

will not be viable, even if the Israeli government perceives Yudhoyono’s proposal as

favourable. More importantly, President Yudhoyono has no close relations with any of

the Middle Eastern leaders required to make such a plan viable (Fealy 2006, 29).

Therefore, Islam comes about only in the rhetoric, rather than substance of Jakarta’s

policy.

53

In a nutshell, Islam’s role is mostly marginalized in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda.

This is influenced by a combination of factors such as the unchallengeable non-Islamic

nature of the state’s identity, the ruling elite’s material interest, and external constraints.

Besides these factors, the persisting fragmentation and conflict within Indonesian

Islamic political groups have affected to the strength of Islamization in the arena of

domestic politics and foreign policy.

54

Chapter Two

Islamism And Secularism In Sukarno’s

Foreign Policy Towards Pakistan

This chapter aims to investigate whether it is Islamic solidarity or the elite’s material

interests which has shaped Indonesia and Pakistan relations during the Sukarno era. It

argues that Islam was relevant for Indonesian diplomacy and the struggle against the

Dutch colonialism. However, the focus on nationalist interest caused Indonesians to

balance relations with Indian National Congress and Muslim League. In the post-

colonial era, there were occasional, and then increasing references to Muslim identity,

but that Indonesian response was determined by their geostrategic and ideational

interests in promoting anti-colonialism and nonalignment. As these interests shifted, the

tendency in Indonesia to mainly rely on secularist discourse was modified to bring in

Islamic identity or language as well. Within this context, Indonesia engaged with

Pakistan in the Asian African forum and Islamic conference. At the height of the two

countries’ relationship, Sukarno strongly favoured Pakistan against India at some stage

in their armed conflict over Kashmir in September 1965.

Islamic Solidarity and Anti-colonialism

As soon as Japan was defeated by the American allied forces in August 1945, the

Indonesian nationalist leaders gained the momentum to proclaim independence on 17

August 1945 amidst a power vacuum in the country. The nationalist’s move was

responded to anxiously by the former colonial ruler before Japan, the Dutch. As stated

by the Dutch Minister of Far East Affairs, Logeman, ‘…the Indonesian nationalist, who

was uplifted by Japan, does not have the rights to determine Indonesian destiny…. [All]

territories under Japan have to be returned to their former rulers, including the Dutch

Indies…therefore, the declared independence is not legitimate, and the Dutch deserves

to re-impose administration on the country…’ (Mochtar 1989, 4). The Dutch resisted

55

Indonesian independence, and for the Indonesian nationalists it meant that the threat of

aggression from the ex-colonial power remained to shadow the country’s independence.

The international environment emerging soon after the World War II was also not

sympathetic to nationalist sentiments among colonized areas. The great powers which

won World War II, such as the United States, Britain, and France were reluctant to

recognize Indonesian independence. The United States (US) even had extended

diplomatic and military assistance for the Dutch (Patterson 1998, 1-4). One example of

this was the US attempt to block a proposal on 21 January 1946 by Ukraine to hold a

special discussion session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting

concerning the existence of the British troops in Indonesia which were used by the

Dutch as a vehicle to deploy troops to Indonesia (Times of Indonesia 31 January 1946).

In March 1947, the American government extended de facto recognition for Indonesian

sovereignty only in three islands; Java, Madura, and Sumatra. The territories beyond

these islands were not recognized to be part of the jurisdiction of the Republic of

Indonesia (Wuryandari 2008, 65).

Under these circumstances, the Indonesian nationalists realized the indispensability of

finding their own ways to protect independence, as Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir

asserted ‘…We have to maintain independence with our own minds and might…’

(Times of Indonesia 29 January 1947). The twin needs of survival and security as well

as international recognition in order to obtain the status of a legally legitimate

independent state became the urgent concern of the Indonesian leaders and nation. Such

definitive national interests directed Indonesia’s twin policies on; conducting diplomacy

and struggling physically against external powers during the formative period between

1945 and 1949.

The reluctance on the part of the Western powers to endorse Indonesian independence

prompted Jakarta to appeal to the Muslim world for political support and recognition.

The responsibility to secure recognition from Muslim countries was undertaken by

56

Deputy Foreign Minister Agus Salim – a prominent figure of Sarekat Islam - who made

a goodwill trip to the Middle East in March 1947. The Indonesian envoy emphasised the

country’s Islamic identity to achieve recognition. According to Salim (Times of

Indonesia 29 March 1947), he requested support of the Egyptians for the freedom of

Muslim brothers in Indonesia, and the Egyptian government saw the importance of

longstanding Islamic connections that had been built by Indonesian Muslim youths

studying in the country. These religious ties contributed to the political support by

Egypt for Indonesia. As a result, on 25 March 1947 Salim concluded with the Egyptian

government the Treaty of Indonesia-Egypt Friendship. This formal relationship meant

that the Egyptian government had conveyed its recognition for the Republic of

Indonesia. The Indonesian emissary acknowledged that Islam in its very universal form

of the Muslim ummah (community) had helped his country to secure international

recognition. Following the recognition from Egypt, other Middle Eastern Muslim states,

such as Iraq on 2 April, Saudi Arabia on 16 April, and Syria on 24 June (all in 1947)

extended de jure recognition for Indonesian independence (Bintang Timur 26 June

1947). Islam was at this stage relevant for the Indonesian diplomatic struggle.

The same trend could be seen in the expressions of sympathy and support from South

Asians prior to the departure of the British from the Indian subcontinent. Indonesian

diplomacy in South Asia intended to get support, and develop communications with, the

independence movements in India, including leaders of the Indian National Congress

and the Muslim League. A few months before the end of the British rule in India, an

Indonesian delegation attended the first Asian Relations conference that was convened

by the Congress in New Delhi, April 1947. The Indonesian delegation was led by Prime

Minister Syahrir, and was accompanied by Agus Salim and Mohammad Roem (Solichin

1963, 45-6). On this occasion, Syahrir availed the chance to express the Indonesian

view on issues facing Asian nations and to underscore the real threat colonialism

brought to peace in Asia. More importantly, Indonesia called upon other states to extend

recognition for its independence. In response, Jawaharlal Nehru of the Congress

57

affirmed Indians support for Indonesian independence, and urged other Asian nations to

do the same (Times of Indonesia 30 April 1947).

At this conference the Muslim League was not present - perhaps because its leaders

were intentionally uninvited by the convener. Given the existing negativity between the

Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, the Indonesian delegation may have

avoided contacts with the Muslim league. But despite formal support of the Congress

leader during the Asian Relations conference, the Indonesian delegates played their

Islamic card to secure political endorsement of the Muslim League. Roem was assigned

by Syahrir to meet with and ask the support of the Muslim League leaders in Karachi.

On 23 April 1947, the Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah warmly welcomed

Roem in his office. There the two Muslim figures talked about the plight of millions of

Muslims under Western imperialism around the world, and pledged to intensify

communications between them. When asked about the Muslim League’s position on the

Indonesian cause, Ali Jinnah said to Roem: ‘…I would send my personal letter to the

Dutch ruler in Indonesia to protest its persistent lust for colonizing the Muslim land of

Indonesia…of the Indonesian struggle for freedom, this is the obligation of all Muslim

peoples to support it…’ (Roem 1983, 53-4). Once again this demonstrated the use and

efficacy of the language of Islamic identity features in Indonesian conduct of diplomacy

to muster international support.

But from the outset, the limits to which Indonesian leadership would use the language

of Islamic identity were evident. President Sukarno, for instance, personally appealed to

Ali Jinnah for support but avoided using Islamic language. As reported by an

Indonesian daily Siasat (10 May 1947) Sukarno on behalf of the Indonesian people

wrote a letter to Ali Jinnah dated 1 May 1947, calling for support from leaders and

peoples of the Indian subcontinent in order to assist Indonesian nationalists struggle for

defending independence. In response to Sukarno’s request, Ali Jinnah on behalf of the

Muslim League urged all Muslims in India to pray for their Muslim brethren’s struggle

for a better place on earth; free from suppression by the Western powers. To highlight

58

the Islamic aspect of the Indonesian struggle, Ali Jinnah identified it as ‘the mixture of

jihad and nationalism’. Further according to the Muslim League leader, ‘…every

Muslim is obliged to defend their homeland from invaders as this is part of iman

(Islamic moral)…’.

It may be argued that Indonesia was adopting a twin track diplomacy to obtain

international support. Islam was used as an element of Indonesian diplomatic strategy to

attain international recognition: the references to the Islamic identity in its diplomacy, it

was able to secure support of other Muslim countries that were willing to endorse

Indonesian independence due to their sentiment of Islamic solidarity with Indonesian

Muslims. This was apparent in the way Pakistan articulated its stand in favour of

Indonesia against the Dutch. But at the same time, the Indonesian secularist leadership,

mainly Sukarno, also referred to secular notions of independence. It was reflected in

diplomacy vis-a-vis the Indian National Congress and was used to secure support of

non-Muslim countries, including Australia, Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam (Reid 1996).

The international recognition for the existence of an Indonesian state did not mean the

end of the Dutch threat to Indonesia. The allied troops, especially those of the British

army that were dispatched to Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia since September 1945,

had not yet been withdrawn. They still assisted the Dutch troops with warring

Indonesian nationalists (Sabir 1987, 52). The revolutionary struggle for independence,

therefore, did not cease until the Dutch acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty on 27

December 1949. Up until then, the Dutch had carried out military operations aimed at

bringing Indonesia back under their control (Nasution 1977). The first Dutch aggression

began on 21 July 1947, and was designed to occupy industrial centres in East Sumatra

as well as Central and East Java. The Dutch wanted to paralyse the most important

economic resources of the nationalist government and at the same time control

agricultural and oil products there to meet their own needs. This military operation was

opposed by the Amir Syarifuddin government of Indonesia which then appealed to

Australia to raise the issue in the UNSC. Canberra supported Indonesia, arguing that the

59

latter had been a legitimate entity in international law due to recognition from other

countries. Thanks to Australian diplomacy, the UNSC issued resolution S/459 on 1

August 1947 ordering a ceasefire between the Dutch and Indonesia. Both sides reached

a peace agreement in April 1948. However, it did not stop the Dutch who deployed

troops on 18 December 1948 to invade the Indonesian capital city that had been

temporarily moved to Yogyakarta in the aftermath of the Dutch taking over of Jakarta.

This second wave of Dutch aggression generated intense international reactions to the

Dutch on the one hand, and greater sympathies for Indonesia on the other.

In South Asia, this support for Indonesia found expression in the convening of the

Second Asian Relations Conference by the Indian National Congress in New Delhi in

January 1949. The Indonesian case of freedom was the main agenda of the meeting. The

conference passed a resolution calling for an immediate end of hostilities in Indonesia

and, suggested a number of steps, including negotiations under the United Nations

mediation, the formation of international peace observer team for peace in Indonesia,

which in turn led to the transfer of authority from the Dutch ruler to the nationalist

government of Indonesia (Times of Indonesia 24 January 1949). India followed up the

outcome of the second Asian Relations conference and mustered international support

for the cause of Indonesian independence by bringing the issue to the UN, and seeking

the members of the UNSC to intervene in terminating the Dutch aggression. The UNSC

adopted resolution S/689 on 28 February 1949, asking both Indonesian and the Dutch

forces to observe a ceasefire and to release all Indonesian nationalists apprehended by

the Dutch authority. Later, an agreement was signed in Den Haag on 7 May 1949,

providing for a cessation of hostilities, restoration of the Indonesian nationalist

governance and, preparation for a complete handing over of power from the Dutch to

the Indonesian government (Majumdar 1982, 23).

Pakistan supported Indonesia throughout this struggle. Soon after gaining independence

on 14 August 1947, the Pakistan government extended formal recognition to Indonesia.

The Pakistani government declared a public holiday throughout the country on 17

60

August in celebration of the second anniversary of Indonesian independence (Times of

Indonesia 16 August 1947). As broadcasted by the Indonesian government-owned radio

(ANTARA 18 August 1947) the founding father of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah

also stated: ‘…I would like to take up the opportunity to congratulate our Muslim

brothers in Indonesia for their great efforts to retain independence celebrated today…’.

This articulation of Pakistan’s support for Indonesia was located in the tendency among

the leaders of the nascent state to refer to their Islamic identity as a means of securing

support from other Muslim states. On 17 August 1948, for instance, Mohammad Ali

Jinnah stated that his message to all brother Muslim states was one of friendship and

goodwill, and ‘…they were all passing through perilous times…the drama of power

politics being staged in Palestine, Indonesia, and Kashmir should serve an eye opener to

them…’. The Pakistani leader stressed that it was mainly by putting up a united front

that could make Muslim voices heard in the counsels of the world (Jinnah 1967, 156).

Indonesia’s struggle against the Dutch, therefore, was easily presented in terms of

Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Later, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan declared

‘…the fact that over 90 percent of the Indonesian peoples are Muslims meant to

Pakistani that Indonesian suffers and grievances were also of ours…’ (Arora 1975,

220).

The Pakistani leaders and peoples also expressed their concern over the Dutch

aggression and, provided moral and tangible support for Indonesia. Mohammad Ali

Jinnah, on his Eid address to the nation on 18 August 1947, sent a message of sympathy

to Indonesians who were repeatedly called ‘brothers Muslim’. The Pakistani leader

avowed that Pakistan would support Indonesia against the invaders (Ahmad 1964, 409).

Ali Jinnah ordered the detention of some foreign planes at Karachi Airport and the

Pakistani government subsequently suspended the license of the Dutch airline KLM, on

23 December 1948, which was suspected to have helped carry armaments for the Dutch

troops arranged to attack Indonesia. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan also

declared that the government of Pakistan would not lift the suspension if the Dutch did

not reverse its tactics in Indonesia. Furthermore, Zafrullah Khan asserted the possibility

61

of further actions by his government should the Dutch invasion not immediately end

(Times 24 December 1948). In the Pakistan’s parliamentary hearing, Zafrullah Khan

condemned and described the Dutch raid in Indonesia as ‘…barbarous, an affront to the

heart of Asia, and an outrage to human decency…’ (Arora 1975, 220).

The Pakistani Constituent Assembly and press denounced the Dutch violent actions

against Indonesia, claiming that such attacks were condemned by all Pakistanis. For

example, Chaudry Nazir Ahmad of West Punjab moved a motion in the Constituent

Assembly that mentioned that the Dutch military operation was condemned by every

Pakistani. The press in Pakistan, such as Dawn, widely covered consequences of the

Dutch police actions toward Indonesians under the editorial titled ‘Murderers of

Freedom’, saying that such military assault on Indonesia was ‘…a perfidious war of the

latest colonial plunder…’. All these anti-Dutch deliberations prompted the Indonesian

representative in Karachi to acknowledge that Pakistanis’ resentment to the Dutch was

very empathetic (Arora 1975, 220-1). In January 1949, Pakistan’s Prime Minister,

Liaquat Ali Khan, participated in the convened Second Asian Relations conference held

by India at New Delhi, with the Indonesian case for freedom as the main agenda. By

supporting the resolutions passed at the conference, the Pakistani leader expressed their

support for the continuing Indonesian struggle (Times of Indonesia 24 January 1949).

The support for Indonesia, it is important to note, predated the independence of Pakistan

as a state for Muslims in August 1947. Muslim soldiers of the British Indian army as

part of Gorkha regimen/recognized as Gorkhas had helped the struggle of Indonesians.

They had been sent to Indonesia in September 1945 as part of the allied troops landing

in Tanjung Priok Harbor Jakarta commanded by Vice Admiral Patterson. Some of the

Muslim troops within this military unit were Ghulam Rasul, Gilamar Bani, Ghulam Ali,

Mohammed Jacub, Umar Din, Mohammad Khan, Muhammad Siddique, Fazul Sensyah,

Fasul Din, Sawkat Ali, Mohammad Syafi, and Basjir Rachman. All were devout

Muslims. The Muslim soldiers were then assigned to operate in East Java landing in

Tanjung Perak Port, under the Division 5 led by Major General E. C. Mansergh and in

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West and Central Java under the Division 23 commanded by Major Gen. D. C.

Hawthorn (Syam & Khan 2005, 32).

According to Ghulam Rasul (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 February 1984), the Muslim soldiers

began to feel sympathetic to the struggle of Indonesian peoples after arriving in Jakarta.

When they heard Allahu Akbar echoed by Indonesian fighters whenever military clashes

occurred, the Muslim soldiers felt that they were warring against their Muslim brethren.

Moreover, in every sweep towards Indonesian people’s districts which the allied troops

were undertaking, the Muslim soldiers found copies of the Qur’an at their homes and

Arabic of Bismillah Ar Raham-e Raheem written on the front door. All these discoveries

touched the hearts of the Muslim soldiers. Thus, they started to be wondering whether

or not to continue to fight against the Indonesian nationalists.

Ghulam Rasul said that he and his compatriots felt convinced that their feelings were

true and that they were being asked to fight against a Muslim country and society. The

fact that most of the Indonesian peoples were Muslims was confirmed to Ghulam Rasul

and others by an Indian Muslim Zaristan Khan – who had long lived in Jembatan Merah

Street of Jakarta. When a group of Muslim soldiers was visiting Zaristan’s house, he

explained that the leaders of the Indonesian independence movement were fighting for

the freedom of Muslims of Indonesia from colonial powers, the Dutch and its allied

troops. Although the Muslim soldiers were not allowed to listen to local radio

broadcasts, at Zaristan’s home they disobeyed such a prohibition, and had the

opportunity to pay attention to Sukarno’s and other Indonesian nationalist leaders’

addresses to their peoples and other nations. Additionally, they were informed by

Zaristan of the news about the Muslim League leader Ali Jinnah encouraging Muslims

to fight with Indonesia on the colonial ruler (Shaifuddin 2005, 5).

As a result, some Muslim soldiers started clandestine assistance for Indonesian

nationalist fighters. Two of these groups, Laskar Hezbollah and Laskar Sabilillah

consisted of Muslim youths mostly affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama organization.

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They were founded in the early 1940s under the auspice of the Japanese troops with the

aim of defending Indonesia from external attacks. Two prominent leaders of the Laskar,

Kiai Masykur and Kiai Zainul Arifin, were known as the leading guardians of the idea

of Indonesian Islamic state. However, they had put aside their differences on ideology

with secularists when the country and Muslims were facing threats from the invaders

(Ma’shum 1998, 181-2). These groups provided the first point of contact for the Muslim

soldiers in British army. The process started with these soldiers making contacts and

agreements with groups such as Laskar Hezbollah and Laskar Sabilillah. Ghulam Ali

and his compatriots told local fighters that they would like to fight with them

(Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 February 1984).

It was agreed that the Muslim soldiers would say greeting Assalmu’ allaikum so that

Indonesian fighters would recognize them as fellow Muslims and avoid confrontations

between them. This agreement was passed on to the leaders of the Indonesian army,

such as A. H. Nasution, Sarbini, Kawilarang, Suharto, and Sarwo Edhi as well as Vice

President Mohammad Hatta. The nationalist leaders followed up by circulating letters

instructing all Indonesian fighters not to clash with the Muslim soldiers who wanted to

join local combatant units (Nasution 1977, 37).

Some 600 Muslim soldiers from the British Indian army left their rank units in Jakarta,

Bogor, Banten, Medan, Surabaya, Semarang, and Yogyakarta. Initially, the deserters

provided assistance in military logistics to Indonesian fighter units, gave information of

allied troops’ patrols, and trained local fighters. Such secret support turned overt and

massive when the Muslim soldiers were involved in shielding Indonesia against the

second Dutch military invasion in December 1948 (Khan 2004, 26-32). By 1950, after

a five-year-war on colonial powers in Indonesia, only 75 of these Muslim soldiers had

survived. Most of them died on the battlefields. Some of those survivors chose to return

home and be identified as Pakistanis. They were recognized by the Pakistani

government as Muslim heroes and received their full rights as armed force members.

Some of them were employed by the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad. Others

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remained to live in Indonesia, for example, Ghulam Ali and Ghulam Rasul joined staff

of the Indonesian national armed forces (Kedaulatan Rakyat 5 February 1984).

The Pakistani government sent a special envoy to attend the transfer of power from the

Dutch to the government of Indonesia on 27 December 1949. At the event the envoy

said to President Sukarno that he noted the strength of Muslim solidarity that connected

peoples of the two countries, which had helped unite their powers against the colonial

Dutch forces in Indonesia (Sutopo 1973, 1). In return, the government of Indonesia

expressed gratitude and deep appreciation of the services rendered by the Pakistani

Muslim soldiers in defence of Indonesian freedom. The Indonesian Minister of Defence,

Djuanda, and Army Chief of Staff General Ahmad Yani awarded the Satia Lencana

medal to 20 Pakistani soldiers who had survived the war and joined the Indonesian

army. Others who died during the war were posthumously honoured. At the same time,

the Indonesian government awarded the highest medal of the Indonesian Republic, Adi

Purna, to Ali Jinnah for his moral and tangible support during the critical years of

Indonesian struggle for independence (Khan 2004, 34).

The Indonesian Prime Minister, Mohammad Natsir, who was also the leader of

Masyumi Islamic Party, accompanied by Kiai Masykur (who was serving as Minister of

Religious Affairs), visited Pakistan and thanked the Pakistani government and peoples.

At a meeting of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs (Karachi) on 9 April 1952,

when delivering his speech titled ‘The Contribution of Islam to World Peace’, Natsir

declared ‘…the spirit of Islamic solidarity [had] proven to be a solid basis for the

Indonesian and Pakistani relationship…’ (Natsir 2000, 17-8). One may argue that

Natsir’s use of Islamic language in describing the link between Pakistan and Indonesia

may have reflected his personal views on the prominence of Islam for Indonesian

governance and foreign relations. But it also indicated that Islam was present as an idea

in the Indonesia’s worldview and foreign policy in spite of the privileging of the secular

nationalists’ identity.

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However, apart from these occasional examples, Islam did not emerge as a major

reference point in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. Indonesia tried to avoid

frequent use of language that focused on religious sentiments. Instead, Indonesia

defined its foreign policy as being governed by the pursuit of as much support and

friendship as possible to develop a respectable position in the international community.

In contrast, Pakistan often identified Indonesia in terms of their Muslim connections -

an approach that was not always shared by the Indonesian secular nationalists. The

impact of these different views and approaches became apparent as the two states

operated in the post Second World War international system.

The Focus on Anti-colonialism and Nonalignment Policy

Similarities existed between Indonesia and Pakistan in terms of the formation of their

respective states and foreign issues faced by them. Like Indonesia, Pakistan was born

out of a post-colonial state with its anti-colonialism vision. Similar to Indonesia which

was struggling for maintaining its territorial integrity from the Dutch aggression,

Pakistan had felt its country susceptible to foreign attacks, particularly from India.

Hence, Indonesia should have a sense of tenacity to build strong relations with Pakistan.

However, after the transfer of power in 1949 Indonesia pursued policies different from

those pursued by Pakistan especially with its reference to Muslim identity. Identity and

the elite’s interests mattered since Sukarno and the secularist leadership had paid little

attention to Islamism, instead articulating the discourse of balanced relationships toward

India and Pakistan, and focusing on Asian African solidarity for anti-colonialism. The

section highlights this tendency but locates it within the context of Pakistan

government’s references to Islam’s role in its relationship with other Muslim states.

Pakistan became independent from British colonialism on 14 August 1947. Since it had

secured independence on the basis of the Two Nation Theory that argued for the rights

of Muslims to have their own state carved out of British India – Pakistan - it was

understandable that the language of Islamic identity would be a feature of the country’s

international projection. This was particularly so as the Muslim League leaders had

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insisted that the difference between the two communities of faith could only be resolved

should the Muslims be allowed to have their own country. The projected vision of

Pakistan was also of a state where Muslims of the subcontinent were able to practice the

teachings of Islam in life, divorced from Indian secularism (Hussain 1966, 55). But also,

sentimentally Muslims of the subcontinent felt more attached to the Islamic world

because of their commonality in belief (Ahmad 1968, 67).

In fact, the formation of Pakistan did not finish religious-based differences between the

Hindus and the Muslims. It even escalated into the first open conflict between Pakistan

and India over the state of Kashmir in 1948. The war was provoked by the Pathan

tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province with the backing from the embryonic

Pakistani army who descended on Kashmir to support overwhelmingly Kashmiri

Muslims uprising against the Hindu ruler of the princely state (Khan 1992). Fighting

between Pakistan and India ended with the UN intervention; between 1948 and 1954 the

ceasefire line was monitored by the United Nations Military Observer Group on India

and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). One-third of Kashmir, the far northern and western areas of

the state was under Pakistan’s control, whilst the Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh

which comprised two-thirds of the state were under Indian rule. The UN called for a

plebiscite to determine the final status of the disputed territory. After initially accepting

the idea, India soon rejected it on grounds that Pakistan’s membership of the US led

alliance had changed the situation on ground. Pakistan, on its part, continued to demand

that the plebiscite should be held on the assumption that the Muslim majority population

of the state would join Pakistan (Gupta 1966, 6-16; Schofield 2000, 15-49). Both

Pakistan and India continue to claim possession of the Kashmir territories.

The newly independent Pakistan had to design its foreign policy to address two crucial

security problems; dealing with the Kashmir dispute, and the most appropriate strategies

to counter a possible threat by the larger India (Delvoie 1995, 141). Its response was to

seek patrons who could protect the nascent state, while simultaneously making friends

with other countries to meet its economic needs. In search of protection, Islamabad

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aligned with the great power, especially the US under the umbrella of Central Treaty

Organization (CENTO) which was formally concluded in 1954. It also joined the

Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) to protect East Pakistan. At the same

time, to meet its economic interests, Pakistan looked for help from Japan as well as

members of the British Commonwealth, mainly Australia and Canada (Sattar 2007, 32-

41). This policy was certainly not designed on the basis of the Pakistan’s identity as a

state for Muslims, but material needs.

However, having been created on the basis of its Islamic identity, Pakistan was equally

keen to develop ties with the Islamic world. Islamabad used the language of Pan-

Islamism in its foreign policy. This could be seen in its attempt to consolidate a united

Islamic bloc. On 25 November 1949, members of Pakistani business community

organized the Islamic economic conference in Karachi. About 60 delegates and

observers representing Egypt, Iraq, Persia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, North

Africa, Muscat and Oman, the Maldives Islands, Spanish, Transvaal, Morocco, and

Arab League participated in the conference. The support from the Pakistan government

for the conference was noticeable when the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan,

inaugurated the meeting on 26 November 1949. In his inaugural address he emphasised

‘…the need for the presence of Islam as a panacea for the diverse issues faced humanity

at the time…’. He expressed his country’s strong commitment to Islam by stating that

Pakistan had the ambition to serve Islam and to serve humanity. Pakistani Finance

Minister at the same meeting identified features that united the Muslim world; their

faith, culture, and economic underdevelopment. The conference recommended Muslim

solidarity as the context in which economic cooperation, trade expansion, as well as

knowledge exchanges could take place among the Muslim states. The goal was to

develop the commonwealth of Muslim states (Times 28 November 1949). Pakistan also

proposed that the conference of Muslim countries be held annually. Participants in the

meeting agreed with this plan (Times 28 November 1949). Thus, this became Pakistan’s

success in initiating the unity amongst Muslim countries.

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Developments in the 1950s showed that Muslim countries held diverse views on the

idea of Muslim. In 1950 the second Islamic conference, convened in Tehran, established

a permanent secretariat of the Islamic forum and several committees were appointed.

They had done some valuable work on ways and means in which to achieve economic

cooperation. In Tehran the constitution was also changed requiring every participant

country to channel membership through its own government. The Muslim conference

continued to function after 1950 during which another conference was held by Syria in

1951, and in 1954 Pakistan accepted to play host again. But the 1954 Islamic

conference received little enthusiasm, perhaps because some other Muslim countries

were unhappy with Pakistan’s membership of the US led alliance. The idea of Pan-

Islamism was promoted by other Muslim states as well. In 1957 Nigeria attempted to

gather 30 Muslim countries for another holding of the Islamic conference. In May 1958,

an Iranian newspaper Etelaat called for the holding of a conference of Iran, Pakistan,

Turkey, and Afghanistan. Egypt also came out with the idea of Pan-Islamism limited in

cultural cooperation. This was widely supported in the Muslim world. Favouring the

Egyptian idea, Pakistan remained active communicating its commitment to Pan-

Islamism as part of its Muslim identity – even when the notion of Muslim ummah was

interpreted mostly in cultural terms (Hussain 1967, 137-9).

Indonesian policy towards Pakistan, however, was not shaped with reference to Islam.

Sukarno considered the references to the Two Nation Theory and its implications for

Pakistan’s relations with India to be the country’s internal matter. The focus on

secularism led Jakarta to adopt an equidistant position towards Pakistan and India.

Indonesia professed friendship with both Pakistan and India. Just after the declaration of

independence by Pakistan and India, President Sukarno sent messages to congratulate

them on their success in struggling against colonialism and the establishment of their

respective states (Times of Indonesia 16 August 1947).

Indonesia shaped its relations with both Pakistan and India on the basis of commonality

of ideas and policies. It limited formal space provided to Islam in its foreign policy was

69

already conveyed by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Hatta (Bintang Timur 5 February

1950) when he had stated: ‘…Indonesia’s international diplomacy should be made

flexible but strong to pursue the national interests mandated by the 1945 Constitution in

which religions as formal reference are not known…’. This secular notion shaped the

context in which Indonesia related to Pakistan.

Indonesia did not respond with keenness to Pakistan’s rhetoric of Pan-Islamism. It did

not attend the first Islamic economic conference held in Karachi in 1949. It was perhaps

because Jakarta was concentrating on diplomatic efforts to smooth the way for the

handing-over of authority from the Dutch to be held in December that year. However,

Indonesia was not averse to participating in the Islamic conference convened by

Pakistan in Karachi in February 1954, but communicated the limited significance

accorded to Pan-Islamism by sending just a small group of foreign affairs officials, and

only as observers (Times of Indonesia 10 February 1954). There is no evidence

reporting on Indonesia’s participation in the later conferences of Islamic states during

the 1950s.

Formally, Indonesian and Pakistani ties were consolidated by the signing of the Treaty

of Friendship on 3 March 1951 in Jakarta, laying the foundation of mutually beneficial

relations between the two nations. Once again, Islam was not mentioned as the

foundation of the two countries’ relationship in the text of the treaty, but it did contain

universal values such as social justice, respect to sovereignty, mutual cooperation, and

peace (Sutardjo 1951, 3-10). This treaty was followed by the agreement between the

two governments on bilateral trade cooperation, on 7 February 1953 concluded in

Karachi. The two sides agreed on promoting cooperation to improve trade between

them particularly in the agricultural sector. Trade would also be enhanced on an

exchange scheme by which Indonesia would make available crude oil for Pakistan in

return for some jute and cotton products as well as industrial goods from Pakistan (Text

of Trade Agreement between Indonesia and Pakistan 1953).

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While playing down the relevance of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy towards

Pakistan’s focus on Pan-Islamism, the government in Jakarta was eager to foster

stronger relations with India with its pronouncement of Asian African solidarity. India

and Indonesia on 3 March 1951 signed the Treaty of Friendship declaring a perpetual,

peaceful and unalterable friendship between New Delhi and Jakarta. Trade and cultural

relations agreements were concluded on 30 January 1953 and 29 December 1955

respectively (Text of Treaty of Friendship between Indonesia and India 1951; Text of

Trade Agreement between Indonesia and India 1953; Text of Agreement on Cultural

Cooperation between Indonesia and India 1955).

The Jakarta-New Delhi links became more powerful when Indonesia agreed with the

Indian concept of nonalignment in face of the Cold War blocs rivalry. In return India

was eager to introduce Indonesia at formal and informal groupings of states, for

instance, the Colombo power meeting in 1954 (Singh 1967, 656). Jakarta considered

that Indian support could help Indonesia obtain an elevated status in the international

arena. Both Jakarta and New Delhi held similar views on matters related to Asian and

African countries. While building on this similarity, Indonesia sided with Indian

assessment of the situation in South Asia. According to the Indonesian Prime Minister

Ali Sastro Amidjojo (1973, 5), when invited by Ceylon’s Prime Minister John

Kotelawala to take part in the Colombo conference in April-May 1954, Premier

Amidjojo identified two requirements before he could consent; first, the issue of

Kashmir between India and Pakistan was not to be discussed in order to avoid

unnecessary arguments, and second, that as the follow up of the Colombo meeting,

Indonesia had to be given an opportunity to develop the idea of holding a larger forum

embracing Asian and African nations. Kotelawala approved these requests, and Nehru

supported Indonesia.

Indonesian diplomacy went well and in November 1954 with the support of Colombo

powers it successfully convened the Bogor conference for the preparatory forum to

discuss the holding of the first Asian African conference to be held in Bandung in April

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1955 (Abdulgani 1964). At the Asian African conference, which was attended by 29

Asian and African countries, Prime Minister Amidjojo proudly mentioned that the

Bandung conference was unique as it was the first time Asian and African states were

able to convey their intention to make decisions on their own without interference from

Western powers. The Bandung Declaration, issued at the end of the conference,

expressed Afro-Asian position against colonialism, racial discrimination, and a

commitment to world peacemaking (Agung 1973, 222-4). Another Afro-Asian

conference was scheduled in June 1956 at Cairo but had to be postponed due to the

unstable situation of the Middle East caused by the Suez crisis. By 1960 Indonesia

intended to revive the proposal, but met with little success. This was mainly because of

the strong opposition from India which had felt that Indonesia would rival its leadership

role in the Third World affairs. Pakistan, on the other hand, supported the Indonesian

proposal (Burke & Ziring 1990, 310-11). This meant that even though Indonesia had

displayed only little interest in supporting Pakistan, it could still establish links with it in

the Asian African forum. The later developments indicated that Indonesian gradual

disengagement with India served as a wider space for Jakarta and Islamabad to

strengthen ties.

Indonesia’s Stronger Relations with Pakistan

During the 1960s, Indonesian foreign policy was centralized in the figure of President

Sukarno whose ideas and interests dictated the state’s external relations. Ever since the

installation of Guided Democracy in 1959, Sukarno had assumed a complete direction

of Indonesia’s foreign policy; gradually giving it an ideological ground as the struggle

of the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS)

mostly referred to the West. Modelski (1963) and Legge (1972) explain that Sukarno

considered an international conflict theory between the new and the old powers as the

determining feature of world society. This conflict would, in his view, lead to the

ultimate and inevitable destruction of the old. In Sukarno’s view, the root cause of

international tensions lay in imperialism and colonialism and not the Cold War

ideological enmity. This worldview was the radicalized form of the discourse of anti-

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colonialism and anti-imperialism in Indonesian foreign policy with confrontational

characters of Sukarno dominating the state’s international relations in the 1960s.

The changing dynamics of regional and global settings also influenced Indonesia’s

foreign policy towards Pakistan. Jakarta had viewed with alarm the emergence of

Malaysia with the help of Britain and India and considered it to be a potential threat to

Indonesia. It was also suspicious of Indian improved relations with Washington after the

Sino-Indian border war in 1962. Meanwhile, Jakarta had improved military ties with the

Soviet Union, particularly during the dispute over West Irian against the Dutch, and had

remained aloof from Washington. After the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, tensions

escalated between Indonesia and India. Jakarta allied with China against the perceived

expansion of the British Empire and Indian power in Southeast Asia. This contributed to

the improvement of qualified relations between Jakarta and Islamabad.

The strengthening of Indonesia and Pakistan ties can be divided into three phases.

Firstly, between 1960 and 1962 Indonesia and Pakistan tried to identify common views

and policies. Secondly, during 1963-1964 the two sides were keen to show reciprocal

support and develop mutual cooperation based on common interests. And finally,

Jakarta and Islamabad actively collaborated in the creation of a strategic front against

India when the Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir broke out in September 1965.

The first phase of the improvement of ties between Jakarta and Islamabad took shape

during Pakistani President Ayub Khan’s visit to Jakarta in the early December 1960.

The meeting of the two countries’ leaders was not planned to discuss serious matters

related to bilateral relations. It was like a friendly exchange of views between Sukarno

and Ayub Khan. Nonetheless, they agreed to forge a more cordial relationship: as

indicated in the joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks, the two sides

committed to review economic and cultural ties which over the last decade had not

shown much progress, aiming to discover ways and means to progress them to a more

satisfactory degree (Text of Joint Communiqué between Indonesia and Pakistan 1960).

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The sign of improvement in the relationship was further evident when Sukarno and

Ayub Khan expressed in front of cheering crowds at Bandung their full support for the

rights of self-determination of all peoples. Sukarno was happy with Ayub Khan’s

statement that Pakistan would continue to endorse Indonesia’s position in the West Irian

issue. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released an official announcement

saying that Pakistan was a true supporter of Asian peoples struggling under foreign

domination (Bintang Timur 6 December 1960).

However, despite this growing amity, the two states differed on certain foreign policy

issues. Though they agreed upon the rights of self-determination for all peoples,

Indonesia did not mention specifically the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India

- a silence that slightly disappointed Ayub Khan (Times of Indonesia 8 December

1960). Pakistan’s membership of the US alliance system also remained a point of

disagreement: Ayub Khan tried to explain Pakistan’s position by arguing that his

country required an umbrella against the communist expansionism. Indonesia disagreed

with Pakistan’s position. Sukarno, in reply to Ayub Khan’s clarification, maintained

Indonesian policies of non-commitment to either bloc of the Cold War, saying that

Asian African powers would become the victims of the bloc opposition if they

submitted to them (Times of Indonesia 8 December 1960). The two leaders also

differed on the plan to convene the second Asian African conference: President Ayub

Khan had not yet supported Indonesia’s plans to hold this conference by stating that

‘…the gathering of Asian and African nations might not be needed urgently…’ (Times

of Indonesia 12 December 1960). Pakistan’s position was perhaps a reaction to

Indonesia’s unwillingness to support Islamabad’s Kashmir policy.

The nature of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan changed as Jakarta’s friendship with

New Delhi to deteriorate. The setback in Indonesia-India relations was primarily caused

by Nehru’s open refusal to Sukarno’s proposal for convening a second Asian-African

gathering. Ever since the Bandung conference, Indonesia was keen to host such a

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meeting by which Jakarta had attained tremendous international prestige. Nehru argued

that a second Asian-African conference would do more harm than good to Afro-Asian

states by reiterating publicly that Asia’s and Africa’s problems would sharpen

dissimilarities amongst them. Nehru’s actual reason was an unwillingness to see

Indonesia earn more credit from the forum. On the other hand, China ardently endorsed

the Indonesian proposal. India, with its old allies Yugoslavia and Egypt, both of whom

resented Indonesia, hindered the proposal of a second Bandung-type meeting, and

instead planned a conference of nonalignment countries that eventually took place at

Belgrade in September 1961 (Singh 1967, 658).

On his journey to Belgrade, Sukarno declined Nehru’s invitation to visit New Delhi.

Instead, he chose to have a short stop-over at Karachi Airport. At the airport the

Indonesian leader expressed his fondness for the people of Pakistan by admitting that he

liked Pakistan and its people (Bintang Timur 1 September 1961). In spite of the

remaining different views and policies between Indonesia and Pakistan, this episode

demonstrated that, parallel to a certain degree of coolness between Jakarta and New

Delhi due to Sukarno’s disappointment with Nehru, and on the other hand, Indonesia

had asserted its preference for Pakistan. It was to provide an important path towards the

improvement of relations between the two states.

At the Belgrade conference, Indonesia strongly challenged India’s preeminent position.

Sukarno insisted and was allowed to deliver his major address after Tito’s welcoming

speech. The Indonesian daily Bintang Timur (2 September 1961) reported that in the

group photo of the participants Sukarno was at the centre, accompanied by Tito, Nasser,

and Nehru. It could be interpreted as suggesting that Sukarno wanted to eliminate the

prevailing notion that Nehru was the originator of nonalignment stand in the Cold War.

However, India had succeeded in ensuring that the declaration of the non-alignment

position subordinated all issues to its ideological commitment of neither pro Western

nor Eastern bloc for averting threats to world peace. The outcome of the Belgrade

conference upset Sukarno since no mention had been made for the cause of the West

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Irian issue, while the twenty-seven-point Belgrade Declaration mentioned nationalists’

issues in Algeria, the Congo, Angola, Palestine, and Iberia (Indonesian Observer 10

September 1961). Hence, the Belgrade conference had furthered tensions between India

and Indonesia, opening up a wider space for Indonesia and Pakistan to promote each

other’s interests.

Pakistan overtly supported Indonesia’s challenge to the nonaligned group. The editorial

on 1 September published in a prominent Pakistani English daily - Dawn - expressed

doubt if the non-aligned forum could play a crucial role in the resolution of world’s

problems. The editorial was critical of Nehru’s idea of neutrality as not being based on

sincerity and honesty. Specifically it criticized India’s response to Indonesian

preference for a second meeting: it reported that previously most Afro-Asian states had

approved Indonesian demand for a second gathering, but India endeavoured to impede it

due to a fear of China’s and Pakistan’s attendance. Dawn alleged India had never had

the sensitivity towards the plight of Asian and African peoples (Arora 1975, 231-2).

Such coverage was in line with the harsh criticism of the Belgrade conference in the

Indonesian press: the editorial entitled ‘The Betrayal of Anti-colonialism’ in a pro-

government daily Angkatan Bersenjata (4 September 1961) pointed out that ignorance

of the preponderant anti-imperialism struggle in West Irian by the Belgrade conference

was the bias of nonalignment policy. It suggested the Indonesian government review the

friendship with India. Another daily Siasat (3 September 1961) even more asked the

government to freeze ties with India. Importantly, Indonesian Observer (2 September

1961) identified similarities between the Pakistani policy in Kashmir and Indonesian

struggle for integrating West Irian. It identified the two cases as evidence of anti-

colonial powers’ policies against foreign aggressors.

During the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, India expected Indonesia to condemn

China. But Indonesia remained impartial. Public opinion in India reflected considerable

annoyance at Indonesia not taking a firm stand against China that was portrayed as the

aggressor. India reminded Indonesia of the solidarity founded earlier in Colombo,

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Bogor, and Bandung. However, Indonesia confirmed its neutral position when in the

six-nation-Colombo conference in December 1962 the Indian proposal for joint action

against China was refused by Indonesia, Burma, and Cambodia (Singh 1966, 172).

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 also had a profound impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy,

which made it possible for Islamabad and Jakarta to stand side by side against New

Delhi. The war had created an interest between India and the United States in their

common desire to contain China. India, which had long rejected Washington’s offer of

military aid and refused to adopt a friendly attitude towards the West, was compelled by

its military debacle in 1962 to seek military assistance from the Anglo-American

alliance. New Delhi’s request for military aid was favourably received in London and

Washington which in addition promised long-term military aid. This formed an

informal alignment of India and the Western military powers. The improvement in

Indian-US relations affected Pakistan’s relations with the US; realizing that Islamabad’s

strategic importance for the US had declined, Pakistan reacted to the altered

environment by forging closer relations with China. Beijing and Islamabad shared an

interest in retaining the balance of power in the region vis-à-vis India, and containing

the possibility of Indian aggression (Hyder 1966, 20).

Still in 1962, Jakarta rejected the Indian role in the transfer of power from the Dutch to

Indonesia in West Irian. The New York Agreement, concluded on 15 August 1962, had

provided for the Netherlands’ administrative power to be reassigned to Indonesia within

seven months beginning on 1 October 1962 to conclude on 1 May 1963. In the

meantime, West Irian was to remain under the authority of the United Nations

Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). To assist with the task, UNTEA invited

India to provide the services of six military officers who would be led by Brigadier

General Inderjeet Rikhey. Indonesia preferred Pakistan’s participation to that of India.

Hence, at Indonesia’s request, Pakistan was appointed as an alternative to India to form

the United Nations Security Force (UNSF) for West Irian, with a 1500 strong

contingent commanded by Major General Said Uddin Khan (Indonesian Observer 2

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October 1962). This was a clear sign of Indonesian preference for, and recognition of,

the importance of Pakistan, paving the way to improve their qualified relationships.

Between 1963 and 1964 the relations between Jakarta and Islamabad improved within

the context of a triangular relationship involving Pakistan, Indonesia and China. The

triangular relationship was directed against the emerging alliance between India, the US

and the Soviet Union. Jakarta was interested in countering the Indian efforts to block its

plans for the Afro-Asian world. But it also sought support for its ‘crush Malaysia’

policy which included elements of confrontation without going to war with Malaysia.

As elaborated by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Subandrio, in his speech before the

Resimen Mahakarta in Yogyakarta on 20 January 1963, the policy towards Malaysia

was guided by Indonesian commitment to ‘pursuing confrontation against colonialism

and imperialism in all its manifestations’. But since Malaysia had unfortunately ‘let

itself become the proxy of colonialism and imperialism…[Indonesia was] compelled to

adopt a policy of confrontation….’ (Djiwandono 2001, 2). Malaysia was depicted by

Jakarta as the extension of Western colonialism, especially of the British in Southeast

Asia.

Pakistan, on its part, sought a new patron after reduced US support in the wake of the

Sino-Indian border war. It also looked for endorsement by Asian and African states of

its Kashmir policy that was always couched in terms of the rights of the Muslim

population to become part of the Islamic state of Pakistan. China needed Afro-Asian

countries to stand by its efforts in countering the perceived American domination as

well as Soviet communist revisionism expressed in its fear of encirclement. These

interests brought the three states together (Singh 1980, 44-5), and Indonesia and

Pakistan discovered common interests. This was a step in the direction of closer

relations than had been the case so far.

The emergence of the triangular relations of Indonesia-Pakistan-China marked the end

of the discourse of independent and active foreign policy, and led to a more radicalized

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worldview proposed by Sukarno. On many occasions, Sukarno had been more

outspoken of the necessity for the Third World countries to ally with NEFOS. At the

Cairo meeting of nonaligned states in September 1964, Sukarno challenged Indian

peaceful coexistence policy by arguing how NEFOS and OLDEFOS could coexist

peacefully in situations like the conflict in Cambodia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Still in

the same month, Sukarno took Indonesia out of the UN, severely criticizing the world

organization of a stronghold of the OLDEFOS. In its place, Sukarno wanted to establish

the conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFOS). When Tunku Abdul Rahman,

the first Prime Minister of Malaya, proposed the joining together of conservative

Malaya, with the British colony of Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak, and build a

new more powerful nation called Malaysia, Sukarno felt it was an onslaught of the

OLDEFOS. For Sukarno, Indonesia should have been consulted about the disposition of

colonies around its borders. Further for Sukarno, the creation of Malaysia was designed

to encircle and control the revolutionary NEFOS, Indonesia (Tan 2007, 155).

Pakistan’s position on Indonesia’s NEFOS discourse was unique: Pakistan was a

member of CENTO and had been beholden largely to American economic and military

aid for nearly 15 years. But it had also come to realize the significance of an alliance

with Jakarta and Beijing under the guidance of the then Foreign Minister, Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto. However, during the height of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in 1964-

1965, Pakistan remained neutral with its proposal for mediation to resolve the dispute.

Indonesia did not respond to this peace initiative, but Malaysia did (Times 25 February

1965). However, Pakistan’s failure to side with Indonesia did not affect its

strengthening ties with Jakarta.

President Sukarno paid a visit to Pakistan in June 1963 where he was warmly

welcomed. On his arrival, the Indonesian leader urged Pakistan and all NEFOS

sympathizers to rally against the OLDEFOS order which retained domination,

exploitation, and suppression of peoples around the world. President Ayub Khan praised

Sukarno for his tough diplomacy and determination to advocate for the liberation of

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West Irian, and hoped that Indonesia would lend its remarkable support for the similar

struggle of freedom being undertaken by the peoples of Kashmir. Sukarno did not

pronounce Indonesian support for Pakistan’s position on Kashmir (Indonesian Observer

24 June 1963). Nevertheless, in a speech in Murree on 25 June, Sukarno emphasized the

need for more solid cooperation and real friendship between Indonesia and Pakistan.

Furthermore, Sukarno declared that the tumultuous welcome he was receiving reflected

spontaneous brotherly feelings the Pakistanis had for Indonesians (Bintang Timur 26

June 1963).

At this event too, there had emerged a mixed context within which Indonesia viewed its

ties with Pakistan; secular and Islamic discourses emerged as common ground on which

it became possible to promote the relationship amidst the strategic shift in Indonesia-

India relations. This was an important modification in Indonesia and Pakistan relations,

by which the former had indicated greater willingness to recognize the role of its

Islamic identity, albeit the dominant theme remained the struggle of NEFOS and

Bandung spirit. It can be discerned in the way Sukarno approached relations with

Pakistan as stated in the joint communiqué which on the one hand reaffirmed that the

Asian African solidarity was the main basis for the two countries relations, and on the

other hand mentioned Islam as the bond of historical friendship between Indonesians

and Pakistanis. They referred to the period when soldiers of the two nations fought

together against the Dutch in Indonesia (Text of Joint Communiqué between Indonesia

and Pakistan 1963).

Pakistan committed to favour the Indonesian plan for the holding of the second Afro-

Asian meeting and was prepared to take part in the NEFOS Games to be held in Jakarta

in 1964 instead of the Asian Games (Indonesian Observer 1 July 1963). By confirming

its support of a second Bandung-like forum, Pakistan was able to place its relations with

Indonesia on a better footing than the deteriorating Indian-Indonesian ties. Foreign

Minister Subandrio - when accompanying President Sukarno on his visit to Karachi –

was assured that Indonesia had formed a promising friendship as was clearly shown by

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the sincerity of the people and government of Pakistan, and that this was very

meaningful for the struggle of NEFOS (Bintang Timur 28 June 1963). Indonesia felt

more confident with its closer relationship with Pakistan, which was sending a signal to

India that the Jakarta-Islamabad collaboration was entering a new phase.

The conflict between India and Indonesia was meanwhile widening. Sukarno, eager to

convene the second Asian African conference, hoped to seek recruits to his proposed

NEFOS grouping. Nevertheless, India was determined to stall the holding of such a

Bandung type meeting. The Shastri government of India, on the diplomatic front, made

a concerted attempt with Yugoslavia, Egypt, and Ceylon, to host a rival conference, the

second nonalignment meeting. It was quite likely that a meeting between nonaligned

states might render unnecessary a second Bandung-like conference because most Afro-

Asian countries were taking part as well. At any rate, India considered a conference of

Asia and Africa would have been delayed had the nonalignment group held their

gathering in 1964 earlier than the planned Bandung gathering (Singh 1980, 45).

As Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai set out on a tour of Africa to secure support of

the second Afro-Asian conference, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs took active

steps to convince Ceylon and Egypt of the desirability to speed up convening the second

nonalignment conference. To New Delhi’s surprise, Colombo and Cairo were only too

willing to oblige; the preparatory meeting at the ambassadorial level was held at

Colombo in March 1964. Indonesia, Pakistan and China did not want to be

outmanoeuvred by India, and Indonesia hosted the preparatory meeting of the second

Afro-Asian conference in April 1964 (Singh 1966, 172-3).

At the meeting held in Jakarta, the two blocs vainly opposed each other’s position.

Controversies cantered on the Indian proposal to invite Malaysia and the Soviet Union.

For Indonesia, Malaysia did not exist. China could not accept the attendance of the

Soviet Union at the conference which Peking had been long expecting to dominate and

able to gain a good image. Indonesia at the time was close to the Soviet Union in the

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military field since its dispute over West Irian with the Netherlands. However, Jakarta

was inclined to favour China, and Sukarno saw this as more helpful to his ‘crush

Malaysia’ campaign. The trio Jakarta-Beijing-Islamabad put up a strong fight against

the proposed Malaysian and Soviet participation. This issue further strained relations

between Indonesia and India. The national media, controlled by the Indonesian

government, accused India of insulting Indonesian sensibility through the controversial

initiative of trying to bar the Afro-Asian conference (Singh 1967, 663).

Again, Indonesia felt hindered by India and likeminded parties. Indonesia, with the

support of China and Pakistan, wanted to convene the second Asian-African conference

in an Indonesian city, which was to be held prior to the nonalignment meeting at the end

of 1964. Once more India struck at the very root of Indonesian bid. To the great

disappointment of Indonesia, Pakistan and China, India succeeded in confirming

support of African delegations, in that not only the second Afro-Asian gathering would

be held in 1965 after the nonalignment conference, but also the venue would be in an

African country, to be decided by the Organization of African Union (OAU). Algiers

was identified on 10 March 1965 as a likely venue for the conference. To give more

time to Algiers to make preparations, the schedule of the meeting was changed to 29

June 1965 (Millar & Miller 1965, 311). By this time, Indonesia and India were engaged

in a contest in respect to the ideas, venue, and participants in the convening of the

Bandung-like meeting.

Amidst growing tensions with India, in September 1964 Sukarno visited Pakistan to

seek a more solid commitment in support of Indonesia. The joint statement issued at the

visit established the framework for a stronger relationship between Indonesia and

Pakistan. It was on this visit that, for the first time, Sukarno asserted his political

support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Sukarno openly acknowledged that the

Kashmir issue was of the Indonesian government’s concern from now on, so that the

people of Indonesia were called to support the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination.

Any action by an external ruler – the reference to India - to thwart the efforts of the

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majority of Kashmiri peoples was opposed in line with Indonesia’s continuing fight

against imperialism of the OLDEFOS (ANTARA 22 September 1964). Indonesia had

made it clear that it was leaning towards Pakistan.

Indonesia and Pakistan economic ties grew as well. The commitment to enhance

cooperation produced a trade protocol signed between Pakistan and Indonesia on 11

January 1965 in Jakarta. Pakistan granted Indonesia an export credit package worth US$

10 million, and agreed to export cotton textile yarn and jute to Indonesia (Text of Trade

Protocol between Indonesia and Pakistan 1965). From 1 to 8 March 1965, Indonesia and

Pakistan held a conference on economic and cultural cooperation in Karachi, with

Indonesia agreeing to import Pakistani films instead of the Indian and agricultural goods

(Text of Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation between Indonesia and

Pakistan 1965).

While Indonesia and Pakistan were fostering ties, further tension arose with India.

Observers were convinced that the split between Indonesia and India within the Asian-

African powers was a considerable factor in the failure of that second Bandung-type

gathering (Weinstein 1965, 335). Beside this, unsettled situations in Algiers following

the overthrow of President Ben Bella on 19 June 1965 had paved the way for India to

work actively with Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, and Japan to reschedule the conference to 5

November 1965. In fact, the conference never took place (Singh 1967, 664). The year

1965 witnessed the height of Indonesian hostility towards India.

This development served as a fresh opportunity for Indonesia and Pakistan to further

consolidate their political relations. Foreign Minister Subandrio of Indonesia made a

three-day visit to Pakistan beginning on 19 February 1965. In Pakistan, Subandrio

assured the people of Pakistan that his government would carry on working with

Pakistan for the strengthening of their relationship. An Indonesian press correspondent

in Karachi wrote that the Pakistani media gave wide coverage of Subandrio’s visit.

Indonesia – especially President Sukarno - was symbolized as the champion of freedom

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in Asia, and the greatest leader of the Indonesian nation and Muslims. Moreover, under

the leadership of the revolutionary Indonesia, the NEFOS movement was identified as

the denominator of changes in the neo-colonized world. India, in contrast, was

illustrated as the perpetrator of brown imperialism in the region (Bintang Timur 20

February 1965).

Since Indonesia was improving relations with Pakistan, Islam began to be relatively

more present than was the case before in Sukarno’s rhetoric. Sukarno used the language

of Islamic identity in an inaugural address at the Asian-African Islamic conference held

at Bandung in the first half of March 1965. He exhorted ‘…to seek freedom from

colonialism in all its forms [as] it had oppressed and suppressed the Muslim

world…colonialism has put Islam in the chains against which Muslims are obliged to

oppose…’ (Indonesian Observer 15 March 1965). Sukarno attempted to construct an

image that the struggle against colonialism featured in his worldview and policies were

congruent with the Islamic duties.

According to Sukarno’s supporter, who was also an activist of Nahdlatul Ulama, H. A.

Notosutardjo (1963, 11-5), the ideological policy of NEFOS against OLDEFOS

reflected the revolution of Islam when Prophet Muhammad struggled for the changes to

his society; from uncivilized into a civilized one. Such an interpretation of Islamic

values in Sukarno’s policy was supplemented and supported by the Indonesian media.

For instance, Bintang Timur (16 March 1965) which published an editorial on the day

Sukarno was addressing the Asian African Islamic conference, paid tribute to the

Indonesian leader as the champion of Muslims and freedom. Therefore, beside holding

the title of a revolutionary supporter of the Third World struggles, Sukarno and

Indonesia had been branded with Islamic identity.

Islam was used in flavouring Indonesian political interest in humiliating India: in a

reception for the participants of the Asian African Islamic conference, the Indonesian

Foreign Minister Subandrio, said ‘…Islam should be the basis of worldwide human

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revolution…’. Despite complaints from the Indian delegates, the Indonesian foreign

minister called upon the worldwide Muslims ‘…to present a united front against non-

Muslim aggressors, and provide all assistances for Muslims being attacked by non-

Muslims such as what happened in Kashmir…’ (Bintang Timur 17 March 1965). This

statement indicated that Indonesia had been willing to adopt Islamic languages in the

foreign policy more openly, although the change was not simply due to a heightened

awareness of Islam as the bond with Pakistan and others in the Muslim world.

In any case, Pakistan benefited from this change. During the mid 1960s, the Islamic

identity was more obviously and strongly applied in Indonesia’s approach to describe its

relations with Pakistan. For instance, Indonesian Ambassador to Pakistan Brigadier

General Roekmito Hendraniggrat wrote in Pakistan Horizon (1965, 142) ‘…the people

of Pakistan had shown to us (Indonesians) an amount of goodwill and affectionate

feelings to their brothers in Islam, a kind of relationship that would be hard to find in

any other bilateral ties…’. The ambassador added ‘…it is true that Islam makes

indestructible bonds for the two nations...’. As the Pakistan Horizon published by the

Pakistan Institute of International Affairs was a significant space where foreign policy

issues were discussed in the country, the publication of the opinion of the Indonesian

ambassador in the space indicated that he wanted to engage Pakistani opinion and

policy makers with Indonesian Muslim identity.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the Indonesian Attitude

In September 1965, India and Pakistan fought their second war on Kashmir. Prior to the

war, the two armies had clashed over the Rann of Kutch, a piece of marshy land along

the border of India and adjoining Sindh. The issue was settled through an accord signed

between the two states on 30 June 1965 (Choudhury 1972, 242). One of the points in

the agreement mentioned that the Kashmir dispute, if unresolved, would be submitted

for arbitration of an international tribunal. Pakistan expected that this principle could be

applied to the Kashmir issue in the future (Sayeed 1966, 8). The Rann of Kutch fighting

was perceived by Pakistan’s leadership as a solid demonstration of its strength. This

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encouraged Pakistan that an uprising could be spurred on in Indian-governed Kashmir.

The Pakistani government’s assessment was that India, having lost the Sino-Indian

border war of 1962, would not be confident enough to risk an all out war, especially

after its experience in the dispute over the Rann of Kutch. Additionally, Pakistan was

confident that the well equipped military personnel as a result of the American aid it

received over the last ten years would be able to thwart Indian moves. Only four months

after the clash in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan commenced an underground operation –

called ‘Operation Gibraltar’ – to send Mujahideen infiltrators across into the Indian-held

Kashmir area to incite people insurgence (Burke & Ziring 1990, 333).

The Pakistani provocative actions worried India, and New Delhi retaliated by

mobilizing troops to seize Kargil. It was followed by Indian advances along the

ceasefire line between Pakistani and Indian occupied Kashmir. Events started moving at

rapid speed. Pakistani tanked troops moved up to occupy the Chamb sector of

Southwestern corner of Indian-occupied Kashmir on 1 September 1965. India was

concerned that if the Pakistani troops took over Aknur and Jammu, New Delhi’s

communications with Srinagar would be cut off, and Indian troops would be bottled up

between the ceasefire line and the valley. Thus, on 6 September 1965, India positioned

troops to cross over the international borders between India and Pakistan. A full scale

armed conflict was fought between India and Pakistan on the outer edges of Lahore and

Sialkot in West Pakistan during the next two weeks. The war ended on 23 September

1965 without any side achieving a decisive breakthrough (Sayeed 1966, 9).

The war caused a major concern among the international community, and the UN

intervened on the diplomatic front. On 4 and 6 September, the UNSC passed resolutions

209 and 210 respectively, calling for an immediate ceasefire. The Pakistani government

responded to these moves by stressing that the Kashmir dispute remained the sole cause

of conflict between India and Pakistan and that it needed to be resolved to ensure peace

in the region. Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan expressed these views in his meeting

with the Secretary General U Thant who visited Pakistan during the conflict. He

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emphasized that the UN had a responsibility to ensure that self-determination rights of

the Kashmiri people were realized (Gauhar 1993, 340). Pakistan’s Foreign Minister

Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto also rejected allegations that Pakistan had prompted the war to

occur. He pointed out that the cardinal principle of Pakistan’s foreign policy was to

establish peace with its main neighbour India. He emphasized that ever since Ayub

Khan became the leader of Pakistan, he had made all efforts to make a peaceful

settlement with India. For example, in 1959 Pakistan made an offer to India to bring

about a meaningful settlement so that their armies would not face each other in combat.

In line with Pakistan’s established position, he argued ‘…the people of Jammu and

Kashmir [had] never been part of India, and that they [were] part of the people of

Pakistan…’ (1965, 4-5). Therefore, India had to accept that the people of Jammu and

Kashmir have the absolute rights of self-determination. Pakistan sought India’s respect

to this as the principle of good neighbourly relations.

Despite being in an alliance relationship with Pakistan, the American response was to

not take sides, and to leave it to the UNSC to seek an end to the war (Sattar 2007, 97-8).

American strategic policy makers in South Asia saw the war between Pakistan and India

in frustration, mainly due to the use of American weapons by both sides to fight each

other and not for combat against Washington’s enemies. On 8 September, the US

stopped supplying arms to both Pakistan and India. Pakistan reacted to this policy by

questioning Washington’s commitment as an ally. In reply, Washington argued that

Islamabad had sparked the war with India. This introduced an element of

disillusionment among the Pakistani government: President Ayub Khan felt ‘let down’

by American view that it was not bound to support Pakistan and did not consider that

Indian attacks were an act of aggression. Pakistan felt betrayed: though the US had

ceased supplies of arms to both India and Pakistan, India could still have access to the

weapons provided by the Soviet Union - contributing to power disequilibrium.

China, in contrast, stood by Pakistan. Having signed a series of agreements with

Pakistan in 1963, and keen to use Pakistan as a link with Middle Eastern Muslim states,

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Beijing extended full support to Pakistan both tangibly and intangibly (Gauhar 1993,

347-8). China, at the Pakistan’s request for assistance, was prepared to provide

munitions and spare parts, and fly in the material on fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Foreign

Minister Chen Yi of China was outspoken in denouncing Indian military actions in

Kashmir. In Karachi on 4 September Chen Yi expressed the Chinese government’s

criticism of Indian unjust armed provocations in Kashmir. Three days later, the Chinese

foreign minister condemned what he mentioned as India’s criminal aggression against

Pakistan, and accused India of trying to intimidate its neighbour through whatever deeds

it liked. On 12 September, China reaffirmed its stance on the Kashmir issue, that it

completely endorsed Kashmiri people’s rights of self-determination, and could not

approve Indian attacks on Pakistan. The position was in line with the stand taken by

Pakistan. So, even though China was not physically involved in the conflict, it adopted a

strong pro-Pakistani position on the conflict.

Generally, the Muslim world stood by Pakistan (Sayeed 1966, 10), except for Malaysia

which opposed Pakistan’s position; which was expressed by a Malaysian diplomat with

Indian origin during the UNSC discussions on the war. Iran and Turkey rendered

planeloads and ammunition to Pakistan despite restrictions imposed on American arms

transfer to a third party by Washington. President Nasser of Egypt, together with the

Arab countries, assured Pakistan of their sympathy, and called upon India and Pakistan

to settle the Kashmir conflict in accordance with the UN resolution passed in 1949

asking for a plebiscite. This was significant as Egypt had earlier been in favour of the

nonalignment policy of India.

Indonesia also supported Pakistan during the 1965 War thus marking the third phase of

the improvement in their relations. Indonesia declared readiness to militarily support

Pakistan. According to the former Chief of Pakistan’s Air Force, Air Marshall Asghar

Khan (1979, 44), he went to Jakarta and carried a personal letter from Ayub Khan for

Sukarno, explaining the situation Pakistan was facing. Responding to the Pakistani plea

for military aid, Sukarno said that Pakistan’s terrible need was Indonesia’s as well.

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Sukarno considered Indian attacks on Pakistan as though it was an aggression to

Indonesia, and pledged, upon the ground of Islamic solidarity, to provide all assistances

necessary for Pakistan. The Pakistani emissary was told to regard Indonesia as his own

country and take from it whatever might be helpful to Pakistan in the emergency

circumstances. This commitment was materialized into Indonesia’s military support for

Pakistan.

Indonesia went so far as to ask Ceylon permission to use its airports for transferring

military aircrafts for Pakistan, which were manned by personnel of Indonesian Staff

College. In fact, it was reported that Ceylon rejected this request on account of its

neutral policy towards India and Pakistan. In mid September, Sukarno sent the

Indonesian Chief of Staff Vice Marshall Omar Dhani to China for a secret mission to

obtain spare parts of military airplanes as Indonesia was arranging to dispatch them for

military assistance to Pakistan. Then, Indonesia gave eight MiG-19 jet fighters to

Pakistan without asking for permits from Soviet’s authority (Khan 1979, 47).

In addition to air force aid, the Indonesian government agreed to give naval aid.

Indonesia at Pakistan’s request for aid was ready to take over the Andaman group of

islands. The Chief Commander of Indonesian navy believed that India did not deserve

to be there in Andaman and Nicobar islands since they are an extension of Indonesian

territory of Sumatra, and are located between Indonesia and East Pakistan. Therefore,

the Indonesian navy commenced patrols and undertook inspection of these areas to see

what India had done there (Bintang Timur 10 September 1965). An observer even said

that India had postponed launching its sea strikes on Pakistan after realizing that the

Indonesian navy was already in Pakistan’s seas7. The Indonesian military aid to Pakistan

illustrates that Indonesian support was not confined to sheer rhetoric.

The Indonesian elite gave statements suggesting that they viewed India as an aggressor

in Kashmir and the perpetrator of conflict in the state. Assertive languages backing

7 From an interview with Wahyudi Purnomo who is an expert of Indonesian foreign policy in South Asia under Sukarno, February 2010.

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Pakistan were heard in Jakarta during the war. Sukarno gave a press conference

expressing the fellow feeling and prayers of Indonesians for Pakistanis who were

fighting sternly against aggression to the sovereignty of their country and people

(Pakistan Horizon 1965, 364). The Chairman of the Indonesian Parliament, Arudji

Kartawinata, and Chairman of Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist

Party, PKI) D. N. Aidit, shared similar views and depicted Indians as the representation

of neo-imperialists in Asia. They also advised the Sukarno government to devote more

humanitarian assistance to Pakistanis in need (Bintang Timur 8 September 1965).

It may be argued that the Indonesian support for Pakistan was extended within the

context of the China-Pakistan-Indonesia triangular alliance that had evolved since the

turn of the 1960s. Jakarta was willing to cooperate with China in supporting Pakistan

during the war both diplomatically and militarily. But the explanations of Indonesian

policy on Pakistan located the support within the context of Indonesia’s struggle against

imperialism, and its Islamic identity. In explaining the Indonesian government’s policy

on supporting Pakistan, the Minister of Communication Ruslan Abdulgani spoke to

journalists in Jakarta, saying that India was in doubt about anti-colonialism, endorsing

the birth of colonial puppet Malaysia, as well as betraying the Bandung Spirit. On the

other hand, Pakistan had developed friendship and solidarity with Indonesia in the

struggle against colonialism, faithful with the respect to the rights of self-determination,

and complied with the Bandung Spirit. Therefore, Indonesia decided to support

Pakistan’s struggle for the Kashmiri people’s rights of self-determination (ANTARA 7

September 1965).

Generally, media in Indonesia was in favour of the government’s policy towards

Pakistan. For instance, an editorial of the nationalist daily Kompas (10 September 1965)

wrote an appraisal to Indonesia’s tangible support for Pakistan which was of help in

fortifying the struggle of the Kashmiri people. The daily expressed that every nation has

an inalienable rights to self-rule. In the case of Kashmir, its people’s rights were denied

by India due to the latter’s selfish national interest. The policy adopted by Indonesia

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was correct because it was aimed at defending the rights of self-determination for

peoples in Kashmir. Based on the Bandung Spirit of Asian and African solidarity, the

government of Indonesia was urged to help heighten Pakistan’s bargaining position in

international diplomatic arenas.

Ambassador Hendraninggrat – when inaugurating the Indonesian consulate in Dhaka on

19 September 1965 – stated that the Indonesian government and Muslims gave Pakistan

their full political and moral support without reservations. Emphasizing on solidarity in

the name of Islam, Hendraninggrat mentioned ‘…no power on earth that could disturb

Islamic bonds binding Indonesia and Pakistan…’ (ANTARA 20 September 1965). With

this statement, it is clear that the Indonesian government had offered its support for

Pakistan by both acknowledging the need for the pursuance of Muslim solidarity and

the struggle against imperialism manifested in Kashmir; a dual-approach that admitted -

even if to a limited extent - the importance of Islam in Indonesia and Pakistan relations.

Societal groups in Indonesia also supported Pakistan with reference to their common

Islamic identity. As the war started on 6 September, about 2,000 angry masses

organized by the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama Party demonstrated in front of the

Indian embassy in Jakarta, mouthing anti-India and pro-Pakistan slogans. Two days

later, another bigger mass rally took place, and on 9 September massive gatherings

turned violence. The Indian embassy was stoned and ransacked, three cars belonging to

the embassy were burnt out, and the Indian information service office was occupied

through force by angry Indonesian mobs (Sayeed 1968, 236). It was reported that in

West Java property of Indians was placed in custody. In Medan North Sumatra, the

Indian consulate and Khalsa English School were seized by rowdy elements. The

Gandhi Memorial School and office of the Air-India in Jakarta were also attacked. In

this troubled atmosphere, the Indian embassy in Jakarta decided to evacuate the wives

and children of its staff (Singh 1966, 174).

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Nahdlatul Ulama pledged a readiness to send volunteers to Kashmir to fight against

Indian forces there. The former leader and founder of Laskar Hezbollah and Laskar

Sabilillah, affiliated mostly with Nahdlatul Ulama, Kiai Masykur expressed his great

sympathy to Pakistan. He said that he was called upon to do that by the history of his

and other Muslim fighters who had struggled hand-in-hand with Pakistani Muslim

soldiers to defend the freedom of Indonesia during the 1940s. Therefore, it was his duty

to pay back those services given by Pakistani Muslim brothers by supporting them

against the attacks of foreigners - the reference was to Indians (Kompas 11 September

1965).

Despite its professed secularist identity, the Sukarno government, represented by

Foreign Minister Subandrio, appreciated the commitment and actions by the Islamist

activists of Nahdlatul Ulama. He claimed ‘…the show of solidarity by the Indonesian

masses is highly appreciable…it reflects the genuine feeling of support of Indonesian

peoples for Pakistanis who are fighting powerfully to safeguard their independence and

territorial integrity…’ (Indonesian Observer 10 September 1965). Although there was

no report suggesting that the Indonesian government facilitated volunteers to go to

Kashmir, the events taking place in Jakarta and other cities where mass protests against

Indians continued violently, with no effort made by the security authorities to control or

stop them, indicated that the government favoured the violent actions.

The Indian parliament and government complained about all these destructive actions

by Indonesians. However, the government in Jakarta ignored it and continued to launch

anti-India propaganda. In Pakistan, efforts to strengthen relations with Indonesia

continued. On 8 October 1965, Sukarno Day – in honour of the Indonesian nationalist

leader – was celebrated throughout the country, despite the fact that a coup, on 30

September/1 October, ousted him from power (Singh 1966, 174). Later, on 20 February

1966, the Revolution Brigade of Kashmir sent a letter to Sukarno to express their

gratitude towards the Indonesian government and peoples (Kompas 21 February 1966).

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During the Sukarno era, Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan indicated gradual

changes - from the position of avoiding the use of Islam as the reference to describe the

relationship, to acknowledging the importance of and emphasizing Islamic identity as a

factor in their relationship. Although this development was not caused by the growing

Islamic orientation of the Indonesian elite’s interest and policies (which remained

predominantly secular in its outlook), it was made possible through the shift in

Indonesian-Indian strategic relations which opened up the space for Pakistan to forge

stronger ties with Indonesia. Though Pakistan was motivated by more than merely its

Islamic identity in relating to Indonesia, the use of Islam by the Pakistani government

enabled the Sukarno regime to at least use the rhetoric of Islam in improving Indonesian

and Pakistani ties. Indonesian Islamist groups, with a history of joint struggle against

colonialists in Indonesia, supported the references to Islamic identity and used similar

references to describe their relations with Pakistanis.

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Chapter Three

Indonesia-Pakistan Relations Under

Suharto During The 1970s

Following the fall of the Sukarno government, a new regime known as the New Order

was installed under the guidance of President Suharto. This new administration, which

was backed up by the military establishment, subsequently shifted the direction of the

state’s foreign policy, including Indonesia’s South Asia policy. Jakarta sought to

maintain friendship with Islamabad and at the same time reinvigorated relations with

India by abandoning enmity inculcated by Sukarno. This chapter investigates the

presence and use of Islam by the Suharto government as a reference point in the

relationship with Pakistan within its changing South Asia policy.

The chapter argues that Islam received little attention as the framework in which

Indonesia conducted its foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Instead there was an increased

focus on management of regional stability for economic development that, in turn,

resulted in Jakarta promoting balanced relationship with Islamabad and New Delhi.

This change could be discerned in the early years of Suharto (1966-1971). Then,

Indonesian attitudes to the crisis in East Pakistan - which led to the independence of

Bangladesh in December 1971 - also indicated an absence of the use of the language of

Islamic identity in Suharto’s foreign policy towards Pakistan. After the crisis,

Indonesian and Pakistan ties remained cordial in economic and cultural fields. The New

Order government acknowledged the importance of Islam in relations between

Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims at the societal level, but shied away from supporting

or promoting these links.

Suharto’s Foreign Policy Direction

Unlike the early years of Sukarno rule when the most crucial foreign policy problem

was to retain independence from external threats, the New Order government under

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Suharto found the state in a serious predicament caused by its predecessor’s radical

international policy. Thus, Indonesian foreign policy during at least the first five years

of Suharto was dictated by the interrelated domestic demands for economic recovery

and political stabilization.

The New Order government inherited three serious problems from the preceding regime

that needed to be resolved urgently. Firstly, the distortion of Indonesian national

identity articulated in the conducts of foreign policy particularly during the final years

of Sukarno. There were two gross misrepresentations of Indonesian identity; one was

that Indonesia strayed from a state with the peace-loving independent activism policy

into the confrontational revolutionary leader of the Third World powers in its rhetoric of

the New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) against the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS)

(Weinstein 1971, 97) and, the second was the reference to sources of identity other than

Pancasila, especially the use of the language of Islamic identity visible in Indonesian

support for Pakistan against India during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.

Secondly, with such an identity construction Indonesia adopted hostile attitude vis-à-vis

the West which, as the OLDEFOS, was accused of sustaining the world order of neo-

imperialism and neo-colonialism. In addition, Sukarno was aggressive towards the

neighbouring Third World countries such as Malaysia, which was accused of the proxy

of the Western imperialism, and India, which was labelled as the brown imperialist.

This radical international activism was combined with Indonesian reliance on China and

the Soviet Union for economic and military cooperation (Singh 1986). So, as the

relations with China were frozen after the alleged communist coup in Jakarta at the end

of September 1965, and links with Moscow were cool, Indonesia had no reliable

partners. And the relations with the Western economic powers had seriously

deteriorated (Bandoro 1994, 2-4).

Thirdly, the economy had collapsed due to the Sukarno regime’s international political

adventurism. By March 1966, the country’s foreign debt had mounted to US$ 785

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million whilst the national reserve held were only about US$ 400 million - enough for

the purchase of goods for the next six months. The inflation rate had reached an

unprecedented 600 percent. People’s purchasing power declined. This was exacerbated

by the problem of insufficient supplies to meet people’s basic needs, especially rice due

to the failure of the agricultural sector (Kompas 14 March 1966). Under these

circumstances, it was imperative for the new government to obtain international

economic support and to develop cooperation with countries alienated by the previous

regime.

The New Order government reasserted the central role of Pancasila as the state’s

national identity and pledged to reconstruct Indonesia’s foreign policy which had been

abused by Sukarno through bringing it back in consonance with the constitutionally

guided principle of independent activism foreign policy. The main architects of this

revised approach were President Suharto, Vice President Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX,

and Foreign Minister and Foreign Economic Relations Coordinator Adam Malik. For

the New Order government, the restoration of Indonesian economic condition was

linked to the creation of regional security and stability that was identified as Indonesia’s

main foreign policy priority (Sindunegara 1991, 19). Suharto expressed these ideas,

constituting the new Indonesian international outlook, in his first foreign policy speech

in the House of Representatives on 17 August 1966. He affirmed the central role of the

1945 Constitution in shaping Indonesian foreign policy (ANTARA 17 August 1966).

Drawing attention to the fourth paragraph of the preamble, Suharto asserted that

Indonesia wished to ‘…contribute to world order based on peace, freedom, and social

justice’ and to ‘live in peace and friendship with all nations in the world…’. The policy

of nonalignment and anti-interventionism was brought back to the centre stage and

economic and financial recovery was identified as the first. The new policy comprised

of both idealism and pragmatism with a declared preference to foster friendly and

mutual relations with all nations. However, this was not to mean that other countries

could intervene in Indonesia’s affairs, and jeopardize the country’s independence.

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Foreign Minister Adam Malik (1967) translated Suharto’s vision to include a focus on

the broadest possible international cooperation economically, politically, socially, as

well as culturally. The new government would endeavour to build Indonesia’s ties with

all countries if these could be beneficial to the state’s national interests and welfare of

the people. Stressing this point still further, Adam Malik remarked ‘…Indonesia’s

foreign policy would be aimed at an extension of economic and financial cooperation

between Indonesia and the outside world; both East and West as long as such

cooperation does not harm Indonesia’s national interests…’. This indicated that there

was a change from a provocative policy to good neighbourliness and open international

cooperation. Such a position also indicated a stark contrast between the foreign policy

postures adopted by the Suharto government and that by Sukarno.

The good neighbourly policy was at first implemented in the formation of a regional

institution of Southeast Asian countries called the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) in a meeting of five head of government on 8 August 1967 in

Bangkok Thailand. The ASEAN Declaration (1967) stated that the regional grouping is

‘…the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together with

friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, and secure for their

peoples for the posterity the blessings of peace, freedom, and prosperity…’. Within the

spirit of stability under ASEAN, Indonesia managed to overcome its dispute with

Malaysia. Still in 1967, in an attempt to broaden the scope of economic cooperation,

Indonesia joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank which

enabled its economy to be integrated with the international system. Under the auspices

of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), Jakarta made efforts to improve

Indonesian ties with the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United

States (US) (Malik 1968).

Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in South Asia

The change in Suharto’s foreign policy affected Indonesia’s relations with South Asian

countries as well. Suharto saw that links with the two South Asian major powers, India

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and Pakistan, had to be placed in a balanced proportion, with emphasis on mutual

cooperation for economic benefits and the creation of regional stability and security.

This was the context of Indonesia and Pakistan relations during the early years of the

New Order.

Indonesia remained friendly towards Pakistan. However, the pro-Pakistan policy and

the references to Islamic identity made in the 1965 Kashmir conflict as the basis of

Jakarta’s relations with Islamabad diminished significantly. The new Indonesian

Ambassador to Pakistan was appointed not long after Adam Malik became foreign

minister in March 1966. Sutopo, who was an active military officer, took over

ambassadorship on 1 April 1966 from Ambassador Roekmito Hendraninggrat who had

been appointed by Sukarno. The new ambassador made a statement that Indonesia

acknowledged friendship with Pakistan that had begun during the 1940s, and that those

ties had grown relatively without political disturbances ever since. Indonesia

appreciated the support that the Pakistani government had extended in various

international arenas. The foreign policy priority of the new national leadership in

Indonesia was to promote regional stability and economic cooperation, and according to

Ambassador Sutopo, relations with Islamabad would follow the same direction

(Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1967, 5). There was no reference to the Islamic bond

between the two states.

The reduction, if not absence, of Islamic reference in Indonesia and Pakistan relations at

that time was noticeable in the joint communiqué issued after the meeting between the

visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and the Pakistani Foreign Minister

Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, on 6 November 1966 in Karachi. It expressed a commitment

to maintain the ‘deep rooted relations between the societies of Indonesia and Pakistan’.

These relations were to be based on ‘…the principles of mutual cooperation, peaceful

settlement of international dispute, and the respect to each other national interests and

sovereignty…’ (Kompas 7 November 1966). There was no mention of Islam as the

bond for either the long-established relationships or future interactions (Text of Joint

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Communiqué between Indonesia and Pakistan 1966). This sent a clear signal that

Pakistan may not expect unqualified support from Jakarta, especially on the Kashmir

issue, based on common religious identity. The tone and content of the message were

different from the policy adopted by Sukarno.

The Pakistan government also shied away from extending unqualified support to the

Indonesian government. For instance, Adam Malik underscored the need for

establishing regional security and stability in the Indian Ocean. Indonesia’s major

concern was the activities of Soviet naval forces in the ocean, the developments in

Vietnam and the possibility of communism expansion in Indochina. After all, Indonesia

was observing with alarm China’s policy in Southeast Asia. This view was

understandable on account of the establishment of a military regime in Indonesia with

its fierce anticommunist orientation. Pakistan acknowledged the importance of building

up regional security and stability in the Indian Ocean without commenting on the

Vietnam War (ANTARA 8 November 1966). However, the renewed focus on economic

recovery was reflected in the agreements signed between Indonesia and Pakistan.

Indonesia was to import US$ 29.5 million worth of a variety of goods, mainly

agricultural and surgical products, from Pakistan on deferred payment during 1966 and

1967 (Angkatan Bersenjata 8 November 1966).

The significance of economic links was reemphasized by the Indonesian Foreign

Minister, Adam Malik, when he visited Pakistan in early April 1968. He referred to the

importance of Pakistan in the Indonesian plans to enlarge the area of economic

cooperation (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 7). The focus on economic relations

built upon the efforts made during the Sukarno era: As early as 1953 Indonesia and

Pakistan had concluded a treaty of trade cooperation, but it did not work. Only after the

visit of President Sukarno to Pakistan in September 1964, was the framework of

collaboration revived. Further on 19 August 1965 it was institutionalized and

augmented by the formation of Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation

(IPECC) organization on a ministerial meeting held in Jakarta. Some of the projects

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identified by IPECC for joint ventures were jute manufacturing, cotton textiles, metal

processing, fisheries, rubber processing, and ship building. Also in the IPECC scheme

was joint technical cooperation in oil exploration and sugar plants (Text of Joint

Declaration of IPECC 1965).

The IPECC was essentially the legacy of Indonesian-Pakistani strengthened ties under

Sukarno. However, how the New Order government measured its existence remained

relevant. At the first anniversary of IPECC, Adam Malik was keen for the cooperation

under IPECC with Pakistan to continue because it had been satisfactory. Then, the

ministerial councils of IPECC were set up to hold annual consultations for reviewing

progress having been achieved by the two sides under the IPECC agreements (Kompas

7 November 1966). After its establishment in 1965, IPECC had contributed to

intensifying commercial activities between Indonesia and Pakistan. By 1969 the

Indonesian embassy in Islamabad (1969, 11) reported the grant of separate US$ 5

million and US$ 10 million by Pakistan to Indonesia. The aim was to give a boost the

value of Indonesian imports from Pakistan from US$ 22.1 million in 1967 to US$ 32

million in 1968, consisting of agricultural products especially rice, sport goods, cotton

yarn, textiles, surgical equipment, and machineries. Meanwhile, Indonesia supplied

Pakistan with palm oil, fertilizer, tea, spices, and petroleum products valued at US$ 11

million.

The continued friendly relations with Pakistan were not to compromise Indonesia’s

effort to repair the damage done to Indonesian ties with India by the Sukarno regime.

Instead of criticizing India for its imperialism, the new regime identified India as an

important power in the Asian and African halls of diplomacy as well as nonalignment in

which Indonesia was taking part. The Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik,

expressed his government’s commitment on 4 April 1966 in an address to the

Indonesian parliamentary committee to put the misunderstandings of the past behind

and improve the relationship with India to give it more substance (Indonesian

Department of Information Paper 1966, 13). Indonesian leaders repeated these

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expressions of interest in repairing the damage in relations and openly acknowledged

that over the past two years Jakarta-New Delhi links had not been harmonious. India

responded to the moves by supporting Indonesia: the Indian Ambassador Perala Ratnam

provided textiles and medical supplies worth US$ 5,000 for the victims of a flood in

Central Java on 19 July. Adam Malik identified this India’s humanitarian aid as

symbolic of Indian friendship with his country and the people (Arora 1981a, 289).

The attempts to improve relations with India were made both at governmental and non-

governmental level: towards the end of August 1966, some members of the Indonesian

House of Representative, student committees, and journalists travelled to New Delhi for

the same missions. Adam Malik made a five-day-visit to India from 3 to 7 September,

followed by the visit of Vice President Hamengku Buwono IX on 22 September

(Kompas 23 September 1966). According to Roesnadi (1975, 181), the shift reflected

an assessment by Adam Malik that the tilt towards China and Pakistan during the first

half of the 1960s had led Indonesia to ignore the spirit of the 1955 Ten Bandung

Principles, and that the situation needed to be corrected. In his view the time had now

come for both sides to rediscover the commonality in views and policies for better

future ties. The main value of the improved relations with India was the pursuance of an

image that Indonesia was a peace-loving and friendly nation.

Adam Malik was aware of the offense to Indians caused by the Indonesian pro-Pakistan

position on the Kashmir conflict. Therefore, in gaining improved ties with India, Jakarta

launched its equidistant policy towards India and Pakistan over Kashmir. On a monthly

foreign policy review held at Pejambon Jakarta on 6 November 1966, Adam Malik

issued a statement saying ‘…different from the bitter past, now we hold impartiality

towards the Kashmiri conflict...’ (Kompas 7 November 1966). The expectation was that

the neutral position taken by Jakarta would certainly appease New Delhi’s objection to

foreign party’s intervention in the Kashmir issue.

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New Delhi welcomed changes in Jakarta’s worldview and foreign policy. The Indian

Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, in Rajya Sabha on 8 August 1966, said that he noticed

with pleasure Jakarta’s goodwill gestures to revitalize relations with New Delhi. Singh

referred to the setback in the two countries relations as temporary, and that sooner or

later kindly relations would have been restored. As a goodwill gesture, India provided a

credit loan worth Rs 100 million in support of Indonesian program for acceleration of

economic rehabilitation (Ramachandran 1966, 166).

The change in the nature of relationship between India and Indonesia coincided with the

assumption of power by Indira Gandhi in 1966. Under her leadership, India continued to

declare its commitment to a policy of nonalignment but also made efforts to establish

close links with the Soviet Union. It also continued the upward trend in its relations

with the US. Attempts were also made to improve India’s image in the eyes of its

immediate neighbours in South and Southeast Asia. Although there existed a view in

India that Asian independence movements were a by-product of Indian nationalism,

Indira Gandhi tried not to identify with such an excessive view, and focused on dealing

with Southeast Asian states on the basis of mutual partnership (Roesnadi 1975, 182-3).

It was the visit of Prime Minister Gandhi to Indonesia in June-July 1969 which marked

the building of a more solid foundation for the reestablishment of close interactions

between the two sides. The Indian prime minister described her visit as ‘one more link

in the chain that binds friendship between India and Indonesia’. Such a visit enabled the

two governments to arrive at a common approach towards regional and global issues;

the Vietnam War, a proposal of solidifying the function of the United Nations (UN),

and reducing the prevailing unequal relations between the Developed and Developing

World. Under Gandhi and Suharto, Indian-Indonesian ties were directed at expanding

mutual cooperation in the field of economics, culture, and technology (Kompas 30 June

1969).

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As mentioned earlier, the Suharto regime viewed making Southeast Asia secure and

stable as the main priority of its foreign policy, as it perceived that the region was facing

threats from great power politics and their intervention in the region. The involvement

of great powers such as the US, the Soviet Union, and China, in Jakarta’s view, could

escalate into regional confrontations. The need to avoid such confrontation provided the

context for Indonesian South Asia policy and specifically relations with Pakistan: the

crisis in East Pakistan 1971 heightened concerns among the elite in Jakarta, and shaped

their response to the crisis that ultimately resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh in

December 1971.

The East Pakistan Crisis

Bengalis of East Pakistan had actively supported Quaid-i-Azam Ali Jinnah in his

struggle for the founding of Pakistan. Yet, not long after Pakistan was independent in

1947 East Pakistanis began to experience inequitable treatment. The politics of power

sharing between Islamabad and Dhaka, economic disparity between the West and East

Pakistan, and cultural mistreatment of East Pakistanis contributed to tensions between

East and West Pakistanis (Sattar 2007, 112). Even though East Pakistanis comprised the

majority in Pakistan, they were suffering from a deep-rooted fear of domination by the

minority West Pakistanis (Owen 1972, 206). Over two decades after Pakistan

independence, East Pakistani groups strongly felt obliged to struggle for equal

treatment, and when it was not fulfilled, their sub-nationalism got the momentum to turn

into a movement for the creation of a separate state (Choudhury 1972, 244). This finally

led to the breakup of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971.

Under the parliamentary system instilled between 1947 and 1958, democracy in

Pakistan did not work. The central government did not even carry out general elections,

whilst the provincial elections were shrouded by undemocratic conducts of the

electorate. There were no well-organized political parties either. There was no national

party operated since the decline of the Muslim League. The failure of parliamentary

democracy led to the development of a powerful but irresponsible executive aided by

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formidable structures of bureaucracy. Pakistan governance was monopolized by

bureaucrats and military officials (Almond & Coleman 1963, 572). After Ayub Khan

ascended to presidency in 1958, the democratic political system guaranteed by the

constitution was, in fact, implemented in an oligarchy. There were cabinet and

parliament but the real power was centralized in the hands of one figure – the general or

the president himself (Wilcox 1968, 87).

Under the authoritarian ruling elite, few East Pakistanis were allowed to obtain high-

ranking official positions in Islamabad. The central government was composed of

mostly West Pakistani civil and military officers. Therefore, East Pakistanis had no role

in the governance. Every vital decision on public policy, economic development,

diplomacy and defence was, in the final analysis, made by the West Pakistani

bureaucrats (Ahmad 1972, 14). With regard to the application of the federalism, in

provincial matters the central government appointed West Pakistani officials to hold key

positions in East Pakistan to carry out day-to-day administration. Pakistan was adopting

federation, but in reality the regional government was completely subordinate to the

central ruling elite - particularly with financial arrangements (Wilcox 1968, 89).

The East Pakistanis found that the West Pakistani civil and military stationed in their

province were never willing to build real bonds with the local population. There were

few social contacts between them. The West Pakistani officials regarded themselves to

be socially superior to Bengali Muslims living in East Pakistan that were labelled as

converts from the lower-caste Hindus called Sudra. The result was bitterness and social

disharmony. It was through shared responsibilities and social communications that a

feeling of nationalism was planted. There was, however, no media for East Pakistanis to

have a thread of national feelings with West Pakistanis, apart from commonality in

Islamic religion. The focus on Pakistan as the homeland for Muslim, which was

advocated by Ali Jinnah, began to fade away in East Pakistan. Instead, secessionist

sentiments grew fast in the province (Choudhury 1972, 246).

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The demands for regional autonomy of East Pakistanis sharpened after the 1965 Indo-

Pakistan war. There was a myth that if India attacked East Pakistan, the Pakistani army

would move up to New Delhi. The war disproved this myth. Foreign Minister Zulfiqar

Ali Bhutto claimed that during the war East Pakistan had been protected by China. It

was perceived by East Pakistani groups that their survival could not be guaranteed by

Islamabad. East Pakistani intelligentsia in Dhaka and abroad started to think about

developing their own diplomatic links, should they be left alone by Islamabad. India

was aware of such a secessionist emotion, and initiated infiltration into East Pakistan to

spark a people uprising (Ahmad 1971, 13).

The economic disparity between West and East Pakistanis during 1960 and 1970 further

complicated the situation. The centralized economic policies pursued by Islamabad

prevented even distribution of national revenue for East Pakistan. The East Pakistanis

felt as though they were under colonial rule due to economic exploitation by the central

government. For instance, most income from jute as the chief export commodity of East

Pakistan went to Islamabad’s defence expenditure. East Pakistanis did not enjoy

benefits from its production. The economic discrepancy was illustrated in the income

per capita of West Pakistanis in 1970 which was 61 percent higher than that of the East

Pakistanis. This figure was doubled compared to the record in 1960 (Owen 1972, 206-

7). Under these circumstances, East Pakistani disaffection towards West Pakistanis was

not hidden. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League designed the demand for

greater autonomy (Thorp 1987, 144). However, Ayub Khan’s administration associated

the request for autonomy with East Pakistani separatism, envisaging Awami League

leaders as having been duped by Indian propaganda with its ambitions to dominate West

Pakistan. President Ayub Khan could appreciate that East Pakistanis no longer wanted

to be with Pakistan (Gauhar 1994, 441).

In December 1970, the Pakistani general elections took place, in which Mujibur

Rahman’s Awami League not only won 99 percent of the seats in East Pakistan (167 of

169 seats), but also acquired a majority in the Pakistan National Assembly. Mujibur

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Rahman had fought elections on the basis of the six demand points for East Pakistani

full autonomy. Elite in Islamabad immediately showed unhappiness with the East

Pakistani aspirations, because they would lose the absolute cultural, political and

economic control over Pakistan’s eastern wing (Owen 1972, 208). While at the same

time, it was apparent that Mujibur Rahman and Awami League followers would not

accept anything less than what they had stated. Pakistan, inevitably, was going to

undergo an unexpected political turmoil (Ahmed 1971, 8).

Nature too played an important role in the crisis. A gigantic cyclone in November 1970

caused death and devastation in its path through the countryside. A quarter of a million

people were drowned. The federal government was charged with indifference to the

plight of East Pakistani peoples (Sattar 2007, 113). India, which had been observing the

developments in East Pakistan, came to take the lead to assist with organizing

humanitarian aid for the natural disaster victims on its borders (Owen 1972, 208). This

project was used by New Delhi as a route to intervene in Pakistan’s domestic affairs.

India readied itself to intensify separatist sentiment of peoples living along its borders.

Indian intelligence units known as Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was designed

and assigned to undertake the mission in East Pakistan (Ahmad 1971, 14).

Political situation in Dhaka heated up as the radical element of Awami League started to

loudly voice demands for independence, ignoring the fact that the erstwhile six points

articulated by Mujibur Rahman were negotiable in respect to the demand of greater

power-sharing, foreign affairs and defence matters, and particularly economic

arrangements. The Awami League leader could not control the radicals in the party.

Islamabad, nonetheless, failed to talk with the Awami League about power-sharing by

virtue the latter showed no more interest in negotiation. Consequently, the government

of President Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law on 26 March 1971 and, instructed the

crackdown of secessionist movement of East Pakistan. The Pakistani army commenced

a massive military operation in East Pakistan which caused an exodus of refugees to

contiguous Indian states (Klatt 1972, 109).

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Indian opinion makers, the media and politicians, exaggerated the impact that the East

Pakistan crisis was having on India. The Indian government said that it had tried to feed,

house and clothe about nine million refugees. However, the Indian economy was unable

to feed the refugees for an unlimited period. Therefore, they had to be brought back

home soon otherwise the Indian economy would have collapsed (Bose 1972, 13). Media

editorials in India amplified the feeling of being overburdened by the East Pakistani

exodus and being extremely disappointed with the intransigent attitude of the Pakistani

leaders. This was effective in directing public support for the government. In addition,

as tales of murder, loot, burning, and torture in East Pakistan began to spread

throughout India, public opinion was stirred to sympathy and wrath. New Delhi, was

confident with the decision to fully endorse the liberation movement in East Pakistan,

and was prepared for military action to terminate the crisis (Barnds 1971, 319-20).

The Pakistani government viewed Indian response as evidence that India was eager to

separate East Pakistan from the Western wing of the country. This claim is not baseless.

Some Indian strategic thinkers, for example, K. Subrahmanyam stated ‘...the undoing of

Pakistan is in its vital interest and Indians now have the opportunity the like of which

will never come again…’. For India to be a major power of the subcontinent,

dismemberment of Pakistan was an essential precondition (Faruki 1971, 27). These

assessments prevented the Pakistani government from responding to the concerns of the

East Pakistanis, while the Indian military intelligence units started crossing over the

borders into East Pakistan. Soon India and Pakistan were fighting a ground war in 1971

(Ahmad 1972, 15).

The Pakistani government adopted the position that the crisis in East Pakistan was

entirely its internal affairs. On the other hand, India made an effort to internationalize

the problem. The Indian representative for the UN attempted to bring up the issue at

ECOSOC meetings, with a view to justify Indian interference in East Pakistan by

accusing Pakistan of violating human rights of the East Pakistanis. Pakistan, in turn,

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accused India of intruding into Pakistan’s domestic jurisdiction and deplored that New

Delhi gave its own version of events, an example of which was that the Indian press had

intentionally uncovered the stories of killings of non-Bengalis by the secessionists.

Agha Shahi claimed that Pakistanis had not committed such atrocities (Far Eastern

Economic Review 15 May 1971). Pakistan claimed that the Indian move at ECOSOC

meeting had failed since in the resolution issued at the end of its sessions, there was no

mention of the human rights issue in East Pakistan (Far Eastern Economic Review 17

May 1971). Foreign Minister Ali Bhutto accused India of utilizing the East Pakistan

problem as a pretext to invade East Pakistan (Bhutto 1972, 44).

Formally the UN had agreed that Pakistan’s stand on keeping the issue in its eastern

province was ‘strictly within Pakistan’s jurisdiction’. Secretary General U Thant in his

letter to President Yahya Khan dated 17 May 1971, observed that the situation in East

Pakistan did not justify intervention in the matters of internal authority of the UN

members, and any countries should not submit a request for that settlement under the

UN Charter (Ali 1971, 33). But in reality, the crisis in East Pakistan involved

superpower politics that actually had taken shape since the 1965 Kashmir war. The US,

although it chose to be impartial in the 1965 war, was still allied with Pakistan under

SEATO and CENTO. The Soviet Union openly backed India with air force equipment

during the 1965 Kashmir war. China, as discussed in the previous chapter, was strongly

in favour of Pakistan. These power alignments became more settled by 1970. India had

continued to receive Soviet’s military aid. But it was critical of the US decision to

resume arms supplies to Pakistan on 8 October 1970. The Pakistani government, led by

General Yahya Khan, sought to balance the Indian relationship with the Soviet Union

by keeping the US onside and seeking Chinese military assistance (Walter 1972, 4).

However, when the situations in East Pakistan became tense in the aftermath of

Islamabad’s harsh crackdown on East Pakistan in March 1971, the superpowers’

attitudes were ambivalent to the events. The US refrained from public criticism of the

Pakistani government while making informal diplomatic efforts to urge a cessation to

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the military operations. The Soviet Union publicly deplored the murders of East

Pakistanis by the Pakistani military, and advised a political solution, making initial

offers of economic aid to Islamabad to indicate its good intention. The Chinese Prime

Minister Chou En-Lai sent a letter to President Yahya Khan dated 12 April 1971, urged

Pakistan ‘to make a distinction between the masses of people and the collective of

people who wanted to avert the unification of Pakistan’. But publicly the Chinese

government consistently maintained that the East Pakistan situation was the internal

affairs of Pakistan which should be overcome by the Pakistani people themselves

without external interferences (Marwah 1979, 561-2).

The Muslim world demonstrated diverse responses to the crisis in East Pakistan.

Supporters of Pakistan, such as Iran, Iraq, Morocco and Turkey, extended their favour

in three ways; firstly, adhering to the principle of non-interference; secondly, treating

the development in East Pakistan as Pakistan’s domestic affairs; and thirdly, asking

foreign powers not to meddle in what is Pakistan’s internal matters. But Egypt and

Afghanistan were silent on the crisis in East Pakistan. It was perhaps because of

differences in political orientations between them (Ali 1971, 45-6). Malaysia too did not

express solidarity in the name of Islam with Pakistan as it did not wish to upset India

(Chandola 1972, 1224-5).

As the tensions mounted, in June 1971, the Soviets guaranteed protection for India from

China’s reprisals in case of a war with Pakistan. On 9 August 1971 India and the Soviet

Union concluded the Twenty Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The

treaty provided for consultations of major international issues of concern to the two

sides and, required each to refrain from giving assistance to any third parties which

were part of an armed conflict with the other. In fact, the treaty was aimed at

eliminating fears of China’s intervention. India received from the Soviet Union 52

Sukhoi SU-7 fighter-bombers as well as SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles. In addition,

Soviet delivered to India 450 T-54/T-55 battle tanks, 150 PT-76 amphibious tanks, and

F-class submarine. With the Soviet’s protection and assured of a Soviet veto in the

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Security Council deliberations, India moved fast on the trace of military operations. It

combined the military moves with building up of international opinion through

propaganda and high levels of official diplomacy (Iqbal 1972, 26).

By mid November 1971, border incidents between Indian and Pakistani troops

increased. By late November 1971, Indian troops opened fire with Pakistani forces

inside East Pakistan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi charged Pakistan with aggression

and placed India officially on a war footing 27 November 1971. On 3 December 1971

the full scale war broke out when India invaded East Pakistan. On the same day,

President Yahya Khan commended the army and air forces to carry out a retaliatory

attack across the borders from West Pakistan (Sattar 2007, 115-7). Assisted by about

100,000 Mukti Bahini forces trained by the Indian army, India took Dhaka from the

Pakistani army on 16 December 1971, and accepted the surrender of the Pakistani

military personnel in East Pakistan. This was despite the efforts at the UN Security

Council to secure a ceasefire - a project that was undermined by the Soviet veto. On 17

December 1971, President Yahya Khan accepted a general ceasefire, and on 20

December Ali Bhutto replaced him as President of the residual Pakistan. President Ali

Bhutto adopted a policy of conciliation, and released Mujibur Rahman on 7 January

1972 (Burke 1973, 1036-49). Mujibur Rahman took office as the first prime minister of

an independent Bangladesh on 12 January 1972.

The 1971 war caused material and immaterial damage to Pakistan (Sattar 2007, 120).

Following the defeat of the Pakistan’s contingent, over 93,000 civilians and soldiers

were taken prisoners by India. The Indian forces occupied 5,139 square miles of

territory in Western part of the country. In addition, about one million people were

displaced. Pakistan lost its confidence. There were doubts if the remaining Pakistan

could survive after losing its eastern wing.

The Indonesian Response

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As the breakup of Pakistan became imminent, the Pakistan Government sought to

project Indian policy as directed against a Muslim state. This resembled the references

adopted by Islamabad during the 1965 war. But, despite being a country with a majority

Muslim population, Indonesia opted to remain neutral or impartial in dealing with the

East Pakistan crisis. Jakarta set aside its pro-Pakistan policy taken during the 1965 Indo-

Pakistan war. Indonesia did not provide tangible support for Pakistan in the 1971 war,

but at the same time did also not want to offend Pakistan by showing a leaning towards

India. During the crisis, Jakarta avoided using the language of Islamic solidarity like it

had done for Pakistan in 1965. The New Order government preferred to refer to secular

agendas, such as the respect for state sovereignty and anti-foreign interference,

humanitarian aid to the crisis affected peoples, and the willingness to expand friendship

with any parties having the same policy orientation. On top of this, Indonesia

emphasized the need for maintaining internal and regional security. The Islamic

component had disappeared from Indonesia’s foreign policy.

This policy unfolded throughout the duration of the East Pakistan crisis of 1971.

Indonesia’s emphasized the principle of non-interference in dealing with developments

in East Pakistan, implicitly suggesting an agreement with Islamabad’s position on the

issue. Jakarta was in favour of the view that all developments in East Pakistan were

completely of Pakistan’s domestic affairs. Foreign Minister Adam Malik – when

addressing the press in Jakarta on 23 April 1971 – announced that his government

opposed outsiders that were escalating the crisis since they had no legitimate rights to

do that. Furthermore, Adam Malik revealed that Jakarta would not recognize the

existence of whatever new entity generated from disintegration of the sovereign nation-

state of Pakistan (Kompas 24 April 1971).

When armed conflict broke out between Pakistan and India in December 1971, Jakarta

repeated its previously declared opinion, and urged a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

From Jakarta, Adam Malik on behalf of the government of Indonesia affirmed that the

best way of settling the open conflict that occurred again between Pakistan and India

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was for the two sides had to sit down and talk. The show of force would simply be

affecting stability in the region. Indonesia called for an immediate ceasefire between

India and Pakistan, and for the two armed forces to be withdrawn from East Pakistan.

Indonesia hoped for the speedy return of normality in the subcontinent (Kompas 5

December 1971).

Jakarta was eager to stress its concern regarding the possible impact of India’s

intervention in East Pakistan on regional stability and peace. The New Order military

elite in particular did not feel convinced of the correctness of India’s position in its war

with Pakistan. Indonesia thus showed reservations about Indian foreign policy of the

crisis. Jakarta viewed the East Pakistan crisis was a by-product of external power

politics of interference – the reference was to India and its ally the Soviet Union –

promoting a cause of a dissident movement which could ultimately lead to the

bifurcation of an existing state of Pakistan. This, Indonesia feared, could possibly

spread to neighbouring states. In other words, Indian foreign policy behaviour at the

time was considered as having the potential to prompt internal and regional problems

for its other neighbours.

Regarding the potential effect to Indonesian internal affairs, an Indonesian army

commander Lieutenant General Sumitro (Angkatan Bersenjata 12 December 1971)

commented that the developments in the subcontinent and the war had created

undesirable precedents and uneasiness amongst Indian neighbours in the Indian Ocean

rim - particularly Indonesia which was focusing on its efforts to create domestic

stability and peace. According to the Indonesian general, this trend might drive the

latent separatist groups to consider asking for foreign power assistance, and

undermining state sovereignty and integrity in other countries. The assessment indicated

that Indonesia considered the possible national disintegration of Pakistan as posing a

direct threat to other states’ political stability and economic development. At that time,

the government in Jakarta was facing the rise of Muslim minority ethno-nationalist

sentiment in the Aceh Province. It may be argued that Indonesia was apprehensive that

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Indian action in East Pakistan would set a precedent for similar dangerous possibilities

for other Southeast Asian countries beset with secessionism problems.

Indonesia’s response to the crisis and the war was based on its strategic assessment of

developments in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. Jakarta located the

developments within the context of the Cold War politics, and Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Lieutenant General Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo (1976) – who was the chief of Lembaga

Ketahanan Nasional (the Institute for National Resilience) in Jakarta, a think-tank group

and part of Suharto’s policy circles - articulated the Indonesian viewpoint as to how the

Soviet Union was engaged in the East Pakistan crisis by actively providing its backing

to India. Suryohadiprojo (1976, 110-12) argued that Soviet rivalry with China pushed

Moscow to lean towards New Delhi. The Twenty Year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and

Cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow was significant as it was concluded just

four months before the India-Pakistan war broke out at the end of 1971. The treaty

became a guarantee for India that the Kremlin would not adopt a neutral posture in the

case of a war with Pakistan. At the same time, the treaty could be meant as deterrence to

Peking as well with a message that Soviet had supported the secessionist movement of

East Pakistan. Furthermore, regarding superpowers’ rivalry, America who was facing

too much trouble in Indochina was not in a position to meet the Soviets in South Asia.

New Delhi was aware of the fact that Washington did not want to be physically

involved in the crisis. At the same time, China, which had a great desire in neutralizing

Indian and Soviet moves in East Pakistan, could not do much to help Pakistan with

military support during the war. This was mainly due to China’s material inferiority to

Soviet. It was a distinct disadvantage for Pakistan. On the other hand, the crisis in East

Pakistan which led to the liberation of Bangladesh was a political and military triumph

for India and the Soviet Union. Indonesia was particularly concerned at the increasing

involvement of the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean region in the process of supporting

India. Hence it opposed interference, and talked of regional implications of the crisis

and the war leading to Pakistan’s dismemberment.

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Although the Indonesian government eschewed using the words of Islamic identity to

support Pakistan, and took a neutral stand, it did not avert others to express opinions

through critical languages. Non-state actors were allowed to play a role in

communicating Indonesian concerns. Youth and student organizations – not identified

as affiliated to a particular Muslim group - protested against Indian military intervention

in East Pakistan and conducted some small and sporadic demonstrations in Jakarta. The

protesters who gathered in front of the Indian embassy denounced India as a hypocrite;

claiming itself as the champion of nonaligned powers and a peace-loving state, but in

fact tightly bound with the communists to invade a smaller and weaker state. The mass

actions were not as violent as what occurred during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war because

the police guards blockaded them (Kompas 7 December 1971). It was apparent that

despite the anxiety felt by some Indonesian leaders at the Indian intrusion into East

Pakistan, the New Order government did not want to strain relations with India by

allowing angry protesters to attack Indian properties.

The media in Indonesia tended to comment critically on what they depicted as the

Indian illegitimate involvement in the East Pakistan crisis, while not broadcasting much

coverage on the Pakistani side. Newspaper editorials such as of The Tribune of

Indonesia (14 December 1971) pointed out that India’s main objective in its

interference in East Pakistan was to weaken its neighbour, and through the mutilation of

Pakistan, New Delhi could ensure its definitive desire for the Greater India, which in

turn, dominated the whole region of South Asia.

Other Indonesian media agreed with the government’s strategic views on the East

Pakistan crisis. For instance, an editorial by Kompas (18 February 1972) titled ‘India

and Pakistan War’ which warned about the side effect of the East Pakistan crisis to the

larger framing of Cold War politics in the region. The national daily wrote that

Indonesia envisaged the unwanted implications of the potential superpowers rivalry for

regional stability where the growing Soviet naval penetration and existence in the

Indian Ocean would prompt the US to increase its presence as well. The paper argued

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that superpowers rivalry should be reduced; it also suggested that the littoral states of

the Indian Ocean had to take the responsibility of regional security and; suggested that

the region should be made as a zone of peace.

The Jakarta-based publication of Angkatan Bersenjata (20 December 1971) wrote that

in Southeast Asia there seemed to be a common denominator for the political mood

prevailing from Kuala Lumpur to Jakarta; mistrust of superpowers that had used the

cause of regional conflicts to further their own political objectives, far too often to the

detriment of weaker states. In the context of the war in the Indian subcontinent, the

Indonesian daily claimed that ASEAN members - Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore -

were strongly motivated by a realization of common interests to keep the region free

from vying superpowers. They referred to the UN Declaration on Indian Ocean as a

zone of peace, issued on 16 December 1971, stating that the littoral states of the Indian

Ocean commit to preserve their independence, sovereignty, and national integrity, and

to overcome political, economic, and social problems under conditions of peace and

tranquillity. The three countries’ primary concern was by all means to maintain the

stability of the Malacca Strait, which was the main line of trade and transportation in

Southeast Asia, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The Indian government considered that Indonesia’s apprehension was quite misplaced.

New Delhi explained that the crisis in East Pakistan was caused by President Yahya

Khan’s brutal military repression policy in East Pakistan. India argued that its

interference in East Pakistan was the act of humanitarian relief (Arora 1981a, 315). In

an attempt to secure Indonesian support, the Indian Minister of External Affairs Swaran

Singh discussed the crisis with Adam Malik in Jakarta. However, Jakarta carefully

avoided supporting the Indian position: it agreed that Pakistani leaders were responsible

for the unstable situation in East Pakistan, but did not stop considering the crisis there as

merely Pakistan’s internal affairs. The Indian references to the political and economic

problems faced by New Delhi due to excessive refugees from East Pakistan caused

Adam Malik to express a common view with his Indian counterpart that it was urgent to

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create conditions conducive for the returning home of the refugees from camps in India,

but he did not support Indian military intervention in the crisis. (Dewanto 1994, 139).

Such an exchange of views between the Indonesian and Indian high-ranking officials

reinforced Jakarta’s middle-of-the-road policy on the issue. It continued to refer to the

universal principles of non-foreign intervention as the basis on which the crisis needed

to be resolved. The neutral position taken by Jakarta was translated into support for

humanitarian aid to peoples who were adversely affected by the crisis in East Pakistan.

The Indonesian government through its representative office in New Delhi helped

distribute food, clothes, and medicine worth Rp 10 million to aid refugees from East

Pakistan (ANTARA 1 February 1972).

Post-war Problem and Diplomacy

The most crucial problem faced by the new government of President Ali Bhutto was

how to maintain the remaining territories of Pakistan. The Pakistani government

expected India to abandon every attempt to further disrupt Pakistan’s territorial integrity

(Bhutto 1973, 544). At the same time, it had to design a policy on dealing with

Bangladesh as a new state.

The issue was first dealt with in terms of recognition of Bangladesh. Islamabad did not

recognize Bangladesh promptly, claiming that it was part of Pakistan and also opposed

the continuing presence of the Indian army there. Several countries mainly those having

had special economic and political connections with India, such as Burma, Japan,

Malaysia, and Singapore, were quick to extend recognition for the newly born state of

Bangladesh (Straits Times 14 February 1972). Britain and members of the

Commonwealth, such as Australia and New Zealand, also gave formal recognition for

Bangladesh immediately. The British government then persuaded Western European

countries to recognize Bangladesh. In retaliation, Pakistan withdrew from the

Commonwealth. The US and the Soviet Union were also reluctant to side with Pakistan.

Ali Bhutto could only rely on old friends such as China and the Muslim world for

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sympathy and support. As always, China pledged to stand by Pakistan and extended

economic and military aid. Some Muslim states of the Middle East and Africa assured

Pakistan of their political support (Sattar 2007, 120-2).

Jakarta did not rush to recognize the existence of Bangladesh in order not to offend

Pakistan and waited for the situation to become clearer. On 1 January 1972 Adam Malik

instructed Hassan Arif – a senior diplomat – to lead the Indonesian representative office

in Dhaka. To the government of Mujibur Rahman, it meant that Indonesia was going to

recognize Bangladesh in the coming days. However, Adam Malik likened it to a

‘…story [that] had not yet finished…’. Indonesia did not provide any political support

yet for Bangladesh, and waited for further developments there. This was because Jakarta

wanted to see if an agreement could be reached between Dhaka and Islamabad to find a

political solution in the scheme of confederation (Kompas 5 February 1972).

Speculations again circulated in Dhaka about Indonesia having recognized the

independence of Bangladesh. It was due to Jakarta’s warm welcome to the Bangladeshi

envoy S. K. Pani who visited Jakarta at the end of January 1972. Moreover, the

Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Zaad spoke on Radio Dhaka, saying

Indonesia had recognized Bangladesh. Adam Malik still did not confirm the claim. The

Indonesian foreign minister declared that his government would recognize Bangladesh

should two requirements be accomplished by parties in the conflict. One was there had

to be a peace agreement between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and two, was that Indian

troops had to be withdrawn from East Pakistan. This was important to establish that

Bangladesh would not be the puppet of a foreign power; his reference was to India

(Kompas 4 February 1972). The demand for the withdrawal of Indian troops was similar

to the one being made by the Pakistani government at that stage.

Adam Malik reemphasized the Indonesian position on Bangladesh. On 17 February

1972, he urged Pakistan and Bangladesh to meet and talk about peace, and Jakarta –

when asked – agreed that would like to mediate between them in accordance with the

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objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy of international peace. In response, Bangladesh

conveyed it would have only talked to Pakistan if the latter had recognized its existence

as an independent state. Pakistan gave no prompt reply to Indonesia’s initiative.

Instead, President Ali Bhutto planned to send his special envoy Ghulam Mustafa in late

February 1972 to Jakarta to discuss peace talks with Dhaka. The Pakistani envoy was

due to arrive in Jakarta and meet with President Suharto later on 22 February (Kompas

18 February 1972). However, the visit was cancelled. On the same day, Adam Malik

called six foreign ambassadors from Pakistan, India, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, the

Philippines, and Burma to have discussions. At that stage, Indonesia was the only

ASEAN country which had not yet recognized Bangladesh. Adam Malik talked to S. K.

Pani just a few hours before his meeting with the other ambassadors.

The mediation role being played by Indonesia was formally acknowledged by the

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, who announced that Pakistan and

Bangladesh had in principle agreed to hold peace talks in Indonesia. Japan had also

offered its mediation services, but Indonesia was finally chosen because its majority

Muslim population was more popular with both the Pakistani and Bangladeshi peoples.

However, it was still aware of the role that other Muslim countries could play (Kompas

23 February 1972). These references were an indication of the importance attached by

the Indonesian government to its Muslim identity. But it was careful not to categorically

refer to it as the main reason for the mediation being offered by Jakarta.

At the same time, Indonesia decided to formally recognize Bangladesh before 1 March

1972. Adam Malik communicated the decision in a long discussion with the Pakistani

Ambassador Ghulam Gayur. He explained to the Pakistani government Indonesia’s

position on Bangladesh in terms of both sides’ shared view to expand friendship

(Kompas 25 February 1972). This Indonesian attitude indicated that the careful

approach towards Bangladesh was aimed at not offending Pakistan. Jakarta regarded

good neighbourliness with Islamabad as important, yet at the same time did not want to

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ignore the emergence of Bangladesh. Indonesia had altered its earlier policy on

committing to resist the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

The pragmatic and flexible nature of Suharto’s foreign policy disappointed Pakistan. A

written note from the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad informed Jakarta of the

disappointment. Instead of ignoring the reaction, Adam Malik planned to discuss the

issue with President Ali Bhutto’s special representative when they met in Jeddah Saudi

Arabia for the third Islamic Foreign Ministers conference scheduled to be held in early

March 1972 (Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 18).

Indonesia met its promise to give the official recognition for Bangladesh. On 25

February 1972, the department of foreign affairs in Jakarta announced the recognition

and sent a diplomatic note to New Delhi in order to be forwarded to Dhaka (Kompas 26

February 1972). One month later, on 25 March, Indonesia and Bangladesh opened

embassies in each other’s capital city. The agreement was achieved just one day before

the first anniversary of the Bangladeshi national day (Kompas 26 March 1972).

At the Islamic foreign ministers meeting conducted in Jeddah between 29 February and

8 March 1972 – in which the Indonesian delegation was led by Adam Malik - the

Pakistani delegates attempted to give delegations of other participating countries their

interpretation of the crisis in former East Pakistan. Putting all the blame on India,

Pakistani diplomats argued that the problem of East Pakistan arose on account of the

machination by foreigners. This reference was certainly towards India. It was the

external power that wrecked peace and tranquillity of the region and, as it continued at

work there, according to the Pakistani delegates ‘...neither the Pakistani government

would be able to reach the heart of the East Pakistanis nor could the East Pakistanis

speak with their true voices...’. To the conference participants, Pakistan’s position was

generally endorsed. The Secretary General of the Islamic conference made a move

towards peace by suggesting Bangladesh and Pakistan meet and talk at the holy city

Mecca (Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1972). The conference also agreed to

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send a delegation of six Muslim states to Pakistan and Bangladesh to promote

reconciliation for the two sides. Dhaka declined the initiative, arguing that most Muslim

countries’ delegates had not yet officially recognized Bangladesh. In October 1972,

foreign ministers of some Muslim states decided during the UN General Assembly

session to reactivate the settlement mission, which again was thwarted for the same

reason retained by Bangladesh (Mahdi 1999, 253-4). It to some extent displays the

success of Pakistan’s diplomacy in holding recognition for Bangladesh.

The Indonesian government participated in the Jeddah Islamic conference as an

observer, not yet formally attached to the Islamic grouping. The attendance indicated

Jakarta’s willingness to join other Muslim states. However, this did not extend to

Jakarta following the lead of other Muslim states in shaping its position on the East

Pakistan crisis. Respecting the existence of Bangladesh, Indonesia focused on resolving

the humanitarian problems of Bangladeshi refugees. A diplomatic note outlining policy

orientation for the Indonesian delegates at the Jeddah conference confirmed it, and even

told of another important mission that the Indonesian government wished to pursue by

attending the meeting despite talking of humanitarian issues; ‘…that the participation

aims at widening cooperation with the conference members, especially for economic

development…’ (ANTARA 21 February 1972). It demonstrated that the participation in

the OIC was designed to assist Indonesia economically and that it was not to get Jakarta

embroiled in the tricky issue of Bangladesh’s recognition by other Muslim states.

The Indonesian and Pakistani delegates discussed the question of recognition during the

Islamic conference. Adam Malik told the Indonesian press correspondence at Jeddah

that he had had a constructive discussion with his Pakistani counterpart on some issues,

including Bangladesh, and Jakarta’s decision to recognize Bangladesh for expanding

partnership was finally understood and then accepted by Islamabad (Kompas 9 March

1972). Indonesia retained this policy of good neighbourliness towards Bangladesh and

Pakistan, even though the Pakistani cause was raised again in the following year’s

Islamic foreign ministers conference (Merdeka 27 March 1973).

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On 27 June 1972, Indira Gandhi and Ali Bhutto met at Simla to discuss post-war

settlement. Pakistan avoided negotiating the release of prisoners of war with recognition

for Bangladesh. Islamabad also rejected the connection between the post-war settlement

and the Kashmir issue. It focused on gaining the Indian commitment to respect

Pakistan’s sovereignty. Explicitly, the Simla Agreement signed by Ali Bhutto and Indira

Gandhi on 2 July 1972 favoured Pakistan’s territorial integrity. It was stated in

subparagraph 1(2) of the accord that both sides would resolve any differences by

peaceful means (Sattar 2007, 128-32). Pakistan interpreted it as the Indian

acknowledgment of its unchallengeable rights of sovereignty protected by international

law, whilst for India it implied that Islamabad could no longer ask for third party

involvement in bilateral issues nor raise any bilateral problems in the UN and other

international forum. Pakistan could not agree with such an Indian interpretation,

nonetheless it seemed to be happy with another important indication of the repaired

relationship, in particular with India’s assurance for Pakistan that it was not making

efforts to encourage disruptive activities in Baluchistan as well as the North West

Frontier Province (Ziring 1982, 43).

Jakarta responded favourably to the Simla Agreement. Indonesian Ambassador to

Pakistan Sutopo, on behalf of the Indonesian government, said to the press in Islamabad

that the willingness of both India and Pakistan to forego the engagement of force in

dealing with bilateral issues would contribute positively to the normalization of

situations in the subcontinent and its surrounding regions (Indonesian Embassy

Islamabad 1973, 38). The secretary general of Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ali Alatas – while attending an ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok – stated that

Indonesia and other ASEAN countries welcomed the sign of peace shown by Islamabad

and New Delhi (Kompas 4 July 1972).

Pakistan used the Islamic world forum to seek for support of its demand especially in

regard to the release of prisoners of war. It was successful diplomacy. The fourth

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conference of foreign ministers of Muslim countries took place in Benghazi Libya

between 24 and 26 March 1973. The conference called upon Pakistan and Bangladesh

to reconcile. It strongly urged India and Bangladesh to expedite the return of the

civilians and military officers held during the 1971 war (Islamic Conference of Foreign

Ministers 1973). At the meeting, the Indonesian attitude was in line with the

conference’s outcome; advising Pakistan and Bangladesh to leave the past and look

instead for better relations (Merdeka 27 March 1973). It meant that Jakarta had paid

more attention to Pakistan’s position than its hesitant attitude seen at the 1972 Jeddah

Islamic conference. This might have been influenced by the prospect of peace following

the reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan.

With the mediatory efforts of the OIC, eventually Pakistan was willing to extend its

formal recognition for Bangladesh in 1974. After recognizing Bangladesh, the Pakistani

leadership did not entertain negative feelings toward Bangladesh. President Ali Bhutto

identified them in terms of the requirements of Muslim fraternity. This was clearly

mentioned in Ali Bhutto’s book titled The Third World: New Directions, ‘…such a

reconciliation process in the spirit of Islamic fraternity will now bury a past that both

peoples of the two countries can prefer to see forgotten…’ (Bhutto 1977, 77).

This episode demonstrates the reduction, if not the absence, of Islamic ideas and

identity in Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Pakistan in dealing with the development

of the East Pakistan crisis. This was primarily caused by the New Order elite’s

preeminent interests in adhering to the framework identified earlier as the main pillars

of Indonesian foreign policy. The response to Pakistan had altered from adhering to the

principle of non-interference for preserving Pakistan’s national integration and

territorial integrity, into understanding the circumstances surrounding India’s position,

and further extending recognition for Bangladesh. Pragmatism and flexibility were

Indonesia’s foreign policy considerations towards Pakistan. Jakarta – although

expressing concern at regional security potentially affected by Indian activities – did not

want to confront India, with which relations were being repaired. In parallel, links with

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Pakistan were not sacrificed even though they were not politically as close as they were

during the Sukarno era.

Indonesia-Pakistan Ties after the Crisis

After the East Pakistan crisis, there seemed to be a mixed context in Indonesian

relations with Pakistan; that is, not using the language of Islamic identity when issues

did not permit, but accepting the presence of the country’s Muslim identity in the areas

where Islam became important. This trend mainly happened in inter-society links.

Both Indonesia and Pakistan pursued complementary economic cooperation and mutual

trade achievements through the scheme of IPECC. After the crisis in East Pakistan, this

organization continued to function. However, the pace of development of Indonesia-

Pakistan collaboration under IPECC remained slow. There were some projects approved

by IPECC which existed only on paper awaiting implementation. During its 15 years of

existence IPECC had not been able to make significant strides toward the realization of

all the approved deals. This was perhaps caused by both sides’ internal economic

upheavals and weaknesses at the time, and therefore, there were not enough funds for

supporting IPECC’s joint ventures (Ali 1981, 100-1).

Adam Malik acknowledged this at the seventh session of IPECC annual meeting in

1975 held at Karachi, that there had been some insurmountable obstacles hindering the

progress of IPECC’s joint ventures. Although the Indonesian foreign minister did not

mention what those obstacles were, it was noticeable that the slow progress of IPECC’s

industrial projects had given an impression of the partnership for some times having lost

its warmth of the past. The 1975 ministerial consultation agreed to review the ongoing

projects for improvements (Mustafa 1982, 7-8). However, there was still no clear

strategy resulting from both Indonesia’s and Pakistan’s attempts to enhance cooperation

in IPECC. The Pakistan Secretary of Foreign Affairs Riaz Piracha avowed that his

government was also concerned about the slow progress of IPECC, and would like to

sort the problem out. According to Piracha, the Indonesian government realized the

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problem, and had the goodwill to resolve it. Yet, the two sides did not come up with

strategies to tackle the problem (Kompas 27 February 1981).

Parallel to IPECC developments, trade between Indonesia and Pakistan during the first

half of the 1970s indicated that Pakistan enjoyed a surplus of Rs. 813 million due to the

simultaneous increase in its exports to Indonesia. Nevertheless, since 1975 the

restriction of cotton imports imposed on Pakistan’s export goods by Jakarta had

decreased severely in Pakistan’s balance of trade with Indonesia worth minus Rs 364.9

million (Ali 1981, 104). Taking note of this trade imbalance, IPECC at its eighth session

in Jakarta in mid 1976 recommended certain measures to rectify the situation. Efforts

were promoted to remove some bottlenecks, diversify trade goods, and arrange direct

shipping. However, no greater outcomes had been achieved. Pakistan, consequently,

reciprocated the unfair treatment of Indonesia with the suspension of a tea import

agreement which subsequently affected Indonesian exporters - especially those in the

agricultural industry. The volume of Indonesian exports declined from Rp 120 million

in 1976 to Rp 50 million in 1977. Nonetheless, this number was not significant in

respect to the country’s total international trade that counted about Rp 340 billion which

was mostly composed of oil products exports (Kompas 8 December 1977).

This trade dispute was finally sorted out in December 1978 following the deal signed by

Pakistani and Indonesian business delegates worth US$ 20 million for two years, in

which tea from Indonesia was exchanged with various Pakistani engineering goods, and

as well the Pakistani cotton restriction was lifted. Such an agreement was of help to

boost bilateral trade at least until the end of the 1970s, although Indonesia’s balance of

trade with Pakistan suffered a deficit of US$ 17.4 million (Indonesian Embassy

Islamabad 1980, 38).

In cultural terms, the New Order government acknowledged the importance of the

country’s Muslim identity to the development of links between Muslim societal groups

in Indonesia and Pakistan. Islam was present as the bond for Indonesians and Pakistanis.

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Indonesia and Pakistan had signed a cultural agreement in 1960. Since then, a number

of cultural delegations were exchanged. With the purpose of developing stronger inter-

Islamic society relationships, Pakistan’s Department of Education established an

organization called International Qur’an Recital (IQR) that was in charge of

implementing programs for exchange of Islamic missions. Indonesia has participated in

the IQR activities since 1972. The first delegation of Indonesian students to take part at

the IQR was on the invitation by the Pakistani government. When attending the event,

the Indonesian Consul in Karachi acknowledged that Indonesia was happy to take part

in the Islamic intercultural event, and hoped for it to be continued (Aziz & Ahmad

1973, 15).

There was an initiative by the Indonesian Muslim Youth Committee affiliated with

Nahdlatul Ulama organization to convene an inter-Islamic society conference in Jakarta

with the primary sponsorship of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was designed

akin to IQR. However, such an event – taking place in June 1979 - did not receive

enthusiastic responses. Pakistan sent its representatives there along with Egypt,

Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Iraq. There is no record of important output from the Islamic

youth meeting, except for a joint declaration by the participants of the commitment to

encourage sustainable friendship amongst Muslim youth around the world. There was

no mention of any plans to hold a similar Muslim youth gathering (Indonesian Ministry

of Religious Affairs 1980, 24).

Social organizations such as Pakistan-Indonesia Cultural Association (PICA) as well as

Indonesia-Pakistan Friendship Society (IPFS) were founded in November 1972 by

Indonesian Muslim students in Karachi to serve as channels for societies of the two

countries to forge closer interactions. Reportedly, the Indonesian consulate in Karachi

became the major sponsor of both Muslim groups’ activities, including Islamic culture

exhibitions and student exchanges between Pakistani and Indonesian universities

(Indonesian Embassy Islamabad 1973, 21). These are examples of the

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acknowledgement by the government of the importance of Islamic identity in

Indonesian and Pakistani ties.

However, the participation of Indonesian Muslim groups at Islamic-related events such

as IQR of Pakistan was not sustainable. The last time Indonesian Muslims took part at

IQR was recorded in 1977. A report made by the Indonesian embassy in Islamabad

(1990, 42-8) covering social and cultural field of cooperation between Indonesians and

Pakistanis from 1978 to 1989 did not record any more Indonesian participation in IQR.

There was a problem facing Indonesian Muslim groups in taking part at the

international Islamic society forum. It was perhaps because the Indonesian

government’s lack of committed support for the enhancement of Muslim activities. The

government signed agreements and allowed Muslims to expand cultural and religious

activities, but did not back them up with sufficient resources. This was not against

Pakistan. However, the policy was part of a general attitude. Institutional cooperation

amongst Muslims in Indonesia and other Islamic societies was not prioritized in

Jakarta’s agendas. This was confirmed by a member of Indonesian parliament from the

Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP)

that in line with the program of national development, Indonesia’s Islamic identity was

not relevant. Rather, an image of a neutralist developing country was regarded as the

appropriate depiction for the nation. This was in particular crucial for Suharto’s

heightening relationship with the secular economic donors of the IGGI (Merdeka 9

April 1980).

The changing context of Indonesian foreign policy towards Pakistan illustrates that the

primacy of the interest in economic development favoured by regional stability

marginalized Islamic identity. This was mostly visible in Indonesia’s avoidance to refer

to Islamic identity and interest in its response to the crisis in East Pakistan that gave

birth to Bangladesh as a sovereign state in December 1971. The rationale of geopolitical

considerations guided Indonesian diplomacy not to take a place in the crisis. The

position was in contrast to Sukarno’s tangible support for Pakistan against India during

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the 1965 war over Kashmir. Nevertheless, both Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims

remained keen to interact to support cultural ties, and Islam came about more in inter-

societal relations. The government did not stop such Islamic links, and even to some

extent supported them. However, as part of the general policy design of not being

committed to Islamic ideas, the support for Islam was minimal.

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Chapter Four

Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And

Soviet Invasion Of Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ushered the world into the

second Cold War. As the frontline state, Pakistan bore the brunt of the Soviet presence

in its neighbouring state, while at the same time benefited from the United States (US)

aid. Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan came to rely on, and expect, support from other

Muslim states. This chapter explores the extent to which Indonesia provided this

support, and the factors that shaped Jakarta’s responses to the Soviet presence along

Pakistan’s borders. It also assesses if a divergence of responses developed between the

Indonesian government and Muslim groups to the Afghanistan issue.

The chapter argues that the Indonesian government expressed only a moral commitment

to support Pakistan, but did not want to be directly involved in the problem. At the time

the elite in Jakarta did not consider the Afghan war as an important issue to the state’s

national security and stability. Instead they were mostly focused on creating national

and regional resilience to further Indonesia’s internal security. Islamic identity did not

occupy any space in this policy. However, on the societal level Muslim elements were

critical of articulating their views on and able to build movements of jihad for

Afghanistan. The government took a repressive approach to these dissenting Muslim

voices. As a result, critical Muslim expressions were quietened, while some

underground Islamist elements developed outside links and engaged in jihad activism

for Afghanistan. Pakistan became an important transit point for Indonesian jihadists,

where they could receive sanctuary as well as guerrilla training. The events in

Afghanistan, to some extent, sowed the seeds for the formation of ongoing transnational

militant Muslim networks between Pakistan and Indonesia.

Pakistan and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

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In December 1979 the Soviet Union troops moved into Afghanistan. Pakistan saw the

Soviet military presence in that country as a serious threat to its national security. The

government in Islamabad was faced with Soviet presence on the country’s entire

thirteen-hundred-mile frontier with Afghanistan. For Pakistan the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan generated two alarming security threats. One was founded in Pakistan’s

growing concerns over domestic ethnic tensions. There was wariness of Soviet and

Afghan attempts to organize Baluchistan dissidents, who were resentful that Baluchistan

was not yet given due recognition as a fully-fledged province of Pakistan. Hence, the

external threat was compounded by internal ethnic politics, complicating Pakistan’s

security problems (Wriggins 1984, 287-8). The second security threat was the concern

in Islamabad that the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan might escalate and

lead to Soviet-Indian collaboration for further military intervention; in this case Pakistan

would be exposed to the nightmare of Indo-Soviet aggressiveness (Sattar 2007, 156).

As a consequence of the war, thousands of refugees sought sanctuary in Pakistan. In

midsummer 1987 Afghan refugees in Pakistan were officially estimated to have reached

3.45 million – almost 3.5 percent of Pakistan’s entire population. The refugees were

settled in 325 camps, most of them were located in the provinces bordering

Afghanistan, the North West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan (Wirsing 1991, 24).

Pakistan turned out to be the frontline state vocally opposing the Soviet presence near

its borders. For this role, Pakistan was upgraded in America’s global strategy to roll the

Soviets back. The American concern was to secure the oil lanes stretching from the

Middle East to Afghanistan. Therefore, within a few days of Soviet aggression,

President Jimmy Carter declared that Washington would supply military, food, and

other aid to defend Pakistan’s independence and security. The American president, in

addition, reconfirmed his government’s commitment to Pakistan under the 1959

Executive Agreement, and made it known that it was ready to use force if necessary to

safeguard Pakistan. Soon afterward, on 2 January 1980, the Pakistani Foreign Minister

Agha Shahi went to Washington for further negotiations. Four days later, the American

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National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski visited Pakistan, a highly publicized

event, to reinforce his government’s commitment to assisting Islamabad (Mustafa 1981,

473).

The American aid package offered to Pakistan had economic and military components;

US$ 200 million worth of economic assistance to be spread over two years and US$ 200

million worth of military hardware for Islamabad (Mustafa 1981, 474). Various

arguments were presented with reference to the advisability of accepting or rejecting the

Washington aid offer. The most compelling reason against its acceptance was that the

aid offered was too little to be meaningful; it would only cause Soviet enmity without

providing real security for Pakistan. Accordingly, President Zia Ul-Haq rejected the US

offer describing it as ‘peanuts’ (Cornell 2006, 311).

The advent of the Reagan government gave rise to a new trend in American policy in

Southwest Asia. The main idea of the new policy was to establish US military reliability

in the region, thereby containing Soviet expansionism. Washington saw all East-West

relations in strategic terms. The evolving American global strategy was to combat

Soviet power by promoting the defence of countries inclined to the West; this included

a free flow of arms and economic support (Girling 1981, 407-13). Pakistan was

identified as a frontline state and worthy of significant assistance from the US. Pakistan

responded positively to such a policy and began to receive billions of dollars of

American economic and military assistance, from June 1981 onwards.

With the US support, Pakistan confidently engaged in multilateral diplomacy at the

United Nations (UN), aimed at putting moral pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw

from Afghanistan. Initially, Pakistan attempted to play down the legitimacy of the

Soviets in Afghanistan. With a letter dated 3 January 1980, the Pakistani representative

addressed the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent session on

Afghanistan in order to consider the situation in that country, and its implications for

international peace and security. The letter was circulated amongst the UN members,

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and received support of 51 other countries. In the 2185th meeting of the Security Council

held on 5 January 1980, the president of the Security Council started deliberations on

whether it was necessary to respond to the letter of request by the 52 countries by the

convening a special session on Afghanistan. At the procedural discussion, the initiative

was barred by the Soviet Union and East Germany, but approved by China and 12 other

member countries. Despite a unanimous voice of the Council’s permanent members, the

president announced that, following consultations with member countries of the

Security Council, the request of the 52 states was included in the meeting agenda, and

the issue on Afghanistan was adopted (UN Discussion Paper 5 January 1980, 1-2).

The Security Council held a special session on the matter of Afghanistan in six

meetings from 6 to 9 January 1980. All signatories of the letter of request were invited

to the meeting without the right to vote. On the first day of the meeting, the Pakistani

representative reviewed the events of the last week of December 1979, specifying that

the sovereign country of Afghanistan had been subjected to a military intervention by

the Soviet Union on the pretext of saving the state from external interference. During

this event, the legitimate government of President Hafizullah Amin was removed and

the president was executed along with members of his family. Furthermore, the arrival

of refugees pouring out of the country into Pakistan had increased since April 1978,

putting a heavy burden on Pakistan’s economy with its scarce resources. Pakistan,

therefore identified the situation as a threat to peace and security in the region, and

insisted the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and leave the country

alone. This position was strongly opposed by the representative of the Soviet-backed

Afghan government. The Afghan representative challenged the legitimacy of the

meeting to discuss matters belonging to the realm of Afghanistan internal affairs, and

gave an account of the ongoing political events which were said to have culminated in

the deployment of Soviet troops. These events, the argument continued, justified the

deployment - not invasion - of the Soviet troops in accordance with the mutual treaty of

friendship signed between the two countries (UN Discussion Paper 6 January 1980, 1-

3).

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In the course of debates during the first two days of the meetings, most of the

participating countries spoke in various degrees of criticism of the Soviet Union’s

dispatch of its troops to Afghanistan. Generally, they expressed opposition to such an

intervention, noting that it posed instability and a threat to the region’s security. Some

openly asserted that the Soviet military in Afghanistan was a kind of invasion, violating

the Charter of the UN and the principles of international law. Claiming that it was

aimed at shaping a puppet regime, which would easily adopt a foreign ideology over the

people and thereafter endorse what they considered to be the Soviet’s strategy for world

domination. Others complained that the absorption of Afghanistan, a neutral country, in

the sphere of the Soviet Union’s influence would weaken the nonalignment movement.

They urged the council to take appropriate measures to stop and reverse Soviet action in

the country. In the meeting of 7 January, the President of the council drew attention to a

draft resolution, sponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, the Niger, the Philippines, and

Zambia, which would have the Security Council deeply censure the recent armed

intervention in Afghanistan. It called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops

from Afghanistan and requested the Secretary General to submit a report of progress on

the implementation of the proposed resolution within two weeks (UN Discussion Paper

7 January 1980, 5-6).

Prior to the vote on 9 January, the delegation from China stated that the draft resolution

would be inadequate since it had not officially condemned the Soviet Union. This

omission was intended to prevent the delegation of East Germany from arguing that the

proposed resolution was unacceptable because, amongst other things, it had sidelined

the process of mutual bilateral treaty. The draft resolution was put to the vote receiving

13 in favour to 2 against (the Soviet Union and East German objected). As a result, the

resolution was not passed due to the veto from a permanent member of the Security

Council, the Soviet Union. After the vote, the President of the council announced that

the meeting would be postponed and might be reconvened following further

consultations (UN Discussion Paper 9 January 1980, 2). Although accepting the result

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of this process, the Pakistani delegation acknowledged that the Security Council had

actually failed to pursue its most important function - to keep world peace. This opinion

was endorsed by others, such as Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines (The New

York Times 10 January 1980).

Pakistan went on to mobilize the support of the Muslim world. Pakistan hosted the

Islamic conference of foreign ministers from 27 to 29 January 1980 in Islamabad, at

which they condemned the Soviets; demanded expeditious and unconditional

withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghan territories; called for the termination of

tyranny against the people of Afghanistan; and urged all countries and peoples of the

world to secure Soviet withdrawal through all possible means. This joint declaration of

the conference was issued almost with a single voice, only Syria, Libya, and South

Yemen dissented (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1980).

Indeed, Soviet military actions in Afghanistan prompted anxiety amongst Middle East

Muslim states. The governments of Iraq, Iran, and Syria considered that the invasion

further dramatized the fragility and disunity of the region. However, the Muslim states’

declared collective feelings about the Soviet Union were not followed up by staging a

concerted action to effectively put pressure on Moscow to withdraw. Another Islamic

conference was held by Pakistan in May 1980, but it still tended to show inaction. The

promise of financial support for the Afghan resistance movement included in the

January declaration was omitted in May, replaced by a provision for negotiations

between Iran, Pakistan, the Karmal government, and the resistance movement

spokesmen. At the conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia in January 1981, the Islamic

meeting did not even issue any public statements about the Soviet’s military

intervention in Afghanistan. Instead, it called for further negotiations under the good

office mechanism of the Secretary General of the United Nations (Newell 1981, 173).

Verbal expressions of the Muslim world would not dislodge the Soviet troops.

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By and large Afghanistan had been converted into an arena for the superpowers’ proxy

war. The roles played by the foreign powers were to support the Afghan resistance

movement against the Soviets. To be able to function successfully, the resistance

movement required the fulfilment of three conditions; a group of fighters; sanctuaries;

and a dependable supply of food, money, and arms. Foreign powers committed to give

assistances to the Afghan guerrillas were the US, China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Washington aid was channelled to the Afghans through the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) in collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence especially the Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI). China supplied weapons. Pakistan, while becoming the site of

collaboration of a number of states, played the key role in providing sanctuaries for the

Afghan guerrillas based in Peshawar, despite having consistently denied ever having

made official efforts to arm the rebels,. Afghan resistance groups could take refuge

along the Pakistan-Afghan border. They were able to conduct training for the recruits

and further operations in the areas where guerrilla warfare was going on (Ahmed 1983,

97-8). In the name of the protector of the Muslim ummah (community), the Saudis had

backed calls for jihad fighting in Afghanistan. The Saudi government, in collaboration

with Muslim Brotherhood and some other Islamist groups, assembled volunteers from

Arabia and other Muslim countries. Thus, thousands of volunteers were able to take part

in jihad for Afghanistan. The jihadists were consolidated in the office of the Muslim

Brotherhood and Rabita al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World Council, RAI) in Peshawar

which had become the centre for recruitment, training, and coordination of volunteers,

and further developed into the Service Bureau of Arab Mujahideen run by Abdullah

Azzam and Osama bin Laden. They too received the blessings of Washington. Almost

all Afghan Mujahideen factions, including the Hizb-i-Islami, the Jami’at-i-Islami, and

the Jama’at al-Da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa Ahl al-Hadith, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,

Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Jamil al-Rahman respectively enjoyed the support of the

Muslim volunteers (Rubin 1997, 185).

Response of the Indonesian Government

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In comparison with the reactions of the US, China, and other states which condemned

the Soviet invasion and were willing to counter the Soviet military action in

Afghanistan, and particularly the Muslim world that firmly backed Pakistan’s position

on the Afghan issue, the Indonesian governmental response was weak and restricted.

The New Order government perceived the developments in Afghanistan as a matter that

would not have direct and significant implications for Indonesian national security and

stability. Hence, Indonesia responded to the issue only with limited moral support for

Pakistan, and a reluctance to become tangibly involved in the campaign against the

Soviets. Significantly, at a time when a number of Muslim states were referring to the

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a Muslim issue, the Indonesian government’s

position was also devoid of reference to Islamic identity. The nature of this support was

apparent in Indonesian policy at the UN and in the speeches made in Indonesia by its

leaders.

When Pakistan brought its concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the UN

Security Council meeting, Indonesia was a co-signatory to the letter with other 50

states. The Indonesian representative Mario Viegas Carrascalao, who signed the letter

on behalf of Jakarta, spoke of the Indonesian position on the Soviet military action

during the Security Council debate of 7 January 1980 on the Afghanistan issue. Instead

of using the language of Muslim solidarity, Indonesia applied the perspective of

nonalignment movement when Carrascalao stated ‘…the course of events taking place

in Afghanistan should be managed immediately in order to avert escalation of conflict

into regional instability…There had been an act of external interference in a sovereign

state’s domestic problems, and this was not in consonance with the view to respecting

international law and order…’ (Indonesian UN Representative Office 1981, 12).

Indonesia shared the view of Pakistan that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan

would pose a threat to regional security and peace. Indonesia directly used the language

of criticism of the Soviet Union military action as invading Afghanistan and violating

international law and as such employed the language of the nonaligned movement.

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However, the theme of Islamic solidarity was not used to refer to the Indonesian policy.

This was in contrast to the position taken by a number of other Muslim states. For

example, Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Muhammad, denounced the Soviets as

infidels attacking the Muslim state and peoples of Afghanistan. The Malaysian leader

further urged Muslims around the world to give their prayers for Afghanistan and to

unite behind the Islamic forces fighting jihad against the Godless communists. The

Malaysian government, he declared, would facilitate Muslim fighters from the country

who wanted to go to Afghanistan for jihad (Nair 1997, 35).

That the Indonesian support for Pakistan was indeed weak and confined to merely moral

commitment was also noticeable in the statement made by Foreign Minister Mochtar

Kusumaatmadja after the vote in the meeting of the Security Council on 9 January 1980.

He stated that Indonesia would endorse Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to raise the issue

on Afghanistan again later in the UN special session if asked, and the meeting might be

rescheduled. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Indonesian foreign minister had just

pushed the Soviet Union to immediately withdraw its military units from the Afghan

land (Kompas 11 January 1980). Though this statement indicated a shared view with

Pakistan, yet Jakarta did not express how it would speed up the process beyond the UN

mechanism. Pakistan got no more than this limited commitment of moral support.

The reluctance of the Indonesian government to articulate its opposition to the Soviet

invasion in terms of Muslim solidarity, while remaining sympathetic to the Afghan

people being occupied by the Soviet Union, was also apparent in the statements made

by President Suharto. When visiting Islamabad in December 1980, Suharto did share

Pakistan’s anxiety about the persisting presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and

supported the call for a dialogue under the UN Secretary General to arrange for the

disengagement of Soviet troops and honourable return of Afghan refugees (Kompas 8

December 1980). But there was no declaration of how Suharto would support Pakistan

as the state facing an immediate threat to its own security as well. Later, on 7 January

1980 when addressing the Indonesian parliament, President Suharto used references to

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anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, and avowed ‘…We Indonesians have the feeling

of empathy to the people of Afghanistan whose friendly nonaligned government has

been seized by a foreign power for its own political and strategic objective…’. Suharto,

then, equated Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of Soviet-supported

government with ‘…what Vietnam did in Kampuchea and China did in Vietnam…’. To

the Indonesian president, this was intolerable due to the clash with the values of

Indonesian 1945 Constitution opposing foreign power intervention in a sovereign state’s

affairs (ANTARA 8 January 1980). Nevertheless, this strong policy pronouncement was

not coupled, once again, by concrete action in assisting the Afghan resistance. Thus, it

meant that Indonesia did not want to be part of the evolving strategy to roll the Soviets

back. It could be argued that the Indonesian position on the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan followed the trend established in the past. Ever since Suharto ascended to

power in 1966, there had been no definitive intention shown by his government to place

Pakistan in its international affairs. During the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971, Jakarta -

despite endorsing a peaceful settlement to the Indo-Pakistan conflict - did not do more

than providing verbal moral support for Pakistan’s sovereignty. This position was

retained during the Afghanistan war.

The talk of moral commitment was repeated in November 1982 on a diplomatic visit

made by President Zia Ul-Haq to Jakarta. The two governments did not advance beyond

what had been agreed since the 1980 meeting. The joint communiqué issued at the end

of the meeting between Suharto and Zia contained just an expression of their concern

over the lingering foreign military presence in Afghanistan. Additionally, the two

leaders called upon withdrawal of Soviet troops to allow Afghan people to exercise their

rights of self-determination (Kompas 7 November 1982).

Indonesia’s inattention to Pakistan’s need for support against the Soviet Union during

the 1980s contributed to a degree of coolness in Jakarta and Islamabad links in the

1980s. When Pakistan attended the Jakarta meeting of April 1985 for the

commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Asian African conference, Suharto made

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no mention in his inaugural address of issues being faced by Muslim countries,

including what was taking place in Afghanistan. There were three important agendas

underscored by Suharto to be discussed in the meeting; economic development of the

developing world, international telecommunication advancement and information

technology, and maintenance of peace and security in conflict areas such as Kampuchea

and some African Sahara hot spots. At that gathering in Jakarta, Pakistan’s delegation

was not led by the head of government, instead Islamabad sent only lower level

diplomatic officials (Kroef 1986, 33-8). Pakistan probably realized that the agenda

being discussed did not have a great deal of salience for its major foreign policy

concerns.

To place the limited nature of Indonesian support for Pakistan against the Soviet Union,

it is essential to appreciate that from Jakarta’s point of view, unless they posed direct

challenges to Indonesia’s national interests, issues pertaining to conflict in the Muslim

world were only of secondary consideration for Suharto and the Indonesian elite. The

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the threat that it could spread to Pakistan and

throughout Southwest Asia was not a serious concern for policy makers in Jakarta. This

was perhaps caused by a strategic calculation that Afghanistan was far enough from

Southeast Asia that the war in that country would not immediately impact on Indonesia.

The New Order maintained that the focus of Indonesian foreign policy was on the

management of security and stability of Southeast Asia. Indonesia was more inward-

looking by the early 1980s. The communist Vietnam was regarded as constituting the

most urgent threat to ASEAN members by virtue of its interest in overthrowing the

Kampuchean regime which could further expand the Sino-Soviet conflict in relation to

Russia’s presence in Vietnam. It also could inflame the US to become involved.

The communist Vietnam was indeed viewed as hostile towards Indonesia. Embassy

personnel in Hanoi acknowledged this. Vietnam gave recognition and protection to the

members of banned Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Indonesian Communist Party, PKI)

fleeing Indonesia’s harsh military crackdown between 1966 and 1967. In addition,

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Hanoi expressed sympathy for the socialist Fretilin Party - which was a separatist

movement in East Timor Province – by opposing Indonesian annexation of the former

Portuguese colony in 1975 (Suryadinata 1991, 335).

The perceived threat had intensified by 1979, in the wake of the Chinese invasion of

Vietnam. Although the Chinese intervention was claimed merely to teach Vietnam a

lesson, speculation circulated in ASEAN capital cities that Peking was prepared to

expand its ideological influence and interests in Southeast Asia. Indonesian Foreign

Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja advanced this position in an interview with the army

daily Angkatan Bersenjata (28 February 1979). The foreign minister suggested that it

was time for all ASEAN member countries to fortify their commitment to the

preservation of intraregional security. Without this the region would fall into protracted

conflict involving outside powers, especially the communists.

Aware of the challenges to its immediate regional security, the New Order government

responded with a more inward-looking policy. Originating from the concept of national

resilience – Indonesia’s most pronounced strategic view in the 1980s (Anwar 1996) -

this vision positions internal affairs as the determining factor to Indonesia’s national and

regional security. However does not necessarily rank military affairs as the most

important factor. As a concept, national resilience is based on the proposition that

national security does not lie in the military alliance or umbrella of great powers, but

rather in the self-resilience emanating from domestic factors, such as economic

development, political stability, and a sense of nationalism (Irvine 1980, 40). The

initiator of this concept was Suharto’s right-hand man Brigadier General Ali Moertopo.

To Moertopo’s mind (1977, 197-219), national resilience reflected the conviction that

every nation had its own potential, including economic, political, socio-cultural, and

ideological strengths, to maintain internal and external security without dependence on

outsiders. For Indonesia, this vision suggested that national self-confidence building

was the paramount element of its security policy.

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Jusuf Wanandi (1984, 305) – a leading international relations scholar affiliated with the

Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies – explained the application

of the Indonesian concept of national resilience at the regional level. When every

member of ASEAN could reach overall economic development, and overcome their

internal threats, regional resilience ‘[would] result much in the same way as a chain

derives its power from the strengths of its constituent parts…’. The integrality of the

element’s strength is vital to underpinning regional resilience. With this in mind, the so-

called regional resilience is the extension of the national resilience of the immersed

states.

Despite its normative and unpractical nature, the primacy of national resilience as

Indonesia’s strategic view was strongly endorsed by the New Order leader Suharto.

When giving his national address of 16 August 1975, Suharto urged entire sections of

the Indonesian nation to promote national resilience through a solid attachment to

Pancasila, as a way of retaining national security, and to progress economic

development (ANTARA 17 August 1975). The Indonesian president socialized this idea

on many occasions. Universities were invited to explore the relevance of the national

resilience in depth. By the end of 1975 Suharto had made a regional tour to confer with

leaders of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, with a further meeting with President

Marcos of the Philippines in January 1976, to gain their approval of the concept of

national resilience (Hansen 1976, 176).

As a result, the Indonesian strategic vision was well accepted by ASEAN leaders. The

concept of national resilience, together with deliberation and consensus, as well as non-

interference, was included in the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation issued by

the first ASEAN heads of government summit in Bali 1976. Article 11 of the treaty

stipulated that in order to preserve their national identity, all member states should

endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in political, economic, socio-

cultural, and security fields, to adhere with their respective aspirations, free from

external interference and internal subversive activities (ASEAN 1976).

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This normative structure backed by Indonesia created a regional order for Southeast

Asian nations relationships, formalized as the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

(ZOPFAN). The ultimate aim of ZOPFAN was to enable ASEAN to develop concerted

goodwill to determine its own destiny in the international environment. The underlying

premise of ZOPFAN was the regional resilience of ASEAN as a group, which in turn

would prevent conflict, and promote cooperation with the three communist countries in

Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), as well as structure a balanced relationship

with the great powers (Wanandi 1982, 503).

This was the corridor through which the Suharto government implemented foreign

policy and prevented confrontation with the communists in order to keep Southeast Asia

stable. In relation to the Afghan war, Jakarta was not averse in supporting Pakistan, but

was aware that involvement in a strategic alliance against the Soviets would have only

increased the potential for the sphere of conflict to be expanded into Southeast Asia.

Reaction of the Indonesian Muslim Community

The Indonesian Muslim community followed the trend of the Islamic world’s responses

to the Soviets occupation of Afghanistan. They showed tangible support for the Afghan

resistance by echoing and undertaking jihad against the Soviets. However, this was

unfavourable for the government. Suharto, with full favour of the military institution,

made domestic security and stability his regime’s first priority of policies through the

rhetoric of achieving effective national resilience. Those perceived as potentially

opposing them needed to be tightly controlled and domesticated. As a result of the

military’s persistent perception that ethno-religious politics could cause national

insecurity problems, as happened in the 1950s and 1960s, critical Muslim voices were

adversely implicated. Within this line of policy, the Islamic component did not have the

space to appear in the formal policy of the New Order government.

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Since the mid 1970s, relations between Indonesian Muslim society and the New Order

government had been mediated by a nation-wide organization known as Majelis Ulama

Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Ulama, MUI). For the first time at conference held

in Jakarta between 30 September and 4 October 1970, by the Centre for Indonesian

Islamic Propagation, a governmental agency associated with the Indonesian Ministry of

Religious Affairs, an initiative to found a group that could accommodate the religious

activities of ulama (Muslim preachers) throughout the country was articulated. Initially,

Indonesian Muslim leaders and the public responded sceptically to the plan. They

supposed that the New Order regime was trying to create another instrument to curb

Islamic political movements and power. This was closely related to Suharto’s refusal to

allow the reestablishment of the Masyumi Islamic Party that had been proscribed by

Sukarno in 1962. However, the New Order leader did not totally ignore the power of

Muslims, especially the leadership role of ulama in the Islamic society. Hence, Suharto

wanted to bring ulama into part of his political structures, and as such the Ministry of

Religious Affairs was assigned to materialize this idea (Ichwan 2004, 47).

The Centre for Indonesian Islamic Propagation held another national conference of

ulama in Jakarta, from 26 to 29 November 1974. This event was important because the

idea to set up a nation-wide institution for Indonesian ulama was discussed and

reformulated. The convener succeeded in gaining the approval of the participants for the

establishment of MUI. Twenty six representatives of all provinces attended the

inauguration of MUI; including 10 representatives from Nahdlatul Ulama,

Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, and other national Islamic groups, 4 government

representatives, and 13 independent Islamic scholars (www.mui.or.id). This reflected a

large variety of Islamic identities in the country. The emergence of MUI received a

favourable response from the government. President Suharto expressed support for the

newly formed Islamic organization. The Ministry of Home Affairs followed up by

instructing local governments to institute their own councils of ulama. By the end of

May 1975, with the support of the governmental structures, MUI branches had been

founded in all 26 provinces and a number of regencies (Ichwan 2004, 48).

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The first national congress of MUI was convened from 21 to 27 July 1975 in Jakarta.

On 26 July the national structure of the organization was shaped, and Buya Hamka was

appointed as the first general head of MUI. The charter of MUI was promulgated on the

following day (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1995, 18-20). According to the MUI charter,

this organization was not explicitly pursuing political objectives. The leadership of MUI

defined the function and role of their organization as; 1) the inheritor of the Prophetic

duties (warasatul anbiya), 2) the enforcer of shari’a (Islamic law), 3) the protector of

Muslims (riwayat wa khadim al ummah), 4) the forum for Muslims to discuss religious

matters, and 5) the mediator between the government and the Muslim people (Noer

1978, 79-81). The last point could be interpreted as political since it involved the state

and society interactions.

Officially MUI was not a legislative institution attached to the administration

machinery. It operated like a semi-governmental organization and in many cases

functioned like an Islamic NGO. Although Suharto engineered its foundation, and it

carried on receiving funding from the New Order government, MUI was independent in

its ability to select its chairpersons from the members’ preferences, as well as its ability

to determine which issues to discuss at meetings. MUI consists of ulama and scholars

from the two largest Islamic groups of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. However,

the outcome of MUI’s consultation – fatwa – does not necessarily and formally bind the

Islamists. This is because fatwa is not an official product of a supervisory body, but

rather it advises Indonesian Muslims on issues related to Islamic religious life (Hosen

2003). With the authority to issue a fatwa MUI frequently claimed the righteousness of

its Islamic interpretation, sometimes causing debate amidst the Muslim public (Olle

2009).

Since a conference in 1980, MUI had decided to be active in voicing its position on

international affairs of the Muslim world (Majelis Ulama Indonesia 1980, 15-6). On 2

January 1980, MUI demonstrated a strong protest and condemnation to Soviet

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aggression against Afghan peoples. According to the chairperson of MUI, Buya Hamka,

the Soviets had stricken Islam, and as such he urged Muslims all over the world to

oppose it. He went further to encourage Indonesian Muslims to carry out jihad, and

fight with Muslim fellows in Afghanistan against the Soviet infidels (Kompas 3 January

1980). A similar assertion appeared in the public statements made by MUI ulama in

West Java, West Sumatra, and South Sulawesi (Jawa Pos 1 January 1980).

Ulama in those provinces even urged the leaders of MUI to approach the New Order

government in order to take a more solid stand on the Afghan war. Voices of Muslim

solidarity were resonated by the ulama. They urged Islamic government officials not to

be silent on what was going on in Afghanistan, because it was the duty of every Muslim

to care about the struggle of their brethren against the invaders of Islam. Ulama who led

traditional Islamic boarding school pesantren readied themselves to organize volunteers

to go to Afghanistan for jihad (Jawa Pos 1 January 1980). However, there was no fatwa

or further statement about Afghanistan made by MUI in response to this grass roots’

demand.

The Indonesian government responded toughly to the Islamists’ expressions. The Home

Affairs Minister, Lieutenant General Supardjo Roestam, said that the avowal to send

volunteers to Afghanistan against the government provision could be classified as an act

of subversion. Furthermore, illegal paramilitary activities were considered as disturbing

to national resilience and security (Angkatan Bersenjata 8 January 1980). From the

President’s office, Suharto was reported to have commented on the ulama opinions. The

Minister of Information Ali Moertopo, in lieu of Suharto, said that the President

requested that the ulama calm down their followers by avoiding making provocative

statements. Also that they should be aware of the government’s policy on the issue that

the war in Afghanistan was not a war against Islam, but more precisely an action

violating the universal norm of sovereignty and self-determination (Berita Yudha 9

January 1980). This sent a signal that Suharto did not like rival voices to his

government’s position in the Afghan war. Thereafter MUI did not argue against such a

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governmental stand. This was perhaps because they did not want to take the risk of the

New Order government’s repression towards dissenting Islamic views.

A response to the Afghan war also came from a group of Indonesian Muslim youths

identifying itself as the Muslim Youth Movement – whose activists were mostly linked

to Nahdlatul Ulama organization. Their voices were similar to that of MUI. The youth

masses held a rally in front of Soviet embassy in Jakarta. They called for the withdrawal

of Soviet’s troops from the Muslim land of Afghanistan. Some of the demonstrators

even stated readiness for jihad fighting against the Soviets. Yet, the rallies did not

become violent. The Indonesian security authority guarded them stringently, and the

masses dissolved themselves in few hours (Kompas 4 January 1980).

The leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama did not come up with public statements about the

Afghan war or take action at that time. This was different from their position in the

1965 Indo-Pakistan War when they joined Sukarno in supporting Pakistan vis-a-vis

India. The inaction of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic group in Indonesia, could be

related to the changes taking place within this organisation instead of the repressive

handling by the Suharto’s regime.. By the end of the 1970s, Nahdlatul Ulama had

developed an idea to ‘return to kithab’. The return to kithab discourse meant that

Nahdlatul Ulama moved away from practical political affairs, especially in their

affiliation with the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United

Development Party, PPP), and returned to being a jam’iyyah dimiyyah organization,

which focused on the social and cultural activities of life of an Islamic society.

Formally, this change was declared at the Situbondo muktamar of 1984. Since then,

activities of the organization, including sermons, seminars, and social gatherings, have

no longer been under strict scrutiny by the government, in fact in some cases they were

even facilitated (Ida 2004). This was the way that Nahdlatul Ulama avoided the New

Order repression, while at the same time looked for accommodation.

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With the jargon of achieving national resilience, the New Order regime justified its

repressive actions to crack down on all potential dissent to its policies. This affected

Islamic publications as well. In the wake of the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, a

group of Islamic university students in the city of Yogyakarta published a daily named

Ar-Risalah. In the January and February 1980 Fridays column, Ar-Risalah actively

discussed themes including the ideology of Darul Islam, the state based on Islam in

Indonesia, while also urging Muslims everywhere to unite under the banner of jihad

against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Ar-Risalah even provided a special column to

publish opinions of Indonesian Muslims on what they felt were attacks on Islam. The

Indonesian authorities responded negatively to this publication, the editor of the daily

was arrested and jailed on the charge of subversion, and the daily was closed down by

April 1980. Nevertheless, two years later Ar-Risalah reincarnated into Ak-Ikhwan, with

the same vision and mission of jihad, and representation of voices of Muslims that were

being suppressed. Again the government cracked down this publication (Tapol 1995,

119).

The Suharto regime was able to reinforce tight control over Islamists’ voices in public

space. Paradoxically, the repression experienced by some elements of the Indonesian

Muslim community gave rise to Islamists’ clandestine activities. Cells, called usroh,

operated widely in the areas surrounding Islamic universities, particularly in Central

Java, Lampung, and South Sulawesi. Usroh was formed as a study group of Islamic

teaching and learning. Its ideological contents referred entirely to the struggle of the

Darul Islam group in the 1950s and 1960s, and portrayed them as opponents to the

Pancasila state. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar who led the al-Mukmin

madrasah in Ngruki Sukoharjo, Central Java, were the originators of usroh, and

responsible for the blowout of this activity throughout Central Java. The usroh networks

were greatly implicated in the aftermath of the government’s harsh crack down on

critical Muslim voices. Some of them were incarcerated and imprisoned without a fair

trial, while others continued with their underground movement in the countryside,

especially in Central Java and Lampung, or fled to Malaysia. In 1985 Ba’asyir and

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Sungkar escaped to Malaysia, and established an usroh-like group there (Van

Bruinessen 2002, 124-5).

With the emergence of global Islamism in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,

Muslims from around the world organized themselves to fight jihad in defence of Islam.

Indonesian Muslims also followed in this campaign. Malaysia became the shelter for the

New Order opponents affiliated with Islamic identity movements. Hundreds of

thousands of Indonesians travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan for jihad, and to receive

guerrilla training. Ba’asyir and Sungkar were engaged in organizing their associates in

Indonesia to recruit Muslim volunteers for jihad. Recruits were from West Java, Central

Java, Sumatra, and South Sulawesi areas, where usroh previously mushroomed (Van

Bruinessen 2002, 125). Some of the recruits were Agus Dwikarna, Hambali, Fatur

Rahman al-Ghozi, and Ali Gufron (Barton 2004, 51).

Intelligence analysts do not provide exact information about the Indonesian Muslim

volunteers’ journey of jihad to Afghanistan. Information available only indicates that

they were involved with Mujahideen factions in Peshawar and connected closely to

Ba’asyir and Sungkar. After arriving in Pakistan, many Indonesian jihadists enlisted

Abdullah Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat (office bureau), before continuing the journey

to the training camp run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. At the Sayyaf camp those Indonesians

probably met Osama bin Laden and other future al Qaeda figures, such as Khalid

Sheikh Muhammad. A small number of Indonesian volunteers went to the camps of

other Afghan mujahideen leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jamil al-Rahman

(Bubalo & Fealy 2005, 52-3). The Darul Islam spokesman Al-Chaidar, confirmed the

involvement of jihadists from Indonesia in the Afghan resistance movements. He even

mentioned a number of 30,000 Indonesian volunteers fighting with Mujahideen in

Afghanistan. Half of them were the veterans of Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian

Islamic Army, TII), the military wing of Darul Islam, with which Ba’asyir and Sungkar

were affiliated (Van Bruinessen 2002, 125).

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Indonesian Muslims who undertook jihad in defence of Afghanistan were not

necessarily connected to usroh and the movement organized by Ba’asyir and Sungkar.

There were individuals with personal conviction who made their own way to Pakistan

and Afghanistan for a jihad. One of the Indonesian jihad fighters who acknowledged his

involvement with Afghanistan Mujahideen is Jafar Umar Thalib, who founded the

radical group called Laskar Jihad in Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto. The rise of

Jafar in particular, and Indonesian jihadists more generally, was related to some extent

with the activities of two important Islamic institutions; Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah

Indonesia (the Indonesian Council for Islamic Proselytizing, DDII), more popularly

known as Dewan Dakwah, and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam Dan Arab (the

Institute for Islamic Knowledge and Arabic, LIPIA) located in Jakarta. To some extent,

both Islamist institutions had been intellectually connected with Pakistani Islamists. The

key role of Dewan Dakwah and LIPIA was to give birth to the younger generation of

Muslim militants who would refuse to accept the legitimacy of the Pancasila state.

Dewan Dakwah was the creation of Mohammad Natsir – the former leader of the

banned Masyumi Islamic Party. He was supported by Muslim activists and ulama who

were loyal to the idea of Darul Islam, to establish Dewan Dakwah at a meeting held in

Masjid al-Munawarah Tanah Abang Central Jakarta on 26 February 1967. At the time,

Natsir was aware of the political atmosphere in which Islam had been suppressed and

marginalized by the New Order government. Therefore, in order to avoid the

government’s suppression he declared the founding of Dewan Dakwah with a modified

mission, declaring that in the past they had carried out Islamic duties through political

practice, but that they should conduct politics through Islamic missionaries

(www.dewandakwah.org).

Natsir and others wished to achieve twin objectives, maintaining their existence amidst

Indonesian Muslim groups, and safely promoting Islamic identity in the secular political

milieu. To this end, Dewan Dakwah adopted domestic and international strategies;

mobilizing Islamic preachers throughout the country to hear briefings by the

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government’s officials on Suharto’s national development policies, and immediately

associated themselves with anti-communist Saudi Arabia. Dewan Dakwah became the

representative of Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim Council) of Saudi Arabia in

Indonesia. This international linkage placed Dewan Dakwah in line with Suharto’s

policy to eradicate the remaining force of communists in the country (Hasan 2006, 37-

8). As a result, Dewan Dakwah could exist with its Islamic feature under the New Order

repressive polity.

Parallel to the spirit of global Islamic resurgence in the early 1980s, Dewan Dakwah

sought to popularize Islamic themes. Through the network of Muslim preachers and

Mosques, Dewan Dakwah spread the ideas that the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-

Islami represented, by popularising the writings of Islamic ideologues such as Banna,

Qutb, Maududi of Pakistan, Sayyid Hawwa, and Mustafa al-Siba’i. Funding for Dewan

Dakwah’s Islamic activism came mostly from the Saudi government channelled through

institutions such as Hai’at al-Ighatha al-Alamiyya al-Islamiyya (International Islamic

Relief Organization), al Majlis al-Alami Li’i Masjid (World Council of Mosques), al-

Nadwa al-Alamiyya li al-Shabab al-Islam (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), and

Lajnat Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic Charity) (Hasan 2006, 39).

The significant financial support of the Saudis enabled Dewan Dakwah to expand its

missionary programs. It was active in distributing free copies of Al-Qur’an and Islamic

books to Islamic schools and organizations, as well as organizing Islamic preacher

training (www.dewandakwah.org). Under the framework of the preacher-training

program, Dewan Dakwah entered into cooperation with MUI in the project called Da’i

Transmigrasi. The project was aimed at sending Muslim preachers to remote areas of

transmigration throughout the country (Hasan 2006, 39-41). Essentially it was created to

teach Muslims about their religion, and prevent them from being subject to the

influences of Christian missionaries (Hasanuddin & Angek 2000).

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To ensure financial support for the wider Islamic activism in Indonesia, Dewan Dakwah

served as a mediator between Saudi funding institutions and a number of local Muslim

groups, particularly those who had puritanical views, such as al-Irsyad and Persis

(Hasan 2006, 41-3). Additionally, Dewan Dakwah arranged for Saudi scholarships to be

given to Indonesian Muslim youths wanting to study Islam in the Middle East and other

countries, including Pakistan. This project took place during the 1970s and 1980s

(Singh 2007, 46). Dewan Dakwah’s most important role was facilitating Indonesian

Muslims to gain contacts with Islamic activists in the Middle East and Pakistan while

studying there, and then in turn contribute to the expansion of radical teachings, such as

Salafi Wahhabism.

During the 1980s, activism of Dewan Dakwah was supported by LIPIA. They

collaborated in spreading the teaching of Salafi Wahhabi throughout the country.

LIPIA, established by the Saudi’s representative in Jakarta in 1980, concentrated on the

teaching of Arabic, and introducing those awarded scholarships by Dewan Dakwah, to

Islamic universities in Pakistan and the Middle East. LIPIA’s curricula were adopted

from the Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud Islamic University Riyadh. LIPIA still provides

its students with pre-university intensive Arabic courses for two semesters. Then,

students are directed to major in faculties, such as Islamic history, Islamic theology

traditions, Qur’an exegesis, and Islamic law. Teaching staff are recruited from Egypt,

Libya, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Yemen (LIPIA Prospectus 2009). In the

1980s LIPIA’s students were mostly talented preachers who had completed the task of

Islamic missionary in the isolated areas of transmigration under the Da’i Transmigrasi

project of Dewan Dakwah and MUI. With significant financial support from the Saudis,

LIPIA was subsequently able to broaden its programs, and started to apprentice talented

students from numerous madrasahs in East Java and South Sulawesi (Hasan 2006, 43-

4).

It is difficult to accurately evaluate how deeply LIPIA could influence the growth of

Salafi Wahhabism in Indonesia. But in fact, LIPIA’s students were indoctrinated in

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various aspects of the Salafi Wahhabite ideas. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, who studied at

LIPIA between 1988 and 1993, acknowledged that he was required to master the study

of Salafis such as Ibn Taymiyah. In addition, Ulil described the LIPIA’s teaching

faculty as very intolerant of the local Islamic culture and practice (Bubalo & Fealy

2005, 57). The students acquired the knowledge of Salafi Wahhabism in various halqas

and dauras where they had the opportunity to interact with the Middle Eastern and

Pakistani Salafis. It is also important to note that thoughts of Islamist ideologues, such

as Banna, Qutb, Maududi have found fertile soil in the institute. During the 1980s,

LIPIA annually sent approximately 30 Indonesian Muslim students to study Islam in the

Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabian universities, the most favoured of which were

Imam Muhammad ibn Sa’ud Islamic University and Medina Islamic University, as well

as the Pakistani Maududi Islamic Institute (Hasan 2006, 46-7). In the eyes of Indonesian

Muslims, for many years, studying Islam at foreign Islamic universities has been

regarded as a privilege. This is the major attraction of LIPIA to Indonesian Muslim

students, despite the various traditions of Islam they have ascribed.

As mentioned earlier Indonesian Islamists not only expressed their voices for

Afghanistan, but also joined in jihad with Mujahideen there. The Wahhabite

connections of Dewan Dakwah and LIPIA, had in a sense contributed to the making of

jihadist like Jafar Umar Thalib. Jafar was born in December 1961 in Malang East Java.

He is a descendant of a religious Yemeni-Madurese family. His father Umar Thalib was

an activist of al-Irsyad - an Arab descendant organization in Indonesia that was

affiliated with Dewan Dakwah. Jafar underwent three kinds of educational streams that

led to his Islamic militancy; informal Islamic education from his father; formal

education at Islamic schools; and non-formal education especially during his

involvement with the Salafi Wahhabi movement in Pakistan, and holy war experience in

Afghanistan. That Jafar had no formal education in Pakistan is an indication that

Muslims from the two countries had begun to build links beyond formal Islamic

education.

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His father introduced Jafar to Islamic teachings and Arabic. He mostly familiarized

himself with puritan Islamic teachings recommended by al-Irsyad and Dewan Dakwah.

Then, Jafar began his formal education at an al-Irsyad madrasah in his hometown, led

by his father. Jafar’s higher educational degree was obtained at the religious teacher

training school, run by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, also in Malang. After

graduating from this school, in 1981, Jafar continued his Islamic studies at the Persis

madrasah of Bangil East Java; Dewan Dakwah had also supported this madrasah. Jafar

spent only two years in Bangil because he was dissatisfied with teaching-learning

process there. So he went to Jakarta to study at LIPIA. Again the young Jafar left the

institute without completing his degree, although he had been there for three years. This

was on account of a dispute with one of his lecturers. It was not clear what its cause

was. With the help of the institute director al Amir, Jafar was awarded a Saudi

government scholarship to proceed to study at the Maududi Islamic Institute in Lahore

Pakistan and left for this country in 1986 (Umam 2006, 21-2).

The Maududi Islamic Institute is an educational institution directly linked to the

Jama’at-i-Islami Party of Pakistan. The institute was built in 1982 within the party’s

headquarters in Mansoora complex. It is named after Abul Al’a Maududi who had

received support from the Saudi government. The institute’s curricula consist of Islamic

and non-Islamic subjects, including English, economics, sociology, political science,

ethics and morals, Qur’an studies, Islamic theology traditions, Islamic law, and

prophetic studies. The non-Islamic subjects are taught in English, and the religious ones

in Arabic. The chief goal of the institute was to produce cadres for Islamist movements

prepared to spearhead a global Islamic revival (www.islamistwatch.org). At this

institute, Jafar once again quarrelled with his lecturer over what he claimed was an

interpretation of a hadith. This made him decide to leave the institute in 1987, without

finishing his studies (Tempo Interaktif 27 December 2000).

While the Indonesian government was reluctant to support Pakistan and Afghanistan,

Indonesian Muslims like Jafar went to these countries to carry out jihad with the

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Mujahideen. When Jafar visited Peshawar in 1987, he started empathizing with the

struggle of Afghan Muslims against the Soviet invasion. Jafar, then, joined in jihad with

the Afghan Mujahideen. He was involved in jihad between 1987 and 1989. The

Indonesian jihadist enlisted with the faction connected to Saudi Salafi Wahhabi

movement, the Jama’at al-da’wa ila al-Qur’an wa ahl al-Hadith, led by Jamil al-Rahman

(Forum Keadilan 20 November 2001). Jafar acknowledged that he volunteered in

Afghanistan because of the feeling of Islamic solidarity (ukhuwah Islamiyyah) with the

Afghan peoples. He regretted that such feelings were not existent in the hearts of the

Indonesian rulers, who were mostly Muslims, and criticized them for doing nothing for

Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jafar emphasized that jihad is the highest obligation of every

Muslim which they have to conduct in life (Buletin Laskar Jihad 6 June 2001, 1). The

strict adherence and strong commitment by Jafar to do jihad in terms of violent action

demonstrates his militancy. This is also a general attitude of the Indonesian jihadist.

Jafar is just one of thousands of Indonesian jihadists believed to have undertaken jihad

fighting in Afghanistan. An intelligence source in Jakarta corroborated that the majority

of them were students studying in the Middle East especially in Saudi Arabia and

Egypt. The jihadist activities cannot be separated from the roles of either the Saudi

Arabian government in providing financial support, or the Pakistan Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) in organizing training for guerrilla warfare. On returning home to

Indonesia the jihadist brings a jihad ideology inspired by Salafi Wahhabism, combined

with warfare proficiency. They also continue to have regular contact with each other,

mostly clandestine, and are eager to wait for the opportune time to carry out jihad to

establish an Islamic state in Indonesia8.

Indonesian Responses after the Soviet Withdrawal

The improvement in American-Soviet relations by the end of the 1980s had swift

implications for the conflict in Afghanistan. The UN sponsored talks in Geneva that had

came to a stalemate, on account of Washington and Moscow’s inflexibility, showed

signs of progress. The two superpowers acted as guarantors for Pakistan and 8 From an interview conducted in February 2011.

153

Afghanistan which signed an agreement on 14 April 1988 regarding the withdrawal of

Soviet military personnel, to commence on 15 May that year. The withdrawal was due

to be completed by 15 February 1989 (Yasmeen 1994, 115).

On 26 February 1989 the Indonesian government decided to open its diplomatic office

in Kabul to link with the Soviet-backed regime there at a charge d’ affair level. This

policy sustained the difference in approach taken by the government, and the Muslim

community on the Afghanistan issue. Indonesian Muslims were more sympathetic to the

Islamic Mujahideen leadership. For example, a group of Muslims called Komite

Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for the Solidarity

with the Islamic World, KISDI) openly expressed its sympathy to the Mujahideen

fighters and opposed the continuing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

The KISDI was founded in 1987 in Jakarta with the support of the prominent figure of

Dewan Dakwah, Mohammad Natsir. The strong connection between Dewan Dakwah

and KISDI can be seen in the Islamist figures that were appointed as executive members

of the KISDI organization. Amongst them were: Hasan Basri, the former chairperson of

MUI and an activist of Dewan Dakwah; Husein Umar, the former secretary general of

Dewan Dakwah; Abdul Rasyid Syafi’I, from Perguruan; As Syafiiyah, who was

affiliated with Dewan Dakwah; some of Dewan Dakwah’s younger cadres such as

Kholil Ridwan of the Council of Cooperation amongst Madrasah in Indonesia; Ahmad

Sumargono who led the Jakarta-based Mubaleigh groups; and Mazni Yunus, an activist

of Dewan Dakwah. KISDI was originally established to react to the brutal military

offensive of Israel in Palestine. Later on, this Islamist group broadened its advocacy to

voice Indonesian Muslims’ views on issues related to Islam throughout the Islamic

world (Rahmat 2005, 80).

Between 1987 and 1993, KISDI was assertive about advocating its aspirations for

solidarity with Afghanistan. In addition it spoke out harshly in denouncing the

American-led multinational troops that warred on Saddam Hussein’s regime of Iraq in

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1991. Indonesian Muslims were encouraged by this group to undertake jihad fighting

with Bosnian Muslims against the infidels’ troops of Yugoslavia. The KISDI was also

active in collecting Indonesian Muslims’ donations for humanitarian aid purposes for

Muslims in Moro, Southern Philippines, who were suffering from the prolonged conflict

between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the central government in

Manila (Sumargono 1999).

According to KISDI, in reference to the Soviet’s continuing involvement in

Afghanistan, Muslims should have been led by an Islamic government, not a Godless

communist regime. The Indonesian government’s decision to open formal contacts with

the communist regime of Afghanistan was questioned, and regretted, on the grounds it

had not empathized with Afghan Muslims, and had not accommodated the feelings of

the majority of Indonesian Muslim peoples. Furthermore, the KISDI kept on

encouraging Muslims to promote jihad against the aggressor to Islam. It insisted on the

high meaning of jihad for Muslims, and stated readiness to organize Islamic fighters to

be sent to the conflict areas (Suara Merdeka 28 February 1989). This vision shows that

the KISDI had a militant character, interpreting the struggle of jihad merely in terms of

physical violence.

The military disliked such activities, and warned the group not to conduct any actions

that could be categorized as dissident acts. The Commander-in-Chief, General Try

Sutrisno, stated to the press that he would take all necessary measures to maintain

national stability and resilience, and prevent it from being disrupted by provocative

actions (Berita Yudha 1 March 1989). The general did not point explicitly to whom this

warning was aimed at, but it could easily have been directed at organizations like the

KISDI. Again, the New Order government showed the use of repressive measures to try

to quieten dissenting Muslim opinions. This was not directly in opposition of foreign

parties, either Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the wider Muslim world, but rather part of a

general attitude to sideline Islamic languages in the state’s international affairs.

155

On 25 February 1989, Mujahideen, with the backing of Washington and Islamabad,

established an interim administration in Peshawar in the wake of the departure of the

last Soviet troops on 15 February. The fundamental idea was to shape a state-like

political organization, which would take over power once the Kabul regime was

toppled. The many factions of Mujahideen convened a Shura (assembly), to choose who

would be authorized to run the interim government. However, the Shura reflected splits

and disunity rather than the commonalities which existed between the Peshawar-based

Mujahideen, dominated by Pushtuns, and the inside Afghanistan factions. The Pushtuns

in Peshawar excluded the non-Pushtuns, and the Shi’ite resistance group in Iran. The

elimination of the Iran-based Mujahideen embittered the non-Pushtuns who felt

alienated, and feared that the interim government might be repeating the history of

Pushtun hegemony (Rashid 1989, 26).

One clear example of the upheavals and disunity inside Mujahideen was that the

Rabbani’s party was only assigned a marginal role in the Shura. Rabbani was a Tajik,

and his party consisted of mostly non-Pushtun followers. Rabbani’s party received just a

small share of votes in the Shura, unbalanced to their relatively large size, and as a

result, Rabbani was given an unimportant position in the interim government. It was

assumed by Rabbani’s proponents as an attempt by the Pushtuns to keep them out of

power (Rubin 1990, 156). The rifts and disunity amongst Mujahideen were certainly

more complex in nature. Ethnic lines divided the Mujahideens.

Although the interim government was supported by the US and Pakistan, the

international community was doubtful about the viability and feasibility of such a

fragmented leadership. Accordingly, some countries held reservations about extending

political recognition to them. However, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Bahrain did not take

long to recognize the Afghan government-in-exile (Kyodo News 12 April 1989). This

was perhaps related to their ongoing support for the Mujahideen since the outbreak of

the Afghanistan war.

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At the Riyadh conference of Islamic foreign ministers held between 13 and 16 March

1989, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) extended recognition to the

Afghan Mujahideen provisional government. The conference invited the Afghan

Mujahideen to occupy the seat of the state of Afghanistan, which had been vacant since

the extraordinary session of the Islamic conference of foreign ministers convened in

Pakistan, January 1980. The secretary general of the conference explicitly reiterated that

the conference lauded the heroic struggle of Afghan peoples under the leadership of the

Afghan Mujahideen alliance for restoring their identity as an independent Islamic state.

Furthermore, the conference participants welcomed the formation of the Shura and the

latter’s selection of provisional government on free and independent will. The OIC

affirmed its desire to carry on humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in collaboration with

the Pakistani government (The Islamic Conference Foreign Ministers 1989).

Indonesia attended the Riyadh meeting, however it did not extend its recognition to the

Mujahideen government. According to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, although the

Islamic conference had recognized the Mujahideen leadership, there was no obligation

for the participating members to do the same. More importantly, the principle of

independent activism in Indonesia’s foreign policy did not allow the government to

support a government-in-exile. Indonesia had endorsed the Geneva Agreement, on the

14 April 1988, on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, thus suggesting

that Jakarta was taking a position in favour of the Afghan peoples’ rights for self-rule

(Kompas 31 March 1989).

In mid April 1989, Foreign Minister of the interim government Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

visited Malaysia and Indonesia in order to seek recognition. As a result, Malaysian

Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar announced his government’s recognition of the

Mujahideen government-in-exile. This decision was reportedly taken after a series of

contacts and appeals made by the Saudi’s diplomats in Kuala Lumpur. Fortunately, the

Saudis were able to convince the Malaysian government of the ability of the

Afghanistan interim government to create a stable condition, and unite their war-torn

157

society. Then, Malaysia was also firm in extending its recognition on the grounds of the

spirit of Islamic solidarity with Afghanistan Muslims (Kyodo News 12 April 1989).

When arriving in Jakarta from Kuala Lumpur, at the Sukarno-Hatta International

Airport, Hekmatyar spoke to local media and urged the government and peoples of

Indonesia to show their support for the struggle of Afghan Muslims (Kompas 13 April

1989). The KISDI responded favourably to such a request. It published a statement

welcoming the visit of Hekmatyar, and further pledged to endorse his Islamic

government. The KISDI claimed that they represented the feelings of most Indonesian

Muslims about solidarity with Afghanistan (Suara Merdeka 14 April 1989). However,

there is no information as to whether the Indonesian Muslim group met with

Hekmatyar, or organized a mass gathering to express support, despite releasing a press

statement to that effect.

The Pakistani government tried to secure Indonesian recognition for the Mujahideen

leadership, but it did not receive the expected response. The government in Jakarta still

refused to recognize the Afghan government-in-exile. Unlike Malaysia, which declared

recognition upon the ground of Islamic solidarity with Afghanistan, Indonesia did not

refer to it in shaping its policy on Afghanistan. Ali Alatas, after receiving Hekmatyar in

his office on 13 April, in a meeting that was facilitated by the Pakistani representative in

Jakarta, reemphasized the earlier position that Indonesia strongly supported the struggle

of Afghan people. However, Jakarta had extended diplomatic contacts with the

government in Kabul, and thus it did not want to appear ambivalent by recognizing

another government. Furthermore, to Ali Alatas, Indonesia would not want to strain the

peace process, as the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan had been completed

since 15 February 1989 (Kompas 14 April 1989).

Critics of the policy of not recognizing the interim government of Afghanistan,

particularly by the Muslim elements, claimed that it was a result of an attempt by

Indonesia’s at appealing to the Soviet Union for a better relationship. The indication of

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which was clear in a plan made for the visit of President Suharto to Moscow scheduled

for June 1989. In the eyes of the critical Muslims, the government was more favourable

to the communist superpower than to its Afghan Muslim brothers (Suara Merdeka 16

April 1989).

The New Order government rejected criticisms that they did not care about the plight of

millions of Muslims in Afghanistan. The Indonesian government argued that it did not

want to interfere in the conflict of a foreign state. Moreover, the formation of a

government-in-exile would only complicate the conflict in Afghanistan. At the same

time, the government and peoples of Indonesia invariably paid much attention to the

Afghan peoples, as evinced in the extensive humanitarian aid deployed to assist the

refugees and war victims of Afghanistan (Kompas 9 May 1989). An editorial in a pro-

government daily, Angkatan Bersenjata, argued on 14 April 1989 that Indonesia did not

need to undertake an emotionally-based foreign policy like that of other countries, such

as Malaysia, by giving recognition to a rebel government on behalf of Islamic solidarity.

Indonesian foreign policy should be conducted in line with the principle of the respect

for the sovereignty of every nation, and principals of non-interference, according to

which the existence of a government-in-exile backed by foreign power was

unacceptable.

The New Order government felt that no urgent actions needed to be taken in dealing

with what was happening in Afghanistan. In January 1990, Jakarta decided to upgrade

its diplomatic ties with Afghanistan to ambassadorial level. Abdul Ghani was assigned

to head the Indonesian embassy in Kabul. This decision ignored a request from Pakistan

that Indonesia should reconsider its policy towards Afghanistan (Kompas 11 January

1990).

This case demonstrates that there was variance of the governmental and non-

governmental responses in Indonesia towards what happened in Afghanistan. The

Soviet Union’s invasion of the Afghan country was viewed by the elite in Jakarta as an

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event far from Indonesia, and hence they considered that Indonesian national and

regional stability was not threatened directly. This caused the Indonesian government to

express limited commitment to support Pakistan’s policy on the Afghan war. Islam did

not appear to be the feature of this attitude. On the grass-root level, however, Indonesian

Islamists were assertive about expressing their feeling of Islamic solidarity with the

Afghans, and were able to relate with other Muslims, especially based in Pakistan, for

the jihad war against the Soviets. In this pattern of the state and Islamic group

interaction, the use of Muslim identity was apparently absent in Indonesia’s foreign

policy.

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Chapter Five

Indonesia’s Revitalized Relations With Pakistan:

Islamic Identity and Economic Cooperation

The beginning of the 1990s saw the newfound feature of Indonesia’s foreign policy turn

towards the Muslim world. There was a shift taking place in the way that the New Order

government dealt with Muslim countries; from avoiding using the language of

Islamism, as had been the case in the past two decades, Jakarta moved towards an

acknowledgement of the country’s Muslim identity. For example, in the Organization of

the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Developing Eight (D-8), Indonesia spoke of issues

pertinent to Muslims. However, the nature of interests underpinning the policy did not

change. It continued to be shaped by the material need for expanding economic

cooperation. This chapter attempts to explain how and why the trend happened and, to

examine its implications for Indonesia-Pakistan relations.

The chapter argues that a shift had taken place within the Suharto regime on

acknowledging the country’s Islamic identity. This was connected to the rising power of

an Islamic organization called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the

Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI). The ICMI emerged at the

societal level, but due to its presence as a Muslim group with vision supporting the

government’s policies on national development, it also gained the support of the New

Order leaders. Therefore, to some extent it could have an influence on foreign policy

agenda as evident in its changed policy on the OIC. But Islam did not emerge as the

dominant notion of Indonesian identity. Other interests continued to shape Jakarta’s

policy as well. In this context, Indonesian ties with Pakistan improved, with the

economic area becoming the focus of their connection. The changing geostrategic

environment of Pakistan played a significant role in the process: after the Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan and the failure of the United States (US) to continue the

aid relationship with Pakistan, Islamabad needed to find new partnerships. As part of

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this strategy, Pakistan initiated the ‘look east’ policy with a focus on improving

relations with Southeast Asian states. As a major Southeast Asian state, Indonesia

received significant attention with economic arena showing signs of improved

Indonesia-Pakistan relations.

The Emergence of ICMI

By the mid 1980s there was global resurgence of Islamism around the world, as a

reaction to events in the Muslim world – mainly the war in Afghanistan. In Indonesia,

this was reflected in some sections in the middle-class Muslims in urban areas strongly

expressing the need for acknowledging the country’s Islamic identity. They were keen

to establish a Muslim organization that could accommodate aspirations of Indonesian

Muslims. Between 1984 and 1986, Muslim activists, mostly from Islamic universities,

held several conferences to realise the goal. However, none were successful in

achieving concrete results in the formation of a solid Islamic movement (Tempo 8

December 1990).

The major challenge faced by Muslims in Indonesia in consolidating their activities was

the government’s disapproval and intervention. For instance, in 1989, a national Muslim

intellectual gathering was planned to be held in Yogyakarta. Initiated by a senior

modernist Muslim activist, Imaduddin Abdulrahim, the aim was similar to the previous

proposals, to unite Indonesian Muslim activists in a group with national vision.

Imaduddin invited 50 Muslim intellectuals, yet only 39 participants attended the

meeting in October. Unfortunately, before they finalized their discussions, the meeting

was dissolved by the Indonesian security authorities, as they had not secured the permit

from the Indonesian government (Berita Buana 3 October 1989).

After observing the failure of the efforts made by Imaduddin, and feeling frustrated by

the continuing fragmentation and disunity amongst Indonesian Muslim activists, a

group of students at Brawijaya University of Malang East Java, decided to prevent this

problem from reoccurring. Those students – Eric Salman, Ali Mudakir, Mohammad

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Zaenuri, Awang Surya and Muhammad Iqbal – committed to revive the initiative

launched in Yogyakarta. They were aware of the need to acquire support from the ruling

elite, and that this endorsement would require a concession be given to the New Order

rulers (Pelita 4 December 1990). Eric Salman and others began to organize a Muslim

Intellectual conference at Brawijaya University scheduled in October 1990. In search

for support, they travelled to Jakarta to appeal to some Muslim figures. They were

advised by Nurcholish Madjid, Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Dawam Rahardjo, to meet

with B. J. Habibie to seek his support for a permanent Muslim intellectual organization,

to be led by Habibie himself, and that they should obtain the government’s blessing

before holding the national Muslim intellectual meeting (www.icmi.or.id).

With the help of Syafi’i Anwar, a reputable journalist of the Islamic weekly, Panji

Masyarakat, Madjid, Imaduddin, Dawam, and the five students arranged a meeting with

Habibie. According to Syafi’i Anwar (Muzani 1993, 140), Habibie agreed to the idea,

and surprisingly, also asked to present his paper in the national Muslim conference. To

Habibie’s mind, the conference should be framed in the theme of ‘The Contributions of

Muslim Intellectuals to National Development’. Although stating his personal approval,

Habibie underlined that as a cabinet member he needed to seek permission from Suharto

to take part in that Muslim forum. It was agreed between Habibie and the students to

support each other; Habibie was willing to approach the political elite for their

endorsement of the idea of convening a national Muslim intellectual conference, while

the students would provide him with a formal draft of a request to the government.

The decision to approach Habibie for support was an effective option. Bacharuddin

Jusuf Habibie was known as a devout Muslim, indicated by his fasting on Mondays and

Thursdays. Habibie’s personal relationship with Suharto was closer than anyone else

outside the President’s immediate family. They were like father and son. The

relationship went back to 1950 when Suharto was assigned to be in-charge of South

Sulawesi Province and the general had befriended Habibie’s family. After Habibie’s

real father passed away, not long after Suharto’s arrival, the 13-year-old Habibie had

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been under Suharto’s protection. In a political biography, the New Order leader

admitted that Habibie regarded him as a parent, from whom he took notes on the

philosophy of life, and sought guidance from (McCharty 1998, 1-2).

Habibie’s political and bureaucratic career had a bright beginning, starting with a

technocratic job, prior to ascending to a ministerial position. Despite his personal

brilliance, many argued that this was due to Habibie’s relationship with Suharto.

Habibie a highly educated scientist, was a dedicated proponent of the power of

technology in support of economic development. He studied aeronautical engineering in

Germany before being called back by Suharto in 1974 to help develop the country’s

industries. Habibie served as Minister of Research and Technology in Suharto’s cabinet

for about 20 years (McCharty 1998, 2). By 1995, he had received no less than 50

medals of Honour from the Indonesian government for his contributions, which

included building airplanes, steel mills, cars and shipping industries (Republika 10

December 1995). With his Islamic identity, Habibie was widely regarded as an icon of

Indonesian Muslim progress and internationally recognized in the Islamic world (Amir

2007, 83). Through his position and access to the centre of the New Order power,

Habibie was able to significantly contribute to the creation of the Islamic intellectual

group.

Habibie played a crucial role by undertaking high level lobbying with Suharto to

smooth the way for the establishment of the ICMI. Habibie gained the approval of his

Muslim colleagues in the New Order cabinet, including six ministers; Ali Alatas,

Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, Moerdiono, Harmoko, Emil Salim and Munawir

Sjadzali. At the societal level, Habibie circulated the draft request for support - designed

by the Muslim students - amongst academics, journalists, and businesspeople. As a

result, the draft request obtained consent of 49 signatories, all prominent Muslim figures

representing various Islamic groups, as well as professional associations. With this

support in hand, Habibie spoke to Suharto about the idea of ICMI, and was able to

secure the Indonesian leader’s endorsement. According to Habibie, Suharto told him ‘it

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is his duty to help, uplift, and guide the majority of Indonesians who are Muslims to

progress…’ (Husaini 1995, 58).

The Muslim intellectual conference was held between 8 and 10 December 1990, during

which President Suharto inaugurated the ICMI. He emphasised the importance of Islam

as a force for national development to the 512 participants, who included scholars and

activists from around the country. He identified Indonesian Muslims (Muslim

intellectuals) as ‘an integral part of and reliable power of our nation’ and claimed ‘with

the setting up of ICMI, they [would be] encouraged to contribute to the success of

national development…’ (Pelita 9 December 1990). Habibie, on his first speech as

ICMI leader, underscored that the organization would work hand-in-hand with the

government to advance Indonesian social, economic, and cultural developments (Jawa

Pos 11 December 1990). Even though both Suharto and Habibie did not affirm ICMI as

a political group, the presence of the two leaders of the New Order had implied the high

political profile of ICMI. Importantly, Suharto had for the first time openly recognized

the significance of Islam and Muslims for the country’s development.

As it was established to accommodate all Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, ICMI

membership embraced the elements of traditionalist and modernist Muslims. However,

ICMI cleverly communicated its Islamic identity through themes that conformed to the

New Order government’s policy lines. Firstly, the ICMI leadership adhered to the first

principle of Pancasila, that is, belief in the one supreme God, representing what they

term tauhid (the oneness of God). Secondly, the purpose of ICMI was to improve the

quality of human resources in Indonesia, promoting technical and scientific education

particularly at university level which had been the first priority of the ICMI affiliated

Minister of Education and Culture Wardiman Djojonegoro and Habibie himself.

Thirdly, ICMI committed to support the state - not the market - as the primary agent for

economic development. This view was advanced mainly by ICMI’s secretary general

Adi Sasono (Liddle 1996, 617-20).

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The ICMI moved towards a strategic position in the New Order governance. Habibie

and the ICMI leadership utilized bureaucratic approaches to strengthen their political

power. The patron-client system was applied to recruit supporters. More and more high-

ranking officials of Suharto’s administration from both central and local governments

were recruited to be ICMI cadres, and in return they received opportunities for

promotion. There was a general assumption that in order to attain a better bureaucratic

and political career, one should belong to ICMI, regardless of the degree of their Islamic

religiosity. As such ICMI was viewed as the catalyst for political achievement (Hefner

1997, 76). By 1995, ICMI had been supported by 42,000 cadres encompassing various

branches of government agencies and societal Islamic associations (Ummat 3 December

1995).

The ICMI held its second national congress in Jakarta in December 1995, and was

attended by 1,200 delegates representing ICMI branches throughout the country.

Habibie was re-elected as national chairperson for a second five-year term, and Suharto

was appointed as the patron of ICMI. Several high-ranking officials, including 16

ministers in the cabinet, attended the meeting and were given important positions in

ICMI leadership (Gatra 9 December 1995). This event demonstrated that with the

support of Suharto’s bureaucracy the ICMI had grown as a powerful Islamic group9.

The rise of ICMI’s political power bought with it the hope that more room would be

made to accommodate the aspirations of Indonesian Muslims, and that the Islamic

identity would be able to exert influence in the New Order governance, or at least

Islamic voices would be less suppressed than before.

The rise of the ICMI was striking; they were ready and highly likely to drive

Indonesia’s national and foreign policy in line with their worldview. In the foreign

policy area, the task was given to Ali Alatas, an activist of ICMI with Arab Hadhrami

descent, who was appointed as foreign minister in 1988. In an interview with The

Jakarta Post (2 November 1999), Ali Alatas explained that his vision of Indonesia’s

foreign policy was entirely faithful to the basic tenet of ‘independent activism’. He 9 The reason why Suharto supported the establishment of ICMI has been presented in Chapter One.

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called it a principled foreign policy, and emphasized that it was ‘not an expeditious one,

not a quality of expedience tending with the wind or just for the sake of short-term gain,

sacrificing basic principles…’. Ali Alatas (2006) argued that Indonesian foreign policy

in many respects referred to idealism, rather than realism. In pursuit of the national

interest, the state’s foreign policy was guided by the notion of mutual cooperation

instead of the struggle for power; compliance with international law instead of forceful

domination; creation of order based on consensus instead of military alliance; and the

notion of cooperation and goodwill among states rather than anarchy as underpinning

international system.

In relation to the position of Islam as the marker of identity in Indonesian foreign

policy, Ali Alatas (ANTARA 3 November 1999) was convinced that Islam always had

something in common with the government’s policy. The fact that the majority of the

Indonesian population professed to Islam was, and still is, an important factor in

decision making. Ali Alatas referred to Jakarta’s policy on the Arab-Israel conflict to

establish this claim: Indonesia did not reject the existence of the Jewish nation, nor was

it against Israel, but decision to open diplomatic relations with Israel was more to do

with the will of the majority of Indonesians who wanted Tel Aviv to first undo what it

was doing to the Palestinians and the Arabs. This position was also part of Indonesian

anti-colonial stipulation in the 1945 Constitution. This example, he argued, showed that

Islamic identity and the non-Islamic reference to foreign policy were, and are, both

important features in Indonesia’s relations to the Muslim world.

Indonesian Changing Policy in the OIC

During the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesia did not play an important role, or occupy a

prominent position within international Islamic organizations. This was the official

position of the Suharto government. This was not simply because the Muslim world

underestimated Indonesian capability and its large Muslim population. The New Order

leaders did not want Indonesia to be seen as a state with an Islamic identity that could

potentially distance its relationships with the secular Western economic donors (Azra

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2006, 107). Imron Rosyadi (1981, 28), a member of Indonesian parliament representing

the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Development Party,

PPP), favoured this position. For instance, he argued that Indonesian presence in the

OIC was static, marginal, and full of formality over substance. The reason for this was

that Indonesia had never shown political solidarity with the Islamic world, for instance,

by attaching itself officially to the OIC as a full member.

Indonesia’s first attendance in the OIC was noticeable at the third Islamic foreign

ministers conference convened at Jeddah Saudi Arabia in 1972. However, the

Indonesian delegates, led by Foreign Minister Adam Malik, refused to sign the OIC

Charter promulgated in 1969. This was on account of a disagreement with the condition

for OIC membership stipulated in Article viii of the charter, stating that every Islamic

state is eligible to be an OIC member upon submission of an application expressing

willingness and preparedness to adopt the charter. In relation to the article, the phrase

that pointed to membership being only for Islamic states hindered Indonesia’s full

involvement. As Adam Malik argued: ‘Indonesia is a state based on Pancasila, and

accordingly an attachment to the Islamic organization will be misleading because of

obscuring its national identity…’. Nevertheless, the Indonesian foreign minister

affirmed that Indonesia would continue to participate in the OIC activities (ANTARA

14 March 1972).

Jakarta was not averse to taking part in the OIC, but it was not going to seek formal

membership. This status of partial membership in the Islamic organization should be

understood as a reflection of the government’s foreign policy that could not simply

ignore the reality that nearly 90 percent of the Indonesian population were Muslims.

Thus, the Indonesian government maintained involvement in the OIC, while not over-

playing the country’s Islamic identity. Indonesia continued to articulate its secular

identity as a developing country, as well as promoting cooperation with members of the

Islamic conference based on equal partnership and mutual benefits (Hein 1986, 141). As

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such Indonesia was able to participate in the OIC with a loose and non-binding

commitment to solidarity with other Muslim states.

An official report issued by the Indonesian ministry of foreign affairs at the turn of the

1990s mentioned that ever since Indonesia’s first attendance in the 1972 Islamic

conference, Indonesia had taken part actively in various OIC’s activities, with economic

cooperation as the main motivation underpinning its participation. For example, in 1983

Indonesia signed the General Agreement on Economic, Technical, and Commercial

Cooperation amongst members of the OIC, as well as hosting the Islamic conference of

chamber of commerce. Indonesia was always represented in the Islamic countries

meetings and contributed to the programs of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). In

return, starting in 1974 Indonesia received loans worth no less than US$ 50 million

from the IDB (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991, 82).

Following the establishment of ICMI, discourse over strengthening Indonesia’s ties with

the Muslim world began to increase in Jakarta. In February 1991, Habibie spoke to the

press of the new direction of the government’s policy on international affairs;

‘Indonesia will take a greater and more prominent role in the Islamic world which

previously it has neglected due mainly to over-focusing on domestic economic

development…and the development of Islam in the country and internationally is

ignored…’. Furthermore, according to Habibie, the time had come for Indonesia to play

a greater role in the Muslim world. Other ICMI leaders, especially Amien Rais who was

chairing the group’s council of expert, supported this view. Rais argued that Indonesia

was historically and culturally closer to the Islamic world than the Far East. Therefore,

relations with Muslim countries should be tightened. Habibie claimed that Suharto

agreed with his idea (Berita Buana 4 February 1991). Given the fact that Indonesia’s

foreign policy was centralized in the presidential institution, Suharto’s support made it

possible for Habibie to influence the state’s international agenda.

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The first outcome of this change in direction was the New Order government’s

enthusiasm for enhanced participation within the OIC, with a move from partial to full

membership. However, this continued to be hindered by the condition of Islamic state

identity for membership. The solution was to approach the Islamic conference and

petition for a change in the conditions, removing the explicit requirement of an Islam-

based state. For Indonesia, this demonstrated Foreign Minister Ali Alatas’ argument,

(ANTARA 3 March 1991) that it was important to keep its principled foreign policy,

continue to be consistent with the 1945 Constitution, and not to stray from the national

identity of Pancasila, whilst at the same time enabling it to improve the standing in the

Muslim world.

In 1991 Indonesia decided to seek full membership of the OIC. This decision was

followed by intensive diplomacy led by Ali Alatas, during which Indonesia succeeded

in stipulating a significant change to Article viii of the OIC Charter on the conditions

for membership. The phrase ‘Islamic state’ was altered to ‘every state with Muslim

population’. Under this circumstance, Indonesia was eligible to gain a full member

status of the Islamic group without the need to identify itself as an Islamic state (Perwita

2003, 52). Subsequently Suharto attended the sixth OIC summit held on 9 to 12

December 1991 in Dakar, Senegal. This was the first time the New Order leader was

present at the conference of heads of state/government (Kompas 10 December 1991),

that indicated the more salient position that the Islamic organization was taking in the

Suharto regime’s international policy.

Indonesia sought to voice its interests in issues related to Muslims, in particular those

that related to economic cooperation and development. At the Dakar meeting, Suharto

gave a speech underscoring the need to reduce dependence on Western economies.

Suharto criticized Western economic powers; ‘it is concerning that the Developed

countries have failed to accomplish their promises to take real actions to galvanize

economic growth and development in the Developing countries…’. Suharto pronounced

that the most important area of collaboration with the OIC should be within the

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economic field. Solidarity and friendship within the Muslim ummah (community)

should be centred on how to advance its economy. To this end, Indonesia proposed to

fortify the OIC’s joint projects in the sectors of agriculture, science, technology, family

planning, and banking (Sihbudi & Hadi 1991, 18-20). Indonesian cabinet members soon

followed up the president’s initiatives, especially Habibie, who then undertook

diplomatic visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in April 1992, with the purpose of

discussing collaboration in the establishment of the Islamic centre for culture and

science as a think-tank institution for policy research (Republika 23 April 1992).

The report on Indonesia’s activities in the OIC between 1992 and 1995 indicated that it

had contributed to the development of policies on the promotion of preferential trade

systems, long-term financing schemes, and export and credit cooperation supported by

the IDB (Bisnis Indonesia 11 December 1996). Indonesia joined the OIC but tried to

reframe its agenda and approach to Muslim issues, called for solidarity through trade.

For example, at the Islamic chamber of commerce, industry, and private sector group

meeting in Bandung on 23 October 1996, Indonesia suggested that due to the nature of

the OIC members’ economy, which varied from the rich to the poor as well as from the

resource-based to the industrialized ones, it made sense for them to start to trade with

each other more vigorously. Indonesia hoped that economic solidarity would inform

meetings between the Muslim countries more regularly (The Jakarta Post 24 October

1996).

The height of Indonesian participation in the OIC came in 1996 when Jakarta hosted the

24th OIC foreign ministers meeting. As such, Indonesia automatically led the Islamic

organization. Ali Alatas claimed that it was evidence of the Muslim world’s

appreciation of Indonesia’s positive role in the OIC (The Jakarta Post 4 January 1996).

Although Indonesia was moving closer towards the Muslim world and despite pledging

to sustain efforts to progress economic cooperation amongst members of the Islamic

grouping, there was no new commitment made by the Indonesian government at the

December conference (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1996).

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Since economic interests became the priority in Suharto’s Muslim world policy,

Indonesia’s links with Islamic states such as Pakistan also fell into line with this.

Indonesia and Pakistan relations enjoyed improvement in economic terms in the mid

1990s. Pakistan had also started to see Indonesia as being more important than it had

before. It was to some extent as part of the changing geostrategic atmosphere that

required Islamabad to reorient its foreign relations, for example by adopting the ‘look

east’ policy.

Pakistan: The ‘Look East’ Policy

The death of Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq on 17 August 1988 in an airplane crash

marked the end of an eleven-year period of military-led government. Party-based

democracy was restored. The elections held in November 1988 brought Benazir Bhutto

to power as the first democratically elected prime minister, but she had to deal with the

political reality inherited from the Zia regime. During the last three years of the Zia

government, under an order called the Eight Amendment of the 1973 Constitution, the

president enjoyed supreme power in politics. To be a prime minister one had to be

elected by the national assembly. However, the president had the authority to nominate

and sack the prime minister even for personal reason. General Zia had the power to

appoint senior civil bureaucrats, including provincial governors and judges, as well as

the chief of army staff. Most importantly, the President was authorized to dissolve the

national assembly if he deemed the institution as not working properly. The

establishment of democracy resulted in a slight change in the constellation of political

power, from the supremacy of presidential system, to a troika comprising of a triangular

relationship amongst the President, the Chief of Army Staff, and the Prime Minister. In

fact, only the first two actors possessed real power, the prime minister had to survive in

politics by carefully managing this fragile relationship (Yasmeen 1999, 177-8).

Political games within the troika affected the rise and fall of governments in Islamabad.

The president dismissed Benazir Bhutto’s governance in 1990, and Nawaz Sharif came

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to power in 1993. Three years later, Sharif was ousted and Benazir Bhutto became the

Prime Minister for the second term. This political instability implicated the ignorance of

the political elite about tackling the persistent and real problems plaguing the country,

rampant corruption, and a vulnerable economy. Another important legacy of the Zia

government was the increasingly significant role played by Islamist groups in Pakistan’s

domestic public sphere, and foreign relations. With the approval of the Zia regime

during the Afghan war, groups such as Jama’at-i-Islami founded transnational links to

Afghan Mujahideen groups, and various Arab nongovernmental groups based in

Peshawar. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, they changed the focus of the

movement toward establishment of Islamic states in their countries of origin, including

Pakistan. The inability of the government in Islamabad to curb the Islamist’s radicalism

had, in many ways, led to international pressure on Pakistan (ICG 2009). In turn such

domestic political features were reflected in the formulation of Pakistan’s foreign

policy.

The changing geostrategic environment provided the context in which Pakistan had to

reshape its international relations. As soon as the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from

Afghanistan in 1989, it was clear that the country had begun to lose its centrality in the

US global strategy, and Pakistan’s significant frontline role diminished accordingly.

The nuclear issue started to dominate Washington-Islamabad links. The US asked

Pakistan to discontinue all weapon research programs. When Pakistan refused, the

Pressler Amendment, legislation passed by the Congress in 1985, was reactivated. It

required the American President to render the senate with an annual certificate

guaranteeing that Pakistan did not have a nuclear program for warfare purposes. Failure

to meet the obligation would affect economic and military assistances to Pakistan.

Given that Soviet forces occupied Afghanistan, President Ronald Reagan had issued the

certificate without trouble, and his successor President George Bush did the same until

1989 (Sattar 2007, 225). However on 1 October 1990, after the withdrawal, President

Bush stated that he was unable to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon

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program, and the US government suspended the US$ 564 million in military and

economic assistance for Pakistan (Bray 1992, 65).

The suspension of the American aid severely impacted the Pakistani military. Apart

from losing military assistance which comprised half of the total aid to Pakistan, an

order of F-16 aircraft bound for Pakistan’s armed forces was also cancelled. Pakistani

army also had relied on the US for vital spare parts which were now unavailable as part

of the cessation of aid. The Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Aslam Beg,

though disappointed at the US policy, claimed that without the American military

support, Pakistan had the opportunity to expand a strategy reinforcing closer links with

its Islamic neighbours. This was related to the long-term objective of the army

leadership to develop a strategic alliance amongst Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and

Turkey - without Washington’s backing - in order to counterbalance pressure from

India. This plan would never come about (Bray 1992, 65).

Despite the loss of the US aid package Pakistan could still rely on help from other

international donors who did not follow the American example. Japan was willing to

continue to provide US$ 500 million annually in economic assistance to Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the government in Islamabad failed to handle the economy well, suffering

a big trauma due to mismanagement in budgetary policy, pervasive corruption, and a

debt trap (Sattar 2007, 226). Pakistan’s economic predicament was complicated by

numerous problems resulting from the Gulf War from 1990 to 1991. The American

government stopped giving economic aid to Pakistan only two months before Saddam

Hussein attacked Kuwait in August 1990. The crisis that followed impacted on

Pakistan. The remittances from Pakistani migrant workers based in the Gulf region

sharply declined (from US$ 1.8 billion in 1989 and 1990 to US$ 700 million in 1990

and 1991) while the oil import bill increased in the tense international environment.

This situation aggravated economic problems for the government that had been

increasingly dependent on remittances. Additionally, there were about 100,000

Pakistani migrant workers who had fled to Jordan from Kuwait and Iraq. The

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government in Islamabad had to help settle and feed them. At the time, Pakistan had a

domestic reserve less than US$ 100 million, which was just enough for two-weeks

supplies. To manage the situation, Islamabad called for help from the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC), asking them to provide US$ 2.9 billion of emergency aid

(Yasmeen 1994, 116).

However, there was still the hope amongst Pakistan’s military leaders that their country

would remain significant for Saudi Arabia, and more importantly the US. This meant

that Pakistan would retain its important role in the Gulf region. In August 1990,

Pakistan promised to send 5,000 troops to Saudi Arabia. They were to serve under

Saudi command, and as such did not formally belong to the American-led multinational

forces. In November, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif increased the number of Pakistan’s

military deployment to 11,000. This was partly aimed at persuading the Americans and

the Saudis to support Pakistan in dealing with the economic toll of the Gulf crisis. This

strategy backfired. Islamabad’s decision to send troops to Saudi was fiercely protested

by the Islamists. The government of Nawaz Sharif was conspicuously unprepared to

manage the domestic reactions in favour of Iraq after war broke out in January 1991.

Schools, universities, and shops closed. Thousands of pro-Iraq demonstrators crowded

on to the streets of every major city in Pakistan. This led to an apparent split between

the prime minister and the military chief. On 28 January, shortly before Nawaz Sharif

held a press conference announcing the results of a peace mission to the Gulf, General

Aslam Beg made a public statement revealing his theory that Iraq had been deliberately

incited to invade Kuwait in order to give the US an excuse to intervene in the region. To

the general’s mind, Saddam Hussein was a distinct defender of the Islamic faith against

American-led aggression. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan immediately tried to downplay

the difference between Sharif and Beg by suggesting that the two differed in style rather

than substance (Bray 1992, 65-6).

In fact, Islamabad was not able to make the presumption to approach both the Saudis

and the Americans. Pakistani troops had not been deployed at the frontline of the war

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suggesting that they held only minimal importance to the Americans and the Saudis.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claimed that his policy to align Pakistan with Saudi

Arabia had been vindicated by the outcome of the war. The post-war politics in the Gulf

shattered this claim for good. Pakistan did not play an important role in the post-war

Gulf security arrangements. Saudi Arabia continued to become an important economic

partner for Pakistan, yet Washington-Islamabad relations could not be improved, as the

American government had not been convinced by Pakistan’s half-hearted involvement

in the Gulf war (Bray 1992, 66). Islamabad’s efforts to reinvigorate ties with

Washington again did not go smoothly. Pakistan’s continuing refusal to permit to

international inspections of its nuclear facilities became a primary concern for the US.

Their relations dropped to their lowest level on 25 August 1993, when Washington

imposed economic sanctions against Pakistan and China as a result of their sustained

cooperation in developing their nuclear programs (Mashad 1996, 244-5).

The end of the Cold War was followed by strategic shifts in South, Southwest and

Central Asia. Washington indicated a willingness to entertain an Indian request for

transfer of superior technology, which included nuclear installations. On 6 to 9

November 1993 the Assistant to Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Robin

Raphael, visited New Delhi to discuss ways of improving Indian-American relations.

This suggested that Washington had started to employ equidistant policies toward India

and Pakistan. India also improved its links with China. The demise of the Soviet Union

had given rise to the independence of six of Pakistan’s neighbouring countries. The

natural resource wealth of these countries could provide alternative economic

opportunities for Pakistan on the one hand, but their internal instability could pose new

problems on the other (Strategic Assessment 1997, 10-12). Pakistan was therefore

forced to play it safe in these changing regional contexts.

Endeavours to attain economic revenue from trade with these newly independent

Central Asian countries had created another problem for Pakistan. During the civil war

in Afghanistan, Pakistan helped the Taliban ascend to power in Kabul by 1994.

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However Taliban’s antiquated practice of Islam prompted dismay from the international

community, including the Muslim countries. Islamabad continued the support to retain

its strategic influence in Afghanistan (Riedel 2008, 31), whilst at the same gaining vital

access to trade with Central Asia (Sattar 2007, 227). The policy attracted a lot of

international criticism and directly undermined Islamabad’s image in the eyes of the

international community.

In response to these developments, and in an attempt to discover a relief mechanism, the

government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, during its second term in office (1993-

1996), initiated a reorientation of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Dependence on the Western

industrialized countries, especially the US, was to be reduced by promoting efforts to

look for alternative sources. One outcome was to expand links with the emerging

economies of Southeast and East Asian regions. It was called the ‘look east’ policy

(Mashad 1996, 246).

Benazir Bhutto outlined the new approach to East Asia saying ‘Pakistan has decided to

pursue a look east policy to reduce the long continuing reliance on Western economic

assistances and investments…after the end of the Cold War, the flow of Western aid has

come to an end…it is, therefore, time to look towards the economically developed

Asian countries…’ (Pakistan Horizon 1996, 6). Pakistan was aware of economic

potential possessed by the booming Asian economies, such as Indonesia, Singapore,

Thailand, Malaysia, and South Korea. It was predicted that Pakistan would be able to

secure more economic, and probably political benefits, by forging closer ties with these

countries.

Pakistan was to commence closer relations with ASEAN members. This move had

come quite late from Islamabad in comparison to India, which had started to move

towards Southeast Asia since the early 1990s, and had succeeded in promoting an

Indian-ASEAN partnership in 1995 and an Indian-ASEAN summit dialogue status one

year later (ASEAN Secretariat 1996). Previously under President Zia Ul-Haq’s

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administration, ties with Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and to an extent

Thailand, where a Muslim minority lived in the Southern part of the country, were made

possible in sustaining Islamic social and cultural activities.

On 23 July 1993 Pakistan and ASEAN committed to establish a sectoral dialogue

cooperation to commence more intense economic collaboration. Practically, this scheme

had only begun to work in 1995. Although total trade volume between the two sides had

increased since the early 1990s to a worth of US$ 707 million in 1989/1990 to US$ 1.1

billion in 1993/1994, it was less than 1 percent of ASEAN’s total trade and less than 7

percent of Pakistan’s international trade volume. The investment value was about equal.

Commenting on ASEAN-Pakistan economic ties, the Secretary General of ASEAN

Dato’ Ajit Singh, who was visiting Karachi in March 1995, said that ‘…they were

lagging behind social and cultural aspects of the relationships…’ (Straits Times 25

March 1995). The reorientation for economic benefit highlights the primary importance

of Southeast Asia to Pakistan at this stage.

Given the fact that Indonesia was at the time the primus inter pares of ASEAN, it was

reasonable that Islamabad devoted special attention to enhancing relations with Jakarta.

On 6 February 1996 Benazir Bhutto’s Special Assistant for Economic Affairs, Shahid

Khan Hussein, arrived in Jakarta to discuss preparations for the Pakistani Prime

Minister’s visit to Indonesia, scheduled for the 7th to 9th of March that year (The Jakarta

Post 7 February 1996). This period marked the commencement of reinvigorated

Pakistan-Indonesia ties, especially in bilateral economic cooperation.

The Revitalization of Indonesian Relations with Pakistan

Before 1996 ties between Indonesia and Pakistan had remained normal, although they

were not close. Since the visit of President Zia Ul-Haq to Indonesia in November 1982

there were no high rank official exchange visits between the two governments.

Indonesian Vice President Sudharmono had visited Pakistan on 28 August 1988 to

attend the funeral of President Zia, and understandably did not discuss bilateral

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relations. Suharto did not visit Pakistan until he stepped down from power in May 1998.

The Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was present at the tenth Non-Aligned

Movement (NAM) summit held at Jakarta in September 1992, but it was only for

multilateral business within the organization; there was no account of bilateral talks

between Islamabad and Jakarta.

Nonetheless, the two governments could still show goodwill towards each other in

international diplomacy. Pakistan continued to endorse Indonesia’s assertive

international diplomatic moves either within the NAM or the OIC. Pakistan supported

Indonesia when it expected to lead the two organizations. Although the support of one

country did not make Indonesian diplomacy effective, in terms of the two countries’

relations, Pakistan indicated that it was not averse to Indonesian leadership role in the

two large groupings. In return, Indonesia stood by Pakistan’s proposal to take part in

international fora in which Indonesia had become an important actor, such as Asia-

Europe Meeting (ASEM), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Asia Pacific Economic

Cooperation (APEC) organization.

Even though Indonesia was moving closer towards the Muslim world, Pakistan still

tended not to occupy an important position in Jakarta’s international outlook. It was for

the most part because Indonesia, concerned with economic relations, had found ties

with the Middle East to be more beneficial than those with Pakistan. Indonesia enjoyed

a boost in exports to the Middle East from US$ 1.18 billion in 1991 to US$ 7.67 billion

in 1995. Of these achievement figures, exports to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates,

and Egypt were the three largest. Exports to Pakistan and other non-Middle East

Muslim countries in the corresponding years only amounted to an increase from US$

23.3 million to US$ 90.4 million (Basyar 1999, 92). These figures indicated an

extensive gap between Indonesian trade to the Middle East and trade with Pakistan, thus

causing economic interests to become more focused on that region.

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Indonesia’s greater interests in the relationships with the Middle East, rather than

Pakistan, could also be seen in the intense diplomatic efforts being made by the New

Order government since the early 1990s. Visits to the Middle Eastern states by high-

ranking Indonesian officials had become more common. For example, in June 1990

Indonesia’s Minister of Trade, Hartarto, travelled to Tehran to meet with Iranian

President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. In return, in September of the same year, Iranian Vice

President visited Jakarta; the Iranian President followed this one year later. In October

1991 Indonesia established diplomatic ties with the oil-rich Libya, ignoring Western

concerns about such a decision. Between 1993 and 1997, Suharto made four visits to the

Middle East including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates,

all aimed at finding solutions to matters hindering trade between the two sides (Sihbudi

1997, 50-2).

The situation changed more favourably following a meeting of Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto and President Suharto in Jakarta. From the Indonesian side, Pakistan began to

gain a more meaningful place in Jakarta’s international economic relations. This visit by

the Pakistani prime minister was made as part of her East Asian tour; five ministers of

her cabinet, and 80 business leaders accompanied her, highlighting the importance of

such a diplomatic trip for Pakistan. An official of Pakistani embassy in Jakarta told the

press that the three-day visit of Benazir Bhutto was taking place at a time when bilateral

relations between the two Muslim countries were being weighed by the new wave of

economic globalization. Pakistan’s relations with Indonesia were developed within the

context of its approach towards ASEAN, in which Indonesia was the core member. At

the time Pakistan was already a sectoral dialogue partner of the regional grouping, but

was seeking to gain full dialogue partner status (The Jakarta Post 7 March 1996). This,

accordingly, increased the significance of Indonesia to Pakistan.

Economic relations were high on the agenda of discussions between the Indonesian and

Pakistani leaders. Initially, Benazir Bhutto emphasized historical and Islamic ties

between the two countries. She reiterated that relations between Pakistan and Indonesia

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were steeped in history. The Pakistani government was proud that Pakistan’s soldiers

had fought hand-in-hand with their Indonesian Muslim brethren in the war for

Indonesian independence. In relation to such historical roots, Banazir Bhutto explicitly

pointed out ‘Islamic solidarity proves to have built the deep-rooted relationships

between Indonesians and Pakistanis…’. At this meeting the Pakistani Prime Minister

also expressed a determination ‘to promote economic cooperation with Indonesia and

other countries in Southeast Asia’. Benazir Bhutto personally expressed gratitude to

President Suharto for the Indonesian endorsement for Pakistan’s admittance as an

ASEAN sectoral dialogue partner (Kompas 8 March 1996).

In response, Suharto said ‘Indonesia and Pakistan shared many similarities in their

efforts to create world peace and a new world order which is more equitable and

humane…’ (Kompas 8 March 1996). Unlike Benazir Bhutto’s way of describing

Indonesia and Pakistan relations, there was no mention from Suharto about Islam as the

bond between the two sides. Suharto, while improving relations with the Muslim world

in general and Pakistan in particular, preferred to focus on talking about issues related to

the developing countries, and not to focus on Indonesian Islamic identity. As reported

by ANTARA (8 March 1996), the Indonesian leader stressed ‘the most pressing

challenge faced by the Developing countries like Indonesia in world politics today is the

presence of asymmetric relations between the Developed and the Third World

states…to meet this challenge, the Third World countries need to foster economic

relations accorded on mutual cooperation not exploitation through dependency…’. This

indicated that Islam was not the major consideration of Indonesia’s foreign policy with

Pakistan.

On Indonesia-Pakistan relations, President Suharto suggested that several out-dated

agreements should be revised with a view to adjust them to the present situations,

pointing to the potential that had not yet been fully explored, especially in the fields of

economics, the trade sector, technology, and agricultural cooperation (Pakistan Horizon

1996, 10). Indonesia appeared more interested in promoting economic interests than

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talking about Islamic ties with Pakistan. As a result, the two governments agreed to

revive the Indonesia Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC), an annual

bilateral consultation that had lapsed since the end of 1980s. Under the IPECC, 12

memoranda of understanding were signed, covering a variety of sectors of trade,

investments, and industry worth US$ 1.6 billion, of which US$ 400 million would be

allocated for the construction of private and public sectors (Text of Agreement between

Indonesia and Pakistan 1996). Also under these contracts, 12 large projects were

identified, including the establishment of a palm oil refinery in port Qasim, sale of sugar

plants, cement, and spare parts of submarines by Pakistan on a barter trade basis. In

exchange, Pakistan was to get 15 N-250 passenger planes from Indonesia, with a

percentage of the spare parts being co-produced in Pakistan (BBC News 11 March

1996).

This aeroplane project was significant for the advancement of Indonesia’s aviation

industry, being led by the Minister of Research and Technology, Habibie. This newly

developing industry, known as Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (the Nusantara

Airplane Industry, IPTN), needed a market, and Muslim countries such as Iran, Libya,

and Pakistan were considered as potential buyers of the IPTN product. The ICMI

leaders, such as Amien Rais, were actively involved in the promotion of the IPTN

product in the Middle East and Pakistan. An approach for the sale of the plane to

Pakistan had been made since 1995. This meant that those active in fostering Islamic

identity in Indonesia also paid attention to developing relations in the economic domain

with Pakistan.

Having been encouraged by such business deals, economic interactions between the two

sides increased in the later years. Indonesia’s total trade with Pakistan in 1998 indicated

an increase of 10 percent amounting to US$ 338.86 million, of which Indonesia enjoyed

a surplus of US$ 88.4 million. Palm oil was the largest export product from Indonesia to

Pakistan at that time, valued at 14 percent of total export US$ 213.4 million. Pakistani

exports to Indonesia climbed from US$ 99.87 million in 1997 to US$ 125.41 million in

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1998 (Indonesian Bureau of Statistics 1999). Concurrently, Pakistan’s total trade

volume with ASEAN as a whole was up by 20 percent - between US$ 1.3 billion in

1997 and US$ 1.6 billion in 1998 (PPI News 22 February 2000). This, by all accounts,

indicated the success of the economic diplomacy of Benazir Bhutto in ASEAN.

At the ASEAN meetings, the Pakistani leader requested support from Indonesia in their

bit to join ASEM, APEC, and ARF. This was also successful. The Indonesian Foreign

Minister announced to the press conference that Pakistan would soon be admitted as a

full dialogue partner after the ASEAN ministerial meeting held at Jakarta in July 1996.

Later in Jakarta, President Suharto and Minister of State Secretary Moerdiono

reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to endorse Pakistan’s involvement within ASEM

and APEC forum (Kompas 21 July 1996). This shows that more cordial diplomatic ties

were achieved by Jakarta and Islamabad, in addition to the enhancement in trade

interactions.

It can be seen that Indonesia, as part of its closer moves toward the Muslim world, was

more comfortable to put relations with Pakistan in the context of promoting

international economic cooperation. For example, when attending the OIC extraordinary

meeting in March 1997 in Islamabad, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas asserted to his

Pakistani counterpart Gohar Ayub: ‘the two countries focus of relationship within the

OIC and bilaterally has to be directed at how to deal with economic globalization and

liberalization facing Muslims around the world in entering the new millennium…’

(Kompas 23 March 1997). Indonesia had started bringing Islam into the relationship

with Pakistan, in terms of the forum used to express this idea and the reference made to

Muslim problems. Even so, Islam was not the primary determinant.

Though substantive Islamic identity was not totally in Indonesian foreign policy with

Pakistan, its role did manifest into the pursuance of multilateral cooperation with

Muslim countries. For example, Islam, and Muslim issues provided the space where

Pakistan and Indonesia could be engaged in the creation of a new grouping with an

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Islamic nuance beyond the OIC, called Developing Eight (D-8). This new organization

was founded for the purpose of encouraging a more prominent role for the Islamic

world in the international political economic arena. In the space of D-8, Indonesia could

cooperate with Pakistan and other Muslim states in order to expand trade, economic,

and financial ties. Again, the Islamic identity appeared to be a feature of Suharto’s

international policy, yet the focus remained on economic interests.

Established in Istanbul, Turkey, the D-8 is a group of eight developing countries with

Muslim majority, namely Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria,

Pakistan, and Turkey. The idea of the D-8 organization was introduced by Necmettin

Erbakan, the Prime Minister of Turkey, in a seminar entitled ‘Cooperation in

Development’ held in Istanbul on 22 October 1996. At this gathering, Prime Minister

Erbakan had suggested creating an institution that would be able to improve the

Developing countries’ position in the world economy, to diversify and create new

opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision making at the

international level, and provide a better standard of living for Muslims (Asia Pulse 23

October 1996).

After some preparatory consultations, D-8 was officially promulgated through the

Istanbul Declaration signed by eight heads of state/government on 15 June 1997.

According to the signatories, D-8 cooperation is ‘a global arrangement rather than a

regional one, which is reflected by its membership…the institution is founded on the

ground of economic cooperation, and is a forum with no adverse impact on bilateral and

multilateral commitments of its member countries, emanating from their membership

within other international or regional organizations…’ (Istanbul Declaration 1997). D-8,

therefore, embodies flexibility and inclusiveness in the nature of the institution as well

as membership.

The formation of this new group raised controversy amongst Muslim states. This was

because D-8 was advocated by stressing the assumption that the OIC had not been

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efficient and effective in assisting those countries to respond properly to global

challenges and injustice commonly faced by Muslims (Muhibat 2006, 132). It is for this

reason that several high-ranking members of the OIC such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

did not welcome the existence of D-8, contending that the existing mechanisms

rendered by the OIC met the needs of the Muslim world (Perwita 2007, 56). Indonesia

however argued that the OIC was too large an organization to effectively lift the

economic status of its members. Economic disparity amongst the OIC countries was

also quite significant. Habibie was a strong proponent of this view. He argued that D-8

would be able to accomplish its members’ economic goals. Therefore, the Indonesian

government was eager to form the D-8 as a model to others (Republika 18 June 1997).

This position implied that Muslim issues were really at the heart of setting up the D-8,

illuminating the role of Islam, despite limited expressions, in Indonesia’s foreign

relations at the time.

Subsequently, Indonesia and the other seven Muslim countries emerged with a

commitment to form a smaller network of intergovernmental cooperation. This was the

application of ICMI’s notion on how Indonesia should deal with the economic

challenges of the new millennium. Objectives of the D-8 grouping were defined as

promoting regional economic cooperation amidst developing Muslim states from three

continents, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and upholding solidarity for international peace

and economic relations (Kompas 17 June 1997). The group is still global in nature,

covering five streams of the world major Islamic cultures; Malay, Balkan, Persian Gulf,

Arab, and African. This character of D-8 membership is a clear indication of the focus

on Islam, yet the design of policy is couched in terms of economic cooperation.

The D-8 member’s avoidance of declaring Islam as their primary reference was

perceptible in two points of contention that emerged between the founding states.

Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan wished to identify Islamic principles for D-

8 economic cooperation, as well as wanting the original name for D-8 to be I-8 or M-8.

Nevertheless, the initial I or M was not endorsed by other members, except for Iran,

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while the Islamic principles were rejected as well, and a more neutral identity was

chosen. This followed the concern by some members that I and M could be interpreted

by Westerns states as referring to Islamist and Muslim and could be counterproductive

to the grouping (Haque 1997, 7).

The Istanbul Declaration, hence, pinpointed the main goals and principal areas, as well

as principles on which D-8 cooperation was to be based as; first, the main objective of

D-8 was to be socio-economic development in accordance with certain principles:

‘peace instead of conflict; cooperation instead of exploitation; justice instead of double

standards; dialogue instead of confrontation; equality instead of discrimination; and

democracy instead of oppression…’, second, was the desire to enhance the volume of

trade amongst members and increase exports to the outside countries, and third,

recognize the necessity to overcome trade barriers facing D-8 member countries

(Istanbul Declaration 1997).

Amongst member countries, Indonesia and Pakistan preferred less focus on the Islamic

identity of the new grouping. They shared the same view that open regionalism

highlighting social and economic issues was to be the basis for the new organization.

The reference to economic issues reflected both countries’ motives to get involved

within D-8, and to attempt to discover a method of managing their domestic economic

difficulties.

The New Order government carefully emphasized that the D-8 was not exclusionary in

outlook, and was focused on economic issues. Jakarta assured that D-8 was not

designed to constitute the centre of a future Islamic common market, or a wider alliance

of Muslim nations. Rather, as articulated by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas’s (2001, 437) it

was ‘…open to newcomers and [was] not intended to serve as an alternative to other

multilateral organizations…and in addition, in some ways, D-8 resembles the group of

non-aligned nations with its emphasis on equitable sharing of world resources, fair

trade, economic collaboration, and rejection of domination by Western economic giants,

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as well as the stress on justice, peace, and democracy, instead of conflict, oppression,

and exploitation…’. This concept of the D-8 organization suggests that Indonesia was

not completely reluctant to place Muslim issues as a point of reference. However it was

keen to establish an organization for economic development rather than an Islamic bloc.

In Jakarta, an enterprise like D-8 was considered to be a way for Indonesia to expand its

economic power. In regard to Indonesia and Pakistan relations, the presence of D-8

could become an available arena in which relief strategies could be formed to help each

other cope with domestic problems, especially in economic terms. Hence, the nature of

interest behind Indonesian policy towards Pakistan in the D-8 schema was still the

pursuance of economic profit.

When D-8 came into existence, Indonesia was in the midst of a financial crisis.

Indonesian economic performance was not as good as its achievements during the first

half of the 1990s. The Indonesian economy was being affected by the crisis spreading

throughout Southeast Asia. An economist Mohammad Sadli (1998, 272-5) explains

what happened to the region’s economy; this regional characteristic had been

discernible since its beginning. In mid 1997, speculators attacked Thai baht, this in turn

caused Thailand’s central bank to react by inflating the value of the state’s currency.

Unfortunately, this effort was unable to defend the currency. Subsequently, the

exchange rate of the Thai baht weakened to 41 percent. This was then followed by the

depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah by 55 percent, the Malaysian ringgit by 31

percent, the Philippines’ peso by 34 percent, and Singaporean dollar by 11 percent.

The resulting impact on Southeast Asian countries was the dramatic decline in

confidence from short and medium term capital owners, and as such they withdrew

from ASEAN markets. However, it is still debatable as to why the impact of the

currency crisis spread from Bangkok to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and even

Singapore. One explanation relates to the high convertibility of their currency, and open

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capital market, and the absence of good policies by the government watchdog relating to

currency exchange rates.

Indonesia’s, and the rest of the region’s, predicament was exacerbated by the practice

of, mostly Japanese, bankers of transferring huge amount of money overseas to benefit

from low exchange rates of return domestically. They were lured to ASEAN, which had

gained the reputation of very profitable large markets. They were over-confident. They

overlooked the banking prudence in an atmosphere of euphoria. Local companies,

mainly based in Indonesia, had used a great deal of loans for careless expansion of non-

tradable sectors, such as shopping malls, real estate, housing projects, office buildings,

hotels, and even golf courses. In the case of Indonesia, foreign debt had reached an

amount of US$ 80 billion, of which US$ 60 billion was private debt and US$ 20 billion

was the government. Once the Indonesian rupiah was depressed, the amount of debt

climbed significantly, causing the debtors to be unable to pay them back. The current

account deficit indicated that there was an alarming figure of 8 percent of gross

domestic products (GDP). Indonesia was eventually plagued by a financial and debt

crisis, causing international confidence in its economy to diminish.

Almost at the same time, the Pakistani government, under the second term of Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif (after taking over power from Benazir Bhutto at the end of

1996), emphasized heightening cooperation in regional economic groupings. The

government in Islamabad had been trying to drive Pakistan to attach itself more tightly

to the regional trade blocs, and economic forum, which had agendas that were less

political rhetoric and more economic substance (Asia Times 17 June 1997). Such an

economic-oriented policy, in a sense, could be related to Nawaz Sharif’s personal

background as a businessman. More importantly Pakistan’s domestic economic

problems were influential on Nawaz Sharif’s foreign policy.

Pakistan was beset by dire economic conditions during 1996/1997 and was heavily in

debt, with national reserves of only US$ 430 million, and a debt of US$ 36 billion. The

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majority of its work force was uneducated, and unfortunately Pakistan had a reputation

of being the second most corrupt country in the world. In February 1997 in Lahore,

Nawaz Sharif acknowledged that under those unpleasant circumstances, governing

Pakistan was an unenviable task. Moreover, ‘the company’ (Sharif’s analogy for

Pakistan) was controlled by an interfering board of directors in the shape of the

president and army chief of staff, who could have the prime minister sacked at the drop

of a hat. ‘We’ve got absolutely no room for manoeuvre…’ the prime minister said, and

that’s why it was his responsibility to look for some workable policy options, including

new space for foreign relations (Lamb 1997, 2). The Pakistani army refused to reduce

their budget despite the IMF and World Bank demanding stringent economic and

financial measures to restrict public spending (Murphy 1997, 8).

Through D-8 cooperation, therefore, Indonesia and Pakistan could help each other

fortify their strategies for finding alternative international economic relations. This

policy was fruitful. At the end of the first two years of D-8 cooperation, following the

holding of the second D-8 conference in 1999 at Dhaka Bangladesh, it was reported by

the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (2000) that there was a surge in Indonesia’s bilateral

export volume to Pakistan between 1998 and 1999, from US$ 149.2 million to US$

166.6 million, and that imports had climbed from US$ 150 million to US$ 153 million.

This trend was in contrast to Indonesian exports with other parties in the corresponding

years which signposted a decrease of US$ 200 million from US$ 48.9 billion to US$

48.7 billion.

Critics of the D-8, however, argue that the summits of D-8 heads of state/government,

which had been convened from Istanbul 1997, Dhaka 1999, Cairo 2001, to Tehran

2004, only registered the failure of previous efforts to achieve the goals of

organizations, without being matched by radical strategies deliberated to lay down the

foundation of a new economic, and then political bloc. The global economic, trade, and

financial system had been subject to criticism in D-8 gatherings, claiming that the

prevailing system continually failed to hear the needs of the developing countries.

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Nonetheless the D-8 itself did not produce solutions to repair this situation (Aral 2005,

100).

Western observers, particularly those with cynical opinions about D-8, concluded that

the new economic grouping was virtually no different to the OIC, and that its initial D

might refer to ‘disaster’ rather than ‘developing’. This was a result of supposition that

D-8 countries will not be capable of resolving their own economic issues. In terms of

the level of national income, D-8 countries’ economies varied sharply. Bangladesh,

Nigeria, and Pakistan were low-income countries with US$ 400, US$ 320, US$ 470

gross-national-income per capita respectively. Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia

belong to the lower middle-income group with US$ 2790, US$ 1390, US$ 2000, and

US$ 810 gross-national-income per capita respectively. Malaysia is an exception with

US$ 3780 gross-national-income per capita (Ahmad & Ahmed 2005, 200). These

income figures, would suggest that D-8 members might hope for cooperation amongst

them, which could be effective in reducing their economic gap. However, their low

economic achievement is still indicative of domestic weakness rather than strength.

In the Indonesian Muslim community, this cynicism was opposed, yet on the other hand

D-8 was believed to be able to heighten the future of Muslim unity in a much more

concrete manner. This was expressed, for example, in an editorial of the pro-Islamist

newspaper Republika (20 June 1997) that showed an endorsement of the D-8.

According to the daily, D-8 governments had to focus on moving forward persistently

in order to further the goal of global Muslim unity in face of the West’s economic

infiltration and exploitation.

The elite of the New Order also tended to socialize the idea of D-8 cooperation with

optimism. In a press conference, following President Suharto’s visit to attend the

Istanbul summit, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas reiterated the value tightening the ties of

the newly founded grouping of Muslim countries ‘cooperation in economic field is

expected to be able to materialize that goal…this is closely related to the fact that the

primary problem faced by Muslim countries so far has been economic…’ (Berita Buana

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22 June 1997). Islam, nonetheless, in contrast to the Muslim community view, was not

mentioned as the primary focus for D-8 cooperation. Rather, it was expressed modestly

in terms of Muslim economic issues to be addressed as the organization’s main area of

collaboration.

ICMI leaders, especially Habibie and Adi Sasono, favoured D-8 cooperation projects.

According to them, D-8 would be working to achieve substantial prospects due to their

limited and selective membership, in which the overall population of the eight

participating countries was approximately 800 million, while their cumulative national

product did not go beyond 2.4 percent or US$ 600 million of the world’s total product,

which is about US$ 25,000 billion. They insist that it is quite promising for D-8

countries to advance internal trade volume to obtain higher productivity. The D-8

market also potentially supports their intra-group trade. Politically, economic

independence is crucial for D-8 countries vis-à-vis stronger political economic blocs,

particularly G-8 (Republika 8 July 1997). Their argument strongly reflects the ICMI’s

view about the need for Indonesia’s economic independence, instead of the continuing

reliance on affluent countries. All D-8 members commonly share confidence about the

feasibility of D-8 cooperation.

On the one hand Indonesia’s more active participation in promoting and addressing

issues associated with the Muslim world in the OIC, as well as D-8, can be understood

as its gesture of greater interest in presenting Islamic identity as a feature of foreign

policy. But on the other hand, the content of this course of action proves to be the same

as its previous interests in non-Islamic agendas. The Indonesian government avoided

overwhelmingly using the country’s Muslim identity, and focused on addressing issues

linked to the economic field. Indonesian relations with Pakistan followed in this

propensity. Indonesia committed to revitalize its economic cooperation with Pakistan,

but Islamic identity was not articulated to be the primary bond that tied the two

countries together. Within the D-8, Indonesia’s focus on economic relations with

Pakistan has been more observable than the dedication to Islamism. Indonesia has not

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been disinclined to talk of Muslim issues, but it has been unwilling to markedly refer to

the country’s Islamic identity.

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Chapter Six

Muslim Solidarity In Indonesian Attitude

Towards The Kashmir Conflict

By the end of the 1980s, a massive Kashmiri uprising occurred in the Indian-held

Kashmir. Pakistan, which continues to endorse a plebiscite to determine the will of the

Kashmiri peoples, started seeking international support, including support from

Indonesia, for its Kashmir policy. India however, has always been opposed to Pakistan’s

attempts to further its position on Kashmir in the international community. This chapter

explores Indonesian approaches toward the conflict in Kashmir. This includes three

important phases, the Kashmiri insurgency (1989-1999), Kargil crisis, and post 11

September 2001 developments, whilst outlining responses of the Indonesian

government and the Muslim community to each of these events. The argument is that

the government in Jakarta applied an impartial and passive policy towards Kashmir,

aimed at maintaining balanced relationships with Islamabad and New Delhi.

Geopolitical and economic interests, devoid of Islamic values, shaped this position. In

contrast, Islamic solidarity continued to be articulated by Indonesian Muslims in favour

of Kashmiri peoples, who are still struggling for self-determination, this in a way

suggested a pro-Pakistan position.

The Rise of Kashmiri Insurgency

An appreciation of the external and internal context of the Kashmiri insurrection helps

in understanding why it occurred. Significant changes in Afghanistan, following the

Soviet departure, resulted in a sense of Islamic victory over the communist superpower,

which soon spread throughout the region. Muslim fighters were willing to bring the

spirit of jihad to other regions, including Kashmir. Further, the collapse of the Soviet

Union led to the emergence of a number of new independent entities, particularly five

Muslim countries of Central Asia. This increased the aspiration and hope of the ethno-

nationalism elements in Kashmir (Varshney 1991, 997). The whole process was

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facilitated by the advancement of information technology, a communication revolution,

and the spread of light arms (Giddens 1998, 31).

In the domestic context, the environment in Kashmir had been tranquil for some time,

due to the decrease in tensions between India and Pakistan after the 1972 Simla

Agreement. Nonetheless, disturbances occurred as indigenous revolts exploded in the

Kashmir valley in 1989 and early 1990. The Indian government’s unpopular policy

stirred the Kashmiri Muslims to rebel. This had started in 1982 when the central

government under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi directly intervened in Kashmiri

politics. In response, state leader Farooq Abdullah launched anti-Gandhi campaign.

Consequently, Farooq was sacked, and replaced by a pro-New Delhi leader. Farooq’s

supporters protested violently, leading to the imposition of Governor’s Rule in 1986

aimed to restore law and order (Roy & Wallace 2003, 409). A new party, the Muslim

United Front (MUF), attracted the sympathy of Kashmiri peoples, including the

Kashmiri nationalists and pro-Pakistan Islamists. They ran the 1987 assembly elections

in the valley with the rhetoric of a conflict between Islam and secularism. The MUF

were aiming for a majority endorsement, but were only successful in attracting 32

percent of the recorded votes, largely due to massive manipulation of the elections.

Dissatisfied with the results, young MUF sympathizers joined a growing number of

militant groups who had begun crossing into Pakistan for arms and training. By this

time the Afghan jihad was occurring and Kashmiri Islamists had begun talking about

repeating the experience in Indian-held Kashmir (Tremblay 2009, 934-5).

In 1989 the demand for a azadi (freedom) Kashmir was driven by two sets of forces.

The first was the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which sought an

independent Kashmir with the restoration of the pre-1947 boundaries. The second were

the Islamist movements such as Hizbul Mujahideen (Party of Holy Warriors), Jama’at-i-

Islami, and Awami Action Party, who were all struggling for the unification of the state

with Pakistan. Daily mass demonstrations were accompanied by violence against

supporters of the pro-Indian government, members of the ruling regime, as well as

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alleged government’s informants (mostly the Kashmiri Hindus), and brought about

complete social disarray and paralysis of the state governance (Tremblay 2009, 933).

India immediately blamed the unrest in Kashmir on Pakistan, yet Pakistan’s role in

fomenting the unrest was not evident. Kashmir was again drawn into a protracted ethnic

and religiously motivated conflict (Schofield 2000, 133-88). India’s continued

accusations that Pakistan was involved in the 1989 Kashmiri intifada eroded relations

between the two countries.

The uprising surprised the elite in Islamabad. They concluded that India’s inability to

manage the rebellion might provide an opportunity to reclaim the disputed territory. In

parallel to the growing strength of the people’s revolt was Pakistan’s support for

Kashmiri liberation movements. However this support did not include overt military

offensives into the Indian-administered Kashmir, but was confined to political,

diplomatic, and to some extent logistical aid. Pakistan did however discriminate

between the pro-independence JKLF and the pro-Pakistan Islamist groups. The JKLF

did not intend to become part of Pakistan, and as such Islamabad gave more support to

groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen. Nonetheless, strategic decision makers in Islamabad

were not comfortable with the increasing popularity and power of this Islamist

movement, due to concerns that extremist Islamic interpretations would threaten other

moderate segments of the Kashmiri population. Moreover, Islamabad’s Inter-Services

Intelligence (ISI) diverted its support from the smaller and less united Islamist groups,

such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, which primarily consisted of ex-Afghan and Pakistani

jihadists from the Afghanistan war, in order to conduct violence against the Indian

security forces in Kashmir (Cornell 2006, 319-20).

India’s response to the Kashmiri freedom movement was to impose direct rule on the

State of Jammu and Kashmir on 19 January 1990. The Indian campaign against the

rebels was marked by human rights violations; including the shooting of demonstrators,

massacres, and executions of detainees. In reprisal Anti-Indian groups murdered and

threatened Hindu residents, and engaged in sabotage and bombings. With the

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encouragement and facilitation of the central government, some 100,000 Hindu

inhabitants, known as pandits, left the valley. They were relocated to Jammu and the

surrounding areas (Human Rights Watch Report 1994). At least 15,000 to 20,000

insurgents, police officers, paramilitary personnel, and civilians died due to the

widespread violence (Brown, ed. 1996, 5). Meanwhile, Pakistan’s support for the

uprising increased tensions between Pakistan and India and raised fears of another full-

scale war between the two countries.

The revival of the issue attracted international concern, particularly from the United

States (US). Before the Kashmiri intifada erupted, Washington had been in favour of a

plebiscite to resolve the Indo-Pakistan territorial dispute. Washington had started to

explore better relations with India. India, exasperated with Pakistan’s use of foreign

jihadists in the Kashmir valley, appealed to the US to label Pakistan a terrorist state, yet

the US did not fully support India (Schaffer 2009). The acting Secretary of State,

Laurence Eagelburgar, announced that the American government needed to decide on

listing Pakistan as a terrorist state within 120-160 days which suggested that

Washington was taking the request seriously. However, in the end Washington adopted

a cautious policy on the Kashmir dispute. Neither Pakistan nor India had gained a

positive reaction from the US concerning their Kashmir policies. The Clinton

government was attempting to refocus American foreign policy. Human rights issues

emerged as an important element of the US international outlook in relation to

Developing countries. Clinton made a reference to Kashmir, in his address to the United

Nations General Assembly on 27 September 1993; ‘bloody civil wars, ethnic conflict

and human rights violations ranged from Angola to the Caucasus and Kashmir, evoking

public resentment…’. It was unprecedented that the US should refer to India as a human

rights violator (Palit 2001, 790-1). Despite Washington’s support for a peaceful

dialogue between India and Pakistan, it did not make serious endeavours to intervene in

the conflict.

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Without international intervention, violence in Kashmir continued, although the

intensity fluctuated. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was established in

1993 as an alliance of 26 social, religious and political groups in Kashmir. The main

objective of this organization was to promote self-rule for the peoples of Jammu and

Kashmir and the formation of an Islamic state. This marked the transformation of a

violent insurgency into a political struggle. Nevertheless, violence against the Indian

security forces continued to be carried out by pro-Pakistan Islamists. The APHC’s role

had been corrupted by internal frictions, despite claiming itself as the only legitimate

party to representing Kashmiri aspirations (Tremblay 2009, 934). By the mid 1990s the

Indian security agency had formed a local auxiliary force, called the Rastriya army. It

consisted of surrendered and captured militants. Its main job was to assist in

counterinsurgency operations. Such state-sponsored paramilitary groups also committed

serious human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch Report 1996). Since then Pakistan

and India have engaged in a low intensity war over Kashmir.

The Indonesian Government’s Response

The Suharto government of Indonesia took an impartial and passive position in response

to the Kashmiri insurgency. The pragmatic consideration underpinning Suharto’s

foreign policy was to ignore the emotive references to Muslims being attacked by India;

an idea promoted by Pakistan and suggested the need for solidarity with Pakistan and

Kashmiri Muslims. Instead, a press release by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs on 15 March 1990 expressed Indonesia’s concerns about the development in

Kashmir that had ignited tensions between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, Jakarta

hoped that as members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) the two countries could

overcome their differences using the Simla Agreement of 1972 (Kompas 16 March

1990). It was apparent that for Jakarta, it was an issue involving two states without a

reference to the role of religious issues involved.

In response, India sent two special envoys to Jakarta, V. P. Singh and Arif M. Khan, to

hold talks about Kashmir with President Suharto. The press was informed that India

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requested Indonesia to advise Pakistan not to intervene any further in the Kashmir

conflict. The Pakistani embassy in Jakarta did not react strongly to the Indian move.

There was only a short press release denying Pakistan having direct involvement in that

period of the Kashmiri uprising (Kompas 29 May 1990).

Later, at the Non-Aligned foreign ministers conference held in Jakarta in May 1992,

India and Pakistan quarrelled, bitterly accusing each other of human rights violations in

Kashmir. The Pakistani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Siddique Khan Kanju

charged the Indian administration in Kashmir with trying to conceal human rights

violations in their attempts to suppress the secessionist movements that had flared in the

valley since 1989. The Indian Minister for External Affairs, Eduardo Faleiro, deplored

the raising of what he considered a bilateral problem in a multilateral forum, and

reciprocated by accusing Pakistan of violating human rights in the provinces of Sindh

and Baluchistan. Pakistan wished to internationalize the Kashmir issue by linking it

with human rights issues, which were becoming an increasingly important agenda in

post-Cold War world politics. Yet India maintained that it was a bilateral matter, and

argued that the request for human rights or charity had to begin first at home. India

denied all of Pakistan’s accusations, and accused Islamabad of arming militants and

terrorists in Kashmir to fight against the legitimate Indian government (Reuter News 15

May 1992).

Furthermore, the Indian external affairs minister urged the conference to support his

government’s position against the notion of universal human rights. Arguing that they

varied from country to country according to local cultural, social, economic, and

political conditions, and as such they could not be externally imposed. As revealed by

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas ‘there is no country legitimate to dictate its concept of

human rights over the other…’ (Kompas 2 September 1992).

Such a position reflected the New Order government’s formal attitude towards human

rights issues; that human rights could not be used as a foreign policy instrument. At that

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time Indonesia was facing tremendous international criticism of its handling of the

violent mass demonstration at Santa Cruz, Dili East Timor in November 1991. Since

then human rights had become a sensitive issue in Jakarta’s foreign policy. Indonesia

considered that all nations in the world deserved to develop their own economic and

political system, in respect of the principle of national sovereignty, the rights of self-

determination, and non-intervention (Dewanto & Bandore 1994, 259-60).

However, Indonesia’s and India’s stance in defiance of the universal nature of human

rights did not prevent Pakistan pressing ahead in launching the Kashmir issue at the

Non-Aligned summit in September 1992. India directly opposed this position. When

speaking to the press in New Delhi on 26 August, External Affairs Minister Eduardo

Faleiro, denounced Pakistan’s decision, describing it as an unfortunate and wrong

move. He reiterated that the Non-Aligned summit was to discuss issues concerning the

movement as a whole and not a forum for bilateral problems over Kashmir (AFP News

27 August 1992).

Ignoring this request Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke out on the Kashmir

question at the Non-Aligned summit. In his speech, Sharif said he was convinced that

Kashmir would continue to be a disturbance to India and Pakistan relations as well as

South Asian stability. For this reason, Pakistan urged India to cooperate in attempts to

materialize the Kashmiri’s aspiration for self-determination as stipulated in the 1948

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, and in keeping with the spirit of

Simla Agreement (Hamka 1994, 14).

To deal with this matter, Indonesian President Suharto proposed, what he called, a more

effective mechanism, procedure, and guideline for internal conflict resolution within the

Non-Aligned countries. It would be built around the NAM’s philosophy of overcoming

differences through dialogue, and balanced approaches rather than partisan contention

(Kompas 3 September 1992). In Suharto’s proposal, it was mentioned: ‘conflict

amongst member states of the Non-Aligned Movement which may be detrimental to the

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interests of the organization or may endanger the interests of international peace and

security shall be resolved through good offices, negotiation, enquiry, mediation,

conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own

choice…’. Special to the role of good offices, Suharto proposed ‘any parties in dispute

should seek consultation with the chairman of the NAM organization…’ (Indonesian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992, 4-5).

The proposal, though not specifying any enforcement mechanism such as sanctions, the

use of force, or peacekeeping operations in order to stop transgression by member

states, won support of the summiteers, including Pakistan, whilst India’s position, on

the other hand was silent (AFP News 2 September 1992). Suharto’s proposal can be

interpreted as reflecting two main ideas. First is an emphasis on the relevance of the

NAM, as a forum to discuss the economic and political issues facing the Third World

after the end of the Cold War. Second was an anticipative policy to prevent its interests,

in forging economic and political cooperation, from being hampered by conflict

amongst its member states.

The tenth Non-Aligned summit did not produce any explicit statements in relation to

Pakistan’s Kashmir cause. Nonetheless, the final draft of the joint declaration, issued on

6 September 1992, contained an article indirectly supporting Pakistan’s position stating,

‘freedom fighters are not terrorists…’ (The Jakarta Message 1992, 6). This was also a

reflection of Indonesia’s official stand in dealing with problems related to secessionist

movements in the Muslim world. In response to the statement, the Pakistani Secretary

General of Foreign Affairs Office, Akram Zaki, said that it was satisfactory for his

government, as it had communicated what Islamabad wanted (ANTARA 7 September

1992).

President Suharto followed up the peace initiative, which was officially called The

Jakarta message, by offering to use his position as the chairman of the NAM to mediate

between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This offer was welcomed by Pakistan,

although India continued to refuse international intervention into what it perceived to be

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its domestic affairs. In this situation, Jakarta affirmed that mediation would only be

viable when it was approved by the two parties in dispute (Mashad 2004, 106). In other

words, the Suharto’s initiative had done little more than provide a show of goodwill.

The Indonesian government has never moved beyond this passive official stand.

Kashmir, the OIC and Indonesian Approach

During the first half of 1990s, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue at several meetings of

the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). At the Cairo meeting held between

31 July and 5 August 1990, the OIC foreign ministers passed resolution no. 21/19-P,

which affirmed that the United Nations resolutions on the settlement of the Kashmir

issue had to be obeyed, and that a final settlement must be made in accordance with the

Simla Agreement. This supported Pakistan’s policy on holding a plebiscite to determine

the will of the Kashmiri people. The Islamic conference also reiterated its solidarity

with the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims for their freedom, and expressed a deep concern

at the violence and human rights violations against the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

More importantly, the resolution indicated the willingness of the OIC to send a good

offices mission to help ease tensions between India and Pakistan, and to determine and

promote a peaceful conflict settlement (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers

1990). Directing international attention and support towards Kashmir was a significant

achievement for Pakistani diplomacy.

Indonesia on the other hand was conspicuously silent on the issue of solidarity with

Kashmiri Muslims. This was particularly evident in a diplomatic note from the

Indonesian delegation, dated 5 August 1990, for example, that stated ‘Indonesia is in

favour of a resolution that India and Pakistan have to redeploy their troops to peace-

time locations…’ (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990).

The Muslim world’s support for Pakistan continued to flow. At the Dakar Islamic

summit, the final declaration, concluded on 11 December 1991, made reference to state-

sponsored violence against the predominantly Muslim population, and the Kashmiri

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peoples struggle for self-determination. The summiteers insisted that India should find a

mechanism to resolve the trouble in Kashmir (The Islamic Summit 1991).

Indonesia remained impartial in the issue. It also eschewed making points that agreed

with the terms ‘state-sponsored violence’ and/or ‘human rights violator’. The standard

response was to express a wish for peace. When delivering his speech to the Islamic

summit, President Suharto expressed ‘Indonesia observes with a deep concern at the

prevailing tense environment in South Asia which is caused by the dispute over Jammu

and Kashmir and the unrest that follows…We hope [that] the problem between

Indonesia’s two friends – India and Pakistan – will be peacefully resolved through

dialogue in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the Simla

Agreement…’ (Sihbudi & Hadi 1992, 16-7).

India rejected all outcomes of the Cairo conference and Dakar summit. New Delhi

blocked international human rights organizations and the OIC fact-finding team from

visiting its Kashmir territories. They also rejected the proposed good offices process.

Instead, the OIC fact-finding team went to Pakistani Kashmir and collected information

through interviews with Kashmiri refugees. The report was published in February 1993,

confirming that the Indian security forces were undertaking indiscriminate massive

violence against civilians in the disputed state. The Pakistani media, such as Dawn (29

April 1993) referred to this report, describing the acts of genocide that India had

committed in Kashmir.

The secretary general of the OIC presented the fact-finding report in document no.

ICFM/21-93/PIL/D.3 at the 21st Islamic conference of foreign ministers conducted in

Karachi on 25 to 29 April 1993. In response, resolution no. 9/21-P was issued explicitly

condemning the arbitrary use of force by the Indian military personnel against Muslim

peoples in Kashmir. The OIC also regretted the Indian government’s lack of

cooperation towards its offer of mediation, and the initiative of dialogue offered by

Pakistan. The secretary general of the OIC was assigned to monitor the developments in

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Kashmir and to report them at the Islamic summit to be held in 1994 (The Islamic

Conference of Foreign Ministers 1993).

At this stage, Pakistan was able to exploit the Muslim world’s criticism of India.

Nonetheless the OIC failed to take collective action to pressure India. Islamic solidarity

with the Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for freedom was more visible in moral rhetoric.

For instance, Pakistan urged the Gulf oil-rich states to use their economic influence on

India, including stopping imports of Indian goods, and the flow of Indian workers to the

region, but this never happened (Baba 1994, 186-9).

At the seventh OIC summit in Casablanca Morocco on 13 December 1994 a special

declaration on the Kashmir issue was announced. Essentially, this declaration

strengthened the OIC’s support for Pakistan’s position in Kashmir, by reaffirming their

‘commitment to promote a peaceful political solution to the Jammu and Kashmir

dispute on the basis of the United Nations resolutions…’, thus formally endorsing the

referendum on Kashmir. Furthermore, the OIC declared its eagerness to see positive

approaches applied by Pakistan and India to ease military strains, so that the people of

Jammu and Kashmir could be free from sorrow and violence immediately (The Islamic

Summit 1994). The ability to mobilise international attention and support for its

Kashmir policy amidst the waves of violence occurring in the valley was probably the

most striking achievement of Pakistani diplomacy. However Pakistani diplomacy may

also have had an advantage given the worldwide rise of Islamism after the Cold War,

paralleled with the second Gulf War, Palestinian intifada, and civil war in Bosnia-

Herzegovina.

At the Casablanca Islamic summit, Indonesia did not follow this trend of negative

sentiment flowing from the Muslim world towards India. Instead, Jakarta employed a

conciliatory language, referencing the role of religions in making peace. Foreign

Minister Ali Alatas said ‘Indonesia considers [it] imperative for all religion believers

and responsible governments to promote peace and tolerance through inter-religious

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dialogue and partnership…’ (Alatas 2001, 429). Indonesia was reluctant to articulate its

favour for Pakistan’s position.

However, Pakistan continued to try to gain a firmer Indonesian policy on Kashmir.

When holding bilateral talks with President Suharto in Jakarta early March 1996,

Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto again explained Pakistan’s position on the

Kashmir issue. Benazir Bhutto said that the Kashmir issue significant to South Asia

because of the threat it posed to stability of the region. Therefore, Pakistan called upon

India to resolve the problem in a meaningful dialogue in accordance with the United

Nations resolutions (Pakistan Horizon 1996, 9-10). By emphasizing the importance of

Kashmir for regional stability and security, Benazir Bhutto hoped to prompt Indonesia

to take a more active role in the issue.

Indonesia still remained impartial on the Kashmir issue. This was noticeable in

Suharto’s response to Benazir Bhutto’s approach. According to the Indonesian

president, Indonesia was concerned by prolonged armed conflicts and violence in

several Muslim countries, including Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, and

Kurdistan. Regarding the role Indonesia would play in Kashmir, Suharto repeated his

erstwhile commitment to endorse a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan, but

would only involve in a mediation process if asked by both sides (Asia Times 11 March

1996).

The Kashmir problem was not discussed at the OIC’s foreign ministerial meeting held

at Jakarta in December 1996 (The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 1996). It

was reported that before the conference Jakarta had been willing to discuss sensitive

issues such as Afghanistan and Kashmir. However, the Indian embassy in Jakarta

released a statement saying that it would be unacceptable for India’s domestic problems

to be raised at the Islamic forum that had no locus standi in Kashmir affairs. Jakarta

subsequently declined the agenda, sparking an appeal from Pakistani diplomats in

Jakarta, which resulted in the Kashmiri delegation being allowed to attend but not

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address the conference (Kompas 9 December 1996). This sent a message that Jakarta

continued to balance foreign policy towards India and Pakistan.

Indonesia remained reluctant to actively participate in a resolution to the Kashmir

conflict, despite its interest in promoting the countries Islamic identity in the early

1990’s, as demonstrated by its involvement in the OIC (see again Chapter Five).

Undoubtedly the most convincing reason for this was the continued focus on

geopolitical considerations in Suharto’s foreign policy, which focused only on those

issues affecting Indonesia’s immediate regional stability and security. This did not

include Kashmir. This position was further illustrated by Indonesia’s willing

intervention in the Moro separatist problem in the Southern Philippines. In this case

Jakarta had been willing to use the country’s Muslim identity to smooth the peace

process, and promote regional stability.

In May 1974 Indonesia made a proposal to President Ferdinand Marcos to settle the

Moro problem, but this did not result in a solution. Later, to the dismay of Jakarta, the

Philippines government sought to resolve the issue by asking Middle East countries

under the umbrella of the OIC for their assistance. Unhappy with this approach,

Indonesia committed to continue observing developments in Moro, but declined to

participate any further in the resolution (Sukma 2006, 72). However in 1993, Indonesia

re-engaged in Moro when Suharto approached President Cory Aquino to recommence

the peace process. Jakarta formed and chaired a task force consisting of ASEAN

diplomats that was assigned to organize peace talks for Moro. Between 1993 and 1996,

mediations were held in Jakarta, and in September 1996 a peace agreement was signed

by the Philippines government and the secessionist movement, the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) (Perwita 2007, 125).

According to Wiryono, a senior Indonesian diplomat who had taken part in the Moro

peace mediation, the key to Indonesia’s success as a mediator, was that despite Jakarta’s

nonalignment policy with either party, Indonesia promoted its identity as a Muslim

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majority country in order to be easily accepted by MNLF, but ceased listening to what

Muslims in Moro really wanted. Towards Manila, Jakarta displayed the goodwill of a

fellow ASEAN member helping to solve its problem, this was important because

instability of one country could possibly cause insecurity for the whole region

(Republika 27 December 1996). It showed that Islamic identity was used pragmatically

when it was considered to be a significant factor in accomplishing Indonesia’s

geopolitical interests.

Indonesian Muslim Solidarity for Kashmir

The response of Muslim societal groups was different to the government’s passive and

impartial response towards India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The Indonesian

Muslim community was more assertive about expressing its views, and extending

actions, based on Islamic solidarity with Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for self-rule.

There was a history of pro-Pakistan feeling drawing on the Islamic identity, with groups

such as Nahdlatul Ulama launching an anti-Indian campaign when the war over

Kashmir initially broke out in September 1965. However, the anti-Indian actions did not

appear in Indonesian public’s response to India’s violent police actions against

indigenous intifada in Kashmir in early 1990. Suharto’s repressive crackdown on

dissenting Islamic voices may have been responsible for this silence.

Nevertheless, this did not mean that there was no voice at all. For instance, Komite

Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with

the Islamic World, KISDI)10 acknowledged that as well empathizing with the Muslim

plight in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Moro, the Muslim struggle in Kashmir was also of

deep concern. This view about the Kashmir problem was quite similar to Pakistan’s

position; but Information about whether KISDI had links with Pakistan is not available.

This pro-Pakistan outlook may have been shaped by attachment to the Muslim cause in

Kashmir. The KISDI claimed that it represented the majority of Indonesian Muslim

opinions about the Kashmir issue.

10 See again Chapter Four on the background and activities of KISDI.

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The KISDI argued that the roots of conflict in Kashmir had begun with the partition in

1947. Essentially the problem of Kashmir was the legacy of the high-handed policy of

India under the Hindu ultranationalist Congress Party during the August 1947 partition

of the subcontinent. When the former states of British India were given the option of

choosing India or Pakistan, the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir initially decided to

be independent. Yet, in October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir was coerced into

acceding to India, later the king insisted that such an accession conditional on a

plebiscite by the majority Muslim subjects (KISDI 1993, 2). This reflects the similar

reading of the origin of the Kashmir dispute held by KISDI and Pakistan.

Soon after the undeclared war between India and Pakistan in 1948, the UNSC passed a

resolution calling for a ceasefire and a referendum for Kashmir. Initially, India agreed to

a plebiscite, however later, in 1954, New Delhi renounced it unilaterally. The most

ominous development in the Indian subcontinent in the early 1990s had been the rising

tide of Hindu extremism in Indian politics, and its repercussions for Kashmir. This was

obvious in the demolition of the historic 16th century Ayodhya Mosque of Uttar Pradesh

in December 1992 by the Hindu militants, and in cases of Indian violations of human

rights, including rapes, arson, and torture (KISDI 1993, 4-5). This information is quite

similar to what many in Pakistan believe are the facts of the Kashmir conflict.

The KISDI (1993, 9) indicated its radical position in dealing with what was happening

in Kashmir. According to KISDI, the sad story of Muslims in Kashmir was only one

example of sorrow experienced by Muslim brothers and sisters in Kashmir. KISDI

argued that the grief felt by Kashmiri Muslims was not heard by the international

community, because it was dominated by Jewish economic and political norms and

systems. For this reason, KISDI urged that the Muslim world, in particular the

Indonesian government that represented the most populous Muslim society in the world,

to take collective actions to liberate Kashmir, The use of the word liberation suggested

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that KISDI supported the radical sections of the Kashmiri insurgents and the Pakistani

government.

KISDI’s idea is significant as an alternative reading of the origins and solutions to the

Kashmir dispute. However, it did not change the Indonesian government’s attitude

towards Kashmir. The KISDI’s position was not substantial enough to put enough

pressure upon the Indonesian government in order to alter its response to the Kashmir

issue. This is because, in spite of declaring itself as an Islamic pressure group

(Sumargono 1998, v-vii) and having published its discourse of the Kashmir issue,

KISDI did not make further attempts to mobilize Indonesian Muslims action to

demonstrate their sympathy towards Kashmiri Muslims. Like KISDI, other Indonesian

Muslim groups, such as the ICMI and Muhammadiyah, as well as critical individuals,

seemed reluctant to strongly promote the Kashmir issue to the Indonesian public.

Hence, the Kashmiri struggle went virtually unnoticed.

To some extent this reluctance of Indonesian Muslims, can be related to the fact that

more attention was paid to other issues pertinent to Islam and Muslims, such as the civil

war in Bosnia, which took place during the same time as the violence in Kashmir. In the

eyes of Indonesian Muslims, the Bosnian conflict reflected their long-held conviction

that the West, particularly the US, was perpetuating animosity towards Islam. The

feeling of anti-Western and/or anti-American sentiment was one factor behind the

Indonesian Muslims’ hard-hearted voices. Because this emotion was not reproduced in

the case of Kashmir, the reactions to the issue were relatively weak.

For example, daily mass demonstrations were organized by various Indonesian Muslim

groups during August 1992 to protest against the violence being committed by the

Serbian military in Bosnia. The Muslim crowds spoke loudly of the West’s hypocrisy

towards Muslim countries. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the US eagerly pushed the

United Nations to pass resolutions against Saddam. In the case of Bosnia however, it

took no serious measures (Jawa Pos 19 August 1992). Muslim leaders urged the

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Indonesian government to take concrete action to respond to the concerning situation in

Bosnia (Berita Buana 20 May 1992).

The increasing demand for action caught Suharto’s attention. It was noticeable in the

president’s inaugural address to the nonalignment summit in Jakarta on 1 September

1992. Suharto said that a speedy and resolute action was needed to stop the Bosnian

tragedy, and to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and cultural heritage of

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Indonesian president further urged the UNSC to give the

necessary authority and support for the Secretary General to restore peace in Bosnia.

Suharto also advised the NAM members to play a more active role in resolving the

Bosnian conflict (The Jakarta Post 2 September 1992). This response indicated that

when the Muslim public articulated strong demands to the government, favourable

responses to Islamic-related issues could result, even though Islamic solidarity was not

expressed.

The Kargil Crisis (1999) and Indonesian Response

The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan added a new dimension to the strategic

situation: India tested nuclear weapons on 11 and 13 May, Pakistan responded quickly

with its own nuclear tests within the month. This ignited criticisms around the world,

and triggered sanctions by both countries’ donors, and trading partners, especially the

US and Japan (AFP News 28 May 1998). Also, the Kashmir problem took on a nuclear

dimension. Large-scale international criticisms and pressure were directed at both

Pakistan and India. Nonetheless, the US quietly continued urging Islamabad and New

Delhi toward dialogue (The News 7 July 1998).

As a result, both sides had concluded the Lahore Declaration on 21 February 1999, in

which India and Pakistan vowed, among other things, to intensify efforts for promoting

talks on outstanding bilateral issues, including Kashmir, and to alert each other of

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further arm tests (Lahore Declaration 1999). The Lahore episode raised hope for better

India and Pakistan relations in the wake of the violence in Kashmir.

To the consternation of the international community, the Lahore Declaration was soon

violated. Again on 11 April 1999 India tested its long-range Agni missile, and on 14 and

15 April, Pakistan followed with its long-range Ghauri and medium-range Shaheen

missiles. A day later, India conducted another ballistic missile test. This exchange

reignited international concern about the prospects of an arms race on the subcontinent.

Most importantly, the Kashmir conflict could now involve nuclear weapons. The

peaceful talks of the Lahore summit had completely disintegrated (Press Trust of India

28 December 1999).

This show of force was followed by the outbreak of limited war over Kargil between

India and Pakistan. Pakistan launched an operation to help support militant forces with

artillery and logistics, probably involving Pakistani military personnel as well, to seize

the mountainous areas on the de facto India-Pakistan border in Kargil (Lieven 2002,

115). The Pakistani military leadership was convinced at that time that an attack would

not be responded by India. If India responded, Pakistan and its allies could neutralize

the attack. Moreover, the Pakistani military had felt deeply aggrieved by the Indians

who had exploited the internal crisis in East Pakistan, ignored the 1972 Simla

Agreement by capturing the Siachen Glacier, planned pre-emptive attacks on Pakistan’s

nuclear facilities in the guise of the 1987 Brasstacks exercise, and oppressed the

Kashmiri peoples for decades. All this was complicated by the fact that the international

community had always allowed India to get away with such perceived injustices (Lavoy

2009, 66-7).

In the early week of May 1999 some herdsmen alerted the Indian security forces of the

presence of the Pakistani military next to the village of Gharkun in the Kargil area of

Kashmir. In spite of underestimating the accuracy of this information, the Indian

military authorities sent out a patrol, and on 4 May they discovered possible intruders.

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Quickly, other infiltrators were detected in neighbouring sectors. To further confirm the

existence of Pakistani forces, larger patrols were carried out to examine the extent and

scope of the incursions. Nonetheless, in the last week of May the Indian military leaders

realized the full extent of the activities of the Pakistani infiltrators, and their

engagement of the Islamist forces of Lashkar-e-Toiba (Tellis 2001, 7-18). Thereafter,

the Indian Cabinet Committee of Security (CCS) concluded that the intruders had to be

militarily countered. The conflict that then broke out between May and July 1999 is

known as the Kargil crisis. Although, there was no official declaration of war from

either India or Pakistan, the armed clashes were costly in terms of victims and materials.

India lost 1,174 military personnel and Pakistan lost 772 (Ganguly & Hagerty 2005,

143).

The ground war was accompanied by India launching a diplomatic offensive to

mobilize international opinion against Pakistan, which it alleged to have once again

endeavoured to alter the status quo by dispatching Mujahideens into Indian territories,

therefore violating the ceasefire line in Kashmir. This diplomacy was noticeably

successful. The G-8 countries held that Pakistan was responsible for the military

confrontations in Kargil, and described Islamabad’s intrusion attempt as irresponsible.

The European Union called for the immediate withdrawal of the Mujahideens. The US

regarded Pakistan as the instigator and insisted that the status quo be unconditionally

restored. Relinquishing to mounting international pressure for withdrawal, Prime

Minister Sharif rushed to Washington and on 4 July 1999, signed a joint statement with

President Clinton affirming the reestablishment of the ceasefire line in accordance with

the 1972 Simla Agreement (Mallika 2001, 233-42).

Indonesia also paid attention to the nuclear proliferation issue involving India and

Pakistan that had preceded the Kargil crisis. The continuation of regional stability and

security became the parameter for Indonesian responses to international conflict; Jakarta

reacted to the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India in May 1998. A diplomat in the

Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that Pakistan and India had broken their

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own commitment to non-proliferation, and that the tests by the two rivals demonstrated

that they were once again going head-to-head over Kashmir. Furthermore, the

Indonesian diplomat commented that other parts of the region would also be drawn in

(ANTARA 3 June 1998).

ASEAN, which is the major political and security forum of Southeast Asian countries,

reacted harshly following the Kargil crisis by threatening to disassociate both Pakistan

and India from the sectoral and dialogue partnership they were developing (India Today

9 August 1999). In the eyes of Indonesian foreign policy officials11 ASEAN’s reaction

reflected the conclusion that this potential threat could expand into an interregional

problem. The question arose in the minds of Indonesian and ASEAN diplomats of

whether or not the Kashmir issue could be resolved, or mitigated, in a bilateral agenda

away from the multilateral processes. Kashmir, at this point, had been held hostage in

India-Pakistan relations, resulting in continuing tensions between the two countries.

Although reacting assertively to the development in the subcontinent between 1998 and

1999, Indonesia and ASEAN did not want to quit engagement with Pakistan and India.

As such there was only a warning on the danger of nuclear proliferation. At the ASEAN

meeting held at Singapore in August 1999, opportunities were provided for the Indian

and Pakistani delegations to explain their respective positions on nuclear issues. In the

declaration issued on 8 August, ASEAN noted that the two nuclear powers had pledged

to ease their tensions and discuss their differences in a constructive manner (ASEAN

Secretariat 1999). ASEAN became more accommodative after the talks and continued

to promote dialogue rather than sanctions. Certainly, the Kargil episode had increased

the strategic importance of both Pakistan and India to ASEAN. As an Indonesian

diplomat for ASEAN emphasized ‘ignoring and excluding Pakistan and India from the

regional security dialogue will bring more negative consequences than facilitating them

to sit down and talk…’12.

11 From interviews with some Indonesian diplomats in charge of ASEAN Regional Forum affairs, carried out in January 2010. 12 This opinion was conveyed in an interview carried out in February 2010.

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The Kashmir Issue after 11 September 2001

General Pervez Musharraf took over governance from Nawaz Sharif through a

bloodless military coup in October 1999. The new leadership of Pakistan was inclined

to negotiate with India on the Kashmir issue. Musharraf took an important step by

meeting with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Agra on 4 July 2001. The

talk did not produce a viable solution but there were signs of improvement in the

relationship. The draft of the Agra Declaration being considered stated that the

settlement of Jammu and Kashmir would pave the way to the normalization of relations

between Pakistan and India (Effendi 2006, 106). However hostilities between the two

countries continued during 2001, and no fruitful diplomatic efforts were made.

Peaceful dialogue with India became a more pressing option for Pakistan in the wake of

the 11 September 2001 attacks, which were also followed by suicide attacks on the

Jammu and Kashmir state assembly in October, and the Indian parliament two months

later. Angered by the terrorists’ attacks, the American government launched the global

war on terrorism, intending to hunt down Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda networks

for their alleged involvement in organizing terrorism against the US. Military operations

were undertaken by the superpower, first in Afghanistan to destroy the Islamist

government of the Taliban, believed to have provided shelter for al-Qaeda. In this

campaign, Washington left the world with two choices, become friends or enemies.

India, claiming to have long suffered from militants’ terrorism, and the victim of two

terror attacks after 11 September 2001, was quick to declare its full backing of the US.

New Delhi attempted to establish an informal alliance with Washington. Premier

Vajpayee proposed that Washington expand its war against terrorism to include the

Pakistani-sponsored militants’ terror in Kashmir (India Today 15 October 2001).

In this situation, ushering jihadist violence in the Indian-governed Kashmir was an

indefensible option for Pakistan. The events in America and India changed the

dynamics of the region, and led to the blurring of the moral distinction between freedom

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fighters and terrorists. Under the new rule, states were more responsible for terrorist

groups operating within their borders, and Pakistan could no longer take the risk of

involvement with jihadist troops. Moreover, between December 2001 and July 2002,

India threatened to wage a limited conventional war on Pakistan unless Islamabad

terminated its support for what New Delhi portrayed as cross-border terrorism.

Leveraging its threat of war on Pakistan effectively, New Delhi forced Islamabad to

crack down on jihadist groups inciting war against the Indian government in Kashmir

(Hussain 2007, 103-4). Islamabad was aware of the political and physical costs of the

continuing use of militant force in Kashmir, and promised to permanently end its

backing for armed militancy in the valley (Lieven 2002, 116), providing that India

agreed to find a negotiated solution to the Kashmir dispute.

Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime from Kabul, Islamabad was faced with

the US’ long-term interests in Southwest Asia, making Pakistan conform through the

moderation of enmity towards India. For America, long standing proposals for building

a trans-Asian gas pipeline would only be feasible if Pakistan and India supported the

creation of peaceful interaction between Afghanistan and its neighbours (Hussain 2007,

105). Washington’s policy on fostering reduced tensions between India and Pakistan

was during the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell to Islamabad and New Delhi in

October 2001, to urge restraint by both sides following the bombing of the Kashmir

state assembly. India and Pakistan were engaged in a military standoff triggered by the

militant attacks on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In order to help ease

tensions the American Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, was sent to India

and Pakistan, this was followed by a visit from Secretary Powell and Secretary of

Defence Donald Rumsfeld in June 2002, all with the same mission (Schaffer 2009).

These efforts of high-ranking American policy makers reflected Washington’s interest

in the peace negotiations between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, with its weak economy,

polarized society and polity, flailing support from the international Islamic bloc, and

China’s support for the US’ policy in Afghanistan, had no choice but to facilitate a

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peaceful settlement in Kashmir. In fact, the follow-up to this position included financial

relief and a more sympathetic view on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Musharraf indicated

agreement for talks with India, however he insisted that Pakistan’s policy on protecting

and promoting the Kashmir cause would not change (Mudiam 2003, 270). Perhaps, this

means that Islamabad, despite readiness to reduce tensions with New Delhi, would

never withdraw from the position it has gained in Kashmir; neither allowing the

Kashmir valley to be an independent state nor an accession to India.

India and Pakistan restarted their peace efforts. Although a slow process, these

diplomatic efforts moved steadily ahead. In early 2003, Musharraf attempted to

convince India of his good intention. Prime Minister Vajpayee responded favourably. In

March the Indian prime minister at the conference of SAARC (South Asian Association

for Regional Cooperation) information ministers held at New Delhi, called upon South

Asian countries to promote economic cooperation, despite political differences (Daily

Star 12 November 2003). Vajpayee went on with his positive response by giving a

speech one month later in the Indian part of Kashmir, saying that he was willing to look

forward after 18 months of hostilities (BBC News 2 January 2004). President Musharraf

followed up by projecting a flexible approach towards Kashmir. In a radio interview

with BBC, Musharraf assured India of patience, sincerity, and flexibility in Kashmir.

The Pakistani leader offered to set aside all options unacceptable for India, including the

implementation of referendum in Kashmir, and allowing the people of Kashmir to

develop a consensual solution (BBC News 18 December 2003).

The willingness of both sides to talk increased confidence-building momentum between

India and Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee, in an interview broadcast by Pakistan’s

state television, said that he was willing to discuss the dispute over Kashmir with

President Musharraf. Reportedly Pakistan took serious note of this remark. At the

SAARC summit held at Islamabad in January 2004, Pakistan did not raise the Kashmir

issue; India reciprocated this gesture with prudence by not holding Pakistan directly

responsible for sponsoring terrorism (BBC News 3 January 2004). President Musharraf

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and Premier Vajpayee signed a joint statement on 6 January at the informal session of

the SAARC summit. This was similar to the Lahore meeting that had created a more

optimistic atmosphere for the two sides to promote peace. The two leaders agreed on the

resumption of a composite dialogue to discuss bilateral issues, including Jammu and

Kashmir (BBC News 6 January 2004). This promise would be implemented by some

confidence-building measures, comprising of a ceasefire line along the demarcation in

Kashmir, recommencement of diplomatic talks, and the opening of transportation links

between the two sides (Xinhua News 18 March 2004).

Musharraf continued his pronouncement of peace with India. When talking to Indian

journalists in New Delhi on 18 April 2005, Musharraf proposed a three-step mechanism

to solve the Kashmir problem; 1) the governments of India and Pakistan had to achieve

a consensus; 2) if it needs to include people’s voices, there should be public debate and

support, and 3) to identify the final objective which could involve issues of

independence, self-governance, autonomy, and joint control. These all have different

connotations, and therefore should be analysed in a deeper context. Later in May,

Musharraf emphasized that Pakistan, India, and the Kashmiri peoples should accept the

final objective as enough effort had been made. In response, the new Indian Premier

Manmohan Singh said that India would be willing to continue the peace talks as long as

its position was respected. Musharraf went further with his proposals. On 5 December

2006 he declared an offer for demilitarization and autonomy in Kashmir. In February

2007, Musharraf with a persuasive tone said that Kashmir was ready for resolution and

reconciliation. Until this stage, India had not made any breakthroughs in responding to

Musharraf’s persuasion. New Delhi persistently felt dissatisfied with Musharraf’s

commitment to prevent the crossing of militants into Indian territories. Indians called it

a slowing down, rather than a turning off, of the jihadi tap (Behuria 2009, 438-40).

Domestic political turmoil, which plagued Musharraf’s leadership throughout 2007

eventually, forced him to resign in mid 2008. The decline of Musharraf’s popularity was

coupled by the weakness in his peace discourse on Kashmir. However, his peace

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initiatives produced progressive outcomes, in particular with the holding of Pakistan

and India composite dialogues. Until Musharraf resignation there had been four rounds

of composite dialogue aimed at improving bilateral relations between Islamabad and

New Delhi, which included the involvement of business and civil sectors. Nonetheless,

the Congress government of India did not appear to be discussing issues beyond

normalizing civil and business ties. The dispute over Kashmir became stagnant due to

India’s unwillingness to move forward with a concrete settlement (Gul 2008, 11).

Musharraf, however, had tried to show an open mind and constructive attitude towards

Kashmir, but the settlement of the Kashmir dispute needed each party’s acceptance to

enable negotiations to be productive.

The Indonesian Governmental Response

The government in Jakarta continues to follow the developments in Kashmir. After the

collapse of Suharto’s New Order, there was a hope for a change in Indonesian attitude

towards issues-related to Muslims, including Kashmir. However, the successive

governments under the presidency of B. J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati

Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono tended to preserve the direction

encouraged by the New Order government. In relation to the Kashmir issue, Jakarta still

remains impartial. On some occasions, the Indonesian government has stated a

willingness to play a mediating role between India and Pakistan, but only if requested

by them. Since India has never wanted to allow a third party’s involvement in Kashmir,

the Indonesian position has merely been a symbolic value of goodwill, in fact there is a

sustaining trend to pursue a balanced position towards Pakistan and India.

In September 1999 Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue in the 54th session of the United

Nations General Assembly meeting, with an agenda of promoting international

intervention, as had been done in the Indonesian Province of East Timor less than one

month before. Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz launched a lengthy comparison

between the crisis in East Timor and Indian-controlled Kashmir territory. Laying claim

to the recently proposed concept of humanitarian intervention by Secretary General

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Kofi Annan, Pakistan tried to make the case that one was needed in Kashmir, a plan that

has been in the United Nations for 50 years. In Sartaj Aziz’s words, ‘human rights must

be upheld, not only in Kosovo and East Timor, but also in Kashmir…’ (IPS News 24

September 1999).

Indian officials had been quick to dismiss any parallels between the problems in East

Timor and Kashmir. Indian Foreign Minister Jashwant Singh voiced concern about the

recent humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, arguing that the new

theories and postulating about intervention needed to be debated fully, and not

selectively applied. In his official address to the General Assembly, Jashwant Singh said

that India along with other Developing countries, such as China and Algeria, were

worried about military deployments in Kosovo as an example that could hurt national

sovereignty. Furthermore, the era of the state is still not over, and the United Nations

should not be perceived as a super body that provides a viable substitution to sovereign

states, with their continuingly crucial roles (IPS News 24 September 1999).

At the time the Indonesian government under President Habibie did not take seriously

the discourse of comparing the case in Kashmir and East Timor. This was because they

were too busy handling the real political developments in East Timor; specifically

issues surrounded the referendum for the East Timorese. To the great surprise of the

Indonesians, East Timor decided to separate. The independence of East Timor became

the impetus for other regions with long-running secessionist feelings to exercise their

rights of self-rule, such as Aceh and West Papua. The ethno-secessionist group of

Acehnese, called Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (the Free Aceh Movement, GAM), had long

dreamed of making an Islamic state in Aceh Province, separated from Jakarta. The

GAM’s struggle started in the early 1950s along with the Darul Islam insurgencies.

Under Sukarno and Suharto, it was heavily suppressed through military actions.

However, since democracy was installed under Habibie in 1998 GAM has obtained a

new momentum to consolidate its power and demands. The Acehnese problem was

internationalized through GAM’s links with separatist groups residing in neighbouring

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countries, such as in the Southern Philippines, Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Sri

Lanka (Wardhani 2006).

This tendency was an existential problem for the Indonesian government. Moreover, the

fact that the loss of East Timor was made possible by foreign powers’ interference led

to a more profound non-interference sentiment in Indonesia’s foreign policy. President

Wahid was not interested in becoming involved in the Kashmir issue. When Musharraf

visited Jakarta on 31 March 2000, he briefed Wahid on his plan to bring Pakistan back

on the road of progress and development in the Kashmir situation. At a joint press

statement with Wahid, the Pakistani leader emphasized Pakistan’s goodwill to talk with

India in a bid to resolve the Kashmir problem. Pakistan needed support to force India to

negotiate on Kashmir (BBC News 31 March 2000). In response, Wahid affirmed that

Indonesia would not intervene in another state’s internal affairs. Indonesia was always

consistent with its nonalignment policy. However, Wahid indicated that his government

supported Pakistan’s goodwill in promoting dialogue with India (Kompas 31 March

2000).

Wahid made a visit to Islamabad two months later. While addressing a press conference

with Musharraf, the Indonesian leader took the diplomatic path on the Kashmir issue.

Wahid declared that Indonesia was taking the position of Pakistan in which everything

should be discussed with India. In response to a question on what Indonesia’s official

stance on Kashmir was, Wahid stated they were ‘on the side of Pakistanis without

taking offence to the Indians…’. This position was affirmed by expressing Indonesian

preparedness to mediate between India and Pakistan as long as the request came from

both sides, and not only from Pakistan. This was because Indonesia maintained no

policies of unilateral intervention in its foreign policy (The Hindu 17 June 2000). Wahid

surely understood that this neutral position would neither be interpreted as ignorance by

Pakistan, nor regarded as interventionist from the Indian side.

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Wahid’s disagreement with foreign intervention bought his policy in line with India to

some extent. Speaking at a joint press conference with the visiting Indian Prime

Minister Vajpayee in Jakarta, January 2001, Wahid repeated his government’s

reluctance to become engaged in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, by saying that

Indonesia was tied to the existing international laws and treaties abiding India and

Pakistan. Indonesia and India were facing a comparable problems, the reference was

made between the separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua. Thus, according to

Wahid, on this basis the two countries understood each other. Implicitly, Wahid

recognized that Kashmir was the domain of Indian domestic affairs. He was confident

making this statement after the Indian prime minister openly pledged to support

Indonesian national integration (ANTARA 15 January 2001). The Indian support was

an important achievement for Wahid trying to counter the internationalization of

secessionism in the country.

Wahid was unable to settle the problem in Aceh. Vice President Megawati, who

replaced him in July 2001, faced the growing intensity of ethno-nationalist aspirations

of the Acehnese. In mid 2001, information circulated in Jakarta that GAM made use of

Indian territories, especially an isolated group of islands in Nicobar, for gunrunning into

Aceh. This meant that the Aceh problem had an international dimension that concerned

India. Additionally, Acehnese rebels had been involved in pirating commercial ships

stopping in Aceh’s waters before going onward to the Malacca Strait. GAM’s actions

were aimed attracting funding, as well as announcing its political existence (Brewster

2011, 232). The spokesman for GAM in East Aceh Ishak Daud admitted that all ships

sailing the Malacca Strait had to ask permission from GAM otherwise they would be

attacked (AFP News 3 September 2001).

The Megawati government expressed concern at the issue of arms smuggling into Aceh

from Nicobar. In response, the Indian government claimed to have evidence of the

Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan helping the Islamic Acehnese insurgents to get

weapons. Notwithstanding that such an assertion has never been proven, New Delhi

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offered to conduct a joint patrol in Sumatra, Andaman and Nicobar waters. This led

Indonesia and India to reach an agreement to undertake coordinated naval patrols in the

Nicobar and Andaman Islands, as well as the northern entrance to the Malacca Strait

(Brewster 2011, 233). The first coordinated naval patrols were undertaken in September

2002 to check for arms smuggling and drug trafficking (The Jakarta Post 5 September

2002). This security cooperation was practical, but also had strategic value for

Megawati’s policy in countering the impact of the internationalization of the

secessionist threat in Aceh.

The security cooperation with India implicated Indonesia’s Kashmir policy. With the

separatist movement at home, Megawati was not likely to support Pakistan in Kashmir,

as a way of keeping India collaborating in the handling of the internationalized

Acehnese problem. The Megawati government chose to continue Wahid’s neutral

approach to the lingering India-Pakistan problem in Kashmir. Indonesia, under

Megawati, supported Pakistan’s initiative to talk with India over Kashmir without

expressing Islamic solidarity with the latter. In June 2002 President Musharraf

dispatched his special envoy Najmuddin Shaikh to Jakarta to meet with President

Megawati, and handed over his letter seeking Indonesia’s support to defuse tensions

with India. When speaking to the press in Jakarta on 6 June, the Pakistani emissary

indicated that the essence of the letter called upon Indonesia to advise India to exercise

restraint and to resume dialogue rather than to escalate an engagement with a show of

force. Megawati reportedly promised to do whatever Indonesia could to assist with a

reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan (ANTARA 7 June 2002).

Furthermore, the Indonesian president reiterated the commitment of her predecessors, a

willingness to mediate the Kashmir dispute at the request of both India and Pakistan

(Kompas 10 June 2002).

When visiting South Asia in December 2003, Megawati had not yet fostered any efforts

to mediate India and Pakistan over Kashmir. At a joint statement with President

Musharraf, the Indonesian leader only mentioned the need for resolving all the disputed

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matters between India and Pakistan, especially over Kashmir, through a positive and

constructive dialogue process (PPI News 15 December 2003). This was all that

Indonesia could do to show its encouraging intention on the Kashmir issue. To mediate

between India and Pakistan without Indian approval would offend India, and would

violate the principle of non-interference that directed Indonesia’s foreign policy.

President Yudhoyono came to power in October 2004. Soon afterward, the secessionist

movement in Aceh no longer posed a national problem. Following the devastating

tsunami in December 2004, which destroyed the separatist military basis along the

western coastal areas of Sumatra Island, there was no rise in international dimensions of

the Aceh problem for the Yudhoyono government. A peace agreement was achieved in

early 2005, though which the central government granted Aceh a special autonomy

status, including the implementation of shari’a for the Acehnese. It was however

apparent that Yudhoyono did not change Indonesia’s Kashmir policy; the Kashmir issue

even disappeared from Jakarta-Islamabad talks. When visiting Pakistan in November

2005, Yudhoyono discussed with Musharraf the enhancement of economic and security

cooperation between Indonesia and Pakistan (AP News 25 November 2005). Similarly,

President Musharraf did not discuss the Kashmir problem on a visit to Jakarta in

January 2007 (ANTARA 31 January 2007).

This inattentiveness can be explained by considering both sides’ policy. From

Pakistan’s side, Islamabad had affirmed its commitment not to raise the Kashmir issue

with ASEAN member countries. This was made by Pakistan in pursuance of its

dialogue partner status within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At a meeting in

Yogyakarta in May 2004, Foreign Minister, Kurshid Kasuri of Pakistan, approved a

request by ASEAN that Pakistan not to speak of Kashmir in ARF discussions, because

it would cause an unnecessary quarrel with India, which had been therein since 1996

(Kompas 12 May 2004). The ARF was important for Islamabad’s effort to counter the

propagation of Indian influence and interests in Southeast Asia, especially in terms of

disrupting the regional states’ good perception about Pakistan. Pakistan was accepted as

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a member of ARF in July 2004 (Yahya 2004, 365), since then the Kashmir situation has

never been raised in Pakistan-ASEAN meetings. When addressing the Pakistani

community in Jakarta, President Musharraf said again that the best forum to discuss and

manage the Kashmir issue was the ongoing composite dialogue between Pakistan and

India (BBC News 31 January 2007).

Indonesia, which has long held an impartial attitude towards Kashmir, and the

willingness of Islamabad and New Delhi to overcome their differences through bilateral

dialogue, was a positive development that had to be supported. Foreign Minister Hassan

Wirayuda said ‘the involvement of a third party unwanted by each side will only

aggravate the situations in the subcontinent…’ (Kompas 13 May 2004). Indonesia,

therefore, had no moral obligation to intervene in the two parties’ dispute.

Apart from this, the enhancement of Indian-Indonesian relations under President

Yudhoyono was also an important factor in Indonesia’s hesitance to become involved in

the Kashmir issue. In securing the prospects of strengthened ties with India, Jakarta

needed to ensure it did not offend New Delhi’s position in Kashmir. Jakarta and New

Delhi launched a strategic partnership scheme on 23 November 2005 covering

cooperation in defence, economic, and technology sectors (The Jakarta Post 24

November 2005). The strategic partnership placed economic links as top priority. This

was made a reality through the two-way trade between Indonesia and India. Joint

commission meetings were set up annually to monitor the progress of this program. A

report published after the third joint commission meeting held at Jakarta in June 2007

showed significant growth in both sides’ trade volume, from US$ 3.93 billion in 2005 to

US$ 4.79 billion in 2006. The balance of trade was in favour of Indonesia in 2006 with

the surplus of US$ 2.99 billion. With this achievement, optimism arose between

Indonesia and India that they would be able to boost two-way trade volume above US$

10 billion by 2015 (The Jakarta Post 19 June 2007). In the light of such a promising

partnership with India, it is still highly unlikely that Indonesia will undertake policies

that would upset India, such as supporting the Islamic cause in Kashmir.

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Indonesian Muslim Solidarity for Kashmir

Unlike the government that was passive on the Kashmir issue, some elements of the

Indonesian Muslim public maintain endorsement for Kashmiri Muslim’s struggle, and

indicate support for Pakistan. This is visible in the expressions of Muslim activists

affiliated with Dewan Dakwah13 and its Kashmir Solidarity Forum (KSF) of Indonesia.

While they did not organize mass rallies to demonstrate their views and feelings about

the Kashmir issue, they were involved in activities such as seminars, at which the

Kashmir problem was discussed, and carrying out fundraising for humanitarian

purposes.

The KSF was introduced to the public in 1999. Upon its establishment, KSF which was

then led by a Dewan Dakwah figure Mohammad Zahir Khan, was a social network of

Indonesian Muslims who cared about Kashmir. The membership included people with a

similar vision of advocating for the rights of Kashmiris to self-determination, there is no

compulsion for sympathizers of the forum’s mission to contribute financially or join the

gatherings. The nature of the sponsorship is free and voluntary. This forum is a purely

moral movement of Indonesians in support of the Kashmiri struggle (ANTARA 7

February 2001). Zahir Khan the leader of KSF was noticeably the most outspoken

Indonesian Muslim activist articulating the Kashmir issue in the country. He was born

on 31 January 1947 in Asembagus Situbondo East Java. After completing basic

education in Situbondo and Jember, Zahir undertook double degrees in English and Law

at Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta (graduated in 1967 and 1968 respectively). As

an English scholar and lawyer he developed an academic and professional career at

several institutions, such as the Islamic University of Mohammad Natsir Jakarta and

STIAMI. Zahir has been a Muslim activist since he was at Yogyakarta, as highlighted

by his involvement with the establishment of Muhammadiyah Student Association. In

addition, Zahir’s Islamic credentials are clear, as demonstrated by the important

positions he still holds, for instance, leader of the Iqbal Academy Jakarta since 1988,

13 On the origin and development of Dewan Dakwah, see again Chapter Four.

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chair of ICMI branch (1997-1998) of the Netherlands, foreign relations director of the

Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood Movement (2000-2005), and secretary general of

Dewan Dakwah since 2005 (Khan 2006, 84-6).

Zahir Khan published a book in 2004, titled Kashmir under Indian Occupation, which

reveals his notions on the Kashmir issue. The book makes obvious that Zahir has a

strong anti-Indian position. For instance, he describes what the Indian security forces

have done to Kashmiri Muslims as systematic state-backed violence and terrorism. Like

the KISDI, which showed a pro-Pakistan attitude, Zahir also refers to the ways of

thinking commonly encountered in many Pakistanis regarding the background against

which the Kashmir conflict emerged. India is presented as the invader of Jammu and

Kashmir as well as an arrogant power that refuses a peaceful and just settlement of the

dispute. Nonetheless, Zahir believes that negotiation and diplomacy are the best solution

to the ongoing Kashmiri problem, not violence (Khan 2004, 32; 43-6). This

differentiates him from the radical section of the Indonesian Muslim advocates for

Kashmir.

It was reported that KSF held a one-day seminar titled ‘The Future of Kashmiri

Struggle’ in Jakarta at the end of August 2001 (Editor 22 August 2001). Participants,

which numbered around 200, included the representatives of the Pakistani government,

scholars, journalists, and Muslim activists. The presence of Pakistan’s officials in the

event fortified its symbolic significance. Pro-Pakistan views were predominant in the

discussions. Nonetheless, the conveners denied that the Pakistani mission in Jakarta had

sponsored the seminar. They stressed that the seminar was genuinely the manifestation

of Indonesian Muslims’ solidarity with their Kashmiri brethren, despite shared opinion

between the Pakistani attendants and the Indonesian Muslims.

On this occasion, Pakistani Ambassador to Indonesia Major General Mustafa Anwer

Hussain, who was invited to be the keynote speaker at the seminar, thanked the

Indonesian Muslims who had continued to support the government and people of

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Pakistan in seeking solutions to the Kashmir dispute. According to the ambassador, 13

million people in Kashmir had demonstrated their desire to join Pakistan since 1947. In

dealing with the issue, a solution could not be separated from the 1948 United Nations

resolution, the content of which still remains valid. Moreover, the ambassador added

that India had declined the resolution in 1954 and rejected giving the Kashmiri people

the right to self-determination (ANTARA 22 August 2001)

Mazni Yunus of Dewan Dakwah insisted the Indonesian government support Pakistan’s

efforts to conduct a direct vote in Kashmir. Indonesia needed to give tangible political

backing to the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims, as a part of Indonesian Muslims’

solidarity to their Muslim brothers and sisters in Kashmir. Political support for

Indonesia, according to Yunus, was not entirely in terms of deployment of troops, but

endorsement in international forum for Pakistan and Kashmir. More importantly, Yunus

avowed that the feeling of Islamic brotherhood connected him and many other

Indonesian Muslims to Kashmiri Muslims. The secular political institution called the

nation-state, authorized to govern them, could not sever this kind of bond. Islam is in

the hearts and minds of Muslims and would unite them everywhere. The only law that

could rule Muslims is shari’a, which the secular government of Indonesia had long been

denying. This is why the government did not care about Islamic solidarity with the

Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for freedom (www.dewandakwah.org).

Another seminar was convened by KSF with the theme ‘Kashmiri Struggle for

Independence’. It was held in the city of Bandung West Java on 11 February 2003. No

representatives from the Pakistani government were reported to have taken part. The

attendants were mainly Indonesian Muslim activists of Dewan Dakwah, and some

journalists. Zahir Khan presented his view on how the Indonesian government should

respond to the Kashmir conflict. It was essentially the same as Yunus’s view at the

previous seminar, that ‘the Indonesian government today needs to uphold tangible

political support as well as the spirit of solidarity performed by President Sukarno to

Pakistan and Kashmir…’. Khan emphasized that support should not be in terms of

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military aid, but rather more genuine endorsements in the international forum. He

further claimed that most Muslims in Indonesia have called on the Indian government to

stop terrorizing their Muslim brethren in Kashmir (OANA News 12 February 2003).

Beyond the conference room, Zahir Khan and KSF were active in gathering

humanitarian aid for Kashmiri refugees. In 2005 it was reported that Zahir was able to

collect donations amounting to Rp 15 million for Kashmir. This was given to the

representative of the Kashmiri community at the Pakistani embassy in Jakarta on 5

February 2006 in celebration of Kashmir solidarity day. In appreciation of Zahir’s

advocacy, on 23 March 2006, the Pakistani government bestowed the Tamqhai Quaid-i-

Azam award on him (www.islamonline.net). This was an important episode, in which

Zahir and KSF had demonstrated that the feeling of Islamic solidarity were within the

Muslim ummah, regardless of the restricted scope of their movement.

Kashmir sympathizers within the Indonesian Muslim community also use information

technology. This can be found in jihadist and jihad propaganda webpage appearing as

arrahmah.com. This internet site, launched in 2006, claimed itself to be obliged to

disseminate news and values of jihad against the enemies of the Muslim ummah

through journalism. It claims that the publications in arrahmah.com are based on

objective investigations into a wide range of jihad causes, promoting verifiable

arguments against theories and views discrediting Islam and Muslims. Whilst also as

providing an all-encompassing space for persons, whatever their identities, who love to

express support for jihad. The founder and chair of this link, Mohammad Jibril Abdul

Rahman, was prosecuted by the Indonesian government for his involvement in funding

the July 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta. The Ministry of Communication and

Information had categorized arrahmah.com as a radical jihad mouthpiece. Indeed,

articles available on the webpage indicate voices admiring jihadist figures such as

Osama bin Laden, and communicating ideas spearheading antagonism towards the West

(Jews and Christians), secular governments, and institutions that are regarded as

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infidels. Authors in the webpage promote jihad, in the form of violent fighting, as the

proper way to liberate Muslims from the infidel suppression.

Nearly all articles accessible throughout arrahmah.com covering the Kashmir conflict

are translations of media reports, mainly from the Kashmir Media Centre and Pakistani

press. They tell stories about violence occurring in Kashmir with the majority being

accounted to Indian military personnel. India is a subject of resentment, criticism, and

even condemnation. On the other hand, tales of foreign jihadists in Kashmir, including

Pakistani and Afghan Mujahideens, are hailed as heroic. Consequently the site does not

present objectivity and neutrality in journalism.

Of the 50 to 60 writings on the Kashmir issue, there are only four opinions written by

the arrahmah.com team, these are mainly from the chief editor Mohammad Fachry, and

reflect its collective position towards Kashmir. It is not surprising that a pro-Pakistan

view is excessively displayed. In the article titled ‘Kashmir: A Forgotten Place of Jihad’

posted on 12 March 2008, Fachry points out that the origin of the Kashmir conflict is

entirely related to the Indian occupation of the Muslim land of Jammu and Kashmir

since 1947. In denying the rights of Kashmiri Muslims to self-rule, India has used brutal

forces against civilians in the valley, including women and children, and has committed

human rights crimes against the peoples of Kashmir. As the voice of the radicals, the

only observable solution to the Kashmir problem in Fachry’s writing is total jihad, to

punish and then expel the infidel Indians from the Muslim territories.

As a result of the limited scope of this activism, this kind of Indonesian advocacy for

the struggle of Kashmiri Muslims may not affect the making and implementation of the

government’s policy. Forums such as seminar, or online publications cannot be

expected to obtain a lot of attention. Moreover, the chosen agenda is not very popular to

the Indonesian Muslim public. It is also important to note that radical views and

activities do not receive the support of the, mostly moderate, Indonesian Muslims.

Hence, the Kashmiri sympathizers in Indonesia do not have enough power to influence

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the government’s decision making. There is a continuing distance between the

aspiration of some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community and the

government’s position on the Kashmir issue; a foreign policy that is substantially

guided by the elite’s interest in material geopolitical and economic achievements.

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Chapter Seven

Indonesia-Pakistan Relations And

The Global War On Terrorism

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (US) brought

counterterrorism into the centre-stage of world politics. Americans claimed that al-

Qaeda networks led by Osama bin Laden were responsible for this act of terrorism. At

that time, bin Laden was under the protection of Taliban in Afghanistan. President

George W. Bush initiated a war on terrorism, intending to punish the Taliban regime for

its unwillingness to hand bin Laden over to Washington. Support for Bush’s war on

terrorism came from around the world. France, Japan, and NATO allies deployed their

troops in the battlefield. Regional powers, such as China and India, committed to fully

back the campaign. From the Muslim world, Central Asian countries – Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan – provided their air bases and intelligence for the American

military operation into Afghanistan. Iran also rendered intelligence assistance to

Washington (Buzan 2006, 1014; Wanandi 2002, 185-6).

The government of Pakistan, having created and supported the Taliban since the 1990s,

shifted its policy, and joined Washington’s alliance. Initially Pakistan approached

Taliban leaders to hand bin Laden over to the US security authorities. Following this,

Islamabad offered logistical and intelligence assistance for the American military

operation in Afghanistan, without allowing the presence of American troops in

Pakistan’s territories. Finally, the Pakistani government withdrew recognition of the

Taliban following overwhelming defeat and departure from Kabul in November 2001

(Sayyid 2002, 182).

President Pervez Musharraf explained the decision in terms of the inherent dangers of

not cooperating with the US. Musharraf (2006, 201-2) thought that Pakistan, with its

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weak economic and underwhelmed military power, was unable to survive an armed

conflict with the US. Meanwhile, India had endeavoured to step in by offering the

Americans its full assistance. Had Pakistan rejected to side with the Americans, India

could have attained a strategic advantage in the situation by putting pressure on Pakistan

over the Kashmir issue. Therefore, the government’s policy was to safeguard its vital

interests.

In contrast to the government’s position, Islamists in Pakistan bitterly questioned and

opposed the American-led war on terrorism. For example, through local media they

voiced anxiety about the Bush government associating bin Laden and al-Qaeda

networks with the tragedy of 11 September 2001. These were arguments based on a

conspiracy theory. The Islamists were convinced that the assault on the US was

designed by highly experienced and organized anti-Muslim Jewish intelligence. Bin

Laden and the true Islamic Taliban were the innocent scapegoats for the anti-Islam

collaborators. The primary interest behind war on terrorism was to damage the

reputation of the Islamic religion (Yasmeen 2003, 193-4). The urge for jihad in defence

of the Muslim ummah (community) was sounded everywhere in Pakistan. Reportedly,

following the American military offensive that began on 7 October, thousands of

Pakistani madrasah students crossed the border into Afghanistan to fight jihad with the

Taliban (The News 10 October 2001).

However, those Islamist protests did not affect the government’s policy. Musharraf

wished to improve Pakistan’s international image as a moderate Islamic state by

cracking down on militant groups operating inside the country. On 12 January 2002 the

Pakistani government announced the banning of six major jihadist organizations based

in Pakistan, namely Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Ja’maat-

al-Furqan, Sipah-i-Sahaba-i-Pakistan, and Tahrik-i-Jafariyya. Musharraf’s commitment

to become an important strategic ally in Washington’s war against al-Qaeda was

strengthened by controlling the activities of madrasahs in Pakistan. This was done in

several ways: by asking them to conform the Islamic curricula to the government’s

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standard under the program of madrasah reform; watching their links with radical

Islamist groups, especially those with external financial support; and issuing stringent

regulations for student movements between local madrasahs and overseas students

wanting to attend Islamic education in Pakistan (Noor 2008, 141-4).

Indonesia also responded to the war on terrorism. It responds to both the American

military actions, and also the involvement of Pakistan in that campaign. After 11

September 2001 counterterrorism became an important agenda in Jakarta-Islamabad

relations. This chapter intends to look in more detail at the Indonesian response to the

global war on terrorism as well as examine the impact of the terrorism issue on

Indonesia’s ties with Pakistan.

The argument is that the Indonesian governmental response was constrained by the rise

of Islamist groups in the country. They focused on both turning the country into an

Islamic state, and influencing foreign policy. The Islamists reacted strongly to the

American invasion of Afghanistan. The reaction was not limited to radical groups it also

included moderates who challenged the validity of the US approach. The Islamists in

Indonesia also questioned the Pakistani government’s policy of aligning itself with the

Americans against the Taliban. Jakarta’s response was muted and was not as

forthcoming as Pakistan in joining the global war on terrorism. However after the Bali

bombings the government of Indonesia began to realize the impact of radicalism on the

country’s security. The realization of the impacts of transnational networks between

Islamic militants in Pakistan and Indonesia led Jakarta to promote anti-terrorism

cooperation with Islamabad. The increasing strategic importance of Pakistan

relationship with Indonesia was, primarily underpinned by security needs, however

Islam also remained an important consideration.

In this case, significant developments nationally and internationally meant that the state

no longer dominated the substance of bilateral relations. Often governments must

contemplate and cope with the political and security implications of connections at the

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societal level. The expanding Islamist solidarity connecting the militant groups in

Pakistan and Indonesia concerned Jakarta. Democratization of Indonesia, provided more

political space for radical Islamists, this took place at the same time as the rise of

international terrorist networks signified by the 11 September attacks. Pursuit of

common political goals between Indonesian and international militant Islamist groups,

which remained dormant during the New Order governance, has become a salient issue

for Jakarta.

Indonesian Changing Response to the War on Terrorism

Several days after the 11 September tragedy, President Megawati Sukarnoputri visited

the US. Commentators speculated if the government of the world’s most populous

Muslim country would immediately participate in the war on terrorism. However, after

the meeting with President Bush in the White House on 20 September 2001, Megawati

made no mention of any action her government would take to support the Americans.

Instead, she stated ‘…the people of Indonesia shared Americans’ and the world’s grief

and outrage, and condemned terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations…’ (The

Jakarta Post 21 September 2001). Thus the Indonesian governmental response at that

time was not very loud.

In contrast, the Indonesian Muslim community reacted assertively against the

Americans. Islamist groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (the Islamic Defender Front,

FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin, MMI), and

Laskar Jihad, reacted strongly and protested against the events evolving in Afghanistan.

They fostered ideas such as jihad and daulah Islamiyya (Islamic state) coupled with

paramilitary activities. The groups’ involvement in various kinds of violence led to

them be labelled as radicals.

The FPI, led by Habib Rizieq Shihab, had been established by a group of Arab-

Indonesian ulamas in Jakarta in August 1998. The FPI represented Indonesian

Islamist’s vision that there was an urgent need for the reinforcement of shari’a on all

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Muslims in the country. Rizieq believed shari’a was the best solution to all social,

economic, and political problems faced by Indonesians. Rizieq persuaded FPI’s

members that the main obligation of Muslims was to uphold jihad, and combat the

enemies of Islam - the repressive ruling regime and dominant foreign powers. He

declared that the group’s objective was to defend Muslims everywhere from oppression

(Jahroni 2004, 197-253). In reality, FPI’s activities were more ideologically oriented

rather than religiously. They frequently engaged in violent mass actions against the

existence of the Pancasila state, capitalism, and Westernization.

The challenges to the Pancasila state establishment were also posed by MMI. This

Islamist movement was formed on 7 August 2000 in Yogyakarta. Its leader, Abu Bakar

Ba’asyir, who had been figure in the Darul Islam organization, had previously fled to

Malaysia in 1986 to avoid Suharto’s harsh repression. Ba’asyir spoke of the goal of

MMI to unite all Muslim movements in Indonesia who shared the same ideal - to create

an Islamic state (Kedaulatan Rakyat 8 August 2000). Members of MMI were mostly

veterans of the Afghan war and Darul Islam supporters. Therefore, MMI was called the

reincarnation of Darul Islam. Ba’asyir mentioned that da’wa (Islamic preaching) would

be the main instrument to achieve his organizational goal. To expand MMI’s activism,

Ba’asyir relied on the networks of madrasah alumni, especially those from Ngruki

Sukoharjo Central Java. Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar uplifted the madrasah upon

their return from Malaysia in early 1999. Following the death of Sungkar in September

that year Ba’asyir became the director of the Islamic school.

Laskar Jihad, the movement inspired by Jafar Umar Thalib’s experience fighting jihad

in Afghanistan, was another pillar of Islamic radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia.

Upon arrival from Afghanistan in 1989, Jafar was active in expanding the teaching of

Salafi Wahhabi in Indonesia. He announced the founding of the Forum Komunikasi

Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah (the Communication Forum for the Sunni, FKAWJ) on 14

February 1999 in Solo (Jawa Pos 15 February 1999). This aimed to respond to social

and political changes happening in Indonesian Muslim society after the fall of President

Suharto. Soon however, Jafar was reengaged in violent jihad projects, especially when

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ethnic conflict involving Christians and Muslims broke out in Ambon Maluku Province.

On 30 January 2000 Laskar Jihad was named as the paramilitary wing of FKAWJ in

Yogyakarta. The Laskar opened recruiting centres for jihadists in cities such as Bogor,

Jakarta, Solo, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta. In a mass rally of Laskar Jihad that took place

in Jakarta in April 2000, Jafar claimed that there were 3,000 jihadists ready to fight

against Christians who had killed Muslims in Ambon (Gatra 25 March 2002, 66-8).

Although Jafar was not obsessed with overthrowing the legitimate government, his

militant pursuit of jihad meant fighting against non-Muslims that oppressed Muslims

(Umam 2006, 23).

When American forces entered Afghanistan during the Ramadan holy month, members

of FPI, MMI, and Laskar Jihad gathered on major streets of cities like Bandung, Bogor,

Jakarta, Makassar, Medan, Solo, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta to express their anger at the

US. They shouted anti-American, anti-Bush, anti-Christian and anti-Jewish sentiments.

The angry crowds claimed that the US was staging a war on Islam. Demonstrators

displayed photographs of bin Laden and brought a slogan condemning the US as the

‘Great Satan’. They praised bin Laden for what he had done to the US, calling it a holy

war resisting the evil plan to destroy the Muslim world. For the protesters, bin Laden

was a guiltless victim of American and Jewish conspiracies to direct the war on terror at

Muslims, thus positioning themselves as the greatest enemy of Islam. The masses

burned photographs of President Bush and the American flag, as well as destroying

McDonald and Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise logos. There was also a threat to

purge foreigners, particularly Americans from Solo and Surakarta, which caused

anxiety amongst expatriates (Hasan 2006, 20-1).

FPI, MMI, and Laskar Jihad demanded that the government of President Megawati

freeze diplomatic relations with the US and its allies, specifically the United Kingdom

(UK) and Australia (Republika 8 October 2001). Jafar Umar Thalib even went a step

further by calling for volunteers to go to Afghanistan to fight jihad. Laskar set up jihad

bases in Yogyakarta to serve as recruitment and training centres for the jihadist

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candidates. Laskar’s publications claimed that several hundred volunteers had registered

for the Afghan jihad, and 300 of them had arrived in Peshawar Pakistan ready to cross

over the borders toward Afghanistan (Bulletin Laskar Jihad 10 October 2001, 6). The

FPI did the same. Its operation commander Siradj Alwi claimed that 1,000 jihadists had

been prepared for the holy war in Afghanistan (ANTARA 8 October 2001).

The support for jihad also came from elements of the conservative Muslim group

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the Indonesian Council of Ulama, MUI). The council issued

a fatwa insisting that there was an obligation for all Muslims to fight jihad against the

Americans who were invading the Muslim country of Afghanistan for their own

justification of interests (Sebastian 2003, 432-3). When the US began to bombard

Afghanistan, MUI denounced it as an act of the superpower’s arrogance and oppression

of Muslims. The council renewed its call for jihad. Din Syamsuddin, the secretary

general of MUI, conveyed that his organization would not prevent Muslims (in

Indonesia) who wanted to volunteer in the jihad fii sabilillah (fight for the faith of

Allah) against American forces in Afghanistan, as had been done by Mujahideens

against the Soviets in the 1980s (Panji Masyarakat 8 October 2001).

As mentioned earlier, Islamists in Indonesia also expressed their feelings about

Pakistan’s role in the American-led war on terrorism. Like Islamist voices in Pakistan,

an opinion column published by the Indonesian Islamic bulletin Darul Islam (19

September 2001) praised the Taliban as the only true Islamic state in the world that had

correctly translates the teachings of Qur’an into actions. The Taliban was demonstrating

total jihad through non-cooperative acts towards the world system created and

dominated by Judeo-Christian norms and interests. Therefore, it became an obligation

for all Muslims to support the Taliban’s fighting against the infidel’s conspiracy. The

Pakistani government’s decision to align with the Americans was regarded as un-

Islamic, and thus did not deserve Muslim respect.

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In its editorial on the 3 October 2001 Media Dakwah, a media outlet for the old-

fashioned ulama gathered in Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, warned Muslims in

Pakistan and other countries against providing support for American troops in

Afghanistan because of the Bush administration’s white non-Muslim egotism and spirit

of colonialism. As such the Muslim government in Pakistan should be vigilant

concerning international designs to divide the Islamic world. It quoted Qur’an to justify

the claim; verse 120 of the Sura al-Bakarah which mentions ‘never will the Jews or

Christians be satisfied with yours unless you follow their form of religion…’ and verse

109 of the Sura that says ‘quite a number of People of the Book wish they could turn

you back to infidelity after you have believed…’. In addition, the verse 32 of the Sura

al-Tawbah was referred as noting, ‘the Almighty God makes it clear that they want to

extinguish His religion with their mouths…’. By quoting these Qur’anic verses, the

Islamist agent sent a message to Muslims in Pakistan that one of the possible reasons for

the US existence in Afghanistan was as Judeo-Christian missionaries.

Jafar of Laskar Jihad also challenged the Musharraf government’s alliance with the

American military. In a televised interview with SCTV Indonesia (7 October 2001) he

sent a message to Musharraf calling on him to stop collaborating with the Americans

who wanted to annihilate the Muslim state of Afghanistan. Furthermore, Jafar wished to

remind Pakistanis of their heroic history fighting with Mujahideens against the Soviets,

and this time calling on them to combat another Godless people, the Americans.

According to the Laskar Jihad leader, it was not right for Muslims to stand by a force

performing hate towards Islam. This kind of position, to Jafar’s mind, was a betrayal of

Muslim aqidah (conviction). It was reported as well that a number of Laskar Jihad

members had marched toward the area around the Pakistani embassy in Mega Kuningan

Jakarta to express their demand that the government in Islamabad to withdraw from the

US alliance. However, before reaching the embassy yard they were blocked by police

guards (Forum Kota 9 October 2001).

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Replying to Jafar’s claim, the Pakistani representative in Jakarta argued that Pakistan

was in favour of the war on terror based on its national interests, and the shared

commitment of the international community to exterminate terrorist threats. The

decision was not taken on the grounds of animosity towards the Taliban regime, but the

political and strategic requirement of safeguarding Pakistan’s vital national interests14.

Even though the consideration behind the decision was not explicitly explained, it is in

accordance with the policy line taken by President Musharraf.

In dealing with the Muslim public’s reactions to the US’ policy, the Megawati

government issued a six-point-statement on 8 October, outlining its response to the

American military campaign in Afghanistan. The statement affirmed that: 1) the

Indonesian government expressed a deep concern that a military action was finally

carried out; 2) Indonesia noted the statement by the American government that military

operation would only be launched against terrorist training camps and military

installations, and that the operation would not imply an act against Islam; 3) Indonesia

hoped that the operation would be confined in terms of targets and duration so that

minimized civilian casualties; 4) Indonesia called on the United Nations (UN) to

undertake collective response to restore the situation; 5) the Indonesian government

warned that reactions from the Indonesian society should not be expressed in ways

violating the law, and 6) Indonesia would provide humanitarian aid to ease the impact

of war felt by the people of Afghanistan (Indonesian Office of State Secretariat 8

October 2001).

The Indonesian governmental stand took a middle-of-the-road approach, indicating an

unpreparedness to take a decisive option. Megawati was aware of the consequences of

forming policy that confronted the American-led global campaign against al-Qaeda. At

the same time, domestic Muslim groups’ pressure could not simply be ignored. As a

result, the ensuing policy needed to conform to these circumstances, thus prompting

Indonesia to take a weak response to the war on terrorism. In relation to Pakistan’s

support for the American invasion of Afghanistan, Jakarta chose not to make any 14 This statement was conveyed during an interview done in March 2011.

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remarks or to intervene. An Indonesian foreign affairs official later conveyed this15; ‘the

principle of independent activism in our foreign politics knows no actions of interfering

on other countries’ international affairs as long as they do not affect to Indonesia…’.

The government’s position upset radical Muslim groups who thought that Megawati had

failed to condemn the American aggression in Afghanistan. For instance, Habib Rizieq

of FPI, in a radio interview, alleged that the government had indirectly supported

Washington’s military campaign by pronouncing its hope that the operation should be

limited in terms of targets and duration. Indonesia had agreed with military action even

though America could not prove its accusation against al-Qaeda. Quoting from the

Taliban regime’s statement after the 11 September attacks that it would have handed bin

Laden over to America had the latter been able to support its claim with evidence,

Rizieq argued that the Taliban had not tried to protect Osama bin Laden. Thus, the

American invasion was merely a show of force by the arrogant power, and was why the

‘government that is Muslim ha[d] to stay quiet in seeing such injustice…’ (ANTARA

10 October 2001).

Muslim pressure increased especially when moderate elements from Nahdlatul Ulama

and Muhammadiyah who formed the majority also expressed disapproval of the

American approach to terrorism. The leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama doubted the truth

fostered by the US government regarding the involvement of Osama bin Laden and al-

Qaeda in the 11 September attacks. In a column published by the national non-Islamic-

oriented newspaper Kompas (9 October 2001) the Head of Nahdlatul Ulama branch of

East Java argued that firstly it a clear definition of terrorism should be established and

then a decision could be made about whether or not the attacks on 11 September 2001

could be categorized as terrorism. The chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, Hasyim Muzadi,

added that Washington had to provide solid evidence linking bin Laden and the

terrorists’ attacks on the US (Kay 2005, 14).

15 This statement was made during an interview conducted in February 2010.

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Voices from Muhammadiyah said that the US’ definition of terrorism was highly

discriminatory. There was little disagreement over the categorisation of the 11

September attacks, and other attacks against embassies and warships that Osama bin

Laden and al-Qaeda had admitted to carrying out, as terrorism. However the

categorisation of people struggling against a foreign occupation as was questionable.

This meant that Palestinians fighting for their freedom against Israeli rule could be also

written off as terrorism acts. Therefore, Muhammadiyah suggested that the government

in Washington had to fully understand that international law legitimized people’s rights

to self-defence, while Terrorism was politically motivated violence (Suara

Muhammadiyah 10 October 2001).

Muslim leaders, including those of the two largest Islamic organizations, made a

collective statement signed on 12 October 2001 in Jakarta to request to the government

to make a firmer stand against the American-led campaign in Afghanistan (Jawa Pos 13

January 2001). Responding to increasing Muslim pressure, Megawati modified her

policy and criticized the US’ invasion of Afghanistan. At the Istiqlal Grand Mosque of

Jakarta on the celebration of Isra Mi’raj 14 October 2001, Megawati gave a speech

noting ‘it [was] unacceptable if someone, a group, or even a state – arguing for their

cause to hunt down the perpetrators of terror – attacks people of other country…’. The

Indonesian president went to make her government’s perspective clear; ‘in international

law, there are rules that must be observed, and without obeying them, a strike that at the

beginning has meant to combat violence will itself at the end become terror…’.

Moreover, President Megawati expressed her concern at events in Afghanistan with

assertive words; ‘blood could not be washed out with blood…’ (liputan6.com). With the

choice of place and content of the Megawati’s statement, it was obvious that the

government’s policy was more accommodative towards the Muslim peoples’ feeling.

This signal of change given by the president soon received favourable follow up from

key members of the cabinet, who agreed with the argument that the way that the

American government handled global terrorism was inappropriate both for long-term

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security prospects, and diplomatic legitimacy. The Coordinating Minister of Political

and Security Affairs General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono argued that the American

military action in Afghanistan could expand internal conflict into regional and global

conflagrations. More importantly, it could further radicalize Muslims around the world,

with the possibility of sparking a clash of civilizations (Gatra Online 17 October 2001).

Criticism of the American policy was followed by Jakarta’s reluctance to support

unilateral action in the war on terror. At the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) meeting in mid October 2001 held in Shanghai China, Indonesian Foreign

Minister Hassan Wirayuda delivered a speech emphasizing that international efforts to

respond to global terror must be under the umbrella of the UN. The UN should initiate

collective action to combat terrorism (ANTARA 20 October 2001). After a meeting

with Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell, Foreign Minister Wirayuda reaffirmed that

Jakarta preferred an international coalition to American unilateral military operations

(Kompas 20 October 2001). This implied that Indonesia was not convinced of the

correctness and political legitimacy of the American war on terrorism.

The Megawati government’s position was difficult to negotiate. There was the need to

take into account domestic Muslim pressure on the one hand, and the notion of the

state’s security and diplomatic considerations on the other. Megawati wanted to secure

her governance amidst domestic and external difficulties. In terms of the government

and Muslim community relations, Muslim leaders welcomed the change of Megawati’s

policy towards the US. For instance, Abdillah Taha of Muhammadiyah and Dyn

Syamsuddin of MUI conveyed that the government had listened to the aspirations of the

Muslim people. They could understand, however, that the Indonesian government did

not want to condemn America directly, and the position taken was already proportional

(Tempo Interaktif 22 October 2001). Thus, Megawati was able to manage the

widespread anxiety in the country’s Muslim people about the war on terrorism

occurring in Afghanistan.

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However, Megawati’s accommodative policy on domestic Muslim concern gradually

resulted in apprehension between Jakarta and its Southeast Asian neighbours. This was

visible following the arrests and uncovering of suspected terrorist networks by

Malaysian and Singaporean security authorities in December 2001 and January 2002.

The suspects were planning to bomb the American embassy and other targets in

Singapore. Later, in March 2002, the Philippines government unveiled activities of

some Indonesian militant Muslims in Mindanao, and put them under police custody.

They included Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Abu Jibril Abdurrahman, Taufik Abdul Halim,

Faiz Abu Bakr Bafana, Agus Dwikarna, Tamsil Linrung and Abdul Jamal Balfas (The

Jakarta Post 22 March 2002). Pressure was put upon Megawati to carry out more

significant measures to crack down on militant networks in the country. These ASEAN

members argued that evidence was uncovered about the operation of transnational

networks of terrorists under the Jemaah Islamiyah organization approved and led by

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir of MMI. Indonesia was asked to hand Ba’asyir over to the US

investigators for his suspected links with the incarcerated militants as part of the global

networks of al-Qaeda. However, Jakarta was reluctant to do so, causing frustration

amongst the pro-American ASEAN governments. They warned Indonesia that its

protection of terrorists might have security implications for the region (Sukma 2005, 58-

60).

A polemic also arose between Indonesia and the global coalition of anti-terrorism. The

American and Australian governments rejected the alteration of Megawati’s policy. The

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer pointed out that Indonesia had weakened its

commitment to oppose terrorism. The Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer

even came out with a strong statement asking the Indonesian government to resist

domestic Muslim pressure (Tempo Interaktif 22 October 2001). Foreign media directed

a firestorm of criticisms at Indonesia. They bluntly accused the government and Muslim

community in the country of having provided the fertile soil for the growth of

extremism leading to Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, and of protecting terrorists

escaping from the American-led global coalition wrath (National Review 8 April 2002;

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The Age 22 March 2002). Jakarta denied all allegations. Vice President Hamzah Haz,

who was a Muslim figure and head of the Islamic-oriented Partai Persatuan

Pembangunan (the United Development Party, PPP), earnestly gave his counterpoint

‘there is no terrorist in Indonesia…and there is no organization called as Jemaah

Islamiyah linked to al-Qaeda in the country…it is merely a baseless accusation…’

(www.old.hidayatullah.com).

External critical voices did not affect Jakarta. Instead, domestic situations proved to be

the stronger determinant to the government’s policy on the terrorism issue. This was

evident when the devastating Bali bombings occurred on 12 October 2002 and took 202

lives of mostly foreign tourists (88 were Australians), and injured hundreds of others as

well as destroying dozens of buildings. Megawati’s government changed its position on

the war on terrorism. It began by realizing and acknowledging that terrorists were

physically present in the country. This was followed by promoting a counterterrorism

policy, with the removal of radicalism as its essential component. The Indonesian

government formulated regulations, built institutional capacity, and allocated resources

to back up its counterterrorism measures. The bulk of these efforts lay in the authority

of the Indonesian Police (POLRI) and law enforcement apparatus (Widjojo 2005, 198-

201).

Suspicion of the involvement of the Jemaah Islamiyah networks strengthened in the

months following the arrests of Amrozi, Ali Ghufron, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera,

Abdul Rauf and Hambali, in relation to the Bali bombings. Hambali, or Riduan

Isammudin, was suspected of being the principal operator of the Jemaah Islamiyah

group. He had provided accommodation in Malaysia for Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf

al-Hazmi - the two hijackers of the American Airline that crashed into the Pentagon.

They were all believed to be associated with the Ngruki madrasah led by Ba’asyir, and

underwent jihad training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mindanao

Southern Philippines. This supported the claim that Ba’asyir’s madrasah was at the

centre of terrorists acting as al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian associates (Hasan 2006, 22-3).

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The Islamists opposed the change of the government’s policy. Arguments arouse to

relate it to the American and/or foreign powers’ agitation and intervention. Analysis

was based on conspiracy theories. According to a journalist affiliated with the Islamic-

oriented newspaper Republika Dedi Junaedi (2003), the Bali bombings were used by the

government to justify policies on cracking down on Islamic activists in the country, and

had been planned and executed by foreign intelligence services, particularly the

Americans and Jewish state of Israel. This claim was supported by a pro-Islamist

Indonesian intelligence expert Z. A. Maulani (BBC News 13 October 2002) argued that

the bomb explosions in Bali, which had caused such an extraordinary scale of

destruction, could only have been carried out by highly organized and trained secret

services or special commando units equipped with micro-nuclear devices. Therefore,

the Islamists were convinced that no Indonesian Muslims were able to carry out these

attacks, and no terrorists were operating from within their country. The Islamists in

addition believed that the Indonesian government had been persuaded by promises of

financial benefits for collaborating with the Americans and Jews in destroying Islamic

movements.

The government countered this view. It argued that policies issued to deal with

terrorism in the country were accorded on hard facts and the consideration of

maintaining the security of Indonesians. The Coordinating Minister of Political and

Security Affairs General Yudhoyono urged the Indonesian people to stop debating

conspiracy theories behind the Bali tragedy, because these analyses emerged from sheer

speculation. He rejected the statement of the Islamists connecting the government’s

counterterrorism efforts with interests of other countries. Rather, Yudhoyono stressed;

‘We now have solid evidence that terrorists exist in our country, and their actions are

threatening the tranquillity and security of Indonesians…’. In addition to Yudhoyono’s

point, the Indonesian Police Chief General Da’i Bachtiar acknowledged; ‘the security

authorities encountered that [the] terrorists bombing Bali were Indonesians but linked to

global networks…’ (Media Indonesia 11 August 2003).

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The Indonesian government realized that terrorism was a real danger to the country’s

security. The actors behind the terror were not limited to local networking but connected

to groups or individuals in other countries. Expert analysis and documents obtained

from interrogation of the captured terrorist suspects resulted in the realization that

Jemaah Islamiyah was operationally a transnational militant Islamic group of Southeast

Asians with links to Islamists in South Asia, particularly Pakistan. They formed

connections through militant group networks, Indonesian students in Pakistan, and

probably moderate Islamic and non-political-oriented movement of Tablighi Jamaat.

Indonesia-Pakistan Militant Networks

The evolution of radical Islamic thinking and activism in Indonesia cannot be separated

from the events taking place in Afghanistan. During the 1980s when the Soviet Union

entered Afghanistan, thousands of Indonesian Muslim volunteers along with Muslim

counterparts from other countries went to that country to undertake jihad and expel the

Soviets. There in Afghanistan, the jihadists were attracted by the prospects of obtaining

military skills that could then be applicable for jihad in Indonesia. This was illustrated

by the continuing visits of Indonesians to Afghanistan for jihad-related purposes even

after the Soviets had gone. In Afghanistan, the most extreme members of the Jemaah

Islamiyah became familiar with ideas and leaders of al-Qaeda. It was not surprising that

the militant group accepted the 1998’s call from al-Qaeda to fight jihad against

‘Christians and crusades’ - the idea that inspired the Bali bombings of 2002. To reach

Afghanistan, jihadists from Indonesia had to go through Pakistan. However, Pakistan

was not only a transit point. After the Soviet departed, Pakistan became an important

place for Indonesian jihadists wishing to take part in military training in local, and al-

Qaeda militant camps in the country (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 15). With this

position, Islamist groups in Pakistan had to some degree played an important role in

facilitating the creation of the group Jemaah Islamiyah and its militant connections.

The making of Jemaah Islamiyah and its Indonesia-Pakistan militant connections

evolved in two phases. The first phase was the introduction of organizational doctrine

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that occurred in the early 1990s, and the second phase was the shaping of operational

paramilitaries taking place since the mid 1990s. In the first phase, militant figures

especially Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar played the seminal role in

determining the ideals and strategies of Jemaah Islamiyah struggle. Later on in the

second phase, Ba’asyir and Sungkar assigned Hambali to form the military faction of

Jemaah Islamiyah by recruiting Afghan veterans from Southeast Asia. Hambali

arranged for the new recruits to join military training camps in Pakistan and

Afghanistan and as well mobilizing funding for their jihad projects.

Since 1986, Ba’asyir and Sungkar had been in exile in Malaysia. They were engaged in

the Islamic study community known as the Jamaah Sunnah al-Islam based in Kuala

Pilah where Ustad Hashim Ghani offered them hospitality. In 1993 the two clerics

established a religious group called al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah which meant ‘the

community of Muslims’, later becoming the infamous Jemaah Islamiyah. Initially, the

group was set up to continue the ideas and teachings of the Darul Islam organization, to

found an Islamic state of Indonesia. Nonetheless, this changed when the Afghan jihad

against the Soviets neared an end in the early 1990s. Ba’asyir and Sungkar made active

communications with al-Gama’at al-Islamiyah, a splinter radical group of Egypt’s

Muslim Brotherhood that was then linked to al-Qaeda. Ba’asyir and Sungkar were

inspired by this group to move beyond the ideology of Darul Islam into the more

militant Pan-Islamism line of building an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia (Barton

2004, 50).

The feature of the Jemaah Islamiyah organization was presented in a 44-page handbook

consisting of five parts known as the Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama’ah al-

Islamiyyah, or the General Guidance for the Struggle of al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyyah,

PUPJI. It was written in 1993 by a collective of Jemaah Islamiyah leadership under the

guidance of their ideologue Ba’asyir and Sungkar (Oak 2010, 989-990). The PUPJI

defined the ultimate goal of Jemaah Islamiyah’s movement to be the restoration of the

Islamic caliphate. To this end, the Islamization of Indonesia can be deemed as a

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fundamental component of a broader ideological vision that viewed daulah Islamiyya as

the necessary catalyst for the shaping of Islamic governance covering the region of

Southeast Asia. Such an outcome can be reached through a two-step process. The first

step was to develop a puritanical movement with its members having religious social,

political, and military identity. To accelerate this process, it needed to establish a base

of cadres who were steadfast in their obedience and fully committed to the

organization’s long-term objectives. The second step indicated that the group of

individuals with their personal strengths of faith, brotherhood, and fortitude would be

tasked to undertake armed jihad against the polytheists, apostates, atheists, and immoral

peoples. The militant character of Jemaah Islamiyah is clearly described here. However,

PUPJI still places a substantial emphasis on da’wa with the purpose of preserving the

righteousness of Islamic principles. In a sense, the Islamist group combines violent and

peaceful struggles of jihad.

Information revealed by POLRI’s investigation team from interrogations of the arrested

Jemaah Islamiyah’s leaders, especially Abu Rusdan in 2003 and Ustadz Adung in 2004,

showed the Islamist group’s projection in regional armed jihad. This is informed in the

geographical scope and functions of its sections called mantiqi. Mantiqi 1 covered

Malaysia (except for Sabah), Singapore and Southern Thailand. This section functioned

to ensure economic support of Jemaah Islamiyah. Mantiqi 2 included the Indonesian

archipelago, excluding Sulawesi and Kalimantan Islands. This section was directed to

be the recruitment and chairmanship base for Jemaah Islamiyah cadres. Mantiqi 1 and 2

were established in 1993, followed by the building of mantiqi 3 in 1997. Mantiqi 3

encompassed Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Southern Philippines and were

designated as training facilities and for weapon procurement. And lastly, mantiqi 4

touched Australia and Papua New Guinea, as fundraising areas. There is no information

when mantiqi 4 was founded or started to operate. Hambali chaired the establishment of

these regional elements (POLRI 2003; 2004).

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There is no exact number known and agreed on by experts and investigators about the

Jemaah Islamiyah cadres. Nevertheless, it is estimated that during the heights of this

organization’s terrorism between 2002 and 2003, there were about 2,000 activists with

no less than 500 armed jihadists with the support of about 5,000 passive sympathizers at

madrasahs established by Jemaah Islamiyah’s figures in Southeast Asia, the majority of

which were located in Indonesia. They were mostly alumni of the al Mukmin Ngruki

madrasah uplifted by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir16.

Between 1998 and 2001 Hambali organized for his mantiqi 1’s members to visit

Taliban-controlled Afghanistan areas to observe what a real Islamic state looked like,

and to receive short-term military training under the al-Qaeda commanders. One of the

trainees was Azhari Husin, a Malaysian national, who along with Abdul Matin from

Indonesia, were responsible as the bomb-makers behind the bombings in Kuta Bali

October 2002 (ICG 2003). An important Jemaah Islamiyah’s commander Muhammad

Rais – who was in charge as a military instructor at al-Qaeda’s Camp al-Farouk in

Afghanistan where Indonesians received training – claimed that the trainees also went

to the training camps run by Pakistan’s extremist group Lashkar-e-Toiba in Pakistan-

held Kashmir. Such military education received by the Jemaah Islamiyah members was

consistent with Lashkar’s track record of rendering jihad preparation exercises for

foreign jihadists. An acknowledgement by a member of an Indonesian extremist

community indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s affiliated Jama’at ud Da’wa Party

(JuD) carried on rendering training and education for the Indonesian extremists who had

to go to Pakistan to attend them (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 24-5). This

indicates that connections between Indonesian and Pakistani militants had taken shape

before the 2002 Bali bombings. Lashkar-e-Toiba contributed in at least some extent to

the development of Jemaah Islamiyah’s paramilitary capability that enabled them to

launch their terrorist acts.

Before 2000, Lashkar-e-Toiba was not known to extend activities and links with

militant groups in Southeast Asia. Only when ethnic and religious conflicts broke out in 16 This information was obtained through an interview with an Indonesian investigator in December 2010.

248

the Indonesian Province of Maluku and Central Sulawesi, did indications of Lashkar-e-

Toiba cadres’ involvement in the violent events become detected. It is mentioned in

Indonesia’s Coordinating Ministry of Political and Security Affairs’ investigative report

that between April and July 2000, at the height of deadly conflicts between Muslims

and Christians in Ambon Maluku and Poso Central Sulawesi, a group of 30 to 40

foreign jihadists –Pakistanis – arrived in the battlefields to join the jihad struggle with

local al-Qaeda’s cells, Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin. Hambali again played a

significant role in the events. He organized funding from al-Qaeda for jihad in Ambon

and Poso, and with the help of Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin was able to

arrange for the arrival of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s militias in these two conflict areas (Tim

Pencari Fakta Konflik Ambon Dan Poso 2002, 13-5).

Lashkar-e-Toiba (literally the army of the pure) was founded in Kunar Province of

Afghanistan by a group of salafis who were undertaking Afghan jihad. Lashkar was set

up as a paramilitary wing of Markaz ud-Da’wa wal-Irshad (MDI), a fundamentalist

group linked to the Ahl-e Hadith sect led by Hafeez Saeed. The MDI’s basis is still

located in Muridke near Lahore Pakistan. Lashkar’s first recorded presence was in 1993

in Jammu and Kashmir when 12 Pakistani and Afghan infiltrators crossed over the line

of control into the Indian part of the state. This group had changed the focus of its

struggle into liberating Kashmir from the Indian rule. Since its inception, Lashkar-e-

Toiba has been promoted by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) for its

intrusion projects into Indian-held Kashmir (Swami 2005, 61-2).

This Islamist group defines its goals in national and regional terms. It attempted to

promote twin ideological and operational agendas. Specifically, Lashkar-e-Toiba seeks

to Islamize Pakistan’s social and political system towards the creation of a truthfully

theocratic state of Pakistan. To a large extent, Lashkar wants to exploit the ethno-

nationalism-based conflict in Kashmir, which in turn would incite the wider Islamic

religious revolt in India and the neighbouring South Asian countries (Rabasa 2007, 81-

2). Initially, from the base in Pakistani Punjab, Lashkar-e-Toiba focused on ground

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activities in the Srinagar Valley. They then expanded to encompass Delhi, especially the

Red Port shown in the 2008 Mumbai bombings (Tankel 2009). In the aftermath of the

militant crackdowns by the Musharraf government, the organization of Lashkar-e-Toiba

was reshuffled. It was restructured into two exclusively independent wings. One is

Jama’at-ud-Da’wa, which concentrates on Islamic preaching with Hafeez Saeed as its

chief, and the other is the Lashker-e-Toiba operating in Kashmir, led by a Kashmiri

scholar Maulana Abdul Wahid (Rana 2004, 340-1).

Laskar Jundullah was founded in 2000 as a militia of Komite Penegakan Hukum Sharia

Indonesia (the Committee for Enforcing the Shari’a Law in Indonesia), led by Agus

Dwikarna, a Jemaah Islamiyah figure under arrest of the Philippines authority in March

2002. Laskar Jundullah was involved in destructive action against symbols of Western

decadence and commercialism, including fast-food outlets, karaoke bars, gambling

halls, and drinking establishments located in Central Sulawesi Province. Its most

spectacular violence was a series of bomb attacks that struck Jakarta and Manila in

December 2000, for which Agus Dwikarna was sentenced to 18 years in jail (ICG

2004).

Laskar Mujahidin also emerged in 2000 under the chairmanship of Abu Jibril, and was

affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah. Singaporean police arrested him in 2001. This

organization initially functioned as a conduit for recruiting jihadists to fight against

Christians in Ambon and Poso. Laskar Mujahidin was backed up by an Islamic charity

known as Komite Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (the Committee for Mitigating the

Impact of Crisis, KOMPAK) under the aegis of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia.

The mission of this aid organization was to assist Muslims affected by natural disasters,

conflict, and poverty. However, in common with Laskar Jundullah, Laskar Mujahidin’s

real focus has been on the total implementation of shari’a in Indonesia, while the anti-

Christian struggle in Central Sulawesi acted as a training ground for the larger

objective; the complete Islamization of the Indonesian state as the precondition for the

founding of Southeast Asian caliphate (ICG 2002b).

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Hambali of Jemaah Islamiyah, Lashkar-e-Toiba of Pakistan, Laskar Jundullah and

Laskar Mujahidin were linked by their experience in undertaking jihad in Afghanistan

during the 1980s. Hambali, Agus Dwikarna and Abu Jibril were all veterans of Afghan

jihad. The interaction they have made with other jihadists, including Pakistanis, may

have developed into transnational Islamic solidarity. The victory of jihad to expel a

communist superpower like the Soviet Union from Afghanistan inspired the Indonesian

jihadists to rebuild the struggle in their country. Moreover, they expressed Islamic

views in the same way, that is, that the Islamization of the state was the requisite for the

establishment of regional caliphate. Having such commonalities in faith and strategic

objectives, they were highly likely to help each other in their struggles.

It is, however, unclear whether Lashkar-e-Toiba interposes its religious doctrine onto

Indonesian jihadists, or to what extent the Lashkar influences the Indonesian jihadists

during their military training. Yet ex-paramilitary of Laskar Jundullah revealed that

when the Pakistani jihadists arrived to assist him and others with warfare skills at the

jihad base in Poso, he was introduced to the rigorous instruction of Ahl-e-Hadith

tradition with the particular physical discipline of offering prayers. However, this

tradition is not popular with Indonesians (Fajar 22 March 2002). The literature

published by Lashkar-e-Toiba from 2000 onwards suggests that it was interested in

observing developments of Muslim-related issues in Indonesia, and as such some

cooperation with militants in the country may have occurred. Lashkar believed

Christians who received the backing of the US, and the neighbouring countries such as

Australia and New Zealand, were massacring Indonesian Muslims. The Indonesian

government was described as a collaborator in this process on account of its silence and

failure to pay attention to the plight of Muslims in its country17.

Activities of jihadists from Pakistan and Afghanistan prior to the Bali bombings of 2002

were also noticed in their involvement with Laskar Jihad’s paramilitary actions in the

Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon. Laskar Jihad was, therefore, suspected of having 17 The resource of this statement is unpublished information by Samina Yasmeen, January 2011.

251

connections with al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. It was reported that on 7 July 2000

seven Afghans arrived in Ambon, and were spirited away by Laskar Jihad forces. Those

Afghans joined some 200 other Afghans, Pakistanis, and Malays who had already

arrived. This included both individuals and financial support. Laskar Jihad had received

money for jihad from Osama bin Laden and his international Mujahideen networks. Bin

Laden provided money for weapons, and other tools needed, as well as mobilized

fighters to go to jihad hotspots. He continued to do so wherever jihad manifested into

armed struggles, including Ambon. In addition, bin Laden’s trusted assistant Abu Abdul

Aziz was sent to Ambon during the height of Laskar Jihad’s holy war (Abuza 2003,

150).

Jafar Umar Thalib denied such an accusation. He insisted that Laskar Jihad had no ties

with Osama bin Laden or any other organizations related to al-Qaeda or other forms of

movements associated with international networks that Westerners claimed were

terrorists. Rather, Laskar Jihad was a purely home-grown and locally funded religious

group. Jafar even mentioned that when he was fighting jihad in Afghanistan in late

1980s, he had met with bin Laden, but soon realized that the latter was a man empty of

knowledge of Islam (Tempo Interaktif 24 September 2001). However, one could argue

that whatever the nature of the links were, their connections became significant as Jafar,

through Laskar Jihad, opposed the war on terrorism – expressions supported by other

Pakistani and Indonesian Islamists. The leaders and members of the Islamist groups

built upon these relations and both questioned and challenged their governments. Laskar

Jihad did not just criticize the Indonesian governmental position, but also the Pakistani

government participation in the American alliance, and lack of support for the Taliban.

In addition Jafar’s claim of the successful dispatching of Indonesian Muslim fighters to

Peshawar was a strong indication that he had the tendency to be associated with jihadist

groups from Pakistan and Taliban in combating the American military.

Indonesian Students in Pakistan

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Southeast Asian students, particularly from Indonesia, attending Islamic educational

institutions in Pakistan were discovered to be engaged in the development of Jemaah

Islamiyah transnational networks. Information leading to the uncovering of this nexus

was the arrest of Hambali in Thailand on 11 August 2003 (Asia Times 12 March 2003).

In 1999, Hambali asked his younger brother Rusman Gunawan (Gun Gun) and Abu

Bakar Ba’asyir’s son Abdul Rahim to gather students from Indonesia, Malaysia, and

Singapore attending Islamic studies at Abu Bakr Islamic University and University of

Islamic Studies in Karachi. They were grouped clandestinely in a cell known as al-

Ghuraba. The cell was reported to have between 20 to 40 members. Nonetheless, its

exact purpose was blurred. It may have been formed upon the model of al-Qaeda leader

Abdullah Azzam’s Maktab al-Khidamat (office of services) that facilitated foreign

jihadists during the anti-Soviet resistance. Hence, there was a possibility that al-

Ghuraba intended to be the transit point for foreign jihadists before continuing on to

jihad in Taliban-held Afghanistan. Importantly, many of the Indonesian students

belonging to al-Ghuraba cell were alumni of Ba’asyir’s al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah

(Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 23-4). This sends a message that they had

ideological, and to some degree, religious connections to Jemaah Islamiyah.

The existence and activities of the al-Ghuraba cell were unveiled in September 2003 in

the aftermath of the Pakistani security services detection and apprehension of its

members in Karachi (AFP News 22 September 2003). The detainees consisted of 16

Malays, 12 Thais, and 6 Indonesians including Gun Gun. Hambali’s causin Dhani in

Indonesia who was sent a picture of him confirmed the presence of Gun Gun. The other

students were Muhammad Saifuddin, David Pintarto, Muhammad Anwar Siddiqi, Ilham

Sopandi and Furqon Abdullah. Gun Gun was seized on 1 September 2001, Saifuddin on

20 September 2001, while the other four were held two days later. Both Gun Gun and

Saifuddin were captured at a private hostel owned by the Abu Bakr Islamic University

Karachi. Because his father had called him to go home to get married Abdul Rahim was

not part of those incarcerated (ANTARA 1 October 2003).

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Shaykh Muhammad Safarullah established the Abu Bakr Islamic University in 1978.

The Imam and Khatib of Haram Muhammad bin Abdullah As-Subail laid the

foundation stone. The university entirely followed in Islamic curriculum of the Medina

Islamic University, Jamia Islamiyya, and Jamia Imam Muhammad bin Saud Riyadh,

which was committed to teaching the aqidah of Salaf us Salih. The Abu Bakr Islamic

University was the only educational institution in Pakistan that was affiliated to the

Rabitat ul Alam al Islam (the World Muslim Council) organization, its funding is

supported by Saudi Arabians. Teaching staff have been recruited from around the

Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and graduates of local

Pakistani Jamia. For teaching and learning process, students at the university are not

allowed to use languages other than Arabic for medium in classrooms

(www.siratemustaqeem.com). Owing to salafis connections, Abu Bakr Islamic

University has close links to Jama’at-e-Mujahideen - which was founded by Syed

Ahmed Shahid and Maulana Mohammad Islmail Dehlvi Shahid, which was a jihadist

organization fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Thus, Jamia Abu Bakr

turned into an extension of ideology of the Jama’at and became engaged in jihad

activism18. Considering this Islamic characteristic of the Abu Bakr Islamic University, it

was very likely that Indonesian students were espoused to the militancy of Salafi

Wahhabi teachings, particularly on the doctrine and practice of jihad against whom they

considered as kafir (infidel).

Days after the arrests of the six Indonesian students, according to the spokesman of

Pakistan Ministry of Home Affairs Iftiqar Ahmed, no charges had been laid and an

investigation into their cases was underway. However, Ahmed was sure that they had

violated Pakistan’s immigration law (AFP News 22 September 2003). As mentioned

earlier, the Musharraf government was employing closer regulation and control over the

entry and circulation of foreign students within Pakistan’s Islamic educational

institutions. This policy, which had started in early 2002, included charges and further

deportation of foreign students overstaying in the country (PPI News 13 January 2002).

18 This is unpublished information by Samina Yasmeen - January 2011.

254

The spokesman of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, the then

foreign minister, in response to the news from Pakistan, said that they – specifically the

Indonesian students – might be charged of immigration-related issues unless they

registered at any Indonesian representative offices in Pakistan (ANTARA 24 September

2003). Nevertheless, Marty did not comment on the possibility of terrorism charges on

the students.

It turned out that the four Indonesian students arrested on 22 September were staying at

the Jami’at al-Dirasat madrasah on the day the guest of honour at the school was

Hafeez Saeed, the leader of Jama’at ud-Da’wa that was associated with the banned

militant group Lashkar-e-Toiba (PPI News 24 September 2003). This raised speculation

that the Indonesian students and other Southeast Asians were too engaged in the militant

activities promoted by Lashkar-e-Toiba.

The government in Jakarta responded this to. After a week of detention of the Karachi

students the Indonesian government dispatched a joint team of investigators, comprising

of two officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one each from POLRI and the

National Intelligence Office (BIN). Given the composition of the Indonesian joint team,

it would suggest that the arrested students were going to be interrogated and charged

with militant activism, and maybe even terrorism. If the case were merely an

immigration-related issue, the Indonesian foreign affairs representative in Pakistan

would have handled it. Senior Commissioner Zainuri Lubis a spokesman for the

Indonesian police later confirmed that the Indonesian students in custody in Pakistan

may have been involved in activities sponsoring terrorism (ANTARA 30 September

2003).

After nearly six weeks undergoing joint investigations into the charges of terrorism, all

six Indonesian students were eventually deported from Pakistan. A Pakistani security

official announced that they were discovered to be a sleeper cell of the Southeast Asian

terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (AFP News 12 December 2003). Upon arrival in

255

Jakarta on 12 December, the suspected terrorists were immediately put in a police

detention centre in Jakarta. An official of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Sahwin Adenan, who had corroborated in their deportation, pointed out that the

Pakistani government, at the request of Jakarta, had approved to hand the students over

to Indonesian authorities for further investigations into the terrorism-related charges

(ANTARA 13 December 2003).

Analysis and interrogation resulted in verification that al-Ghuraba cell was really part of

the Jemaah Islamiyah network, having undergone training in Pakistan. Details of the

students were (Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 26-7):

1. David Pintarto. Born in Sei Liput Aceh Province in 1981; studied at al Mukmin

Ngruki madrasah in 1997; then moved to Darussyahada madrasah in Boyolali.

When in Pakistan, David attended Abu Bakr Islamic University. After two

months under police arrest in Indonesia, he was freed without being tried.

2. Muhammad Anwar Siddiqi. Born in Magelang Central Java in 1982; studied at

al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah in 1996 and moved to Darussyahada madrasah in

2001; while in Pakistan enrolled at Abu Bakr Islamic University. Following two

months of police custody in Indonesia, Siddiqi was released without being

prosecuted.

3. Furqon Abdullah. This Indonesian student was born in Purworejo Central Java

in 1976; attended al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah from 1986 to 1994; then moved

to Ulul Albab madrasah in Solo; while in Pakistan studied Islam at Abu Bakr

Islamic University. He was sentenced to 14 months on document fraud

following police interrogation in Indonesia and being put on trial.

4. Muhammad Saifuddin. Born in Seleman Yogyakarta in 1980; became a student

at al Mukmin Ngruki madrasah between 1992 and 1995; then moved to

Darussyahada madrasah and joined the terrorist training camp known as Camp

Hudaibiyah of Mindanao Southern Philippines from 1998 to March 2000, and

graduated 5th of 22 students. Saifuddin continued to study at Abu Bakr Islamic

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University Karachi Pakistan before being detained by Pakistan’s security

services. After deportation to Indonesia, he was sentenced to two years on the

charge of involvement in the bomb attacks in August 2003 on J. W. Marriott

Hotel Jakarta.

5. Ilham Sopandi. Also called Husni Rizal; born in 1977; attended 1995 class at al

Mukmin Ngruki madrasah; arrived in Pakistan in July 2003; and then brought to

court in Indonesia and sentenced to 15 months for immigration violation.

6. Rusman Gunawan. Familiarly known as Gun Gun; was born in Cianjur in 1977;

attended Madrasah Ibridaiyah, Tsanawiyah Manurulhuda Madrasah and state

madrasah. Initially, Gun Gun wanted to go to International Islamic University

Islamabad but did not have enough funds, and instead attended Abu Bakr

Islamic University between 1997 and 2001. After being arrested and prosecuted

in Indonesia, Gun Gun was sentenced to four years in jail due to his role in

collecting money for the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombings.

Under the leadership of Abdul Rahim, students in the al-Ghuraba study group discussed

the need to undertake armed jihad against the US and Christians-Jewish conspirators.

They watched videos featuring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s jihad operations

(POLRI 2004). The links between al-Ghuraba cell and Lashkar-e-Toiba were

confirmed. Muhammad Rais said that all members of the Jemaah Islamiyah’s cell

studying at Jamia Abu Bakr and University of Islamic Studies Karachi went to the

Lashkar’s military training base in Pakistan’s Kashmir. Their travel was organized on

holidays by the school’s staff, but each student needed to pay their own way. Gun Gun’s

police testimony gave information about the training he and others received including;

20 days of introduction to theory and practice of using a variety of light arms; 10 days

military skills; as well as additional 10 days for explosives usage (Bubalo, Phillips &

Yasmeen 2011, 24-5).

Although the members of al-Ghuraba cell had not yet applied their knowledge and skills

in real terrorist actions, the emergence of this younger generation of jihadists belonging

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to Jemaah Islamiyah had alerted security authorities, particularly in Indonesia, that the

terrorist group was prepared for regeneration, extending its ideological vision and long-

term objectives beyond the destruction of the older structures. As affirmed by a former

investigator of POLRI, Jemaah Islamiyah was training and consolidating its future

leadership to the Ghuraba cell – mainly Abdul Rahim and Gun Gun – following the

crack down on many terrorists in Indonesia19. Importantly, the experience of the

Indonesian students also demonstrates that terrorists in Indonesia did not work alone but

received significant technical and resource support from Pakistani extremists.

Potential Involvement of Tablighi Jamaat

There was circumstantial suspicion that a non-political moderate Islamic group like

Tablighi Jamaat could have been used by militants to spread the radical ideology of

terror especially during the Jamaat’s ijtima (gatherings) and the Tablighis travel from

Pakistan to Indonesia. Thus far, there has been no solid evidence linking Tablighi

Jamaat with terrorists’ activities, yet to some extent it makes sense to think about the

possibility that individuals inside or outside the group would use it to disseminate

radical jihadism.

Several days after the bombs exploded in Legian Kuta Bali, the activities of Tablighi

Jamaat attracted attention. Local media (Bali Post 20 October 2002) reported that four

foreigners with salafis appearance had been discovered and apprehended by Bali Police

whilst trying to leave the island quietly through Padang Bai coastal areas in the

Karangasem eastern part of Bali. Amidst the island people’s sensitivity to the presence

of outsiders, the report caused speculation that the Bali bombers had been captured. Bali

Police Head Inspector General Budi Setyawan confirmed the arrests and announced that

they were recognized as Pakistani activists of Tablighi Jamaat, but their identities were

not published for investigation purposes. Furthermore, their presence and motives in

visiting Bali were not yet known. Two weeks later, the police spokesman (Nusa 2

November 2002) informed the public that the result of investigations showed no

evidence of connections between the Tablighis and the terrorist attacks. However, a 19 This statement was conveyed in an interview in March 2010.

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terrorism expert from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, Sidney Jones

(2008, 76) continuously insisted on the need to put Tablighi Jamaat activities under

serious scrutiny, given the possibility of extremists using the group.

Shaykh Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, at Mewat Northern India, established Tablighi

Jamaat in 1926. The Jamaat was intended to educate Muslims about their religion, and

ultimately to avert Muslims converting to other religions. Da’wa was the main task of

the Jamaat, to ensure that Muslims understood and obeyed their duties in light of the

Qur’an and sunnah (habits exemplified by Prophet Muhammad). The focus on the

group’s perceptibly correct religious way of life distanced Tablighis from advocating

political-related issues, including condemning the government. Politics, according to

them, is haram (impermissible). The same applied to talking about khilafiyyat (minor

differences) between Muslims, and undertaking Islamic charitable activities (Azra 2006,

190).

Tablghi Jammat expanded to Indonesia through the medium of marriage when

Pakistanis and Bangladeshis travelled to the country and married local women.

Although Tablighis activities have been observable since 1952, they gained significance

in 1974 following the construction of their Mosque in Kebon Jeruk Jakarta, which

became their central office (Azra 2006, 190). So far there is no exact number of

Indonesia’s Tablighis. However, it is believed that they have increased and are present

in all provinces of the country from Aceh to West Papua (Noor 2010).

The risk of extremist involvement within Tablighi Jamaat lays in its nature of

membership and preaching process. One can easily be admitted as Tablighi after

committing to undertake khuruj (go out preaching), even if they are never active again

afterward. Annually, the central office in Jakarta organizes Indonesian Tablighis who

have the financial ability to travel to Pakistan for attending ijtima. Despite stricter

regulations for obtaining Pakistan’s visa for religious educational purposes (applied

since 2002), Tablighis from Indonesia have been able to enter Pakistan as tourists. With

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this in mind, if militants wished to utilize the Jamaat’s activities to cover up and expand

their ideas and movements, they could pretend to pledge to undertake khuruj in order to

be able to convert Tablighis to radical thinking, and then peacefully leave the Jamaat

(Bubalo, Phillips & Yasmeen 2011, 21). Should this happen, terrorists operating

between Indonesia and Pakistan could indeed safely build another channel of

networking.

Indonesia-Pakistan Counterterrorism Cooperation

For the Indonesian government, the complexity in the developments of Jemaah

Islamiyah organization means, specifically in its dealings with terrorism issues, that

there is an objective necessity to promote cooperation with Pakistan in countering

terrorism. For instance, this was revealed by Siswo Pramono, the Deputy Director of

Global Organization of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who believed that

radicalization, was an important security issue for both Islamabad and Jakarta. In the

aftermath of the cooperative success of the two countries security authorities in

breaking the nebulous of terrorist networks working from Pakistan to Indonesia, it was

time for Indonesia to work more closely with Pakistan in dealing with terrorist threats

(The Jakarta Post 20 February 2004).

Bantarto Bandoro, a security and intelligence analyst affiliated with the Jakarta-based

Centre for Strategic and International Studies, agreed with Pramono. According to

Bandoro (ANTARA 22 February 2004), Indonesia’s strengthened counterterrorism

cooperation with Pakistan, especially in terms of intelligence sharing, would enhance

Jakarta’s regional security policies which thus far had focused on three pillars, the

Southeast Asia Centre for Counter-Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur, the Law Enforcement

Academy in Bangkok, and the Indonesian Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation. In

retrospect, Bandoro emphasized the need for pro-active security measures between

Jakarta and Islamabad for the future, as terrorist threats had the continued potential to

harm both sides.

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Indonesia needed to consider that Pakistan has had a growing significance for its

regional security policy. Policy makers in Jakarta accepted this suggestion. Foreign

Minister Hassan Wirayuda expressed it, for instance, after the 11th ASEAN summit in

Jakarta on 2 July 2004. In Wirayuda’s words, ‘now Pakistan is an important partner of

Indonesia and ASEAN in countering transnational terrorism…’ (Kompas 4 July 2004).

At the ASEAN meeting, Pakistan was admitted to be one of the dialogue partners of the

grouping. Regional security issues, including counterterrorism efforts, dominated the

discussions. Later in 2005, Pakistan concluded the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

with ASEAN, as a foundation for the two sides’ practices of stronger and peaceful

relationships.

In elaborating the foreign minister’s statement, spokesman for the Indonesian Ministry

of Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa, said that Jakarta saw Pakistan as having a great

deal of importance in the regional counterterrorism efforts for two reasons. Firstly,

Pakistan had placed itself as the frontline state to combat terrorists of al-Qaeda working

from its country borders with Afghanistan, and secondly, the government of President

Pervez Musharraf had initiated reform to madrasahs in the country in order to restrain

militancy. According to the Indonesian official, this was something that Indonesia

viewed as a crucial step in counterterrorism (ANTARA 4 July 2004).

By the time Indonesia saw the increasing importance of security cooperation with

Pakistan, the central government in Islamabad had launched five measures to promote

reform of the madrasah educational system across Pakistan, which was assumed to

provide the fertile ground of radicalism. These measures included: 1) the establishment

of a national list for all madrasah in Pakistan under the guidance of the National Board

of Religious Education; 2) the central government was authorized to assess the

development and competence of every madrasah in order to ensure allocation of

funding to the most needy institutions, as such the trustees, organizers, and

administrators of madrasah were required to register their assets to the government on

their part; 3) undertaking close scrutiny and ensuring further necessary actions would be

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taken upon donors and NGOs that were suspected of having affiliations with and

support from radical foreign Islamist groups; 4) the government asked all madrasah to

provide the identities of their trustees, administrators, and academic staff in order to

enable observation of their political links with a wide range of parties in the country;

and 5) the reform of madrasah curricula to suit the standard learning content, as

formally offered at Pakistan’s general schools (Noor 2008, 144-5).

In fact, the Megawati government did not conclude the formal counterterrorism

cooperation between Indonesia and Pakistan immediately. This was achieved only after

President Yudhoyono came to power in 2004, when he visited Islamabad in late

November 2005 (The Jakarta Post 25 November 2005). This had been more than two

years since the discovery and annihilation of the Jemaah Islamiyah’s networks in

Karachi Pakistan. It can be assumed that even though acknowledging the importance of

and requirement for such cooperation, the Indonesian government was still inclined to

consider it as a non-urgent matter.

Meanwhile, other ASEAN members have preceded Indonesia in making

counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan a reality. For example, the Malaysian

government - following the break out of Jemaah Islamiyah’s cell in Singapore and

Malaysia in early 2002 and the Bali bombings in October 2002 - approached Pakistan

for joint anti-terror measures. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad announced the plan

when meeting with President Musharraf in October 2002 (PPI News 18 October 2002).

Malaysia promoted bilateral cooperation against transnational crime and terrorism with

Pakistan in the sidelines of the Islamic heads of state/government conference held in

Kuala Lumpur, October 2003 (OANA News 15 October 2003). The agreement was

made one month after the Pakistani security services arrested Malay students belonging

to the Jemaah Islamiyah’s al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi. This meant that the Malaysian

government considered the need for implementing such collaboration as urgent.

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The Indonesian government’s lack of urgency concerning its counterterrorism

commitment with Pakistan was perhaps related to the fact that the focus of the

government’s counterterrorism efforts (following the August 2003 bomb blasts in the J.

W. Marriott Hotel and September 2004 bombings in front of the Australian embassy in

Jakarta) was on a new group led by Noordin Top, that was suspected of being

responsible for the attacks, and was on the run in the country. The government in

Jakarta had focused counterterrorism efforts on domestic areas, while the international

dimension of the terrorism issue had not been given very much attention. Just when the

second Bali attacks occurred on 1 October 2005, the Indonesian police detected the

involvement of Umar Patek20, one of Jemaah Islamiyah’s contacts to Osama bin Laden,

who was at that time was believed to be at large in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area

(DetikNews 3 November 2005). This, eventually, became a stronger imperative for

Jakarta to carry out more concrete counterterrorism cooperation with Islamabad.

In the Accords of Terrorism signed by both President Yudhoyono and President

Musharraf on 24 November 2005 in Islamabad, there was an agreement that established

a joint working group to fight terrorism. The group consisted of police and intelligence

officers of the two states collaborating to coordinate counterterrorism measures, mainly

information sharing and joint law enforcement. The joint working group operated on an

ad hoc basis (Text of Accords on Terrorism between Indonesia and Pakistan 2005).

Despite the lack of details about how this plan should have been applied, the initiative

was not accompanied by sufficient infrastructure - primarily an extradition treaty

between the two governments. Thus, this arrangement was beholden to the goodwill of

each government.

Such a weak framework of counterterrorism cooperation became subject to criticism.

The real condition inside Pakistan did not support it in being effective. This was mainly

related to the fact that the central government in Islamabad was unable to watch, reform

and control activities of the many madrasahs active across the country that had fallen

20 Umar Patek was also accused of masterminding and organizing terrorists’ attacks on 12 October 2002 in Kuta Bali, and he was listed of one of the most wanted terrorists by the Indonesian police.

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under the influence of various militant groups. As suggested by International Crisis

Group, the reform program of Pakistani madrasahs did not go to plan, and worryingly

extremism continues to grow there. Under this circumstance, one can argue that to

expect Pakistan to become a reliable partner of Indonesia to fight against extremism and

terrorism was perhaps unrealistic. Indeed, Pakistan should be able to control extremist

activities inside the country first, before helping others (ICG 2007).

The criticism became louder, especially after the bombing of the J. W. Marriott and Ritz

Carlton Hotels Jakarta on 17 July 2009. Critics said that the ongoing Indonesia-Pakistan

counterterrorism cooperation was inadequate and did not have an impact on eradicating

acts of terrorism. For instance, Sidney Jones (Tempo Indonesia 9 August 2009) claimed

that funding for the bombing was suspected of being provided by an unseen Jemaah

Islamiyah cell that was still operating from Pakistan. The cell transferred money from

Pakistan through Thailand and then carried it into Indonesia in cash via a Malaysian

carrier. Depending on where the funding came from, it could be argued that to some

extent connections with Pakistani militants - severed following the arrest of Hambali in

August 2003 and the demolition of al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi the next month - had

probably been re-established, and security authorities from both Indonesia and Pakistan

were unable to anticipate it.

While dealing with the second Marriott bombing, the head of the Indonesian

government’s agency for counterterrorism Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai replied to

the critics of the Indonesia-Pakistan anti-terror collaboration. He argued that the joint

work on combating terrorism, including radical or extremist movements, remained

underway between Indonesian and Pakistan’s security authorities. If terrorist bombings

happened again, it could not simply be concluded that the intergovernmental measures

had failed, but rather because ‘we are in Indonesia working out the issue from

here…and our colleagues in Pakistan help us from Pakistan…’. Special to the matter of

radicalization, Ansyaad said that another scheme was being prepared with Pakistan to

organize the visit of Pakistan’s moderate Islamic figures to madrasahs in Indonesia and

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give the teachings of true Islam. This was part of the government’s de-radicalization

program (www.dephan.go.id).

More important than the discourse of de-radicalization was a concrete achievement

from the Indonesia-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation, specifically in terms of

creating a channel to hand over terrorist suspects without formal extradition

mechanisms. This has been visible in the recent capture of one of the most wanted

Jemaah Islamiyah military figures, Umar Patek, by Pakistani police on 25 January 2011.

This was then linked to information about the presence of Osama bin Laden in

Abbottabad Southwest Pakistan. Reportedly, Patek was making his way to meet with

bin Laden. When the news of Patek’s apprehension made headlines in Indonesian media

in March 2011, the Chief Detective of POLRI Commissioner General Ito Sumardi gave

a press release noting that his institution had liaised with Pakistan in the arrest, and that

he was preparing a team to go to Pakistan to investigate it (DetikNews 30 March 2011).

Several countries’ investigators wanted Patek, including the US, the Philippines,

Australia, and Singapore. The Indonesian government staged a diplomatic approach

with Pakistan to get Patek handed over to Jakarta, arguing that the suspected terrorist

was its citizen and the terror bombings he had designed and executed had occurred in

Indonesia. This led to the transfer of Patek to Jakarta in August 2011. Upon Patek’s

arrival, Ansyaad Mbai stressed the importance of this effort, as Patek is believed to be

able to render more significant information of Jemaah Islamiyah’s developments and

activities (Kompas Cybermedia 11 August 2011). The terrorist suspect is currently

facing court trial in Denpasar Bali.

This has by all means been a crucial achievement for Indonesia. Considering the

important position held by Patek within Jemaah Islamiyah structures, coupled with his

high proficiency in terrorism, his incarceration will hopefully lead to two things. Firstly,

a more comprehensive assessment of the underground operations of the Jemaah

Islamiyah networks, future projection of the hidden terrorist group, as well as

information on the possibility that some aboveground radical Islamic movements

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surfacing in Indonesia recently - such as Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid, another creation of

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir after MMI - have something to do with the clandestine nexus of

Jemaah Islamiyah, and secondly, the paralysis of the major military wing of the

suspected Indonesia-Pakistan connections of Jemaah Islamiyah, which in turn will

prevent them from carrying out large-scale terror attacks in the future. This is despite

the fact that terrorist groups have transformed themselves into smaller and less

organized cells like those detected in the Aceh Province in 2010.

The global counterterrorism agenda has rendered the space for Indonesia and Pakistan

to collaborate against Islamic extremism. Even though the Indonesian governmental

response did not come straight after the 11 September tragedy - like that of Pakistan’s

enlistment in the American war on terrorism - it illustrated the similar serious actions of

moderate Muslims against radical Muslims. For its part, Indonesia has not expressed

responses in formal Islamic terms, but in the language of security. However, the

influence of the Islamic component is noticeable. The Indonesian government does not

support the concept of terrorism pervasively promoted by the Americans, nor does it

easily relate the terrorism issue to Islam, despite being committed to fight against

radicalism, instead it cautiously takes action only when there is enough evidence to

support the involvement of individuals or groups in the act of terrorism.

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Conclusion

This study concludes that Islam, to a limited degree, is used by the Indonesian

government to relate with Pakistan, but it has not become the major consideration and

real reference in shaping Jakarta’s foreign policy towards Islamabad. The role of Islam

is marginal. The relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan is dominated by secular

economic and political agendas. The Indonesian government’s policies have differed in

many respects from the views of its people. Indonesian Muslims consistently articulate

Islamic identity to describe their relationships with Pakistan, especially in dealing with

issues pertinent to Islam and Muslims. This divergence has surfaced because Islam has

been consistently prevented from influencing the making and implementation of

Indonesia’s foreign policy. The state’s non-Islamic identity, elite material interests, as

well as conditions of external environments have established these constraints.

The politics of state formation in Indonesia was characterized by disputation on the

suitability of referring Islam to be the basis of the state and national identity. Islamist

groups claimed that because Indonesia had a majority Muslim population, Islam should

become the basic philosophy of the polity governing the country. This entitlement was

founded on the conviction that Islam was the best guidance to Muslim social and

political life; Islam directives were clear, firm and solid as an ideology for the state. In

opposition to this argument, secularist groups regarded Indonesia as a nation composed

of a plurality of ethnicities and faiths, and therefore the pre-eminence of a particular

religion to be the ideological fundament of the state was not appropriate or even

unacceptable. Indonesia had to be founded on the ground upon which all faiths and

identities were treated as equal. Pancasila, has emerged as the state’s philosophy and

national identity in pursuit of this goal. Following extensive consultations and

negotiations between leaders of the Islamists and secularists, Pancasila was accepted as

a compromise solution, and has been further enshrined as the state identity.

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Pancasila, which consists of five principles; belief in one supreme God, humanity,

national unity, people’s democracy, and social justice, denotes universality in values as

well as dual approaches; acknowledging the attendance of God, but not indicating

submission to a certain religious belief, including Islam. In other words, Pancasila is

principally devoid of explicit mention of Islamic teachings. State identity informs

foreign policy, by virtue of the absence of Islamic allusions in Indonesian identity

affects the manifestation of Islam in the state’s foreign policy. Pancasila stands to be the

formal constraint on Islam’s influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy. Practically, none of

the successive governments act beyond this official limit.

Beside the constraint of Pancasila, the domestic structure of Indonesia also disallows

Islam from significantly influencing the political process and foreign policy. Soon after

its independence was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, Indonesia introduced a multiparty

system characterized by a variety of ideological streams, secular-nationalism, Islam, and

Marxism/Leninism. However, Islamic political parties did not gain a powerful enough

position in the government to enable them to orient policies. This was initially because

acute ideological differences existed within the Islamist movements, which manifested

into fragmentation and disunity amongst them. Consequently, this corrupted their

political power from within.

Following the institutionalization of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, politics was

conspicuously directed by the interest of the ruling elite. Although the process of

Islamization did not stop, the secularist leadership did not indicate interest of pursuing

Islamic agendas. The main interest of Sukarno was to retain his political power. Islam

was politically subjugated into odd accommodative relationships with the nationalists

and the communists. There was not enough space for Islamic opposition to the

secularist governance.

The position of Islam in politics was even more marginalized under Suharto’s New

Order. Stemming from the 1950s and early 1960s when Darul Islam movement,

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aspiring for the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia, carried out insurgencies in

some regions, forcing the central government to undertake repressive crackdowns to

curtail the separatists. This adversely affected Islamic political groups, as the military

establishment began to view Islam as a potential threat to national unity. Islamic

political groups were suppressed and marginalized from politics. There was, however, a

period when Islam was engaged by Suharto especially in the early 1990s, since the New

Order leader felt that the military loyalty to his government had diminished. Suharto

gave the impression of creating greater space for Islamic expressions of people’s socio-

economic and cultural life. While trying to appear more Islamic, Suharto sought to

cultivate Muslim backing and co-opted Islam to buttress his power base fronting the

military challenge.

Islamic political groups suffered from the lack of capability to play politics and to

govern. It is evident during the democratic era post-Suharto that despite the resurgence

of Islamic parties and Islamist groups, in the three consecutive general elections held

since 1999, the non-Islamic-oriented parties continuously overwhelmed the Islamists’

achievement. This has perhaps been influenced by the prolonged fragmentation and

disunity amongst the Islamic political groups, their lack of skill in communicating Islam

as an attractive political agenda, and an external factor - that is, the strength of the non-

Islamic political groups. Islam still remains only a rhetorical, normative, and symbolic

agenda in Indonesian politics, and by extension in foreign policy.

International situations have also contributed to the deficiency of Islamic credentials in

the Indonesian government’s foreign relations. Foreign policy is essentially a response

made by the Indonesian government to the trends in its external environments. When

Indonesia started to launch its diplomacy, the international political system was

dominated by the Cold War. In response, Indonesia chose to adopt a noncommittal

position towards the ideological rivalry between the capitalist and socialist blocs.

Indonesian foreign policy was steered by the principles of ‘independent activism’ that

promoted the ideal of anti-foreign intervention and pragmatism in the campaign for

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national interests. The independent activism policy befits the unchallengeable doctrine

of Indonesian international relations. Under Sukarno, foreign policy was directed by the

discourse of anti-colonialism solidarity and the struggle for Third World freedom.

Suharto, however, focused on fostering good neighbourly policy with regional stability

as the main priority of national economic development. The establishment of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967 implemented this

policy. Islam, therefore, has not occupied an important place in foreign policy agendas.

This condition has been sustained under the successive post Suharto governments. In

recent years, Islam has started to be a consideration in foreign policy, but still does not

shape it.

In the context of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan, Pancasila is an important factor

limiting Islam in influencing Jakarta’s foreign policy. It, in many respects, is at odds

with the Muslim community’s aspiration for Islamic identity. This is evident in the

cases such as Indonesia’s responses to the Afghanistan war and the Kashmir conflict.

However, it does not necessarily mean that Islam has no roles at all in Jakarta’s

relations with Islamabad. Islam became an important element of the Indonesian

nationalists’ diplomacy for international recognition from the Muslim world. In the case

of Indonesia’s support for Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Islam was also

expressed by Sukarno to strengthen the value of his anti-India campaign.

Elite interest becomes a determining factor to Islam’s role in Indonesia’s foreign policy,

and relationship with Pakistan. When Islam is considered as relevant to supporting the

ruling elite’s interest, it is used as a feature in foreign policy. In the case of Sukarno’s

support for Pakistan in the 1965 war, the Indonesian leader’s interest to contain India

brought Islam to the area of the state’s foreign conduct. In the 1990s, Indonesia under

Suharto was active promoting ties with the Muslim world in general and Pakistan in

particular, underpinned by the interest in economic cooperation. In the democratic era,

Islam becomes a more significant factor in Jakarta’s foreign policy, particularly in the

case of the muted response to the global terrorism issue; the policy aimed at avoiding

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domestic Muslim repercussion. However, in the Islamic-related issues like the East

Pakistan crisis, the Afghan war, and the Kashmir conflict, Islam was absent in the

Indonesian governmental responses, because the elite in Jakarta did not see the

relevance of Islamic solidarity for their material interests.

International and regional situations too shape Jakarta’s policy towards Pakistan, and

determine the position of Islam in the two sides’ relationships. The lack of sympathy of

the great powers for Indonesian independence had driven Jakarta to look for support

from Muslims in the Middle East and South Asia by emphasizing the country’s Islamic

identity. In the 1950s Islam had no roles in Indonesia’s nonaligned policy and closer

relations with India. However, following the 1962 Indo-China war the geostrategic

environment directed Jakarta to lean towards Pakistan, and open up the space for the use

of Islamic rhetoric in Sukarno’s policy during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Under the

New Order regime (1966-1998), external settings had always been perceived as having

no room for Islam to appear in Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan. The post-Cold War

world order, for instance, the global war on terrorism, has contributed to the rise of

radical Islamists’ activism in Indonesia, but the state’s foreign policy remains devoid of

any Islamic references.

The following is the summary of the important findings of the chapters discussing the

role of Islam in Jakarta-Islamabad relations, which highlight the foreign policy impact

of the three factors mentioned above.

Observation of Indonesia-Pakistan relations under Sukarno generates three conclusions.

Firstly, Islam has been useful as a tool for Indonesia’s diplomacy and struggle for

independence. Since gaining independence in 1945, Jakarta had faced external threats,

especially coming from the Dutch. Western powers were hesitant to recognize and

support Indonesia’s independence. Therefore, the nationalist leadership under Sukarno

turned to Muslim countries for recognition. The Islamists played an important role,

through the use of their Islamic card, in securing recognition from the Muslim world.

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Indonesian diplomacy was also directed at South Asia, in order to access the Indian

National Congress and the Muslim League. The secular and Islamist nationalists in

Indonesia conducted different methods of appealing for the support of South Asians.

Sukarno persisted in the use of anti-colonial language, while the Islamists expressed the

need for support in terms of Muslim solidarity. In fact, the focus on the nationalist

objectives drove Jakarta to balance communications and interactions with both the

Congress and the Muslim League. Beside international diplomacy, the nationalist

struggle involved physical revolution. Indonesians and Pakistanis, in the spirit of

Islamic solidarity, fought together against Dutch aggressions in Indonesia. The process

of diplomacy and revolution ended with the transfer of sovereignty from the

Netherlands government to Indonesian nationalists in December 1949. In this part of the

evolution of Indonesia’s relations with Pakistan, Islam and anti-colonialism were

combined to become important features.

Secondly, following the achievement of sovereignty, Indonesia began to enter into

world politics. Despite the fact that Jakarta and Islamabad had indicated similar anti-

colonial orientations in their international relations, and Pakistan’s valuable backing for

Indonesia’s independence, their relationship continued on unsatisfactorily. Identity and

elite interests did matter at this stage. The secular nationalist government of Sukarno

was not interested in Pakistan’s project of Pan-Islamism for the Muslim world. The

focus of Sukarno’s foreign policy in promoting an anti-colonialism and non-

commitment position in the Cold War resulted in the enhancement of ties between

Jakarta and New Delhi. The height of Indo-Indonesian political cooperation was the

monumental holding of the 1955 Asian African conference at Bandung. Nevertheless,

the difference between Sukarno and Nehru began to arise when the latter felt that

Indonesia had attained too much international prestige through the Asian African forum.

Afterward, India opposed the Indonesian plan for the second Bandung-like meeting,

thus causing Sukarno to become frustrated with Nehru’s position. As disagreements on

the ideas and leadership of the Third World between Sukarno and Nehru escalated into

tensions between the two countries, the space is opened up for Pakistan and Indonesia to

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improve their links. By the early 1960s, Sukarno abandoned the discourse of

independent activism policy, and radicalized Indonesian foreign policy in line with the

New Emerging Force (NEFOS) worldview, as opposed to the Old Established Force

(OLDEFOS) worldview. Confrontational policy toward India derived from this.

Thirdly, in spite of Sukarno and Nehru’s bitter personal conflict, the shift in geostrategic

atmospheres, especially in the wake of the 1962 India-China border clash, had also

provided room for the strengthening of ties between Jakarta and Islamabad. The fact

that Indonesia and Pakistan were leaning towards China helped to establish further

commonality in their views and policies. At first this resulted in limited improvement in

the relationships. However this intensified with Pakistan’s support for Indonesia’s

proposal for a second Bandung-type conference, and Indonesia’s reciprocal anti-

imperial support for Pakistan on Kashmir. During the Indo-Pakistan war in September

1965 over Kashmir, these heightened relations shaped the strategic engagement of

Jakarta, Beijing, and Islamabad, vis-à-vis India. Indonesia explicitly used Islamic

identity to align itself with Pakistan. Islam emerged as the key factor in describing the

strength and preponderance of Indonesia’s support for Pakistan. Even though the

Indonesian government followed the secular political interest, it did not oppose

domestic Muslims reacting sternly to India in the name of Islam. Islamic ideas and

secular interest became the context for Jakarta’s support for Islamabad.

Indonesian foreign policy changed following the rise of the New Order government

under Suharto in 1966. The new leadership committed to reinstate Pancasila as the

state’s national identity, as well as the independent activism principle to guide

Indonesian foreign policy. In effect, the use of Islamic language reduced, if not

disappeared, in the state’s international relations. This was paralleled by a focus on the

creation of regional political stability to support national economic development.

Hence, the New Order government developed good neighbour politics. In this general

context, Jakarta’s policy in South Asia was modified as well. It encompassed

Indonesia’s links with Pakistan and India. Jakarta remained cordial with Islamabad, but

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not closely tied, as was the case under Sukarno in the 1960s. The Suharto government

also avoided using Islamic language to describe Indonesia-Pakistan links. The main

agenda promoted by Indonesia with Pakistan was the achievement of mutual economic

cooperation. In parallel, the impaired ties with India were restored with the similar

objective. Suharto tried to balance Indonesia’s position between Pakistan and India.

Indonesia’s fostering of a non-Islamic coreligionist stance was noticeable during the

crisis in East Pakistan that led to the emergence of Bangladesh in December 1971.

Jakarta’s response went through some changes. Firstly, it recognized the legitimacy of

Islamabad to respond to the trouble in its eastern territory, and refused foreign

intervention, especially by India, in the crisis. Indonesia showed anxiety towards the

involvement of the superpower – the Soviet Union – in the East Pakistan problem with

the supposition that such an act could potentially spur instability that could expand into

Southeast Asia. Secondly, in order not to offend Pakistan Jakarta did not rush to

recognize Bangladesh. Finally, after discerning the post-crisis prospect, the Indonesian

government recognized Bangladesh and opened formal diplomatic ties with Dhaka. This

policy was communicated on the grounds of neutral language, that is, the willingness to

build up friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries.

After the crisis in East Pakistan, Indonesia and Pakistan were still keen to sustain

relations in the economic and cultural field. During the 1970s, the two countries’

economic ties developed, although not satisfactorily, under the institution called

Indonesia-Pakistan Economic and Cultural Cooperation (IPECC). Cultural relations

continued through channels of the state’s agencies and societal groups. In this area of

interaction, the Indonesian government indicated an acknowledgement of the role and

importance of Islam, but did not extend substantial support. As a result, Islamic inter-

societal activities only took place between 1973 and 1977.

Suharto’s non-Islamic feature in foreign policy was more obvious in Indonesia’s

response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, beginning in 1979, which

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prompted a decade-long Muslim resistance in that country. For Pakistan, the presence of

Soviet troops along its borders with Afghanistan was the most serious security problem

at the time. The Zia Ul-Haq government of Pakistan became the frontline opposition to

the Soviets. With the support of the United States (US), Islamabad became involved in

the global strategy to roll the Soviets back. The Muslim world stood by Pakistan and

extended support for the Afghan resistance movement. This event showed the world the

emergence of international Muslim solidarity. The trend was also present in Indonesian

Muslims. However, the ways the Indonesian leaders dealt with the Afghanistan issue

indicated dissimilarity between government policy and the Muslim community’s

attitude.

Jakarta provided only a limited commitment in support for Pakistan’s policy on the

Afghan war. Islamic solidarity was not the heart of the Indonesian governmental

response. The New Order government’s opinion was anti-Soviet. The policy

pronouncement referenced universal values like the respect of every nation’s rights of

self-determination, and anti-imperialism. This, to an extent, implied an approval of

Pakistan’s resistance of the Soviets. Nonetheless, Jakarta did not follow up with resolute

and concrete support for Islamabad; rather it merely performed moral support. Suharto

and the foreign policy elite in Jakarta did not consider the Soviet Union’s aggression in

Afghanistan as an urgent problem for Indonesia, because of its geostrategic distance.

The possible fall of Indochina to a communist regime, and subsequent expansion of

communism into Southeast Asia was more threatening than the Soviet presence in

Afghanistan. The focus was on Indonesian national security and the stability of the

immediate Southeast Asian region. As a result, when Jakarta and Islamabad became

focused on their respective regional issues, political relations between them diminished.

At the societal level, however, Indonesian Muslim groups were more assertive about

expressing feelings of Islamic solidarity with Afghan Mujahideen, including the call for

jihad. In response, the New Order government took repressive actions in order to

maintain national resilience. Critical Muslim voices were subjected to domestication.

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Paradoxically, the government’s suppression sparked clandestine Islamist movements in

reaction, which assisted Indonesian Muslims seeking to join the jihad in Pakistan, and

Afghanistan. As part of the strategy to bleed the Soviets, Pakistan’s security agency

provided the jihadists with sanctuaries and guerrilla trainings. Interactions amongst

Mujahideens in the jihad for Afghanistan sowed the seeds for the later emergence of

transnational militant networks between Indonesian and Pakistani Muslims. This

episode demonstrated that Islamism in Indonesia, to some extent, arouse as a response

to the inattention, if not complete ignorance, of the government to the role of Islam in

the country’s foreign relations.

After two decades of coolness in the relationship between Indonesia and Pakistan, a

sign of progress came to surface in the 1990s. During these final years of the Suharto’s

regime, Indonesian foreign policy shifted from subservience to assertiveness in the way

that relations with the Muslim world were conceived and implemented. The driving

force of this move was Muslim intellectuals assembled in the government-favoured

group called Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia (the Indonesian Association of

Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI). Stemming from the will of Muslim activists to obtain

recognition of the country’s Islamic identity, the establishment of the ICMI was

monumental. In this association for the first time the intellectual element of the

Indonesian Muslim community received the blessing of Suharto. The ICMI, henceforth,

grew to be an influential social and political nexus. Interestingly, notwithstanding their

obvious Islamic identity, the ICMI launched more vigorous non-Islamic economic and

political issues. This Muslim association upheld the notion of Pancasila as the

Indonesian national identity. In other words, it did not come out with the dream of

founding an Islamic state. The rise of the ICMI was striking, and the ICMI’s

worldviews – through the role of its cadres in governance - influenced Indonesian links

with the Muslim world.

The change engineered by ICMI was clearly envisaged in Indonesia upgrading its

partial status to full formal membership within the Organization of the Islamic

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Conference (OIC). Muslim issues gained more attention in Indonesian policy within the

OIC. Despite Jakarta referring to the country’s Islamic identity in its international

relations, the distinction between feature and content in Indonesia’s foreign policy

stayed unaltered regarding the position of Islam. The appearance indicated an

acknowledgement of the Islamic identity, but the substance carried on being determined

by secular agendas, particularly in the economic field. For Indonesia, in consonance

with the ICMI’s vision, interrelations in the Muslim world had to above all focus on

lifting the economic power of Muslims.

Indonesia-Pakistan relations tagged along with this trend. Jakarta was inclined to

commence more quality relationships with Islamabad. Despite the fact that an alteration

was taking place in the Indonesian international outlook on the Muslim world, Pakistan

also experienced a new domestic and external landscape of foreign policy. Pakistan’s

most urgent need was set to be the fulfilment of economic survival of the deterioration

of Islamabad-Washington ties after the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.

It led the government in Islamabad to look eastwards in search for alternative resources.

In this context, Indonesia’s and Pakistan’s enthusiasm to reinvigorate bilateral links

with economic cooperation came to be the focus and content. Indonesia did not use its

Islamic identity to relate with Pakistan. This propensity extended in the Muslim

grouping shaped in 1997 named Developing Eight (D-8). Muslim issues were at the

heart of Indonesian participation in D-8; nonetheless the enterprise was not

accompanied by the substantive reference of Islamic identity. At this stage, Islam was

an attribute of but not the real component in Indonesian foreign policy towards

Pakistan.

The enduring constraint on the role of Islam in foreign policy formed by the primacy of

material interests and external situations can clearly be seen in how the Indonesian

government responds to the Kashmir issue. Indonesian Kashmir policy has been neutral

with balanced approaches toward Pakistan and India. This impartiality has been

influenced by geopolitical considerations, setting aside Islamic solidarity with Kashmir.

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This is observable in the ways the New Order government dealt with the Kashmiri

insurgency. Indigenous uprisings have shaken the Indian-ruled Kashmir since 1989. In

dealing with this development, Pakistan had staged international diplomacy to obtain

the world community’s support for the Kashmiri rights of self-determination. India has

invariably opposed all efforts made by Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir

problem.

At the Non-Aligned Movement forum, Indonesia showed the goodwill to participate in

an initiative to settle the Kashmir conflict, however it was not accompanied by real

actions. Jakarta argued that a third party’s involvement had to be approved by both

Islamabad and New Delhi. The persistent disagreement by the Indian government to the

role of a foreign mediator in Kashmir caused Indonesia’s position to be meaningless. At

other times Indonesia has not demonstrated Islamic solidarity for Pakistan similar to

that performed by the members of the OIC. The passive attitude of Jakarta towards

Pakistan’s plea for support in Kashmir was not a rejection of the Islamic nature of the

issue. Instead, this foreign policy was substantially determined by geopolitical

considerations, in particular the need to create regional stability. Once an Islamic-

related issue was deemed to have a direct consequence on Indonesia’s regional security,

Jakarta has not been reluctant to actively engage in an effort to find the resolution. This

is illustrated by Indonesia’s initiative and involvement in resolution of the Moro conflict

in Southern Philippines. In this case the Islamic identity of Indonesians was used to

approach the Moro separatist movement, while still maintaining impartiality. Jakarta did

this because the Moro problem was thought of as having the potential to influence the

stability of the Southeast Asian region.

In addition the case of Kashmir shows once again how the Indonesian government and

Muslim community differed when reacting to an Islamic-related issue. Some elements

of the Indonesian Muslim population consistently spoke of Islamic solidarity with

Kashmiri Muslims, to the point of declaring a pro-Pakistan position. Nonetheless, their

expressions were limited in scope. The feeling of solidarity with Kashmiri Muslim

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fellows did not manifest into strong political pressure on the government. This appeared

to be primarily moral support unlike events, in Bosnia where Indonesian Muslims put

forward enormous demand for the government’s more resolute stand. Kashmir lies

outside of their radar that is selective to issues immediately linked to antagonism

between Islam and the West.

Violence in Kashmir was prolonged during the 1990s, and the situation was

complicated by India and Pakistan embarking on a nuclear rivalry. International

opinions have been focused on the possible danger of an arms race in the Indian

subcontinent. More importantly, the Kargil crisis that occurred in mid 1999 increased

international awareness of the possible escalation of the sporadic armed clashes between

Pakistan and India into a nuclear war. Indonesia responded to the Kargil episode with

wariness. Jakarta did not expand policy beyond the regional dialogue mechanism

provided by ASEAN. To an extent, the Kashmir issue has reached greater significance

in Indonesia’s regional strategic view.

Nevertheless, the changes in geostrategic milieus of Pakistan – in the wake of 11

September 2001 and American subsequent invasion of Afghanistan – have forced it to

modify policy on Kashmir towards promoting dialogue as an option for peaceful

settlement. In this development, Islamabad continued trying to get Indonesian support

for its Kashmir policy. In response, however, the successive Indonesian governments

after Suharto remained impartial and passive. One explanation of this tendency has been

the enhancement of the relationship between Jakarta and New Delhi, especially in the

security and economic fields. The prospect of cooperation with India has prevented

Indonesia from pursuing a proactive attitude towards Kashmir; the policy was

formulated in a way that did not cause offence to the Indians, while retaining goodwill

towards Pakistan. At the societal level, however, the spirit of Islamic solidarity

continued to be alive. Indonesian Muslim advocacy for Kashmir was undertaken

through seminars, fund raising, and publications. The scope of the activism was limited,

and could not become a meaningful pressure upon the government. With the absence of

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strong public pressure, the Indonesian Muslim activists supporting Kashmir could not

influence the government’s position on the issue.

After 11 September 2001, the global war on terrorism becomes an important component

of security relations between Indonesia and Pakistan. The Pakistani government under

President Pervez Musharraf shortly decided to enlist the American-led campaign to hunt

down Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda networks in Afghanistan, thus staging a war

against the Taliban government. The policy was built upon the consideration of keeping

Pakistan’s vital national interest secure, and securing the survival of the nation-state

from the danger of being recalcitrant towards the US policy. This caused strong

reactions from the Islamists in the country. Anti-Americanism and jihad in defence of

the Muslim ummah was noticeable everywhere in Pakistan. Musharraf’s decision was

regarded being un-Islamic. Nonetheless, Musharraf was steadfastly in support of

Washington. As such his government applied domestic policies, including the

crackdown on militants and militancy. Islamist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba, were

banned. Madrasahs throughout the country were under close scrutiny, and the

circulation of foreign students in Pakistani educational institutions was strictly

controlled.

Indonesia also responded to the global war on terror. The Indonesian governmental

response was muted however. It neither promptly joined with the American-led

coalition nor directly opposed Washington. On the other hand, Indonesian Muslims

demonstrated more assertive attitudes; such as articulating protests, with some even

preparing for a jihad fii sabilillah (fight in the faith of Allah) against American and

alliance troops in Afghanistan. The Islamists also questioned the involvement of the

Pakistani government in the US military campaign. Pressure was directed by the

Islamists at the Megawati government to take a firmer stand in dealing with the war

occurring in Afghanistan. As domestic Muslim pressure mounted, Megawati took a

position criticizing the US military action, but not condemning it. To the Islamists, this

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attitude was understandable. This episode clearly indicates that Islam had become an

important factor in influencing the government’s policy.

However, in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, and subsequent chain of attacks the

Indonesian governmental response to terrorism changed. It started to take resolute

counterterrorism measures to safeguard against national security being threatened by

extremism and terrorism. The effort resulted in the destruction of terrorist networks in

the country, and equally important the unveiling of international connections between

terrorist suspects in Indonesia and militants in Pakistan. The connections took shape

before 11 September 2001 and the Bali bombings. They lay in the special relationship

between Jemaah Islamiyah’s operatives and the banned Pakistani militant group of

Lashkar-e-Toiba. A cell called al Ghuraba which consisted of Indonesian (and other

Southeast Asian) students attending Islamic education at Islamic universities in Karachi,

were found to have connections with Jemaah Islamiyah activists and military training

from Lashkar-e-Toiba. There was circumstantial suspicion that the moderate non-

political movement of Tablighi Jamaat has potentially been used for expanding

extremist activism and thinking.

These findings led the Indonesian government to promote counterterrorism cooperation

with Pakistan. Indonesia, realizing the danger that terrorism posed to its national

security envisaged the importance of Pakistan on two counts; one was a Pakistani

government commitment to curb radicalization within the country, and two was the

provision of exchange information and resources to handle the terrorist networks

stretching between the two countries. This case illuminates that the Indonesian response

to global terrorism and counterterrorism was framed in a mixed context, carefulness in

managing domestic Muslim anxiety whilst at the same time pursuing the need to

maintain the security of the country.

With regard to the ongoing debate on the role and position of Islam in Indonesia’s

foreign policy, this study has demonstrated; firstly, that investigation through case study

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of bilateral ties between Indonesia and a particular Islamic state can provide a more

comprehensive understanding about the presence of Islamic ideas in foreign policy,

including the dynamics of Jakarta’s attitude toward Islamic-related issues, and its

implication to the Muslim community. Secondly, Islamic features have not been entirely

absent in Jakarta’s participation in international affairs of the Muslim world. Islam has

proven to be an important consideration of the governmental policy when there has been

a congruent interest between the ruling elite and Islamic groups in response to a specific

issue. To step higher the study claims that despite the fact of the lack of academic

consensus on theoretical approach through which to analyse the roles and limits of

Islam in foreign policies of Muslim countries, a solid framework of analysis could be

built by employing dimensional factors such as the state’s identity, the ruling regime’s

interest, and external settings.

The ability to discuss all aspects of Indonesia-Pakistan relations in the wider context of

Islam’s role in Indonesia’s external relations is outside the scope of this study. There are

some aspects that may be worthwhile developing in further research. Firstly, if they had

some ideological and personal connections there would be some similarities in the

views of Islamists in Pakistan and Indonesia regarding Islam and the West interaction.

There are perhaps other Islamic groups – despite Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jemaah

Islamiyah or Tablighi Jamaat – which have built their transnational networks from

Indonesia to Pakistan. This is an interesting and important area of study to look at in

more depth - the Indonesia-Pakistan inter-Islamic fundamentalist groups’ links.

Secondly, research on people-to-people ties does not necessarily mean an excessive

focus on militant activism. The history of Indonesia-Pakistan relations demonstrates that

moderate Islamic movements, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and the ICMI, have paid

attention to issues pertinent to economic, cultural, and political affairs occurring

between both countries. Therefore, there is a question as to whether these Indonesian

Muslim organizations have links to Pakistani moderate Islamic groups and to what

extent they come about, this is also a fascinating avenue of investigation.

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Finally, owing to the increasingly significance of societal and cultural factors to foreign

policy analysis, this study would suggest a more extensive examination of the roles

played by Islamic intellectuals or think-tank groups in the making and application of

Indonesian international relations. This is supported by the fact that more and more

Islamic centres are nowadays present in the country, and active in articulating their

notions on world politics. How the Islamic intelligentsia formulates aspirations for

Islam in foreign policy, and how the Indonesian government deals with these voices -

accommodating, resisting, or ignoring them and why, would be relevant to further

research.

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