is there life after saddam

Is There Life After Saddam?An Interview with the Iraqi

National Congress ChairmanAhmad Chalabi

Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of an exiled Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi

National Congress (INC), has worn many hats. He studied at MIT, earned a doc-

torate in mathematics from the University of Chicago, taught at the American

University in Beirut, managed a bank in Amman, and started a software company

in London. With the creation of the INC in 1992, Chalabi set up an armed base inthe U.S. -protected Kurdish territory in northern Jraq--waitingfor the right moment

to unseat Saddam Hussein. In 1995, the INC led an offensive against the Iraqi army

and, in the absence of U.S. support, suffered a disastrous defeat with numerous casu-

alties. Chalabi was forced to flee the country. After the 2000 presidential elections in

America, George W Bush brought Iraq back to the top of American foreign policy

agenda, and Chalabi reemerged as a major player, considered by some a potential

leader of the after-Saddam Iraq.In early October 2002, as the Bush administration contemplated the idea of

invading Iraq, The Fletcher Forums Mariya Rasner visited Ahmad Chalabi at the

INC office in Washington, D.C

FORUM: The Iraqi opposition, and specifically the INC, has had mixed relations

with the U.S. government, the State Department, and the intelligence community.

Can you explain that? Moreover, why do some people like you, while others do not?CHALABI: The INC was founded on the platform that was pretty straightfor-ward: the overthrow of the dictatorship in Iraq and the establishment of a demo-

cratic, pluralistic government with federal structure. We called for a government

that respects human rights and renounces weapons of mass destruction, as well as

war as state policy in general. The INC was formed by a group of Iraqi represen-

tatives of various communities and political trends. In general, we are seen as anIraqi patriotic organization.

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t8 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS

These values have a natural affinity with the values espoused by the UnitedStates. However, that is no guarantee that various departments of the UnitedStates that deal with foreign affairs would support such an organization. We arefirst and foremost created in the interests of Iraq and the Iraqi people, and some-

The attacks of9/11showed what a state, even

a weak one, could do if

it is controlled by terrorists

and a man bent ondeveloping weapons of

mass destruction.

times there are conflicts and contradictions

between what we view to be in the interests

of Iraq and the Iraqi people and what agen-

cies of the U.S. government that deal with

us view to be in the interests of Iraq and theIraqi people.

You must remember that the U.S.foreign policy is concerned with the inter-

ests of the United States. So, naturally, there

are differences that arise between us. I don't

think that we've ever come into conflict

with the values and positions of the United

States, but some in the U.S. do think that our interests, our timetable, and our

agenda are not satisfactory, and that this agenda is not what they want to support.I have sometimes been accused of trying to drag the United States into a

premature war with Saddam. My position is very clear. I went to Congress in

March 1998 and stated that the Iraqi people call for open cooperation with the

U.S. in the overthrow of Saddam. And I have worked openly towards this purpose.This position, however, did not find favor with some people in the U.S.

government. At the same time, it is difficult to attack an idea that the UnitedStates should be supporting liberty, freedom, and democracy. So, rather thanattack that idea, they instead attacked me as the path of least resistance.

FORUM: What is the U.S. agenda in Iraq? How does it differ from your agenda?

CHALABI: The U.S. Congress has supported my agenda entirely when it passedthe Iraq Liberation Act.' The Clinton administration did not agree with this. Theadministration thought that Iraq was to be contained, and that Saddam was not a

threat. The national security adviser once used a very strange analogy when he said,"We will treat Saddam like a whackamole: any time this whackamole puts his head

up, you whack him." He thought that Saddam could not possibly be a threat to theUnited States, and that interference in Iraq is not its business. However, it was inthe interests of the United States to contain Saddam-regardless of either the cost

to the Iraqi people or the long-term interests of the United States. So, in the end,President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, but immediately deflected it.

FORUM: In other words, the money wasn't forwarded where it was supposed to go?

CHALABI: It's not the matter of the money not being forwarded. The Congress pro-vided for training and supply of equipment from the stocks of the Department of

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IS THERE LIFE AFTER SADDAM? AN INTERVIEW WITH 19THE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS CHAIRMAN AHMAD CHALABI

Defense. You would think that the Department of Defense stocks are mainly con-

cerned with waging war, but they immediately said that there was no lethal training

to be provided and no lethal equipment to be given. We, of course, opposed this

view, but we had to cooperate and accept whatever we were being given.

However, things have changed. The Republican platform for the 2000

election said very prominently that the Republican Party and the president, if

elected, stand for the full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act and the

removal of Saddam Hussein.

FORUM: What role, if any, did 9/11 play in the formation of U.S. policy towards

Iraq?

CHALABI: September 11 made it very clear to the American people what havoc

a group of supposedly stateless terrorists could bring onto the United States. It

also made the comparison and the parallel easy: it showed what a state, even a

weak one, could do if it is controlled by terrorists and a man bent on developing

weapons of mass destruction. President Bush had a great idea, and as all great

ideas, it is very simple. He said, "Saddam is a terrorist, and he has weapons of

mass destruction. If he combines his terrorist skills with his weapons, he poses a

serious threat to the United States. Therefore, Saddam must go." This happened

to be the position of the U.S. Congress, and is also what the Iraqi people have

been passionately calling for.

FORUM: There were times when Iraq was a friend-the U.S. supported Iraq in

its war against Iran in 1980-1988, and as we now know, transferred to Iraq a lot

of the same weaponry that now threatens

American lives.

CHALABI: Well, this is not a new thing in I don't think anybody inhistory. First of all, I don't think anybody in the U.S. government everthe U.S. government ever considered considered Saddam a fiend.Saddam a friend. They always considered

him a son of a bitch, but he was your son of They always considered hima bitch. That was the attitude. a son of a bitch, but he was

Second, this argument could also be your son of a bitch.applied to Stalin. The United States pro-

vided huge quantities of lend-lease equip-

ment to Russia, largely through Iraq by the way, during the Second World War.

Of course, Stalin helped win that war, and then the Soviet Union promptly went

and used this procured equipment against the United States during the Cold War.

Furthermore, during the Korean War, much of the equipment used against

the United States' forces was of American origin. However, in the case of Stalin,

it was within the United States' interests to supply him with technology because

Hitler was seen as the bigger threat. In turn, when Stalin continued to pursue an

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20 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS

expansionist policy and sought to spread revolutionary communism around theworld, the U.S. had to confront him despite the fact that a few years earlier theyhad supplied him with hardware.

A similar situation applies to Iraq. It is how people view danger and inter-ests of a country that determines their behavior at a specific point in time. Thisis what you learn when you take courses in international relations and history. Ifyou read Kissinger's book on the Treaty of Vienna, he goes on to elaborate how[Prince Klemens von] Metternich and [Viscount Robert Stewart] Castlereaghwere urging Napoleon before the Battle of Nations to accept a settlement becausethey thought that Czar Alexander was becoming a bigger threat as Napoleon wasbeing weakened. They went so far as to engineer a defeat of their forces in orderto demonstrate that it was in their interest to accept peace with Napoleon. Statesdo these things. Kissinger thought that it was a neat effort.

FORUM: And yet, it seems that in 1991, just as President Bush declared a cease-fire, there was a great opportunity to topple Saddam by supporting an internalrevolt in Iraq, but the U.S. was afraid of Iran at the time. Do you consider that asign of shortsightedness in how the U.S. government sees the world and conductsits foreign policy?CHALABI: The U.S., in dealing with the situation in Iraq after the first Gulf War,came to erroneous and disastrous conclusions largely due to both the ignorance

of the situation in Iraq and lack of political

The U.S., in dealing with planning for its future following the enor-mously successful military planning that

Iraq after the first Gulf accompanied the war. This is an example of

War, came to erroneous how a great power can easily win the war

and disastrous conclusions, and then somehow lose the peace.The people who urged President

This is an example of how Bush to stop the war and pull out of Iraq,

a great power can easily and who argued that the U.S. forces should-

win the war and then n't get involved in further military conflict,somehow lose the peace, ended up embroiling the United States for

more than a decade in combat operations in

Iraq. This miscalculation, you could say, wasthe root cause of the hostility that Osama bin Laden bandied about against theUnited States. Bin Laden's main claim is what? It is "let America leave the holyplaces of Islam." But America is there to protect Saudi Arabia and the other Gulfcountries against Saddam. So, by not finishing him off in 1991...

People said that the U.S. shouldn't get involved in military operations.As a result, the United States ended up flying combat missions to enforce no-flight zones in the north and south of Iraq. Now the United States finds itself



involved in further military operations because Saddam has violated everyresolution of the United Nations dealing with the initial war aims and theceasefire resolution.

So, the advice about Iraq that President Bush received was faulty. It pre-sented an erroneous portrayal of Iraq as a society of violent, querulous peoplewho can only be kept in check by the steady, strong hand of a dictator. That por-trayal was the order of the day, and it was a miscalculation.

Basically, what the people who argued this wanted was Saddam withoutSaddam. They thought that a victory for thepeople in Iraq would involve several dan-gers. The first danger was that they thought The Shi'a of Iraq certainlythe Kurds would split off. Second, they do not want Iranians,feared that the Shi'a would introduce Iran or Turks, or Americans,to control Iraq. Of course, nobody hadtalked to the Kurds or the Shi'a in any sub- or British, or Russians tostantial way. Rather, they made these rule their country. Theyassumptions on the basis of impressions and are Iraqis.largely influenced by Saddam's propaganda.

You have to remember that the bulkof the Iraqi army that fought Iran in the eight-year war between 1980 and 1988was composed of Shi'a. The Shi'a of Iraq certainly do not want Iranians, or Turks,or Americans, or British, or Russians to rule their country. They are Iraqis.

The Kurds of Iraq... No Kurdish leader had called for separation, and noKurdish leader had called for independence. After all, the Kurds do possess someintelligence and political sophistication-in fact, they possess a lot of intelligenceand political sophistication. If you compare the Kurdish regions on the map, theKurdish areas in Iraq contain the smallest part-smaller than the Kurdish areasin Iran or Turkey-and have far less population than in Iran and Turkey. Besides,they are landlocked. So, how can anybody in his right mind-a responsible polit-ical leader in Kurdish areas of Iraq-call for an independent Kurdish state whenhe is immediately going to confront far stronger forces that are all hostile to him?How could he survive? Turkey would oppose it, Iran would oppose it, Iraq wouldoppose it, and Syria would oppose it. What's the point?

But, of course, this impression [of a Kurdish drive for independence] hadprevailed. The final decision was taken on erroneous grounds. There was nopolitical plan. Few people talked to the Kurds themselves. In fact, there was a banin the United States at the time against talking to the Iraqi opposition!

This time President Bush is doing things differently. Of course, the IraqLiberation Act outlines the entire body of relations between the Iraqi oppositionand the United States. There is the experience and the platform of the INC. Andthere is much dialogue as well as a great deal of understanding of how the Iraqi

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2.2 THE FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS

people will behave and react in the face of American military action against Iraq.As a matter of fact, you do not see a single Iraqi opposition group of any signifi-

cance opposing American action in Iraq, except the Communists.

FORUM: So how will the people of Iraq react?

CHALABI: With great jubilation. The people of Iraq will be celebrating the fall

of Saddam in the hands of the United States.

FORUM: And what will happen then?

CHALABI: In our view, what should happen is that an interim coalition govern-ment should be established as soon as the

United States forces commence operationsSaddam is afar better and we gain access to any Arab part of Iraq.

conspirator than any agency This coalition government would enjoy the

of the U.S. government, support of the United States and be in

charge of the military force that we expectto be trained under the Iraq Liberation Act.

By the way, the Iraqi military units in the army will be called to join this force.

Subsequently, the coalition government would deal with the problem oflaw and order in Iraqi cities and with the issue of humanitarian relief, providing

food supplies in any emergency situation that may arise.

FORUM: Who are the constituent members of this coalition?

CHALABI: The coalition is composed of the political forces in Iraq that we thinkrepresent various constituencies in Iraqi society.

FORUM: So you are here in Washington talking to the U.S. government. Are the

Kurds here in Washington talking to the U.S. government? Are the Shi'a here in

Washington talking to the U.S. government?

CHALABI: We all came together back in August 2002 to talk to the U.S. gov-ernment. I came here to attend the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]

meeting.

FORUM: And you have developed a joint framework of operation?

CHALABI: The opposition will work together in alliance with the United States.

FORUM: Has it happened before where all of the Iraqi opposition groups joined

forces? For instance, the Kurds broke into civil war just as there were signs ofgreater cooperation.

CHALABI: Review your history. The INC was formed in June 1992 right after theKurdish elections. Both Kurdish parties worked together with the INC, and the

INC established its own headquarters in the north, in Kurdistan. The Kurdsworked for two years with the INC together, and started the conflict only when

they discovered that, contrary to earlier expectations, the United States government

VOL.27:1 WINTERAPRING 2003


was not going to support the INC in an effort to overthrow Saddam. So at that

point local considerations and struggle for wealth became more important thanworking together. But initially, the Kurds came together, everybody was in the INC,and they all subscribed to the INC platform.

Then there is the issue of exile politics. There is a cardinal law that doesnot get violated very often, and that is: the more remote the possibility of success

in the country, the more disunited various factions of an exiled opposition. Uponseeing that prospects of achieving victory increase, opposition forces very quicklycoalesce and come together. This dynamic has worked in many places. Take, forexample, the struggle against the Nazis in France. There were 47 different resis-

tance factions that were killing each other. However, when they saw that theAllies were going to land, they all came together.

FORUM: The U.S. has always insisted that the overthrow of Saddam had to comefrom within his own circle. The alternative to that, from the U.S. standpoint, was

a "silver bullet" approach-an assassination. You, on the other hand, have advo-

cated some sort of mutiny in the army and within Iraqi society. Can you explainyour point of view?

CHALABI: The position of the INC has been that any change in Iraq couldhappen only by the will of the Iraqi people gathering support from the Iraqi mil-itary with the assistance of the United States. This position had come into con-fl ict w ith th e v iew o f p eo p le w h o th o u g h t ...................................................................................................................................

that they could generate a coup d'&at inBaghdad using the Iraqi army officers from Any Iraqifrom militarySaddam's inner circle but who were disloyal circles who had workedto him. with the United States in

Anybody who thought that this could

be done had seriously misunderstood the a conspiracy againstnature of Saddam's regime. Saddam is a far Saddam is either dead or,better conspirator than any agency of the if he is lucky, in exile.U.S. government. When Saddam found out

that the United States was trying to topplehim through a military coup d'6tat, he did not sit still. He began to send the so-called conspirators to provoke military plots. The result of this tactic is a decade offailure for the U.S. Any Iraqi from military circles who had worked with the UnitedStates in a conspiracy against Saddam is either dead or, if he is lucky, in exile.

So our view is the correct view. The Iraq Liberation Act speaks to that, and Ihope that this will be the policy of the U.S. government. Even when Saddam's son-in-law fled the country-and his son-in-law is no ordinary person, he is the one who

established the Republican Guards [Saddam's elite forces] and was in charge of theweapons program-he could not generate any support for the overthrow of Saddam.



What he did was that he asked the U.S. to provide him with two armed divisionsand have the U.S. Air Force take orders about targets in Iraq. That did not happen.

FORUM: Does the INC have any relationship with the United Nations?CHALABI: The United Nations is a club of states. We are not a state, so we arenot admitted to the club.

The United Nations has generally had a very difficult time either opposingor meeting with the opposition to Saddam. We sometimes meet surreptitiouslywith some United Nations bureaucrats. More frequent are our encounters withindividual missions to the United Nations. The UN agency that has dealt.with usthe most is UNSCOM [United Nations Special Commission], largely due to thecourage of its two chairmen, Ambassador Ekeus and Ambassador Butler.

FORUM: What is your current opinion of the UN?CHALABI: The UN is the body where the world resolves its differences andagrees on a common position. But the UN is very nervous about regime change.It works to preserve regimes, rather than change them.

FORUM: Would that not go against international law?CHALABI: No. If so, how did they achieve regime change in Germany in 1945?Or regime change in Japan? The United Nations was actually based on regime....................I -............................ ...................................................1......... ch a n g e , b u t o v er th e y ea rs it d ev elo p ed in to

a club of nations that became something ofThe UN is very nervous a cover for a multitude of sins.about regime change. It The United Nations, under the guise

works to preserve regimes, of non-interference, became a false witness

rather than change them. to genocide, repression, and deportation notonly in Iraq, but also all over the world. Ithas had limited success resolving these types

of issues that beset tens of millions of people. And it is, of course, a tragedy toput the concept of state sovereignty above all other affairs taking place on thatstate's territory. The principle of non-interference becomes a hypocrisy when con-fronted with totalitarian regimes that destroy the very fabric of civil society intheir own countries. Saddam is the prime example of that. Repression at home isthe other side of the coin of aggression abroad.

FORUM: But Saddam has been smart over the years, inviting the UN weaponsinspectors in to see limited resources, then throwing them out, and letting themback in again at the height of international outcry and a threat of military action.And then he does the same thing all over.CHALABI: This remark is not a comment on the intelligence of Saddam. Rather,it is a comment on the fecklessness of the United Nations.


IS THERE LIFE AFTER SADDAM? AN INTERVIEW WITHTHE IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS CHAIRMAN AHMAD CHALABI

FORUM: Do you put the U.S. in that same category of "fecklessness"?CHALABI: Under the Clinton administration, yes, but not now. President Bush,in his speech on September 12, 2002, laid down what he is going to do. He very,very adroitly said that the United Nations, if it does not meet the challenge,would devolve into the fate of the League of Nations. It is a very important and

historic comment, and it is true. He saidthat the United States would not stand forthat, and that the United States has a dutyunder Article 51 [of the UN Charter] to

defend itself.People say that the U.S. does not con-

template pre-emptive strikes. That is false.During the Cuban Missile Crisis, PresidentKennedy was about to launch a strike on

Cuba to destroy missiles deployed by theSoviet Union-although no missile wasfired or contemplated of being fired at the

The principle of non-

interference becomes a

hypocrisy when confronted

with totalitarian regimes

that destroy the very

fabric of civil society in

their own countries.

United States. But nevertheless, he invoked the right of self-defense to destroy thestrategic threat present in Cuba against the U.S. That is a pre-emptive strike! So,the principle of pre-emptive strike is not alien to the foreign policy of the UnitedStates. The United States will pre-empt threats to its national security.

How is the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Cuba differentfrom the ability of Saddam to use chemical and biological weapons, and evennuclear weapons, on United States territory? It is not any different.

FORUM: The President's speech and the build-up of tensions with respect to Iraqhave provoked a debate in the United States, certainly in the intellectual circles,

about the nature of U.S. power. The talk is about unilateral as opposed to multi-lateral use of power, and about U.S. hegemony in the world. There are even com-

parisons being drawn between the U.S. and the Holy Roman Empire. Empires,it is being argued, have a historic tendency to collapse when acting unilaterally.Therefore, the multilateral argument is that the U.S. should act in concert with

Europe and the UN. Are you a participant in this debate, do you find it useful?CHALABI: This debate is interesting and would make a good subject for a thesisin history. I enjoy participating in this debate, but it is not relevant to our situa-tion. It would be very amusing to try to identify a future Caligula in the United

States, or a future Claudius, or indeed a future Nero. But it is not relevant to ourcase. And I should just mention that the Roman Empire was brought down bybarbarians. In turn, September 11 attacks were carried out by barbarians.



FORUM: So what does history hold for us? Will the U.S. be faced with the same

threat that the Roman Empire faced centuries ago?

CHALABI: Marx said that when history repeats itself, it becomes a farce.Today's challenges are different, the world is different, and the United

States is all too aware, I think, of the limitations of its power.

FORUM: Do you care whether the U.S. acts unilaterally or multilaterally?

CHALABI: Wewant to liberate our country, and we want to construct democracyin Iraq. In our view, the more the U.S. has influence over this process, the better it

is for us politically, economically, and in terms of human rights for the people of Iraq.

FORUM: But the United States does not care about human rights for the people

of Iraq, does it?

CHALABI: The Iraq Liberation Act does-it provides for human rights, fordemocracy. Also, there are two joint resolutions passed by Congress calling for thetrial of Saddam as a war criminal. Moreover, the statement of President Bush atthe United Nations on September 12 began not with weapons, but rather with

the plight of the Iraqi people. The first resolution he mentioned was Resolution

688. So I think the U.S. cares about human rights in Iraq.That having been said, the U.S. record of supporting human rights in the

Third World has not been the most brilliant since the Cold War. But again, most

of the operations conducted by the U.S. inThird World countries were secret intelli-

The Roman Empire gence operations that involved covert

was brought down by action. By its definition, covert actionrestricts the universe of people available toparticipate, and you generally take who you

September 11 attacks were can and deny that you knew them later.

carried out by barbarians. This is not the situation in Iraq. When theU.S. has acted in a public way in foreigncounties, they ended up, by and large,

embracing freedom, human rights, and decency, as they did in Germany andJapan after the Second World War.

FORUM: But then there is an argument, say about Nuremberg, that it was "vic-

tors' justice."CHALABI: I would take victors' justice over Nazi justice or Tojo justice. So what?

This is not an argument. This is historical revisionism by people who are living

comfortably off the consequences of victors' justice.

FORUM: The humanitarian situation in Iraq was largely caused by economic

sanctions. How do you reconcile that with what you say is the United States' con-

cern for human rights?



CHALABI: The economic disasters of Iraq are entirely of Saddam's making andare not the function of the sanctions. The Iraqi people have been suffering from

shortages throughout the period of Saddam's rule even though Iraq had huge oilrevenues. Shortages of food supply in Iraq were commonplace throughout the1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the UN sanctions specifically excluded food and

medical supplies from the list of prohibited items. Immediately upon the passageof the resolution that imposed sanctions on Iraq, the UN passed two resolutions,Resolutions 706 and 712, which enabled Iraq to import food and medicine.

Saddam refused to accept those resolutions.Then the United Nations started its oil-for-food program, which is far

more adequate to meet the needs of Iraqi people than what Saddam was preparedto accept. This is not a claim based on statistics or analysis, but it is based on theactual fact-the experience of the Northern Kurdish region. In Kurdistan, where

people receive a specific percentage from the share of the total goods that Iraq getsb ased o n th e p o p u la tio n p ro p o rtio n (1 3 .5 .......................................... .................................................................................percent), the level of prosperity and well-being of the people is unprecedented, ever. The economic disastersWhy is that the case, while it is not the case ofIraq are entirelyin the areas controlled by Saddam? of Saddams making.

So sanctions are not the cause of the

plight of the Iraqi people and the economicdestruction. Furthermore, for six long years until today Saddam would not exportoil. When was Resolution 986 passed? Certainly a year before Saddam acceptedits implementation. In other words, it was within Saddam's power to get sanc-tions removed within, I would say, five months. If you read Resolution 687 thatspecified when sanctions were supposed to be lifted, and add that time period,you would discover that Saddam could have had sanctions lifted in 145 days. Yousee? Saddam never cared about lifting the sanctions. If you look at the memo-randa from the Iraqi government to the United Nations, you would see that

Saddam did not call for the lifting of the sanctions. Rather, he called for theimplementation of Articles 22 and 19 of Resolution 687, which say what? They

do not say "lift the sanctions." Rather, they say, "let us sell the oil and pocket themoney." Saddam was after cash for his own purposes, not after the goods for theIraqi people.

But of course, as usual, the United States and the Western powers lost the

propaganda war, and Saddam won the propaganda war. And everybody in the

West and in the Arab world believes now that sanctions are the cause of thetragedy in Iraq. No, Saddam is the cause of that tragedy. Saddam had forgonebetween those two years over a hundred billion dollars in oil revenue-justbecause he wanted to keep his weapons of mass destruction.



FORUM: How could Saddam, being who he is, win the propaganda war againstthe West? Why were the human rights groups more likely to believe him?

CHALABI: Saddam thrives on the contradictions of his enemies. Have you seen

the movie "The Truman Show?" Saddam is the Truman Show, and the United

States and the United Nations is the man sitting in the middle. Saddam can create

an atmosphere in Iraq which is entirely theatrical-it looks real, but it is not.

Saddam is able to demonstrate to the UN and to any humanitarian orga-

nization, no matter how sophisticated it is, that there is suffering and there is

death in Iraq. He causes it, and he engineers it.

FORUM: Thank you very much. m

NOTESI Iraq Liberation Act was passed by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton on October 31, 1998.

In the presidential statement issued by the White House, Clinton said that "the United States should sup-port those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the bitter real-ity of internal repression and external aggression that the current regime in Baghdad now offers." The IraqLiberation Act gave the administration authority to provide the Iraqi opposition with Pentagon supplies,

training, and other assistance worth $97 million. See Iraq Liberation Act, Statement by the President,<http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/libera.htm> (accessed November 23, 2002).


is there life after saddam

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