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NEBOSHInternational Technical

Certificate inOil and Gas

Operational Safety

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Element 1Health, Safety and

Environmental Management in Context

Learning From Incidents Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas Risk Management Techniques Used in The

Oil and Gas Industries An Organisations Documented Evidence

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Why investigate accidents and near-misses?

Learning from Incidents

Should we apply the same level of investigation for each?

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Types of Incident:

Near miss

Accident Injury accident

Damage only accident


Dangerous occurrence

Ill-health

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Basic Investigation Procedures

Step 1: Gather facts.

Step 2: Analyse to determine immediate and root causes.

Step 3: Identify suitable corrective measures.

Step 4: Plan the remedial actions.


FIRST: Treat Injured, Secure/make safe

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Step 1: Gathering Information

Secure the scene.

Identify and Interview witnesses.

Collect factual information.

Check documentation.


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Step 2: Analysing Information

Draw conclusions about the immediate and root causes.


Immediate causes Underlying or root causes E.g. a worker slips on a puddle of oil spilt on the floor immediate causesare the slip hazard (unsafe condition) and the worker walking through it (unsafe act).

E.g. the failure to adequately supervise workers or provide appropriate PPE.

To remedy immediate and underlying (root) causes.

Step 3: Identify Suitable Control Measures

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Step 4: Plan the Remedial Actions

Recommended action

Priority Timescale Responsible person


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Cost of the remedial actions


Remedial Costs Ongoing Costs

Buying personal protective equipment

Providing adequate storage

Putting in place inspection and maintenance programmes.

Carrying out regular inspections

Replacing PPE as it wears, etc.

Maintaining the storage facility, with ongoing training for operators.

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The Importance of Learning from Major Incidents


Piper Alpha incident:

Permit-to-Work systems

Safety Management

Rig Design

Maintenance Systems

Safety Training

Safety Audits

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Piper Alpha incident:

Permit-to-Work systems

Safety Management

Rig Design

Maintenance Systems

Safety Training

Safety Audits


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The outcomes of other previous incidents include:

Bhopal, India, Toxic gas release (1985). 2,700 dead; 50,000 seriously affected; 1,000,000 others less seriously affected.

Buncefield, UK (2005). 40 injuries; widespread damage.

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, Gulf of Mexico (2010). 11 dead; Major oil spill.


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Safety culture

Shared attitudes and beliefs and a way of behaving.

Good safety culture:

High regard for health and safety

Good perception of risk shared by all workers

All adopting the same positive attitudes

Ownership (taking responsibility for H&S).


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Hazards Inherent in Oil and Gas

Flash Point the lowest temperature at which sufficient vapour is given off to flash when a source of ignition is applied.

Vapour Density mass per unit volume of vapour

Vapour Pressure the pressure exerted by a vapour in equilibrium with its liquid (or solid).

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Classification of Flammability

Flammable classification Flash Point

Extremely Flammable Below 0o C

Highly Flammable 0o 21oC

Flammable 22o 55oC


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Flammability Limits


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Explosive atmosphere situations

Explosions have occurred under the following circumstances:

During hot work, i.e. welding, grinding Where naked flames have occurred Where metal tools have created sparks Where electrical equipment has created sparks Where static electricity has created sparks


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Toxicity

Ability of a chemical molecule to cause injury after it has reached a susceptible site in the body, and also applies to the quantitative study of the bodys response to toxic substances.


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Substances and preparations which...

Very toxic in very small quantities can cause death or acute or chronic damage to health when inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin.

Toxic in small quantities can cause death or acute or chronic damage to health when inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin.

Harmful cause death, acute or chronic damage to health when inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin.

Corrosive may, on contact with living tissues, destroy them.Irritant non-corrosive substances or preparations which through

immediate, prolonged or repeated contact with the skin or mucous membrane, can cause inflammation.

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Substances or preparations which, if they are inhaled or ingested or penetrate the skin...

Sensitising are capable of eliciting a reaction by hyper-sensitisation (on further exposure to it characteristic adverse effects are produced). May be sensitising by inhalation or sensitisation by skin contact.

Carcinogenic may induce cancer or increase its incidence.Mutagenic may induce heritable genetic defects or increase

its incidence.Toxic for reproduction

may induce or increase its incidence of non-heritable adverse effects in the progeny and/or an impairment of male or female reproductive functions or capacity.

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Hydrogen (catalyst regenerator. In petroleum refining)

highly flammable/explosive (explosive range 4.9 75%)

Colourless and odourless

Low density

Low ignition energy

Not toxic but asphyxiant in high concentrations

Reacts vigorously with oxidants


Properties and Hazards of Gases

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Methane (natural gas)

Highly flammable/explosive (explosive range 5% -15%)

Low density (Explosive mixtures can form below low ceilings, etc.)

Easily ignited

Simple asphyxiant

Odorising agent added


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LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) as Propane/Butane (fuel)

Easily liquefied gas

highly flammable


Denser than air, collecting at low level

Explosive mixtures form, often readily flashing back to the source of a leak

Easily ignited

Simple asphyxiant and inhalation can lead to drowsiness

Reacts explosively with chlorine


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LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) (fuel).

Liquid gas easily vaporises

highly flammable/explosive gas


Easily ignited

Simple asphyxiant but non-toxic

Contact with liquefied form will cause frostbite (Very cold (boiling at -161C))

Volume increases 630 times on vaporisation


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Nitrogen

Non-flammable gas

Colourless, odourless and tasteless

Used to inert flammable and explosive atmospheres (vessels)

Used as cover layer of gas on top of flammable and explosive substances

Used to freeze pipes and pipeline purging

Nitrogen in the blood decreases oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood


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Hydrogen sulphide

Flammable gas

Colourless with intense smell of rotten eggs

Denser than air, accumulates at low levels

Can travel long distances and flash back when spark is applied

Toxic, irritates eyes, skin and respiratory tract and can lead to respiratory paralysis


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Oxygen


Non-flammable but supports combustion

Oxygen enrichment can lead to fires and explosions

Reacts violently with oils and greases


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Anti-foaming agents - used in process and cooling liquids to reduce problems caused by foam, dissolved or trapped air, such as:

Cavitation, reducing pump efficiency (and creating noise) Reducing the capacity of pumps and storage tanks Bacterial growth in the fluids Dirt and debris formation and surface flotation Reducing the effectiveness of the fluids in use Longer downtime for cleaning and maintenance Clogging of filtration equipment Shortened fluid replenishment times and added costs


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Anti-wetting agents waterproof barrier coatings.

Protection against water ingress in harsh environments Some protection against corrosion.


Corrosion preventatives for fuel systems and process pipelines.

Refrigerants, e.g. propane, ammonia, sulphur dioxide and methane.

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Micro-biocides anti-bacterial treatments.

Oil-system biocides in oil production and water injection systems

Water injection system biocides


Fuel preserving biocides

Water system biocides for salt and fresh water systems.

Special biocides e.g. to reduce sulphate reducing bacterial in drilling and process platform structures and pipelines.

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Hazards and Risk Controls for Additives

Hazards:

Depends on inherent chemical hazard, physical form and route of entry into the body

Risk Controls:

Hazardous substance Risk assessment Automated dosing instead of hand-dosing Safe storage and handling procedures Suitable PPE (chemical resistant clothing, goggles, RPE)


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Water and Steam:

Used in system cooling, lubrication (drilling muds), fire deluge systems, advanced hydrocarbon recovery methods.


The hazards - pressure injection of fluids into the body- severe steam burns (including of lungs)- asphyxiation

Safe handling - Special procedures- water and heat-proof clothing.

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Mercaptans (a group of sulphur containing chemicals)

Offensive odours (can be used as odorising agents)


H2S and mercaptans removed in oil refineries and natural gas processing plants

Headaches, nausea, coughing, irritation of the lungs and eyes.

Very high concentrations - breathing difficulties, cyanosis (turning blue), loss of consciousness and muscle spasms.

Appropriate respiratory protective equipment (RPE) is to be worn where potentially harmful levels may be present.

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Drilling muds (drilling fluids)

Used in deep holes in oil and gas extraction:

Lubricant (reduces friction and heat and reduces the chances of friction-related complications).

Carrier for the materials through which drilling takes place

Different muds for different circumstances (viscosity and density).

Aqueous (water) based, non-aqueous (oil) based, or gaseous fluids

Mineral or synthetic in nature.


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Hazards

Contact with additives (e.g. diesel oil and fumes, anti-foaming agents)

Fire/explosion (Natural gases and flammable materials that can be returned to the drilling work areas).

Controls

Fire safety precautions

Suitable PPE


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Sludges (drilling wastes)

Low Specific Activity (LSA) sludges may contain naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), e.g. uranium, thorium , radium, strontium.


Radiation monitoring in settling-out areas

Removal of LSA scale from production equipment (specialist dispersal chemicals or high-pressure water flushing).

Protection of personnel (from contact and inhalation) may need restricted, controlled areas and classified workers for high radiation levels.

Pyrophoric* iron - special control measures to dispose of it

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In oil and gas production, LSA scale is typically found in:

The production well

Safety valves

Well heads

Production manifolds

Inside separators

Water separators


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The Purposes and Uses of Risk Assessment Techniques

Risk Management Techniques Used in The Oil and Gas Industries

The 5 Steps approach to risk assessment is:

Degree of rigour proportionate to the risk - more depth and technical input needed for more complex risks associated with oil and gas processes.

Step 1 Identify the hazards

Step 2 Identify who might be harmed and how

Step 3 Evaluate the risks and decide on precautions

Step 4 Record your findings and implement them

Step 5 Review your assessment and update if necessary

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The UK Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 requires:

All hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified.

All major accident risks have been evaluated, and

Measures have been, or will be, taken to control the major accident risks to ensure compliance with the law that is, a compliance demonstration.


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Hazard identification

Hazard identification the CORE of risk assessment. The main stages are:

Risk estimation and ranking of risks

Risk evaluation and implementationof risk reduction to ensure

compliance with law

Review

Identificationof possible additional

riskreduction


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Qualitative vs. Quantitative Risk Assessment


Using qualitative methods to determine frequency and severity

Qualitative (Q)

Where frequency and severity are approximately quantified within ranges

Semi-qualitative (SQ)

Where full quantification is demonstrated

Quantified risk assessment (QRA)

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Semi-Quantitative (SQ)

Use this if it is adequate for deciding on appropriate controls. Record findings and recommendations.

If not adequate, first increase the depth of modelling of the risk assessment and see if it now meets requirements.

If it does, record the findings and recommendations.


Determining the Right Method of Risk AssessmentQualitative (Q)

Use this method if it is adequate for deciding on appropriate controls. Record the findings and recommendations.

If not adequate, then use

(Continued)

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Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)

If adequate, use QRA.

If not, increase depth of the risk assessment model until it answers all questions.

Record findings and recommendations

In their Offshore Information Sheet No 3/ 2006, the UK HSE give more industry specific guidance on how to determine which risk assessment method is appropriate.

If not adequate, then use

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The Starting Point Approach examples:

Large integrated platforms or nodal platforms in the North Sea - likely to need QRA.

Less complex installations and those with smaller workforces, e.g. drilling installations, normally unattended installations (NUIs) - SQ could be suitable.

Where clear standards/benchmarks for design and risk reduction, Qoften sufficient.


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Risk Estimation and Ranking of Risks

RiskManagement

Know your risks and what youshould be doing about them

Plan, prioritise, implement risk controls

Make sure risk controls remain effective

Review and learn


P Policy OOrganisingP PlanningMMeasuringA AuditingR Review

The HS(G)65 SMS:


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Systems approach - Managing Hazards and Risks at each stage

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Risk control of INPUTS (covering design, selection, installation etc):

RCS needed for: Examples

PHYSICAL RESOURCES rigs, safety critical equipment, substances

HUMAN RESOURCES Recruitment/selection of staff & contractors

INFORMATION H&S laws and standards

RISK CONTROL of PROCESS


Area of Process Risk Examples

Production workplace Field, rig, facilities, support systems, access, welfare

Plant & Substances Oil/gas drilling, pumping, storage

Procedures Shifts, job design

People Leadership, competence


Reducing Risks to ALARP

Other Risk Management Tools - HAZOP

Purpose - to identify any deviations from design intent, their causes and consequences.

Useful at design stage of hazardous installations/processes.

Multi-disciplinary team and brainstorming

Uses guide words to identify deviations e.g. MORE, LESS

Devise actions to reduce risk down to acceptable level.


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HAZID

Purpose - to identify all hazards for later risk assessment

Uses brainstorming, aided by key words.

Useful when considering changes to existing plant layout.


FMEA


How can each component fail?

Cause?

Effects on system as a whole?

How serious?

Can the failure be detected before effects become serious?

Industry Related Process Safety Standards

Promote concepts of Inherently safe and risk based design i.e. design it out


Design it Out principles Examples

Hazard elimination Discontinue, substitute (non-hazardous)

Consequence reduction Substitution (less hazardous), reduced inventory, spill containment, separation/isolation

Likelihood Reduction Simplify, clarify, redundant systems, ignition source removal

Sources of Written, Recognised Good Practice include:

(UK) HSE Guidance and ACoPs

National or local government guidance

International or national standards (BS, CEN, CENELEC, ISO, IEC, etc.)

Industry specific or sector guidance from trade federations, professional institutions, etc.


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The Concept of Hazard Realisation What If?, e.g. Loss of containment leading to Hydrocarbon Release


Issue to consider from HCRs

Examples

Major Sources system piping, flanges, valves, SBTs, instrumentation

Operational causes Wrongly fitted equipment (gas compression), incorrect operation (human)

Procedural causes Non-compliance with procedure (human)

CONSIDER WORST CASE:


What? Major HCR (> 25kg)Where? From piping/instrumentation

On gas compression unit, close to accommodation.With uncontrolled ignition sources

When? Highest occupancy; deluge system on manualHow? Poorly maintenance, incorrect fittings and not

correctly tightened.


Why?

No PPM

No Detection Equipment

No Emergency

Plan

Poor fire training

Poor response

Poor leadership

No Fire Fighting

Equipment

Taking it further


1 HCR ignited by electrical fault

2 Explosion and fire engulf the canteen

3 All 34 workers in canteen lost

4 Gas compression unit destroyed by blast

5 Gas process operation lost long downtime

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Why?

No warning of

HCR

No water for deluge

Long release duration

Fire fighting

media not available

Personnel elsewhere

No trained response

team

No EER plan

Working down the possibilities in each scenario, begin to eliminate some or reduce some of the consequences andprobability, e.g.


IF THEN

Accommodation NOT next to compression plant

.we may not lose 50% of our crew

fire deluge system is NOT on manual override,

Water will be available automatically to deal with the fire

Risk Management Techniques Used in The Oil and Gas IndustriesThe Concept of Risk Control Barrier Models bow-tie

The Swiss-cheese barrier model


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The Use of Modelling (software) for Risk Identification

Can estimate, e.g.

The evaporation rate of flammable liquids.

The dispersion patterns of leaking vapours/gases,

The likely types, effects and scale of any fires and explosions - the rate of pressure rise, maximum pressure, intensity of thermal radiation, blast zones


Typical Legal Requirements/Good Practice:

Regulators require safety case/safety report submission for each installation type.

Installation cannot operate until SC/SR accepted by regulator (regulator will inspect installation)

Notification required to regulator at design stage (or when moved or change of use).

An Organisations Documented Evidence

Typical Examples: Safety Case (offshore), Safety Report (Onshore)

The Purpose of Documented Evidence such as Safety Cases and Safety Reports

To ensure that duty holders design/operate their facilities safely.

i.e. Measures in place to identify potential for, prevent and mitigate major accidents.

An Organisations Documented EvidenceThe Typical Content of Safety Cases and Safety Reports

Identify major accident hazards use risk assessments, bow-tie diagrams, design calculations etc.


1 Each hazard scenario

2 threats to safety and their causes

3 barriers to prevent those threats

4 consequences of each threat were it to be realised

5 recovery measures required

6 factors that could escalate the hazard or its consequences

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Evaluate major accident risks and measures taken (or to be taken).


1 Identify each hazard/incident scenario

2 Assess frequency criteria

3 Assess consequence criteria

4 Assess EER facilities and requirements

5 Identify and assess risk control measures against ALARP

Arrangements for audits and audit reports

Adequate SMS in place


Major accident prevention policies (in the case of safety reports)

Identify safety critical elements in place to manage major accident hazards

Details of the emergency plan.

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