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    CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY STABILIZATION

    International Relief & Development

    in Iraq

    20032009

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    Copyright by International Relie & Development (IRD) 2012

    All rights reserved.

    The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reect the views o the US Agency or International

    Development or o the US government.

    IRD is a nonproft humanitarian, stabilization, and development organization whose mission is to reduce the

    suering o the worlds most vulnerable groups and provide the tools and resources needed to increase their

    sel-sufciency.

    Design, editing, and production by Communications Development Incorporated, Washington, DC, and Peter

    Grundy Art & Design, London, UK.

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    Contents

    Foreword v

    Overview 1

    Chapter 1 Building community trust 6

    ICAP: The frst step to rebuilding civil society 8

    Establishing services, assisting civilians, creating jobs 13

    Insecurity: Operational limitations in an unstable environment 16

    Chapter 2 A complete stabilization package 22CSP origins: A new approach or international development 23

    Breaking down CSPs design 26

    The complete package: Programmatic and military integration 28

    Chapter 3 Successes and setbacks 34

    Community inrastructure and essential services: CSPs entry point 35

    Business development programs: Light at the end o the tunnel 40

    Vocational training: A sustainable program when we let 44

    Youth activities: Dierent rom everything else 49

    Chapter 4 Converting roadblocks into a roadmap 54CSPs three-year lie cycle as a orce multiplier 56

    Strategic recommendations or uture COIN programs 58

    Epilogue 66

    Acronyms 68

    Notes 69

    Boxes

    1 ICAP: Program and results 9

    2 Awni Quandour: IRDs original elder statesman 11

    3 The evolution o ICAP, USAIDs longest-running program in Iraq 20

    4 CSP: At a glance 25

    5 CSP: Project development process 29

    6 CSP: Results 36

    7 Enhancing internal controls and program oversight 41

    8 CSP and the changing perception o sustainability 46

    9 Stabilization in Iraq: 20 tactical lessons 63

    Figure

    1 Sel-sustaining project work cycle 31

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    In memory o Awni Quandour, whose

    relationships with local communities in

    Iraq were invaluable to making IRDs

    programs work, and who was instrumental

    in establishing IRDs presence in the

    Middle East. His legacy lives on through the

    organizational strategy he helped crat.

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    Foreword

    Recent civil stabilization successes can be traced to

    eorts launched in the Balkans in the 1990s. There,

    civil society groups became critical partners in sus-

    taining and strengthening the peace. The community-

    based model employed in that region is now being

    applied in other conict and postconict zones,

    including West Arica, Iraq, and Aghanistan.

    A airly new development is that NGOs now cooperate

    and coordinate directly with US and international secu-

    rity orces, along with bilateral and multilateral donor

    agencies. In places like Iraq and Aghanistan, the

    coordination has been so close that the NGOs work

    has been viewed as examples o eective counterin-

    surgency. As military and civilian leaders have pointed

    out, civilian agencies are best equipped to understand

    and work directly with local communities, and they are

    generally better received by local governments and

    populations. While some development organizations

    say civ-mil partnerships would compromise their

    neutrality, benefciaries recognize the consistency o

    such partnerships with the NGO communitys mission

    to assist the worlds vulnerable populationseven

    those caught in armed conict.

    This publication explores the Community Stabilization

    Program (CSP) in Iraq, a successul civ-mil partner-

    ship. This cooperative agreement between USAID and

    IRD initially unded stabilization activities in Baghdad

    and then expanded nationwide. At the height o the

    program, IRD had 1,800 sta (more than 90 percent

    local employees) in 15 cities and was implementing

    $21 million a month in programming. Where CSP went,

    multiple USAID audits, military, and USAID experts say

    that stability tended to ollow.

    CSP relied on more than civ-mil partnership, however.

    The program also built on the experience IRD gained

    rom its Community Revitalization through Democratic

    Action (CRDA) program in the Balkans. IRD applied

    lessons about mobilizing war-weary populations to

    reestablish sel-governance, community organization,

    and democratic principles. CSP benefted rom IRDs

    on-the-ground presence and record o success in Iraq,

    as well as the earned trust o local communities. The

    program supported basic training on principles o

    governance, promoted civil society institutions, and

    instituted a rapid participatory appraisal process to

    get projects moving quickly. With this capacity devel-

    opment, Iraqi community groups developed action

    plans and implemented them in coordination with the

    military and local provincial reconstruction teams as

    well as local ministry ofcialshelping legitimize the

    government and establish lines o trust and communi-

    cation between leaders and citizens.

    This publication oers an unvarnished examina-

    tion o CSP and its precursor program in Iraqthe

    approaches, challenges, results, and impacts. The

    story is told in the voice o the many people who

    implemented it as well as by the benefciaries who

    appreciated its contributions to improving security,

    government services, and the quality o lie in conict-

    aected areas. In my view CSP provides evidence

    to support the assertion that social and economic

    development does help sustain peace and stability.

    Dr. Arthur B. Keys Jr.

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    General David Petraeus, commander o the International Security

    Assistance Force, and IRD staers meet with members o the Ramadi

    Womens Center

    Overview

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    Stabilization and reconstruction missions occur in a rangeo circumstancessometimes in hostile security environ-ments, sometimes in permissive ones, and sometimes inenvironments somewhere in between. The mission to stabilize

    and reconstruct a nation is one that civilians must lead. John Negroponte

    Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks

    and subsequent US military operations in Aghanistan

    and Iraq, traditional relie and development programs,

    historically the province o a small group o civilian

    and voluntary agencies, expanded dramatically in

    scale and scope, touching nearly every government

    department, including the US military. Whereas the

    primary ocus o assistance operations generally had

    been centered on providing humanitarian aid, rebuild-

    ing services, and enhancing civil society, the evolving

    eorts reached beyond basic relie measures, aiming

    to stabilize and rebuild populations during a period o

    conict and, in some instances, while military opera-

    tions were ongoing.

    At the same time that the US government was expand-

    ing into stabilization operations, American military

    leadership, inormed by the ongoing wars in Iraq and

    Aghanistan, was recognizing its own needand current

    structural limitationsin these areas. In 2006, the US

    Army and Marine Corps released a new feld manual

    covering counterinsurgency operations, the frst time

    in more than two decades that either had addressed

    counterinsurgency (COIN) exclusively in a manual. The

    primary purpose o the document was to lay out a

    blueprint or the militarys approach to a more contem-

    porary orm o warare, an approach that General David

    Petraeus, one o the manuals chie authors, recognized

    as inextricably tied to nonmilitary resources.

    A counterinsurgency campaign, Petraeus wrote,

    requires soldiers and marines to employ a mix o

    amiliar combat tasks and skills more oten associ-

    ated with nonmilitary agencies and to be prepared

    or extensive coordination and cooperation with many

    intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agen-

    cies. The second chapter o the manual is devoted

    to integrating civilian and military activities, beginning

    with a kind o acquiescence to the limits o industrial

    might in unstable environments. Military eorts are

    necessary to fght insurgents, the manual states, but

    they are only eective when integrated into a larger

    strategy intended to meet the needs o the local

    population and win community support.

    Testiying beore Congress in 2008, John Negroponte,

    the US ambassador to Iraq (200405), noted there

    had been 17 signifcant stabilization and reconstruc-

    tion missions over the preceding 20 years in which

    too much o the eort was borne by our men and

    women in uniorm. Negroponte was lobbying or

    State Department unding or what would become

    the Civilian Response Corps, but the message was

    cleardespite greater need, neither the military

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    2

    What made CSP stand out was the

    close cooperation between the US

    military and USAIDs implementing

    partner, IRDa collaboration at both

    the strategic and operational levels

    nor the government had the necessary knowledge

    or capacity in conict development and stabilization

    methods to carry out an expanded civilian-military

    partnership. Our civilian-military partnership is strong,

    benefcial, and appropriate, he said. But, he added,

    the mission to stabilize and reconstruct a nation is

    one that civilians must lead.

    Civ-mil cooperation: A new way orward

    With the military actively involved in trying to win

    hearts and minds in conict zones, civilian agencies,

    such as the US Agency or International Development

    (USAID), were coordinating among themselves and

    with the military at unprecedented levels to push the

    new approach orward. That intersection o overlapping

    concerns is the centerpiece o civ-mil partnerships.

    One o the largest and most important examples

    o this new type o partnership was the Community

    Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq, a sweeping $644

    million initiative awarded to International Relie &

    Development (IRD) and designed to support quick-

    impact projects, a nonlethal counterinsurgency

    program that reduces the incentives or participation

    in violent conict by employing or engaging at-risk

    youth between the ages o 17 and 35, according to

    the agreement language.

    CSP was a landmark investment in both time and

    resources. Not only did it mark USAIDs frst large-

    scale commitment to a stabilization program in an

    active conict zone, it was also the largest USAID-

    unded cooperative agreement ever to date. The

    scale o this was unusual, said Jeanne Pryor, USAIDs

    deputy director o Iraq reconstruction, at a 2009 US

    Institute o Peace symposium on CSP. Pryor noted that

    the amount o money devoted to CSP was otentimes

    appropriated or an entire continent, let alone one

    program in three years.

    Aside rom the unding, what made CSP stand out was

    the close cooperation between the US military and

    USAIDs implementing partner, IRDa collaboration at

    both the strategic and operational levels that helped

    bring economic development and community stabiliza-

    tion in a conict environment squarely within the US

    governments COIN strategy. Unlike traditional relie

    and development programs where security may be one

    o many equally important actors, CSP operations

    depended wholly on some level o security to succeed.

    Collaborative decisionmaking among the many parties

    involved was crucial. Provincial reconstruction teams

    (PRTs) and local government entities oten generated

    ideas that then became CSP projects, such as a

    un-run sporting event or youth or the reconstruction

    o the Abu Ghraib Old Market in Baghdad, but that

    collaboration relied on a secure operating environ-

    ment. In most situations, though, once the military

    had cleared an area in a city and secured its relative

    saety, CSP projects would begin immediate imple-

    mentation by rebuilding the communitys physical and

    economic inrastructure.

    In short, CSP provided the fnal component o the mili-

    tarys clear-hold-build strategy. That very popular

    phrase, that was the sort o concept that drove

    the interrelationship between the military and what

    ollowed, said James Kunder, a ormer senior ofcial

    with USAID and now an advisor to IRD. The CSP

    program kind o wove in through the hold and build

    phases. It was part o the hold, that people would

    have something to do and wouldnt start fring at the

    orces that were trying to maintain security. But also,

    it could be the beginning o a longer term development

    program that might actually change the place.

    CSP launched in Baghdad, but ater only six months

    its early success led to a rapid rollout in other cities

    across Iraq, 15 in all. With the program quickly under

    way, CSP began ocusing on Iraqi communities with

    the specifc purpose o helping the military stabilize

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    Through its ICAP work, IRD had an

    established base o operations in

    Baghdad and an important logistical

    springboard or launching the much

    larger and more complex CSP

    them. IRDs rapid response or relie and reconstruc-

    tion work, in both kinetic and nonkinetic environments

    and oten alongside military personnel, exemplifed the

    changing ace o development and the role o nongov-

    ernmental organizations (NGOs).

    Earning local trust

    IRD was able to launch and expand CSP quickly

    because it had been operating in Baghdad or three

    years implementing the Iraq Community Action

    Program (ICAP). By going into some o Baghdads most

    dangerous and at-risk neighborhoods when no other

    relie agencies were around, IRD began to gain local

    avor as it assisted a war-weary population to rebuild

    civil society.

    ICAP began operations in May 2003, as a way to mobi-

    lize Iraqi communities ater decades o repression and

    to help communities identiy, prioritize, and address

    their most pressing civic needs. Projects ocused on

    rebuilding economic and social inrastructure, boost-

    ing business development, and providing assistance

    to civilian victims o war. Most important, the projects

    werent decreed by IRD, but decided in conjunction

    with locally organized community action groups.

    In Baghdad neighborhoods, where no legitimate sense

    o grassroots activism or democratic engagement

    had existed or years, community action groups gave

    ordinary citizens a direct role in a kind o decentral-

    ized decisionmaking that had been mostly missing

    rom Iraq. With the help o these community groups,

    IRD completed almost 2,400 ICAP projects between

    2003 and 2006, at a value o more than $73 million.

    The program required an in-kind Iraqi contribution

    o 25 percent o project unds, but that number was

    exceeded by almost $10 millionanother sign o

    Iraqis eagerness to be involved in their planning and

    development processes. Through community action

    groups, IRD helped put individual citizens directly

    in touch with government leaders during a time o

    upheaval and uncertainty. Even tenuous links between

    public and private interests, IRD believed, would help

    citizens regain some sense o trust in their local

    political system and open doors to broader improve-

    ments in their communities physical and social

    inrastructure.

    IRDs close working relationship with the community

    continued throughout the evolution o ICAP, which

    ran concurrently with CSP and continued or years

    aterward as an even more robust mobilization and

    participatory program. Ater three years o ocused

    community interaction with civilians and local leaders

    under ICAP, IRD had enough credibility among Iraqis to

    take on a program as large and military-dependent as

    CSPand to make it work.

    Stabilizing communities

    CSP kicked o in June 2006, a ew months ahead o a

    highly publicized military surge by US and international

    orces. It ended more than three years later, in late

    2009. Throughout implementation, IRD sta ound

    themselves under pressure, pulled in a variety o

    directions by competing and sometimes contradictory

    demands rom multiple stakeholders. But they also

    implemented hundreds o projects that brought order

    and economic revitalization to an oppressed popula-

    tion in the middle o a war zone.

    CSPs main goal can be summarized in one statement:

    reduce or eliminate incentives or individuals to par-

    ticipate in insurgent activities by creating employment

    opportunities and ostering community engagement. In

    Iraq, people were desperate or jobs, so employment

    is where CSP ocused its fnancial muscle. More than

    90 percent o the programs unds were geared toward

    short- and long-term employment. As the implementing

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    4

    By the end o the program, the

    business development component had

    generated 74 percent o the 57,109

    long-term jobs documented by CSP

    agency, IRD was responsible or the civilian-led eort

    to reach CSPs goal. IRD strove to provide a complete

    package o services that optimized the natural overlap

    between the our program components that made

    up CSPs operational design: creating short-term

    jobs through community inrastructure and essential

    services, creating long-term jobs through business

    development grants, establishing robust vocational

    training and apprenticeship services, and engaging

    Iraqi youth through community and cultural programs.

    The IRD approach and program components linked

    CSP projects with military strategy and community

    needs.

    The Community Inrastructure and Essential Services

    (CIES) program component was divided into two

    general project areasinrastructure rehabilitation

    and essential services work, which required unskilled

    labor on quick-impact projects such as trash collec-

    tion and rubble removal. CSP supported scores o

    these projects during the programs frst year. By

    the middle o the second year, IRD began to transer

    oversight o projects back to municipal governments.

    Approximately 1,600 CIES projects generated more

    than 525,000 documented person-months o short-

    term employment20 percent above the target. Given

    the high value placed on providing some kind o job to

    as many Iraqi men as possible, as ast as possible,

    person-months o employment was a critical indicator

    o immediate impact. By this calculation, CSP suc-

    ceededthe program exceeded this target during

    every year o operation.

    However, there were unavoidable challenges in

    implementing a rapid, cash-or-work component like

    CIES, including documentation. Generally, laborers

    were paid in daily fnancial transactions, but payments

    were not always possible to track or ully account or.

    Subsequently, the trash collection projects became

    a lightning rod or CSP critics. Some o IRDs early

    administrative missteps also created obstacles.

    With the business development program, IRD aimed to

    provide long-term jobs, business training to grantees,

    and assistance to vocational training and apprentice-

    ship graduates to transition into regular employment.

    O the more than 10,000 grants awarded, 97 percent

    were classifed in the micro and small categories,

    most commonly to amily-owned businesses. By

    the end o the program, the business development

    component had generated 74 percent o the 57,109

    long-term jobs documented by CSP. Once the program

    was up and running in the dierent cities, the grants

    program produced most jobs airly quickly, and about

    25,000 jobs were created during the frst two years.

    Trade and service sector grants were ound to be the

    most efcient: quick-impact but longer term employ-

    ment opportunities proved extremely supportive o the

    COIN strategy.

    The primary goal o CSPs vocational training and

    apprenticeship program, also reerred to as employ-

    ment generation, was to stimulate economic stability

    by providing Iraqis with employable skills that could

    lead to long-term jobs. That goal was reached, with

    more than 41,400 graduates completing course

    training in construction and nonconstruction trades.

    Through the innovative methods IRD used to link

    training courses to market demand and unemployed

    citizens to employment opportunities, more than

    8,000 vocational training graduates landed long-term

    jobs as a direct result o their training. Yet the voca-

    tional training program accomplished much more than

    reaching a benchmark. It also had a proound eect

    on Iraqs institutional capacityone o CSPs most

    notable achievements.

    The CSP design, like the COIN strategy in general,

    presumed that the strength o Iraqs cultural and

    community network was at least equal to employ-

    ment as a actor in the countrys overall stability and

    social cohesion. Organizing sae and secure com-

    munal activities was perceived to be a critical step

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    Most important, citizens were impressed.

    A sizable number o Iraqis, regardless

    o whether they were directly involved in

    the program, credit CSP with improving

    security and government services

    in reducing sectarian strie. Thereore, CSPs youth

    activities component aimed or something more per-

    sonal than jobsit aimed to help young Iraqis connect

    to their identity, culture, and community and to give

    them enhanced opportunities to orm social bonds

    that would be stronger than the pull o the insurgency.

    Altogether, IRDs youth activities engaged more than

    350,000 participants through soccer matches and

    tournaments and a wide range o other activities.

    A legacy o positive perceptions

    IRD sta, rom feld workers to leadership, exude

    pride when talking about CSP, but the program had

    many other ans as well. Former Deputy Secretary o

    State Jacob Lew said CSP was considered one o

    the most eective counterinsurgency eorts in Iraq.

    Arizona Senator John McCain, Connecticut Senator

    Joe Lieberman, General Petraeus, and others made

    visits to CSP project sites frsthand. And Ryan Crocker,

    during his 200709 tenure as the US ambassador

    to Iraq, repeatedly lauded CSPs track record o job

    creation. Ive had discussions with the [Iraqi] govern-

    ment, Crocker said in late 2007, midway through

    CSPs implementation. What they want, they want

    jobs. They want something that looks like a stable

    uture. . . . Theyre saying, I want gainul employment.

    And we know how to do this because weve done it

    with community stabilization.

    Perhaps most important, Iraqi citizens were

    impressed. At the programs conclusion, evaluators

    worked with two independent Iraqi polling companies

    to survey almost 1,400 CSP participants and nonpar-

    ticipants about the perceived eectiveness o CSP

    activities, how well community needs were addressed,

    and the local support or those activities. While

    economic and security variables make it impossible

    to establish direct causality between CSP activities

    and a reduction in violence, the poll results show that

    a sizable number o Iraqis, regardless o whether they

    were directly involved in the program, credit CSP with

    improving security and government services:

    84 percent o CSP-type program participants said

    their community was saer in 2009 than in 2006

    because o CSP, an assessment shared by 70

    percent o nonparticipants.

    69 percent o program participants said CSP

    helped improve government services.

    60 percent o participants credited CSP with

    bettering relations between religious and ethnic

    groups.

    According to USAIDs Jeanne Pryor, the results showed

    that It worked. All our components worked. Polling

    data, in addition to the outputs that had been mea-

    sured, reported that benefciaries did notice a positive

    impact in their community.

    * * *

    This report revisits IRDs work in Iraq rom the begin-

    ning o ICAP in 2003 to the close o CSP in 2009.

    It is not a project perormance assessment but an

    examination o the approach and the results, inormed

    primarily by the people who carried it out. In consider-

    ing the impact o ICAP and CSP, its important to

    consider actors in addition to outcomes and indica-

    tors, to grasp the weight o individual moments that

    made up the collective whole. These observations

    are important, because they put a human ace on the

    anonymous benefciary and the generic staer.

    For an endeavor like CSP, heavily debated and contro-

    versial, they also oer a complete way o seeing the

    programits accomplishments, its shortcomings,

    and, more importantly, its lasting impact.

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    ICAP oered Iraqi women new skills to support their amilies

    1Building community trust

    through action, empowerment, and commitment

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    Local leaders were not paying attention to everyday people.They would ocus on their relatives or close riends. It wasntthe real people in need. And with ICAP we went directly to thepeople in need.

    Iqbal al-Juboori

    Economic sanctions against Iraq ollowing the 1991

    Gul War meant ewer economic and political opportuni-

    ties, while decreasing quality in public education led to

    a surge in adult illiteracy among Iraqi womenas high

    as 45 percent by 2000, according to United Nations

    (UN) estimates. Ater the US-led invasion in 2003, the

    Coalition Provisional Authority was charged to advance

    womens rights and to leverage womens skill and

    knowledge in the revival o their country. But in

    atermath o the occupation, the reality on the ground

    was that huge numbers o Iraqi women had to support

    their amilies, and they had to do so ater decades

    o diminished educational opportunities had severely

    thwarted their technical skills and capabilities.

    Early on, I met a widow who was responsible or

    eeding her two sons and one daughter, her ather,

    her mother, and her two sisters, said Iqbal al-Juboori,

    who at the time was an IRD business development

    program ofcer in Baghdad. She was the head o the

    amily. Her parents were too old to work, her children

    too young, and her sisters couldnt. Her husband was

    killed during the war, and she didnt know what to do.

    Then she heard about IRD.

    Al-Juboori, who is Iraqi, joined IRD in July 2005,

    two years ater IRD had established its presence in

    Baghdad with ICAP. One o ICAPs cross-cutting objec-

    tives was to encourage the inclusion and empowerment

    o women in all activities. The community action groups

    at the center o ICAP emphasized ensuring the equality

    o mens and womens voices, while program grants

    and employment programs gave women an opportunity

    to engage in the local economy. Internally, IRD hired,

    trained, and promoted women employees or nontradi-

    tional management roles with ICAP, including al-Juboori.

    IRD sta would oten concentrate on widows, treat-

    ing them as people in need. When determining grant

    awards, program ofcers would make home visits to

    meet them and assess the individual circumstances.

    When al-Juboori visited this particular widow, she

    ound a home no larger than a shelter, a single room

    with little urniture housing the ull amily. The widow

    was receiving nominal help, such as used clothes and

    ood, but as she met with al-Juboori, she remained

    defantly prideul. I dont believe anyone can help us,

    she said. What makes you so special? What makes

    you so dierent? All I need is a decent income or my

    amily. As an Iraqi woman, al-Juboori knew that she

    had an exceptional opportunity to relate to this widow,

    standing there in the middle o her home. Youve got

    nothing to lose, she said. So try us.

    As with many Iraqi women, the widow had no discern-

    ible skills or earning power. Al-Juboori described

    one o ICAPs business development opportunities,

    a home-based sewing program in which IRD would

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    8

    BUILDING

    COMMUNITYTRUST

    1

    The community believed in what wewere doing and in our ability to helpIqbal al-Juboori

    supply equipment as long as the recipient maintained

    consistent production. You have to learn to be a

    tailor, she told the widow. I youre good, and i you

    learn, then were going to come back and monitor

    you, and were going to ask you how much youre

    selling. This process was an established par t o the

    ICAP program. But a more immediate problem quickly

    became apparentthe house was so small, there

    was no place to put the equipment. All I have is this

    house, the widow said. And its only one room. So

    where am I going to do this?

    IRD had access to revenue-generating equipment, pro-

    cedures in place to disburse grants, and a results-based

    system o accountability to maximize a benefciarys

    chance at success. I an issue required a programmatic

    solution, IRD had an answer. But overcoming the physi-

    cal limitations o poverty and an overcrowded one-room

    house? That was another issue entirely. Still, IRD ound

    a solution. Once the widows riends and neighbors

    learned o her plight, they got together and ound a

    workspace to donate, provided IRD ollowed through with

    giving her the grant. The community believed in what

    we were doing, al-Juboori said, and in our ability to

    help. She got the grant, and then she learned to sew.

    The widow began selling coats, and over the course o

    the grants process, IRD workers delighted in watching

    her grow proessionally and personally. The frst time

    she received actual money rom one o her coats, she

    came to me, crying, and she hugged me, al-Juboori

    said. And she looked at me and said, Ive struggled or

    my whole lie, and no one has ever helped me like this. I

    dont eel alone anymore.

    ICAP: The rst step to rebuilding civil society

    Oten called the cradle o civilization, modern day Iraq

    is a country steeped in rich cultural and historical

    heritage. Ancient Mesopotamia gave rise to some o

    the worlds earliest cities, including Hatra, the capital

    o the frst Arab kingdom, and its where agriculture

    was born. The region boasted accomplishments in the

    arts, agriculture, architecture, law, and medicine. But

    Iraqs rich heritage proved o little value or much o

    the twentieth century, as political turbulence and war

    took a severe toll. Ater post-World War I British rule

    ended, 58 separate governments ruled Iraq over 37

    years, until a 1958 revolution overthrew the monar-

    chy.1 Ater the Baath party took power in a 1963 coup,

    a brie period o stability and prosperity produced a

    secular state with a thriving oil economy, a rising GDP,

    and a burgeoning education system. Ater Saddam

    Hussein seized power in 1979 and almost immediately

    launched a war with Iran, the countrys economic and

    social inrastructure began to deteriorate.

    In a short time, Iraq descended rom auence to a

    country in which the standard o living was reduced to

    a subsistence level, according to the UNs Committee

    on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.2 As a closed

    society, Iraqs GDP plunged by more than $50 billion

    in less than 10 years, ood and agricultural production

    slowed, and 60 percent o the population depended on

    government rations. Malnutrition, a leading contributor

    to rising inant mortality rate, grew rampant.3 Essential

    services slowed due to years o poor maintenance or

    outright neglect. Approximately hal the population did

    not have regular access to potable drinking water, and

    even ewer households were connected to a unction-

    ing sewage system. Iraq was a ailing state even beore

    the Hussein government ell in March 2003.

    In April 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority was

    established as a transitional government. One month

    later, USAID awarded cooperative agreements to fve

    American NGOs to implement ICAP, a central element

    o USAIDs overall relie and reconstruction mission

    in Iraq. ICAP was conceived as a community action

    and mobilization initiative to oster civic pride in Iraqis

    and to try and reconnect them to an operational civil

    society (box 1). IRD, chosen to implement the program

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    Under the initial ICAP intervention, IRD

    completed 2,381 projects benefting

    more than 20 million people and

    worth more than $73 million

    ICAP began in May 2003 as a mechanism to mobilize Iraqi communities to identiy, prioritize, and address their

    most pressing civic needs. IRD oversaw operations in Baghdad; the rest o the country was divided among our other

    implementing agencies.

    IRD helped establish locally organized community action groups to drive project work, which was ltered through

    three broad program components: economic and social inrastructure to build and repair roads and public buildings;

    business development to provide grant support to micro, small, and medium businesses; and the Assistance to Civil-

    ian Victims Fund, which provided social and nancial aid to innocent individuals and communities injured or aficted

    by military orces.

    Under the initial ICAP intervention (200306), IRD completed 2,381 projects beneting more than 20 million people

    and worth more than $73 millionalmost 40 percent o which was covered by Iraqi communities and the government

    through in-kind contributions. ICAP laid the oundation or the larger and more complex development and stabiliza-

    tion projects to come, and it

    yielded a number o positive

    perormance measurements.

    At its conclusion, ICAP had:

    Generated more than 5,600

    short-term jobs and almost

    23,000 long-term jobs.

    Employment generation

    steadily rose or both short-

    and long-term jobs or each

    year o the program.

    Established 441 community

    action groups with approxi-

    mately 5,500 membersa

    third o whom were women.

    Completed more than 700

    inrastructure projects,

    including the construction or

    rehabilitation o 278 schools,

    75 health centers and hospi-

    tals, 65 water and sewage acilities, 60 roads, and 38 sports and recreation acilities.

    Invested $8 million in more than 1,100 business development projects, covering competitive grants, technical

    assistance, vocational and managerial training, marketplaces, cooperative grants, and handicap activities.

    Aided more than 760,000 Baghdad residents through 515 projects assisting civilian victims.

    Box 1 ICAP: Program and results

    Al-Madan

    Mahmoudiya

    Taji

    Al-Tarmiya

    Abu Ghraib

    Adhamiya

    Al-Istiqlal

    9 NissanTaji

    SadrCity

    Kadhmiya

    Al-Rasheed

    Karada

    Karkh

    Baghdad governorate districts and city districts

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    Community action groups stood at the core

    o ICAP. They were ormed in conjunction

    with community mobilizers that IRD deployed

    in districts in and around Baghdad

    in Baghdad, began operations immediately, ewer than

    two months ater the countrys government structure

    had been completely wiped away.

    Community action groupsa common thread or IRD

    IRD drew rom some relevant experience in ormulat-

    ing its ICAP implementation strategy. At the time,

    IRDs Community Revitalization through Democratic

    Action (CRDA) program in Serbia was nearing the end

    o its second year, and the organization had learned

    many lessons about mobilizing war-weary populations

    to reestablish basic concepts o sel-governance,

    community organization, and democratic principles.

    As part o the CRDA design, IRD at the outset estab-

    lished community committees, chosen entirely by a

    larger population, to serve as implementation part-

    ners, beore later establishing even larger municipal

    working groups to aid in the critical development o

    public-private partnerships. IRD succeeded under

    trying conditions during CRDAs earliest months, and

    that record o accomplishment in postconict Serbia

    played a role in USAIDs decision to award ICAP

    to IRD.

    Community action groups, the primary organizational

    tool o ICAP, bore a close resemblance to the com-

    munity groups IRD helped organize under CRDA. The

    community groups, known locally as CAGs, stood at

    the core o ICAP. They were ormed in conjunction with

    community mobilizers that IRD deployed in districts in

    and around Baghdad. The mobilizers provided basic

    training on civil society, rules o order, and a rapid

    participatory appraisal process to get ICAP-unded

    projects moving quickly. Using these newound skills,

    the community groups worked to develop action plans

    based on their own prioritized needs. Like CRDA, the

    ICAP plan called or a rapid startup to show quick

    results, not only to the donors but to local citizens.

    Additional unding rom the US PRTs aided in the

    ability to make a quick impact.

    Another commonality between CRDA and ICAP was the

    guiding principle that success depended on mutual trust

    between IRD and the community. In Serbia, IRD worked

    to build social capital among people who, due to a

    variety o actors, were predisposed to distrust. In Iraq,

    IRD aced a similar sociopolitical structure, albeit with

    a gaping dierence: Iraq was not postconict. Rather, it

    was an unstable, occupied country with rapidly shiting

    political and religious alliances. Still, in each setting,

    relying on community groups to build strong relation-

    ships proved productive in moving projects orward.

    In Baghdads local communities, where no legitimate

    sense o grassroots activism or democratic engage-

    ment had existed or years, community action groups

    gave ordinary citizens a direct role in a decentralized

    decisionmaking process that had been missing

    rom Iraq or years. Oered this opportunity, citizens

    responded. Within our years, 5,500 Baghdad citi-

    zens were members o community action groups.

    Altogether, IRD helped organize 441 o these groups

    during the initial program phase that ran between

    2003 and 2006. (ICAP had been extended multiple

    times and continued to grow and evolve as a commu-

    nity empowerment program.)

    As the organizational engine o ICAP, the community

    groups were critical to project implementation. In

    the beginning, however, they were not easily ormed.

    Each group had to have a minimum o nine members

    along with the community mobilizer, who typically

    lived in the local neighborhood as a show o commit-

    ment and, ideally, to win the confdence and trust o

    local leaders. Program design was easier said than

    done, since Baghdads political structure was still

    in a transitional state and many leaders viewed the

    community groups as a political threat. At the time,

    there was some rudimentary selection process by

    Baghdad leadership or the city council members

    across all the districts, said Awni Quandour, who

    flled numerous roles on ICAP, including chie o party

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    1

    Quandour joined IRD in June 2003, or the

    beginning o ICAP. He took a leap o aith with

    IRD, an organization barely 5 years old but

    under intense pressure to show quick results

    It was June 2009, and Gary Kinney had spent almost two months in Baghdad on temporary assignment, anxious

    to get home. Neither sandstorms nor aulty documentation would have been welcome delays, Kinney wrote in

    an email, detailing his bumpy exit rom Iraq via Jordan. Kinney, who at the time was IRDs contracts and grants

    manager, avoided a sandstorm, but his documentation proved more troublesome. Passport control ocers at the

    Baghdad airport fagged his visa or being incomplete or incorrect. Whatever the reason, Kinney ound himsel

    stuck.

    Two ocers were in the booth, handing my passport back and orth, without any ability to solve the problem, he

    said. Eventually, the men called or their supervisor, who came and led Kinney to a private airport oce.

    Do you have a CAC card? the ocial asked, reerring to the Common Access Card issued as a standard identica-

    tion by the Department o Deense. No, Kinney replied, he did not. Do you have an MNF-I card? he then asked,

    reerring to another type o identication issued to workers entering and leaving Iraq. Kinney didnt have one o those

    either.

    What he did have, however, was his IRD identication badge, which he pulled rom his wallet. The Iraqi ocial gave it

    a quick glance and then, ater veriying that Kinney was traveling to Amman, promptly returned the ID. Then, without

    urther delay and in one brisk motion, he approved the visa, stamped the passport, and cleared Kinney to leavewith

    a parting message: Tell Mr. Awni that Captain Zain sends his regards.

    A ew months later, Awni Quandour, 56, died o lung cancer at a hospital in Amman. Instrumental in helping IRD set

    up its initial operations in the Middle East, Quandour at the time was serving as IRDs country director in Jordan,

    where his amily had lived or more than 100 years and where he had built a respected reputation doing community-

    based economic development work, including or the Noor Hussein Foundation. During a 2008 Capitol Hill ceremony

    celebrating IRDs 10-year anniversary, Jordans Queen Noor publicly commended Quandour or his work. Awni was a

    great man, said Dr. Arthur B. Keys, IRDs ounder and president, and a major source o insight and inormation to

    many, many key decisionmakers.

    Quandour joined IRD in June 2003, or the beginning o ICAP. He had already spent a lot o time in Iraq, working or

    Catholic Relie Services during the 1990s, and he had an in-depth knowledge o the country and its people. He took

    a leap o aith with IRD, an organization barely 5 years old but under intense pressure to show quick results in an

    unstable country where it had no organizational ootprintor local sta. Quandour came on board anyway.

    He rst met Keys in Amman, at a USAID organizing meeting or ICAP implementing agencies. IRD volunteered to

    work in the capital, where the needs were most widespread and immediate. Awni and I traveled across the desert in

    a ast, unarmed convoy to set up IRDs initial ICAP program in Baghdad, Keys said. We went out into the neighbor-

    hoods, visited amilies in their homes, visited mosques and universities.

    Box 2 Awni Quandour: IRDs original elder statesman

    (continued)

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    Many colleagues have told methat Awni gave IRD a lot o credibilityin that region o the world

    Dr. Arthur B. Keys

    (box 2). According to Quandour, as the community

    groups ourished, tension developed between IRD

    and local political leaders, some o whom accused

    Quandour o causing problems and subsequently

    used their power to delay the approval o projects.

    There was some rivalry between the council

    members and the community action groups, he said,

    because the CAGs suddenly had the ability to create

    projects that werent part o the councils administra-

    tive structure.

    At the time, aside rom oreign military, they were the only non-Iraqis around. Quandours experience and amiliarity

    with the country, however, proved crucial in getting ICAP and IRDs regional operations established quickly. Dr. Keys

    said that he wanted to go to the poor areas o Baghdad rst, beore the others, Quandour said. I told him that all

    the areas were poor.

    Quandour and Keys knocked on doors and talked to the residents, and they learned that in some areas people were

    sleeping on their rootops because their houses were fooded with sewage. With trash and debris everywhere, and

    with sewage backed up as high as a oot or more on some roads, we determined that just cleaning the streets

    would be our rst project, ater listening to people talk about how they were living.

    In the matter o a ew weeks, Quandour and ICAPs chie o party, Terry Leary, hired their sta, created a training

    plan, began street-cleaning and trash-removal operations, and started organizing ICAPs rst community action

    group. People were desperate and wanted some type o sign that lie would improve, Quandour said. We gave

    them hope.

    Quandours rst position with IRD was as ICAPs community outreach director. Beore long, he became the pro-

    grams deputy chie o party beore assuming the chie o party role. He hired and trained IRDs initial Iraqi sta,

    many o whom still work with IRD almost a decade later. He played a critical role in adapting the ICAP model on a

    wider scale-up when IRD began implementing CSP in 2006.

    In Aghanistan, Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, and other locations, Quandour helped hone IRDs project work in unstable

    environments, and many current sta credit him with being the ounding ather o IRDs community development and

    stabilization programs.

    Many colleagues have told me that Awni gave IRD a lot o credibility in that region o the world, Keys said. His

    relationships with local communities were invaluable to making the Iraq programs work. Local sta looked up to

    Awni as an elder statesman. He was ready to go back to Iraq, saying that when he regained his strength, he would

    return to that country.

    While Quandour never had the opportunity to return to Iraq, his legacy and his work live on through the organizational

    strategy he helped crat and through his own personal tieshis daughter Zain and his niece Farah both work on IRD

    projects in Jordan.

    Box 2 Awni Quandour: IRDs original elder statesman (continued)

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    The frst ew years o ICAP projects

    directly benefted more than 20 million

    Iraqis and generated 23,000 long-term

    jobs and 5,600 short-term jobs

    With the help o these community groups, IRD com-

    pleted almost 2,400 ICAP projects over 200306,

    at a value o more than $73 million. The program

    required that 25 percent o project unds be in-kind

    donations rom local Iraqi communities, but this

    number was exceeded by almost $10 million

    another sign o local citizens eagerness to be

    part o the planning and development o their

    communities.

    Establishing services, assisting civilians,creating jobs

    Once a community action group ormed, IRD mobi-

    lizers would provide basic training on rules and

    procedures and a condensed orm o the appraisal

    process. With this introductory training complete,

    members began writing bylaws to guide their work.

    Again, the mobilizers oversaw and helped run this

    activity. Throughout the program, IRD provided train-

    ing to community groups on computer skills, core

    business skills, frst aid, and conict mitigation. This

    training incentivized members to continue their par-

    ticipation while bolstering the groups ability to create

    quality reports and applications and recommend grant

    candidates to IRD.

    Once trained, group members helped shepherd com-

    munity projects through three main program areas:

    Economic and social inrastructure projects to build

    and repair roads and public buildings as well as

    restore essential services.

    Business development grant support to micro,

    small, and medium businesses.

    Assistance to civilian victims and communities

    injured, impaired, or otherwise negatively aected

    by coalition orces.

    The frst ew years o ICAP projects directly benefted

    more than 20 million Iraqis and generated 23,000

    long-term jobs and 5,600 short-term jobs.4 ICAP was

    a unique program, at least in Iraq because it was

    community-based, al-Juboori said. Wed reach out

    to the grassroots level, and at that time, no one was

    representing anyone. There was no eective local

    government. Even though neighborhoods had a lot

    o needs, nobody was reaching out to those people.

    There was no government. There was nobody.

    According to al-Juboori, even ater the rudimentary

    Baghdad councils had been established, the basic

    needs o ordinary citizens were oten overlooked

    due to the rampant nepotism or avoritism that

    had become ingrained in Iraqi political and social

    structure. Local leaders were not paying attention

    to everyday people, she said. They would ocus

    on their relatives or close riends. It wasnt the real

    people in need. And with ICAP we went directly to the

    people in need.

    A chance or citizens to rebuild basic services

    Many o those people in need lived in the Sadr

    district, one o the poorest and most violent neigh-

    borhoods in Baghdad. With little access to basic

    services, residents in two districts encompassing

    roughly 25,000 people ormed the Al Bir community

    action group. In its frst year, the group completed

    15 projects ranging rom the administration o small

    business grants to the creation o public parks and

    playgrounds on vacant lots. The group also organized

    neighborhood cleanups and public health campaigns.

    In a very short time, the Al Bir group became a vocal

    advocate or its citizens, and, in doing so, ormed a

    critical link between individuals and their municipal

    government leadership.

    As part o its eort to boost the local inrastructure

    and business environment, the Al Bir community group

    reached out to create a dialogue with its neighborhood

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    IRDs health advisor reerred Omar

    Mohammad Abas to a hospital that specialized

    in treating amputees, where he was ftted

    with an artifcial leg and underwent an

    intensive fve-week physical therapy program

    advisory council, the local governing authority. In doing

    so, the group learned o an eort to provide needy

    amilies with cooking oil and propane. But that eort

    had not been extended to Al Bir due to the lack o

    municipal capacitysimply put, the local government

    had no way to distribute the goods. So the citizen

    group responded, frst by conducting a house-by-house

    needs assessment, then organizing a distribution

    network consisting o donated warehouse space and

    vehicles staed by volunteers. Once the network

    was in place, the community action group developed

    a distribution schedule and a publicity campaign to

    inorm residents about the program.

    Through the community action group, IRD helped put

    individual citizens directly in touch with government

    leaders. Even tenuous links between public and

    private interests, IRD believed, would help citizens

    regain trust in their local political system and open

    doors to broader improvements in the physical and

    social inrastructure. The Al Bir group, or instance,

    had a broad impact. In addition to helping distribute

    cooking materials, it also helped coordinate a public

    health campaign to provide sae and sanitary cir-

    cumcisions or young boys. IRD assisted the group in

    organizing qualifed practitioners and nurses to come

    directly to amilies homes and perorm the operation

    ree o charge. The program proved very popular in

    the community: it was both low cost, and it improved

    local capacity to deliver health and social services,

    especially or children.

    With Iraqs essential services in poor shape even

    beore the 2003 invasion, community action group

    members placed their greatest priority on initiatives

    that would, among other things, revitalize roads,

    schools, medical acilities, sports acilities, sewage

    systems, and electricity delivery. Even with the

    improvements needed or services like water treat-

    ment and power supply, more than a third o the

    economic and social inrastructure budget was

    directed to school rehabilitation. A total o 278 school

    projects were completed through the inrastructure

    component. But with so much work to be done and

    so many people in need, program components oten

    overlapped. Years into the conict, Iraqs Ministry o

    Education built a school in the Sadr district or 500

    children orphaned by the war. But the ministry did

    not have money to purchase generators, computers,

    or administrative supplies. Ater being contacted by

    the local community action group, IRD urnished the

    school with its missing equipment through ICAPs

    Assistance to Civilian Victims (ACV) program.

    Addressing the needs o innocent victims

    Omar Mohammad Abas, an Iraqi university student,

    was standing outside his amilys home in May 2003,

    when a gunner on an American Humvee opened fre.

    Abas was not the intended target, but the gunfre

    struck him in the let leg. His injury was severe, and

    doctors were orced to amputate above his let knee.

    Almost two years later, in February 2005, the com-

    munity action group representing Abass neighborhood

    brought his story to the attention o IRD mobilizers.

    IRDs health advisor reerred Abas to a hospital that

    specialized in treating amputees, where he was ftted

    with an artifcial leg and underwent an intensive fve-

    week physical therapy program.

    IRD fnanced Abass treatment and prosthetic leg with

    ACV unds. Launched during ICAPs second year, the

    civilian assistance program was conceived as a way

    to provide relie or Iraqi civilians who were harmed as

    a direct result o US military operations. The congres-

    sionally earmarked unds were intended to beneft a

    wide range o Iraqis, rom individual citizens to large

    amilies to entire communities. Projects were divided

    into a number o categoriescommunity-based activi-

    ties included reconstructing or expanding local civil

    services, such as orphanages, hospitals, or centers

    or the disabled; rebuilding or reurbishing individual

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    Ater being told o Marwa Naims

    situation, IRD sta began working on

    an assistance plan that ended with

    Marwa being transported to the United

    States or reconstructive surgery

    homes that had been damaged or destroyed by the

    military; and providing support and necessary equip-

    ment, such as wheelchairs or prosthetics, or medical

    procedures like the one that benefted Abas.

    The program, which was not part o the original ICAP

    design, enabled IRD and other ICAP implementers

    to build trust with Iraqis. The unds were made avail-

    able primarily through the eorts o international aid

    worker Marla Ruzicka, who had successully petitioned

    Congress to provide fnancial assistance to civilian

    victims o war. Ruzickas relentless eorts to ocus

    international attention on civilian hardships made her

    something o a celebrity. She won over journalists,

    diplomats, activists, and politicians, including Vermont

    Senator Patrick Leahy, who pushed the victims com-

    pensation package through Congress and said Ruzicka

    was as close to a living saint as they come.

    The ACV program began in 2004, but in April 2005,

    Ruzicka was killed on a Baghdad road by a suicide

    bomber. Her death drew greater attention to civilian

    assistance eorts in generalRolling Stone called her

    perhaps the most amous American aid worker to die

    in any conict o the past 10 or 20 years. The organi-

    zations implementing ICAP were charged with putting

    the ACV unds to the most eective and efcient use,

    and IRD ound no shortage o people in need. One

    year ater Ruzicka died, the activist organization she

    ounded, Campaign or Innocent Victims in Conict

    (CIVIC), played an important role in assisting IRD with

    one o its most high-profle benefciaries, the young

    Marwa Naim.

    Much like Omar Mohammad Abasand scores o

    other IraqisMarwa benefted rom the commitment

    o her local community action group. Her ather frst

    learned o the civilian assistance program through

    his neighborhood group. Nearly destitute, he received

    a grant to open a small grocery store. As part o the

    monitoring process, IRD workers visited Naim regularly

    at his home. During one o these visits, someone

    rom IRD asked about the shy girl who would always

    hide when visitors arrived. The girl was his daughter;

    she hid, Naim explained, because she was ashamed

    o her severe injuries. When coalition orces entered

    Baghdad in April 2003, an errant rocket struck the

    Naim home with the amily huddled inside. Marwas

    mother was killed; Marwa, 9 years old at the time, was

    disfgured, losing part o her nose and her right thumb.

    Local doctors treated the injuries, but little else could

    be done to reconstruct her appearance. Sad and sel-

    conscious, Marwa became withdrawn.

    Ater being told o Marwas situation, IRD sta began

    working on an assistance plan that started with a

    series o medical assessments and ended with Marwa

    being transported to the United States or reconstruc-

    tive surgery. Working with two other nonprofts, the

    Palestinian Childrens Relie Fund and CIVIC, IRD

    located a surgical team at the UCLA Medical Center

    willing to perorm the operations ree o charge. In

    early 2006, doctors at UCLA reconstructed Marwas

    ace in a series o surgeries conducted over our

    months. IRD also arranged or Iraqi oster amilies

    to host Marwa during her time in Caliornia. In 2009,

    Marwa returned to Los Angeles or a ollow-up proce-

    dure.5 Her story garnered international attention or

    innocent civilian victims in need o help. In many o the

    communities where the ACV program was established,

    IRD and community action groups were the only ones

    oering social services and assistance during most

    violent period o the countrys insurgency.

    Through the initial ICAP period, the number o ACV

    benefciaries soared to 770,000a remarkable

    achievement or a total cost o $5.1 million. ACV

    continued to be a major part o ICAPs ongoing work

    in Baghdad, and its impact grew even more. For

    example, more than 200 hospital and clinic renova-

    tions supported by ACV helped millions o Iraqi citizens

    access more reliable healthcare.

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    IRD placed a premium on diversity

    not just gender diversity, but also a

    diversity o business and geography

    Small steps toward economic renewal

    Civilian assistance cases like Marwas were instru-

    mental in creating community trust. But social inra-

    structure projects accounted or the bulk o IRDs early

    work, totaling more than $31 million through ICAPs

    frst phase. These projects also generated the largest

    employment numbers, though ICAPs business devel-

    opment program was designed specifcally to target

    the need or jobs. The inrastructure and job compo-

    nents carried their own operational designs, but they

    clearly overlapped, which not only aided IRDs eorts

    with ICAP but also served as a useul precursor to the

    even more integrated program design o CSP.

    IRD ocused on job creation through small and

    medium enterprise development, such as giving

    private enterprise grants, orming cooperative societ-

    ies, establishing market links, and extending technical

    assistance and business management training. Grants

    would range rom a ew hundred dollars to help supply

    a small shop to more than $100,000 to establish a

    new actory. Most grants, like the one Bakir Moham-

    med received, ell somewhere in between.

    Bakir, a livestock armer in the rural but highly volatile

    Taji district o Baghdad, received a $24,000 grant

    in the orm o cattle. He personally put up another

    $12,000 in acility rehabilitation costs to bring his

    arm up to standards and make it ully operational.

    Agriculture and livestock arms had always been

    primary contributors to Tajis commercial engine, and,

    with this grant, Bakir was able to reestablish his arm

    as a local employer and as a sizable bee producer.

    Within a short time, Bakir hired a dozen workers,

    more than hal women, and began producing enough

    meat products to meet the demand o nearly 15,000

    people.

    In working with community action groups to administer

    business development grants, IRD placed a premium

    on diversity. Not just gender diversity, though high

    value was given to ensuring equal opportunity or

    women, but also a diversity o business and geogra-

    phy. A slate o business opportunities was necessary

    to maximize employment generation. While sta took

    pride in helping an unskilled widow learn a trade and

    set up a small sewing business, larger agricultural,

    manuacturing, and service sector investments

    accounted or more than 80 percent o approved

    grants. Those grants provided the highest probability

    o large-scale economic renewal and, as a result, the

    greatest opportunity or community impact.

    For regional diversity, business grant opportunities

    were given throughout Baghdad. The total business

    development budget was spent disproportionately,

    the result o a variety o actors such as the dearth o

    viable entrepreneurs and dierent capacities between

    community action groups. The main issue, however,

    can be attributed to a lack o access due to insecure

    or nonpermissive working environments. This hurdle,

    unortunately, was a common thread throughout all o

    IRDs work in Iraq. While IRD tried to balance business

    development and spending as evenly as possible

    across Baghdads districts, the task proved difcult

    due to violence in some areas. Overall, IRD was able

    to maintain signifcant activity throughout the lie o

    the program in all but two districts. Yet, even in those

    dangerous areas, community action groups unctioned

    as intended, and the interrelated program components

    worked together to provide relie and support.

    Insecurity: Operational limitations in anunstable environment

    In the Ibn Zuhr neighborhood o the Madaen district,

    IRD held a town hall meeting in May 2004 to orm a

    community group. From that initial meeting, 19 local

    Iraqis were directly elected by their ellow citizens to

    represent the neighborhood. Working with the local

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    Regarded as Iraqs preeminent acility or

    the treatment o communicable diseases,

    the Ibn Zuhr Hospital was the countrys only

    hospital with specialized equipment and sta

    trained to treat patients with HIV or AIDS

    mobilizer, the group set about identiying and ranking

    needs to develop program proposals. They then

    worked with IRD to put together a realistic implemen-

    tation plan or projects that the group could organize

    and und through their own resources. The projects

    ranged rom small neighborhood cleanups to work on

    a much larger scale, like the restoration o acilities

    at their renowned but war-damaged neighborhood

    hospital.

    Regarded as Iraqs preeminent acility or the treat-

    ment o communicable diseases, the Ibn Zuhr Hospital

    was the countrys only hospital with specialized

    equipment and sta trained to treat patients with HIV

    or AIDS. During 2003, looters stole vital equipment,

    supplies, and drugs. They also started fres, smashed

    windows, and damaged equipment. Ater the looting,

    some hospital sta set out on their own to restore the

    acilitys capabilities by scrounging medical equip-

    ment rom other Baghdad locations and, in some

    cases, purchasing supplies with their own money.

    The destruction o the hospital was a bitter blow to

    the communitys residents, who not only viewed the

    hospitals work as a source o pride but also relied on

    the acility to provide emergency room services and

    primary healthcare. The Ibn Zuhr community group

    designated the restoration o the hospital, a vital

    piece o the communitys inrastructure, as its top

    priority.

    Group members met with hospital sta to determine

    the most urgent needs and worked with mobilizers to

    develop a proposal. ICAP provided the hospital with

    much needed equipment, such as diagnostic tools

    and machinery or sterilizing medical instruments. For

    the community contribution, the Ministry o Health

    provided the hospital with additional equipment and

    ofce urniture. At the same time, group members

    developed their own project to dovetail with the

    ICAP-backed project. Canvassing the neighborhood,

    members raised donations and signed volunteers to

    repaint rooms and make basic carpentry repairs. Using

    equipment donated rom local businesses, volunteer

    electricians repaired the hospitals damaged electrical

    system, not only restoring its unctionality but also

    bringing the wiring up to international standards.

    The enterprising Ibn Zuhr community group, continu-

    ing its independent work, soon created its own NGO

    to provide assistance to the disabled. Relying solely

    on community donations, the newly ormed NGO

    began providing clothing, wheelchairs, and medical

    care to hundreds o disabled children living in the

    Madaen district. Members contacted IRD or ongoing

    guidance on projects and undraising strategies,

    while mobilizers continued to provide capacity devel-

    opment support. Those residents didnt wait or

    someone rom outside their community to tell them

    what they needed or how to proceed, said Ernest

    Leonardo, the chie o party or ICAP. They took the

    initiative to organize themselves and to get to work.

    This kind o grassroots activism is at the heart o

    civil society.

    The Ibn Zuhr community group exemplifed the posi-

    tive outcomes that a program like ICAP, intended to

    reengage citizens through stronger civil society, can

    achieve. Just as impressive was the commitment

    o the Ibn Zuhr group to restoring order even as the

    larger societal abric in the Madaen district began

    to unravel. On April 20, 2005, less than a year ater

    the ormation o the Ibn Zuhr action group, 57 bodies

    were fshed rom the Tigris River downstream o

    Madaen; residents said that hundreds more were in

    the water. Days beore that discovery, insurgents had

    taken control o Madaen district streets, and the local

    government reported 150 Shia men and women had

    been kidnapped.6 The evidence pointed to a system-

    atic killing believed to have taken place over several

    months, during the same time that Ibn Zuhr residents

    and IRD sta had been taking steps to rebuild the

    areas civic pride and unctionality.

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    Whenever harm beell a community action

    group member, or a member o their own

    team, IRD sta would cope by banding

    together or encouragement and support

    Perseverance in the ace o adversity

    IRD was not immune to violent incidents. Also in April

    2005, two community mobilizers were kidnapped

    as they let a scheduled community meeting in the

    Makasib neighborhood o the Rashid district. The IRD

    employees were held or 15 days and released ater

    their amilies intervened. The evidence pointed to

    members o the community collaborating with the kid-

    nappers. Ater the incident, IRD decided to terminate

    operations in the village and the surrounding area.

    While this incident came to a peaceul conclusion, this

    was not always the case. Mushara Jabar Alwan, the

    Iraqi chairman o a community action group in Rashid,

    was executed along with his amily or working with

    the Americans, according to local accounts. Alto-

    gether, seven community action group members were

    murdered or their involvement with community action

    groups and ICAP.

    As Iraqs sectarian violence ramped up, the worsening

    security was a central concern or project manage-

    ment, which took a number o steps to try and ensure

    the saety o sta, participants, and benefciaries.

    Security personnel were contracted and given

    ongoing training, and sta members were inormed

    daily o security events throughout the city. When

    an area became too hot or project activity, work

    was stopped, and feld sta were reassigned to less

    dangerous areas. Some o the numbers detail the

    danger:

    115 inrastructure projects worth $9.3 million were

    canceled or security reasons.

    At least 40 employees resigned because o death

    threats.

    Five employees were kidnapped: three were

    released, one was killed, and one was never

    ound.

    Five employees were killed outside work; our more

    died in work-related incidents.

    While working on IRD projects, fve contractors and

    six laborers were killed; seven IRD employees were

    shot or injured by shrapnel.

    Baghdads increasing violence cost the program in

    many ways. IRD spent $2.2 million or concrete blast

    walls, razor wire, security lighting, communications

    equipment, body armor, and guards and security

    coordination. Many times, ofces had to be closed

    due to security concerns and curews, with the longest

    closure lasting 23 days. Security closures cost an esti-

    mated $11,000 a day in salaries and other expenses.

    Aside rom ofce shutdowns, individual sta members

    oten had to take security leave days when circum-

    stances prevented them rom traveling to the ofce.

    During peaks in the violence, as much as 20 percent

    o labor was lost to curews and security leave.

    Less quantifable was the impact that ear and

    depression had on morale. Once, a mock improvised

    explosive device was placed adjacent to the IRD

    compound, an example o the intimidation directed at

    workers. Many sta were orced to move rom their

    homes, sometimes in response to specifc death

    threats. Nearly everyone lost a riend or relative to

    violence. Whenever harm beell a community action

    group member, or a member o their own team, IRD

    sta would cope by banding together or encour-

    agement and support. In December 2005, Iqbal

    al-Jubooris house was attacked by militants, and they

    let with her brother, part o a mass kidnapping that

    day o men in her neighborhood. Dazed, shaken, and

    scared, she ound hersel walking directly to the IRD

    ofce, where she shared her ordeal with coworkers.

    She was told to go home and rest, but she had no

    desire to do that: I was already where I elt the

    saestat work, with others. Her brother was never

    ound.

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    Even with the insecurity and growing

    threats, signifcant reductions or

    elimination o operations in neighborhoods

    and districts were rare, and IRD

    remained committed to the project

    People had learned to trust us

    In 2006, the fnal year o ICAPs initial program and the

    beginning o CSP, sta turnover exceeded 25 percent.

    The costs o recruiting, hiring, and training new workers,

    in addition to operating without a ull sta, were high.

    During one two-month period, ICAP lost six o its seven

    monitoring and evaluation ofcers as well as its top

    three fnance ofcers. Many sta members were called

    upon to help launch CSP, but the insecurity drove many

    others away. When CSP became operational, sta turn-

    over and emotional distress became even larger issues.

    For one reason, CSP was nationwide, not just Baghdad,

    which, despite the insecurity, was still saer than many

    o the countrys other cities and provinces.

    IRD management continued to work to minimize risk by

    adjusting protocol and activities, and, despite protests

    rom sta in some instances, canceling projects

    or ceasing operations in certain areas. When IRD

    stopped working in the Makasib region o the Rashid

    district ater the sta kidnappings, more than a dozen

    home reconstruction projects had been completed and

    sta had to abandon a good working relationship with

    community members because one or two community

    members were conspiring with insurgents against IRD.

    Even with the insecurity and growing threats, signif-

    cant reductions or elimination o operations in neigh-

    borhoods and districts were rare, and IRD remained

    committed to the project. When I talk about that

    time, I compare IRD to the UN or Red Cross, said

    Vigeen Dola, an Iraqi national who joined IRD as a

    monitoring and evaluation manager ater CSP started

    up. Beore that, he worked or the Red Cross while his

    wie was working with the UN. Both were stationed

    in Iraq. On August 19, 2003, Dolas wie was at work

    when a suicide bomber drove a cement mixer into the

    side o the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 23,

    wounding more than 100, and collapsing three oors

    o the acility.7 His wie was only wounded.

    Following the attack, the UN withdrew most o its

    Baghdad sta. Ater another attack in October let

    12 more workers dead, the UN pulled out o Baghdad

    completely. The UN dropped everything and let, Dola

    said. They had no obvious activities in the conict-

    zone areas. They had activities in the peaceul areas,

    in the north. But people in these conict zones didnt

    even have drinking water; they didnt have electricity.

    Two months later, the Red Cross was bombed, and

    they did the same thing; they pulled out. I was there,

    working with them. I was not only conused, but angry.

    Iqbal al-Juboori, who had not yet joined IRDs sta

    and was working or the UN, was among the 50 or so

    UN employees who remained in Baghdad ater the

    frst attack. All UN operations had been suspended,

    and she had to work rom home, conducting business

    through email correspondence. Al-Juboori said she

    understood why the UN had to pull out: It was not

    a light decision or them to withdraw rom Baghdad.

    A lot o people had died. However, like Dola, she

    said the UN needed to at least maintain some kind

    o public presence in Baghdad to send a message to

    the Iraqi people as well as to those who intended

    to do them harm. IRD, due in some combination to

    its size, exibility, and organizational commitment,

    stuck around, even i it had to adjust operations.

    To local Iraqis and other aid proessionals, such as

    Dola and al-Juboori, this commitment helped set IRD

    apart in the eyes o citizens who might be naturally

    disinclined to trust outsiders. I joined IRD in 2005,

    and Ive seen some really bad days, al-Juboori said.

    But whenever we encountered tragedy or trouble, IRD

    would become more fxed and determined, no matter

    what the obstacles or the challenges were. And there

    were great, great challenges. But people had learned

    to trust us.

    IRDs close working relationship with the community

    continued throughout the evolution o ICAP, which

    was extended and which not only ran concurrently

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    BUILDING

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    Scheduled to wind down in 2012 ater more

    than eight years, ICAP is USAIDs longest

    running development program in Iraq

    with CSP but also continued or years aterward

    as an even more robust mobilization and participa-

    tory program (box 3). Through its ICAP work, IRD

    had an established base o operations in Baghdad,

    which proved an important logistical springboard or

    launching the much larger and complex CSP. More

    important, ater three years o ocused community

    interaction with civilians and local leaders, IRD had

    the credibility to take on a program as large and

    military-dependent as CSP.

    ICAP spanned the initial turbulence o postinvasion Iraq, the subsequent outbreak o sectarian violence and civil

    war, the fow o oreign insurgents, the US military surge, and the uncertain rst steps o a new national government.

    But it originally was scheduled to end December 31, 2006. At the time, 68 projects worth roughly $2.5 million had

    not closed out, though some had ended operations. The others were near completion but had been prevented rom

    closing out due to security problems. More than 90 percent o ICAP projects had been completed by the original

    close-out date, despite the surging violence.

    ICAPs achievements, particularly the successul ormation o community action groups (CAGs) and the groups

    growing role in civil society, led USAID to extend the program, and IRD continued to play an important implementa-

    tion role. USAID extended ICAP once, pushing its project total to more than 1,200 and the number o beneciaries

    to more than 12 million. A second extension began in 2009 amid improving security conditions. Scheduled to wind

    down in 2012 ater more than eight years, ICAP is USAIDs longest running development program in Iraq.

    With that eight-year record o bringing together citizens to identiy their needs, mobilize resources, and lobby local

    government representatives, Baghdads community action groups grew into a lynchpin o IRDs development legacy

    in Iraq. At the end o 2011, Baghdad had more than 120 CAGs with a total membership exceeding 1,800 Iraqi

    citizens across more than 100 residential communities. The organizational growth and development o the CAGs

    as a civil orce is impressive. Since the original ICAP program began, the groups have evolved rom committed but

    inormal collectives to elected membership bodies that are governed by bylaws, hold regular public meetings, and

    abide by institutionalized processes that help give voice to millions o Iraqi citizens.

    These groups are Iraqs largest and most organized network o local change agents, rom homemakers to proes-

    sionals, said ICAP Chie o Party Ernest Leonardo. They understand local needs, and they advocate or those

    needs at the neighborhood and district government levels. In the process, they do more than provide a vital link

    between citizens and their governmentthey oster transparency, responsiveness, and, most critically, public

    condence.

    Box 3 The evolution o ICAP, USAIDs longest-running program in Iraq

    (continued)

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    Through ICAP, community groups havebecome a bellwether o democratic participation,giving everyday citizens an outlet to identiy

    needs and the means to address them

    Ernest Leonardo

    CSPs operational design incorporated many elements

    o ICAP, but, as a straight stabilization mission, it

    was undamentally dierent. It was shaped by the

    near total collapse o Iraqs internal political and

    social inrastructure and the ensuing breakdown in

    securitythe same elements that threatened ICAP

    and other relie and development programs. But unlike

    traditional relie programs, normally divided among a

    group o implementers, CSP was given only to IRD to

    manage and run.

    The community action groups, which remain at the core o the ICAP design, were able to change because the overall

    program mission changed. In the early days, with communities acing a critical lack o basic services, ICAP ocused

    on quick-impact projects designed to stave o a range o impending crises, rom outbreaks o cholera to widespread

    truancy. Thanks to the continuing dedication o group members, the CAGs moved rom stop-gap measures and toward

    the kind o robust, participatory planning processes that create sustainable bonds between citizens and their leaders.

    By the end o 2011, all community action groups had completed comprehensive community action plans to inorm

    long-term district development strategies or Baghdads 15 governmental districts. At week-long planning work-

    shops, under IRDs guidance, group members worked with government ocials at the neighborhood, district, and

    province levels to outline long-term, districtwide strategies or improving basic services and livelihoods, especially

    or women, youths, and the internally displaced. By the end o its program date, ICAP was expected to shepherd

    more than 600 projects identied in the ocial action plans through completion.

    ICAPs broader agenda not only sharpened the mission o community groups, it ostered more diverse program suc-

    cesses, including better assistance outreach or Baghdads internally displaced population, and enhanced measures

    to reach the estimated 5 million Iraqis who had Internet access by mid-2011. IRD worked with all 15 district

    councils to build dynamic websites eaturing useul inormation on government services and contact details and

    spearheaded technology and skills training or inormation technology specialists rom each council. And as part o

    a very inventive and groundbreaking donor marketplace, representatives rom more than 20 international unding

    agenciesincluding the UN, the International Organization or Migration, the US Institute or Peace, and groups

    rom Japan, the Republic o Korea, and northern Europegathered with community action group members to discuss

    unding priorities and local community needs. The ICAP-sponsored event was the rst time donors had the opportu-

    nity to engage directly with community leaders around a locally owned plan or social and economic development.

    Through ICAP, community groups have become a bellwether o democratic participation, giving everyday citizens an

    outlet to identiy needs and the means to address them, said Leonardo. Their eorts, despite violence and limited

    resources, have helped make responsive, bottom-up planning a respected and acceptable practice in Baghdad.

    Box 3 The evolution o ICAP, USAIDs longest-running program in Iraq (continued)

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    A CSP soccer league holds its grand opening ceremony

    2A complete stabilization package

    of programmatic and military integration

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    That dramatic dierence that lie was getting better, it all hadto do with CSP. Neighborhoods were being cleaned up, soccerleagues were starting, and businesses were opening. It wasntall done by the military. The partnership with CSP made all

    these things possible. Andrew Wilson

    In his inuential work, political scientist John Kingdon

    explored the sources o initiative that create unique

    opportun