iran us strategic report 05

8/8/2019 IRAN US Strategic Report 05

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Patrick clawson

The Red Line

H ae Pge U.s. i Py

z

A WA s h i n g t on i n s t i t u t e s t r At e g i c r e p o rt


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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any inor-

mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

2010 Te Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in 2010 in the United States o America by Te Washington Institute or Near East Policy,1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC 20036.

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and Communication

Front cover: An Iranian ocial holds a capsule o uranium hexauoride, or UF6, gasduring a ceremony in Mashhad, Irans holiest city, April 2006. (AP Photo)


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Co

Acknowledgments /

Executive Summary /

Introduction /1

What Objective Should Be Used to Assess Progress? /3

Assessing the Purpose and Impact of Sanctions /7

Assessing How U.S. Policy Affects Iranian Domestic Politics /12

Assessing the Risk of War /14

Conclusion /17

Appendix: Context and Considerations for Responding to Iranian Behavior /18


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Acowldm

My sinCere thAnks to the Clarence S. Brooks Foundation or their commitment to the Iran Security Ini-tiative and or making this publication possible.

PAtriCk CLAWsOn

Deputy Director or Research


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The WashingtonInstituteforNearEast Policy vii

exc smma

be evaluated through two sets o lenses, which in manycases will lead to quite dierent perspectives on the ini-tiatives worth and impact.

Another key theme o the workshop was the gapin perceptions regarding U.S. and international sanc-tions against Iran. A panel o three speakers discussedsanctions in their various orms: ormal and inormal,bilateral and multilateral, targeted and broad. Tey dis-agreed on objectives, however, which strongly aectedtheir evaluation o whether the sanctions might suc-ceed. he speakers remarks and ensuing discussion

raised a wide variety o potential objectives, rom thehighly likely to the largely unattainable. In that order,the proposals included:

aking a moral stance against human rights abuses in

Iran, modeled on Europes well-established record oimposing sanctions or such abuses elsewhere

Dissuading companies and countries rom active par-

ticipation in the Iranian market, based in part on theU.S. reasury Departments successul reputational

approach in the international banking sector

Deterring other countries rom taking the same

nuclear route as ehran

Signaling international disapproval via the Security

Council

Delaying and disrupting ehrans nuclear and missile

programs

Increasing the Iranian peoples discontent with

regime policies

Punishing ehran or, expressed dierently, imposing

costs

Helping the democratic opposition

in suMMer 2010, Te Washington Institute con-vened a strategy workshop on U.S. policy toward Iran.Coinciding with a United Nations Security Councilvote on new sanctions as well as the irst anniver-sary o Irans widely rejected presidential election,the multipanel event raised competing ideas abouthow to assess progress in Washingtons approach. Indoing so, it highlighted the lack o broad consensusabout what the United States is trying to accomplishregarding the multiple strategic challenges posed bythe Islamic Republic.

Te workshop centered on our main issues, eachexposing dierent acets o the assessment gap. First,two presentations examined the overall state o U.S.Iran policy. he two speakers began rom very di-erent starting points and presented largely diver-gent views about the undamental objective againstwhich progress should be assessed. he irst schoolo thought views the poor state o bilateral relationsas the undamental problem. Its proponents tend tomeasure progress by the depth and breadth o U.S.engagement with ehran, especially in negotiations

over the nuclear impasse. Although they do not neces-sarily expect a transormed relationship, they do seekdeep and broad interaction that helps the two coun-tries avoid needless conlicts. he second school othought views Irans multiple challenges to U.S. stra-tegic interests as the undamental problem. Accord-ingly, its proponents measure progress in terms ohow eectively Washington has countered Iranianthreats, especially with regard to advancements in theregimes nuclear program.

Tese two viewpoints on the best means o dealing

with Iranimproving bilateral relations or counteringthe strategic threatlead to quite dierent policy con-clusions. Nevertheless, the workshop reinorced thebelie that U.S. policymakers are unlikely to come downrmly on one side or the other, i only because manyin the current administration nd much merit in bothapproaches. Individual policy initiatives will thereore


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Washington is bound to all woeully short whenassessed by this standard.

Finally, the workshops closing discussions high-lighted an important limitation in assessments regard-

ing the risk o war between Iran and the United States(or Israel): the tendency to ocus on U.S. preemptivestrikes rather than the more likely scenario o an Iranianprovocation that crosses a U.S. red line. Tere are manyreasons to worry about a U.S.-Iranian military conict,particularly given the regimes view that the IslamicRepublic is on the rise and America on the decline, andthe associated view that Washington does not respondwhen ehran takes actions that the White House haswarned are unacceptable. Accordingly, those who wishto avoid war should ocus more on how Washington

can reinorce the credibility o its red-line threats, notjust on the question o whether it has an acceptablealternative to preemptive attack.

One o the workshops nal presentationsan on-the-record address by Vice Adm. (Ret.) Kevin Cos-gri, ormer head o U.S. Naval Forces Central Com-mandassessed the militarys role in preparing or andresponding to potential Iranian provocations in thePersian Gul, among other issues.

ConCLusions

Te Institutes workshop reected wider trends in theIran policy- and opinionmaking communities, wherenumerous ideas or assessing the U.S. approach con-

tinue to compete. Tis lack o consensusalong withthe Obama administrations tendency to ocus on themerits o diering approacheshelps explain why ana-lysts and policymakers will likely disagree as they gradeU.S. policy in the coming months.

Supporters o the current policy can point to somereal successes, emphasizing the progress toward orging

Crippling the country by imposing sanctions on its

energy sector

Using sanctions as leverage to open ruitul

negotiations

Halting ehrans uranium enrichment eorts

In short, the discussion relected the general state oanalysis regarding Iran sanctions: proound disagree-ment about their objectives, which translates intoentirely dierent assessments o the prospects orsuccess.

Another workshop panel highlighted dieringperceptions o Iranian domestic politics. Each o the

speakers assumed that support or democracy andhuman rights is an important U.S. objective, and thatthe U.S. government could do much to improve the

prospects or such change. Most o the workshopsother discussants made no such assumption, however.As a result, the panel highlighted the proound policygap between those who ollow Iranian domestic poli-tics (including Iranian politicians) and the bulk oWashington observers.

In Iran, many in both ehran and the oppositionGreen Movement seem to have made the dubiousassumption that the West holds the key to Iranianpolitical developments, and that its real interest lies inthe victory o democratic orces rather than the nuclear

issue. In other words, many in both the regime andthe opposition will continue to measure the success oU.S. Iran policy by how much the opposition advancesand the hardliners retreata metric that Washingtonviews as secondary to the nuclear issue. And given thepoor prospects that the United States could have muchimpact on these and other democracy-related issues,

There are a rea t wrr abt a u.s.-iraa ltar

cflct, artclarl e the ree ew that the ilac

Reblc the re a Aerca the ecle.


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How to A ssessProgress in U.S. Ir an Pol icy

The WashingtonInstituteforNearEast Policy ix

he gap separating these metrics is unlikely to close;there is little prospect o broad agreement in U.S. pol-icy circles regarding what standards Washington andits allies should adopt or determining success.

I the pessimists are correct, the grave risk is that theUnited States and Iran are headed toward a test o wills.Such a conrontation would probably become a testo orce, most likely initiated when Iran inadvertentlycrosses a U.S. red line and elicits a urious response.

international consensus, delaying Irans nuclear goals,and taking away the regimes enemy narrative aboutU.S. intentions. Others are more pessimistic, empha-sizing how little Iranian actions have changed despite

U.S. eorts, and how boldly Iran continues to dey theinternational community and assert its inuence.

Much o the disagreement between the optimistsand pessimists centers on the same question: what arethe appropriate metrics by which to measure progress?


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iodco

A panel o three speakers discussed sanctions in theirvarious orms: ormal and inormal, bilateral andmultilateral, targeted and broad. Tey disagreed onobjectives, however, which strongly aected theirevaluation o whether the sanctions might succeed.Other participants proposed a variety o alternativeobjectives, some o which will likely be met, andothers that are largely unattainable. Te discussionreected the general state o analysis regarding Iransanctions: proound disagreement about their objec-tives, which translates into entirely dierent assess-

ments o their prospects or success.

Another panel addressed Iranian domestic politics.

Each o the speakers assumed that support or democ-racy and human rights is an important U.S. objec-tive, and that the U.S. government could do much toimprove the prospects or such change. Most o theworkshops other discussants made no such assump-tion, however. As a result, the panel highlighted theproound policy gap between those who ollow Ira-nian domestic politics (including Iranian politicians)

and the bulk o Washington observers.

Te nal panel examined how much credence eh-

ran gives to U.S. red lines, discussing the possibilityo the two countries coming to blows i Iran crossedsuch a line. Tis approach is very dierent rom theusual scenario, which assumes that such a conlictwould be sparked by U.S. preemptive action. hepanel ollowed an address by Vice Adm. (Ret.) KevinCosgri regarding the militarys role in preparing orand responding to potential provocations, among

other issues. (Unlike the rest o the days events, hispresentation was on the record and is included as anappendix to this report.)

ALth Ou g h MOst Observers agree thatIran will continue to pose a major policy challenge orthe United States, there is little consensus about whatwould constitute adequate progress in dealing with thischallenge. U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic pro-vokes much spirited debate that does not break downalong the usual lines o Democrat versus Republican,liberal versus conservative. Tis disagreement is basedin part on the nature and immediacy o the problem,and partly on the degree o inuence the United Statescan expect to wield. Moreover, what some may see

as progress, others consider a step back: or example,those who believe ehran will change course only ipressured externally tend to welcome strong sanctions,while those who believe the only realistic option is suc-cessul Iranian opposition eorts tend to see such sanc-tions as unhelpul.

In summer 2010, the Washington Institute or NearEast Policy convened a strategy workshop on U.S.policy toward the country. he event also coincidedwith the United Nations Security Council vote on newsanctions and took place against the backdrop o the

Brazil-urkey-Iran agreement on uel or the ehranResearch Reactora development that complicatedU.S. eorts to secure stronger sanctions. Workshopparticipants included senior U.S. ocials, both currentand ormer, as well as leading scholars and observers oIran.*Tis report reects the insights its author gainedrom the event.

Te workshop ocused on our main issues:

wo presentations assessed the overall state o U.S.

Iran policy. Te two speakers began rom very dier-

ent starting points and presented largely divergentviews about the undamental objective against whichprogress should be measured.

* Te workshop was held under the Chatham House rule, which states that participants are ree to use the inormation received, but neither the identity northe aliation o the speaker(s), nor that o any other participant, may be revealed.


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2 Washington Institute.org

consensus about what the United States is trying toaccomplish; second, this actor helps explain why ana-lysts and policymakers will likely disagree on the actualsuccess o U.S. policy.

In short, much o the days discussion raised competingideas about how to assess progress in U.S. Iran policy.Accordingly, this report examines two intertwinedthemes: rst, when it comes to Iran, there is no broad

Whe t ce t ira, there bra ce abt

what the ute state tr t acclh.


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Wa Ojc sold b udo A Po?

suppression o postelection protests in 2009, anddespite the ailure o the original engagement oer toyield the response the administration had hoped or.

hose who emphasize the importance o engage-ment eel that it has brought about a change in tonethat could open the door to better communication, andperhaps also to improved relations. Tey argue that ithas had other advantages or U.S. interests as well: theold rhetoric rom ehran painting the U.S. governmentas the enemy o the Iranian people and o Islam no lon-ger works because Obama has taken away the enemy

narrative. Tis, they believe, played a role in the 2009explosion o democratic opposition, since hardlinerscould no longer plausibly appeal or national unity inthe ace o a hostile oe.

he engagement oer, in this view, has also per-suaded peoples and governments around the worldthat the source o the problem is ehran, not Washing-ton. Having U.S. allies, especially in Europe, who trustthe judgment and leadership o the United States ismore important to U.S. interests than progress or lacko it in U.S.-Iran relations. Partisans o this approach

emphasize how much Obamas engagement policy hasdone to cement transatlantic unity about Iran.

Tose who emphasize the importance o improvingrelations express concerns about simultaneously sup-porting democratic orces inside Iran, as they worrythat such support will antagonize ehran withoutdoing much, i anything, to aid these orces. In act,many in this camp argue that open U.S. support, evenrhetorical, hurts the opposition, and Obama admin-istration policy appeared to reect these concerns, atleast initially.

Indeed, the June 2010 U.S. government sanctionswere all ramed in terms o their impact on Iransnuclear program, with barely a reerence to humanrights. U.S. statements about Iran nearly always includea paragraph about human rights and about Americansimprisoned or missing in Iran, but it is the nuclear pro-gram, not these issues, that is the central ocus.

hOW One evALuAtes progress on Iran policydepends on how one assesses the undamental chal-lenges posed by the Islamic Republic. Currently, poli-cymakers and analysts are split between two very di-erent approaches, one emphasizing the importance oimproving U.S.-Iranian relations, the other stressingthe strategic threat o current Iranian policies.

FiRsT AppRoACH:

impRovE BiLATERAL RELATions

One view, strongly supported by many proessional

diplomats, is that the best means o addressing Iranianchallenges is to establish a relationship that will allowboth sides to communicate about their dierences, inot to overcome the mistrust that has persisted or thepast thirty years. Such proponents argue that U.S. inter-ests are well served by diplomacy with hostile states.Even during the height o the Cold War, the UnitedStates and the USSR saw a mutual interest in continu-ing communications. In contrast, the United States hasno oicial direct channel to the Iranians. Accordingto this argument, had there been a more regular dip-

lomatic process in place, the American hikers recentlydetained by Iranian police might have been releasedin a matter o weeks, and the incident might not havebecome a major political issue. Te episode thus illus-trates how, in the absence o a mechanism or address-ing dierences, new problems will continue to arise.For those who emphasize the importance o improv-ing relations, the real objective is not simply to addresscurrent pressing concernssince tomorrow will bringnew problemsbut to establish a robust mechanismor airing and addressing dierences that will allow or

a modus vivendi.Early initiatives by the Obama administration to

open communications with the Iranian governmentwere consistent with this approach. In his March 2009Nowruz message, President Obama stressed the needor a new relationship with Iran. Washington contin-ues to express interest in engagement, despite Irans


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sECond AppRoACH:

REduCE THE sTRATEgiC CHALLEngE

An alternative perspective ocuses on Iranian behaviorand the wide range o strategic challenges it poses. In

this view, ehran presents our key problems.First is the regimes support or terrorism and the

leading role it plays in arming and unding terroristgroups across the Middle East. Such support createsproblems or the United States, Israel, moderate Pales-tinians, and most o the moderate Arab regimes.

Second, Iran has created obstacles in Iraq and Aghan-istan. For a brie moment afer the September 11 attacks,Iran assisted the United States in setting up the Aghangovernment. It is responsible or Hamid Karzais presi-dency o Aghanistan, which is at best a mixed blessing.

However, with the exception o that initial assistance,Iran has been hindering the U.S.-NAO eorts inAghanistan and the U.S.-led coalition eorts in Iraq.

U.S. casualties increased in 20042006 in no small partdue to Irans support or militant groups.

hird, the oppression o the Iranian people overmany decades, but most signiicantly since June 12,2009, is a problem or American interests in the region.Te United States presents itsel as a deender o humanrights and democracy. I it is seen not to react whenbrave protestors take to the streets by the millions, suchpassivity undercuts its image and can make MiddleEasterners skeptical about relying on U.S. promises.

Fourth is the nuclear issue. Irans race towardnuclear capability is well documented by a respectedinternational agency whose judgments are not tainted

by the stains rom which U.S. intelligence has suered.Te Western strategy or responding to Iranian stone-walling has not worked, primarily because o the lacko international unity on the issue. he strategy waspredicated on signiicant support rom an interna-tional coalition larger than merely Germany, France,and the United Kingdom. Te assumption was that at

Furthermore, U.S. government statements do notreveal Washingtons view o the relationship betweenU.S. policy on the nuclear issue and human rights;they do not answer the question asked by Iranian pro-

testors, Obama, Obama, are you with them or withus? Washington has not explained why resolving thenuclear stando is important or ending Irans isola-tion, so resented by Iranian intellectuals, human rightsactivists, women, and youth. A good argument could bemade that so long as the nuclear impasse remains, Iranwill be cut o rom the world, as Ayatollah Ali Khame-nei wants, and that thereore, resolving this dispute iskey to achieving increased democracy. But Washingtondoes not make this argument; instead, U.S. governmentstatements relegate concerns about Iranian domestic

politics to an aferthought, which should give the Ira-nian people every reason to think that the United Statescares little about democracy in Iran.

In short, the irst school o thought sees the poorstate o Washington-ehran relations as the unda-

mental problem, and its proponents measure progressby the depth and breadth o U.S. engagement with theIranian government, especially in negotiations overthe nuclear impasse. It is worth emphasizing that theydo not necessarily expect a transormed relationshipbetween the two countries, but they do aspire to deepand broad interaction that permits the two sides toavoid needless conicts.

Te eort at engagement has not yet produced anyadvance in U.S.-Iran relations, which is a great disap-pointment to its proponents. Tere are good reasons to

question whether any improvement is likely under thecurrent Iranian government, since anti-Americanismis such a hallmark o its ideology. Tere are also goodreasons to question whether improved relations couldlead to a satisactory deal on the nuclear issue and,most important, whether Iran would systematicallyulll any such deal or a sustained period.

The effrt at eaeet ha t et rce a aace u.s.-

ira relat, whch a reat atet t t ret.


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may not be possible to establish a denable, workable,and eective coalition capable o convincing the Irani-ans that negotiations are better than conrontation.

From this perspective, an example o what hap-

pens when the Iran issue is put on the back burner isthe urkey-Brazil-Iran tripartite agreement. Te ratio-nale or the October 2009 ehran Research Reactordeal was that it would act as a condence builder. Tedeal was seen as a beginning, not a solution; it did notaddress suspension o enrichment, but it slowed Irandown. By contrast, the 2010 urkish-Brazilian dealcame at the wrong time, on the eve o UN sanctions. Ithelped Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad bysending him a lieline; it weakened the sanctions eortat the United Nations; and it weakened the interna-

tional eort to convince other countries to engagemore actively on the issue. It was a political attempt byurkey and Brazil to come out as international pow-ers, and it has been a disaster or them.

Many partisans o the Iran-as-strategic-challengeviewpoint would not close the door to negotiations,i only because the West has little to lose by negotiat-ing. However, they would ocus more eort on build-ing up the deensive capabilities o riendly regionalstates, as well as considering an American securityumbrella over them. Additionally, they would keep

the threat o orce on the table, arguing that whilethe United States should be cautious about the useo orce, it should certainly not exclude it as a utureoption. Tere is no consensus, even among those whosee Iran as a severe threat to U.S. interests, about theuse o preemptive orce. Some eel the United Stateswill have to rely on a policy o containment entail-ing security commitments; a substantial buildup oorces; the drawing o a line in the sand; surroundingIran with American military power; and a clear senseo what would happen i Iran crosses the line. Others

argue that even a hint o containment undermines thecredibility o the military orce option and removes itas a motivating actor that will encourage the IslamicRepublic to slow its uranium enrichment program. Intheir view, the hardline Iranian leadership takes theUnited States most seriously when the U.S. position inthe Middle East appears strongest.

some point, Russia, China, and the Arab states wouldtake the strategy seriously and seek its ull implementa-tion. Tis has not happened.

he biggest problems here are China and Russia.

China publicly abides by the three sanctions resolu-tions that it negotiated with the United States and towhich it agreed. But as the European rms have, at theurging o European governments, reduced their activi-ties in Iran, the Chinese have raced in to take advan-tage o the investment and trade opportunities. China,in act, has become Irans largest trade partner since theUnited States began its attempt to negotiate with Iranand sanction it simultaneously. China has been openlyhypocritical about its obligations to the UN SecurityCouncil and the United States, as well as to its bilat-

eral relationship with Washington. Russia has beenonly marginally better, although it has at least thoughtabout Iran in a strategic way. China, on the other hand,tends to see Iran only through the prism o its commer-cial relationships, weighing the potential or expandedtrade with Iran against the possible negative eect onChina-U.S. economic relations o a perceived sabotag-ing o U.S. Iran policy. Te Russians live closer to Iranand have much experience with the Islamic Republic,including through the Bushehr nuclear power plantproject, and yet they have not provided the West with

much help.Many o those who are chiey concerned with Irans

strategic challenges believe that because the threat isacute, the United States should make Iran a priority inits relations with a variety o actors. For example, theyargue that Iran has to become a central ocus or thetransatlantic alliance, whose members must togethernd some way to reinorce the international coalitionagainst the Islamic Republic. he United States andthe European Union need to make clear to Russia,China, and the Arab states that their behavior toward

Iran will have major consequences or their relation-ships with the United States and Europe. Westerncountries have never delivered such a message. heargument rom this camp is that Iran is one o the mostimportant oreign and national security challenges tothe United States. I Washington cannot communicatea sense o vital urgency and potential consequences, it


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relations. O those who support speaking out in avoro democracy and human rights in Iran, some see this asa moral imperative, with little practical implication orU.S. policy on Irans nuclear program.

In short, the second school o thought sees Iransmultiple challenges to U.S. strategic interests as theundamental problem, and its proponents thereoremeasure progress in U.S. Iran policy by how eectively

the United States has countered Iranian threats, andespecially whether Irans nuclear program is advancing.

Te two viewpoints on the best approach or dealingwith Iranimproving bilateral relations and counter-ing the strategic threatlead to quite dierent policyconclusions. However, it is unlikely that U.S. policy-makers will come down rmly on one side or the other,i only because many in the current administration ndmuch merit in both viewpoints. Each particular policyinitiative will thereore be evaluated through two sets

o lenses, which in many cases will lead to quite dier-ent perspectives on whether the policy is worthwhile.

On one issue, there is growing consensus amongmany security analysts: i preemptive orce is appropri-ate, the United States should take the lead in the attack,not Israel. Te use o Israeli military orce against U.S.

wishes would be catastrophic or the U.S.-Israel rela-tionship. Tat said, there is no scenario imaginable inwhich the United States would use its own orces to dis-rupt an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear acilities.

In principle, partisans o the strategic threat viewgenerally advocate speaking out in support o the Ira-nian opposition, but it is not clear what they mean whenthey say this. Many analysts do not believe that supportor democracy and human rights will present any prac-tical possibilities or diminishing the strategic threatsrom Iran any time soon. here are numerous dier-ences o opinion among those who emphasize Irans stra-tegic threat about how much the United States can doto assist democratic orces in Iran. Some argue that U.S.

support would be a kiss o death, which is the view gen-erally held by those who emphasize improving U.S.-Iran

i rcle, arta f the tratec threat ew eerall

acate ea t rt f the iraa t,

bt t t clear what the ea whe the a th.


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A Ppoad impac o saco

CRippLE iRAn

One argument is that i the objective is to stop Iransnuclear program or help the countrys pro-democracyGreen Movement, then sanctions should go or thejugular: the Iranian energy program. o partisans othis view, U.S. and European unwillingness to targetthe energy program shows a lack o seriousness aboutstopping the nuclear program. As one observer putit, the international community will probably imposesanctions that really hurt only afer Iran gets a nuclearweapon. Actually, were Iran to test a nuclear weapon,

many engagement supporters would say that the coun-trys nuclear status makes engagement all the moreimportant, and they might redouble their oppositionto sanctions.

he counterargument is that the United Statesshould not support comprehensive sanctions, such asthose against Iraq in the 1990s, because the Iraqi expe-rience showed how problematic they are: they had noimpact on Iraqs weapons o mass destruction (WMD)program, gutted Iraqs middle class, destroyed Iraqisociety, and divided U.S. allies. In this view, the track

record or universal and comprehensive sanctions isone unmarred by success, and the seriousness o sanc-tions should be judged by how eectively they accom-plish U.S. objectives without hurting the middle class.

HELp THE dEmoCRATiC opposiTion

Some observers hope that sanctions will help IransGreen Movement, though neither the UN SecurityCouncil nor the Obama administration has ocused onthis goal in arguing or the current sanctions regime.Some supporters o democracy and human rights actu-

ally hope that sanctions will convulse the system, whileothers take the opposite tack, arguing that sanctionshurt the Iranian people and thereore reinorce theregimes message that the West is hostile to Iran. Whilethe international community and the United Statesappear unlikely to abandon a gradual approach in avoro shock therapy, it is equally unrealistic to think that

M e A s u r i n g t h e s u C C e s s o sanctionsrequires agreement about their objectives. o deter-mine whether we are making progress, we must knowwhat it is we are trying to achieve. For example, i theprimary goal o sanctions is to induce a change in Ira-nian behavior, then they have been largely ineectiveto date. But i the primary goal is to demonstrate inter-national resolve and cohesion while isolating Iran, thensanctions have achieved their desired eect.

U.S. oicials have a variety o ideas regarding thepurpose o sanctions. Following are some o the most

commonly proposed objectives, moving rom the leastto the most practicable:

HALT uRAnium EnRiCHmEnT

Te Obama administration does not necessarily believethat sanctions will halt Irans uranium enrichment.Many U.S. ocials argue that suspension o enrichmentis a poor measure o the sanctions success, and indeed,it is diicult to see circumstances in which the sanc-tions themselves would lead Iran to halt enrichment. Itis much more plausible that the sanctions would be a

actorpossibly even a very important actorin anIranian decision that the nuclear program has not beenworth the political and economic cost and has notbrought the expected security and prestige benets.

EnABLE FRuiTFuL nEgoTiATions

For many in the Obama administration, sanctions area tool designed to press Iran into opening negotiations.In other words, the objective is engagement, and sanc-tions are a means to that end. A avorite way to phrasethis is that targeted sanctions could create leverage

or diplomacy with Iran. Perhaps. But Iran has a trackrecord o using negotiations as a stalling tactic, so thateven i it were to reengage with the ive permanentmembers o the UN Security Council plus Germany(P5+1), ehran might be more interested in orestall-ing tougher action by appearing to be cooperative thanin actually resolving dierences.


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THE REd LinE


situation will not be pleased by austerity measures, butthen, they have been grumbling about the economy ora long time.

Presumably, punishing Iran is not an end in itsel, but

a means to change Iranian calculations about whetherthe nuclear program is worth the cost. Whether thiscan be accomplished depends in no small part on whatIranian leaders see as the benet o the program. Dothey believe that the West is trying to overthrow themthrough a velvet revolution and that they deeated suchan attempt by their tough response to the 20092010protests? I so, they may conclude that the revolutionsuture can be secured only by orcing the West to backo, and that a robust nuclear program is the best wayto do so. I that is the thinking o the hardliners, they

may regard the advantages o a nuclear program as sosignicant that they outweigh the punishments sanc-tions impose.

inCREAsE domEsTiC disConTEnT WiTH

govERnmEnT poLiCiEs

For many years, Iranians have been unhappy with gov-ernment economic policies and corruption, whichthey see as impediments to growth. Te sanctions, andthe ability o rms controlled by the Islamic Revolu-tionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to bypass them, only

eed the sense o ordinary Iranian businessmen that thegovernment is the source o their problems. Whereasin recent years this discontent had been tempered byexpenditures ueled by rapidly rising oil revenue, nowthe governments oil income is, i anything, shrinking.It seems likely, then, that domestic discontent with theeconomic situation will increase. It is not entirely clearhow sanctions are viewed in the publics evaluation othe countrys economic problems. Some governments,such as Cuba, have successully used sanctions to shifblame to oreign governments or economic ailures

overwhelmingly due to their own inappropriate poli-cies. But at least so ar in Iran, the opposite seems tohave occurred: many Iranians blame economic dii-culties on the governments hardline positions becausethey led to international sanctionsthough in act,ending the sanctions would not lead to as much eco-nomic improvement as these Iranians seem to expect.

the international community will entirely abandonsanctions. Te best that riends o Iranian democracyand human rights can hope or is that some measuresagainst human rights abusers will be added to sanctions

designed to press Iran on the nuclear program. Tis cer-tainly seems to be the approach o the European Unionand the U.S. Congress. Interestingly, it seems that theleaders o the Green Movement in Iran have decidednot to endorse sanctions, but to attack the regime orcausing sanctions to be imposed.

imposE CosTs on iRAn

Sanctions do impose costs on Iran. Yet Iranian lead-ers express supreme conidence that their valuableoil and gas resources allow the country to prosper no

matter how the Western powers view Iranian policies.Furthermore, regime hardliners do not necessarily seeintegration into the world economy as a good thing.Perhaps more important than the economic pain is theblow to Irans sel-image. It is ofen said that Iran cravesrespect and does not want to be seen as a pariah. Tismay quite possibly be so, but arguably, the internationalattention devoted to Irans nuclear program has put thespotlight on the country, portraying it as a major playerin regional, i not world, aairs. hereore, it is notclear how much Irans leaders see sanctions as a painul

punishment.In addition, the costs inicted by sanctions are not

necessarily that dramatic, especially when sanctionsare phased in over time. For instance, the decision othe major international oil companies to end sales orened petroleum products to Iran does not preventthe Islamic Republic rom acquiring gasoline, eventhough it does raise the cost. Similarly, Irans decisionto shif its oreign exchange holdings out o dollars andinto euros, presumably because o the vulnerability odollar holdings to U.S. pressure, led to losses o several

billion dollars, but the Iranian central bank has morethan $70 billion in oreign exchange reserves. Te Ira-nian government has many relatively low-cost alterna-tives or bearing the higher costs imposed by sanctions;Ahmadinezhads proposals or phasing out subsidiescould generate a great many additional resources. obe sure, Iranians unhappy with the current economic


21/36



rights abuses acilitates securing approval or sanctionsrom governments that might otherwise be more reluc-tant to act. Many in Iran seem to eel that sanctionsare good i they visibly hurt those who are hurting the

people, or example, the imposition o a ban on travel byIrans leaders. o the extent that the aim o sanctions isto signal international disapproval o the Islamic Repub-lics activities, an important measure o whether theyare succeeding is how much noise comes out o ehrancomplaining about the sanctions.

Ideally, to signal international disapproval, a coali-tion both broad and deep would need to take switaction. In practice, however, the Security Councilspursuit o unanimity has meant that on average, a yearhas passed between each successive sanctions resolu-

tion, and the resolutions were much weaker than theymight have been. Tere were some real advantages to

the 12-2-1 vote on the June 2010 UN Security Coun-

cil Resolution 1929 imposing additional sanctions onIranwith Brazil and urkey voting no and Lebanonabstainingin that it showed that not every countryin the Security Council has a veto (i.e., the P-5 veto-holders are prepared to push through a resolution overthe objections o some nonpermanent members). Butthat is a silver lining to a black cloud: Security Councilaction has been so slow and modest that Iran has hadample opportunity to adjust, politically and economi-cally, to the incremental measures.

dETER oTHER CounTRiEs FRom TAking

THE sAmE RouTE

Since the Iranian nuclear program intereres with theinternational communitys goal o reinorcing theglobal nonprolieration regime, one objective o Iranpolicy is to deter others rom taking the same path.Sanctions suggest that resisting cooperation with the

For instance, there is apparently a widespread belie inIran that the lack o oreign investment in the countrysoil and gas industry is a result o the sanctions, whereasthe bigger obstacle has been the unattractive business

environment, including the poor terms oered to or-eign investors.

dELAy And disRupT THE nuCLEAR And

missiLE pRogRAms

Te Iranian nuclear program has encountered techni-cal problems. Although some o them were presum-ably due to sabotage rom Western clandestine opera-tions, others have come rom Irans need to repeatedlyreinvent the wheelthat is, to replicate what otherslong ago perected. Sanctions have blocked Iranian

access to needed technology and equipment, yetsome argue that they are not slowing Irans nuclear

and missile programs because IRGC-linked rms are

working with Chinese suppliers instead o Europeans.Tat seems to be a signicant exaggeration, and Irancontinues to devote great eort to obtaining Westerntechnology, which suggests that it is not content torely on Chinese sources.

signAL inTERnATionAL disAppRovAL

Although Irans leaders may publicly dismiss the sanc-tions impact or psychological reasons, they care deeplyabout these and similar international measures. Sanc-tions single ehran out as an international maleactor,

in the company o Sudan and, until recently, Libya. Tisdoes not correspond with how the regime perceives itsrole in the world. Furthermore, it could be argued thatsanctions show that the international community is hos-tile to the regime while supportive o the Iranian people.Perhaps a more accurate way o phrasing the point wouldbe that international distaste or the regimes human

iteratal tate fr the ree ha rht abe

facltate ecr aral fr act fr eret

that ht therwe be re relctat t act.


22/36

THE REd LinE


perceived as acilitating censorship in Iran. Tat led notonly to a disapproving resolution in the European Par-liament, but also to calls to boycott Siemens productsby groups such as Stop the Bomb. Similarly, Caterpil-

lar decided to withdraw rom the Iranian market aferit was targeted by United Against Nuclear Iran, and theFrench energy company otal decided to halt the sale ogasoline to Iran partly because o the new U.S. law press-ing companies to stop such sales, but also because theIranian market is not lucrative enough to justiy acingpolitical pressure and potential legal complications.

TAkE A moRAL sTAnCE AgAinsT HumAn

RigHTs ABusERs

Europe has a well-established record o imposing sanc-

tions or human rights abuses even in places whereother national security interests are absent, as in Zim-babwe or Burma. Accordingly, the European lef seescomprehensive sanctions as an appropriate responseto Irans suppression o peaceul protest. In addition,European media report much more than their Ameri-can counterparts about Iranian human rights abuses,and European publics are more likely to be sympa-thetic to sanctions presented as a moral response tothese abuses than to sanctions or reasons o nationalsecurity. Were the Green Movement to take to the

streets again, European support or tougher actionsagainst Iran would be strengthened even urther.

While there are diering views on the purposes othe sanctions, there is a broad consensus that whateversanctions are imposed should be vigorously enorced.In recent years, the U.S. government has dramati-cally stepped up enorcement o its regulations. Forexample, the reasury Departments Oce o ForeignAssets Control has taken orceul actions that resultedin more than a billion dollars in ines and impressedmany in the inancial industry. he Justice Depart-

ment created the post o national coordinator orexport enorcement and devoted more resources tosanctions-busting cases; it has brought charges againstmore than twenty people or the sale o arms or tech-nology to Iran. While these initiatives deserve to bereinorced and extended, the greater challenge is towork with countries that do not have the resources or

International Atomic Energy Agency is an expensiveproposition. Consider North Korea: while interna-tional sanctions have not stopped it rom developingnuclear weapons, it is hard to imagine many other

governments wanting to imitate Pyongyang. A goodargument can be made that Irans nuclear programhas exacted a heavy cost or little advantage: atertwenty years, Iran is still not nuclear capable, muchless in possession o a nuclear weapon, and it has paidquite a price in its relations with Europe. One cyni-cal view is that the world cared little when Iran wasjust sponsoring terror and oppressing its own people,and that it aced disapproval or these actions onlywhen its nuclear program drew international atten-tion to them.

dissuAdE CompAniEs And CounTRiEs

FRom BEing ACTivE in THE iRAniAn

mARkET

A number o major international rms have pulled outo the Iranian market or political reasons. Pressure todo so comes not only rom the U.S. government, butalso rom European governments and, most important,rom the rms concerns about reputational risk. Temost prominent have been international banks, whichhave responded to the campaign led by Undersecretary

o the reasury Stuart Levey. Te reasury Departmenthas amassed much evidence about deceptive businesspractices by Iranian banks, practices that violate regu-latory guidelines in many countries and that are alsoinconsistent with international banks own codes obest practice. he department has pointed out tointernational banks that their reputation may suer ithey are seen as active partners with Iranian banks thatare cited in UN, EU, or U.S. sanctions actions as acili-tators o Irans nuclear and missile programs.

he same inormal sanctions approach that has

had so much impact in the banking industry is nowspreading to other areas. Te U.S. government has beenemphasizing deceptive Iranian practices in shipping,which have implications or shipping companies as wellas those who insure the ships. A number o industrialirms have been reconsidering their presence in Iran.For instance, Siemens suered when its products were


23/36



analysts do not agree about which are the most impor-tant, they have widely divergent ideas about how tomeasure the impact o the sanctions. hese dier-ences would remain even i complete inormation

were available about how the sanctions are aectingthe Iranian economy. In the absence o agreement onwhat the sanctions are meant to achieve, it is dicultto oresee agreement on their useulness. As CIA

Director Leon Panetta noted in a June 27 statement,

I think the sanctions will have some impact . . . Itcould help weaken the regime. It could create someserious economic problems. Will it deter them romtheir ambitions with regard to nuclear capability?Probably not. Some will see this as showing that thesanctions adopted to date are insucient; others, thatthe sanctions have achieved the right balance.

the motivation to stop Iranian smuggling o materialscovered by the UN sanctions. UN Security CouncilResolution 1929 provides mechanisms or improvingsanctions enorcement, including a panel o experts

to make recommendations and a charge to the com-mittee supervising sanctions to engage more actively.Enorcement eorts will have to be spearheaded bythe major Western countries, which alone have the will

and resources to make them a priority. hese eorts

will be more eective i the major Western countriescooperate with each other rather than running separateeorts; joint programs would bring more resources andbe politically acceptable in countries that do not wantto be seen as bending to U.S. pressure.

In sum, many dierent objectives have been pro-posed or the sanctions. Since oicials and policy

i the abece f areeet what the act are eat t

achee, t ffclt t freee areeet ther efle.


24/36


A how u.s. PolcAc iaa Domc Polc

pressure is relaxed, the internal threat rom the opposi-tion will diminish. A recently leaked audio recordingprovides an excellent insight into Khameneis view othe relation between oreign powers and the domes-tic opposition. In Mashhad, a high-ranking intelli-gence ocial spoke to clerics, recounting Khameneisbelie that ormer Iranian president Ayatollah AkbarHashemi Rasanjani, who has supported the opposi-tion, communicates with the British MI6 intelligenceagency through his son in Geneva. Moreover, Khame-nei views opposition as a lie-or-death situation, as he

has convinced himsel that the Green Movement willnot stop until it removes him rom power. It does notappear that he has any intention o reaching a compro-mise with the opposition or allowing true democraticinstitutions to operate in ehran.

It seems hard to believe that the regime continuesto worry about the Green Movement when the oppo-sition is no longer able to bring large numbers o pro-testors onto the streets o ehran. But the seriousnesswith which the government takes the Green threat canbe seen in the resources it is devoting to countering it.

Te government is making an impressive eort, whichsuggests that it worries that the Greens are an impressiveorce. Consider its handling o internet use: the govern-ment has slowed down access to the point that the inter-net is now barely usable, and the new Cyber DeenseCommand Department employs more than our thou-sand people to monitor email accounts and other dailyinternet activities. he only reasonable conclusionis that the government is terriied o the opposition,though it is almost certainly overestimating the Greens.Since the protests last summer, the regime has eectively

regrouped. o be sure, Khamenei has become more iso-lated and President Ahmadinezhads circle continues todecrease, but the division within the Islamic Republicselite is quite a dierent matter rom the gul betweenthe regime and much o the educated urban public.

Just as Khamenei is convinced the postelection pro-tests were primarily the work o Western governments

irAns COMPLiCAteD DOMestiC dynam-ics have placed the United States in an extremely di-cult position, with real limits on how ar Washingtonhas been willing to go in supporting the oppositionmovement. Still, when assessing American policy,many opposition and government actors tend to ocuson whether perceived U.S. eorts to undermine theregime are succeeding.

Ayatollah Khamenei is wrongly convinced that theWest is the key source o a dire threat to his hold onpower and that a nuclear deal would only whet the

Wests appetite or regime change. Tis belie, whichappears to be shared by many Iranian hardliners, doesnot augur well or engagement or compromise. Manyin the democratic opposition criticize the West orexcessive ocus on the nuclear issue, arguing that theonly way to reliably resolve the nuclear impasse is tohave a trustworthy governmentone controlled bythe democratic oppositionthat is not implacablyhostile to the West. Yet how much the West could doto help the democratic opposition, even i it were soinclined, is by no means clear. Nevertheless, Western

leaders should understand that both the Iranian gov-ernment and the Iranian opposition are convincedalmost certainly alselythat the West holds the keyto domestic Iranian political developments and that itsreal interest is in the victory o democratic orces. Tismeans that both the Iranian government and the Ira-nian opposition will measure the success o U.S. Iranpolicy by how much the opposition advances and thehardliners retreat.

Te nuclear issue eeds directly into Khameneis pre-occupation with controlling the domestic opposition

movement; he has convinced himsel that internationalpressure against Irans nuclear policy is but a small tac-tic in a larger scheme or regime change. In addition,Khamenei believes that without Western support,the Green Movement would not survive. In his view,nuclear progress shows that Iran is powerul and there-ore less vulnerable to external pressure, and as external


25/36



July 7, 2010, in a very encouraging development, 2009presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi stated,

Finally and unortunately, UN Resolution 1929 was

adopted. Trough rationality and wisdom we couldhave prevented this resolution and other resolutionsrom being imposed on us. Why should some ew

persons, hidden rom peoples eyes, decide aboutcases that are tied to the destiny o the country? Werenot people supposed to govern their destiny? Whyshould we think that people agree with everything

we decide? Is the [constitutional] article about re-erendum a ormal and luxury article that generates athunder o insult and accusations [against those whodemand reerendum] every time it gets mentioned?Isnt it time to ask peoples views on sensitive issuesand make them a support or signicant decisions?

(authors translation).

In short, the key actors in Iran whom Washingtonwishes to movethe government and those who could

provoke a debate about the wisdom o the nuclearprogramare likely to judge U.S. Iran policy in nosmall part by a metric that the United States regardsas secondary to the nuclear issue, namely, how muchhuman rights and democracy improve. Furthermore,the prospects are poor that the United States couldhave much impact on these issues, which means thatwhen assessed by this standard, Washington is likely toall woeully short.

inciting misled Iranians, so is he convinced that the ero-cious repression o these protests successully overcamea challenge that would only have grown had he triedcompromise instead. Similarly, Khamenei may believe

that the best way to deeat what he sees as yet another Western challengeon the nuclear issueis to beequally hardline and deant. It would be very optimisticto think that he will be looking or an acceptable com-promise. For him, the measure o success in U.S.-Iranrelations is not likely to be the ability to nd a resolu-tion that satises both sides; he is more likely to aim ordeeating what he sees as a U.S. plot to hold back Iranrom its rightul place as a regional and global power.

On one point, both Khamenei and the variousstrands o the opposition agree: the nuclear issue is not

at the top o their agenda. Te democratic oppositionlargely views the nuclear issue as a distraction rom the

much more important question o whether Iran has ademocratic government. Tereore, it judges U.S. Iran

policy by the impact Washington is having on humanrights and democracy. Tis is a problem or the UnitedStates, because U.S. policy is not currently aimed pri-marily at inuencing Irans actions on these issues, noris Washington likely to have much eect on those mat-ters even i it tried.

he best the United States can hope or rom theopposition is that it will point to the nuclear impasse asan example o an Iranian government policy ailure. On

The ere wth whch the iraa eret tae the gree

threat ca be ee the rerce t et t cter t.


26/36


A r o Wa

Swiss) in an eort to prevent a clash, Iran, instead oavoiding the U.S. eet, laid mines along that very route.Iran has concluded that through stealth, mining, andswarming attacks, it can inict a small but signicantamount o damage on the United States. While U.S.retaliation would be swif and devastating, Iran wouldsee the damage it inicted as a moral victory.

Additionally, orces within the Iranian military areworking to escalate tensions. Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps Navy (IRGCN) oicers may be eageror a ght. It is dicult or the United States to craf

a strategy when certain parties in Iran may even wel-come limited U.S. strikes or domestic political rea-sons, calculating that such attacks would rally theirpower base and give them a ree hand to deal with theGreen Movement. Furthermore, there are other rea-sons why some in Iran are eager or a ght. Adm. AliFedavi, or instance, a deputy IRGCN commander,apparently desires a conrontation with the UnitedStates as part o a personal vendetta over a previousbattle with U.S. naval orces during the latter phases othe Iran-Iraq War.

Te decentralized operational command system othe Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) andIRGCN urther increases Irans propensity or violentconrontation. Such decentralization makes it dicultor Irans political and military leaders to control theescalation o crises, as calling o attack orders can provechallenging. In addition, IRGC and IRGCN ocersare ofen rewarded or taking aggressive action againstenemies. Irans talent or sel-deception should not beunderestimated. Tere is an insular aspect to the IRGCthat makes it sometimes believe its own propaganda

and encourages conrontation with the U.S. military.Another reason Iran may miscalculate is that the

United States has arguably been passive in dealing withIranian provocations, such as mock attacks on U.S.ships and simulated mine attacks. Iran has sponsorednumerous acts o terrorism against the United Statessince 1983 without engendering a military response. It

A s s e s s M e n t s r e g A r D i n g the risk o warbetween Iran and the United States (or Israel) havegenerally stemmed rom the prospect o a U.S. mili-tary strike on Irans nuclear acilities. Tis is at best anincomplete method, ocusing on only one scenario,and not a particularly likely one at that. At the veryleast, such calculations must actor in the possibilitythat Iran will initiate the conict. In other words, therisk o war should be assessed in part by how provoca-tively ehran is acting, not solely by the odds that theUnited States will strike rst.

Perhaps Iran would initiate a conict deliberately,but it seems much more plausible that Irans overcon-dence would lead it to cross a U.S. red line inadver-tently. Te United States and Iran are entering a periodwith a heightened potential or such a miscalculationbecause ehran perceives that the international orderestablished afer World War II, which served to under-pin U.S. power, is crumbling, and that a new interna-tional balance o powerone more avorable to Iranis emerging. Accordingly, ehran sees the United Statesas a declining power, and Iran as a rising power.

An apt analogy can be made here with the periodrom 1988 to 1990, ollowing the Iran-Iraq War, whenan emboldened Saddam Hussein adopted a moreaggressive regional policy that culminated in the inva-sion o Kuwait. Iraqs growing activism was due to thematuration o its WMD program and the belie that itwould soon have nuclear weapons. Saddam, too, talkedabout the decline o American power, and this led Iraqto overplay its hand. Iran may also overplay its hand,although it is most unlikely that an Iranian miscalcula-tion would take the orm o an invasion.

While Iran recognizes its military ineriority, it maynot mind a conict, since it is looking or a moral vic-tory, not a military one. Irans potential or a moral vic-tory at the expense o a ew ships is signicant. In 1988,or example, during the last U.S.-Iran military conict,Iran did not shy away rom conrontation. When theUnited States signaled its route to Iran (by way o the


27/36



during Operation Desert Fox that it struck targetsthat could tangibly aect the stability o the Iraqiregime. Moreover, because the United States has gen-erally ensured that military actions were proportion-

ate, the Iranian regime could calculate that Americanmilitary action would not threaten its survival.

he Iranian nuclear dilemma is emblematic o aproblem democracies ace when dealing with chal-lenges. Until the September 11 attacks, the UnitedStates did not devote the necessary resources to al-Qaeda; afer the attack, the entire calculus changed.Similarly, Israels 2006 war with Hizballah wassparked by the kidnapping o soldiers, yet there hadbeen ve kidnapping attempts in the previous eightmonths, and only ater the kidnappings were suc-

cessul did Israels approach change. From the muted

U.S. response to the loss o hundreds o soldiers romimprovised explosive devices supplied by Iran to Iraqi

insurgents, ehran may calculate that it can challengethe United States without ear o the consequences.hat may lead Iran to push and push until the U.S.president says, no longer.

It is dicult to craf a deterrence strategy againsta government whose members may welcome limitedU.S. strikes or domestic political reasons. One solu-tion would be to convince the adversary that a con-ict would not remain limited and that the UnitedStates would no longer maintain its traditional policyo proportionality. Under current conditions, how-

ever, such U.S. warnings might not be credible.In short, there are many reasons to worry about a

military conict between the United States and Iran; apotential U.S. military strike on Iranian nuclear acili-ties is hardly the only issue. Indeed, a major consider-ation is the Iranian view that the Islamic Republic ison the rise and the United States on the decline, and

continues to push the United States and interprets thelack o response as a sign o weakness. Although theUnited States detained a number o IRGC personnelproviding support to violent extremist groups in Iraq

and Aghanistan who targeted U.S. orces, it still hasnot taken military action. From Irans perspective, awhole series o U.S. red lines became pink when Iranactually crossed the line. Irans leaders may calculatethat this process will be repeated endlessly. We cannotbe certain how the United States would react i Iranstarted producing highly enriched uranium. Duringthe 1980s, the United States did not shy away romgetting in Irans ace to curtail Iranian actions, whichmade the Iranians eel as though the United States wasalways watching them. Tis kind o pressure reduced

the risk o war.

Iran may also correctly calculate that the U.S.military is not necessarily well prepared or limited

conict, as it has ocused almost exclusively on coun-ter-insurgency and stability operations in the pastdecade. As a result, the knowledge base and institu-tional memories in the Deense Department abouthow to engage in limited conlictas the UnitedStates did in Iraq in the 1990shave atrophied. Tislack o recent experience in conducting limited con-ict, coupled with the act that the U.S. Navy has notbeen seriously tested in more than sixty years, raisesurther questions about U.S. competence to containand deter Iran.

In addition, Iran may also count on U.S. alliesand the U.S. policy o proportionality to constrainmilitary actions by the United States. For example,because in the late 1990s U.S. allies ofen did not per-mit the United States to use air bases in the PersianGul to strike Iraq, the United States was orced torely on desultory cruise missile strikes. It was only

it ffclt t craft a eterrece trate aat a

eret whe eber a welce lte

u.s. tre fr etc ltcal rea.


28/36

THE REd LinE


the credibility o its red-line threats as they are withwhether the United States has an acceptable alternativeto a preemptive strike. Te most important questionor assessing whether a military clash is coming is this:

how likely is Iran to overstep U.S. red lines?

the associated view that the United States does notrespond when Iran takes action that Washington haswarned would be unacceptable. hose who wish toavoid an U.S.-Iran military conict should be at least

as concerned with how Washington can reinorce

mch f the areeet betwee the tt a

et ceter the ae qet: what are the

arrate etrc b whch t eare rre?


29/36


Coclo

Much o the disagreement between the optimistsand pessimists centers on the same question: what arethe appropriate metrics by which to measure progress?he gap separating these metrics is unlikely to close;there is little prospect o broad agreement in U.S. pol-icy circles regarding what standards Washington andits allies should adopt or determining success.

I the pessimists are correct, the grave risk is thatthe United States and Iran are heading toward atest o wills. Such a conrontation would probablybecome a test o orce, most likely initiated when Iran

inadvertently crosses a U.S. red line and elicits a uri-ous response.

the uniteD stAtes fACes many challengesand ew opportunities in its policy toward Iran. Tereis little consensus about what U.S. aims should beor how much progress Washington can reasonablyexpect to make. Supporters o the current policy canpoint to some real successes, emphasizing the prog-ress toward orging international consensus, delay-ing Irans nuclear goals, and taking away the regimesenemy narrative about U.S. intentions. Others aremore pessimistic, emphasizing how little Iranianactions have changed despite U.S. eorts, and how

boldly Iran continues to dey the international com-munity and assert its inuence.


30/36


Appdx: Cox ad Codaoo rpod o iaa bao

includes steps to protect the interests o the UnitedStates, its riends, and the international community.

A consistently rm, and potentially orceul, response

to any hostile acts or threats against vital interests othe United States and its regional riends.

A tough ongoing sanctions program that targets,

inter alia, Iranian nuclear and missile programs, allentities supporting international terror, and the com-mercial interests o the IRGC.

An uninterrupted and unltered international inor-

mation ow to the Iranian people.

Te United States will be dealing with a troublesomeIran or the oreseeable uture, and there is little reasonto believe the regimes demise will come about soon.As a result, there is a danger that the internationalcommunity will soon tire o the Iranian problem andthat countries will choose to overlook the challenge tointernational stability it poses, in avor o the pursuit o

narrow economic or other interests, as is already occur-ring with China.

Tus, or the U.S. strategy to succeed, it must con-tinue to isolate and sanction the regime until the lat-ter changes its behavior and policies and meet Iranianchallenges with a rm response at the time, place, andmanner that Washington sees t.

nAvCEnTs AppRoACH

During my time at the helm o U.S. Naval Forces Cen-tral Command (NAVCEN), missions and orces

were assigned along three principal lines o operation:(1) maritime securityinvolving coalition orcesto deny terrorists use o the sea by directly oilingtheir plans or supporting activities (such as drug andweapons smuggling); (2) conronting violent extrem-isminvolving mainly U.S. naval orcesby sup-porting combat operations in Iraq, Aghanistan, and

By Vice Adm. Kevin Cosgrif, U.S. NAVY (Ret.)

i n fOrMu LAti n g A str Ateg y toward anIran which seems determined to play a destabilizingrole in the region, the United States must rst decidewhat it is attempting to accomplish: a nuclear-weapons-ree Iran? Regime change? Or some other goal? Onlyafer setting realistic goals can it hope to ormulate anappropriate matching strategy.

In developing a U.S. strategy or Iran, there are ourmajor realities Washington must conront: irst, the

Islamic Republic o Iran (IRI) believes that its revolu-tionary ideology takes precedence over internationalnorms; second, ehran cannot abide the U.S. role inthe region, which it believes is the main obstacle toits hegemonic aspirations; third, although riven byinternal divisions, the IRI has acted airly consistentlyin accordance with the above belies; and ourth, theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasbecome ever more powerul, to the point that theregimes survival and perhaps control are in its hands.his last point, in particular, will greatly complicate

U.S. eorts to deal eectively with Iran.Because o these realities, the United States must

actively seek to contain and isolate the Islamic Repub-lic; unortunately, that means containing the country asa whole. Tis is not to suggest a radical change in U.S.policy; it does mean, however, that Washington mustmove rom occasional ad hoc, piecemeal responsestoward a more systemic approach.

o this end, a sustainable and realistic strategy mightuseully incorporate several elements:

A general respect or Iranian sovereignty and terri-

tory. Tis includes regular, direct communicationswith the regime (where appropriate).

A credible and persistent diplomatic and military

deterrent posture to counter Iranian propaganda andmalign military and irregular warare activities. Tis


31/36



was reassuring to our riends, and it was always possibleto ratchet up rom this stancethough the next step,the use o orce, requires much greater care. Likewise,great care is needed to build de-escalatory options into

most plans as the situation warrants. In general, the goalis to inuence behavior while avoiding major combat.

ConTingEnCy pLAnning

Te United States has had several occasions to engagein contingency planning in response to Iranian activi-ties. Sometimes these eorts involve only the U.S. Navy,although they usually involve other Central Command(CENCOM) components. he good news is thatthe United States has sucient military power in placein the Gul to accomplish what is required while main-

taining capability to meet U.S. military commitmentsin Iraq and Aghanistan. And it was not always easyto correctly perceive how U.S. messages were beingreceived by the IRI regime, average Iranians, and otherpeoples in the region.

At a practical level, then, some key attributes themilitary might consider in any contingency planninginclude the ollowing:

Any action must be ramed by a communication nar-

rative, as it were, mindul that the United States was

not only sending a message to the regime in ehran,but also to average Iranians, regional allies, and theinternational community. For instance, in this vein,risk to civilians must be kept to a minimum.

he United States should be prepared to respond

very quickly while undertaking vigorous diplomacy.

Responses should generally be directed to the source

o the provocation.

Asymmetric responses are appropriate i they

have the potential to yield signiicantly improvedoutcomes.

his last actor is o particular importance. Forinstance, suppose the United States were to impose aninspection regime against all Iranian-agged merchant

elsewhere; (3) countering Iraninvolving mainly U.S.naval orcesto deter bad behavior.

NAVCEN sought to leverage the power and exi-bility o maritime orces as a visible reminder to ehran

o our ability to respond to aggression. NAVCEN,however, avoided being provocative, and always actedwith disciplined restraint. And while ehran respectsstrength, it detests the United States or being strong(but ironically may despise it or not using orce whensuch a response is called or . . . to not act orceully insuch cases is to undermine U.S. credibility in the eyeso riend and oe alike).

In assessing possible military responses, it is impor-tant to take a broad view. Military action does notnecessarily entail combat. For example, much thought

should be devoted to the movement and employmento the Fifh Fleets ships and aircraf, especially aircrafcarriers and amphibious ships, in the belie that theirrelative transparency could be used to reinorce cer-tain Iranian perceptions o U.S. intentions. Conversely,ambiguity could be created i that were called or. Tisis not unique to naval orces, but the sea does allow oroperational maneuver in useul ways.

NAVCEN crafed a modest strategic communica-tion plan as part o our lines o operation, consisting olines o persuasion:

Te positioning o ships, and conveying (or conceal-

ing) where they were and what they were up to as themost powerul orm o communication.

A proactive public aairs plan intended or Arab

riends and external audiences, but which we knewwould be visible within Iran.

Engagement o regional military and civilian leaders

through visits, conerences, and briengs, and gen-

erally also keeping U.S. embassies apprised o rou-tine and nonroutine situations and soliciting themor advice.

Being somewhat transparent works to the advantage othe United States in that it makes it easier to be ambig-uous when that is called or. Appearing less belligerent


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THE REd LinE


ConCLusion

he United States needs a clear-eyed view o theproblem posed by the IRI and a strategy tailored tothe realities it aces. Tis translates into the need or

a long-term approach. Te United States must remainengaged with the UN and with other countries, whilerecognizing the limits and staying power o theseother actors. And it needs to be realistic about what itis trying to accomplish, while remaining ready to backup its words with actions on a sustained and systemicbasis. o this end, the U.S. military posture in theGul and the signals the United States sends throughits activities there can play a useul role in deterringan Iran committed to destabilizing the region whileat the same time reassuring its riends.

ships to make sure sanctioned material is not beingtranserred in response to some provocation elsewhere.Such actions would pose some real diplomatic andoperational challenges but would play to U.S. strengths

and Iranian weaknesses. Such operations would dis-rupt the rhythm o shipping companies with IRGCconnections and cost Iran time and money, and theycould be used to oreshadow more serious additionalactions (or instance, up to and including a blockade).

One can consider other possible options, but thesalient point is the use o asymmetric advantagesocused upon highly valued (or potentially highlythreatening) Iranian capabilities in a more or less ver-tical ashion may yield especially impactul results instopping bad behavior.


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t Wao i o na ea Polc

Bar f drectr

President

Martin J. Gross

ChairmanHoward P. Berkowitz

Chairmen Emeriti

Fred S. Laer

Michael Stein

Founding President and Chairman EmeritaBarbi Weinberg

Senior Vice Presidents

Bernard LeventhalPeter LowyJames Schreiber

Vice Presidents

Charles AdlerBenjamin BreslauerWalter P. Stern

Secretary

Richard S. Abramson

TreasurerDimitri Sogolo

Board Members

Anthony BeyerRichard BorowRobert FromerMichael GelmanRoger Hertog, emeritus

Shelly KassenMichael KestonDaniel MintzZachary SchreiberFred SchwartzMerryl ischGary Wexler

Next Generation Leadership Council

Jill Abramson

Anthony Beyer, cochairDavid EigenDaniel EisenstadtJonathan S. GilbertAdam HerzJames KestonZachary Schreiber, cochairWhitney SkibellJonathan orop

Bar f Ar Warren ChristopherLawrence S. EagleburgerMax M. KampelmanHenry A. KissingerSamuel W. LewisEdward LuttwakMichael MandelbaumRobert C. McFarlaneMartin PeretzRichard PerleJames G. RocheGeorge P. ShultzR. James Woolsey

Mortimer Zuckerman


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How one evaluates progress on Iran policydepends on how one assesses the fundamental

challenges posed by the Islamic Republic.

z

iran us strategic report 05

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