INVENTINGTHEFUTUREPostcapitalismandaWorldWithoutWork

NickSrnicekandAlexWilliams

FirstpublishedbyVerso2015©NickSrnicekandAlexWilliams2015

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Contents

AcknowledgementsIntroduction

1. OurPoliticalCommonSense:IntroducingFolkPolitics2. WhyAren’tWeWinning?ACritiqueofToday’sLeft3. WhyAreTheyWinning?TheMakingofNeoliberalHegemony4. LeftModernity5. TheFutureIsn’tWorking6. Post-WorkImaginaries7. ANewCommonSense8. BuildingPowerConclusion

NotesIndex

Chapter3

WhyAreTheyWinning?TheMakingofNeoliberalHegemony

WeareallKeynesiansnow.

MiltonFriedman

If our era is dominated by one hegemonic ideology, it is that of neoliberalism. It iswidely assumed that the most effective away to produce and distribute goods andservices is by allowing instrumentally rational individuals to exchangevia themarket.State regulations and national industries are, by contrast, seen as distortions andinefficiencies holding back the productive dynamics inherent to freemarkets. Today,thisvisionofhoweconomiesshouldoperateiswhatbothitscriticsandproponentstakeasabaseline.Neoliberalismsetstheagendaforwhatisrealistic,necessaryandpossible.While the economic crisis of 2008 has upset the blind belief in neoliberalism, itnevertheless remains an entrenched part of our worldview – so much so that it isdifficult even for its critics to picture coherent alternatives. Yet this ideology ofneoliberalism did not emerge fully formed from the minds of Milton Friedman orFriedrichHayek, or even theChicago School, and its global hegemony did not ariseinevitablyfromcapitalism’slogic.

In itsorigins,neoliberalismwasa fringe theory. Its adherents found itdifficult togain employment, were often untenured, and were mocked by the Keynesianmainstream.1Neoliberalismwasfarfrombeingtheworld-dominatingideologyitwouldeventuallybecome.Thequestionthischapterwillfocusonis:Howdidasmallbandofneoliberalsmanagetoreshapetheworldsoradically?Neoliberalismwasneveragiven,neveranecessaryendpointofcapitalistaccumulation.Rather,itwasapoliticalprojectfromthebeginning,andamassivelysuccessfuloneintheend.Itsucceededbyskilfullyconstructinganideologyandtheinfrastructuretosupportit,andbyoperatinginanon–folk-politicalmanner. This chapter aims to show that neoliberalism functioned as anexpansive universal ideology. From humble beginnings, the universalising logic ofneoliberalismmadeitcapableofspreadingacrosstheworld,infiltratingthemedia,theacademy, the policy world, education, labour practices, and the affects, feelings andidentities of everyday people. This chapter therefore focuses primarily on howneoliberal hegemony was constructed, rather than on the specific content of

neoliberalism.Whatisofgreatestinterestishowitwasabletotransformtheideologicalandmaterialfabricofglobalsociety.

Whatstandardhistoriesofneoliberalismoftenneglectisthewaysinwhichthemaincomponentsofthisideologicalarchitectureweresystematicallyandpainstakinglysetinplaceinthedecadespriortothe1970s.2Itisinthisprehistoryoftheneoliberalerathatwecandiscern analternativemodeofpolitical action–one that evades the limitsoffolkpolitics.Thisisnottosaythatthisprehistoryprovidesamodelforanyfutureleftistprogrammesimply tocopy;rather, it isan instructivecasestudy inhowtherightwasable to move beyond folk politics and create a new hegemony. The history ofneoliberalismhasbeenoneofcontingencies,struggle,concentratedaction,patienceandgrand-scale strategic thinking. It has been a flexible idea, actualised in various waysaccording to the specific circumstances it encountered: fromGermany in the 1940s,Chile in the1970sand theUKin the1980s, topost-Hussein Iraq in the2000s.Thisversatility has made neoliberalism a sometimes contradictory project, but one thatsucceedspreciselybytransformingthesecontradictionsintoproductivetensions.3

Thesetensionsandvariationshaveledsometobelievethattheterm‘neoliberalism’ismeaninglessandshouldberelegatedtopolemics.Butthetermhassomevalidity,evenifitisoftenusedloosely.Inpopularperception,neoliberalismisusuallyidentifiedwithaglorificationoffreemarkets–apositionthatalsoentailsacommitmenttofreetrade,privatepropertyrightsandthefreemovementofcapital.Definingneoliberalismasthevenerationoffreemarketsisproblematic,however,becausemanyostensiblyneoliberalstates donot adhere to free-market policies.Others have argued that neoliberalism ispredicateduponinstillingcompetitionwhereverpossible.4Thismakessenseofthedrivetowards privatisation, but it fails to explain the debates within neoliberalism aboutwhethercompetitionisanultimategoodornot.5Sometakeintoaccountthesetensionswithinneoliberalismandrecogniseitasthepolitical,ratherthaneconomic,projectofaparticularclass.6Thereiscertainlysometruthtothisclaim,but,takenatfacevalue,itcannotexplainwhyneoliberalideologywasrejectedforsolongbythecapitalistclassesthatpurportedlybenefitfromit.

Our view is that, contrary to its popular presentation, neoliberalism differs fromclassical liberalism in ascribing a significant role to the state.7 A major task ofneoliberalismhasthereforebeentotakecontrolofthestateandrepurposeit.8Whereasclassical liberalismadvocatedrespectforanaturalisedspheresupposedlybeyondstatecontrol (thenatural lawsofmanand themarket),neoliberalsunderstand thatmarketsare not ‘natural’.9Markets do not spontaneously emerge as the state backs away, butmustinsteadbeconsciouslyconstructed,sometimesfromthegroundup.10Forinstance,thereisnonaturalmarketforthecommons(water,freshair,land),orforhealthcare,orforeducation.11These andothermarketsmustbebuilt throughanelaborate arrayof

material, technical and legal constructs. Carbonmarkets required years to be built;12volatilitymarkets exist in large part as a function of abstract financialmodels;13 andeven themost basicmarkets require intricatedesign.14Under neoliberalism, the statethereforetakesonasignificantroleincreating ‘natural’markets.Thestatealsohasanimportantroleinsustainingthesemarkets–neoliberalismdemandsthatthestatedefendproperty rights, enforce contracts, impose anti-trust laws, repress social dissent andmaintain price stability at all costs. This latter demand, in particular, has greatlyexpandedinthewakeofthe2008crisisintothefull-spectrummanagementofmonetaryissues through central banks. We therefore make a grave mistake if we think theneoliberal state is intended simply to step back from markets. The unprecedentedinterventions by central banks into financial markets are symptomatic not of theneoliberalstate’scollapse,butofitscentralfunction:tocreateandsustainmarketsatallcosts.15Yetithasbeenanarduousandwindingpathfromneoliberalism’soriginstothepresent, inwhich its ideas hold sway over those injecting trillions of dollars into themarket.

THENEOLIBERALTHOUGHTCOLLECTIVE

The origins of neoliberalism are disparate, both geographically and intellectually.Elementsofwhatwouldbecometheneoliberalprojectcanbefoundin1920sVienna,1930sChicagoandLondon,and1930sand1940sGermany.Throughoutthesedecades,nationalmovementsworkedonthemarginsofacademiatomaintainliberalideas.Itwasnotuntil1938that these independentmovementswere togain theirfirst transnationalorganisation,resultingfromtheWalterLippmannColloquiumheldinParisjustbeforetheeruptionofWorldWarII.Forthefirsttime,thiseventbroughttogethertheclassicalliberal theorists, the newGerman ordoliberals, theBritishLSE liberals, andAustrianeconomistssuchasFriedrichHayekandLudwigvonMises.Itfocusedonthehistoricalebbingofclassicalliberalisminthefaceofrisingcollectivism,anditwasherethatthefirststepsweremadeinconsolidatingagroupofnewliberalthinkers.Outofthiseventaneworganisation–CentreInternationald’ÉtudespourlaRénovationduLibéralisme–arosewiththeexplicitaimofdevelopingandspreadinganewliberalism.TheoutbreakofWorldWarIIquicklyputanendtotheambitiousaimsofthisorganisation,butthenetworkofpeopleinvolvedwouldcontinuetoworktowardsdevelopinganeoliberalism.Theseedsoftheglobalneoliberalinfrastructurehadbeenplanted.

It was an idea of Hayek’s that ultimately mobilised this infrastructure into a‘neoliberal thought collective’ and inaugurated the slow rise of the new hegemony.16SincetheWalterLippmannColloquiumhadbeenburiedintheonslaughtofWorldWarII,thetransnationalinfrastructureofanincipientneoliberalismhadtobereconstructed.

AchancemeetingwithaSwissbusinessmanin1945gaveHayekthefinancialmeanstoput his ideas into action.17 Thuswas born theMontPelerin Society (MPS): a closedintellectualnetworkthatprovidedthebasicideologicalinfrastructureforneoliberalismtoferment.18Itisnoexaggerationtosaythatalmostalloftheimportantfiguresinthepostwar creation of neoliberalism were in attendance at its first meeting in 1947,including theAustrian economists, theUK liberals, theChicago School, theGermanordoliberalsandaFrenchcontingent.19

From its beginnings, the MPS was consciously focused on changing politicalcommonsenseandsoughttodevelopaliberalutopia.20Itexplicitlyunderstoodthatthisintellectual framework would then be actively filtered down through think tanks,universitiesandpolicydocuments,inordertoinstitutionaliseandeventuallymonopolisethe ideological terrain.21 In a letter to those he had invited, Hayek wrote that thepurposeoftheMPSwas

toenlist thesupportofthebestmindsinformulatingaprogrammewhichhasachanceofgaininggeneralsupport.Oureffort thereforediffersfromanypolitical task in that itmustbeessentiallya long-runeffort,concernednotsomuchwithwhatwouldbeimmediatelypracticable,butwiththebeliefswhichmustgainascendanceifthedangersaretobeavertedwhichatthemomentthreatenindividualfreedom.22

TheSociety thusmadea ‘commitment toa long-runwarofposition in the “battle ofideas”…Privatized,strategic,elitedeliberationwasthereforeestablishedasthemodusoperandi.’23 Opening the ten-day event, Hayek diagnosed the problem of the newliberals:alackofalternativestotheexisting(Keynesian)order.Therewasno‘consistentphilosophyoftheoppositiongroups’andno‘realprogramme’forchange.24Asaresultofthisdiagnosis,HayekdefinedthecentralgoaloftheMPSaschangingeliteopinioninorder to establish the parameterswithinwhich public opinion could then be formed.Contrary to a common assumption, capitalists did not initially see neoliberalism asbeingintheirinterests.AmajortaskoftheMPSwasthereforetoeducatecapitalistsastowhytheyshouldbecomeneoliberals.25Inordertoachievethesegoals,thevisionofeffectiveactionwasoneofoperatingon the invisible frameworkofpoliticalcommonsense thatwas formedby the ideascirculating inelitenetworks.From itsorigins, theMPS eschewed folk politics byworkingwith a global horizon, byworking abstractly(outside the parameters of existing possibilities) and by formulating a clear strategicconceptionof the terrain tobeoccupied–namely,eliteopinion– inorder tochangepoliticalcommonsense.

Behind this set of goals there lay a consistentbuthighly flexible accountofwhatwasnewaboutneoliberalism.Divisionsarose,inparticular,overtheroleofthestateinmaintainingacompetitiveorder;somearguedthatinterventionwasnecessarytosustaincompetition, and others that intervention was the source of monopolies and

centralisation.26 There were less divisive arguments over other particular policypositions, indicating that thiswas far fromahomogeneousorunifiedgroup. Inmanyways,thecommonelementwassimplythesocialnetworkitself,withitscommitmenttobuildinganewliberalism.27Yetthisinbuiltpluralityallowedneoliberalismtofosterandmutateasitspreadaroundtheworld,givingithegemonicstrengthinitsadaptationstothe particularity of each space.28 Its flexibility as an ideology allowed it to excel incarrying out its hegemonic function of incorporating different groups into anoverarchingconsensus.29

Thesedebatesalsoextendedtoquestionsofstrategy.ManymembersandfinanciersofMontPelerinwere impatientwithHayek’s long-termapproachandwanted to startproducingbooksandotherpublicationsimmediately,inordertoinfluencethepublic.30In the midst of Keynesian dominance, stable growth and low unemployment, Hayekkeenly recognised theunlikelihoodof changingpublicopinion.TheSociety’s strategywas self-consciously long-term, and Hayek’s view eventually won out within itsmeetings.Outsidethesemeetings,thenetworkssurroundingtheMPSbeganactivelytoconstruct an extensive transnational infrastructure of ideological diffusion.Hayek hadbeen planning since at least the mid 1940s to establish a system of think tankspropoundingneoliberalideas,whileatthesametimeworkingtoplaceSocietymembersingovernmentpositions(astrategythateventuallyproducedthreeheadsofstateandalarge number of cabinet ministers).31 It was the 1950s, in particular, that saw theproliferation of think tanks allied to the Society, and the subsequent diffusion ofneoliberalideasintotheacademicandpolicyworlds.

IntheUK,theaimsoftheMPSwerepursuedbyanetworkofthinktanksandotherorganisations,suchastheInstituteofEconomicAffairs,theAdamSmithInstitute,theCentreforPolicyStudies,andanarrayofsmallergroups.MembersoftheMPSweretoenterintoUSpolitics,firstviathinktanksliketheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute,andthenthroughmoreformalpositionssuchasMiltonFriedman’sroleaseconomicadvisortoBarryGoldwater in his presidential run.Yet itwas inGermany that neoliberalismwouldfirstachievebothorganisationalandpolicysuccess.

NOTSOTENTATIVESTEPS

InthewakeofWorldWarII,theworldwasprimedforsignificantchangesineconomicideas.Yet itwasGermany thatfacedauniquesetofeconomicdifficulties–both thewell-known hyperinflation problems of theWeimar Republic and the arduous post–World War II reconstruction effort. While most of the world adopted Keynesianpolicies,Germany took a different pathway, guided by some of the same neoliberalswhohadconvenedattheWalterLippmannColloquium.Giventheuttercollapseofthe

German state, the problem facing postwar reconstruction planners was how toreconstitute the state – specifically, how to produce legitimacy without having afunctional state infrastructure already in place. The answer was found in the ideaspropoundedby theearlyordoliberals: establisha spaceofeconomic freedom.This inturngeneratedawebofconnectionsbetweenindividualswhichproducedthelegitimacyofanascentpostwarGermanstate.Ratherthanalegallegitimacy,thestatewasseentoderive its legitimacy from a well-functioning economy.32 It was this idea that wouldprovidethegroundingforneoliberalism’sfirstpolicyexperiments.

FollowingWorldWarII,theordoliberalsbegantomoveintogovernmentpositionsand implement their ideas, establishing the material and institutional foothold fromwhichtoshapeeconomicideology.Thefirst,andperhapsmosthistoricallysignificantposition,wastheappointmentofLudwigErhardtothedirectorateofeconomicsinthepostwar administrative zone of the British and USmilitaries.With the support of afellowordoliberal,WilhelmRöpke,Erhardsimultaneouslyeliminatedallexistingpriceand wage controls, and drastically cut income and capital taxes. This was a radicalderegulatorymove,andonethatcompelledtheSovietUniontoestablishablockadeonBerlinandinauguratetheColdWar.33Inthedecadesthatfollowed,ordoliberalswouldcome increasingly to populate significant positions in the German Ministry ofEconomics, with Erhard himself becoming Chancellor in 1963. But despite theirintentions, the ordoliberals lacked a principled distinction between legitimate andillegitimate government interventions – an ambiguity which facilitated the Germaneconomy’stransformationintoincreasinglyKeynesianforms.Interventionstomaintaincompetition shaded into interventions to providewelfare, and by the 1970sGermanyhad become a standard social democratic state. The difficulties encountered in thepolicyworlddidnotstopneoliberalismfrominnovatingonother terrains, though–inparticular,thespaceoftheso-called‘second-handdealers’inideas.

SECOND-HANDDEALERS

Neoliberals had long emphasised the importance of using a variety of venues toinfluenceelitesandconstructanewcommonsense. In thepostwarera, thisapproachspannedacademia,themediaandthepolicyworld.Butoneoftheprimaryinnovationsforneoliberalconsolidationoftheideologicalspherewastheuseofthinktanks.Whiletheyhadexistedforoverahundredyears,theextensiveusemadeofthembytheMPSwas a novelty. It involved developing policy arguments, building policy solutions andhoming inoneconomicculprits.An informaldivisionof labourwasestablished,withsome think tanks focusing on the large philosophical ideas, targeting the veryassumptions and rationale of the orthodox Keynesian position – this was the task

adopted by the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (MIPR) in the 1970s, forexample – while others aimed to produce more immediate public policy proposals.These were explicit attempts to unhinge the dominant worldview in order tosubsequentlyintroducespecificpolicysolutionsthatweregroundedupontheneoliberalview.

ThefigureofAntonyFisherwasvitalinthebuildingofneoliberalism’sideologicalhegemony.34OneofthefoundersoftheUK’sfirstneoliberalthinktank–theInstituteof Economic Affairs (IEA) – Fisher explicitly argued that themost difficult part ofchanging ideas lay not in their production, but in their diffusion. As a result of thisbelief,FisherwouldbeheavilyinvolvedinestablishingconservativethinktanksnotonlyintheUK,butalsoinCanada(theFraserInstitute)andtheUnitedStates(theMIPR).TheIEAitselfwasfocusedon‘thosewhomHayekhadcalledthe“second-handdealers”inideas,thejournalists,academics,writers,broadcasters,andteacherswhodictatethelong-termintellectualthinkingofthenation’.35Theexplicitintentionwastochangetheideological fabric of the British elite, infiltrating and subtly altering the terms ofdiscourse. This also extended shrewdly to the mission of the IEA itself, whichmaintained a deceptive position on its own aims, presenting itself as an apoliticalorganisationfocusingonresearch intomarkets ingeneral.36 In linewith thisvisionofideologicaltakeover,theIEAproducedshortpamphletsintendedtobeasaccessibleaspossibletoamainstreamaudience.37Moreover,thesetextswerewritteninasomewhatutopianfashion,withoutregardforwhetherapolicywascapableofbeingimplementedat thatmoment.38Thegoal,asalways,was the long-termredefinitionof thepossible.Over the course of decades, these various interventions developed a wide-rangingneoliberalworldview.Morethanjustsingle-issueresponsestothefashionableproblemsof the day, what the IEA and its associates had constructed was a systematic andcoherenteconomicperspective.39Thinktanksinstilledthisworldviewbyeducatingandsocialising rising members of political parties. Numerous members of what wouldbecome Thatcher’s administration passed through the IEA during the 1960s and1970s.40 The outcome of the IEA’s efforts was not only to subtly transform theeconomic discourse in Britain, but also to naturalise two particular policies: thenecessityofattackingtradeunionpower,andtheimperativeofmonetarystability.Theformerwouldpurportedlyletmarketsfreelyadapttochangingeconomiccircumstances,while the latterwould provide the basic price stability needed for a healthy capitalisteconomy.

In theUnitedStates, too, think tanks andacademic researchgroupswerebuilt topushforabroadlyneoliberalagenda,theHeritageFoundationandtheHooverInstitutebeingtwoofthemostnotable.41TheMIPRaimedtoredefinepoliticalcommonsensebywritingbooks onneoliberal economics thatwere intended for a popular audience,

some of which eventually sold over 500,000 copies. Other books, such as CharlesMurray’sLosingGround,laidthefoundationsforthepolicyshiftwhichtodayidentifieswelfaredependencyratherthanpovertyitselfasthecentralsocialproblem.Numerousotherwidespreadpolicy ideas, suchaszero-tolerancepolicingandworkfare, stemmedfromthepolicyfactoryoftheMIPR.Itsbookssucceededintheirobjectiveofchangingthe common sense of the political classes and the public. The think tank, as anorganisationalform,wassointegraltoneoliberalism’sideologicalsuccessthattheveryprocess of creating think tanks was itself institutionalised. The Atlas EconomicResearch Foundation, founded in 1981 by Fisher, declared as its explicit aim ‘toinstitutionalise thisprocessofhelpingstartupnewthink tanks’.Atlas todayboastsofhaving helped create or connect over 400 neoliberal think tanks inmore than eightycountries. The sheer scale of the neoliberal ideological infrastructure is made fullytransparenthere.

Beyond think tanks, a variety of other mechanisms were used to build up ahegemonicdiscourse. Inworking to install theChicagobrandofneoliberalismas thedominantalternative,MiltonFriedmanwroteextensiveop-edsandnewspapercolumns,andmadeuseoftelevisioninterviewsinawaythatwasunprecedentedforanacademic.Businesses funded projects to turn hiswork into popular television shows, taking themediaterrainbystorm.42Thesetechnologicaltoolsweretheessentialmeansheusedtodiffuse his economic vision to policymakers and the public. Newspapers such as theWallStreetJournal,DailyTelegraphandFinancialTimesparalleledthiseffort,shapingthepublic’sperspectivebyinvokingneoliberalpoliciesateveryopportunity.43Businessschoolsandmanagementconsultanciesalsobegantoadoptandspreadneoliberalideasaboutcorporate forms,and theChicagoSchoolbecameaglobalbeaconofneoliberalthought.44 Such institutionswere crucial for the spreadofneoliberalhegemony, sincetheywere often the training grounds of the global elite.45 Individualswould come totheseneoliberalUSschoolsand thenreturn to theirowncountrieswith theneoliberalideologyinculcatedinthem.Bythe1970s,therefore,afull-spectruminfrastructurehaddeveloped to promulgate neoliberal ideas. Think tanks and utopian proclamationsorganised long-term thinking; public-facing speeches, pamphlets and media effortsframedthegeneraloutlinesoftheneoliberalcommonsense;andpoliticiansandpolicyproposals made tactical interventions into the political terrain.46 Yet, despite theirincreasingly hegemonic potential, a mere decade prior to the arrival in office ofThatcherandReagan,Keynesianismstillreflectedthemostwidelyacceptedapproachtoorganising states andmarkets.The ideasof thisgroupofneoliberal intellectualswerestill often seen as senseless throwbacks to the failed policies of the pre–GreatDepression era. But thiswould all change by the 1980s – a decade thatwould leaveKeynesianism in disarray and enshrine neoliberalism as the preeminent model for

economicmodernisation.

GRASPINGTHEWHEEL

Having made national inroads, neoliberalism first gained serious internationalprominence in the 1970s, as a response to the combined pressures of highunemploymentandhighinflation–bothofwhichhadoriginatedinoilshocks,generalcommodity price rises, wage increases and the expansion of credit. The dominantKeynesianapproachtotheeconomyhadarguedthatgovernmentsshouldstimulatetheeconomybyputtingmoneyintoitwhenunemploymentwasrising,but,wheninflationwas rising, takemoney out of the economy, to slow down price rises. In the 1970s,however, both problems arose simultaneously – rising inflation and risingunemployment, or ‘stagflation’. The traditional Keynesian policy solutions wereincapableofdealingwiththisconjunction,thusseeminglydictatingaturntoalternativetheories. It is important to be clear that, at this point,multiple interpretations of theeconomic problemwere possible. The production of inflation throughwage rigiditiesand trade union power was not the only possible framing of the problem, andneoliberalism was not the only possible solution. Alternative interpretations wereavailable,alternativeanswerspossible; in themoment,nooneknewwhat thewayoutwouldbe.47Theneoliberalnarrativeof thecrisis,for instance,playsdowntheroleofbanking deregulation by UK Chancellor Anthony Barber in the early 1970s and thebreakdown of theBrettonWoods system.These deregulations sparked a surge in themonetarybaseandasubsequentsurgeinpriceinflation,andthenwageinflation.48Inotherwords,analternativenarrativewaspossibleinwhichtheproblemwasnotstrongunions,butratherderegulatedfinance.

Thattheneoliberalstorywonoutisinnosmallmeasurebecauseoftheideologicalinfrastructurethatadherentstoitsideashadconstructedoverdecades.Theneoliberalsfound themselves well placed, since they had routinely argued that inflation was anecessary outcome of the welfare state’s unwillingness to break wage and pricerigidities. They had both a diagnosis of the problem and a solution. Governmentofficialswhowere uncertain aboutwhat to do in the face of crisis found a plausiblestoryinneoliberalism.49Itwasthusthelong-termconstructionofintellectualhegemonybytheneoliberalthoughtcollectivethatleftthemwellpositionedtoleveragetheirideasintopower.50AsMiltonFriedmanfamouslyputit,‘Onlyacrisis–actualorperceived–producesrealchange.Whenthatcrisisoccurs,theactionsthataretakendependontheideasthatarelyingaround.That,Ibelieve,isourbasicfunction:todevelopalternativesto existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossiblebecomesthepoliticallyinevitable.’51Thisprogrammespellsoutexactlywhathappened

inthe1970scrisis.Ifalternativeanalysesofthecrisishadbeenaccepted,itwouldhaveentailedapolicyresponsedifferentfromthatofneoliberalism.Ratherthanattackingthepowerof labour,forexample,politicianscouldhaverespondedbyre-regulatingcreditcreation. In other words, neoliberalism was not a necessary outcome, but a politicalconstruction.52

While Keynesian approaches were eventually able to develop an explanation ofstagflation,bythenitwastoolate,andtheneoliberalapproachhadtakenoveracademiceconomics and the policyworld. In short, neoliberalismhadbecomehegemonic.Thedecade after 1979 sawMargaretThatcher elected as theBritish primeminister, PaulVolcker appointed as chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Ronald Reagan electedpresidentoftheUnitedStates.TheIMFandWorldBank,facingidentitycrisesafterthebreakdown of the BrettonWoods system,were rapidly infiltrated and converted intocruciblesofthetrueneoliberalfaithbythe1980s.Franceundertookaneoliberal turnduring theMitterrand administration in the early 1980s, and themajor economies ofEurope became bound by the neoliberal policies embodied in the constitution of theEuropean Union. In the United States and UK, a wave of systematic attacks werelaunchedagainstthepoweroflabour.Piecebypiece,tradeunionsweredemolishedandlabourregulationsdismantled.Capitalcontrolswereloosened,financewasderegulated,andthewelfarestatebegantobescavengedforprofitableparts.

OutsideEuropeandNorthAmerica,neoliberalismhadalreadybeenforcedonChileandArgentina in theaftermathofmilitarycoups in the1970s.Thedevelopingworlddebt crisis of the 1980s acted as a key moment to break traditional proto-socialisthegemoniesandinstituteaturntoneoliberalismacrosstheworld.53Moreover,withthebreakdownoftheUSSR,EasternEuropesawawaveofneoliberalisingtrendsthatwerespurredonbyWesterneconomicadvisors.ItisestimatedthattheseprivatisingpoliciesinformerSovietnationsledtoamilliondeaths,provingthatprivatisationcouldbejustas deadly as collectivisation, and that the expansion of neoliberalismwas a far frombloodlessaffair.54Misery,deathanddictatorshipslayinthewakeofitsadvancesacrosstheglobe.Thiswasanormativeregimethathadforceditselfintotheeverydaypsychicandbodilyrealityoftheworld’spopulation.Bythemid1990s,withthecollapseoftheUSSR, neoliberalism’s extension via IMF structural adjustment policies, itsconsolidationintheUK’sNewLabourandClinton’sUSadministration,anditsubiquityintheacademicfieldofeconomics,neoliberalismhadreacheditshegemonicpeak.Thenovel conjunctural moment of the 1970s was quickly forgotten by the public, andneoliberalism took on the universal and natural qualities that Thatcher’s doctrine of‘thereisnoalternative’hadespoused.Neoliberalismhadbecomeanewcommonsense,accepted by every party in power. It mattered little whether the left or right won;neoliberalismhadstackedthedeck.

THEIMPOSSIBLEBECOMESINEVITABLE

Aswehaveseen,neoliberalismpropagatedits ideologythroughadivisionof labour–academics shaping education, think tanks influencing policy, and popularisersmanipulating the media. The inculcation of neoliberalism involved a full-spectrumproject of constructing a hegemonicworldview.A new common sensewas built thatcametoco-optandeventuallydominatetheterminologyof‘modernity’and‘freedom’–terminologythatfiftyyearsagowouldhavehadverydifferentconnotations.Today,itisnearly impossible to speak thesewordswithout immediately invoking theprecepts ofneoliberalcapitalism.

We all know today that ‘modernisation’ translates into job cuts, the slashing ofwelfare and the privatisation of government services. To modernise, today, simplymeans to neoliberalise. The term ‘freedom’ has suffered a similar fate, reduced toindividual freedom, freedom from the state, and the freedom to choose betweenconsumer goods.Liberal ideas of individual freedomplayed an important role in theideological struggle with theUSSR, priming the population of theWestern world tomobilise behind any ideology that purported to value individual freedoms. With itsemphasis on individual freedoms, neoliberalism was able to co-opt elements ofmovementsorganisedaround‘libertarianism,identitypolitics,[and]multiculturalism’.55Likewise,byemphasisingfreedomfromthestate,neoliberalismwasable toappeal toanarcho-capitalistsand themovementsofdesire thatexploded inMay1968.56 Lastly,withtheideaoffreedombeinglimitedtoafreedomofthemarket,theideologycouldco-opt consumerist desires.At the level of production, neoliberal freedom could alsorecruit emerging desires among workers for flexible labour – desires that were soonturnedagainstthem.57 Instrugglingforandsuccessfullyseizing the ideological terrainofmodernityandfreedom,neoliberalismhasmanagedtowinditswayinexorablyintoourveryself-conceptions.Inarrogatingthemeaningoftermssuchasmodernisationandfreedom, neoliberalism has proved itself to be the single most successful hegemonicprojectofthelastfiftyyears.

Neoliberalismhasthusbecome‘theformofourexistence–thewayinwhichweareledtoconductourselves,torelatetoothersandtoourselves’.58Itis,inotherwords,notjustpoliticians,businessleaders,themediaeliteandacademicswhohavebeenenrolledintothisvisionoftheworld,butalsoworkers,students,migrants–andeveryoneelse.Inother words, neoliberalism creates subjects. Paradigmatically, we are constructed ascompetitive subjects – a role that encompasses and surpasses industrial capitalism’sproductive subject. The imperatives of neoliberalism drive these subjects to constantself-improvement in every aspect of their lives. Perpetual education, the omnipresentrequirement to be employable, and the constant need for self-reinvention are all of apiecewith this neoliberal subjectivity.59 The competitive subject,moreover, straddles

the divide between the public and the private. One’s personal life is as bound tocompetition as one’s work life. Under these conditions, it is no surprise that anxietyproliferates in contemporary societies. Indeed, an entire battery of psychopathologieshas been exacerbated under neoliberalism: stress, anxiety, depression and attentiondeficitdisordersareincreasinglycommonpsychologicalresponsestotheworldaroundus.60 Crucially, the construction of everyday neoliberalism has also been a primarysource of political passivity. Even if you do not buy into the ideology, its effectsnevertheless force you into increasingly precarious situations and increasinglyentrepreneurial inclinations. We need money to survive, so we market ourselves, domultiple jobs, stress and worry about how to pay rent, pinch pennies at the grocerystore, and turn socialising into networking.Given these effects, politicalmobilisationbecomes a dream that is perpetually postponed, driven away by the anxieties andpressuresofeverydaylife.

Atthesametime,weshouldrecognisethatthisproductionofsubjectivitywasnotsimplyanexternal imposition.Hegemony, inall its forms,operatesnotasan illusion,but as something that builds on the very real desires of the population. Neoliberalhegemonyhasplayeduponideas,yearningsanddrivesalreadyexistingwithinsociety,mobilisingandpromisingtofulfilthosethatcouldbealignedwithitsbasicagenda.Theworshipofindividualfreedom,thevalueascribedtohardwork,freedomfromtherigidworkweek,individualexpressionthroughwork,thebeliefinmeritocracy,thebitternessfeltatcorruptpoliticians,unionsandbureaucracies–thesebeliefsanddesirespre-existneoliberalism and find expression in it.61 Bridging the left–right divide,many peopletodayaresimplyangryatwhattheyseeasotherstakingadvantageofthesystem.Hatredfortherichtaxevadercombineseasilywithdisgustforthepoorwelfarecheat;angerattheoppressiveemployerbecomesindistinguishablefromangeratallpoliticians.Thisislinked with the spread of middle-class identities and aspirations – desires for homeownership, self-reliance and entrepreneurial spirit were fostered and extended intoformerly working-class social spaces.62 Neoliberal ideology has a grounding in livedexperience and does not exist simply as an academic puzzle.63 Neoliberalism hasbecomeparasiticaloneverydayexperience,andanycriticalanalysisthatmissesthisisbound to misrecognise the deep roots of neoliberalism in today’s society. Over thecourseofdecades,neoliberalismhasthereforecometoshapenotonlyeliteopinionsandbeliefs,butalsothenormativefabricofeverydaylifeitself.Theparticular interestsofneoliberals have become universalised, which is to say, hegemonic.64 Neoliberalismconstitutesourcollectivecommonsense,makingusitssubjectswhetherwebelieveinitornot.65

AMONTPELERINOFTHELEFT?

Ithasoftenbeenarguedthatneoliberalismsucceeded(andcontinuestosucceedinspiteofitsfailures)becauseitissupportedbyaseriesofoverlappingandpowerfulinterests–thetransnationalelite,thefinanciers,themajorstockholdersofthelargestcorporations.Whiletheseinterestshavecertainlyassistedthepotencyoftheneoliberalideology,suchan explanation nevertheless leaves certain questions unanswered. If elite support wassufficient for ideological success, and if neoliberalismwas clearly beneficial to elites,therewouldnothavebeenaforty-yeardelaybetweentheinitialformulationoftheideasandtheirimplementation.Instead,theembeddedliberalismofKeynesianismremainedideologicallydominantevenasitconstrainedpowerfulinterests.Inparticular,financialinterests were sidelined for a long period after the 1929 crash and ensuing GreatDepression. The power dynamicsmaintaining the Keynesian consensus needed to betaken apart piecemeal. Equally, an explanation of neoliberalism’s success that reliessolely on its compatibility with particular elite interests also leaves unexplained whyother possible responses to the problems of the 1970s were never implemented. Animportantelementofneoliberalism’seventualideologicalsuccessisthattherewasbotha crisis and a readily available solution. The crisis (stagflation) was one that nogovernmentknewhowtodealwithatthetime,whilethesolutionwasthepreconceivedneoliberalideasthathadbeenfermentingfordecadesinitsideologicalecology.Itwasnotthatneoliberalspresentedabetterargumentfortheirposition(themythofrationalpoliticaldiscourse);rather,aninstitutionalinfrastructurewasconstructedtoprojecttheirideasandestablishthemasthenewcommonsenseofthepoliticalelite.

Inallofthisthereareimportantlessonstobelearned,whichhaveledsometocallfor aMont Pelerin of the left.66 On the broadest level, this history of neoliberalismserves to demonstrate that the greatest recent success of the right – installing aneoliberalhegemonyonaglobal scale–wasaccomplished throughnon–folk-politicalmeans.Thismeans,inthefirstplace,thattheneoliberalsthoughtinlong-termvisions.Thiswas a different temporality fromboth election cycles and the boom-and-bust ofindividualprotests. Instead,what the leftcan learnfromishowtheMPSpatientlysetout explicit objectives and analysed the terrain of their historical conjunction, all inorder to propose specific and effectivemeans to alter that terrain. It set its sights onlong-termchange,waitingfortyyearsforthecrisisofKeynesianismandtheemergenceof Reagan and Thatcher. In taking this approach, the intellectuals of neoliberalismthoughtabstractlyintermsofpossibilities:whatwasimpossibleduringtheirowntimebecame possible later, partly through their actions and preparations. Secondly, theysoughttobuildacounter-hegemonicprojectthatwouldoverturntheconsensusaroundsocial democracy and Keynesian policies. They took a full-spectrum approach tochanginghegemonicconditionsandbuiltupanentireideologicalinfrastructurethatwascapable of insinuating itself into every political issue and every fibre of politicalcommonsense.Itoverthrewthehegemonicideasofitstime.AsPhilipMirowskiwrites,

theirstrategicgeniuswas

toappreciate that it isnotenough todangleautopianvision justbeyond reachaseventualmotivation forpolitical action; the cadre that triumphs is the side that can simultaneouslymount a full set of seeminglyunrelatedpoliticalproposalsthatdealwiththeshort-,medium-,andlong-termhorizonsofaction,combiningregimesofknowledgeandinterimoutcomes,sothattheendresultistheinexorablemovementofthepoliseverclosertotheeventualgoal.Theshrewdstrategyofsimultaneouslyconductingbothashortgameandalonggame,superficiallyappearingtotheuninformedtobeinmutualconflictbutunitedbehindthescenesbyoverarchingtheoreticalaims,isprobablythesinglemostsignificantexplanationofthetriumphofneoliberalpoliciesduringaconjuncturewheretheiropponentshadcometoexpectutterrefutation.67

ThethirdmajorlessonforthelefttolearnisthattheloosecollectiveofMPSalsothought expansively in spatial terms– aiming to spread thenetworkglobally, throughkeynodes.Inthethinktank,theyfoundanorganisationalformadaptedtothetaskofglobal intellectual hegemony. They established networks between think tanks,politicians, journalists, themediaand teachers–buildingaconsistencybetween thesedisparate groups that did not require a unity of purpose or organisational form. Thisentailedanadmirableflexibilityintheirproject.Whileneoliberalismisoftendenouncedasbeingtooempiricallydisparatetomakesenseasacoherentproject,itisinfactthewillingness tomodify its ideas in light of conditions on the ground that hasmade itparticularlypowerfulasanideology.

ThecallforaMontPelerinoftheleftshouldthereforenotbetakenasanargumenttosimplycopyitsmodeofoperation.Theargumentisratherthattheleftcanlearnfromthelong-termvision,themethodsofglobalexpansion,thepragmaticflexibilityandthecounter-hegemonicstrategy thatunitedanecologyoforganisationswithadiversityofinterests.ThedemandforaMontPelerinoftheleftisultimatelyacalltobuildanewthehegemonyoftheleft.

Report(London:DepartmentforEnvironment,FoodandRuralAffairs,2005).80. CarolineSaunders,AndrewBarberandGregTaylor,FoodMiles:ComparativeEnergy/EmissionsPerformance

of New Zealand’s Agriculture Industry, Agribusiness and Economics Research Unit, Lincoln University,Canterbury,NZ,July2006,pdfavailableatlincoln.ac.nz.

81. IntheUKin2005,airfreightmadeupjust1percentoffoodtonnemilestravelled,but11percentoffood-relatedemissions.Smithetal.,ValidityofFoodMiles,p.3.

82. DougHenwood,‘MovingMoney(Revisited)’,LBONews,2010,atlbo-news.com.83. StephenGandel,‘ByEveryMeasure,theBigBanksAreBigger’,Fortune,13September2013,atfortune.com.84. VictoriaMcGraneandTanGillian,‘LendersAreWarnedonRisk’,WallStreetJournal,25June2014.85. OTCDerivativesStatisticsatEnd-June2014,Basel:BankforInternationalSettlements,2014,p.2,atbis.org.86. DavidBoyle,ALocalBankingSystem:TheUrgentNeedtoReinvigorateUKHighStreetBanking(London:New

EconomicsFoundation,2011),p.8.87. Ibid.,pp.8–9.88. GilesTremlett,‘Spain’sSavingsBanks’CultureofGreed,Cronyism,andPoliticalMeddling’,Guardian,8June

2012.89. Boyle,LocalBankingSystem,p.10.90. AndrewBibby,‘Co-opBankCrisis:WhatNextfortheCo-operativeSector?’,Guardian,21January2014.91. Greg Sharzer,No Local: Why Small-Scale Alternatives Won’t Change the World (Winchester: Zero Books,

2012),p.3.92. PhilipMirowski,NeverLetaSeriousCrisisGotoWaste:HowNeoliberalismSurvivedtheFinancialMeltdown

(London:Verso,2013),p.326.93. Zibechi,‘LatinAmericaToday’.94. ChristianMarazzi,‘ExodusWithoutPromisedLand’,inCampagnaandCampiglio,eds,WhatWeAreFighting

For,p.viii.95. Suchanapproachhasalsobeenlabelled‘alternativism’bycommunisationtheorists.Endnotes,‘WhatAreWe

toDo?’inBenjaminNoys,ed.,CommunizationandItsDiscontents:Contestation,Critique,andContemporaryStruggles(Brooklyn:MinorCompositions,2012),p.30.

96. Day,GramsciIsDead,pp.20–1.97. Bey,TAZ,p.99.98. InvisibleCommittee,ComingInsurrection,p.96.99. Ibid.,p.113.100. Ibid.,p.102.101. Ibid.,pp.107,114.102. VivekChibber,PostcolonialTheoryandtheSpecterofCapital(London:Verso,2013),pp.228–9.103. DanHancox,TheVillage Against theWorld (London: Verso, 2013), Chapter 8; Ulrike Fokken, ‘Die Rote

Insel’,DieTageszeitung,16February2013,attaz.de;JasonE.Smith,‘TheDayAftertheInsurrection’,RadicalPhilosophy189(2015),p.43.

104. SeealsoAlbertoToscano,‘ThePrejudiceAgainstPrometheus’,STIR,2011,atstirtoaction.com.105. Chris Dixon, ‘Organizing to Win the World’, Briarpatch Magazine, 18 March 2015, at

briarpatchmagazine.com;KeirMilburn,‘OnSocialStrikesandDirectionalDemands’,PlanC,7May2015,atweareplanc.org.

3.WHYARETHEYWINNING?THEMAKINGOFNEOLIBERALHEGEMONY

1. JamiePeck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),p.40.2. Thisstandardhistoryisnowintheprocessofbeingrewritten,andthischapterreliesheavilyonthepioneersof

thisresearch,includingtheunpublishedworkofAlexAndrews.See,forexample,PhilipMirowskiandDieterPlehwe,eds,TheRoadfromMontPelerin:TheMakingoftheNeoliberalThoughtCollective(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2009);PhilipMirowski,NeverLetaSeriousCrisisGotoWaste:HowNeoliberalism

Survived the FinancialMeltdown (London: Verso, 2013); Peck,Constructions of Neoliberal Reason;DanielStedmanJones,MastersoftheUniverse:Hayek,Friedman,andtheBirthofNeoliberalPolitics(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2012);RichardCockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable:Think-TanksandtheEconomicCounter-Revolution,1931–1983(London:Fontana,1995);MichelFoucault,TheBirthofBiopolitics:LecturesattheCollegedeFrance1978–1979(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2010).

3. Witness,forinstance,theunlikelybutimmenselyproductiveallianceintheUnitedStatesbetweeneconomicneoliberalsandradicalsocialconservatives.Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.6;DavidHarvey,ABriefHistoryofNeoliberalism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),pp.49–50.

4. PierreDardotandChristianLaval,TheNewWayof theWorld:OnNeoliberalSociety, transl.GregoryElliot(London:Verso,2014).

5. Rob Van Horn, ‘Reinventing Monopoly and the Role of Corporations: The Roots of Chicago Law andEconomics’,inMirowskiandPlehwe,RoadfromMontPelerin,pp.204–37.

6. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism.7. Philip Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism (New York: Oxford

UniversityPress,2010),p.128.8. KarlPolanyi is anotable exception,having long ago recognised the roleof the state inbuildingmarkets in

labour and land.Karl Polanyi,TheGreat Transformation: The Political andEconomicOrigins ofOur Time(Boston:BeaconPress,2001);Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalismReason,p.4.

9. Thisgenderingofrightsisappropriateforthehistoricalcontext.10. It is worth mentioning that this political construction of economies negates the possibility of any simple

economism.ThomasLemke,‘TheBirthofBiopolitics:MichelFoucault’sLectureattheCollègedeFranceonNeoliberalGovernmentality’,EconomyandSociety30:2(2001),p.194.

11. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.2.12. Theconstructionofmarketshasbeenexceptionallywellstudiedwithinthesociologyoffinanceandeconomic

sociology.SeeDonaldMacKenzie,MaterialMarkets:HowEconomicAgentsAreConstructed(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),Chapter7;DonaldMacKenzie,FabianMuniesaandLuciaSiu,eds,DoEconomistsMakeMarkets?OnthePerformativityofEconomics(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007);MichelCallon, ‘AnEssay onFraming andOverflowing:EconomicExternalitiesRevisited by Sociology’, inMichelCallon,ed.,TheLawsofMarkets(Oxford:Blackwell,1998),pp.244–69;MichelCallon,‘TheEmbeddednessofEconomicMarketsinEconomics’,inCallon,LawsofMarkets;AndrewBarry,PoliticalMachines:GoverningaTechnologicalSociety(London:Athlone,2001).

13. NickSrnicek, ‘RepresentingComplexity:TheMaterialConstructionofWorldPolitics’,PhD thesis,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience,2013,Chapter5;DonaldMacKenzie,AnEngine,NotaCamera:HowFinancialModelsShapeMarkets(Cambridge:MITPress,2008).

14. Callon,‘EssayonFramingandOverflowing’.15. This create-and-sustainmovement inmanyways parallels JamiePeck’s notion of the roll-back and roll-out

phasesofneoliberalisation.SeePeck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,pp.22–3.16. MirowskiandPlehwe,RoadfromMontPelerin.17. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.48.18. Plehwe,‘Introduction’,inMirowskiandPlehwe,RoadfromMontPelerin,p.16.19. Cockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.109.20. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.50;Cockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.4.21. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.50.22. CitedinCockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.104.23. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.49.24. CitedinCockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.111.25. Plehwe,‘Introduction’,p.7.26. DardotandLaval,NewWayoftheWorld,p.55.27. Plehwe,‘Introduction’,p.4.28. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.276.29. ColinCrouch,TheStrangeNon-DeathofNeoliberalism(Cambridge:Polity,2011),p.23.30. Cockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.117.

31. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.51.32. Ibid.,p.84.33. Peck,ConstructionsofNeoliberalReason,p.57.34. QuantitativesocialnetworkanalysishighlightsthesignificanceofFisheraswell,placinghimalongsideHayek

atthecentreoftheMPSnetwork.SeePlehwe,‘Introduction’,p.20.35. Cockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.131.36. Ibid.,p.132.37. Ibid.,p.141.38. Ibid.,p.142.39. Ibid.,pp.156–7.40. Ibid.,Chapter5.41. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.44.42. Ibid.43. Cockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.184.44. LeoPanitchandSamGindin,TheMakingofGlobalCapitalism:ThePoliticalEconomyofAmericanEmpire

(London:Verso,2012),p.114.45. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.54.46. Plehwe,‘Introduction’,p.6.47. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.13.48. Ann Pettifor, ‘The Power to “Create Money out of Thin Air”’, openDemocracy, 18 January 2013, at

opendemocracy.net.49. This desire for an answer can also be seen in the choice ofmacroeconomicmodels. Peter Kenway,From

Keynesianism toMonetarism:TheEvolutionofUKMacroeconometricModels (London:Routledge,1994),p.39.

50. Cockett,ThinkingtheUnthinkable,p.196.51. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press,2002),p.xiv.52. Someargue that neoliberalismwasnecessarybecauseof the crisis of accumulation facing capitalism in the

1970s.Butthisargumentneglectsalternativewaysinwhichthatcrisiscouldhavebeenresolvedandattributesimmenseclarityofself-interesttocapitalists.

53. Philip Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism (New York: OxfordUniversityPress,2010),p.139.

54. David Stuckler, LawrenceKing andMartinMcKee, ‘Mass Privatisation and the Post-CommunistMortalityCrisis:ACross-NationalAnalysis’,Lancet373:9,661(2009).

55. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.41.56. Thisisonesourceofthecommonclaimthatpostmodernismistheculturalexpressionofneoliberalism.57. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.53.58. DardotandLaval,NewWayoftheWorld,p.3.59. Ibid.,p.265.60. MarkFisher,CapitalistRealism:IsThereNoAlternative?(Winchester:Zero,2009),Chapter4.61. WandaVrasti, ‘StrugglingwithPrecarity:FromMoreandBetterJobstoLessandLesserWork’,Disorderof

Things,12October2013,atthedisorderofthings.com.62. Harvey,BriefHistoryofNeoliberalism,p.61.63. Forevidenceof theausteritynarrativeand its adoption inpopularconsciousness, seeLiamStanley, ‘“We’re

Reaping What We Sowed”: Everyday Crisis Narratives and Acquiescence to the Age of Austerity’, NewPoliticalEconomy19:6(2014).

64. ErnestoLaclau, ‘IdentityandHegemony:TheRoleofUniversalityintheConstitutionofPoliticalLogics’,inJudithButler,ErnestoLaclauandSlavojŽižek,eds,Contingency,HegemonyandUniversality:ContemporaryDialoguesontheLeft(London:Verso,2011),p.50.

65. Theclassicalmarkofideologytodayis that itfeedsoncynicism,or,asSlavojŽižekputsit, ideologyworkseven(andespecially)ifyoudonotbelieveinit.SeeSlavojŽižek,TheSublimeObjectofIdeology(London/NewYork:Verso,1989).

66. Mirowski,NeverLetaSeriousCrisisGotoWaste,p.356.67. Ibid.,p.332.

4.LEFTMODERNITY

1. This expansionary process has been conceived of in a variety of (not incompatible) ways – for instance,throughuneven and combineddevelopment, spatial fixes, and expanding cycles of hegemony. In each case,though, the expansionary nature of capitalist universalism is readily apparent. See, respectively,Neil Smith,UnevenDevelopment:Nature,CapitalandtheProductionofSpace(London:Verso,2010);DavidHarvey,TheLimitstoCapital(London:Verso,2006);GiovanniArrighi,TheLongTwentiethCentury:Money,PowerandtheOriginsofOurTime(London:Verso,2009).

2. For a lengthy defence of this claim, see Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital(London:Verso,2013),¶9.4.

3. ‘For it is finally theuniversal…whichfurnishes theonly truedenialofestablisheduniversalisms.’FrançoisJullien, On the Universal: The Uniform, the Common and Dialogue Between Cultures (Cambridge: Polity,2014),p.90.

4. MarkFisherandJeremyGilbert,ReclaimModernity:BeyondMarkets,BeyondMachines (London:Compass,2014),pp.12–14.

5. SandroMezzadra, ‘HowManyHistoriesofLabor?TowardsaTheoryofPostcolonialCapitalism’,EuropeanInstituteforProgressiveCulturalPolicies,2012,ateipcp.net.

6. MarkFisher,CapitalistRealism:IsThereNoAlternative?(Winchester:Zero,2009).7. Similarargumentshavealsobeenmadeaboutpostmodernity.SeeHarvey,TheConditionofPostmodernity:An

EnquiryintotheOriginsofCulturalChange(Oxford:Wiley-Blackwell,1991).8. PeterWagner,Modernity:UnderstandingthePresent(Cambridge:Polity,2012),p.23.9. Fora similarargumentwith respect to ‘development’, seeKalyanSanyal,RethinkingCapitalistDevelopment:

PrimitiveAccumulation,GovernmentalityandPost-ColonialCapitalism(NewDelhi:RoutledgeIndia,2013),p.92.

10. Togiveasenseofthisvariety,Jamesonoutlinesfourteendifferentproposalsforthebeginningofmodernityashistoricalperiod.FredricJameson,ASingularModernity:EssayontheOntologyofthePresent(London:Verso,2002),p.32.

11. AlbertoToscano,Fanaticism:OntheUsesofanIdea(London:Verso,2010);FrederickCooper,DecolonizationandAfricanSociety:TheLaborQuestioninFrenchandBritishAfrica(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).

12. Chibber,PostcolonialTheory,p.233.13. Weseek tofollowSusanBuck-Morsswhenshewrites: ‘TherejectionofWestern-centrismdoesnotplacea

tabooonusingthetoolsofWesternthought.Onthecontrary,itfreesthecriticaltoolsoftheEnlightenment…fororiginalandcreativeapplication.’SusanBuck-Morss,ThinkingPastTerror:IslamismandCriticalTheoryontheLeft(London:Verso,2003),p.99.

14. WangHui,TheEndoftheRevolution:ChinaandtheLimitsofModernity(London:Verso,2011),pp.69–70.15. GöranTherborn,EuropeanModernityandBeyond:TheTrajectoryofEuropeanSocieties,1945–2000(London:

Sage,1995),p.4.16. Jameson,SingularModernity,p.18.17. CoreyRobin,TheReactionaryMind:ConservatismfromEdmundBurke to SarahPalin (NewYork:Oxford

UniversityPress,2011).18. SimonCritchley,‘IdeasforModernLiving:TheFuture’,Guardian,21November2010.19. KamranMatin, ‘Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism’, European

JournalofInternationalRelations19:2(2013),p.354.20. WaltWhitmanRostow,TheStagesofEconomicGrowth:ANon-CommunistManifesto(Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress,1990).21. WalterMignolo,TheDarker Side ofWesternModernity:Global Futures,DecolonialOptions (Durham, NC:

DukeUniversityPress,2011),pp.xxiv–xxv.