INVALIDATINGAJUDGMENTFORFRAUD...ANDTHESIGNIFICANCEOFFEDERALRULE60(b)ByW.DEANWAGN*Whenitcanbeprovedthatajudgmentofacourtwasob-tainedbyfraud,thequestion -ariseswhetherornotitcanbesetasideandanewtrialhad.Theproblemtobediscussedhereiswhencanreliefbeobtained.Twodifferentproceduresaretobedistinguished:1.Amotionin thecourtthatrenderedthejudgment.2.Anindependentactiontosetthejudgmentasidebroughtin thesamecourtor adifferentcourt.Ourconcernhereis withindependentactionofthe kind broughtinthefederalcourts.FederalRule601wasamendedradicallyin1946,alteringconsiderablytheformerruleregardingthesettingasideofjudgments.Thenewrule(sofaras pertinent)provides:"(b). . . Fraud,etc.Onmotionanduponsuchtermsasarejust,thecourtmayrelieveapartyorhislegalrepresentativefroma finaljudgment,order,orproceedingforthefollowingreasons:(3)fraud(whetherheretoforedenominatedintrinsicorextrinsic),...Themotionshallbemade...not morethanoneyearafterthejudgment,order,orproceedingwasenteredortaken. . . Thisrule doesnotlimitthepowerofacourt to entertain an independent action.. . or to setaside a judgmentfor fraud upon thecourt."(Emphasisadded)Therulethus expresslyprovidesthateitherintrinsicorextrin-sicfraudwillconstitutegroundfor upsettingajudgmentifa mo-tionismadewithinoneyear.But whethernot onlyextrinsicbutalsointrinsic fraud willconstitutesufficientground forupsettingajudgmentaftertheexpirationoftheyearperiodisuncertain.Theplain languageof theruleseems togivecarte blanche authoritytoacourttograntreliefatanytimeforanytypeoffraud.Butrecentjudicialinterpretationsoftherule pointoutquestionsthatdeserveconsideration.* 3rdyearlawstudent,DukeUniversity;A.t.Colgate,1950.128U.S.C.A.Rule60;28U.S.C.1655.42DuKEBARJOURNALWhatis"frauduponthecourt"withinthemeaningofRule60's savingclauseand howisthis tobedistinguishedfrom intrinsicand extrinsicfraud?Did theframers of therule intend toauthorizethesettingasideofjudgmentsforintrinsicaswellasforextrinsicfraud in anycase?Weredifferent standardsoffraudrequiredforthe"independentaction"mentionedintherulethanwerere-quiredforsettingasideajudgmentfor"fraudonthecourt"?Rule60(b)issophrasedastoimplythat"fraudonthecourt"isagroundforinvalidationofajudgmentdifferentfromthegroundswhichwillsustainan"independentaction";theclausesusingthesephrasesareseparatedbyanotherdealingwithaquitedistinctsubject.Wastheframers'intenttoapplythreedifferentrules:one astodirect motions, anotheras to independentactions notinvolving"fraudonthecourt,"anda thirdastoattacksinvolving"fraudonthecourt."Itseemsdoubtfulthatthisdistinctionissound;forascommentatorshavesuggested,2 itisdifficulttoseewhyanyandeveryinstanceoffraudisnot"frauduponthecourt. "Theframers'intentionisbestindicatedintheAdvisoryCom-mittee'sdiscusionof therule.3"Theamendment...[makes]...fraud anexpressgroundforreliefbymotion;andunderthesavingclause,fraudmay beurgedasa groundforreliefbyindependentactioninsofarasestablisheddoctrinepermits.4 ...Andtheruleexpresslydoesnotlimitthepowerofthecourttogivereliefunderthesavingclause.Asanillustration ofthesituation see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.HartfordEmpire (o.[322U.S.238(1944)1."(Italicsadded.)"Fraudonthecourt"asawordofartwasnewnomenclatureintroducedinthe1946amendmenttoFederalRule60.BecauseofthedefinitereferencetoHazel-Atlas Glass Co.v.Hartford Em-pire Co.,i anexaminationof thiscaseis imperativefor afull under-standingof themeaningofthephrase.Hartford,insupportofanapplicationforapatent,submittedtothe PatentOfficeanarticlereferring tothecontestedprocessasa2MooreandRogers,Federal Belief fromCiiil Judgments,55YALEL.J.623(1946),n.268atp.692.3 28U.S.C.A.followingRule60,atp.313.'TheCommitteenotecitesMooreandRogers,op.cit.supra note2,and3MooR,FEDTPRAcTicE,(1sted.),60.03,p.3266.Butthemeaningofthisreferencedefiningandexplainingtheruleisambiguousbecausethesetwoauthoritiescitetheconflictofopinionwhichisnotedinthiscomment.322U.S.238(1944).INVALIDATINGAJUDGMENTFORFRAurD43"revolutionarydevice."AlthoughthearticlewaswrittenbyHartford'sofficials,itwassignedbyanimpartialoutsider.ThisarticlewasinstrumentalinpersuadingthePatentOfficetogranttheapplication.HartfordthensuedHazelcharginginfringementofthepatent.TheCourtofAppealsreversedthedistrictcourt'sdismissalofthecomplaint,largely-becauseofthespuriousarticle.Finally,HazelcapitulatedandpaidHartford$1,000,000anden-teredintoa licensingagreement.The informationabout thefraudwasbroughttolightabouttenyearslater.Hazeltheninstitutedactiontohavethejudgmentagainstitsetasideandthejudgmentofthedistrictcourtre-instated.'WhenthiscasereachedtheSupremeCourt,Mr.JusticeBlack,writingforthemajorityofacourtdivided5-4,directedthedistrictcourttosetasideitsjudg-mentinthefirstactionenteredpursuanttotheCircuitCourtofAppeals'mandate,andtore-instateitsoriginaljudgment.Thecourtsaid:[The]generalrule[is]that[federalcourtswill]notalterorsetasidetheirjudgmentsaftertheexpirationofthetermatwhichthejudgmentswerefinallyentered. . . [But]everyelementofthefraudheredisclosedde-mandstheexerciseofthehistoricpowerofequitytosetasidethefraudulentlybegottenjudgment.Here. . . wefindadeliberatelyplannedandcarefullyexecutedschemetodefraudnot onlythePatentOfficebut theCircuitCourtofAppeals...Thepublicwelfaredemandsthattheagen-ciesofpublicjusticebenotsoimpotentthattheymustalwaysbemuteandhelplessvictimsofdeceptionandfraud. . ."6Theopiniondidnotrefertothedistinctionbetweenextrinsicor intrinsic fraud.Prior tothiscase therehad been twoconflictingSupremeCourtdecisions,theearlieroneholdingthataninde-pendentactiontosetasideajudgmentcanbefoundedonlyuponextrinsicfraud, theother holding thatintrinsicfraud suffices.Thecourt'sfailuretocharacterizethefraudpracticedbyHartfordjustifiedabeliefthataliberaldoctrinewastobeappliedinthefederalcourts, and that fraudsynonymous withthe Hartfordfraudwouldbeabasisforrelief.SincetheHartford casewasusedbytheAdvisoryCommitteetodefinetheterm"fraudonthecourt,"what thiscasemeansis what FederalRule60(b)means.I Id.at244,245.44DuKEBARJOURNALFraudasGroundforIndependentAttackBeforeRule60(b)Ithasgenerallybeenstatedthat"theactsforwhichacourtofequitywillonaccountoffraudsetasideorannulajudgmentordecreebetweenthesamepartiesrenderedbyacourtofcom-petentjurisdictionhaverelationtofraudsextrinsicorcollateraltothematter triedbythefirstcourt,andnot toa fraudinthematteronwhichthedecreewasrendered."' 7Thereislittledoubtthatthemajoritystateruleisthattheonlytypeoffraudforwhichacourtofequitywillupsetajudgmentisextrinsicfraud;thatin-trinsicfrauddoesnotaffordgroundforrelief.8 Thestatementofthelawisclear,butitsapplicationcanleadtoperplexitiesbe-causeitoftenwillbedifficulttocategorizethefraudinquestion.9TheSupremeCourt hasaddedconfusionbyrendering inconsistentdecisionsrelatingtothetypeof fraud neededto upseta judgment;inonecase statingflatly thatextrinsicfraudonly wouldbegroundforsettingasideajudgmentinanindependentattack0 andinalaterdecisionallowingintrinsicfraudtoconstitutegroundforsettingajudgmentaside."Ithasbeensuggestedthat theruleoftheearlierThrockmorton case(extrinsicfraud only)andtheruleofthelaterMarshall case(intrinsicfraudsuffices)12 arenotin'UnitedStatesv. Throckmorton,98U.S.61,68(1878).a Cf. RESTATEMENT,JUDGMENTS,126with 121.SeeFREEMAN,JUDO-mEx s, 1233;3MooaE,FEDERALPRACTICE,(1sted.1938),60.03;126A.L.R.386.ExtrinsicfraudisillustratedbyMeGuinnesev.SuperiorCourt,196Cal.222,237Pae.42(1925),wherethefraudallegedwasthefailuretonotifyinterestedpartiesofthependeneyofasuit.Metzgerv.Turner,158P.2d701(Okla.Sup.Ct.1945)illustratedanapplicationofintrinsicfraud.Thedefendentin anactiontoquiettitlewhereinadefaultjudgmentbad beenenteredagainsthimsoughttohavethejudgmentvacatedonthegroundoffraud,allegingthat theplaintiffhadmadefalseallegationsthat hehadgoodtitle,andfalselyallegedthathewasinpossessionwheninfacthe wasnot.Itwasheldthatthefraudcomplainedofwasintrinsicfraudgoingtotheactualorpotentialissuesintheoriginalsuitandwasthereforeinsufficientgroundonwhichtovacatethejudgment.SeeNote,24TEx.L.REv.233.'Itis"ajourneyintofutilitytoattempttodistinguishbetweenextrinsicandintrinsicmatter."MooreandRogers,op.cit.supranote2atp.658.0United Statesv.Throckmorton,supranote7.1Marshallv.Holmes,141U.S. 589(1891)."UnitedStatesv.Throckmorton,supra note7,wasabillinchancery,theplaintiffseekingtohavethecourtsetasidetheconfirmationofalandgrant.ThefraudallegedwasthatthedefendanthadobtainedanillegallandgrantfromaMexicanofficialwhohadnoauthoritytogiveit.Therewereotherperjureddocumentsinvolved.TheSupremeCourtdeniedrelief.InMarshallv.Holmes,supra note11,afterthecloseoftheterm,thedefendantagainstwhomthejudgmentswererenderedfiledapetitioninthesamecourtINVALIDATINGAJUDGMENTFORFRAUDconflict.'3 Butareadingoftherecentcasesdemonstratesthatdifferentcircuitsdisagreeabouttheeffectofthesetwodecisionsandareconsequentlyapplyingdifferentstandards.ThethirdcircuitinPublicker v.Shallcross14 thoughtthattheThroekmorton casewasnolongerlaw.Rejectingthecontentionthatitwaswithoutpowertoinvalidateajudgmentobtainedbyintrinsicfraud,theCourtofAppeals,citingtheMarshall case,said:"Wedonotconsiderourselvesboundby[theThrockmorton]case for ...wedonotbelieveitisthelawoftheSupremeCourttoday. . ."15Thecourtappendedthecomment:".. . [The]truthis moreimportant thanthetroubleittakestogetit."Ontheotherhand,the8thcircuitinPhillips Petroleum Co.v.Jenkins"0 held thattheThrockmorton casewasstilllaw.Thiswasanactionforrelieffromatortjudgmentagainsttheappellantonthegroundthatdefendanthadsimulatedaninjuryanddis-abilityandconspiredwithaphysiciantodeceiveexaminingdoc-tors.Thecourt,citingtheThroekmortoncase,said:"CourtsoftheUnitedStates.. .willnotdepriveapartyofthebenefitofajudgment...onaccountofintrinsicfraud.' 17TheSupremeCourt hasneverclarifieditsposition.'8 Butthetypeoffraudinvolvedin theHartford casewouldleadtoa tenta-tiveconclusionthatatleastsometypesofintrinsicfraudcouldbefortheannulmentofthejudgmentuponthegroundthatthejudgmenthadbeenobtainedthroughtheuseoffalsetestimonyandforgedletters.TheSupremeCourtgrantedrelief.1 SeeChicago,R.I.& P. Ry.Co.v.Callicotte,267Fed.799(8thCir.1920),cert denied255U.S. 570(1921);16A.L.R.386.14106F.2d949(3rdCir.1939),126A.L.R.386,certdenied308U.S. 624(1940).2 Id.106F.2dat950.-- 91F.2d183(8thCir.1937).17Id.at187.1"ThisinconsistencyinthefederalcourtswasattemptedtoberesolvedinCraverv.Faurot,64Fed.241(C.C.N.D.I.1894),reversed 76Fed.257(7thCir.1896),certif. dismissed162U.S. 435(1896),wherethecourt,"feelingthatUnitedStatesv.ThroekmortonandMarshallv.Holmeswereindirectconflictandnotknowingwhichwastogovern,sentthecasetotheSupremeCourtonacertificateofimportance.TheSupremeCourtrefusedtohearthemerits,disposingofthecaseonatechnicalityastothevalidityoftheuseofacertificateofimportance."3Moons,FEDEnAIPRAOToB%(1sted.), 60.03,n.17,p.3268.Alawwriterin21CoL.L. Rv.268commented,"Asforthefederalrule...itmustremainunsettled.Sincethecourtsareatlibertytociteeitherlineofauthority,anddosoassuitstheirconvenience,theonlypossibleanswerinspiteofrepeatedassertionstothecontrarythatthefederalruleisclearisthatthereisnofederalruleatall."DuxEBAJouRNALgroundsforupsettingajudgment.Mr.JusticeBlack'sassertionthat the"agenciesofpublic justice[are]not soimpotentthat theymustalwaysbemuteandhelplessvictimsofdeceptionandfraud..."19wouldapplytodeceptioncommittedbyintrinsicfraudaswellasdeceptionbyextrinsicfraud.Perjury isconsideredintrin-sicfraudandsincethefalsearticleutilizedbyHartfordseemsanalogoustoperjuredevidencethereisstronggroundforarguingthatthemoreliberal Marshall rulewasadoptedasthefederalrule.But, becauseof theambiguityoftheSupremeCourt'sposition, wefindtwodivergentattitudesexpressedamongthecircuits.Thelowerfederalcircuitshavebeenpermittedtoselecttheremedialattitude theyprefer,in spiteof whatwasa mutedcommandtothecontraryinHazel-AtlasGlass v.Hartford.ApplicationofRule60(b)Ashasbeenseen,theamendmenttoFederalRule60(b)in-troducedtheterm"fraudonthecourt"andnodistinctionwasdrawnbetweenextrinsicandintrinsic fraudinthesavingclause.20Becauseoftheconflictingviewpointsofthecasesupto1946itisdifficulttoascertainwhatwasintendedbythisnewterm.Butunlessthesavingclauseof therulewasintendedtorecognizesometypeofintrinsicfraudasgroundforreliefinanindependentaction,thereferenceto theHartford decisionhasnomeaning.Certainlyitcanbevalidly arguedthatHartford impliedlysug-gestedthattheMarshallcaseoverruledtheThrockmortoncaseand thatthe Marshall rulewastheruleofthefederalcourts.TheSupremeCourt'sfailuretolimittheapplicationofthefrauddoe-" Ibid.Mr. JusticeBlackalso said..... tamperingwiththeadministrationofjusticeasindisputablyshownhereinvolvesfarmorethaninjury toasinglelitigant.Itisawrongagainsttheinstitutionssetuptoprotectandsafe-guardthepublic,institutionsinwhichfraudcannotcomplacentlybetoleratedconsistentwiththegoodorderofsociety."TwocasesdecidedbytheSupremeCourtcitingtheHartford casefailtoshedmuchlightonthemeaningthecourtattachedtothedecision.UniversalOilProductsCo.v.RootRefiningCo.,328U.S.575(1945),citedtheHartfordcaseandsaidat p.580,"Theinherentpowerofafederalcourtto investigatewhetherajudgmentwasobtainedbyfraudisbeyondquestion."ButinKnauerv. UnitedStates,328U.S. 654(1946),Mr.JusticeFrankfurterinti-matedthattheexclusionofintrinsicfraudasagroundforreliefmightstillbetherule.-oRecallthattheruleexpresslyprovidesthateitherintrinsicorextrinsicfraudcanbegroundforreliefbymotiontothecourtthat renderedthejudg-ment.INVALIDATINGAJUDGMENTFORFRAUD47trinetoextrinsicfraud indicatedanintent to utilizeamoreliberaldoctrineandtoaccordinjuredlitigantsawiderbasisforrelief.However, whatevertheintentoftheSupremeCourt, thecontentionthat theMarshall rulewastheruleofthefederalcourts(vis-a-vistheHartford case)wassoon rejectedbyalower federalcourt.Prior totheadoptionofRule60(b)'samendmentin1946,theCourtofCustomsandPatentAppealshadbeforeitinJosserandv.Taylor21 a petitionforleavetofilea billofreviewinthepatentoffice,theplaintiffclaimingthat thedefendantcommittedfraudintheinterferenceproceedinginwhichpriorityoftheinventionhadbeenawardedhim.Thefraudallegedwasperjury,andthecourtsaid:"Weareunableto[agreethattheHartford caseheld]thatajudgmentordecreerenderedbya federalcourtat aformerterm,22 obtainedbyintrinsic fraudasdistinguishedfrom extrinsicor collateralfraud,shouldnullifya proceed-ingsuchas hereinvolved...Wethinkitisevidentfrom[that decision]that theCourtwasof theopinionthat 'cer-tain officialsandattorneys'of theHartfordCompanyhadenteredandcarriedout aconspiracytodefraudthePatentOfficeandtheCircuitCourtofAppealsandthatsuchaconspiracywasnotanintrinsicbutanextrinsicorcol-lateral fraud.' '23Thisdecisionisimportant,forifthecourt'sinterpretationoftheHartford caseiscorrectthenewFederalRulebecomesmerelyare-statementoftheoldThrockmorton rule.And,Josserand v.Taylor wasfollowed,withrespecttothemeaningofFederalRule60(b),inDowdyv.Hawfield.24 TheDistrictofColumbiacircuitwasaskedheretosetasidetheprobateofawillbecausewitnessesforthewillhadgivenperjured testimony.Thecourtsaid:"....[Rule60(b)]stipulates that'Thisrule doesnot limitthepowerofacourttoentertainanindependentaction. . . tosetasideajudgmentforfrauduponthecourt.'TheSupremeCourtinUnitedStatesv.Throckmorton...21159F.2d249(Ct.Oust.&Pat.App.1946).22ThisdecisionwasrenderedpriortotheamendmenttoFederalRule60.Atthistime,theruleregardingmotionsinthecourtthatrenderedthejudg-mentwasthatacourtcouldnotupsetajudgmentrenderedatapriorterm.Theamendmentgaveayeargraceperiod.23Josserandv.Taylor,supra note21at253.ThisdecisionisconsistentwiththesuggestionthattheHartford caseintendedtoapplyamoreliberalruletopatentcasesonly."1189 1.2d637(D.C.Cir.1951),cert.denied342U.S.830(1952).48DUKEBAuJOURNALheldthatfraudmustbe'extrinsicorcollateral'tothemattertriedbythefirstcourt,andnottoafraudinthematterinwhichthedecreewasrendered.Josserandv.Taylor...affirmedthisruleandinthatcasetheHartfordcasewasheldnottohavechangedtherule."25The effectof Federal Rule60(b)was thus summarilydismissed.Thereasoningwas:FederalRule60(b)adoptstheHartfordrule;Hartfordin Josserand. Taylor washeld tohave beenmerelyan applicationof therule of theThrockmorton case;sotheThrocc-mortonruleisstilllaw.Thecourtgavenoconsiderationtothepossibilitythattheframersofthecodeintendedtodistinguishbe-tweengroundsfor independentattackandgroundsforupsettingajudgmentforfraudonthecourt.NotwithstandingDowdyv.Hawfield,thissameDistrictofColumbiacircuit6 wasaskedinDausuel v.Dausue2ltosetasideajudgmentofdivorcebecausethedecreehadbeenprocuredbyperjury.Thiswas a proceedingonajudgmentcreditor'sbillforalimonywhereinthehusbandfiledacrosscompliantseekingtosetasidethedivorce.Thetrialcourtdismissedthecrosscomplaintandfoundgenerallyfor thewife.TheCourtof Appealsheldthatifthefactswereasallegedinthecrosscomplaintthedecreeofdivorcecouldbevacated.JudgeEdgertonsaid:"Acourtmayatanytimesetasideajudgmentforafterdiscoveredfrauduponthecourt.Hazel-AtlasGlassv.Hartford ... Rule60(b).. .expresslydoesnotlimitthepowerofacourttoentertainanactionforthatpurpose."(Italics added.)28Thecourtdid not citeitspreviousrulingin Dowdy v.Dowdy;andby ignoringthedistinctionbetweenextrinsicor intrinsicfraudim-pliedthat itisnolongersignificant.NewJersey'sRuleofCivilPractice3:60-2isidenticaltoFed-eralRule60(b).TheNewJerseySupremeCourtwasaskedinShammasv.Shammas29 tointerpretthe"fraudonthecourt"phrase.Thiswasanactionfordivorcewhereintheadministratoroftheestateofpetitioner'ssecondwifefiledapetitiontosetaside2 5Id.,189F.2dat638.26Differentjudgesweresitting.27 195F.2d774(D.C.Cir.1952).28Id.,at775.299 N.J.321,88A.2d204(1952);seealsoLysterv.Berberich,65A.2d632(N.J.Super.App.Div.1949);Williamsv.DeFabio,65A.2d858(N.3.Super.App.Div.1949);andsee98U.or'PA.L.REv.117,n.2.INVALIDATINGAJUDGMENTFOpFRAUD49thedivorcedecreeandadjudgepetitionerguiltyofcontemptforwilfullygivingfalsetestimonyinthedivorcetrial.Althoughthecourtheldthattheadministratorswerestrangerstothe recordandhadnostandingtoattackthejudgment,it(1)expresslyre-jectedtheThrockmorton rule,(2)expresslyrejected theargumentthatif intrinsicfraud wasallowedtoupsetjudgmentsendlessliti-gationwouldresult,and(3)heldthateitherintrinsicorextrinsicfraudwaswithinthe"fraudonthecourt"term.TheNewJerseySupremeCourtthushasdonewhattheSu-premeCourt hasfailedtodo,i.e.,ithasattachedadefiniteunder-standingtothemeaningofthephrase.ConclusionRule60(b)canbeinterpretedinatleastthreedifferentways.Anindependentactiontosetasideajudgmentforfraud(1)maybegroundedonlyuponextrinsicfraud,(2)maybegroundeduponeitherextrinsicorintrinsicfraud,(3)maybegroundedonlyuponextrinsicfraud,exceptinthoseinstanceswhereintrinsicfraudconstitutes"fraudonthecourt."Untilnow,thecourtshavebeenconcernedwith whetherornot"fraudonthecourt"includesatleastsomeinstanceofintrinsicfraudorwhetherthisphraseiscontrolledbytheThrockmortonrule.However,thephrasingofRule60(b)permitsthesuggestionthat"fraudonthecourt"isagroundforinvalidationofajudg-ment differentfrom theground whichwillsustain an"independentaction."' 30 Suchadistinction,however,wouldtendtomultiplythealreadyexistingconfusion.Thepresentconflictbetweenthecircuitsstemsfromthecon-flictingdecisionsrendered bytheSupremeCourt prior totheadop-tionofRule60(b)andtheambiguityoftheterm"fraudonthecourt."Thenewrulemakesitdifficulttodistinguishthetypeoffraudwhichmustbeavailedofwithinoneyear,fromfraudonthecourt, whichmay beurged at anytime.Whyis everyfraud nota fraudonthecourt?ButaslongastheCourtsofAppealshave1oTherulestates,"Thisruledoesnot limitthepowerofa courttoentertainanindependentaction,[thenareferenceto proceedingsin rem],ortoset asideajudgmentforfrauduponthecourt."Conceivablytherearethreedifferentcircumstanceshere,withadifferentruleapplicabletoeach.D=BARJOURNALinconsistentauthoritiestocite,Rule60(b)willstandfortheThrockmorton ruleortheMarshall ruledependingonthecircuit.Courtsrefusingtorecognizeintrinsicfraudasa basisforrelieffear therecurringlitigationthat mightresult."Endlesslitigationinwhich nothingwaseverfinallydeterminedwouldbeworsethanoccasionalmiscarriagesof justice.',31 Yet, ontheotherhandthereisa naturaldesiretohavethecourtsperformjusticeandtodenyamantheprofitsofhisownwrongdoing."Thenotionthatre-peatedretrialsofcasesmaybeexpectedtofollow...thesettingasideof judgmentsrenderedonfalsetestimony willnotwithstandcriticalanalysis.Ratheritismorelogicaltoanticipatethattheguiltylitigantcommittingperjury ... willnotriskpursuingthecausefurther."'32Itissubmitted,however,thatitiswrongtohavedifferentconsequencesdependon thetypeof fraudcommitted-thatif"fraudvitiatesajudgment"nodifferenceshouldstemfromthelabelattachedtothefraud.Thetest,rather,shouldbe,wasthefraudofthetypethatthepartyhadarealopportunitytolitigateinthefirstaction ?3 Ifintheopinionofacourtajudgmentwasobtainedthroughtheutilizationoffalserecordsanddocumentsofwhichapartywasjustifiablyunaware,thenthejudgmentshouldbeset aside,regardlessofthefactthat thefraudwasintrinsic.Ontheotherhand,ifapartycouldhaveknownofthefraud,andhadathoroughopportunitytoinvestigatethematterandthroughhisownfaultanadversejudgmentwasrendered,noreliefshouldbeavailable.Certainly theSupremeCourt demonstratedan intentto broadenthescopeofthefraudruleintheHartford caseandthattheframersofFederalRule60(b)'sterm"fraudonthecourt"didnot restatetheThrockmorton rulealone.Hadthelatterbeentheirpurposeitseemsreasonabletoassumetheywouldhavesaidso.ContrarytotheopinioninJosserand v.Tajlor, supra, itissub-mittedthattheSupremeCourtadoptedandappliedtheMarshallruleintheHartford caseanddemonstratedanintenttoliberalizethefederalruleandthatFederalRule60(b)wasanexpressionofthisintentformalizedinaruleofprocedure.31Fawcettv.Atherton,298Mch.362,299N.W.108;notedin40Mio.L.REv. 598."Shammasv.Shammas,9N.J.321,88A.2d204(1952).33See,98U.orPA.L.Ray.117;otherlaw notesdiscussingintrinsicandextrinsicfraudrulesare22HAv. L.REv. 600;49HARv.L.REV.27;21CoL.L.Rzv.268;21ILL.L.R-v.833;28GEo.L.J.848;36ILL.L.Rav.894;24TEx.L.R v. 223;12Coaar.LL.Q.385.INVALIDATINGAJUDGMENTFORFRAUD51TheinterpretationofNewJersey'sSupremeCourtstemsfromamorerealisticunderstandingoftheintentionoftheframersofFederalRule60(b)andofthemoresensibleapplicationofthedoctrineoffraudupsettingjudgments.3 4 TheThrockmorton ruleleadstoanomalousresults:ofXobtainingreliefbecausehisad-versarykeptoneofX'switnessesawayfromthecourtroomandinducedthewitnessnot totestify, whileY'sjudgmentagainst himwouldstandeventhoughhis adversarybribedoneofY'switnessestoutterfalsetestimonyonthewitnessstand.Thelabelextrinsicorintrinsicaddsnothing-andjusticeshouldnotbepredicatedonwords.Until nownotestshavebeenrecommendedfor defining"fraudonthecourt."Perhapstherationalizationannouncedin Haddenv.RumseyProducts35 bythedistrict courtfor theWesterndistrictofNew Yorkisaswiseaspossible:"Outofdeferenceto thedeeprooted policyinfavorof thereposeof judgments...courts ofequity havebeencautiousinexercisingtheirpower[inupsettingjudgments]. . .Butwhentheoccasionhasdemanded,whereenforcementofthejudgmentis'manifestlyunconscionable'. . . theyhavewieldedthepowerwithouthesitation."3 6Until theSupremeCourt re-definesits positionthe"manifestlyunconscionable"test willbetheonlytest,anditwill remain,asithas been, thatdespite Federal Rule60 (b)thereis no federal rule atall.11Shammasv.Shammas,supranote32,88A.2dat208,"[U]ponprinciple,weholdthatreliefforfrauduponthecourtmaybeallowedunderourrulewhetherthe fraudchargedisdenominatedintrinsicorextrinsic."31196F.Supp.988(W.D.N.Y.1951).0I d. at993.