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UNU-GCM Policy Report : The Case of (In)Voluntary Returns? EmilyLouiseBoyce

Intern:April–May2017Summary | 1

Introduction | 2

TheContextofAssistedReturnSchemes | 2

FactorsAffectingtheChoiceofReturn | 4

HowEffective arethesePolicies? | 5

HowVoluntary arethesePolicies?| 6

HowMoral arethesePolicies? | 7

CaseStudy:TheGreatBritishScheme | 8

PolicyRecommendations | 12

References | 13

Summary Thispolicy reportcriticallydiscusses theuseofvoluntaryreturnsasapolicy.Arguingthatdespitetheirbenefitstheyarenotaseffective,voluntaryormoralasfrequentlyclaimed.ItemploysacasestudyoftheUKtoprovideanexampleofsomeofthepracticesdiscussed.Thepolicy recommendationsemphasises the importanceof a fairmigrationmanagementsystemandtheneedtocarefullyconsiderthemotivationsforemployingsuchapolicy.

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Introduction Inaworldcurrentlycharacterisedbyincreasingmigrationflowsandrhetoricaboutclosingborders, a policy of assisted voluntary returns, sometimes known as pay-to-go schemes,have become commonplace globally. These schemes are, according to the InternationalOrganisation forMigration (IOM n.d.), “an integral part of a comprehensive approach tomigrationmanagement aimed at offering humane and dignified return and reintegrationoptions tomigrantswho are unable or unwilling to remain in host countries”. By payingcertainmigrantgroupstoleave,withincentivessuchasflighttickets,cashbenefitsandskillstrainingtheyareheraldedasbeingcost-effective,moredignified,andwiththecapacitytopromotesustainabledevelopment(IPPR2013;Papdemetriou&Fratzke2016).However, therehavebeennotablecritiquesof thesepolicies.Firstly, thetake-upof thesepolicieshasbeenlow(Blacketal.2011)andtherehasbeenlimitedresearchonthedegreeof sustainability in the return process. Much of the research that has been undertakenshows that despite governmental, NGO, or IOM assistance, many returnees end up inprecarioussituations (Carr2014).Secondly, theextenttowhichtheseschemesare in factvoluntary isquestionable. Ifone is living inavulnerablesituation inahostcountry, ifonefaces the threatofdeportationand ifone ismisinformed regarding the situation inone’scountry of origin then the choice might not be considered voluntary. Thirdly, there is aquestionastothemoralityofthesepolicies.Isitrighttopayacertaingrouptoleave?Isthisnotdemeaningalsotothosenotbeingofferedthisreturnsuggestion?(GerverForthcominga)Mightitnotalsoincentivisegovernmentstodetainmorepeoplesothatthereisagreatertake-upoftheseschemes?This policy report will discuss the current context of assisted return schemes and theliteraturediscussingmotivationsforreturn.Thereportwillthenprecedewithadiscussionof the effectiveness, the voluntariness and the morality of these schemes, questioningwhetherthepresentpopularityofthesepoliciesiswarranted.Finally,thepolicyreportwillconcludewithsomerecommendations.

The Context of Assisted Return Schemes Tounderstandthecurrentcontextoftheseschemesitisusefultounderstandtheirorigins.There was a period after the SecondWorldWar when a number of European countriesrecruited guestworkers from former colonies and certain states to help rebuild theircountries. Theseworkerswereonly invitedas ‘guests’ and thegovernmentshadnopriorintention of letting these workers remain. However, many settled and had entered aprocessof “makinghome” in theseEuropeancountries (Neyts2015).After theoil shocksthere were no longer any employment opportunities and so these countries wanted toencourage their guestworkers,who they viewedas temporary in the first place, to leave.TheNetherlandswas the first country to start in1974with its ‘ReintegrationofEmigrant

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Manpower and Promotion of LocalOpportunities for Development’ program (Black et al.2011). 94,000people accepted theoffer fromFrance’s ‘AideauRetour’ schemebetween1977and1981,andinGermanyaround135,000peopleleftusingaschemebetween1975and1984(McCabeetal.2009).Theseinitialschemeswerealldesignedformigrantslegallyinthecountry.The IOM firstbecame involvedwith supportinggovernmentswith these schemes in1979andhashelped1.4millionmigrantssincethenglobally(IOM,n.d.).IOMviewsthisworkaspartofits’remitto“enhancethehumaneandorderlymanagementofmigration”(IOMn.d.b). However, from 1979 to today themotivations and context that assisted return takesplaceinhassignificantlyaltered.Todaythesepoliciesarenotonlydirectedatguestworkersbutalsoatconvicts,asylumseekers,failedasylumseekers,refugees,unemployedmigrants,employedmigrants–dependingonthecountry,anynon-citizenmightbeeligibletoreturntotheircountryoforiginwithgovernmentassistance.The typeofassistancevaries too: somecountriesoffer skillsprogramssuchasDenmark’sWant2Worktraining(Valenta&Thorshaug2011);supportwithtraveldocumentsandplanetickets;cashgrantspreandpostdeparture;helpfromlocalNGOswithsettingupabusiness,and,sometimes,andcrucially,informationonconditionsincountryofreturn.The motivations for governments putting in place these policies also differs. There is astrong element of having secure borders and being able to perform effective migrationmanagement (IPPR 2013; Papdemetriou & Fratzke 2016). Secondary to this overarchingideologicalreasoningisthepolicies’cost-effectiveness.Comparedtodeportationsvoluntaryreturnsaremuchcheaperastheydonotnecessarilyrequiredetention,charteredflightsoranagreementwiththecountryoforigin.EstimatesintheUKfrom2005showdeportationsto cost around £11,000 per person and assisted voluntary return £1,100 (IPPR 2013).Moreover, enforced removals are also more difficult to justify morally. There are oftenadvocacygroupswhowork to stopdeportations.A recenthighprofileeventat a LondonairportmadetheBritishheadlines,whenprotestorsstoppedaflighttakingoffforNigeriainthemiddleof thenight (TheGuardian2017).Othermotivationsmight includewanting toreducenet immigration,thiscanbeshownthroughthefrequentstipulationthatmigrantsoncereturnedarenotallowedtore-enterthecountryandinordertodecreasethenumberofbenefitclaimants.Asylumseekersarecommonlynotpermitted toworkandso relyonthestateforsupport.Assisted return schemes differ globally and are not confined to traditional ‘immigration’countries. The IOMworkswith countriesacross theglobe toprovideAssistedReturnandReintegration. The map below highlights the host countries that the IOM worked in forreturnsbetween2011and2015(IOM2016).

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Source:IOM(2016)

Factors Affecting the Choice to Return Thechoicetoreturn ismarkedbycomplexityand interwovenfactors.Authorsargueoverwhether thepresenceof the schemeencourages further returnsoronlyhelps thosewhohad already decided to return already. Gerver (Forthcoming b) shows that in Israel theamount ofmoney offeredwas a key incentive to promoting the choice to return amongrefugees.ValentaandThorshaug (2011) concur, inNorway the levelof financial incentiveseemedtobeaffectingthedecision.Otherresearchshowsthattheavailabilityofassistanceis not a factor in the return decision (Koser & Kuschminder 2015).McCabe et al. (2009)questionwhether theassistance justsubsidises thosewhohadalreadyplannedtoreturn.Blacketal.(2011)arguethatalthoughitisnotakeyfactorinmakingthedecisiontoreturn,thereneedstobefurthersustainedresearchtestingwhethertheamountofmoneyaffectsthedecision.Soitispossiblethatincreasingthelevelofmonetaryassistanceavailabledoesin fact sway some people who were on the fence about returning. For those alreadyplanningtoreturn it isabonusandthereareundoubtedlysomewhowouldneverreturnwiththispolicynomattertheamountofmoneyoffered.Theliteraturealsooutlinesavarietyofotherfactors.Firstly,itisimportanttonotethatthisis a complex decision to take and as Black et al. point out themigrant is not necessarilyrational(Blacketal.2004).Anassumptionmadebycertainpolicymakersisthatbyreducingthewelfareofmigrantsintheircountryitwillencouragethemtoreturntotheircountryof

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origin.However,muchoftheliteraturearguesthatthisisamistakenassumption.InaBlacketal.study(2004)theyfoundnoevidencethatrestrictingtherighttowork increasedthelikelihoodof return.ThissomewhatcontradictsKoserandKuschminder (2011)whofoundthat theright tobeemployedwas importantto45%of those interviewed;but it isworthbearinginmindthatmostofthemigrantstheyinterviewedwereidentifiedbyIOM,sotheyhad probably previously sought information on returns. However, policies of removingsocialserviceaccessandusingdetentionasmeasurestoincreasetake-upwerenotdeemedimportant in that same study, nor in that of Valenta and Thorshaug’s (2011). This quoteaccurately sumsup thepicture fordeparturecentres thatmightbeextended tocoveranentire country’s environment: “Themajorityhavebeen through somuchand invested somuchtimeandeffortbeforetheyreceiveafinalrejection. It isnaivetobelievethat livingstandardsindeparturecentrescanhaveanyimpact”(Valenta&Thorshaug2011:17).Thereareotherfactorsthatdohaveanimpact,notablytheperceivedsafetyandsecurityinapotentialreturnee’scountryoforigin.ThiswasdiscussedbyWebber(2011)thatpoliticalstability and personal security are key. He and Carr (2014) both note that a number ofreturneeshavediedafter returning for a varietyof reasons– their personal safety is notassured. InBlacketal.’sresearch,safety,securityandpeace inthecountryoforiginwereconsideredthemostimportantfactors(2004).Otherfactorsincludingresponsibilitiesinthecountry of origin, a child’s education, levels of integration, all contribute to the returndecision.Interestingly, it has been found by a number of scholars that the threat of removal isstronglyassociatedwithtake-upofvoluntaryreturnschemes. If there isacrediblefearofdeportation thenpeople aremore likely to takea governmentoffer to return. Koser andKuschminderwrite“thereisevidencethatthethreatofremovalisacriticalcomponenttothetakeupofvoluntaryreturnprogrammes,whereastheprogrammes, inthemselves,donotgenerallymotivatereturn”(2015:14).TheIOMandgovernmentsalsosupportthisview(Webber2011).Finally,andsomewhatremarkablyprovidingpeoplewiththerighttoremigratetothehostcountry, and even citizenship, enhances their likelihood of returning. Allowing fortransnationalism, integration, regular employment and a legal status encouragessustainable return (Koser & Kuschminder 2015). Kalia (2008) writes “having the right toreturnwheneconomiccircumstanceschangecouldbeanincentivetoleavenow”.Blacketal.’sresearch(2004)alsoconcursthatintheUK,grantingpermanentstatusdoesnotreducethelikelihoodofreturning.Policiesrestrictingaccesstowelfareandincreasingthedifficultiesinattainingalegalstatusthroughrestrictingimmigrationandnotgrantingrefugeestatuseasily(Webber2011)mightinfactbelimitingtheeffectivenessofgovernmentaimstoencouragereturns.

How Effective are these Policies? Thereareanumberofcriticisms levelledattheeffectivenessofthesepolicies.Firstly, thetake-upoftheseschemesislow(Blacketal.2011).Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis,

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onebeing the significantdistrust of the government and theofficial. Carling et al. (2015)argue that this ispartlybecausemigrants themselveswere treatedwith suspicion,and inordertoreceiverefugeestatustheyhavehadtoprovetheir‘stories’.ResearchbyBlacketal. (2004and2011)arguesthatusingNGOsand internationalorganisationswould leadtogreater levels of trust of these schemes and possibly higher take-up. This distrust isdemonstratedbyAfghanipotentialreturneeswhofelttheywouldnotreceivetheassistancepromisediftheyusedavoluntaryassistancereturnscheme(Blacketal.2004).The low take-up of these schemes is also tied to the lack of information about them.However,methodsemployedintheUKtoraiseawarenessincludevanscirculatingLondonboroughswiththewords‘GoHome’onthem(TheGuardian2013).Thiswasmetwithmuchcriticism and the pilot project was not rolled out. In providing information about theseschemes, if they are targeted at undocumented migrants particularly, governments fearbeingcriticisedforhavingpolicieswhichrewardpeoplefor‘breakingthelaw’.Anotherproblemisthesustainabilityofthesereturns.Areport issuedbytheIOMlookinginto sustainability states that there has been very limited research on the topic and thedefinitionofsustainabilityiscontested(Koser&Kuschminder2015).Thereislimitedornomonitoringandevaluationonceareturneehasreturnedtotheircountryoforigin(Carlingetal.2015;Webber2011)andthisissomethingthatacademicshavecalledfortounderstandthedriversofsustainablereturnandtoensureappropriate information isgiventopeoplecurrently thinking of returning (Gerver Forthcoming c). Some research analysing theexperiencesofreturneesshowsthatbusinessfailureishigh(Blacketal.2011);thatthereisagraverisk topersonalsecurityas returneescanbedetained,canhavetheirpossessionsstolenasmanyassumetheyarerich,andcanhavedifficultiesreintegrating.Inanumberofstudies thatCarr (2014)analysed somepeoplehadgonemissinghaving returned. Finally,sustainability is frequently measured by whether the migrant chooses to return or not.According to Black et al. (2011) there is no behavioural change, and many want toremigrate,andapreviousstudyfromBlacketal.(2004)concurs.These policies have also been heralded for their ability to encourage development, asmigrants can bring back their skills to help in development (Webber 2011) andwith thefinancial assistance can start businesses. However, according to Black et al. (2011) therehave been no development gains. In fact, countriesmay notwish returnees to return astheyloseremittancesandthereisnotsufficientinfrastructuretocope(McCabeetal.2009).If there was a large number of people moving back at the same time this would causegreaterissues(Blacketal.2004).Thesepoliciesarenoteffectiveinfacilitatingreturnsshownthroughlowtake-up,theyarenoteffectiveinencouragingsustainablereturns,andtheyarenoteffectiveinencouragingdevelopment.

How Voluntary are these Policies? Not only are these policies not considered very effective but they are also frequentlycriticised for their lack of voluntariness. There is not a single definition for measuring

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voluntariness. The IOM argues that voluntariness can be with and without compulsion;UNHCRarguesthatitneedstobeaninformedchoiceandafreechoicethatisgenuineandnotinduced(Webber2011),Gerver(Forthcomingb)setsoutathree-partdefinition.Firstly,that the person is fully informed and fully capable to decide; secondly that there is nophysical coercion involved and thirdly at least oneoptionprovides an acceptable level ofwelfare.Shecontendsthatvoluntariness isnotnecessarilyabinaryvariable,andsotherecanbeascaleofvoluntariness.Evidently the voluntariness of the decision to return depends on the individual, theirpersonalcircumstancesandthecountry.However,therearesomecommonfeaturesofthispolicywhichcanbeviewedasbeingangledtowardstheinvoluntaryendofthescale.In interviews forBlack et al.’s 2004 study, a numberof people interviewed felt forced toreturn, or felt they needed to. This is somewhat confirmed by Koser and Kuschminder’sstudy(2015)wherethethirdmostpopularreasongivenforreturningis“IfeltIhadnootherchoice”.ThisdoesnotfiteasilywitheitherGerver’sorUNHCR’sdefinitionofvoluntariness.Using detention, the threat of deportation, and restricting access to social services arepolicies frequently deployed in order to motivate returns using these schemes. Thecredibilityofenforcedremovalisakeydriverofencouragingpeopletotake-uptheofferofthese schemes. Many have argued that fearing deportation is not an adequate level ofvoluntarinessandisinsteadsimplyresistance(Carlingetal.2015).Ifthechoiceisbetweendeportationandreturningtoalifepotentiallymarkedbypersecutionandpovertythenthisdoes not provide an optionwith an acceptable level ofwelfare, and hence, according toGerver (Forthcoming b), could not be considered voluntary. It is a choice, but it is notvoluntary. There is also an unclear division between coerced and voluntary return as aperson who can choose to voluntarily return can often also be detained and forciblyremovedat any time (Carr2014).Where the voluntaryendsand the involuntary starts isdebatable.

How Moral are these Policies? Another argument used to justify these policies is that they are more humane thandeportation, are more sustainable and lead to development with the reintegration ofreturnees(IPPR2013).Thisconceptofreintegrationmightjustifythereturnofmigrantstounsafe environments and the use of development assistance formigrationmanagement.However, as previously outlined the policies are not effective in either encouragingdevelopment or in reintegration. Whether or not they are humane policies is anotherquestion.Thereareclearconflictinginterestsbetweengovernmentsandmigrantsinthesepolicies.Inanumberofcountries,includingtheUK,therearetargetsfornumbersofreturns(Blacketal. 2011). This gives immigrant officials conflicting incentives between providing accurateinformationaboutthesituationinthecountryoforiginandpotentiallydissuadingsomeone

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from returning, or omitting crucial information, or evenmisinforming people in order toreachkeytargets(GerverForthcomingc).Forcingsomeonetoreturnagainsttheirwilltoaplacewheretheymaybeatriskofdetentionorpersecutionismorallyobjectionable(Blacket al. 2011). By not informing someone of these risks and encouraging their return byofferingmoneycanthereforealsobeseenasmorallyobjectionable(GerverForthcomingc).Secondly, offering people monetary incentives to leave a place signals that they areunwelcome (Gerver Forthcoming a). If the money is enough to provide a benefit thatoutweighsthecostsassociatedwiththedemeaningofferthismightbesufficient,however,if the offer also offends other third parties who do not take it, it may not be morallypermissible(GerverForthcominga).Themorepublictheseoffersofassistance,thegreaterthe potential offence caused, Black et al. (2004:23) note the opinion of one potentialreturnee “I personally don’t think they should advertise it. How can they guarantee thatlivesaregoingtobesafe?Theycan’t.Sodon’tadvertiseit.”A final moral argument dissuading against the use of these types of programs in theircurrent form is that in certain cases (for example the UK and Norway (Webber 2011;Valenta&Thorshaug2011)encouraging take-upof theseprogrammes is closely linked tocreatinganenvironment that is increasinglydifficult to live inandemploysdetentionanddeportation (IPPR 2013; Black et al. 2004; Gerver Forthcoming b). Creating such a livingsituationisnotonlyineffectiveasoutlinedabovebutalsomorallyobjectionableasitfurtherharmsthemostvulnerablealready.Theofferofmoneyto leaveacountry isdemeaningnotonly to thoseofferedthemoneybutmaybealsotothoseinminoritygroupsorinavulnerablemigratorysituation.Therearedifferent incentives for immigration officials leading to situations where people may bepersuadedtoreturntoriskysituations.Theenvironmentthatiscreatedinthehostcountrywiththeaimofleadingtoagreatertake-upofthereturnsassistanceisnothumane.

Case Study: The Great British Scheme TheUKisaninterestingandinformativecasetochoose.Notonlyitisacountrywithahighnumberofimmigrantsbutitisalsoknownforitsstrictimmigrationcontrols.Morerecently,theUKhasmoveditsprogrammeofAssistedVoluntaryReturns(AVR)toberunin-housebytheHomeOffice.HavingpartneredwiththeIOM,from1999onAVR,theUKthenmovedtowork with the NGO Refugee Action in 2011. This contract was terminated and thegovernmentmovedtobringtheservicein-houseatthestartof2016.Thegovernmenthasalso changed the level of assistance to £2000 in cash with limited other support andrestrictedthepeoplewhocanapply(gov.uk2017).Movingawayfromcooperatingwithanyexternalbodiesthisplacesassistedvoluntaryreturnsclearlywithinmigrationmanagementratherthanwelfareconcernsorinternationaldevelopmentassistance.Moreover, the UK is sometimes seen as a leader in policy change and many countriesfollowed the UK model of placing enforced and voluntary returns under the same

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institutionalumbrellaratherthanfollowingthepreviousGermanmodelsofseparatingthem(Koch2013),soit ispossiblethatotherhostcountriesmightimplementsimilarchangesinthefuture.Therefore,widerconclusionscanbedrawnfromthiscase.PolicyChangesTheUK government has had a number of schemes from1999, targeting different groupswith different levels of assistance. Below is a timeline summarising the key policies andchanges:TimelineofAssistedVoluntaryReturnProgrammesintheUK1999

Introduction of the ‘Voluntary Assisted and Return and Reintegration Programme’(VARRP)cofundedbytheEuropeanRefugeeFundandHomeOffice;andoperatedbytheIOM-areturnschemeforthosewhoseasylumapplicationshavefailed

2002

IntroductionofReintegrationassistanceat£500Startof‘ReturntoAfghanistanProgramme’(RAP)

2004

Startof‘AssistedVoluntaryReturnofIrregularMigrants’(AVRIM)schemeoperatedbytheIOM

2005ReintegrationassistanceforVARRPschemeincreasedto£1000

2006Startof‘FacilitatedReturnsScheme’(FRS)forforeignnationalprisonersReintegrationassistanceforVARRPschemeincreasedto£3000

2010ClosureofAVRIMschemeStartof‘AssistedVoluntaryReturnforFamiliesandChildren’(AVRFC)

2011RefugeeActionstartedtooperatetheVARRPscheme;introductionofthe‘Choices’programmeofferingfreeandimpartialinformationtopeopleconsideringreturning

2013OperationVaken,acontroversialinformationpilotscheme,waslaunchedinAugusttomuchcriticismduetothevanscirculatingLondonBoroughsandleafletswiththemessage‘gohome’clearlyvisible

2016

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End to Refugee Action operating VARRP.Move to in-house expertise running twoschemes:VoluntaryReturn(refused leavetoenter/remain inUK; familygroupwithminor inUKillegally;chosentowithdrawapplicationtoextendone’sleavetoremain;asylumclaimant)AssistedReturn(asylumseekerswithapplicationsandfailedasylumseekers;afamilygroup with a minor; an unaccompanied minor; a victim of trafficking; medicalcondition;discretionaryleavetoremainthathasexpired)

Sources:gov.uk(2017);Webber(2011);TheGuardian(2013);HomeOffice(2010)HowEffectiveisthispolicy?From2004it isclear,fromthegraphbelow,thattheoverallnumberofasylumreturns(inblue)hasbeendecreasing,while thenumberofenforcednon-asylumreturnshas roughlystayed constant. However, there has been an increase in the number of voluntary non-asylumreturns.Theincreasesmightbeduetotheincreasingnumberofschemesonoffertargetingdifferentgroupsandtheincreaseinthelevelofassistanceoffered.Therewasalsoanincreaseinthemarketingeffortsoftheseschemes(HomeOffice2010).ItcouldalsobebecauseofincreasingnumbersofeligiblepeopleintheUK.

Source:ONS

However, therearenumerousdifficulties inmeasuringthenumberofeligiblepeople.Thenumberofundocumentedmigrants isdifficult toestimategiventheclandestinenatureoftheactivity.Oneestimateproducedin2005basedonthe2001Censusdataestimatesthenumber at 430,000 with 175,000 quasi-legal migrants depending on their future asylumstatus(LSE2007).Anupdatedfigureusingadifferentmethodputthefigureat618,000attheendof2007(LSE2007).Ifthatfigureisaccuratethenin2007,onlyapproximately3%oftheeligiblepopulationreturned.Ifthosetwofiguresareapproximatelycorrectthentherewasanincreaseof200,000irregularmigrantsintheUKbetween2001and2007.Therefore,there would have been an increase in the number of migrants eligible for the AVRIM

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scheme as well. However, the recent policy change has removed help for any irregularmigrants unless they are considered vulnerable.With this new criteria it would be evenhardertoestablishthenumbersofthoseeligible.The Migration Observatory (2016) note a key weakness in UK data on rejected asylumseekers. Some failed asylum seekers depart by enforced removal, some by voluntaryremoval,othersbytheirownvolitionandothersstayintheUKasirregularmigrants.Inthecurrentsystemthereisnowaytodistinguishbetweenthefinaltwocategories.Thismeansthat knowing thenumber of people eligible for schemes for failed asylum seekers is alsodifficulttomeasure.Moreover,muchresearch(Blacketal.2011;Blacketal.2004)contendsthatthetargetedmigrantsdonothavemuchtrustinthegovernmentand,inparticular,theinformationgivento them.This is confirmedbyan impact studyon theVARRPschemeby theHomeOfficewhoshowthatintheUKcontextthisproblemcontinuestoexist.In2005aroundonethirdofpeopleapplyingfortheVARRPschemedroppedoutand“suspicionoftheauthoritiesintheUKandaboutVARRP”(HomeOffice2010:ii)werecitedaskeyreasons.In this same impact report it was noted among the 48 VARRP returnees interviewed inPakistanandAfghanistanonlyone-thirdexpectedtostillbethere inthereturncountry infiveyearstime(HomeOffice2010).This isclearlyunsustainablefromthepointofviewofminimisingremigration.Thereportalsointerviewednon-VARRPreturneeswhoweremoresettledandlessdependentonthestateorNGOsupportwhentheyreturnedcomparedtoVARRP returnees. Due to the most recent changes to the scheme Refugee Action haswarnedthat“Peoplewillbelessabletoachievesustainablereturns.Theyaremorelikelytobecome internally displacedor remigrate, they aremore likely to face security threatsorpersecution and they are less likely to be able to generate an income, access suitablehousing,subsistence,healthcareoreducation”(RefugeeAction2015).HowVoluntaryisthispolicy?TheUKgovernmenthasrecentlychangedtheirapproachandhasbroughttheirschemesin-house, and no longer offers any impartial information to those considering returning(Refugee Action 2015; Home Office 2017). This move has beenmet withmuch criticismfromNGOsandparticularlyRefugeeActionwhowerepreviouslycontractedtoprovidethisinformation.Withoutaccesstoaccurateinformationonthesituationpeoplewillnotbeabletomakeaninformeddecisionandhenceitcanbeviewedasinvoluntary.Detention centres and coercion are strategies used to increase the take-up of returnschemes in the UK. Numbers of enforced returns are closely linked to voluntary returnsaccordingtoanumberofscholars(Webber2011),howeveritisnotclearifthatisthecaseintheUKfromthegraphabove.TheaimofthenewUKVoluntaryReturnServiceistoleadtotheremovalof31,500peopleoverthreeyearswithabudgetof£18,638,296.14(HomeOffice 2016). A piece of investigative journalism showed that there is a great deal ofcoercion by the Home Office that certain NGOs are complicit in, that uses detention,occasionally physical force, and threats of deportation to encourage take-up of theseschemes(IRIN2017).

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HowMoralisthispolicy?There is likely to be a reduction in the number of people using this system of voluntaryreturns due to both the lack of trust in the government and the absenceof information.According toRefugeeAction (2015) thiswill translate intohigher ratesofdestitutionandthereforegreatercoststoLocalAuthoritiesandtheNHS.Bynotgivinginformationaboutasituation,asisthecurrentpolicyoftheHomeOffice,thegovernmentcouldbemorally implicatedasit letspeoplechoosetoreturntoapotentiallydangerous situation without knowing if they are fully conscience of the risks of theirdecision.By givingmoney forpeople todo that, theynotonlydemean themby showingthattheyarenotwelcome,buttheyareencouragingpeopletoleavetoriskyenvironments.Gerver (Forthcominga, b, c) shows thatwithholding informationand incentivisingpeoplewithmonetaryrewardscouldbemorallyreprehensible.CaseConclusionThe UK offers a cautionary tale to governments considering following these policies andbringingaschemeofvoluntaryreturnsin-house.NotonlyistheUKschemepotentiallylesseffectivebutalsoitislessvoluntaryandlessmoral.

Policy Recommendations

o The usage of assisted voluntary return schemes needs to be strongly questioned.The motivations for countries facilitating return need to be clearly linked to theindividualconcernedandthedevelopmentopportunities,ratherthantothedesiretodecreasethenumberofcertaingroups inacountry.Theschemesarecurrentlyineffectiveandreducinglivingstandardstoencouragetake-uponlyharmsthemostvulnerable.Governmentsalsoneedtoaskthemselveswhatviewaretheypromotingof their country in the creation of such an environment and by paying people toleave?

o These schemes are often compared favourably to the alternative of deportations.

However, without these policies perhaps the level of deportations would alsodecrease?Byfurtherencouragingtheseschemes,thereisalsoanencouragementofpoliciesofdetention,coercionanddeportation.

o To facilitate development, governments need to consider using bilateral schemes.Frequently, AVR policies are carried out unilaterally without consideration of thereturn environment. Return schemes could bemuchmore effectively targeted atpromotingdevelopmentifcarriedoutincooperationwithothercountries.

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o There needs to be a reconsideration of the most appropriate forms of migrationmanagement.Ifinfactofferingcitizenshipandthepossibilitytoremigratetoahostcountry gives people the reassurance they could return to their country of originmoreeasily,thenpromotingregularisationsandeasieraccesstocitizenshipmightbea better way forward. Moreover, having more channels that allow for regularmigration and implementing a fairer andmore effective asylum system is part ofthis.

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