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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20034 January 30, 1965

ISABELO ASTRAQUILLO and JUANITA J. ASTRAQUILLO, petitioners,

vs.PRIMITIVO JAVIER, AMPARO S. JAVIER, COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE NICASIO YATCO,in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch V, Quezon City),

and of QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for petitioners.E. Quisumbing-Fernando and Y. Quisumbing-Javellana for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Petitioners-spouses Isabelo and Juanita Astraquillo prosecuted before this Court the instantpetition to review on certioraria resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special Fourth Division), inits CA-G.R. No. 30249-R, which, upon motion for reconsideration of respondents-spousesPrimitivo and Amparo Javier (defendants-appellees below), reversed its original decisiongranting herein petitioners' petition forcertiorari, and upheld a special order of execution of thedecision pending appeal issued by respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal(Quezon City, Branch V) in its Civil Case No. Q-2276.

After a protracted trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City, Branch V) had rendered

a decision in its case No. 2276, dated August 1961, the dispositive portion of which reads asfollows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered inthis case in favor of the defendants Primitivo Javier and Amparo S. Javier and againstthe plaintiff Isabelo Astraquillo Juanita J. Astraquillo, as follows:

(a) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint;

(b) Declaring the real estate mortgage marked in evidence in this case as Exhibit K-1,inexistent and void;

(c) Ordering the plaintiffs to vacate pay the premises in question and surrenderpossession thereof to the defendants;

(d) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P250.00 in the form ofrentals from April 1956 up to the time the possession of the premises in question is

surrendered to the defendants;

(e) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P200.00 a month fromSeptember, 1956 until the possession of the premises in question is delivered to thedefendants, by way of actual damages;

(f) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P2,240.00 which the formerreceived from Patrocinio Evalle but which was not turned over to the latter;

(g) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P2,789.48 which theplaintiffs received from the PHHC by way of condonation of delinquency interests andwhich was not turned over to the defendants.

All the foregoing to bear interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the fili ngof the complaint, until fully paid; and

(h) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as moral

damages;

(i) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants, the sum of P2,000.00 by way ofexemplary damages;

(j) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney'sfees; and

(k) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.

As above stated, the plaintiffs are entitled to be reimbursed in the sum of P19,587.26and P12,464.24. It is understood, however, that these amounts should be reimbursedto the plaintiffs after they have surrendered the possession of the premises in questionto the defendants and the same to be deducted from the respective amounts to be

paid by said plaintiffs to the defendants.

From the unfavorable decision, plaintiffs Astraquillo filed on 27 September 1961 their notice ofappeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal. Upon defendants' objection to the approval of saidrecord on the ground that it was incomplete and defective, the plaintiffs were ordered by the trialcourt to amend the same to conform to said opposition. Plaintiffs submitted their amendedrecord on appeal, and set it for approval on 14 October 1961, which was later reset for 28October 1961. In the meantime, defendants Javier filed on 10 October 1961 their motion forexecution pending appeal based on the alleged insolvency of the plaintiffs, which motion wasamended on 25 October 1961 substantially alleging the same ground. Plaintiffs opposed saidmotion.

On 28 October 1961, the trial court granted defendants' motion and issued an order which wedeem pertinent to quote hereunder because it discusses the respective contentions of theparties relative to the disputed issue in the present petition. Said order reads:

Before the Court for resolution is an Amended Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,dated October 25, 1961, filed by counsel for the defendents. Counsel for the plaintiffsfiled an opposition on October 28, 1961.

The special reasons set forth in the instant motion is that, plaintiffs in this case areinsolvent. To substantiate their claims, defendants allege that: (a) as early as March1955, the PHHC had attempted to eject plaintiffs from the property in question for non-payment of the installments due thereon, which attempt was not carried out onlybecause defendants stepped in and paid the balance due to said PHHC; (b) plaintiffIsabelo Astraquillo himself admitted on the witness stand that he was in need of funds;that (c) plaintiffs' gross income for the year 1959 amounted to only P4,400.00 of whichsum P1,500.00 was the total income of plaintiff Isabelo Astraquillo, while the balancewas the salary of plaintiff Juanita J. Astraquillo from her teaching position.

The main argument advanced by the plaintiffs in support of their opposition of theissuance of the writ of execution prayed for herein by the defendants is that, "the mere

allegation that plaintiffs are insolvent without the corresponding finding of proof to thateffect is not special or good reason that will justify the issuance of execution pendingappeal." Plaintiffs further contend that the discretion of the trial court in issuing animmediate execution is to be reckoned from the circumstances obtaining after thedecision has been rendered and not from the circumstances that took place during theperiod of trial.1wph1.t

Needless to state in this connection, that among other things, the plaintiffs wereordered to pay the defendants the sum of P250.00 in the form of rentals from April1956 up to the time possession of the premises in question is surrendered to thedefendant. Apparently, as to this date, the total of the accrued rentals amounts tosome P16,000.00 more or less. As the years go by pending appeal of this case, theaccrued rentals would gradually increase as a matter of course, and there are strongindications, as pointed to by the defendants, that plaintiffs are not in a position to paythe same. Should it be the case, as there are well founded reasons to believe that it

would be, such circumstances would undoubtedly render the decision nugatory. This


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to the Court, is sufficient reason to justify the issuance of the writ of execution prayedfor.

In fine, the primordial reason that impels the Court to grant the motion of defendants isbecause plaintiffs are insolvent. If they were not in such situation or if they are nowbetter off than they were during the pendency of this case for trial, said plaintiffs haveno proof on that score.

WHEREFORE, for the special reasons set forth above, the Court orders the issuanceof a writ of execution in this case pending appeal, unless the plaintiffs file asupersedeas bond in the sum of P20,000.00 within a period of ten (10) days from

receipt of this order. It is understood that if after the period of ten (10) days asaforestated, plaintiffs have not filed the supersedeas bond, the Clerk of Court isdirected to issue the writ of execution in this case pending appeal. Counsel for bothparties notified hereof in open court.

Plaintiffs filed on 28 November 1961 a motion to reconsider the above-quoted order which thetrial court denied on 2 December 1961, and for failure to post the supersedeas bond required inthe same order the trial court also directed, on 28 November 1961, respondent Sheriff to enforcethe corresponding writ of execution.

Plaintiffs went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorarito annul and set aside said writof execution pending appeal, which, as intimated at the beginning of this opinion, was ultimatelydenied by said appellate court. However, before petitioners herein could seek a reconsiderationof said resolution, and before the same could become final and executory, respondents Javiersecured on 14 July 1962 an alias writ of execution in the trial court, and, pursuant thereto,respondent Sheriff levied on the personal properties of the petitioners herein and set the sale

thereof for 25 July 1962. Respondent Sheriff also threatened to eject petitioners herein from theproperty in question. Petitioners herein therefore presented on 23 July 1962 the instant petitionto review on certiorariwith a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction before this Court. We gavedue course to the petition, and issued the corresponding writ upon the filing of a bond in theamount of P10,000.00, which the petitioners posted in due time.

The sole issue for determination in the present petition is whether respondent Court of Appealscorrectly upheld the order of the trial court in executing its decision pending appeal. In otherwords, the only issue is whether respondent trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the special order of execution in question.

Petitioners herein question the propriety of the conduct of the Court of Appeals in completelyreversing its original decision granting their petition for certiorariand setting aside and annullingthe order of execution of the decision of the trial court pending appeal. They contend thatrespondents Javier, in their motion to reconsider, raised substantially the very same issues andgrounds alleged in their answer to the petition; hence, there was no justification for respondent

appellate court to change its original decision.

Petitioners herein also contend that respondents Javier, as the prevailing parties and movantsfor executing the decision pending appeal in the trial court, had the burden to prove the former'salleged insolvency, and since no evidence was submitted to substantiate such claim ofinsolvency, the issuance of said special order was not warranted under the circumstances.

On the other hand, respondents Javier maintain that respondent Court of Appeals correctlyupheld the disputed special order of the trial court, the same being conformable to the law and

jurisprudence on the matter.

It is already well-settled that under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,

The power to grant or deny a motion for execution is discretionary with the court(Federal Films v. Ocampo, 78 Phil. 479). Accordingly, the appellate court will notinterfere to modify, control, or inquire into the exercise of this discretion, unless it beshown that there has been an abuse thereof (Calvo v. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 203; Case v.Metropole Hotel, 5 Phil. 49; Gamay vs. Gutierrez David, 48 Phil. 768; Buenaventura v.Pea, 78 Phil. 795; Ong Sit v. Piccio, 78 Phil. 785; Naredo v. Yatco, 80 Phil. 220).

(Federation of United Namarco Distributors v. National Marketing Corp., et al., &National Marketing Corp. v. Tan, et al., G. R. Nos. 1-17819 & L-16678, March 31,1962).

It is not disputed that respondents Javier filed their motion for execution pending appeal in thetrial court before petitioners Astraquillos perfected their appeal, and averred the insolvency ofthe latter as the special and good reason for such execution specifying and citing the factsappearing in the records of the case upon which such claim is based. Respondent trial judge, ingranting the motion seem to have been satisfied that the evidence already submitted did warrantsuch execution pending appeal. This finding was confirmed by the Court of Appeals in itsdisputed resolution.

Under the circumstances prevailing in the case at bar, we are constrained not to disturb thedisputed ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Coming to the first contention of the petitioners herein, suffice it to state that it is one of theinherent powers of the court "to amend and control its process and orders so as to make themconformable to law and justice" (Sec. 5, Rule 135, Revised Rules of Court). This power includesthe right to reverse itself, specially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error ormistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party-litigant. Thisappears to have been what happened in the case at bar; hence respondent Court of Appealsperfectly acted within its prerogatives in reversing itself.

With respect to the second contention of the petitioners herein, the records of this case belietheir claim. In its resolution, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence toconfirm the order of the trial court executing its decision pending appeal. Thus, it ruled that theinsolvency of the petitioners herein has been clearly shown, which is a good and special reason

for the immediate execution of the decision, to wit:

1. The petitioners owe in back rentals alone to the respondents, as per decision ofrespondent Judge the sum of P250.00 monthly from April, 1956 to the present orroughly P18,000.00;

2. Petitioner Isabelo Astraquillo admitted during the trial of the civil case, his need offunds several times;

3. As per notice of the Sheriff's sale, dated December 4, 1961, respondent Sheriffcould levy only on household effects of the petitioners, mostly furniture items, tosatisfy the judgment;

x x x x x x x x x

5. Petitioners could have stayed the writ of execution by filing the P20,000.00supersedeas bond required by respondent judge, which they did not do;

Considering that we are bound by the above-quoted factual findings, since in appeals bycertiorariunder Rule 45 (formerly Rule 46 of the old Rules) of the Revised Rules of Court "the

judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to facts, and cannot be reviewed by theSupreme Court" [11 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 ed.), 413], we see no way tohold that the Court of Appeals committed any grave abuse of discretion in ultimately affirmingthe special order of execution issued by the trial court. Anyway, insolvency of a party (in thesense of inability to show apparent assets adequate to meet its obligations) need not be proveddirectly, but may be inferred, as the appellate court did, from a number of circumstancesappearing of record.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed, and the writ ofpreliminary injunction heretofore issued ordered dissolved. With costs against the petitioners.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R.Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J .:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court iswhether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to theprovincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for thecrime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information datedAugust 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA YMAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the

Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and asfurther amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did thenand there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody andcontrol one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6)rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permittherefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at theoutset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accusedwas found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permitor license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of lawwhether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued bythe Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance thathe would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being thatonly a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified suchquestion to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for hisfirearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that hecould pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does theaccused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunitionmentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in theCity of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereoffrom the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answeredcategorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement:"The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that theaccused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision."Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of hisappointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor ofBatangas, dated June 2, 1962;

1another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste

also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and QuezonCity on a confidential mission;

2the oath of office of the accused as such secret

agent,3

a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secretagent" of Gov. Leviste.

4Counsel for the accused then stated that with the

presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question

of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincialgovernor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibitswere admitted and the parties were given time to file their respectivememoranda.1wph1.t

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting theaccused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to anindeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay thecosts. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of theGovernment."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decisionmust be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful

for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunitiontherefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in themanufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."

5The next section provides

that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers,sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the PhilippineConstabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police,provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use inthe performance of their official duties."

6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he isnot exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is toapply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been

demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7

Theconviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8

where a secret agent wasacquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as asecret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer"equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set asidethe clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore thatthis decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longerspeaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,vs.ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J. :

This special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issueof whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitionsfor, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusiveappellate jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases ofGarcia vs. De Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections,

1this Court ruled in the negative

because of the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by theconstitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that

jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of ac tion, mustexist as a matter of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these

two classes of jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred bylaw. One does not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state thatin the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise oforiginal jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or bylaw. It is never derived by implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELECappellate jurisdiction, it does not grant it any power to exercise original jurisdiction overpetitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which isspecifically conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed outthat the doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC

2 that neither the Constitution nor

any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs still findsapplication under the 1987 Constitution.

In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections,3

this Courtreiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to theaffirmative view of the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:

Sec. 50. Definition.

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear anddecide petitions for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involvingelection cases.

The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having beenissued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hecontends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scantconsideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P.

Blg. 697 which was to govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984;hence, it was a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent RositaCumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes,

Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of onlytwenty-two votes over the former.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to

have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgementin favor of the petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court herebydeclares the protestant as having won the mayoralty election and asduly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Nortein the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant havingobtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.

Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the privaterespondent on 1 July 1994.

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filingher notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.

On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pendingappeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.

On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pendingappeal. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the privaterespondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriffheld in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition forcertioraritoannul the aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appealand the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.4

Thedispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES thatis [sic] has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions forcertiorari,prohibition and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, andtherefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition forcertiorariwhichis hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 ishereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on

August 4, 1994 LIFTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position.as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pendingresolution of the appeal before this Commission in the case ofRelampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.

In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent

COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the


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Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the performance ofits judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinarywrits of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has appellate

jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confersjurisdiction to issue the prerogative Writs, then the Commission hasjurisdiction.

Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.

B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TOGOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANGPAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OFSECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATINGFUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50provides:

Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversyrefers to any question pertaining to or affecting theproceedings of the Board of Canvassers which maybe raised by any candidate, political party orcoalition of political parties before the board ordirectly with the Commission.

The Commission Elections shall be the sole judgeand shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusiveauthority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,prohibition and mandamus involving electioncases.(Emphasis supplied).

We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697,has been repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has notbeen repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code(BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:

Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. Presidential DecreeNo. 1296 otherwise known as the The 1978 ElectionCode, as amended, is hereby repealed. All otherelection Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules andregulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with theprovisions of this Code is hereby repealed, exceptPresidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas PambansaBlg. 20 governing the election of the members of theSangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.(Emphasis supplied).

B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereofis not inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case,the Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases, that impliedrepeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:

Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, soalso should the grant of original jurisdiction by mere

implication to a quasi-judicial body be tabooed.(Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . .did not modify or repeal, whether expressly orimpliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is commonplace Learning that implied repeal are not favored inLaw and are not casually to be assumed. The firsteffort of a court must always be to reconcile or

adjust the provisions of one statute with those ofanother so as to give sensible effect to bothprovisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261(1974); Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197(1971); National Power Corporation vs. ARCA, 25SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208(1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters

Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377(1965).Only when there is clear inconsistency and conflictbetween the provisions of two (2) statutes, may acourt hold that the provisions later in point of timehave impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that(Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs.Philippine American Management Employees

Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs.Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs. Ranada,Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).

It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructedafter the Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of theprovisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This actshall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 BatasangPambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regularBatasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and theselection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by theConstitution.

While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicableonly for the particular election (like election and campaign periods,

voting constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisionscould be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the Commissionthat B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."

But the important consideration is that the authority granted to theCommission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our electionlaws. It should be mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No.6638 which governed the local elections of January 18, 1988, as to thenumber of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number ofSangguniang members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are s tillapplicable up to this day. In fact, it became one of the importantcontrolling provision which governed the May 11, 1992 elections. Ifprovisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with thepresent election laws did not self-destruct, why should Section 50 ofB.P. Blg. 697?


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Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that"any city or municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter withoutany legal basis in inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty ofan election offense," although this provision is found in Section 10 ofExecutive Order No. 134 supposedly with limited application as theenabling act for the elections for Members of Congress on May 11,1987 and for other purposes.

Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to theCommission on Elections because the Pimentel case said there wasnone, to fill a void in the law, and avoid an incongruous situation.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be takenseparately but in its relation to the statute's totality.Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to"harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws."Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutesmust be reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customsvs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7,1975, 66 SCRA 113).

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory construction rule is: "When theLegislature enacts provision, it is understood that itis aware of previous statutes relating to the same

subject matter and that in the absence of anyexpress repeal or amendment therein, the newprovision should be deemed enacted pursuant to thelegislative policy embodied in the prior statutes."(Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, L-36153,November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicialfunctions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election casesgranted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no moreappellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the SupremeCourt, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in hisdissenting opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdictionof the Supreme Court in election cases should properly be limited todecisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not fromlower courts.

It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No.6388, September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the Courtof Appeals then had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided bythe lower courts.

In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and theCourt of Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases fromthe lower courts because after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia andUy cases, the Supreme Court said:

In view of this pronouncement, an original civilaction ofcertiorari, prohibition ormandamus against

a regional trial court in an election contest may befiled only in the Court of Appeals or in this Court

being the only courts given such original jurisdictionunder the Constitution and the Law. (Emphasissupplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under theConstitution and the law, it is most logical for the Commissionwhenever it performs judicial functions to have the authority to issuethese prerogative writs. . . .

. . .

In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in thecase of Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongcopromulgated on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banchad occasion to rule on the question of whether or not the Commissionhas the authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in electioncases.

The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. CommissionerRegalado E. Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants theCommission, the exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari,prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are alsoSupreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that theCommission has no such authority precisely because; according to thedecisions, there is no law granting such authority, and without any hintwhatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs. Pambansa Blg.

697.

As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing thatSec. 50 of BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code(BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer,respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was declared that,indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs ofcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 hasnot been repealed.

As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of theCourts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights whichare legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or

not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of thegovernment (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuantto Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicialpower and said power includes the determination of whether or notthere has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutionalmandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid ofits appellate jurisdiction.

5

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order ofexecution pending appeal and the writ of execution because

[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July12, 1994 the court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case foras early as July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its order


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issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner as in fact itordered the elevation of the records of the case to this HonorableCommission.

6

Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment onthe petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELECto cease and desist from enforcing is challenged resolution.

As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by

invoking the very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged theresolution and the dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uycases.

In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELECpostulates that it issued the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appealinterposed by the private respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uycases, and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:

it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employmeans necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it bylaw (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, therewas no need for any statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed, inannulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, publicrespondent did not exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regardwas necessary to preserve the subject of the appeal and to maintain

the statusquo of the parties pending the final outcome of its review ofthe correctness of the appealed decision.7

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over thecases unlike in the instant case where the trial court had already given due course to theappeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC which had takencognizance of the appeal.

This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.

The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral is unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is notsupported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELECdocketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules ofProcedure, the special relief cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, andcontempt proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed inthe challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then, the COMELEC hadrecognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTCdecision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special civil action forcertioraridocketed as SPRNo. 1-94. The two cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need nofurther elaboration. Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, itcannot now be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinaryappeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor Generalnotwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now in questionpaves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in the Garcia and Uycases.

As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy,9

and later, in Veloria,10

this Court ruled that theCOMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such

jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expresslygranted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was,per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa whichshall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter asprovided by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code(B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa,

11this Court is then confronted with

the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984election of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of thesectoral representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the OmnibusElection Code.

The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoralrepresentatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition.

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hearand decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involvingelection cases. (Emphasis supplied).

it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period oftime. Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled inPimentel vs. Commission on Elections,

12it seems quite obvious that the grant was

intended as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationalityresulting in a splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice DeCastro in the said case.

But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealingclause of the latter reads as follows:

Sec. 282. Repealing clause. Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwiseknown as The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. Allother election laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, orparts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code are herebyrepealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas PambansaBlg. 20 governing the election of the members of the SangguniangPampook of Regions IX and XII.

The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:

An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistentenactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repealsmust either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has insome instances been held to be an express recognition that there areacts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative ofthe legislative intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clausecannot be deemed an express repeal because it fails to identify ordesignate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative of animplied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely,merely predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflictis found under application of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusionis more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more often a detrimentthan an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is

construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts.

13


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This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in therevision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted inthe revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code providesotherwise expressly or impliedly.

14

By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that theBatasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace themwith the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all priorelection statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shallremain in force. That sentence

predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantialconflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the same subjectmatter. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repealsand the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex

proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing lawsso that, if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, theproper step is to express it. The failure to add a specific repealingclause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates thatthe intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless anirreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of thenew and the old laws.

15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph ofSection 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent withany of the provisions of the latter, It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon theruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph ofSection 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear anddecide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involvingelection cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, theCOMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the

substance of the challenged resolution.That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting thepetitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is alltoo obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of thedecision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days

16from 1 July

1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filedbefore the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the InterimRules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to theCOMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would bedeemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,

17or on 6 July 1994. On

4 July 1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of therecords of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial courtwas divested of its jurisdiction over the case.

18Since the motion for execution pending

appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial courtcould no longer validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed

before the perfection of the appeal.19

Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC hasthe jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pendingappeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. ManuelM. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.

The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.

No pronouncemnt as to costs.SO ORDERED.


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Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 117040 May 4, 2000

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE,

respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Respondent Isetann Department Store moves for reconsideration of the decision in thiscase insofar as it is ordered to pay petitioner full backwages from the time the latter'semployment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time it is determined that thetermination of employment is for an authorized cause. The motion is opposed by petitioner.The decision is based on private respondent's failure to give petitioner a written notice oftermination at least thirty (30) days before the termination of his employment as required

by Art. 283 the Labor Code.In support of its motion, private respondent puts forth three principal arguments, to wit: (1)that its failure to give a written notice to petitioner at least thirty (30) days in advance inaccordance with Art. 283 of the Labor Code is not in issue in this case because, as amatter of fact, it gave its employees in the affected security section thirty (30) days paywhich effectively gave them thirty (30) days notice, and petitioner accepted this form ofnotice although he did not receive payment; (2) that payment of thirty (30) days pay in lieuof the thirty (30) days prior formal notice is more advantageous to an employee becauseinstead of being required to work for thirty (30) days, the employee can look for another jobwhile being paid by the company; and (3) that in any event the new ruling announced inthis case should only be applied prospectively.

Private respondent's contentions have no merit.

First. Private respondent states that in September 1991, its employees in the security

section were called to a meeting during which they were informed that a security agencywould take over their work and that the employees would be paid "their last salaries, onemonth pay for every year of service and proportionate 13th month pay"; that all affectedpersonnel, numbering around fifty (50), accepted the company's offer and stopped workingby October 1, 1991, although they were paid their salaries up to October 31, 1991; thatpetitioner Ruben Serrano said he was reserving the right to take advantage of the offer butafter several months brought this case before the Labor Arbiter's office. Private respondentclaims that "petitioner accepted the mode of notice in this case [and] never questioned it"and that "not having been raised as an issue in the petition. . . the said notice requirement"lies outside the issues raised by the pleadings of the parties" and should not be passedupon by this Honorable Court."

It is not true that the validity of private respondent's offer to pay thirty (30) days salary inlieu of the thirty (30) days written notice required under Art. 283 of the Labor Code was not

raised in issue in this case. Private respondent itself raised the issue in its position paperbefore the Labor Arbiter's office, thus:

. . . Respondent was, from the time of [petitioner's] separation, offeringto pay his last salary and proportionate 13th month pay less payment ofhis loan but he unreasonably refused to accept it. . . .

. . . On October 11, 1991, [petitioner] together with all other employeesholding the position of Security Checker were formally terminated bythe Respondent Company on the ground of the adoption of cost savingdevices. Accordingly, all the security checkers were duly paid onemonth for every year of service plus their last salaries and proportionate13th month pay less payments for loans obtained from the RespondentCompany and other dues deductible from their last salary. . . . [A]ll thesecurity checkers with the sole exception of [petitioner] herein, gladlyaccepted the offer and readily got what was due to them and in turn,executed an "Affidavit of Quitclaim" manifesting their utter satisfactionto the offer of Respondent and expressed their waiver and quitclaim forany claims from the company. Respondent reserves the right to presentsuch affidavits of quitclaim at the right opportune time. After a fewmonths, [petitioner] did not manifest his reaction to the company's offerafter he failed to appear on the day the Respondent scheduled thegiving of the separation pay and other amounts due to them. The nexttime, Respondent received a word from [petitioner] was when itreceived this summons.

1

Joining issue with private respondent with respect to the validity of the latter's scheme forterminating the services of its security employees, petitioner contended before the Labor

Arbiter:

2. [Petitioner's] dismissal is patently illegal. The constitutional duty ofthe state to protect the right of the laborers to security of tenuredemands that an employer may be permitted to terminate the servicesof an employee only under conditions allowed by and with due processof law (Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. Regional Director/Minister ofLabor, 168 SCRA 315).

3. This doctrinal pronouncement of the Highest Tribunal was wantonlydisregarded by respondent in the instant case [a]s purely narrated by[petitioner] in his affidavit Annex "A." He performed his work faithfullyand efficiently and he never transgressed the rules and regulations ofcompany during the entire period of his employment. Thecommendation of the Company with regard to [petitioner's] exemplary

performance are attached and marked as Annex "G" to "G-27"respectively. However, he was verbally told and notified byrespondent[s] Human Resource Division Manager Teresita A.Villanueva that his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 . . ..

Indeed, it is mandatory for an employer to accord to the supposederrant or unwanted worker the legal requirements of written notice ofthe specific reason for the retrenchment and eventual termination ofcomplainant and he should have been given a chance to present hisside, otherwise, the worker's security of tenure would be at the pleasureof the employer.

2

Ruling on this issue as thus defined by the parties' pleadings, the Labor Arbiter held thatpetitioner "was not afforded due process. Respondent merely issued to him a dismissal

letter stating retrenchment as the sole ground for his dismissal."3

But, as the Labor Arbiterfound, private respondent failed to prove that it was laying off employees in order to
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prevent or minimize losses. Accordingly, he ruled that petitioner had been illegallydismissed and ordered him to be reinstated and paid full backwages and other monetarybenefits to which he was entitled.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. Maintaining that it had complied with the noticerequirement of the law, it said in its Memorandum on Appeal:

POINT SIX. When the [Labor Arbiter's] decision finds that [petitioner]was not afforded due process, the Hon. Labor Arbiter failed to makedistinction between termination by reason of "just causes" (Arts. 282,Labor Code) and termination for "authorized causes" (Art. 283 and 284,

Labor Code). Due Process which is to afford an employee to explainwhy he should not be terminated is only required if termination is for

just cause under Art. 282 but not [in] termination for authorized causesunder Arts. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. Termination for authorizedcauses requires notice of 30 days before the intended termination dateor in lieu of notice, payment of wages for 30 days which respondent, inthe case at bar, was willing to pay the complainant.

4

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision not because it found that privaterespondent had complied with the notice requirement but only that petitioner's employmenthad been terminated for a cause authorized by law, i.e., redundancy. Accordingly, theNLRC ordered petitioner to be given separation pay in addition to the other monetarybenefits to which he is entitled.

Indeed, the NLRC failed to address the question of whether the notice requirement in Art.

283 had been complied with. Because of this gap in the NLRC decision, this Court, inaffirming the decision, ordered the payment of full backwages to petitioner from October11, 1991 when his employment was terminated without the requisite thirty (30) dayswritten notice until the decision finding the termination to be for an authorized cause hadbecome final.

There is thus no basis for private respondent's allegation that its failure to give a writtennotice of termination to petitioner was never in issue and that, in awarding full backwagesto petitioner for its failure to comply with the notice requirement of Art. 283 of the LaborCode, this court dealt "almost entirely" with a "non-issue."

In any event, this Court has authority to inquire into any question necessary in arriving at ajust decision of a case before it.

5

Second. It is contended that payment of petitioner's salary for thirty (30) days, "even when

[he is] no longer working, is effective notice and is much better than 30 days formal noticebut working until the end of the 30 day period."6Private respondent's letter of October 11,

1991, so it is claimed, was a mere reiteration of the oral notice previously given topetitioner in September that effective October 1, 1991, he and his fellow security checkerswould no longer be required to work because they would be replaced by a security agency,although they would be given their salary for the month of October 1991.

Private respondent's position has no basis in the law. The requirement to give a writtennotice of termination at least thirty (30) days in advance is a requirement of the LaborCode. Art. 283 provides:

Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employermay also terminate the employment of any employee due to theinstallation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment toprevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the

establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose ofcircumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on

the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one(1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination dueto the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the workeraffected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to atleast one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every yearof service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to preventlosses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations ofestablishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses orfinancial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,

whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall beconsidered one (1) whole year. (Emphasis added).

As pointed out in Sebuguero v. National Labor Relations Conmission:7

. . . [W]hat the law requires is a written notice to the employeesconcerned and that requirement is mandatory. The notice must also begiven at least one month in advance of the intended date ofretrenchment to enable the employees to look for other means ofemployment and therefore to ease the impact of the loss of their jobsand the corresponding income.

Nothing in the law gives private respondent the option to substitute the required priorwritten notice with payment of thirty (30) days salary. It is not for private respondent tomake substitutions for a right that a worker is legally entitled to. For instance, as held inFarmanlis Farms, Inc. v. Minister ofLabor,8under the law, benefits in the form of food or free electricity, assuming they weregiven, were not a proper substitute for the 13th month pay required by law.

Indeed, a job is more than the salary that it carries. Payment of thirty (30) days salarycannot compensate for the psychological effect or the stigma of immediately finding one'sself laid off from work. It cannot be a fully effective substitute for the thirty (30) days writtennotice required by law especially when, as in this case, the fact is that no notice was givento the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

Besides, as we held in our decision in this case,9the purpose of such previous notice is to

give the employee some time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job as well as theDOLE the opportunity to ascertain the verity of the alleged authorized cause of termination.Such purpose would not be served by the simple expedient of paying thirty (30) dayssalary in lieu of notice of an employee's impending dismissal, as by then the loss ofemployment would have been a fait accompli.

Private respondent nevertheless claims that payment of thirty (30) days salary in lieu ofwritten notice given thirty (30) days before the termination of employment is in accordancewith our ruling inAssociated Labor Unions-VIMCONTU v. NLRC.

10

This claim will not bear analysis. In that case, the employees and the then Ministry ofLabor and Employment (MOLE) were notified in writing on August 5, 1983 that theemployees' services would cease on August 31, 1983 but that they would be paid theirsalaries and other benefits until September 5, 1983. It was held that such written noticewas "more than substantial compliance" with the notice requirement of the Labor Code.

Indeed, there was "more than substantial compliance" with the law in that case because, inaddition to the advance written notice required under Art. 284 (now Art. 283) of the LaborCode, the employees were paid for five days, from September 1 to 5, 1993, even if theyrendered no service for the period. But, in the case at bar, there was no written notice

given to petitioner at least thirty (30) days before the termination of his employment. Hadprivate respondent given a written notice to petitioner on October 1, 1991, at the latest,
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that effective October 31, 1991 his employment would cease although from October 1 hewould no longer be required to work, there would be basis for private respondent's boastthat "[payment] of this salary even [if he is] no longer working is effective notice and ismuch better than 30 days formal notice but working until the end of the 30 days period."This is not the case here, however. What happened here was that on October 11, 1991,petitioner was given a memorandum terminating his employment effective on the sameday on the ground of retrenchment (actually redundancy).

Third. It is contended that private respondent's non-observance of the notice requirementshould not be visited with a severe consequence in accordance with Art. III, 19(1) of theConstitution. The contention is without merit. In the first place, Art. III, 19(1) of theConstitution, prohibiting the imposition of excessive fines, applies only to criminalprosecutions. In the second place, the decision in this case, providing for the payment offull backwages for failure of an employer to give notice, seeks to vindicate the employee'sright to notice before he is dismissed or laid off, while recognizing the right of the employerto dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment forany of the authorized causes mentioned in Arts. 283-284.

11 The order to pay full

backwages is a consequence of the employer's action in dismissing an employee withoutnotice which makes said dismissal ineffectual.

12The employee is considered not to have

been terminated from his employment until it is finally determined that hisdismissal/termination of employment was for cause and, therefore, he should be paid hissalaries in the interim. This eliminates guesswork in determining the degree of prejudicesuffered by an employee dismissed with cause but without notice since the penalty ismeasured by the salary he failed to earn on account of his dismissal/termination ofemployment.

Fourth. Private respondent finally contends that, in any event, the new doctrine announcedin this case should only be applied prospectively. Private respondent invokes the ruling inColumbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

1that

[While] a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the datethat law was originally passed, [this is] subject to the qualification thatwhen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view isadopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the newdoctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to partieswho relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. To holdotherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and

justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior tosuch adjudication.

It is apparent that private respondent misconceived the import of the ruling. The decis ion inColumbia Pictures does not mean that if a new rule is laid down in a case, it should not beapplied in that case but that said rule should apply prospectively to cases arisingafterwards. Private respondent's view of the principle of prospective application of new

judicial doctrines would turn the judicial function into a mere academic exercise with theresult that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum and would deprive theholding in the case of any force.

Indeed, when the Court formulated the Wenphil doctrine,14

which we reverse in this case,the Court did not defer application of the rule laid down imposing a fine on the employer forfailure to give notice in a case of dismissal for cause. To the contrary, the new rule wasapplied right then and there. For that matter, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of

Appeals15

the Court laid down the rule that in determining the existence of probable causefor the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases, the court mustrequire the production of the master tapes of copyrighted films in order to compare them

with the "pirated" copies. The new rule was applied in opinion of the Court written byJustice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in the very same case of 20th Century Fox in which the new

requirement was laid down. Where the new rule was held to be prospective in applicationwas in Columbia Pictures and that was because at the time the search warrant in that casewas issued, the new standard had not yet been announced so it would be unreasonable toexpect the judge issuing the search warrant to apply a rule that had not been announcedat the time.

A good illustration of the scope of overruling decisions is People v. Mapa,16

where theaccused was charged with illegal possession of firearms. The accused invoked the rulingin an earlier case

17that appointment as a secret agent of a provincial governor to ass ist in

the maintenance of peace and order sufficiently put the appointee in the category of a"peace officer" equal to a member of the municipal police authorized under 879 of the

Administrative Code of 1917 to carry firearms. The Court rejected the accused's contentionand overruled the prior decision in People v. Macarandangon the ground that 879 of the

Administrative Code of 1917 was explicit and only those expressly mentioned therein wereentitled to possess firearms. Since secret agents were not among those mentioned, theywere not authorized to possess firearms.

Although in People v. Jabinal18

the Court refused to give retro active effect to its decisionin Mapa, because the new doctrine "should not apply to parties who had relied on the olddoctrine and acted in good faith thereon" and, for this reason, it acquitted the accused ofillegal possession of firearms, nonetheless it applied the new ruling (that secret agents ofprovincial governors were not authorized to possess firearms) in the very case in which thenew rule was announced and convicted the accused.

In the case at bar, since private respondent does not even claim that it has relied in goodfaith on the former doctrine of Wenphil and its progeny Sebuguero v. NLRC, there is noreason not to apply the new standard to this case.

WHEREFORE, private respondent's motion for reconsideration is DENIED with finality forlack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
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Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 121905 May 20, 1999

VITARICH CORPORATION, DANILO SARMIENTO and ONOFRE SEBASTIAN,

petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ISAGANI E. RECODO,respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:

VITARICH CORPORATION (VITARICH), together with its co-petitioners DaniloSarmiento and Onofre Sebastian,

1through this petition forcertiorari, assails as grave

abuse of discretion the reversal of its previous decision by public respondent NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Private respondent Isagani E. Recodo was hired by VITARICH, a feeds

manufacturing corporation, as an Accounting Clerk in its office in Marilao, Bulacan. In1979, he was promoted as Accounting Supervisor, then in 1986 as SalesSuperintendent while assigned in Davao City. In 1988 he became the Sales Managerfor Western Visayas based in Iloilo City with a monthly salary of P18,200.00.

2

As Sales Manager Recodo was supervised successively by three (3) division headswho were his immediate supervisors, namely, Dave Fernandez (1988-1989), BenCruz (1990-1992), and Onofre Sebastian (15 June 1992 up to Recodo's termination).3

He also underwent several audit examinations in his line of work.

In March 1991 VITARICH conducted an audit in Iloilo in response to a letter of acertain Espinosa pointing to anomalies in the backloading

4and arrastre t ransactions

of Recodo. The evaluation of the audit team found no concrete evidence that Recodowas receiving direct commission from the backloading of the chartered vessel butfaulted him for his inadequate exercise of internal control regarding the matter, and noevidence either that Recodo had been receiving a share in the arrastre since theshipper and the arrastre operators managed by the Espinosa family denied this.However, an unaccounted difference of P14,002.50 in the backloading profitssurfaced. Consequently, the audit team recommended that bills of lading shouldcover all backloading shipments; all collections from backloading shipment should bedirectly paid to the cashier who is responsible for procedural controls; and, incentivepayments to the captain of the vessel and the cash advances for the port expensesshould be covered by pro performs.

5

On 25 June 1992 another audit report was submitted detailing the accommodation ofMr. Elbert Jeanjacquet as a trade client whose account was 74% past due andunsecured yet was allowed as a contract grower for two thousand (2,000) chickenheads. The accounts of twelve (12) other customers granted extensions over andbeyond the credit limit were further enumerated in the report. Except for two, all theseaccounts did not have any collaterals to secure them. 6

On 6 June 1992 a cash audit generated these findings: (a) cash collections werediverted to defray the area's operational and administrative expenses as the revolvingfund was consumed before its replenishment in the form of countersigned checksfrom Cebu came; (b) personal "vales" (cash advances) were disbursed from therevolving fund in violation of company policies; and, (c) payments to suppliers weretaken from the revolving fund instead of being paid in checks.

7But, unlike in the first

two audit examinations where no action was taken by VITARICH after receipt of thecorresponding reports, Recodo this time was required to explain why he allowed thereported violations of company policies.

8

In his letter of 11 August 1992 Recodo clarified that the alleged personal "vales" wereactually for business expenses and for wages of employees and that the use ofcollections to dafay operational and administrative expenses was unavoidableparticularly when the chartered vessel was on dock unloading feeds while thereplenishment of the revolving fund was delayed. He further assured VITARICH thatall transactions with stevedores, shipping lines, PAL and piece workers were all onC.O.D. basis.

9

Admittedly, when petitioner Onofre Sebastian took over in June 1992 as Divisionhead he was faced with a high volume of account receivables (A/R) accumulatedduring the time of Ben Cruz, his predecessor. To address the problem petitionerSebastian and respondent Recodo conferred in the middle of July 1992 with the latterbeing instructed to cut down the accountabilities of Rex Cordova, a companysalesman in Iloilo. Thereafter Recodo advised Cordova to reduce his technical credit

extensions. In less than a month, the amount of account receivables was reducedfrom P800,000.00 to P205,000.00.

10. However on 27 August 1992 Recodo was

asked again to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why he should not be terminatedfor failure to ground Rex Cordova in accordance with the 4 August 1992memorandum of vice president Onofre Sebastian.1wphi1.nt

The other grounds cited for terminating Recodo were his failure to reduce Cordova'sA/R driver, the allowance of extension of his credit line, as well as themisrepresentation of his outstanding A/R.

11The memorandum of 4 August 1992

instructed Recodo to confirm all A/R drivers who were already two (2) weeks overdueto preclude any ghost deliveries and to ground all salesmen with A/R drivers whowere already thirty (30) days old so that they could only resume deliveries afteraccounts were collected or payment arrangements were made.

12

In his 5 September 1992 letter Recodo explained that only the first paragraph of thefaxed memorandum was readable so he had it verified. He only learned its full contextwhen he was negotiating for the security of Cordova's past accounts. Thus, hepostponed grounding Cordova until 20 August 1992 in order to bring about positiveresults. The negotiation reduced Cordova's A/R driver from P800,000.00 toP250,000.00 as of 19 August 1992 which amount would be further lowered toP150,000.00 by September. The alleged misrepresentation in the figures given wasnot deliberate but was merely a mental lapse due to tension at work.

13

After investigation, E.T. Enriquez, Head of Personnel, submitted his report onRecodo's alleged insubordination. Enriquez found that there was "no defensibleground for terminating (Recodo's) services." He cited as reasons therefor the non-documentation of any warning given to Recodo to justify any loss of trust andconfidence in him.

14Nevertheless, VITARICH terminated Recodo on 15 October

1992 for violation of the 4 August 1992 Memorandum including policies on creditextensions and cash advances.


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On 13 October 1992, Recodo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment ofmanagerial incentive bonus and for moral and exemplary damages. Initially thecomplaint was directed against VITARICH and its president Danilo Sarmiento, but on21 January 1993 vice president Onofre Sebastian was also included as respondent.

On 23 June 1993 the Labor Arbiter adjudged VITARICH and its impleaded officersguilty of illegal dismissal and ordered them to pay Recodo seven (7) months backwages from November 1992 to May 1993 in the total amount of P418,600.00 plus10% attorney's fees of P41,860.00. A separation pay of P291,200.00 was grantedRecodo because reinstatement was no longer feasible in view of the strained

relations between the parties. Moral and exemplary damages were not awarded sincethere was no finding of a valid reason to do so. For one to be entitled to thesesdamages, the manner in which the dismissal was made must be deliberate, maliciousand tainted with bad faith. In this case the Labor Arbiter found no proof thatpetitioners acted in bad faith when they dismissed Recodo from employment. Theclaim for management incentive bonus was likewise denied as the grant of a bonus isa management prerogative.

15

The Labor Arbiter pointed out that although VITARICH justified the dismissal ofRecodo by the audit reports on backloading, unauthorized credit extensions and cashdisbursements and insubordination the company's dismissal letter was only anchoredon insubordination without any mention of the past audits as bases thereof.Consequently, for want of prior notice, the Labor Arbiter ruled that lack of due processattended Recodo's termination. Nonetheless, the evidence of VITARICH relative to

the charges of backloading and unauthorized transactions was examined.

Thus, the Labor Arbiter reached the following conclusions: Firstly, there was noconcrete evidence to support the claim that Recodo was receiving commissions orprofited through hidden deals in the backloading transactions; nor did the companysuffer any material loss as it even profited substantially therefrom. The Labor Arbiternoted that the transactions were undertaken upon the instructions of Recodo'ssupervisor, Dave Fernandez, hence, officially authorized by the company. They wereproperly documented by bills of lading considering that the shipper would suffer legaland other constraints if it were otherwise.

16Secondly, credit extension limits,

unsecured accounts and disbursements of cash collection for operational andadministrative expenses were already part of the system when petitioner OnofreSebastian took the helm as division head and instructed Recodo to solve theproblems. Recodo exerted efforts to do so, especially with the reduction of Cordova's

account and accomplished the lowering of overdue and unsecured accounts within amonth. It was clear that the cash disbursements were utilized for official business.

17

Lastly, the Labor Arbiter significantly found that Recodo's explanation to the chargesimputed to him by VITARICH was sincere and reasonable and that any breaches incompany policies he might have committed were only ordinary, not willful to warranthis dismissal.

18

On appeal by VITARICH, the NLRC while finding a lack of due process in Recodo'sdismissal reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision on the following rationale: (a) had thebackloading transactions been properly handled by Recodo the profits would havebeen greater, hence, VITARICH suffered losses by such mismanagement; (b)although the backloading transactions were authorized by the division head, theproper handling thereof was the duty of Recodo and his failure to do so was enoughbasis for the company's loss of confidence in him; (c) violations of company policieswere not mere carelessness since they were due to mismanagement by Recodo; (d)

the non-grounding of salesman Cordova might have had a sincere and reasonableexplanation but the very act of defying management's specific directives constituted astrong ground for its loss of trust and confidence; and, (e) Recodo's failure to requiresecurity for accounts and his allowing them to exceed the limit were contrary toaccepted business practices and company policies. All told then, the series ofinfractions committed by Recodo were enough bases for his termination.

Thus, in its 19 September 1994 decision, the NLRC set aside the judgment of theLabor Arbiter but awarded Recodo a P2,000.00 indemnity fee because he wasterminated without due process.

19

Upon motion for reconsideration by Recodo, the NLRC issued its assailed resolutionof 18 July 1995 reversing its earlier decision. It acknowledged that its previousdecision was flawed by surmises on the backloading transactions, conjectures on thecredit line extensions and speculations on the grounding of Cordova. The resolutionapplied the time-honored doctrine that the Labor Arbiter, as a trier of facts, had thesuperior oppotunity to test the credibility of witnesses and the veracity of thedocumentary evidence submitted. It further upheld the findings and recommendationsof the audit teams that failed to find the accusation that Recodo violated a number ofcompany policies.

20

On 14 August 1995 the NLRC denied a motion for reconsideration by VITARICH,hence, this petition based on the sole allegation that the reversal was a grave abuseof discretion as it was the main decision which was in accord with the facts.

21

We are not persuaded by VITARICH. In rectifying its previous appreciation and NLRCdid not commit any abuse of discretion, much less grave. A careful scrutiny of therecords reveals that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is suffused with the establishedfacts and a correct understanding of them. Consequently, it is but proper for NLRC toabandon its for

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