This article was downloaded by: [Simon Fraser University]On: 13 November 2014, At: 11:01Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

The Round Table: The CommonwealthJournal of International AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat toReligious Minorities in Eastern India?Kunal Mukherjeea

a Lecturer in International Relations/Asian Security, University ofLancaster, UKPublished online: 09 Sep 2013.

To cite this article: Kunal Mukherjee (2013) Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minoritiesin Eastern India?, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 102:5,445-457, DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2013.834641

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2013.834641

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to ReligiousMinorities in Eastern India?

KUNAL MUKHERJEE*Lecturer in International Relations/Asian Security, University of Lancaster, UK

ABSTRACT This article looks at the rise of Hindu nationalism in contemporary India, with aspecial focus on the eastern city of Kolkata. It argues that while the rise of Hindu nationalismhas been a burning problem in recent years, it should be noted that the problem does not existuniformly throughout the country. The levels of violence in relation to Hindu nationalism differfrom place to place. Careful attention needs to be paid to this variation which exists withinHindu nationalism, and also to the variation which exists within the levels of violence associ-ated with it. In other words, while events that took place in Gujarat in 2002 may say some-thing about the situation in western India, they do not necessarily reflect the situation in otherparts of India, especially the east of the country. With India being a vast country and eachpart of the country being grounded in a specific context, keeping this variation in mind isextremely important. The data supporting this argument were collected earlier this year fromthe state of West Bengal.

KEY WORDS: Hindu nationalism, Bharatiya Janata Party, minorities, Calcutta, security, WestBengal, fundamentalism, Savarkar, Arya Samaj, sanskritisation, Christians

Introduction

Since the attacks in the United States of 11 September 2001, there has been much talkon religious fundamentalism, which now occupies a very central position in politicaldiscussions as well as in academic circles. Although the role played by religion anddifferent religious groups in international relations and national politics had beenignored for a while, or at least not been given the attention that it deserved, the situa-tion in the post-9/11 period has changed considerably. Increasingly, both policy-makersand academics at the national and international level are focusing on the role played byreligious groups in foreign policy-making, ethnic conflicts and transnational terrorism.Although the emphasis has primarily been on political Islam, discussions on Hindunationalism/fundamentalism have also been going on, particularly after the events thattook place in Gujarat, India, in 2002 with regard to the Muslim minority.

The definition of fundamentalism involves a tendency to take the Holy Scriptureliterally and involves adherence to a set of fundamental tenets as the line ofdemarcation between the so-called ‘true’ believers and the rest of the community. Themain traits of religious fundamentalism include religious revivalism, homophobia,

*Correspondence Address: Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, University of Lancaster, Bailrigg,LA1 4YW, UK. Email: k.mukherjee1@lancaster.ac.uk

© 2013 The Round Table Ltd

The Round Table, 2013Vol. 102, No. 5, 445–457, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2013.834641

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

anti-intellectualism and hostility towards minorities (Noorani, 2002, p. 65). The politicaland social rise since the early 1980s of what were previously peripheral Hindu national-ist organisations such as the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad(VHP), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and numerous other RSS-created organisationsin Indian society, often collectively called the Sangh Parivar or family of associations,has resulted in major concerns with regard to the future of India’s democracy (Bhatt,2004, p. 133). Hindu nationalism or Hindu fundamentalism basically represents anationalist cultural movement that aims to make India more Hindu, by promoting Hinducultural and religious traditions (Flaten, 2012, p. 625). ‘Hindutva is targeted attransforming the Indian state and controlling the Muslim and Christian minorities’(Anand, 2005, p. 204).

The aim of this article is to look at the rise of Hindu nationalism/fundamentalismand to what extent it really constitutes a threat, especially to Muslim and Christianminorities in eastern India. The article has a special focus on the eastern city ofCalcutta and religious minorities that reside within the city. The article argues, basedon the recent interviews that were carried out in the city of Calcutta in April 2013,particularly with minority communities, that, first, Hindu nationalism should not beviewed in monolithic terms, and that the element of threat varies from place to placewithin the subcontinent. In other words, the intensity or level of threat associated withHindu fundamentalism/nationalism does not exist in the same way throughout thecountry. Levels of political violence differ from place to place. The situation in theIndian state of West Bengal, for instance, is a story of peaceful coexistence. This isnot to say that the threat does not exist (of course it does), but events in Gujarat donot necessarily mean that there will be similar levels of violence elsewhere in India.This point is important because when one reads some of the current literature in rela-tion to Hindu nationalism/fundamentalism, one gets the impression that it exists in thesame way uniformly throughout the country, and this is not the case. It seems thatsome scholars have had a tendency to generalise the situation in Gujarat to the rest ofIndia. My case study of Calcutta and West Bengal will prove that this is mostcertainly not the case.

India is the world’s largest democracy and one of the hallmarks of a democracy isthe protection of minority citizens. Although there have been major disturbances inIndia since it became independent in 1947 from British colonial rule, in relation toreligious minorities, India has also had some success in promoting minority rights. Incontrast to most explanations, which tend to focus on the darker side of Hindu national-ism, this article makes a major shift from traditionalist explanations and focuses on aslightly more positive side. The material gathered through recent interviews willsubstantiate this line of argument. There is a special emphasis on the voices of Muslimand Christian minorities from the city of Calcutta, which is the capital city of the east-ern state of West Bengal. Interviews were carried out with both public figures fromminority communities as well as with the local people, again from the same minoritycommunities. Thus, by following both a top-down as well as a bottom-up approach interms of gathering primary data, the article aims to give a comprehensive andall-encompassing picture of the situation in the city of Calcutta. In other words, viewsfrom above and from below have been considered while writing this article, althoughthere is an emphasis on the section that deals with views from above.

446 K. Mukherjee

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

Traditional Explanations

‘Hindu nationalism is defined as an ideology that seeks to imagine or construct acommunity i.e. a nation on the basis of a common culture, a culture configured by aparticular notion of Hinduism’ (Zavos, 2000, p. 5). The traditional explanation withregards to the rise of Hindu nationalism is that it took root in India during Britishcolonial times and that it was actually a response to the introduction of an aggressiveBritish modernity. ‘The bureaucratic structure consequently installed came to bedominated by utilitarian concepts, while after 1813 Christian missions were establishedon a greatly increased scale’ (Jaffrelot, 1993, pp. 13–14). The bureaucratic structureassociated with the East India Company and the institutions linked with the Christianmissionaries shared a common dislike for the Hindu tradition and were regularlyinvolved in practices and activities that denigrated Hinduism. There was considerableresistance to the reforms that were introduced by the then administration and also to theproselytising and educational activities of the Christian missionaries. Although manyscholars believe that Hindu nationalism took root in the early times of British India,some believe that ‘the distinctive ideology of Hindutva that animates contemporaryHindu nationalism was expounded at length during the early 1920’s by the Indiananti-colonial revolutionary, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar’ (Bhatt, 2001, p. 4).

Savarkar’s image of India’s physical geography consisted of the land that liesenclosed in between the natural boundaries of the Himalayas in the north, the Bay ofBengal in the east, the Indian Ocean in the south, the Arabian Sea in the west and theriver Indus in the northwest. According to Savarkar, the first requirement of the Hinduidentity was ‘citizenship by paternal descent within this physically bounded territory ofIndia’ (ibid., p. 94). Indeed, the rise of Hindu nationalism since the 1980s has beenpredicated upon the attempt to establish a Hindu nation state, together with the‘de-legitimation of communities and citizens who fall outside of a homogeneouslyconstructed “Hindu” fold’ (Mukta, 2000, p. 442). It is the Hindu soldier and the warriormonk who protect the nation. They not only protect the nation, but also in fact are thenation (Banerjee, 2005, p. 83). These warrior monks have to work for the glory ofIndia, which is the land encapsulated within the physical frontiers mentioned above.Apart from Savarkar’s key texts, writings by M. S. Golwalkar and DeendayalUpadhyaya provide us with some insight into central elements of Hindu nationalistthought (Adeney and Saez, 2005, p. 40). The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which was a majorstrand of Hindu fundamentalism in the post-independence period but later dissolved,oscillated between two strategies: one was with a moderate stance that involved posi-tioning itself as a patriotic party on behalf of national Indian solidarity as the protectorof the poor and vulnerable classes and of small privately owned businesses and theother strategy had a much more militant approach (Jaffrelot, 2007, p. 19). The militantapproach was based on the promotion of an aggressive ‘Hindu-ness’ symbolised by thecampaign to raise Hindi to the stature of national language (ibid.). There was also anemphasis on the protection of cows, the cow being sacred for Hindus, but not forMuslims (ibid.).

After the battle of Plassey, which took place in 1757, when Robert Clive defeatedSiraj ud Daula, the then nawab of Bengal, the British merchants trading with India atthat time realised that they no longer had to stay in India as traders but could actuallybe the rulers of the land. Gradually, with the passage of time, the British decided to

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minorities in Eastern India? 447

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

establish their political hegemony in South Asia since they realised that they were farsuperior to the local rulers in terms of military technology and strength, as the battle ofPlassey in 1757 and the battle of Buxar in 1764 had proved. The Indian rulers hadfancy palaces and rode elephants, but were lagging behind in the area of militarytechnology. Realising this, the British colonial administrators at that time decided tocontrol the region politically and gradually with the passage of time asserted themselveseconomically and politically, thereby establishing their hegemony in southern Asia. Theintroduction of British values in Indian society especially through the East IndiaCompany and the role played by the Christian missionaries through their proselytisationcampaigns was criticised and resisted by both leaders and locals from the Hinducommunity, who felt that they were being stripped of their own culture, and were beingforced to embrace a set of values that were alien to their own indigenous values. As aresponse to that, we see the rise of what is now called Hindu fundamentalism, Hindurevivalism or Hindu nationalism. Thus, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism needs to beanalysed in this British colonial context. This is one of the most accepted explanations.‘Cultural nationalism in India grew not only out of Indian culture as such but also outof the specific process through which Indian elites began to inhabit and make sense of,received romanticist notions of authenticity and deep cultural differences between theEast and West’ (Hansen, 1999, p. 42).

It should be noted though that although the term fundamentalism has been used inthis article, the term has been criticised because there are no fundamentals of the Hindufaith. Hinduism has existed for centuries and there is no one founder, but manyfounders and also different cultural forces and different philosophical schools of thoughthave actually contributed to the rise of Hinduism (Flood, 1996). This stands in contrastto other world religions such as Islam, Christianity and Buddhism, where the religion isbased primarily on the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed, Jesus and the Buddha.This explanation put forward by scholars with regards to the rise of Hindu nationalismor Hindu fundamentalism (let us use the term for the sake of convenience, referringprimarily to the militant strand in Hinduism) being a reaction against western modernityis similar to the explanation put forward with regards to the rise of Islamism in SouthAsia. Islamism refers to the extreme politicised version of Islam, often compared withother ‘isms’ such as fascism, Marxist Leninism and Nazism, which sees itself in conflictwith the western world, other non-Muslims such as Hindus and Sikhs, and also withother Muslims who are perceived as pro-western, secular or not sufficiently Islamic(Mukherjee, 2009, p. 19). There are two major strands of Islamism, which are MiddleEastern Wahabism, named after Mohammed Abdul Wahab, and South AsianDeobandism, named after the Islamic seminary or madrasa in the north Indian town ofDeoband. The Deobandi school of thought came into existence when the British imperi-alists overthrew the then Muslim rulers of India and started to impose a set of westernChristian values on the defeated Islamic community in India.1 As a response to this,and to safeguard South Asian Islamic culture and values from the onslaught of westernChristian values, ideologues such as Mohammed Qasim Nanatawi and Rashid AhmedGangohi founded the Islamic madrasa at Deoband, in north India. More generallyspeaking, when scholars look at the rise of religious fundamentalism in any tradition,one of the classic explanations is that it is a response to the advent of modernity(Armstrong, 2000, p. 140). There are groups who benefit from the modernisationprocess but there are others who feel excluded and this feeling of exclusion pushes the

448 K. Mukherjee

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

latter group to resort to more violent means to get their voices heard. This frameworkof analysis has been used to understand both Islamism and Hindu nationalism in SouthAsia, but for now let us focus on Hindu nationalism/fundamentalism, as that is theprimary focus of this article.

Views from Above

Interview with a Sanskrit Pandit, Arya Samaj, April 2013, Calcutta

In contrast to the above explanation that Hindu nationalism came into existence as aresponse to British modernity, the interview that I carried out with a Sanskrit pandit inthe city of Calcutta on 13 April 2013, at the Arya Samaj, Calcutta, which is a Hindurevivalist organisation, it seems that the rise of Hindu nationalism needs to be analysedand located within the context of social/societal evils in 18th/19th century India, andthe attempt to rectify these evils.2 The Arya Samaj is one of the many cultural organisa-tions associated with Hindu renaissance and also one of the movements from whereHindu nationalists find their ideological inspiration. Thus, a discussion on its beliefsand practices becomes necessary. This pandit whom I got the chance to talk to men-tioned that there were all sorts of societal problems going on in the name of religionduring the times of British India. For instance, women and the so-called lower castessuch as the shudras did not have access to education. If the so-called lower casteschanted Vedic mantras, their tongues would be cut off, he told me. If the so-calledlower castes heard or tried to hear the mantras, then their ears would be cut off. ‘Thefounder of the Arya Samaj, was a man by the name of Dayanand Saraswati, whowanted to give women the rights to have access to education and also access to thesacred texts of Hinduism, the Vedas.’3 Thus, Dayanand Saraswati established schools/gurukuls for women’s education. Another social evil that the pundit spoke about washow girls at a very early age were married to men who were a lot older than them. Thiswas called ‘balya bibaha’, which means early marriage. He told me that Saraswatifirmly believed that girls should get married at the right age. Seventy-year-old menwere getting married to 15-year-old girls. Thus, Saraswati carried out a movementagainst this practice. Not only were girls being subjected to harsh treatment by thesenior male members of a patriarchal society, but also, at the opposite end of the spec-trum, elderly women, especially widows, were being subjected to social exclusion anddraconian treatment. The pundit mentioned that although widow remarriage isassociated with the well-known Hindu reformer and progressive thinker Vidyasagar, thefounder of the Arya Samaj, Dayanand Saraswati, also made major contributions in thisdirection. He campaigned for widow remarriage and for it to be accepted at the societaland grassroots level. Although laws were beginning to change, people’s attitude towardswidows were not really changing, so Saraswati made Herculean efforts in this direction.The movement was in favour of gender equality and emphasised ‘devi puja’, whichrefers to worshipping female gods in the Hindu pantheon.

Dayanand Saraswati was also against untouchability because he believed that allhumans were children of God.4 The Arya Samaj was thus against social stratificationsthat existed in Hindu society, and was in favour of equality. Its social movements had astrong egalitarian approach, especially with regards to women and so-called lowercastes, and fought for more flexibility to exist within the Hindu caste system. This was

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minorities in Eastern India? 449

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

the historical background that the Sanskrit pundit provided me with, with regards to thesocial context in which the Arya Samaj came into existence. When asked what theorganisation’s contributions were in contemporary Indian society, he mentioned thatwomen were still being deprived and denied access to education, especially adivasi(tribal) women. Women were also being forced into prostitution. The Arya Samaj wasfighting against this.

The Arya Samaj also focused on respect for the elderly, especially respect for one’sparents. It argued that one should look after one’s parents and keep them happy whilethey are alive, and it was no use making elaborate offerings at the ‘shraad’, or funeralceremony, after their death.5 The Samaj was also against idol worship and idolatry.6 Godhas no shape or form. Idol worship, he mentioned, is impossible because it is impossibleto visualise God. God is one and does not come in the form of men or women. There isno gender for God. The organisation, however, does make use of photos of its founder,but the pundit made it clear to me that the photos were used to remind people of thequalities of Swami Dayanand Sarawati, and not actually to worship the picture of itsfounder. There was no use making offerings to non-living photos or idols because thesewould not answer people’s prayers. The Arya Samaj upheld the Vedas and Vediclearning as the true source of all knowledge. The pundit argued that one should considersocietal progress as one’s own and thus the Arya Samaj had a strong socialistic messageand emphasised societal welfare. It was also in favour of democracy and democraticdecision-making processes. He went on to say that the Arya Samaj was open to all andthat many Sikhs had actually joined the movement/organisation. For instance, BhagatSingh, who was a well-known Indian freedom fighter, was from a Sikh background, buthis family embraced the Arya Samaj and its values. Also, Hindu converts to Islam wereincreasingly finding a place in the Arya Samaj. The movement was primarily trying toget rid of social evils associated with Hinduism and superstition, in accordance with theprinciples of the sacred texts, the Vedas and, of course the writings of DayanandSaraswati. In this connection, he mentioned the ‘Satyarth Prakash’, which means ‘Lightof Truth’. The pundit mentioned that Saraswati emphasised truth and recognised thatthere were evils in all religions, and he made a clear distinction between truth anduntruth and was against all unscientific ways.

Thus, from the above interview, which went on for more than an hour, it is clearthat the message of the organisation is for gender equality, societal welfare, spread ofscientific knowledge and democracy. Far from being a threat to Muslims and Christiansand other vulnerable groups in India, this organisation seems to have positive implica-tions for religious minorities. This makes it clear that within Hindu nationalism/funda-mentalism there are different strands of thinking and some strands actually havepositive implications for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. As Sikata Banerjeerightly puts it, ‘Hindutva is not a monolithic cultural construct. It has varied over timeas well as according to context’ (Banerjee, 2005, p. 75).

Interview with a Prominent Senior BJP Leader, 13 April 2013, Calcutta

‘The phenomenal rise of the BJP and the corresponding growth of Hindu political resur-gence are variously branded as “Hindu fundamentalism”, “Hindu revivalism” “Hindunationalism” and so on’ (Ghosh, 1999/2000, pp. 15–16). The BJP has been categorisedas one of the most anti-Muslim Hindu nationalist political parties in contemporary

450 K. Mukherjee

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

India. While this may be true for certain parts of the country, particularly in Gujaratand the heartland region of India, it does not apply uniformly to other parts of thecountry, such as the eastern state of West Bengal. The party’s basic philosophy isderived from the Hindu nationalist writings of the 1920s and 1930s and it claims thatIndian nationalism was essentially Hindu in nature and that ‘the Indian nation wouldsoon reject the Congress Party with its secular and pluralist philosophy’ (Graham,2006, p. 156). Indeed, the BJP has faced the ongoing problem of coming up with a‘coherent ideology and nationalist narrative in the face of regional diversity’ (Gillan,2003, pp. 381–398). So what implications do these have for religious minorities in con-temporary India? One would think that the BJP philosophy is a hardliner’s philosophy,but when I actually got the chance to speak to one of the leading BJP politicians, myviews changed. This could be because India’s democratic political institutions, particu-larly coalitional politics, have now moderated the BJP’s religious political agenda(Pardesi and Oetken, 2008, p. 24). ‘For several structural reasons, including coalitionalpolitics, the BJP has had to compromise on some aspects of its radical agenda for shortterm political gains’ (ibid.). Thus, we see a milder approach, and this seemed verymuch the case in West Bengal.

I got the opportunity to speak with the president of the BJP, Mr Rahul Sinha, in hisBurrabazar office in Calcutta this April (2013), and asked the leader and his colleaguesabout the background, main political aims and objectives of the party, the role of reli-gion in the party ideology and their approach towards ethnic and religious minorities,especially Muslim minorities. To this, Mr Sinha mentioned that the main aim of hisparty was to give India a ‘central position’ in world affairs.7 Although he did not spec-ify what he meant by ‘central position’, I assumed that he was referring to making Indiastrong economically and militarily, as the BJP website emphasises defence and freemarket economic policies.8 Their political inspiration came from Dr Shyama PrasadMukherjee and the RSS. In 1977, he mentioned that the Bharatiya Jana Sangh mergedwith the Janata Party, along with other parties under the leadership of Jay PrakashNarayan. It was in 1977 that they formed the Janata Party government at the centre.‘After the Janata Party government was formed, we came out of the Janata Party andformed a new political platform, Bharatiya Janata Party in 1980 at the Mumbai Confer-ence.’ Currently, the BJP is waiting to get power at the centre. The BJP, he said, hadruled earlier and was in power in a number of states, including Karnataka, Goa, Guja-rat, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Himachal Pradesh and Punjab.Thus, the BJP is a strong force throughout the country. He mentioned that it is the onlypolitical party that is fighting against corruption. Other parties he mentioned, such asthe Congress, were going for the policy of appeasement and were trying to appeasereligious groups and were trying to collect votes based on religious politics. On theother hand, ‘we believe in the one nation formula’. In India, ‘all minorities and ethnicgroups are Indian. Religion is a separate issue, which should not come into politicalaffairs. Religion is about one’s personal belief. It is indeed a private affair. Religionshould not and cannot have an impact on politics’.9 Other political parties collect votesbased on the policy of appeasement of different religious groups. In West Bengal, hementioned that the Trinamool Congress (TMC) government has announced that Islamicleaders such as imams were to get a monthly allowance. Mr Sinha questioned this.‘Why should the imams get this allowance, which amounted to 2500 Indian rupees ona monthly basis? Imams also got houses and some land. The children of these Islamic

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minorities in Eastern India? 451

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

leaders were also getting educated at the government’s expense. It was the CPI(M)[Communist Party of India (Marxist)] that started this type of an appeasement policy,and they had declared Muslim reservations at the government service level as well as ineducation.’10 Both the TMC and the CPI(M) were communal. ‘Why does the TMCleader, Mamata Banerjee, current chief minister of West Bengal, wear a hijab when shevisits Muslim areas?’11 All religious groups should be treated in the same way. ‘Thereshould be no extra facility for any particular religion. The state should not show anysort of favouritism to any particular religion. Recently, minority communities havejoined the BJP in thousands. For instance, Goa, is a predominantly Christian state, butGoa is under the leadership of the BJP. The BJP has also given 33% reservations forwomen in the party constitution, and this is the only party which has these reservationsfor women. There are twenty-four office bearers in the state, of which eight were beingheld by women.’12

Once again, like the interview with the Sanskrit pundit from the Arya Samaj,Calcutta, this politician gave me the impression that his political party, the BJP, had anegalitarian approach towards different ethnic groups and religious minorities and wasalso in favour of gender equality. This stands in contrast to what some earlier scholarshave said with regards to Hindu nationalism and it being known for its upper caste andbrahmanical nature (Hansen and Jaffrelot, 1998, p. 22). There is also a general beliefthat fundamentalist groups are anti-women, but this BJP leader told me that they werein favour of women and women’s rights. Mr Sinha’s point that all were Indian is similarto the French model of mono-cultural liberalism, where everyone is first of all a Frenchcitizen and then a Hindu, Muslim, Jew, Christian. In other words, one’s national identitywas to take precedence over one’s religious, ethnic and other identities.

Interview with the Bishop of Calcutta, 16 April 2013

In an interview with the Bishop of Calcutta, he told me that Christian minoritiesenjoyed full rights and facilities as Indian citizens in the Constitution of India. ‘We, theminority, are enjoying full minority rights.’13 The least fortunate are getting supportfrom the government. ‘In the Indian state of West Bengal, racism or for that matterreligious discrimination is not visible. We all live together.’ The Bishop mentioned thatthere was a minority forum, which they used as a platform to voice their concerns ifthey had any. Mr Biswas told me that the government had made a range of promises tothe Christian community in Calcutta, and that it was trying very hard to fulfil all thesepromises and the aims of the Indian Constitution, and when the government failed,there would be protests. ‘We have good relations with everybody. Calcutta is a mixed,cosmopolitan city, and we interact with all other religious communities. Christiansregularly take part in non-Christian festivals and events like Id and Baisakhi, and wealso invite people from other faiths during Christmas. West Bengal was ruled by theLeft Front for a very long time, but now it has been taken over by the TMC govern-ment, but the BJP also very much exists here, but we do not feel threatened at all bythe BJP. There are lots of Muslims in the BJP. We face no threat from any politicalparty. Some orthodox groups may cause problems elsewhere, but this is not the case inWest Bengal.’14 When asked about the north-eastern states of India, which have quite astrong Christian presence, especially states such as Nagaland, he said that ‘relationswere fine’. He added at a more general level, ‘in India there is diversity, but amongst

452 K. Mukherjee

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

the diversity, we are one, and there is unity. In other words, in India there is unity indiversity. For instance, in India, there exists linguistic diversity, but all Indian languageshave common origins i.e. Sanskrit’.15

Based on what the Bishop of Calcutta told me, it seemed that there was no realtension between Hindu right-wing groups and the Christian community as a minoritycommunity. Speaking on behalf of the Christian community, he gave me a picture ofpeaceful coexistence, although I had my doubts with regards to his views about theIndian northeast, where people actually feel different from the racial majority in Indiaproper, and where there have also been strong separatist tendencies and calls forindependence.

Interview with the Principal of Scottish Church College, Calcutta, 7 April 2013

I conducted a one-hour interview with the principal of Scottish Church College,Calcutta, which is one of best Christian colleges in the country and an institution thatcame into existence in the first half of the 19th century, during the times of Britishcolonial rule. The Principal came from the south Indian state of Kerala, which has astrong Christian presence, especially when compared with the eastern state of WestBengal. In places such as Calcutta, Dr Abraham argued, the Christian presence wasgoing down because of the continuing marriages of Christians with non-Christians.16

Generally, if parents were a mixture from two different religious backgrounds, childrenfrom such parentage would not practise Christianity. Despite the fact that he believedthat the Christian presence was fizzling out, he mentioned that religious tolerance inCalcutta was much higher than in most other parts of India.17 The Principal mentionedthat the Christian community in Calcutta did not feel rejected or embraced by the Hindumajority. He said that the Hindu majority did not particularly care much about theChristian presence. 18

The same college is also known for having a strong student population from India’snorth-eastern states and most of these students are from a Christian background. Whenasked about the north-eastern students and whether or not they felt marginalised by theHindu majority, he mentioned that students from India’s northeast found it hard tomingle with the local community, which is why they always kept to themselves andkept their own identity.19 ‘They form a separate community within the college.’ Thiscould be because intellectually these students from the northeast were not on par withthe local Bengali students. ‘Sometimes there are clashes between north-eastern studentsand local students.’

Based on what Dr Abraham told me, I got the impression that although Christianityin his opinion was fizzling out in Calcutta, there was no sign of any real tensionbetween them as a religious minority on the one hand and Hindu politics and the Hindumajority on the other.

Interview with the Principal of St James’ School, Calcutta

St James’ school, which is located on A. J. C. Bose road in Calcutta, opposite toMother Teresa’s Mother House, is one of the top Christian schools in India for boys. Igot the opportunity to interview the current principal, Mr Ireland, and asked him abouthis views on the Christian community in Calcutta and how they felt especially in

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minorities in Eastern India? 453

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

relation to the Hindu majority and Hindu politics. He started by giving me some back-ground material and mentioned that Anglican churches in India went through a phaseof transformation in the 1970s. Instead of being associated with the Church of England,the affiliations of these churches were now being made to the ‘Church of North India’and the ‘Church of South India’.20 There were different kinds of protestant groupsinvolved in the process and these different groups came together and indigenised thechurch. They made the church a part of Indian culture. ‘Christians do not feel alienatedin Indian society’, he said. ‘The word, “minority” has taken on great importance inrecent times because of politicians. This was not felt in the last thirty years, but onlyhas come about in the past ten years. Minorities, generally speaking, are increasinglyplaying an important role in Indian politics, although Christian minorities almost had norole in politics.

However, the contributions made by Christians in the areas of education were hugeand the Hindu majority were drawn towards the Christian community because of thiscontribution in the educational sector. The role of Christian minorities will be importantin the growth and development of India as long as the schools are owned by Christians.Education is very central to the growth and development of a country. Christians inIndia have been offering the best education in India and have been influencing Indiaand her people. All the Christian schools here are almost one hundred and fifty yearsold and thus have had a tradition of academic excellence and scholarship. This isvalued by the Hindu majority and also by Muslims. Hindus and Muslims are exposedto the good work by Christians especially in the areas of education and charity, particu-larly the hospitals run by Mother Teresa’s organisation. Christians in the more remoteand rural parts of India might not get the same recognition and they may suffer someelement of rejection from the Hindu majority, but by and large in the urban centres andcities, Christians feel privileged. They get privileges, like getting reservations in goodChristian schools.’21 This is what Mr Ireland had to say about the place of the Christiancommunity in relation to mainstream Hindu society. When asked about his views withregards to the BJP, he said, ‘The BJP has a fixed concept: that this land of India isassociated with Hindutva and anything else that exists within its national boundarieswill exist at its mercy and benevolence. But India being what it is will not permit suchas an existence because India at its very core is secular. So no religion really belongs toIndia. The Aryans came and brought their way of life: Hinduism. Muslims came toIndia and brought Islam. The Christian missionaries came from outside of India andbrought Christianity. And although many of these religious traditions came from outsideof India, now they are very much a part of India and its culture.’22

Once again, the story put forward by the Principal of this very reputed Christianschool in Calcutta was one of peaceful coexistence, as opposed to conflict between theHindu majority and politicians on the one hand, and religious minorities and theirleaders on the other.

Views from Below

For purposes of this article, I made sure that I collected data from ordinary people aswell and tried to see to what extent their views fitted in with the views of publicfigures. Often voices from below do not match the version of events produced by the

454 K. Mukherjee

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

political elite or the non-political elite. However, in this case there seemed to be a directmatch and overlap.

In an interview that I carried out on 15 April 2013, with a Muslim school teacherwho was heavily veiled in her hijab and jilbab in Calcutta, she told me that althoughshe was very much aware of the racism and religious discrimination that British born orwestern born Muslims had been subjected to since 9/11, she as a Muslim woman inIndia faced no such discrimination.23 She mentioned that India was a democracy andthat especially in places such as West Bengal, Muslims were not subjected to exclusionor economic and political discrimination. She did mention that there were problems inother parts of India, such as Gujarat, but the situation was entirely different in the stateof West Bengal. On 16 April 2013, another Muslim lady told me that since childhoodshe had never felt excluded from mainstream society and that she had never faced anyproblems with regards to her religious identity.24 A similar response came from an oldMuslim gentleman who was a doctor practising in one of the predominantly Muslimsparts of Calcutta, close to the Nakhoda Masjid, which is one of the main Mosques inCalcutta.25

Concluding Observations

From the above discussion it is thus clear that while the problem of Hindu nationalismexists in contemporary India, and much has been written about it, one needs to becareful in not exaggerating the levels of threat. One needs to give recognition to the factthat although the problem of Hindu fundamentalism/Hindu nationalism exists in India,which has profound implications for religious minorities, it does not exist uniformlythroughout the country. For instance, Hindu fundamentalism does not exist in theeastern state of West Bengal, the way it exists in the western state of Gujarat. In fact, itis quite the opposite. Whereas Gujarati society is polarised and fragmented alongreligious lines as we have seen from recent events, the story in Bengali society is, byand large, a story of peaceful coexistence. Hindu–Muslim tension has also existed inthe heartland region of India, where many of the Hindu nationalist groups have theirbases. This is also where caste politics has been traditionally entrenched. The heartlandregion of India is also very close to where the Babri Masjid controversy took place inAyodhya. One possible reason why Hindu–Muslim/Christian relations are peaceful inthe state of West Bengal and why Hindutva politics has not taken root in West Bengal,as it has in other parts of India, is because the eastern part of the subcontinent wassubjected to Aryanisation or sanskritisation at a much later date. It was the heartlandregion that first became Aryanised in very early times. The east has always been amelting pot where there has been a coexistence of different religious communities forcenturies. Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Christians and tribal cultures in this part ofsouthern Asia have not only lived together peacefully for centuries, but also have oftenaffected each other’s culture unknowingly. If one travels to the Hooghly region of WestBengal, just outside the city of Calcutta, one gets to see the cross-cultural interactionthat has taken place between different religious groups. This cross-cultural impact isquite easily noticeable, especially when one looks at the architectural edifices in theregion. For instance, Hindu temples, such as the Hansheshwari temple in Tribeni,Bansberia, Hooghly, is a syncretic fusion and beautiful blending of different Islamic

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minorities in Eastern India? 455

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

and local Hindu architectural styles.26 However, it could also be argued that IndianMuslims, unlike British Muslims, are not visible minorities. Indian Muslims or IndianChristians look very similar to Hindus. Ethnically they are from the same racial stock,because most of them were Hindus to begin with, but later converted to Islam/Chris-tianity. As they do not stand out the way Muslims do say in Britain, people from thedominant Hindu majority on an everyday basis see them as one of themselves and thusthere is no process of ‘othering’ of Muslims and Christians in West Bengal. Thesituation, however, for Christians from the Indian northeast and Muslims from, say, aplace such as Kashmir is of course quite different. As people from India’s north-easternstates are from a mongoloid racial stock and look very different from mainstreamIndians, they are subjected to racial and religious discrimination, and are also threatenedby right-wing extremist groups.

Notes

1. For further discussion, refer to B. MetCalf (1982) Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

2. Interview carried out by author at the Arya Samaj, Calcutta, 19, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-700,006, WestBengal, India, 13 April 2013.

3. Ibid.4. Ibid.5. Ibid.6. Ibid.7. Interview with Mr Rahul Sinha, BJP President, West Bengal, Burrabazar Office, Calcutta, April 2013.8. www.bjp.org, accessed 17 May 2013.9. Interview with Mr Rahul Sinha, April 2013, Calcutta.10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Ibid.13. Interview with Ashok Biswas, the Bishop of Calcutta, Bishop House, Chowringhee, Calcutta, April 2013.14. Ibid.15. Ibid.16. Interview with Dr J. Abraham, Scottish Church College, 1&3 Urquhart Square, Calcutta 700,006, West

Bengal, India, 17 April 2013.17. Ibid.18. Ibid.19. Ibid.20. Interview with Mr Ireland, Principal, St James’ School, A. J. C. Bose Road, Calcutta, India, April 2013.21. Ibid.22. Ibid.23. Interview carried out by the author, 15 April 2013, Calcutta, India.24. Interview carried out by the author, 16 April 2013, Calcutta, India.25. Interview carried out by the author, April 2013, Calcutta, India.26. Field trip to West Bengal, India, April 2013.

References

Adeney, K. and Saez, L. (Eds) (2005) Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism. London: Routledge.Anand, D. (2005) The Violence of Security: Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Representing ‘the Muslim’as a Danger, The Roundtable: Commonwealth, Journal of International Affairs, 94(379), 203–215.doi:10.1080/00358530500099076.

Armstrong, K. (2000) Islam: A Short History. London: Phoenix Paperback.

456 K. Mukherjee

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014

Banerjee, S. (2005) Make me a Man! Masculinity, Hinduism and Nationalism in India. New York: State Uni-versity of New York Press.

Graham, B.D., The Challenge of Hindu Nationalism: The BJP in Contemporary Indian Politics, in DeSouza,P.R., and Sridharan, E., (Eds) (2006) India's Political Parties, New Delhi/London: Sage.

Bhatt, C. (2001) Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths. Oxford, New York: Berg.Bhatt, C. (2004) Democracy and Hindu Nationalism, Democratisation, 11(4), 133–154. doi:10.1080/1351034042000234567.

Flaten, L.T. (2012) Hindu Nationalist Conceptions of History: Constructing a Hindu Muslim Dichotomy,South Asia: A Journal of, South Asian Studies, 35(3), 624–647. doi:10.1080/00856401.2011.642794.

Flood, G. (1996) An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Ghosh, P.S. (2000) BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism: From Periphery to the Centre. New Delhi:Manohar.

Gillan, M. (2003) Bengals Past and Present: Hindu Nationalist Contestations of History and Regional Idenity,Contemporary South Asia, 12(3) 381–398. doi:10.1080/0958493032000175905.

Hansen, T. (1999) The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India. New Jersey:Princeton University Press.

Hansen, T. and Jaffrelot, C. (Eds) (1998) The BJP and Compulsions of Politics in India. Oxford: OUP.Jaffrelot, C. (1993) The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India. New York: Columbia University Press.Jaffrelot, C. (2007) Hindu Nationalism: A Reader. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Mukherjee, K., Islamism and Neo-fundamentalism in Durward, R., and Marsden, L., (Eds) (2009) Religion,Conflict and Military Intervention, Surrey: Ashgate.

Mukta, P. (2000) The Public Face of Hindu Nationalism, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23(3) 442–466.doi:10.1080/014198700328944.

Noorani, A.G. (2002) Islam and Jihad. London: Zed Books.Pardesi, M.S. and Oetken, J.L. (2008) Secularism, Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in India, Asian Security,4(1), 23–40. doi:10.1080/14799850701783148.

Zavos, J. (2000) The Emergence of Hindu Nationalism in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Is Hindu Nationalism a Threat to Religious Minorities in Eastern India? 457

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Sim

on F

rase

r U

nive

rsity

] at

11:

01 1

3 N

ovem

ber

2014