irs search warrant handbook 2009

7/28/2019 IRS Search Warrant Handbook 2009

1/11

SEARCH W ARRANT HANDBOOK

Office of Chief CounselCriminal Tax Division

2009

IRS-ACLU 00202


2/11

PREFACECriminal Ta x attorneys frequently provide legal advice to Criminal Investigationpersonnel with respect to search w arrant applications. To a ssist in evaluating such

applications, this handbook provides an overview of search wa rrant law, The overviewprovided herein is not intended to take the place of thorough legal research w ith respectto a particular search warrant ap plication.This handbo ok does not create or confer any rights, privileges, or benefits on a ny.person, It is not intended to ha ve the force of faw or of a statem ent of Internal RevenueService policy, See U nited States v. Caceres, 440 U .S. 741 (1979),

s/Edwa rd F. CroninEDW ARD F. CRONINDivision C ounsel/Associate C hief Counsel(Criminal Tax)Internal Revenue Service

IRS-ACLU 00203


3/11

TABLE OF CONTENTSINTRO DUC TION ............ ..................................................................................... 1A, Prim ary Au thorities ..................................................................................... 2

1, Fourth Amendment ..........................................................................22, Federal R ules of Criminal P rocedure, Rule 4 1 ............................... 3

B. P r im a r y L e g a l Is s u e s ...............................................~ ..................................41. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy .................................................42. Probab le Cause ...........i .......................................... " .........................43. Particularity ...................................................................................... 5

RE ASON AB LE EX PE CTA TION OF PR IVAC Y ....................................................A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy ..............................................................5B. Reasonableness .............................................. ........................................... 6PROBABLE CAUSE ................................................................ i ............................ 9A. Standa rds of R eview ........................~ ........................... : .............................. 9B. Factual Showing ...............................~ ....................................................... 10C. Agents C onclusions ..................... ......................... , ................................. 10D. Informants ................................................................................................ 12

1. Totality-of-the-Circum stances Analysis ............................ . . . . . . . . . . . . 122. Factors Considered ...................." ................................................... 133. Criminal Activity of informants .......................................................144~ Anonymous and Confidential Informan ts .......................................155. Corroboration ................................................................................ 15

E. Staleness ................................................................................................ 171. Factors ................................................................................ , . . . . . . . . .182. Ongo ing Pa ttern of Crimina l Activity .............................................18

IRS-ACLU 00204


4/11

IV.

3. Business Records ......................................................................... 19F. A nticipatory Sea rch W arrants .................................. : . . . . . . . . . : ...................... 19G. Effect of False Statements or Om issions ...............................................

1. Material False Statements .............................................................202. Material Omissions ........ ............................................... " . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 21

PA RTICUL ARITY ............... .......................................... i .....................................22A. Generality vs. Overb readth ................... .................................................... 22B. Standards of Review ............................................:..i ................................. 24C. Place to be Searched ............................................................................... 25D. Items to Be Seized ........................................................................ ~ . . . . . ~ . . . .26

1. Factors Considered ........................................................................ 282. Best Practices ................................................................................ 28

a. Inclusion of All A vailable Information ..................................29b. Reference to Criminal Violations .........................................30c. Reference to Time Frame ..............~ .................................... 32d. Incorpora tion and Attachm ent o f A ffidavit ............................32e. Exam ples ................................................. ~ . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . 33

3. Generic D escriptions ................................" . . . . . . . . . . ~ ..........................344. Catch-All Phrases .............................~ ............................................ 35

a. "Including but Not Limited to". ..............................................35 b . Other Catch-All P hrases ......................~ ........................... ~ . . . 3 6

5. "Permeated With Fraud". ...............................................................38EXE CUTING THE W ARR AN T: THE P LAIN V IEW D OCTR INE .........................1A. General Requirements .................. 42

Imm ediate Apparency~ ...................................... ........................................ 43

IRS-ACLU 00205


5/11

VII.

R E M E D I E S F O R U N L A W F U L S E A R C H E S A N D S E I Z U R E S ............................5A, The Exc lusionary Rule ..............................................................................45

1. Total vs. Partial Suppression .........................................................462, Good Faith Exception ......................................................... : . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 .3. Attenuation Exception ....................................................................504. Independent Source Exception .....................................................515. Inevitable D iscovery E xception ....................................................... 52

B .. Age nt. L iability and Q ualified Im munity ....................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54C. G overn m ent L iabil ity ............................................ . .................................... 55COMPUTER~RELATED SEARCHES AND SEIZURES .....................................5A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ..........................................................56B. Probable Cause ........................................................................................ 56C . . Par ticularity ..........~ . . . . . . . . .. . . . . i . . . . . . . . . .. .......................................................... 57D. Ninth Circuit Procedural Requirements .............................................. . . . . . . .59E. Privacy Statutes that M ay Apply to Com puter Searches ..........................9

1. The Stored Communications Act ...................................................592. The Priva cy P rotection Act ............................................................60

iv

IRS-ACLU 00206


6/11

search; threw her to the ground, and hand cuffed her so t ightly as to cause pain.Assum ing these allegations to be true, the court concluded that the agents conductviolated the Fourth Am endm ent, that a reasona ble agent in his posit ion wo uld haveknown that it did, and that therefore the ag ent was not entitled to qualif ied im mu nityonthose charges. 34 2 F.3d at 1059 . How ever, with respect to the plaint iffs claim thatdetaining her in handcuffs dudng the search wa s unlawful, the court held that eventhough the agent had violated her constitutional rights, he was entitled to qualifiedimm unity as to this port ion of her claim. T he court exp lained that, at the t ime of thesearch, the case law had n ot clearly established that this conduct~violated the p lair~tiffsconstitutional rights. Id. at 1065.

Q ualified imm unity was held not to ap ply with respect to any of the claimsbrought against IRS agents in Tekle v. Uni ted States, 511 F.3d 839 (gth Cir. 2007). tnthat case, the age nts executed search and arrest warrants at the hom e of the plaintiff sparents, who w ere suspected of narcotics trafficking a nd tax-related offenses. Dudngthe search, the agents allegedly held a g un to the head of the eleven-year-old plaint iff,who w as unarm ed and ba refoot, hand cuffed him, pulled him up by the chain of thehandcuffs, and detained him w ith the handcuffs on for approximately 15 m inutes andthen for an add it ional 10 -15 m inutes with guns sti ll drawn. The plaintiff brought a Bivensaction against the agents for the use of excessive force and for subjecting him to anunreasona ble detention. The N inth Circuit held that agents w ere not entit led to ass ertqualified imm unity because "a reasonable officer should have known that it wasconstitut ionally excessive to use su ch force and to use the handcu ffs in the m anneralleged against an unarm ed elevem year-old child who was fully complying with theofficers requests." 511 F.3d at 856.C. Government LiabilityIn addition to claims ag ainst individual officials, the Federa l Tort Claims A ct("F.T.C .A.") provides tha t a civil action alleging an illegal arrest, search, or seizu re by afederal officer may be brought d irectly a gainst the United States governm ent. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). The relevant po rt ion of 2680(h) provides that the federal governm ent is notimmune to suit with regard to "acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcementofficers of the United States Gov ernment~ for "any claim arising ... out of assault,battery, false imprisonm ent, false arrest, abuse of process, or m alicious prosecu tion."ld. The prov ision defines "investigative or law enforcem ent officer" as " any officer of theUnited States who is empow ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or tom ake arrests for violations of Fed eral law." id.

V!!, COMPUTER-RELATED SEARCHES AND SEIZURESCom puter*related searches and seizures are subject to the same F ourthAm endm ent requireme nts that apply to any search or seizure: a wa rrant is generallyrequired if the target has a reasonable expectation of pdvacy in the computer to besearched, and the w arrant application must be evaluated.for probable cause andpart icularity. Ho weve r, the legal an alysis of these issues mus t take into account theunique characteristics of comp uters, which enable users to-store va st am ounts of

55

IRS-ACLU 00207


7/11

inform ation and to sh are or restr ict access to that information in various way s. Further,when searching compu ters, law enforcement ag encies are subject to specificrestrictions and obligations under the Stored Comm unications Act ("SCA" ), 18 U.S.C. 2701, et seq, and the Privacy Protection Act ("PP A"), 42 U .S,C, 2000aa et seq.A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The a nalysis of an individuals expectation of privacy with respect to a com puterdepend s on the !ocation and ownership of the computer and the extent to which it maybe accessed by others. Courts have held that an individual generally has a reasonableexpectation of privacy with respect to his or her home com puter. See United States v.Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 , 190 (2d Cir. 2004); Guest v. Le is, 255 F.3d 325, 33 3 (6th Cir,2001). Conversely, an em ployee may have a reduced expectation of pdvacy in his orher office computer, especially if that computer is subject to some level of monitoring byhis or her employer. See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 3 92, 398 (4th Cir, 2000 ).W hen two or m ore individuals share a com puter, or when an individualscomputer has f~le-sharing software or is attached to a network, courts m ust engage in afact-intensive analysis to determine w hether Fourth Am endm ent protections app ly. In .such situations, if access to files is limited by a pass word or othe r mea ns, there ma y bea reasona ble expectation of privacy, See Tru lock v , Freeh, 275 F.3d 391,403(4th Cir.2001 ); United States v. Heckenkam p, 482 F,3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)~Like flies shared over a network, emails and other transmissions generally losetheir reasonable exp ectation~ privacy and thus their Fourth Ame ndm ent protectiononce they have been sent from an individuals computer. Se e Un ited S tates v. L i fsh i tz,369 F.3d a t t90; Gu est v . .Le is , 255 F.3 d at33 3. A sim ilar principle app lies to acomputer users subscriber information, which is shared with an internet service

provider and is therefore not subject to Fourth A men dm ent protections. See U ni ted .States v . Per r ine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir~ 2008),B. Probable CauseAs w ith all searches, if there is a reasona ble expectation of pdva cy and thewarrant requirement app lies, applications for computer-retated warrants m ust beevaluated for probable cause, in general, the probable cause ana lysis for comp uter-related searches is no different from the analysis for other searches. See Un ited Statesv. Giberson, 527 F .3d 882, 888~89 (9th Cir. 200 8) (stating, with respect to a com putersearch for tax records an d other docu ments, that "the p otential intermingling ofma terials [on a com puter] does not justify an excep tion or heightened p roceduralprotections for computers beyond the Fourth Am endments reasonablenessrequirement,"). B ut see Un i ted States v. Com prehensive Drug Test ing, Inc,, 579 F,3d989 (9th Cir. 2009) (an b anc) ( imposing new p rocedural requirements w ith respect tothe search and seizure of electronic data from a non-suspe ct third party). As with othertypes of searches, the connection between the place to b e searched and the items tobe seized m ay be inferred if that inference has "com mon sense appea l." United States

v, Perry, 531 F.3d 6 62,665 (Sth Cir. 2008),

6

IRS-ACLU 00208


8/11

For exam ple, in Uni ted States v. Khanani , a case involving immigrationviolat ions, money laundering conspiracy, and the ev asion of federal employm ent andincome taxes, the defenda nt contended that the seizure of his computers was withoutprobable cause because the affidavit submitted with the warrant application provided nofact-specific reason to be lieve there were com puters in his office, or that his compu tershad be en used to facilitate the comm ission of any of the alleged criminal violations,502 F.3d 12 81, !290 (11th Cir. 2007). The court disagreed, noting that the affidavitdescribed the defendant as a n accountant for one of the co-conspirators and that oneof the tax returns for that individual had been found in the trash outside the defendantsoffice:

W hile the M aster Affidavit did not indicate that it was a c om puter-generated tax form, in reviewing the affidavit to a scertain w hether itfurnished p robable cause for the warrant sough t, the affidavit is given a"com mo n sense and realistic" interpretation, o.~ Ad ditionally, [a witnessfor the government] testified, that prior to the warrant application, he hadentered [the defendants] office and observed connected computers. Thedistrict court did not err in concluding that the allegations of the MasterAffidavit were sufficient to provide proba ble cause for the seizu re ofcomputers from [the defendants] accounting business.Id. (citations omitted). As this quotation indicates, the same "com mon sen se" standa rdthat applies to probable cause d eterminations .in general also applies in the context ofcomputer-related searches and seizures. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238(1983) (".The task of the issuing m agistrate is simply to mak e a practical, com mo n-sense d ecision w hether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,.... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a cdme wilt be found in aparticular place.").

C. ParticularityComputer technology poses unique challenges with respect to the particularityrequirement, Because computers are capa ble of stodng and intermingling a great dealof information, and because com puter data m ay be mislabeled or otherwise concealed,it may be diff icult to draft a com puter search wa rrant that is com prehensive withoutbeing overbroad. T his potential for overbreadth, however, underscores the impo rtanceof draft ing com puter search warrants with sufficient particularity, See U nited States v.Otero, 563 F.3d 1 127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The m odern development of the personalc6m puter and its ability to store and interm ingle a huge array of ones pe rsonal pap ersin a single place increases taw enforcem ents ability to conduct a wide-rang ing search

into a persons private affairs, and a ccordingly m akes the pa rticularity requirem ent thatmuch more important.").In Otero, a case involving cha rges of ma il fraud and c redit card theft aga inst apostal carr ier, the Tenth C ircuit emphasized that "warrants for computer searches m ustaffirmatively limit the search to e vidence of specific federal cdmes or specific types of

57

IRS-ACLU 00209


9/11

material." 563 F .3d at 11 32 (citation omitted; em phasis in original). The court held thatthe warrant at issue lacked.sufficient particularity on the following grounds:Attachment B is quite neatly divided into two subsections: "ITEM S TO BESEIZED" and "COM PUTER ITEM S TO BE SEIZED." Each paragraphunder the first section takes pains to limit the search to evidence ofspecific crimes or evidence pe rtaining to specific persons along M s,Oteros delivery route. Each p aragraph under the second section, incontrast, has no limiting instruction whatsoever, Read alone, they eachauthorize a search a nd seizure of "[a]ny and all" information, data,devices, programs, and other materials. There is no explidt or evenimp lidt incorpora tion of the limitations of the first five paragrap hs. Thecomp uter-related paragraphs do not even refer to the rest of the wa rrant.In fact, the presence, of limitations in each o f the first five paragra phs bu tabsence in the second four suggests that the com puter searches are notsubject to those limitations. Even w hen read in the context of the overallwarrant, therefore, the paragraphs authorizing the co mp uter search weresubject to no a ffirma tive limitations,

Id. at 1 I32~33. The O t e r o holding indicates that ex plicit references to " affirma tivelimitations," such a s a description of the specific cdm es suspe cted, must be m ade in thecom puter section of a,.search warran t in order to satisfy the particularity requirem ent,See a lso United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3 d 1 t40, 1149 (9th Cir, 2006) (holding that thewarrant at issue satisfied the particularity requireme nt in part because "the g overnm enthere did describe at som e length both the nature of and the m eans of com mitt ing thecrime.").Although courts have em phasized the need for part icularity in comp uter searchwarrants, they also recognize that the government m ay be unable to search for specificcom puter f iles during the execution of a warrant and m ay need to conduct a wholesaleseizure of the computers themselves for subsequent searching. Se e, e .g ., Guest v .Le is , 255 F.3d 325, 3 35 (6th Cir, 2001 ) ("Beca use of the technical difficulties ofconducting a com puter search in a suspects hom e, the seizure of the computers, .including their content, was reasona ble in these cases to allow p olice to locate theoffending files."); U p h a m , 168 F.3d a t 535 (" i t is no easy task to search a well- ladenhard drive by going through all of the information it contains .., The record shows thatthe mec hanics of the search for images later performe d off site could not readily havebeen done on the spot."). It cannot be assumed , however, that the seizure of acom puter for off-site searching is justified in every instance. Rather, to satisfy thepart icularity requ ireme nt, a sea rch wa rrant aff idavit m ust provide facts that support the

need for an off-site search. See Un i ted S ta tes v . H i ll , 459 F.3d 9 66, 975-76 (9th Cir,2006) (~Ve do not approve of issuing warrants authorizing blanket removal of allcom puter storage m edia for later examination whe n there is no affidavit giving areasonable explanation ,,, as to why a w holesale seizure is necessary.").

58

IRS-ACLU 00210


10/11

Consideration should also be given to the possibility of imaging a com putershard drive rather than seizing the comp uter itself, because remova l of the com puter maymake it impossible for the target to continue conducting business. See, e.g, UnitedStates v. Raybum H ouse Off ice B ui ld ing, Room 2113, W ashington, D.C. 20515, 4 9 7F.3d 654, 670 (D .C. Cir. 2007) (noting that one of the ways in w hich FBI agents whosearched a congressmans off ice m inimized disruption wa s by " imaging com puter harddrives rather than sea rching the computers").

D. Ninth Circuit P rocedural Requirementstn a recent en banc op inion involv!ng the search of a non-suspect third p artyscomp uters, the N inth Circuit introduced new procedural requirements for comp uter-related searches. See U ni ted S tates v. Co mp rehensive Drug Test ing, lnc. , 579 F.3d989 (9th C ir. 2009 ). The court described these new guidelines as follows:1. Magistrates should insist that .the government waive reliance upon theplain view do ctrine in digital evidence case s ....2. Segregation and reda ction must be either done by specializedpersonnel or an independent third party ....3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destructionof information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in otherjudicial fora ....4. The governm ents search protocol must be designed to uncover.onlythe informa tion for which it has p robable cause, and only that informationmay . be examined by the case agents ....5. The go vernment m ust destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possessit, return non-responsive da ta, keeping the issuing ma gistrate informedabout when it has done so a nd wha t it has kept.

579 F.3d at 1006.E. Privacy Statutes that May App ly to Computer Searches

1. The Stored Com munications ActIn general, the Fourth Am endm ent does not protect commun ications held melectronic storage, such as em ail messages stored on a server,, because internet usersdo not have a reasonable expectation of pdvacy in such comm unications, Further,because the Fourth Amend ment app lies to government searches rather than searchesby pd vate actors, it does not app ear to limit the ability of internet service providers("ISPs") to obtain customer information and disclose it to the g overnme nt; To fil l this

59

IRS-ACLU 00211


11/11

gap, the Stored C omm unications Act ("SCA "), t8 U.S.C. 270I-11,19 establishescertain protections for custom er information inthe possession of ISP s. Se e 18 U.S.C. 270 3, Specifically, if the governm ent seeks to com pel disclosure of the contents ofelectronic comm unications and other information without prior notice to customers orsubscribers, the SCA requires thata valid search w arrant be obtained. See Guest v .Leis, 255 F.3d 32 5, 339 (6th Cir. 2001 ).2. The Privacy P rotection Act

The Fourth Am endm ent also does not apply to searches and seizures ofdocum entary evidence in the p ossession of innocent third part ies, such as the press.See Zurcher v. Stanford Dai@, 436 U,S. 547 (1978), However, the Privacy ProtectionAct of 1980.("PPA "), 42 U.S.C. 2000aa et seq., makes it unlawful for a governme ntemployee to search for or seize documentary m aterials possessed by a person with apurpose to disseminate som e form of public commu nication. 42 U.S.C. 2000a a(a);(b). The PP A generally does not a pply if the materials sought constitute contraband orthe me ans of com mitting a criminal offense, or if there is probable caus e to believe theperson possessing the materials has committed a criminal offense to which thema terials relate, 42 U.S.C. 2000 aa(a).

As the Sixth Circuit has obse rved, interpretation of the PP A presen ts particularchallenges in the context of com puter searches. See G uest v . Le is , 255 F.3d 325, 34t(6th Cir. 200t), These challenges stem from the difficulty of iseparat[ing] the offendingmaterials from other innocent material on the computer." Id. at 341-42. In Guest, thecourt expressed concern .that criminals migh t seek to insulate electronically-heldcriminal evidence from search and seizure by including P PA -protected ma terials ontheir computers. See id . at 342 . Accordingly, the court held that "w hen protectedmaterials are com mingled on a criminal suspects com puter with cdm inal evidence thatis unprotected by the act, we wil l not f ind l iabil ity under the P PA for seizure of the PP A-protected materials." Id. The court cautioned, however, that "police may not then search the PPA-protected materials that were seized incidentally to the criminalevidence." Id. In the case before it, the court de clined to find the defendants l iableunder the PP A because the owner or operator of the.computers at issue was a criminalsuspect, and the PP A-protected m aterials were not searched. Id.

~ The SC A is Tit le I I of the Electronic Comm unications Pdvacy Act ("ECP A"), Pub. L.99-50 8, 100 Star. 1848.

6O

irs search warrant handbook 2009

Documents