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IPCS Forecasts

East Asia in 2015 China & US I China & Japan I North Korea, South Korea & Intern‐Korean

Relations I A Strategy for India

Sandip Kumar Mishra

IPCS Special Report # 175 January 2015

IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #175, January 2015

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About the Author

Sandip Kumar Mishra

Dr Mishra is an Assistant

Professor at the Department

of East Asian Studies, Delhi

University & a Visiting Fellow

at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

(IPCS)

He writes a column for the IPCS titled East Asia

Compass. See http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/dr‐

sandip‐mishra/

This report is an updated and compiled version of

his earlier commentaries for his column during

2014.

© IPCS, 2015

B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor

Safdarjung Enclave

New Delhi 110029

Tel: 91‐11‐4100 1900, 4100 1901

Fax: (91‐11) 41001902

Cover Photo Credit:

http://www.mappery.com/maps/Far‐East‐Asia‐

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CONTENTS Section‐I East Asia in 2015: A Forecast

US and China

China and Japan

Inter‐Korea Relations

A Strategy for India

Section‐II East Asia in 2014: A Review

US‐China and East Asia at Crossroads

A Thaw in China‐Japan Relations?

North Korea

South Korea

India in East Asia

East Asia in 2015

IPCS Forecasts

East Asia in 2015 Sandip Kumar Mishra

AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofEastAsianStudies,DelhiUniversity&VisitingFellow,IPCS

EastAsiain2015:AForecast

ThefuturepoliticallandscapeofAsia‐Pacificwouldlargelybedecided,arguably,byhappeningsintheEastAsianregion.ItissobecauseinEastAsia,theinterestsofthreeimportantplayersofworldpolitics‐theUS,ChinaandJapan‐comeindirectcontactwithoneanother.Inthelastfewyears,thesekeyplayersalongwithSouthKoreaandNorthKoreahavebeentryingtoreviewandrealigntheirforeignpoliciesaccordingtothe‘changingrealities’oftheregion.These‘changingrealities’arenotroutineandtheyhavepotentialtofundamentallychangethenatureofinter‐StaterelationsinEastAsiaaswellasinthewholeAsia‐Pacificregion.USandChina

ThefirstandforemostbilateralequationthatisgoingtobeimportantfortheregionisbetweentheUSandChina.Thecourseofcontest,cooperation,coexistenceorcontainmentbetweenthemisgoingtobeplayedprimarilyintheEastAsianregion.In2015,itwouldbeinterestingtoseewhether an ‘assertive China’ competes with the US’ ‘Asian pivot’ or whether both countrieschart out a cooperative course for bilateral relations in the framework of theG‐2, in spite oftheir several disagreements. In the past, the policies and behaviour of both have been toevaluatetheextremeoptionsandmanymorein‐betweens.

However, in 2015, both of themwould be pressed to take a clearer stand on their bilateralrelations. There could be several possibilities between the two countries and it would beprematuretosaythatanypossiblefutureisagiven.NothingisperordainedandboththeUSandChinaaregoingtoshapeeachother’schoices,preferencesandpostures,andmoreimportantly,theprocessisgoingtobeanon‐linearandcomlicatedone.

ChinaandJapan

Thenext importantdeterminant for theEastAsia regionwouldbe the trajectoryof relationsbetweenChinaandJapanin2015,thesecondandthirdbiggesteconomiesoftheworld.Iftheycooperate,theycouldcreateahugepositivethrustfortheEastAsianregionandbeyond.Butiftheyoptformilitarycontainmentorconfrontationwitheachother,itwouldbeahugedisasterfor the region. FromrecentChinese and Japanesebehaviour, it seems that theyare finding ituncomfortabletoco‐existwitheachotherasbothlookatregionalpoliticsinazero‐sumgamemodel.In2015,ChinaandJapanneedtomakepeacewiththeexistingrealities,andtherecentmeeting between Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping may have begun the process of mutualaccommodation.


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Japan,intheprocess,wouldhavetore‐thinkitsquesttobecomea‘normal’Stateanditsrecentultra‐nationalistrhetoricoverhistory,territorialityandotherissues.Similarly,Chinaalsoneedstore‐adjustthecourseofits‘peacefulrise’,whichforamajorityofneighbouringcountriesisnotseenas‘peaceful’anymore.In2015,ifChinadoesnotreviewitsbehaviour,suchasitsstandonthe disputes in the South China Sea, East China Sea and so on, it could propel many of theneighbouringcountriestoworkovertlytocounter‐balanceChina.

Inter‐KoreaRelations

In2015, relationsbetweenNorth andSouthKoreawould alsobe of significance.TheKoreanPeninsula is rightly identified as one of the flashpoints in East Asia and uneasy inter‐Korearelationsconstitutethecoreofit.Inthefirsttwoyearsofherrule,SouthKoreanPresidentParkGeun‐hye has been unable to begin ameaningful dialogue and exchanges with North Korea.However,ifsheisabletomakeithappenin2015,itwillbeawelcomesignforregionalpolitics.Foralmost four to fiveyears,NorthKoreahasbeengoing throughaphaseofsuccession,andaftersomuchanimosity,KimJong‐un’sregimemightrealisethatthesametacticsmaynotworkeachtime,whichcouldleadtoanotherphaseofengagementwiththeinternationalcommunity.Inter‐Korea relationsare importantbecause itbrings in theUS,China, JapanandevenRussiaintotheprocess.Thepoliticalgamethatwouldbeplayedoutbetweenthesebigplayers,iftheKoreanPeninsulaisweakandunstable,wouldundoubtedlydestabilisetheregionandperhapseven the entire Asia‐Pacific. Thus, a bilateral or multilateral mechanism to bring about abreakthroughintheinter‐Stateimpasseisrequiredin2015.

EastAsia:AStrategyforIndia

Formanydecades, Indiahas seemingly consideredEastAsia too far awaygeographicallyandhas therefore lacked an integrated policy towards the region. India has been satisfied inmaintainingbilateralrelationswithNorthKorea,SouthKorea,JapanandChinaseparatelyandhastriedtokeepitselfawayfromtheirbilateralrivalryinregion.TheIndianapproachhasbeenbasedontheconsiderationthatIndianeitherhasinterestsnorthecapacitytopursuethemintheregion.

However, in thechangingAsia‐PacificdynamicsaswellaswithIndia’sgrowingeconomicandpoliticalstature, ithasbecomeunavoidable forIndiatoarticulateacoordinatedpolicyfortheEastAsiaregion.IndiahasnotbeenabletokeepitselfalooffromthecontestbetweenChinaandtheUS or China and Japan. Similarly, itwould insufficient to say that Indiawould be able tomaintain good relations with both Japan and South Korea without taking a stand on theirbilateraldisagreements.

India, which is an emerging power in the Asia‐Pacific, must realise that the churning andtransformationinEastAsiaisgoingtoshapethepoliticsoftheAsia‐Pacificinanimportantway.Thus, it isnotonlyappropriatebutalso incumbentupon India tobeapartof thisprocessofchangingregionalpolitics.Thenewcourseof IndianforeignpolicytowardsEastAsiamustbeinitiatedin2015knowingwellthattheprocesswouldbedifficultandtime‐consuming.Itmaybring both displeasure and support from various quarters, but a principled, consistent,transparent,andcooperativeapproachwouldultimatelybeabletoovercomeit.

East Asia in 2015

EastAsiain2014:AReview

I

US‐ChinaandEastAsiaatCrossroads

China,Japan,KoreaandtheUS:RegionatCrossroads

JapanesePrimeMinisterShinjoAbevisitedYasukunishrineon26DecemberlastyearandthevisitinvitedusualcondemnationsfromChinaandSouthKorea.TheUSalsoreactedbysayingit‘disappointing’ and would lead to ‘exacerbate tensions’ in the region. However, Japaneseposturing has been relentless and on the New Year day, Japanese Internal Affairs MinisterYoshitakaShindohadanothervisittotheshrine.ThetensionandmistrustinEastAsiahasbeenescalating in recent years and Japan, China and North Korea have shown uncompromisingintent to compete rather than concedeand cooperateon the issuesofmutualdisagreements.ChinahasrecentlydeclareditsAirDefenseIdentificationZone(ADIZ)unilaterally,whichgoesbeyond its contest inEastChinaSeawith JapanoverSenkaku/Diaoyu islands.NorthKorea isalsogoingthroughdomesticpowerstruggleandrestructuringofequationswithitsclosestallyChina.Inthisproblematicinterstaterelationsintheregion,theJapaneseright‐wingassertionsin domestic politics and its impact on foreign policy has further complicated the securitycalculusoftheregion.TheEastAsian region is closely connected in economic, educational and cultural spheresbutthereisahugetrustdeficitinsecurityarenaanditposesagravechallengeforfurthereconomicexchanges and integration of the region. There are assurances that the tension among thesecountrieswouldnotmovebeyonda certain limit aseconomic interdependentwouldbring inmoderationintheirbehaviours.However,theargumentmaynotsustainablebeyondapoint.Iftheescalationoftensionamongthesecountriescouldnotbechecked,itmayderailanddisrupttheircooperationineveryfield.The role of the US is considered to be important as it has leverage to pacify Japan andconstructivelyengageChinatomaketheregionmorestable.TheUScouldalsoconveyChinatocontainNorthKoreanprovocative behaviour aswell as sock‐observe any instability inNorthKorea.WashingtonhasbeentryingtoreachoutBeijingthroughitsdiplomaticchannelbutthereis no indication that it has been equally keen in pacifying Japan. The Japanese aggressiveposturing,evenifnotopenlyappreciatedbytheUS,hasbeengrantedsilentconsentbytheUSand it is quite unsettling for not only China but also South Korea. Japan has been cleverlysilencedWashington by remaining fully committed to theUS alliance and its interests in theregionalpolitics.Forexample,thedayafterthePrimeMinisterAbe’svisittoYasukuni,Okinawagovernor agreed to relocate the US military base at Futenma to near by Henoko. It wascharacterisedas‘criticalmilestone’bytheUSSecretaryofDefenseChuckHagel.ItappearsthattheUSismoreinterestedinitsnarrownationalinterestsintheregionanditdoesnothaveanyseriousobjectionwithJapaneseaggressiveposturing.Probably,theUSthinksthatanassertiveJapanwouldbeabufferagainsttheriseofChineseinfluenceintheregion.ManyscholarsrelateAmericanconcessiontoJapanwithitsstrategyof‘Asianpivot’.Therearealsospeculationsthatprobably the US does not have enough diplomatic leverage over Japan to stop its aggressiveposturingandsoithasdecidedtogoalongwithJapaneseplanofthingsratherthandictatingitsownterms.Whateverbethereason,thecomplacencyonthepartoftheUSwoulddefinitelymakeitdifficultforWashingtonhaveanycredibleandconsequentialengagementwithChina.Chinawouldnotbesatisfiedbytheuseofwordslike‘disappointment’anditwoulddefinitelychartoutitsowncourse of actions, which might be detrimental for the regional security environment. The


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Chineseannouncement tohave itsownADIZcouldbebetterunderstood in the lightofabovedynamics.Furthermore,theUSconcedingandaccommodativebehaviourvis‐à‐visJapanposesadifficultquestiontoSouthKorea,whichisequallycloseallyoftheUSintheregion.Eventhough,South Korea enjoys security guarantee from the US, it has to rethink about its own securityequationsintheneighbourhood.SouthKoreaischallengedbyabelligerentand‘unpredictable’North Korea as well as an aggressive and uncompromising Japan. Seoul tried to forge acooperative relationship with China in variety of areas when South Korean President ParkGeun‐hye visited Beijing in mid‐2013. Although, it does not mean that South Korea wouldabandon itsoldally‐ theUS, innear futurebutcontinuous JapaneseaggressiveposturingandinsufficientAmericanattempttoprohibitit,mayforceittoreviewitsrelationswiththeUS.Thus, the East Asian region is at a crossroad and a vicious cycle of threatening anduncompromisingbehaviourshavebeenposinghugeriskofconflict.Nosinglecountrycouldbeblamedforpresentescalationsandtherehavebeenchainsofactionsandreactions.Itwouldbepertinent to see how soon all the stakeholders realise that the process must be stoppedcollectivelyoritmayleadtoapointofnoreturn.

Obama’sVisit:DecipheringUS’RegionalIntentions

Thefour‐nationtripmadebyUSPresidentBarackObamainApril2014couldbeinterpretedinmanydifferentways.ItwasimportantasinOctober2013,Obamawasnotabletoparticipateinthe Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit andmany commentators read it as adilutionofthe‘Asianpivot’.Therecentvisithadseveralobjectives,anditseemsthattheUShasbeenabletoclearlyconveymostofitsmessages.

ThefirstmessagewastoChina,anditconveyedthattheUSisnotinagreement,atleastatthispointof time,withXi Jinping’s ideaof a ‘new typeof greatpower relationship’.While theUScommitmenttothe ideaof its ‘Asianpivot’couldbedebated,Washingtonseemstobeseriousaboutitscommitmenttoitsregionalallies,Japan,SouthKorea,Philippines,andsoon.AlthoughObamamade it clear that theUSdidwant to ‘control’or ‘contain’China, themessagehesentacrosstheregionwasloudandclear,andnaturally,itcreatedabighueandcryintheChinesemedia.ThesecondgoalwastopersuadeJapanandSouthKoreatobemoreaccommodatingofeach other. It was indeed a tough job, and the US President tried to demonstrate his fullcommitmenttoJapanwhileatthesametimecitedhistoricalreferencesandtheissueofcomfortwomentosootheSouthKoreansentiments.

Hesuggestedthatbybeingmore‘honest’tothepast,theseissuescouldberesolved.Healsosaidthatmorethanthepast, it is importantto“alsokeepoureyetothefutureandpossibilitiesofpeace and prosperity.” It was a clear message to its two closest allies that the US does notendorsetheiranimosityanddoesnotwanttobecomeapartytoit.Itwouldbeinterestingtoseewhetherthismessagewillbelostinthedomesticpoliticsofthesetwocountriesorwillinitiateanewphaseintheirbilateralrelations.

The third message was the very inclusion of Malaysia in Obama’s itinerary. Malaysia isconsideredtobea‘swingstate’andthevisitmeansthattheUSisinterestedinreachingouttomore partners in Southeast Asia, apart from consolidating its relations with time‐testedpartners. However, Obama’s attempt to forge a partnership with Malaysia has raised some

East Asia in 2015

toughquestionsregardinghumanrightsandotherissues.ItcouldarguablybecalledthemostdiscomfitinglegofObama’svisit.

The only solacewas that the itinerarywas finalised and announced at least sevenmonths inadvanceandChinawasawarethatthiswasgoingtohappen. ThefourthpurposeofthevisitwastosendanotherresolutemessagetoNorthKoreathattheUS is innomoodtochange itstoughbutconsistentpolicyof ‘strategicpatience’,andisnotreadytonegotiatewithanuclearNorth Korea. Thismessagewas also conveyed during theNuclear Security Summit inMarch2014inTheHaguetoXiJinping,whenheproposedarenewaloftheSix‐PartyTalkswithNorthKorea.DuringObama’svisittoSeoul, therewasspeculationthatNorthKoreamightconductafourth nuclear test. However, Obama was not deterred by the shadow of a possible NorthKoreannucleartestandsaidthatitwould‘furtherisolate’NorthKoreaandinvitemore‘bitingsanctions’. The fifth andmost obviousmessageObama gave to China during his visitwaswith regard to the Philippines. Although he did not name China, he said that sovereignty,territorialrights,internationallaw,andfreedomofnavigationmustberespected.Heexpressedthe US’ ‘iron‐clad’ commitment to the Philippines’ security, and emphasised that all disputesmustbesettledpeacefully,andnotbyintimidationandforce.

ItwasaclearmessagetoChinaregarding itsbehaviour intheSouthChinaSeaandterritorialdisputeswiththePhilippines.TheUSalsohasadefencedealwiththePhilippineswhichwouldbringbackUStroopstothecountryatamuchlargerscale.

ThesixthandprobablylessdiscussedobjectiveofthevisitwascanvassingfortheTrans‐PacificPartnership (TPP). The partnership is one of the most important economic negotiationscurrently underway, one which seek to establish a free‐trade regime for countries thatconstitute40percentoftheworld’sGDP.Mostimportantly,itexcludesChina. Thus,Obama’svisittoEastAsiasentclearmessagesabouttheUS’intentionstofriendandfoealike.Now,thequestion is whether the US has the capacity to execute these intentions given the complexequationsinregionalpoliticsandChineseresponsestotheUS’messages.Itissaidthatclarityofintent and consistency of policy is not necessarily a merit of foreign policy in internationalrelations,andanassessmentofthevisitatthispointwouldbepremature.

II

AThawinChina‐JapanRelations?

Abe‐JinpingSummitMeet

AfteralmosttwoyearsoftheelectionofShinzoAbeasthePrimeMinisterofJapan,heandandChinesePresidentXiJinpingmetforthefirsttimeatasummitmeetonthesidelinesoftheAsia‐PacificEconomicCooperation (APEC)gathering inBeijingon10November2014. ShinzoAbeandXiJinpinghavedeliberatelyavoidedeachothersincecomingtopower.TherivalrybetweenChina and Japan over the islands in the East China Sea and other maritime and historicaldisputeshaveovershadowedhugeeconomicexchangesandthedependencethatbothcountrieshaveoneachother.Manyhavecommentedthatiftheirforeignpolicycoursesarenotcorrected,itwouldhave adestabilising effect on the region.Thus, even though themeetingbetweenXi


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JinpingandShinzoAbelackedsubstanceandwasmoresymbolic, ithasbeenappreciatedasapositivegesturefrombothsides.

The second and third largest economies of the world have had strong disagreements onpolitical,securityandstrategicissuesforsometime.InAsianpolitics,oneisconsideredtobearisingpowerandtheotheralsoseekstomaintainitsfootholdandbemoreassertive.Inanerawhen the Asian political landscape is a contested arena both for the countries (new and oldregionalpowers)andforthemodelsofinter‐staterelations(cooperativeandbalanceofpower),thebilateral relationsbetweenChinaand Japanhavebeenand shouldbe followedwithkeeninterest.

Theeconomicexchangesbetweenthetwocountrieshavebeenoneofthelargestintheworldbutinthepastfewyears,ithasbeenabitderailedbypolitics.Itissaidthattheyear2010wasthe turning point in their bilateral relations. This year, China replaced Japan as the secondlargesteconomyintheworldandinSeptember2010acrisiseruptedwhenaChinesetrawlercollidedwithJapanesepatrolboatsneartheSenkaky/DiaoyuIslands.Ithasalsobeensaidthattheincidentwasblownoutofproportionbecauseofsomedisputesrelatedtotheexportquotasof rareearthminerals.While thismayormaynotbe true itwasdefinitelyanewmoment inAsianpoliticsinwhichJapaneseeconomicsuperioritywassurpassedbyChina.

Foralmosttwoandhalfdecades,JapanfoundsolaceinbeingthenumberoneeconomyinAsiaand number two economy in the world, despite a stagnant economic growth. It might beclaimedthatChinacatchingupwithJapanintheeconomicspherewashardforJapanesepeopletoacceptanditwasoneofthefactors,alongwithrisingnationalism,thatprovidedShinzoAbewiththesupportforhisassertivepolicy.Japanwasprobablyuncomfortabletocoexistwithaneconomic equal in the neighborhood. When the Japanese government decided to buy threeislandsoftheSenkaku/DiaoyuinSeptember2012,itledtoahugepoliticalanddiplomaticcrisisbetween the two countries. Strong posturing and words were exchanged and it severallyaffected their bilateral economic exchanges. These events affected bilateral trade and theJapanese investment to China has since gone down by almost 50 per cent in the first ninemonthsof2014.

Meanwhile, Chinahas alsobeennegotiating its future course, both external and internal, andhowastrongerChinawouldstand inAsianpolitics.TherewasaconsensusthatChinashouldworkforits‘peacefulrise’oreconomicgrowthratherthanovertlymakingpoliticalandstrategicassertions. In 2010, when the Chinese economy became the second largest economy in theworld, thehawkish forces inChinastarteddemandingamoreassertiveChina.TheaggressiveChinese behaviour in the trawler collision incident, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes, SouthChinaSeadisputes,anddeclarationofADIZcouldbelinkedwithpressurefromChinesepoliticalhardliners who want a more assertive China as they believe that China now has enougheconomicclouttosustainit.

By recastingChina‐Japan relations in thismanner, it canbe said that the change ineconomicequations between the two made them aggressive and assertive ‐ one because of over‐confidenceandanotherbecauseofasenseofloss.AmilitaryconflictbetweenChinaandJapanishardtovisualiseandtheeconomic implicationsof thepresentbilateralrivalryhavebeenbadforboththecountries.

East Asia in 2015

Thus,themeetingbetweenXiJinpingandShinzoAbemightbeanimportantcoursecorrectionformutualcoexistencewithanacceptanceofthenewrealitiesbybothChinaandJapan.Itdoesnotmean that political and security rivalry related to the future of Asia and their roles in itwould be resolved once and for all. Theway both countriesmade claims and counter‐claimsabout the ‘agreed’ issuesof thesummitmeetmake it clear that itwouldbepremature tosaythat it is a thaw in their relations. But it is definitely a newbeginning in the contest of ‘whoblinksfirst’.

Japan:ImplicationsofIndiscriminateAssertiveness

ShinjoAbe’sunrelentingtoughapproachtowardsChinaisarguablythesecondmostimportantdevelopmentinrecentyearsinEastAsiaafterthegrowingmilitarymightofChina.Thereislotsofsupportacrosstheregionforhispolicyof‘staringatChina’ontheSenkaku/Diaoyuislandsdisputes, especially among those countries, which have been uncomfortable with growing‘Chineseassertiveness’ intheregionbutunabletostopit.TheUSstancehasalsobeenoverallsupportivetothechangedpostureofJapan.However, Abe’s indiscriminate assertiveness, which hurts South Korea and other regionalplayers, would be unable to achieve desired results. There are critiques of Japanese foreignpolicy, who point out that Japan has not been able to create trust in any of its neighboringcountriessuchasSouthKorea,NorthKorea,Russia,andChina.Thus,Japanneedstomoderateitsassertivenessandmakeitmorenuancedtomakeitmorepalatableandwide‐based.ThebiggestprobleminShinjoAbe’sapproachisthatitentirelydisregards‘goodwillcapital’ofJapan, which has been accumulated in the post‐World War‐II period. Japan evokes a verydifferentkindofstatebehaviour,whichdenounceduseofforceinresolvinginter‐statedisputesand concentrated on welfare of people inside its own territory and beyond. The concept ofofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)becamesynonymoftheJapaneseeconomicassistancetomanyAsian,AfricanandLatinAmericancountries.Japancouldandmustutilizethis‘capital’forcreating a network of relations across the region alongwith economic interdependence andpeople‐to‐people contacts, which would make it costly for China or any other countries tobecoming assertive. It does not mean that Japan could be complacent on its defensepreparedness,however,itdoesneedtobeapproachedinaframeworkofcooperativesecurityinvolvingasmanyaspossiblelike‐mindedcountriesoftheregion.Japanhasbeenrespectedforits peace‐constitution and enough deliberationmust happen before abandoning the alternatemodelofJapan.Evenif,Japandecidestomakeaparadigmshiftinitsforeignpolicyapproach,whichseemstobethe case under ShinjoAbe, itmust bemore careful in articulating it. First and foremost, it isadvisable to Japan to work on its defense preparedness without too much rhetoric directedagainst one or other country. In 2013, Japanese defense budget was increased to Yen 4.77trillionwhichwasan increase first timeafter2002.The increase in itself is enough to createsuspicionsinthemindsofobserversandanysharpwordsarefurthergoingtocreatemistrustintheregionalcountries.Probably,JapancouldlearnfromChina,whichcontinuesaugmentingitsdefensecapabilitiesbutkeepstalkingabout‘peacefulrise’and‘harmoniousdevelopment’.Secondly,evenifShinjoAbeadministrationintendstobetoughtowards‘Chineseassertiveness’,JapanneedstobemorecarefulaboutitsotherneighboringcountriesincludingSouthKorea.Inlastoneyearofhisterm,SouthKorea‐Japanrelationshavefurtherdeteriorated.ItwouldnotbeenoughtosaythatSouthKoreangovernmenthaseitherbeentoomuchsentimentalorplaying


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thegameofdomesticpopulism.When Japaneseministers,membersofparliamentandShinjoAbehimself visitsYasukuni shrine, it iswell‐known that SouthKoreawouldnot take it easy.When, insensitive statements are given and confrontational actions are taken on the issuesrelatedtohistorydisputes,comfortwomenandDokdo/Takeshimaislandsdisputes,itisgoingtoaffectSouthKorea’sperceptionaboutJapananditsintensions.RatherthanexpectingSouthKorea tobemore accommodative to thenewpostureof Japan, amore conciliatory approachmustbeadoptedindealingwithSouthKorea.Byusingallpossiblechannelsofcommunication,itmustbeconveyedtoSouthKoreainacrediblemannerthatintheJapan’scontestwithChina,TokyowouldseekcooperationfromSouthKorea.Thirdly,Japanalsomustre‐emphasizethatitwouldliketohavemorecooperationwiththeUSand other democracies in the region such as SouthKorea, Australia and India. Itwould be adifferentparadigmfortheAsiansecurityarchitectureinwhichamultipolar,inclusive,openandrule‐basedstructure issought for. Incase, Japantries tocounter ‘Chineseassertiveness’by itown assertiveness, it might be considered no different than China. To have a differentframeworkneedsemphasisoninvolvingallpossiblepartnersandcreatingregimes,institutionsandstructuresratherthanhavingatit‐for‐tatapproach.The recent visit of Shinjo Abe to India probably could be used as the beginning for a morenuanced Japaneseassertiveness in theregionalpolitics,whichwould try tocreatenetworkofmultilateral partnerships. India, though has avoided to express any opinion on Japaneseindiscriminate assertiveness, would be more comfortable if Japan tones down its rhetoric.Similarly, itwouldbeeasier fortheUStokeepbothJapanandSouthKorea, twoof itsclosestallies in the East Asia, together. The changed Japanese approachwould also be in consonantwithAustralianforeignpolicyapproach.JapanneedstorealizethattocontestwithChinaontheturfcreatedbyChinawouldnotonlybedangerousbutalsobeanisolatingexerciseanditmustbeavoided.

IIINorthKorea:SeekingNewFriends?

NorthKorea appears to have become increasingly desperate in its behaviour. It executed itsnumber two leader Jang Song‐thaek in December 2013, called South Korean President ParkGeun‐hye a ‘prostitute’ and the US President a ‘pimp’ in April 2014, characterised China as‘spineless’ in July2014,and firedaroundonehundredshort‐rangemissiles in theEastSea inJune‐July2014.NorthKorea’sdesperatebehaviourhasnotbeenabletobringanychangeintheUSandSouthKoreanposturesbutithasdefinitelyalienatedChina.

SouthKorea’stoughposture,theUSpolicyof‘strategicpatience’andthegrowingeconomicandpolitical hardships and isolation ofNorthKoreahavebeenproblematic for theNorthKoreanleader Kim Jong‐un. North Korea had tried to come out of the crisis by being tough anduncompromising as it did in the past. Through nuclear and missile tests in early 2013 andescalationofmilitarytensionsinmid‐2013,ittriedtoshowthatpressureandsanctionswouldnotworkandSouthKoreaandtheUSmustgobacktoplacatingNorthKorea.However,NorthKoreamiscalculatednotonlySouthKoreanorAmericanresponsesbutalsoChineseinthelatestroundofhostilities.

It is important to underline that China providedNorth Korea the strategic space inwhich itcouldindependentlydealwiththeUSandSouthKorea,andChinadidnoteitherinterveneinit

East Asia in 2015

orfinditdiscomforting.However,itseemsthatNorthKoreawentbeyondthisstrategicspace.MilitarytensionescalatedintheregionwhenNorthKorealoudlyopposed‐bothinwordsandactions – the South Korea‐US joint military exercise in April 2014. The North KoreanjustificationwasthattheUShadbroughtitsmoreadvancedweaponryintheregionaswellasinstalledamissiledefencesysteminGuam.NorthKorea‐ChinarelationsbecameestrangedandChina started cooperating more substantially with the international community in puttingsanctionsonNorthKorea.

Theexecutionof JangSong‐thaekwassymbolicof thegrowingdistancebetweenNorthKoreaandChinaashewassupposedtobeclosetoChina.Ratherthanamendingitsways,NorthKoreain a way challenged or warned China not to expect any compromise from it. This growingdistance canbe understood from the fact that the newChinese and SouthKoreanPresidentshave been able to have two summit meets in both countries but there has been no visit byChina’stopleaderstoNorthKorea.

NorthKoreaprobablywantstoconveytobothitsrivalsandfriendsthatitwouldnotsuccumbtoanypressureandtheonlywaytodealwithitisengagement.Itwantstosendthismessagebyresortingto theescalationofmilitary tensionandrhetoric.But itseemsthat thenewChineseleadershipisnotinagreementwiththisNorthKoreanstrategy.ChinahasalsobeenlookingatthebroadregionalequationsinwhichithastodealwithanassertiveJapan,ambivalentUSandapossiblepartnerinSouthKorea.

NorthKoreahas also been looking to inculcate newpartnerships and entertained a JapaneseofficialdelegationinPyongyangfortalksontheissueofJapaneseabducteesinApril2013.JapanandNorthKoreahavebeenmeetingtodiscussthisissuesinceMay2014.NorthKoreahasbeenexploringinJapanapotentialpartner,whichmightbeabletolessentheinternationalisolationandpressure.NorthKoreathusappearstobeutilisingtheJapaneseisolationintheregioninitsownfavour.Since2013,NorthKoreahasalsobeentryingtoreachouttoRussiaasitsrelationswithChinahavenotbeensmooth.InMay2014,RussiawroteoffUS$10billioninloanstoNorthKoreaandtherehavealsobeenafewimportantbilateralvisitsfrombothsides.

Inanunprecedentedmove in July2014, theNorthKoreanmediacalled for thestrengtheningrelationswithRussiaon the11thanniversaryof a summitbetweenKim Jong‐il andVladimirPutin.Inthesamecontext,therewasnoofficialstatementonChina‐NorthKorearelationsinonthe33rdanniversaryof itsFriendshipTreatywithChina.IthasalsobeenreportedthatNorthKorea’stradewithRussiareacheduptoUS$104millionin2013withariseof37.3percent.Tofurthertheexplorationofnewrelations,theNorthKoreanforeignministeristovisitVietnam,Laos,Singapore, IndonesiaandMyanmarbeforeheattends theASEANRegionalForum(ARF)meetinginMyanmar.

However,thissearchfornewpartnerswouldnotbeabletocompensateforitsgrowingdistancefrom China. There are still expectations that not everything is lost in China‐North KorearelationsanditisalsonoteasyforChinatofullyabandonNorthKorea.However,Pyongyang’soverturetowardsJapanisgoingtobethekeyandwouldbemostkeenlywatchedinBeijing.IfNorthKoreacrossestheRubicon,Chinawillhavetoseriouslyre‐thinkitsNorthKoreapolicy.


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NorthKoreanPeaceGesturesandInter‐KoreaRelations

AlothasbeenhappeninginNorthKoreandomesticpoliticsaswellasitsrelationswithSouthKoreainrecentmonths.SomeofthesehappeningsappeartoindicatethattheremaybesomeimprovementintherelationshipbetweenPyongyangandSeoul.Butsomeothereventsindicatethatrivalryandhostilitybetweenthemisnotgoingtoabateinthenearfuture.

AdayafterNorthKoreathreatenedtowipeoutSouthKorea,KimJong‐unproposedtostopallslandering‐inspeechandinaction‐bybothNorthKoreaandSouthKorea,from30January30(beginningofthelunarnewyear).NorthKoreaagreedtofamilyreunionsaftersevenyearsbutkeptpostponingdatesforonereasonoranother.Therecentroundoffamilyreunionshappenedfrom20to25February.However,on26February,NorthKoreareportedlyfiredfourmissiles.These contradictory happenings pose serious challenges to our understanding about NorthKoreanapproachandintentions.NorthKoreanpeacegesturesalongwithitscontrarybehaviourmustbeseenthroughabroadframeworkofinter‐Koreanrivalry.

Atpresent,anyNorthKoreanreconciliationwithSouthKoreawillariseoutof four importantsources.First,NorthKoreamayrealisethatthepathofconfrontationwithSouthKoreaisfutileandtheirmilitaryandeconomicsecuritywouldbebetterservedif theycooperatewithSeoul.Second,NorthKoreamay respond to a sincere, sustained and long‐term vision to co‐exist asproposed by SouthKorea in itsNorthKorea policy. Third,NorthKoreamay have to addressinstability in itsdomesticpoliticalandeconomicdomainsandtrytoshowitspeoplethatKimJong‐un is themain driver in inter‐Korean relations,whichwould provide legitimacy to him.Fourth,NorthKoreamaybeforcedbyexternalplayers,especiallyChina,tocooperateandmakepeacegesturetowardsSouthKorea.

Itseemsthat therecentNorthKoreanpeacegesturesaredrivennotbythe first tworeasons,anddomestic legitimacyandexternalpressurearethemoreprobablereasonsfor itschangedbehaviour. Actually, North Korean survival strategy or intent towards South Korea has notchangedmuch in thesemonths and the execution of Jang Song‐thaekmeans that reform andreconciliation with South Korea is not high on the North Korean agenda. Pyongyang is alsoscepticalabouttheSouthKoreantrustpolitikasthepolicyseeminglydemandstrustfromNorthKoreafirstandthenpromisestoreciprocate.Thus,itisclearthatNorthKoreahasalsonotbeenrespondingtotheSouthKoreantrust‐buildingprocess.

Basically,PyongyanghasbeenmakingpeacegesturestowardsSouthKoreaeithertoaddressitsowndomestic situationor to show theoutsideworld, especiallyChina, that it ispositive andconstructiveinitsrapprochementtowardsSeoul.TheNorthKoreaneconomyhasbeeninbadshapefordecades,andafteranotherroundofeconomicembargofollowingtheUnha‐3rockettest in late‐2012anda thirdnuclear test inFebruary2013,economicconditionshave furtherdeteriorated. Themuch publicised execution of Jang Song‐thaek also indicates that there areserious challenges to the political stability of the regime. By initiating a few peace gesturestowards South Korea, Kim Jong‐un wants to garner favourable international opinion andeconomicassistance.Moreover,ifSouthKoreapositivelyrespondstoNorthKoreangestures,itmaybeprojectedinNorthKoreaastheresultoftheyoungleader’s initiatives,thusprovidinghimwithdomesticlegitimacy.

The pressure of China on North Korea to abandon or minimise its provocative actions andbehavioursisalsosignificant,andhasmadeitincreasinglydifficultforChinatosupportNorth

East Asia in 2015

Koreainthecontextofinternationalpressurenottodoso.InMarch‐April2013,hostilityontheKoreanpeninsula reached adangerous level in thewake of a jointmilitary exercisebetweenSouthKorea and theUS and almost daily power‐assertions across the 38th parallel betweenNorthandSouthKorea.ItprovidedanexcusetotheUStobringhigh‐techweaponsandaircrafttotheregionandestablishamissiledefencesystematGuammilitarybase.ItwasdangeroustoChineseinterestsandChinahasbeentryingtopushNorthKoreaagainstanysuchescalationinfuture.NorthKoreanpeacegesturescouldalsobelinkedtotheChinesefactor.

Thecontradictions inNorthKoreanbehaviourexistbecauseofbeing lessgenuine. Itwantstoshowitsownpeopleandtheoutsideworldthat it isconstructiveandseekspeacewithSouthKorea.Sincetheinitiativesdonotemanatefromanyfundamentalshiftinitsperceptionaboutitself or South Korea, there is an in‐built inconsistency in its behaviour. North Korea mustrealisethatagenuinepeacegestureentailsmoreconsistentrapprochementwithSouthKoreaandthiswouldonlybringpositiveresultsforitseconomic,politicalandlegitimacydeficit.SouthKoreahasalsotoshowthatitstrustpolitikisfundamentallydifferentfromthepreviousSouthKorean administration’s tough policy towards Pyongyang. It would be quite fruitful ifPyongyangmakesmoregenuinepeacegesturesandSeoulrespondsmorepositivelyindealingwithNorthKorea.

China‐NorthKorea:ReasonsforReconciliation

On the occasion of the third death anniversary of North Korean leader Kim Jong‐il on 17December 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a special message to the North Koreanembassy in Beijing. The Chinese President underlined the significance of their “traditionalfriendship.”Xi Jinpingalso said that thatChina “is ready toworkwith theDPRK tomaintain,consolidateanddevelopthetraditionalfriendship.”

ItisdefinitelyacleardeparturefromtherecentattitudeofXiJinpingandChinatowardsNorthKorea. First, themessagewas delivered to the North Korean embassy in Beijing by the fifthhighestofficialintheChineseCommunistPartyhierarchy,LiuYunshan.Second,ithasbeenthemost open and straight forward statement by the Chinese President emphasising China’s oldfriendshipwithNorthKoreasinceheassumedpowerinearly2013.Third,itwasgivenontheoccasion of the third death anniversary of Kim Jong‐il, which according to the Confuciantraditionmeanstheendoftheofficialmourningperiodandbeginningofthenewleader’srule.Inaway, itmeansgranting legitimacytoKimJong‐un,whohashada fewdifferencessmoothwithChinasincecomingtopower.Fourth,XiJinping’sstatementandtheprofileoftheChinesedelegatetotheNorthKoreanembassyareverysignificantbecausetheyhappeneddespiteChinanotbeingofficiallyinvitedtothedeathanniversaryprogrammeinNorthKorea.

WhatwereChina’sObjections?

TheChina‐NorthKorearelationshiphasbeenderailedinrecentyears.China’sfirstandforemostdiscomfortwithPyongyangisrelatedtotheNorthKoreannuclearprogramme,notbecauseofitdoes notwant a nuclear North Korea butmore because it would bring a direct US strategicresponsetotheregion.TheNorthKoreannuclearprogrammemayalsopropelSouthKoreaandJapan to move on a similar course of nuclear weaponisation. The second important Chinese


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objection is the lack of economic reforms. China apparently wants North Korea to adoptChinese‐style reform if it wants to survive and survive well. China was reportedlydisappointedwithKimJong‐unonbothaccounts,and2013wasparticularlydisappointingforbilateralrelations.

In February 2013, North Korea had its third nuclear test, which invited sharp internationalcriticism. InMarch‐April 2013,NorthKorea escalatedmilitary tensions and rhetoric towardsSouthKoreaandtheUSwhentheywereconductingtheirannualjointmilitaryexercise.NorthKoreacut‐offhotlinecommunicationswithSouthKoreaandcloseddownGaeseongIndustrialcomplex. In spite of Chinese persuasion, North Korea escalated the situation to a point thatpromptedtheUStosenditsstat‐of‐the‐artweaponsystemstotheregionandinstallamissiledefencesystematGuam.InDecember2013,NorthKoreaexecutedthenumbertwointheNorthKoreanpowerhierarchy,JangSong‐thaek,whowassupposedtobetheclosesttoChinaandwaspro‐reform.ItwasreportedthataclearsignalwasbeingsenttoChina. XiJinpingtriedtoputpressure on North Korea by cooperating with the international community on the issue ofeconomicsanctionsafterthenucleartestsandbyhavingtwosummitmeetswithSouthKoreanleaderParkGeun‐hyewithoutanyhigh‐levelChinesevisitstoNorthKorea.

ContextofRapprochement:

However, it seems from recent developments that China has decided to reach out to NorthKoreaeventhoughNorthKoreadoesnotlookreadytochangeitscourse.Thereareimportantreasonsforthis.One,ChinahasbeendisappointedbySouthKoreanreciprocity,asdespitegoodChineseposturing,SouthKoreaisstillnotreadytothinkbeyonditsprimaryallyintheregion,the US. Two, US, South Korea and Japan recently signed a trilateral intelligence‐sharingagreementrelatedto threatsemanating fromNorthKorea.Chinahascriticisedthismoveandconsidersthatthemechanismmightbeusedtoshare informationaboutChinaaswell.Three,Chinadoesnotfinditappropriateonthepartoftheinternationalcommunity,especiallytheUS,SouthKorea and Japan, tobecome ‘over‐proactive’ on the issue of human rights violations inNorthKorea.

AlthoughbecauseofthevetofromChinaandRussia,themattercouldnotmoveforward,itwasdefinitelyacoordinatedmovetodeclareNorthKoreanhumanrightsviolations ‘crimeagainsthumanity’ and refer it to the International Criminal Court (ICC). China worries that suchprecedentswould be bad forBeijing. Four,NorthKorea over the past year hadbeenmovingclosertoRussia.InDecember2014,NoKwang‐chol,vicechiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheNorth'sArmymethisRussiancounterpart,andChoeRyong‐hae,theWorkers'PartyofKoreasecretarymetRussianForeignMinsterandpledgedtoimprovebilateraldefenceandeconomicrelations.Furthermore,RussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasinvitedNorthKoreanleaderKimJong‐untoMoscowin2015.

AllthesedevelopmentshavemadeChinarethinkitspolicyofputtingpressureonNorthKoreaanditseemsthatanewbeginningintheestrangedbilateralrelationshipmightbesoughtbyXiJinping. China has taken the first step in the process of rapprochement, now it’s up toNorthKoreatorespond.

East Asia in 2015

IVSouthKorea'sExternalRelations

MoreRhetoric,LessContent?

South Korea’s foreign relations especially in East Asia are in a state of impasse under thecurrent President Park Geun‐hye.During the last President LeeMyung‐bak, itwas clear thatSouthKoreagaveprioritytoitsalliancewiththeUSandresultantlydriftedawayfromitsclosesteconomicpartner,China.ThecurrentPresidentParkGeun‐hyefromtheverybeginningwantedtobalancethisovertilt.Shetriedtoimplementatwo‐legpolicy,andmadeherfirst‘officialvisit’totheUSandfirst‘statevisit’toChina,emphasisingtheimportanceofbothintheforeignpolicycalculusofthecountry.Itwasindeedaveryperceptivemove.Similarly,SouthKoreaunderthecurrentadministrationdeclaredtheinitiationof‘trustpolitik’towardsNorthKorea,whichwasacorrectiontotheunconstructivehard‐linepolicyofthepreviousSouthKoreaadministration.It was considered to be the right choice to pacify North Korea and engage it in meaningfuldialogue towards denuclearisation, economic reform, and ultimately, bringing about a peaceregimeontheKoreanpeninsula.

However,itseemsthatinbothoftheseforeignpolicyobjectives,SouthKoreahasnotbeenableto move forward as expected. South Korea appears to put more emphasis on rhetoric andshowmanship and less on content. South Korea sought Chinese support in its dealings withNorthKorea,andasaquid‐pro‐quo,showed itsagreementwithChineseobjections to Japan’sassertivebehaviour.However,thiswasnotconsideredsufficientbyChina.Chinaexpectsmorefrom South Korea based especially on Shinzo Abe’s approach towards Japan’s historical andterritorialdisputeswiththeformer.

Chinawas expecting SouthKorea to show restraint in theprocess of partneringwith theUS’strategic games in the region. SouthKoreahas recently announced its part in theUSTHAADmissiledefencesysteminEastAsiaandalsodeclaredthatitwouldnottakeovertheoperationalcommand(OPCON)ofthejointforcesduringthewar‐timeuntil2020s,whichwassupposedtobetakenoverin2015.TherearereportsthatthishasledChinatore‐contemplateitsrelationswithNorthKorea.Reports also say that theChineseAmbassador toNorthKoreahasbecomemoreactiveinhisengagementwithNorthKorea.

TheforeignpolicyobjectiveofthecurrentSouthKoreangovernmentmightbedifferentthanthepreviousone,but itappearstobegraduallybutsurelymovingonthesamepathandtowardsthe same destination. For the first time there have been confirmed reports that China wasdecisivelyunhappywithNorthKoreaandwasreadytoworkwithSouthKoreatoresolve theNorthKoreanissue.IfChinadriftsawayfromSouthKorea,itwouldbeahugelossforSeoul.

SouthKorea’sNorthKoreanpolicyhasalsobeenmorerhetoricalandlesspragmatic.The‘trustpolitik’seemstohavegotthesequencingwrongasNorthKoreaisexpectedtomakeagesturefirst. There are lots of activities to begin inter‐Korea talks, and South Korea has recentlyconstituted the Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation. However, one of the twoVice‐Presidents of the Committee states that South Korea should ‘wait out’ North Korea.Basically,thecurrentSouthKoreangovernment’semphasisona ‘principledengagement’withNorthKoreaisnotverydifferentfromthepreviousgovernment’shard‐linepolicy.So,theresultofthis‘trustpolitik’hasalsobeenadeadlock.Basically,itseemsthatSouthKorea,ratherthan


16

reaching out to North Korea and Japan, is making proclamations meant for its domesticaudiences.

Regarding South Korea’s estranged bilateral relationswith Japan, the blame could largely beattributedtothe‘indiscriminate’assertivenessJapanunderShinzoAbe.Japaneseassertivenessvis‐à‐vis China does have some reasonable explanations but it does not make any sense todistanceSouthKoreaandpushittowardsChina.However,SouthKoreahasalsobeeninflexibleand the Park Geun‐hye has deliberately avoided any meeting with Shinzo Abe. This gesturemightbeusefulforevokingpopularsentimentinSouthKoreabutitcannotbecalledstrategicintermsofforeignpolicy.ItwoulddefinitelybemoreproductivetotalkandwithJapanandtrytopersuadeittomoderateitsstand.

From the Indian perspective, it seems that South Korea’s foreign policy is equallydissatisfactory.ThepreviousSouthKoreanadministrationunderLeeMyung‐bakhadthe‘NewAsia Initiative’ policy to reach out to the Asian neighbourhood including India in a moreproactivemanner. Itwasan importantdeparture from thepastwhenSouthKoreawasmoreinvolvedwithbigregionalplayerssuchasChina,Japan,theUSandRussia.PresidentParkGeun‐hye tried to carry forward this policy and visited India in the very first year of her office.However,herattemptstoreachouttoSoutheastAsiahavebeenweakoratleastinconsistent.Forexample,shedecidedtovisitIndiaatthewrongtime:whentheUPAgovernmentwasabouttoend its term.More thananythingelse,ParkGeun‐hyehasbeen toocomplacent in reachingouttothenewIndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModi.IndiaandJapanhaveforgedseveralnewtiesandstrengthenedoldonesinthepastfewmonthsbuttherehavenotbeenenoughproactiveSouthKoreanattemptstoreachouttothenewIndiangovernment.

The ParkGeun‐hye administration still hasmore than three years of office. During this time,South Korea can learn from its non‐achievements and become more comprehensive andstrategic in its foreign policy making, and also detach itself from domestic politicaldemonstrations.

China‐SouthKorea:ChangingDynamicsofRegionalPolitics

ChinesePresidentXi Jinping’s two‐dayvisit toSouthKoreaon3‐4 July2014 is symbolicof anascent but important change in East Asian political equations. For the first time, a ChinesePresident visited SouthKorea beforemeetingwith theNorthKorean leader.Many observersfeelthatthisisanimportantshiftinChinesepolicytowardstheKoreanpeninsula.ThegrowingChineseexchangeswithSouthKoreaineconomicandotherspheresarenotnew,butBeijinghasalwaysmaintainedthatthisdoesnotmeanadilutionofitsrelationswithPyongyang,whichhasuntil now been characterised as ‘a special relation’. However, it seems that the recent NorthKoreabehaviourhasannoyedChinadecisively.

NorthKoreaoflateappearstonotbelisteningtoChinesesuggestionsandseemstobecreatingproblems forChinese interests in regionalpolitics.The thirdnuclear test, executionofChangSeong‐thaek and severalmissile testsmight be seen as an embarrassing situation for China;China has thus been moving closer to South Korean position. Beijing stressed a “nuclearweapons‐freeKoreanpeninsula”duringthesummitmeetwiththeSouthKoreanPresidentParkGeun‐hyeinBeijingin2013.However,hewasmoredirectduringtherecentvisittoSeouland

East Asia in 2015

expressedthatChinawouldnotlike“anydevelopmentofnuclearweaponsonthepeninsula.”ItisanimportantachievementforSouthKorea,whichwantedChinatobemoredirectinopposingtheNorthKoreannuclearprogramme.

Xi JinpinghasseeminglybeentryingtousethegrowinggapbetweentheUSandSouthKoreaovertheaggressiveJapaneseposturesonterritorial,historyandsecurityissues.TheUShasnotbeenkeentostopJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbe’srevisionistbehaviour.ChinaperceivesitanimportantopportunitytoreachouttoSouthKorea,whoisanimportantpartnerintheUS‐Japan‐SouthKorea securitypartnership.TheChineseattempt touseSouthKoreandiscontentwith the US over conceding to the aggressive Japanese postures would not be easy andimmediate but in the long‐term itmaybring very important changes in the regional politicalequations.XiJinping’svisittoSeoulhaschallengedUSforeignpolicy‐makerstoreconsidertheirgenerousconcessionstoJapan.

Xi Jinping’s visit also has to dowith the growing assertiveness of Japan. China is aware thatSouth Korea has been equally worried about the Japanese claim over the Dokdo/TakeshimaIslands,thereviewofKano’sstatement,insensitivestatementsonthecomfortwomenissue,andregularvisitstoYasukunishrinebyJapaneseleaders.OnedaybeforeXiJinping’svisittoSeoul,Japan reinterpreted its constitutional provision and expressed that it has every right to keepdefenceforces.ChinaisalsointerestedinusingSouthKoreanangeragainstJapanfordecidingtoconductajointinvestigationwithNorthKoreaontheJapaneseabducteeswhowereabductedby North Korea in the late 1970s. Japan has relaxed some sanctions on North Korea in thecontextofthisjointinvestigation.

XiJinpinghasbeenverysubtleinhisapproachtoreachouttoSouthKorea.HehasbeentryingtoplacateSouthKoreabyindicatingtoSeoulthattheUSgivesmoreprioritytoitsalliancewithJapanthanSouthKorea.HeisalsosendingaclearsignaltoSouthKoreathatifSeoulreconsidersitsalliancewiththeUS,Chinaisalsoreadytore‐thinkitsrelationswithNorthKorea.However,ChinaisawarethatSouthKoreanconnectionswiththeUSandJapanarestronganditwouldnotbe easy or straight forward for South Korea to change sides from the US to China. In theimmediate future,Chinawouldbesatisfied ifSouthKorea takesupmoreautonomous foreignpolicy‐making. Xi Jinping has been working to create a broader plan for an alternate Asianeconomicandsecurityarchitectureinwhichheemphasisesthenotionof‘AsiaforAsians’,andany change in SouthKorean policy towards autonomywould be awelcomedevelopment forChina.

From the South Korean perspective as well, its relationship with China is quite delicate.Economic cooperation between the two countries has been indispensable for Seoul.Furthermore,itsmostreliablepartner(theUS)isnotdoingenoughtoaddressitsconcernvis‐à‐visJapan.ThereisasenseofbetrayalinSouthKoreatowardstherecentAmericangenerositytowards ShinzoAbe. SouthKorea thereforewants to express itsdispleasurebydealingmoreclosely with China. Moreover, South Korea sees a golden opportunity to break the closerelations between China and North Korea, which would make North Korean survival moreproblematic. However, Seoul in still not prepared to give up its alliancewith theUS and thewarmwelcometotheChinesePresidentinSeoulisbasicallyapoliticalgametosendmessagestotheUSandJapan.


18

Inbrief,achessboardinEastAsianpoliticshavebeenlaidoutonwhichbothSouthKoreaandChinahavebeenmovingcarefully,withtheawarethatitwouldbetooearlytotrusteachotheratthispointoftime.However,thefuturecourseofEastAsianrelationswoulddependonhowtheUSandJapanrespondtothesemoves.

V

IndiainEastAsia

Modi’sThreeSummitMeets

InSeptember2014,IndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModihadsummitmeetswiththeleadersofJapan,ChinaandtheUS.ThesummitmeetsinitiatedtheunfoldingofIndia’spolicytowardstheEastAsianregion.BychoosingJapanashisfirstdestinationoutsidetheIndiansubcontinentandalso by having an exclusive five‐day programme for Japan,Modi gave clear signals about thepreference and direction of his foreign policy. Further, he also referred to and expressed hisdisagreementwith the ‘tendency of expansionism’, indicating China, suggesting that India isgearedtomoreovertlyconfrontChina’s ‘growingassertiveness’. Itseemsthat IndiaconsidersJapan’s strong response to China as basically a ‘reaction’ and appears to not only be inagreement with Japan in confronting China but also ready to join the their efforts. It wasthereforeaveryclearandstrongIndianmessagetoChina.

Themessages of the India‐Japan summitmeet cast its shadowover the Chinese President XiJinping’svisittoIndiainmid‐September.Inthebeginning,itwasexpectedthatChinawouldtrytoplacateIndiabyofferingmoreChineseinvestmentsinIndia.However,thesummitmeetwasnotsatisfactoryforeitherside.Duringthevisit,theissueofChinese‘incursions’madeheadlinesin the Indianmedia and both countries could not release a joint statement after the summitmeet. There could be various explanations and theories about China’s behaviour, but evenwithout any Chinese ‘incursions’ itwould not have been a successful bilateral exchange as ithappened in the context of India’s very vocal support to Japan. Additionally, the IndianPresidentconcludedhisvisittoVietnamjustbeforetheXiJinping’svisittoIndia.

In another important development, Modi made a much anticipated visit to the US in late‐September.ThevisitwasimportantinthecontextofthemisunderstandingbetweenModiandthe US authorities on the issue of his visa in the past. Modi was able to transcend this oldmisunderstandingandmovebeyondit.ThevisitwasalsoimportantforIndianpolicytowardsEastAsiaasforthefirsttimeinhistory,thejointdeclarationbytheUSandIndiamentionedtheSouthChinaSea.TheUShasbeeneagerforIndiatoplayaroleinEastAsiaforsometime,andithasreferredinthepasttoamoreactiverolebyIndiaintheKoreanproblemandthroughtheuse of terms such as ‘Indo‐Pacific’. However, the reference to South China Sea in the jointstatementwith India has been themost direct one yet,which sends a significantmessage toChina.

Inaway, itseemsthat India’srole inEastAsianpolitics isgrowingthroughIndia’salignmentwithShinzoAbe’sJapanandtheUS.ItisdefinitelygoingtoputpressureonChina,asitwouldnotbeeasyforChinatooverlookJapan,IndiaandtheUStrilateralunderstandingandcommonapproach.

East Asia in 2015

It must be emphasised that taking sides between Japan and China or the US and China hasprobablybeen theeasiest foreignpolicychoice for India.However, thiswouldalsomean thatIndiawouldbesuckedintoavortexofthebigpowers’game,whichisneitherawiseoptionforIndia nor India is prepared for it. Amuchmore challenging course for Indian foreign policywouldbetoleadregionalpoliticsbybringinginconstructive,cooperativeandinnovativeissuesand ideasandbynot leaningtowardsanyof these tworivalgroups.Thehistorical, ideationalandmaterial capital of Indiamustbe invested in such a futuristic vision forAsia rather thangoingbacktothearchaicconceptsofbalanceofpowerandcontainment.

Inthelastthreesummitmeets,thenewIndiangovernmentmadeastrongstatementtoChinaagainst its ‘assertive’ and ‘expansionist’ tendencies. It could be said that a strongmessage toChina was required, which has become more ‘assertive’ vis‐à‐vis Southeast Asian countries,Japan,andtoanextent,India.However,itwouldbemoreprudentfortheModigovernmenttoavoidpopulistandeasieroptionswhichmightbecounter‐productiveforIndiaandtheregioninthe long‐term. The success of Indian foreign policy‐making towards East Asia has been itsprincipledengagementwithallpossiblecountriesinanopenmanner.Havinganovertallianceagainst Chinamight look attractive in the near future but the unfolding of its repercussionswouldnotbebeneficial forthestakeholders.Thus, itwouldbebetter for Indiatocontinueitsopen, balanced, principle‐based and futuristic approach towards friendly and not‐so‐friendlycountriesintheEastAsianregion.

Modi'sVisittoJapan:GaugingInter‐StateRelationsinAsia

ItisremarkablethatPrimeMinisterNarendraModidecidedtovisitJapanforhisfirstforeignvisitoutsidetheIndiansubcontinent.ThevisitisbasedontheconsistentlygrowingpartnershipwithJapanandaswellastheannualsummitmeetbetweenthetopleadersofIndiaandJapan.ItmustbealsorememberedthatShinzoAbeshowsextraregardforModi,andbothModiandAbereportedlyfolloweachotherTwitter.

The visit is an important event in the inter‐State relations of Asia. It may be an over‐simplificationtosaythatboththedemocraciesarewillingtoworktogetheragainsttheriseofaChina‐centric Asia. It would instead be more proper for the Indian PM to keep in mind thecomplexitiesoftheissuesinvolved.

ShinzoAbemightbehappy to receiveModiasa strongandaggressive leader from Indiaandmay like to convince the India PM about his future vision for Japan and regional politics.However,itwouldbepertinenttonotethatJapan’sassertivebehaviourhasnotgonedownwellwithother regional countries suchasSouthKoreaandChina.ByapproachingNorthKorea tohavenegotiationsontheissueofJapaneseabductees,AbehasdefiedinternationalpressuretoisolateNorthKorea.Indiamustbeinformedaboutthesecomplexitiesbeforeembarkingonanycommon vision for Asia with Japan. Modi has taken a constructive approach towards SouthAsian politics and is apparently working to set a futuristic agenda for all the neighbouringcountriessuchasinthefightagainstpoverty,onenergy,

infrastructure and other developmental issues. He has probably been trying tominimise thespace for disputes in the bilateral relations of these countries, and once a positive vibe and


20

momentum is created, the faceof SouthAsianpoliticsmightbeverydifferent thanwhat it istoday. Unfortunately, Abe has been doing quite the opposite in the East Asia. It must beconveyedbyModitoJapanthatIndiawouldliketofollowitsownapproachandwouldbehappyifJapanjoinsIndia(ratherthanIndiafollowingtheJapaneseapproach).

IndiasharesitsconcernswithJapanregardingthegrowingassertivenessofChinaintheregion.ModimustreassureAbeaboutIndia'scommitmenttoJapanandthebilateralpartnership.Atthesametime,however,theModimustalsoinformJapanthattocontainorcounterChinathroughmilitarypower isnot appropriate. Throughdiplomatic andother economicmeans, JapanandIndiacouldcreatedisincentivesforChinainthecontextitsassertivebehaviour.IfModiisabletocreatethisbalanceduringhisvisittoJapan,otherregionalcountriessuchasSouthKoreaandChinawouldnotbealarmedanditwouldbeeasierforIndiatodealwiththeminthefuture.Averystrongstatementandaggressiveintentwouldnotgodownwell.

The PMmust be aware of the need to coordinate India's regional policy rather than havingbilateral relations in isolation, which may contradict one another and create structurallimitations for India'sbilateral gains.While Indiashouldbeable to take itsbilateral relationswith Japan to a new level, it must be future peace‐oriented and coordinated with India'sbilateralrelationswithothercountriesintheregionandbeyond.ThegrowingstatureofIndiain the region andworld hasmade it impossible for India to keep a low profile andwork onbilateralism alone. There is keen interest across theworld inModi's visit to Japan as itmaybecomeoneoftheindicatorsofAsia'sinter‐Staterelationsinthefuture,andModihastokeepinmindthesefactors.

ModiwouldliketohavedefencecooperationwithJapanasbothcountriessharesomecommonthreats. But again rather thanmaking it country‐specific, defence cooperationmust be issue‐specific,broad‐basedandopen.ItwouldbeapositiveifModiisabletogetJapaneseconsentforthecivilnucleardeal,andbothcountriescouldfurtherdiversifyanddeepentheirsecurityties.

The Indian PM's visit and the extensive talks on economic cooperation would bring a lot ofbenefittoIndia.JapanisoneofthemostimportantsourcesofforeigndirectinvestmentinIndia,and Japan has provided remarkable help to India's infrastructural projects. Creating anatmosphereoftrustandcooperationmustfurtheracceleratetheprocess.Modiinallprobabilityis also going to talk with the Japanese leader about the bullet train project. He has beenaccompaniedbyahugecontingentof Indianbusiness leaders, twhich indicates thathewouldliketoplacesignificantemphasisoneconomiccooperationbetweenthetwocountries.

Modihasbeensofarsuccessfulinbringingin'outofthebox'thinkinginhisapproachtowardsforeignpolicy,especiallyinSouthAsia.Hisapproachappearstobringinnewpositiveagendasformutualcooperationrather thanbeingcaughtup inoldconfrontations.AsimilarapproachduringhisvisittoJapanwouldbeawonderfuloutcomeforIndiaandalsoforAsianpolitics.

AForeignPolicyAgendafortheModiGovernment

IndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModistartedhistermwithaboldandpositivemovetoinvitealltheSAARCleaderstohisinauguralceremony.Thesearepositivevibes,anditwouldbegreatifthenewgovernmentisabletoachieveabreakthroughintheproblematicquagmireofSouth

East Asia in 2015

Asia.EquallyimportantwouldbetheModiadministration’sapproachtowardsNortheastAsia,which includesChina, Japan,SouthKoreaandNorthKorea. It is interesting thatModihasnotbeen a prisoner of the stance he took when he was in opposition and during his electioncampaign.HegaveseveralsharpcommentsaboutChinaduringhiselectioncampaignanditisgoodthathehasshownadifferentoutlookandapproachafterhisinaugural.

Chinaisalsoprobablyanxioustoknowmoreabouthisrealposition.On29May,ChinesePrimeMinisterLiKeqiangmadeaphonecalltoModitocongratulatehimandexpressChina’sdesiretoestablisharobustpartnershipwiththenewgovernment. Itwasan importantmoveandModiresponded positively by bringing in civilisational links between the two countries. Hementioned the seventh century Chinese scholar Hiuen Tsang’s visit to his village Vadnagar.Apart from thephone call, ChineseForeignMinisterWangYi is expected to visit India in thesecondweekofJune.TheChinesePresidentXiJinpingisalsosupposedtovisitinthelaterpartof 2014. The Indian approach towards China and vice versa is going to be one of the mostimportantvariablesintheemergingAsianeconomicandsecurityarchitecture.

There are many thorny bilateral issues between the two countries, however, there are alsomany important issues on which both countries could enrich and help each other. Theopportunitiesforbilateraltrademustdefinitelybearticulatedandwidened.Inaddition,thesebilateralrelationsarealsoimportantfortheregionalcalculus.China’srelationswithJapanarequitebitterafter theelectionofShinzoAbe,andtherearesuggestions thatChinahasbecomemore assertive in regional politics in recent years. Chinesebehaviour in the SouthChina andEastChinaSeasarequiteinstructiveinthisregard.ItwouldbeinterestingtoseehowNewDelhitakesupastandonthesebilateralandregionalissues.

Modihasastrongpersonal fan in the JapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbe. It is reported thatAbe sent a warm congratulatory note to Modi and expressed his desire to work with India.Personal relations apart, India has been able to forge a strongmultifaceted partnershipwithJapaninrecenttimes,andtocarryforwardthemomentumandstrengthentiesbetweenthetwocountriesmoreprofoundlywouldnotbeabigchallenge.However,bilateralrelationsbetweenIndiaandJapanwouldalsohavetotakeintoaccountdevelopmentsinJapan‐Chinarelations.ItwouldbeachallengeforthenewgovernmentinIndiatocoordinateitsforeignpolicytowardsChinaandJapan.Indianeedstobringinaconstructivebutrestrainedandcarefulinterventionin theChina‐Japan rivalry andwork for amultipolar, inclusive, rule‐basedAsian security andeconomicarchitecture.Thiswouldnotbeaneasytaskforthenewgovernment.

Japan recently concluded an agreement with North Korea for a joint investigation of theJapaneseabductees,andthiswasseenasaJapanesesteptomoveoutofitscurrentisolationinregionalpolitics.ShinzoAbe’saggressivepostureshavenotbeenappreciatedbybothChinaandSouthKorea.ByreachingouttoNorthKorea,Japanistakingadangerousplunge,whichwouldderailthecollectivesanctionsputonPyongyangbecauseofitsnuclearandmissileprogrammesand human rights violations. The move might further distance South Korea and China fromJapan,andtheemergingscenariowouldbeabigchallengeforthenewIndiangovernment.IndiaenjoysgoodrelationswithSouthKorea;PresidentParkGeun‐hyevisitedIndiainJanuary2014tofurtherconsolidateanddiversifyIndia‐SouthKoreacooperation.AnyextraleaningtowardsJapanwouldcertainlynotsendapositivemessagetoSouthKorea.


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Insteadofbilateralpolicies,Indianeedstoevolveawell‐coordinatedpolicyfortheregion.Thepolicy also needs to take into accountNorth Korea and its nuclear andmissile programmes.India has enjoyed a low‐key but sustained relationship with North Korea and there areexpectationsthatIndiawouldplayamoreactiveandconstructiveroleinreachingouttoNorthKorea.DuringhervisittoIndia,theSouthKoreanPresidentParkGeun‐hyeexpressedherdesireforanIndianroleininter‐Korearelations.

IndiahasemergedasanimportantplayerinAsiaanditwouldbealitmustesttoseehowIndiaconductsitselfinNortheastAsia.India’sLookEastPolicyhasmovedfromphase‐onetophase‐twobybringinginmoreissuesandcountries.IndianowneedstoimplementthenextphaseoftheLookEastPolicy,whichwould introduce innovativeandconstructiveelements inregionalpoliticsandbeaboonforbothIndiaandtheregion.

ipcs forecasts east asia in 2015 - files.ethz.ch€¦ · sandip kumar mishra assistant professor,...

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