iran’s nuclear program: contending perspectives prof. mahmood monshipouri san francisco state...

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Iran’s Nuclear Iran’s Nuclear Program: Program: Contending Contending Perspectives Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State San Francisco State University University SETA, Ankara, March 22, SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010 2010

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Page 1: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Iran’s Nuclear Iran’s Nuclear Program: Program:

Contending Contending PerspectivesPerspectivesProf. Mahmood MonshipouriProf. Mahmood Monshipouri

San Francisco State San Francisco State UniversityUniversity

SETA, Ankara, March 22, SETA, Ankara, March 22, 20102010

Page 2: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Iran’s Nuclear ProgramIran’s Nuclear Program Historical OverviewHistorical Overview

1957: The US and Iran sign a civilian nuclear cooperation 1957: The US and Iran sign a civilian nuclear cooperation pact. The US provides technical aid and several kilograms of pact. The US provides technical aid and several kilograms of enriched uranium to help the country build its first nuclear enriched uranium to help the country build its first nuclear reactor.reactor.

1967: The US provides “a package containing 554 kilograms 1967: The US provides “a package containing 554 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and 112 grams of plutonium” of highly enriched uranium and 112 grams of plutonium” ((Entessar, Entessar, Middle East PolicyMiddle East Policy, Summer 2009:26, Summer 2009:26).).

1974: The shah, encouraged by the US to diversify Iran’s 1974: The shah, encouraged by the US to diversify Iran’s energy resources, launches a program to build 23 nuclear energy resources, launches a program to build 23 nuclear reactors (reactors (The The Christian Science MonitorChristian Science Monitor, Nov. 29, 2009:15, Nov. 29, 2009:15).).

Page 3: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Historical Overview …Historical Overview …

• Mid-1970s: The Iranian government receives Mid-1970s: The Iranian government receives nuclear assistance from other nations, nuclear assistance from other nations, including West Germany (including West Germany (MidGemany’s MidGemany’s Kraftwerk Union–KWU—and Kraftwerk Union–KWU—and Siemans), France, India and South Siemans), France, India and South Africa. Africa.

• Several companies in these Several companies in these countries became Iran’s leading countries became Iran’s leading nuclear-power plant contractors.nuclear-power plant contractors.

Page 4: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Historical OverviewHistorical Overview

The Cold War The Cold War pressures may have pressures may have driven a nascent desire for nukes:driven a nascent desire for nukes: ““According to the Shah, Iran did not fear According to the Shah, Iran did not fear

an attack from the Soviet Union, but an attack from the Soviet Union, but rather from Afghanistan and Iraq acting as rather from Afghanistan and Iraq acting as proxies for Soviet aggression. To counter proxies for Soviet aggression. To counter this threat, the shah told Eisenhower that this threat, the shah told Eisenhower that Iran needed a ‘crash program’ to obtain Iran needed a ‘crash program’ to obtain highly mobile forces with highly mobile forces with atomic atomic weaponsweapons..” ” (Entessar, 2009: 28).(Entessar, 2009: 28).

Page 5: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

History …History …

1979: Islamic Revolution overthrows the 1979: Islamic Revolution overthrows the shah. Nuclear cooperation with the West shah. Nuclear cooperation with the West ends.ends.

““Ironically, newly declassified U.S. Ironically, newly declassified U.S. documents reveal a remarkable continuity documents reveal a remarkable continuity between the shah’s nuclear logic and that between the shah’s nuclear logic and that of the Islamic Republic.” (of the Islamic Republic.” (Entessar, 2009:28Entessar, 2009:28).).

1980-1988: During the Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988: During the Iran-Iraq war, Baghdad bombs Iran’s two nuclear Baghdad bombs Iran’s two nuclear reactors at Bushehr.reactors at Bushehr.

Page 6: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

History …History …

1995: Russia signs a deal with Iran to 1995: Russia signs a deal with Iran to build a lightweight water reactor at build a lightweight water reactor at Bushehr.Bushehr.

2002: Iranian exiles reveal the existence of 2002: Iranian exiles reveal the existence of a facility to enrich uranium at Natanz and a facility to enrich uranium at Natanz and a heavy-water plant at Arak.a heavy-water plant at Arak.

2003: The International Atomic Energy 2003: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) accuses Iran of failure to Agency (IAEA) accuses Iran of failure to comply with international safeguards, but comply with international safeguards, but finds “no evidence” of an attempt to build finds “no evidence” of an attempt to build a bomb. a bomb.

Page 7: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

History ….History ….

2004-2006: the EU-three negotiations 2004-2006: the EU-three negotiations fail and the UN Security Council fail and the UN Security Council broadens sanctions against Iran.broadens sanctions against Iran.

2003: National Intelligence Estimates 2003: National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) show that Iran has stopped its (NIE) show that Iran has stopped its military activities insofar as its military activities insofar as its nuclear program is concerned.nuclear program is concerned.

2008: The UN adopts its third round 2008: The UN adopts its third round of sanctions resolution against Iran.of sanctions resolution against Iran.

Page 8: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

History …History …

Oct. 1, 2009: Geneva: Iran agrees to Oct. 1, 2009: Geneva: Iran agrees to an arrangement whereby Iran sends an arrangement whereby Iran sends its low-enriched uranium to either its low-enriched uranium to either Russia or France for processing and Russia or France for processing and will receive needed nuclear energy for will receive needed nuclear energy for cancer and medical-related purpose.cancer and medical-related purpose.

Mid-Nov. 2009: Iran signals it is Mid-Nov. 2009: Iran signals it is rejecting the West-backed idea.rejecting the West-backed idea.

The stalemate continues. The stalemate continues.

Page 9: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

The Post-War IranThe Post-War Iran

The Iraq-Iran war altered the perception of The Iraq-Iran war altered the perception of the threat.the threat.

““The single most important driving force in The single most important driving force in Iran’s nuclear calculus is its threat Iran’s nuclear calculus is its threat perception.perception.

Iran belongs to no regional security Iran belongs to no regional security structure.structure.

Nasser Hadian, a political scientist at Tehran Nasser Hadian, a political scientist at Tehran University: Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution University: Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution “Iran’s strategic loneliness” has continued.“Iran’s strategic loneliness” has continued.

Page 10: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

No Author Listed, “Iran's key nuclear sites,” British Broadcasting Company.com, Accessed Through the Internet, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4617398.stm

Page 11: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Iran’s Economic Iran’s Economic RationaleRationale

Aims to produce Aims to produce 7000 megawatts7000 megawatts of of electricity by 2020.electricity by 2020. Meet per expected 7% per annum growth in Meet per expected 7% per annum growth in

energy consumption.energy consumption. Save $4 billion revenue, substituting Save $4 billion revenue, substituting

nuclear energy for oil.nuclear energy for oil. Self Sufficiency- “Independent Nuclear Fuel Self Sufficiency- “Independent Nuclear Fuel

Cycle”Cycle”

Mahmoud Monshipouri, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Comes Next?,” Meed Quarterly Report, September 12, 2003, p. 4. Kayhan Barzegar, “The Paradox of Iran’s Nuclear Consensus,” World Policy Journal, 26 no 3, (2009), p. 26.

Page 12: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Nuclear Decision MakingNuclear Decision Making

Division among policymakersDivision among policymakers All power truly rests with KhamaneiAll power truly rests with Khamanei Some jockeying for influenceSome jockeying for influence

Rafsanjani, rebukes Ahmadinejad for Rafsanjani, rebukes Ahmadinejad for playing nuclear chicken, jeopardizing Iran’s playing nuclear chicken, jeopardizing Iran’s negotiating leverage.negotiating leverage.

"We possess nuclear technology that is not "We possess nuclear technology that is not operationalized yet. Any time we decide to operationalized yet. Any time we decide to weaponize it, we can do so rather quickly.“weaponize it, we can do so rather quickly.“– Rafsanjani, 2005Rafsanjani, 2005

Page 13: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Strategic PlansStrategic Plans

Chess vs. American FootballChess vs. American Football Washington has surrounded Iran with bases Washington has surrounded Iran with bases

in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar and massive in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar and massive troop buildups in Afghanistan and Iraq. troop buildups in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The US nuclear-equipped naval carriers The US nuclear-equipped naval carriers patrols the Persian Gulf.patrols the Persian Gulf.

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manochehr Manochehr MottakiMottaki: any future U.S.-Iran negotiation : any future U.S.-Iran negotiation will not resemble American football; rather will not resemble American football; rather it will be akin to a chess match.it will be akin to a chess match.

Page 14: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Surrounded by Nuclear Surrounded by Nuclear PowersPowers

Threat PerceptionThreat Perception Surrounded by nuclear statesSurrounded by nuclear states

Israel (200 war heads and not a Israel (200 war heads and not a signatory to the Nuclear signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Pakistan and IndianPakistan and Indian Both nuclear armed states are not Both nuclear armed states are not

signatories to the NPT.signatories to the NPT. Pakistan (anti-Shia Taliban a possible Pakistan (anti-Shia Taliban a possible

threat if in power).threat if in power).

Page 15: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

The Iranian QuestionThe Iranian Question

“…“…the nuclear impasse is a the nuclear impasse is a consequence of a far wider consequence of a far wider problem between Iran and the problem between Iran and the United States, not its cause. A United States, not its cause. A nuclear solution will not solve nuclear solution will not solve the Iranian questionthe Iranian question.” (Ali M. .” (Ali M. Ansari, Ansari, Confronting Iran, 2006Confronting Iran, 2006).).

Page 16: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Regional PowerRegional Power

Iran’s highest priority is not to become Iran’s highest priority is not to become a nuclear player. Instead, Iran’s most a nuclear player. Instead, Iran’s most important ambition is to important ambition is to take control take control of the Persian Gulf of the Persian Gulf region, a region region, a region that is running out of oil (Robert Baer, that is running out of oil (Robert Baer, ex-CIA operative, ex-CIA operative, The Devil we KnowThe Devil we Know).).

Empire by proxy: Iran intends to Empire by proxy: Iran intends to export its soft-power of Islamism and export its soft-power of Islamism and anti-colonialism throughout the region.anti-colonialism throughout the region.

Page 17: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Containment Containment Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political Barry R. Posen, Professor of Political

Science at the MIT: Science at the MIT: We can Live with a Nuclear IranWe can Live with a Nuclear Iran. . Deterrence and containment can still Deterrence and containment can still work: “… as we contemplate the actions, work: “… as we contemplate the actions, including war, that the United States including war, that the United States and its allies might take to forestall a and its allies might take to forestall a nuclear Iran, we need to coolly assess nuclear Iran, we need to coolly assess whether and how such a specter might whether and how such a specter might be deterred and contained.” (be deterred and contained.” (The NY The NY TimesTimes, Feb. 27, 2006:A19)., Feb. 27, 2006:A19).

Page 18: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Problems of Containment Problems of Containment

Containment would be neither a perfect nor a Containment would be neither a perfect nor a foolproof policy. It would not be a substitute foolproof policy. It would not be a substitute for the use of force.for the use of force.

CostsCosts: the US will have to shelve its call for : the US will have to shelve its call for domestic political reforms in Arab dictatorships domestic political reforms in Arab dictatorships and overlook objectionable Chinese and and overlook objectionable Chinese and Russian behavior on other matters.Russian behavior on other matters.

((James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Gets the Bomb,” Foreign AffairsForeign Affairs, March/April , March/April

2010)2010)..

Page 19: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

DeterrenceDeterrence Juan Cole (Univ. of Michigan): Iran’s leadership is Juan Cole (Univ. of Michigan): Iran’s leadership is

seeking what is sometimes called the “seeking what is sometimes called the “Japan Japan OptionOption” or a “” or a “rapid breakout capabilityrapid breakout capability” ” (“nuclear latency”).(“nuclear latency”).

Unlike North Korea, India, and Pakistan, Tehran Unlike North Korea, India, and Pakistan, Tehran “genuinely does not want to actually construct “genuinely does not want to actually construct and detonate a nuclear device.and detonate a nuclear device.

Most senior Iranian leaders wish to avoid those Most senior Iranian leaders wish to avoid those heavy sanctions, having seen what they did to heavy sanctions, having seen what they did to Iraq.Iraq.

Iran’s nuclear policy is more of an exercise in Iran’s nuclear policy is more of an exercise in deterrence than it is an offensive move.deterrence than it is an offensive move.

Page 20: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

A View from TehranA View from Tehran Iran is not in violations of Article IV, Para. 1 of Iran is not in violations of Article IV, Para. 1 of

the NPT: “ … inalienable right of all the Parties to the NPT: “ … inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production and the Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty.Articles I and II of this treaty.

Iran’s parliament (Majlis) never ratified the Iran’s parliament (Majlis) never ratified the Additional Protocol (AP), yet Iran voluntarily Additional Protocol (AP), yet Iran voluntarily allowed 35 unannounced inspections between allowed 35 unannounced inspections between 2003-2007. Since March 2007, however, Iran has 2003-2007. Since March 2007, however, Iran has disallowed such visits (disallowed such visits (Muhammad Sahimi, Politicizing the Muhammad Sahimi, Politicizing the

IAEA against Iran,” IAEA against Iran,” Tehran TimesTehran Times, March 15, 2010:1 and 15, March 15, 2010:1 and 15).).

Page 21: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

A View from TehranA View from Tehran

Current Iranian leadership sees US-Iran Current Iranian leadership sees US-Iran relations as a zero-sum game.relations as a zero-sum game.

They act rationally to maximize their power. They act rationally to maximize their power. “Bomb” or “rapid breakout capability” takes “Bomb” or “rapid breakout capability” takes the forcible regime-change option off the the forcible regime-change option off the table. It is seen in Tehran as deterrence.table. It is seen in Tehran as deterrence.

The current regime in Iran worries less The current regime in Iran worries less about internal threat and more about about internal threat and more about “external threat,” as they seem to have “external threat,” as they seem to have necessary control mechanisms for dealing necessary control mechanisms for dealing with internal threat. with internal threat.

Page 22: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

A View from TehranA View from Tehran

Current Iranian leaders think in Current Iranian leaders think in terms of structural realism, self-terms of structural realism, self-help, balance of power help, balance of power nervous nervous but resilient peace.but resilient peace.

Iranian strategy is not cultural or Iranian strategy is not cultural or ideological, it is structural.ideological, it is structural.

It is a classic case of self-help in a It is a classic case of self-help in a tough neighborhood.tough neighborhood.

Page 23: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Five-Plus-One TalksFive-Plus-One Talks

Iran makes a nuclear offer with five-plus-one Iran makes a nuclear offer with five-plus-one talks.talks.

Iran: uranium could be exchanged in Turkey, Iran: uranium could be exchanged in Turkey, Brazil, or Japan.Brazil, or Japan.

Five-plus-one: take the bulk of this uranium to Five-plus-one: take the bulk of this uranium to Russia and France in one shipment and send it Russia and France in one shipment and send it back as fuel rods to be used in a small back as fuel rods to be used in a small research reactor Iran has for producing research reactor Iran has for producing medical isotopes. medical isotopes.

Iran has rejected this plan, proposing instead Iran has rejected this plan, proposing instead to swap the material in small amounts.to swap the material in small amounts.

Page 24: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

OptionsOptions

Sanctions: are not efficacious. Have not Sanctions: are not efficacious. Have not worked with Iran: have not strangled worked with Iran: have not strangled Iran in the last 30 years. Have had a Iran in the last 30 years. Have had a crippling impacts on the ordinary peoplecrippling impacts on the ordinary people

Sanctions on the gas import (Iran’s Sanctions on the gas import (Iran’s imports nearly one-third of its gas from imports nearly one-third of its gas from China) will make life difficult for the China) will make life difficult for the Iranian people.Iranian people.

China and Russia are not in favor of such China and Russia are not in favor of such sanctions. Neither are India and Brazil.sanctions. Neither are India and Brazil.

Page 25: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

OptionsOptions

Military option: is not viable. A Military option: is not viable. A military attack will have a military attack will have a consolidating impact on the current consolidating impact on the current regime.regime.

It will plunge the region into chaos.It will plunge the region into chaos. It will skyrocket the price of oil.It will skyrocket the price of oil. Hard to get China and Russia on Hard to get China and Russia on

board on any military strike against board on any military strike against Iran.Iran.

Page 26: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contending Perspectives Prof. Mahmood Monshipouri San Francisco State University SETA, Ankara, March 22, 2010

Room for DiplomacyRoom for Diplomacy The US and NATO forces cannot fix The US and NATO forces cannot fix

Afghanistan and cannot win a civil war in Afghanistan and cannot win a civil war in Afghanistan; cannot operate in tribal areas in Afghanistan; cannot operate in tribal areas in Pakistan; neither can the Pakistani army. Pakistan; neither can the Pakistani army.

For dealing with more tensions in Afghanistan For dealing with more tensions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we need to have Iran’s support and Pakistan, we need to have Iran’s support for the regional stability.for the regional stability.

Security guarantee for Iran in the context of Security guarantee for Iran in the context of direct, bilateral negotiations between Iran and direct, bilateral negotiations between Iran and the United States.the United States.

Iran demands recognition as a regional power. Iran demands recognition as a regional power.