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Introduction to Information Security0368-3065, Spring 2014

Lecture 9: Virtual machine confinement,trusted computing architecture

Eran TromerSlides credit:

Dan Boneh, Stanford

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Confinementusing

Virtual Machines

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ProcessProcessProcessProcessProcessProcess

OS services

OS kernel OS kernel

Virtual machines

CPU Memory Devices

OS services

Hypervisor

Security benefits:• Confinement (isolation, sandboxing) • Management• Monitoring• Recovery• Forensics (replay)

Key Untrusted

Code

US patent 6,922,774 (NSA NetTop)

Host OS (if Type 2)

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VMM security assumption

• VMM Security assumption:

– Malware may infect guest OS and guest apps– But malware cannot escape from the infected VM

• Cannot infect host OS• Cannot infect other VMs on the same hardware

• Requires that VMM protect itself and is not buggy – VMM is much simpler than full OS – VMM API is much simpler than OS API– (but host OS still has device drivers)

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Example of VM security application:

VMM Introspectionprotecting the anti-virus system

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Example:intrusion Detection / anti-virus

• Runs as part of OS kernel and user space process• Kernel root kit can shutdown protection system• Common practice for modern malware

• Standard solution: run IDS system in the network

• Problem: insufficient visibility into user’s machine

• Better: run IDS as part of VMM (protected from malware)

• VMM can monitor virtual hardware for anomalies• VMI: Virtual Machine Introspection

• Allows VMM to check Guest OS internals

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Sample checksStealth malware:

• Creates processes that are invisible to “ps”• Opens sockets that are invisible to “netstat”

1. Lie detector check• Goal: detect stealth malware that hides

processes and network activity

• Method:• VMM lists processes running in GuestOS• VMM requests GuestOS to list processes

(e.g. ps)• If mismatch, kill VM

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Sample checks (cont.)2. Application code integrity detector

• VMM computes hash of user app-code running in VM

• Compare to whitelist of hashes• Kills VM if unknown program appears

3. Ensure GuestOS kernel integrity• example: detect changes to sys_call_table

4. Virus signature detector• Run virus signature detector on GuestOS

memory

5. Detect if GuestOS puts NIC in promiscuous mode

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ProcessProcessProcessProcessProcessProcess

OS services

OS kernel OS kernel

Virtualization – covert channels and side channels

CPU Memory Devices

OS services

Hypervisor

• Covert channel: unintended communication channel between isolated but cooperating components(sender and receiver)– Can be used to leak classified

data from secure component to public component

• Side channel: unintended channel that lets an attacker component retrieve information from an victim component without the latter’s cooperation

• Often induced by low-level resource contention

Key Untrusted

Code

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An example covert channel

• Both VMs use the same underlying hardware

• To send a bit b {0,1} malware does:– b= 1: at midnight do CPU intensive calculation– b= 0: at midnight do nothing

• At midnight, listener does a CPU intensive calculation and measures completion time– Now b = 1 completion-time > threshold

• Many covert channel exist in running system:– File lock status, cache contents, interrupts, …– Very difficult to eliminate

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Demonstrated, using Amazon EC2 as a study case:

• Cloud cartographyMapping the structure of the “cloud” andlocating a target on the map.

• Placement vulnerabilities An attacker can place his VM on the same physicalmachine as a target VM (40% success for a few dollars)

• Cross-VM exfiltrationOnce VMs are co-resident, secret information can be exfiltratedacross VM boundary.(Simulated: theft of decryption keys!)

Cache-based side-channels in cloud computing

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Motivation

Virtual machine confinement:a blessing or a curse?

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Subvirt [King Chen Wang Verbowski Wang Lortch 2006]

• Virus idea:• Once on the victim machine, install a malicious

VMM• Virus hides in VMM• Invisible to virus detector running inside VM

HW OS

HW

OS VMM and virus

Anti-virus

Anti-virus

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The MATRIX

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VM Based Malware (blue pill virus) [Rutkowska 2006]

• A virus that installs a malicious VMM (hypervisor) on-the-fly under running OS

• Use SVM/VT-x to create VM• Microsoft Security Bulletin: (Oct, 2006) :

Suggests disabling hardware virtualization features by default for client-side systemshttp://www.microsoft.com/whdc/system/platform/virtual/CPUVirtExt.mspx

• VMBRs are easy to defeat• A guest OS can detect that it is running on top

of VMM

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VMM Detection• Can an OS detect it is running on top of a VMM?• Applications:

• Virus detector can detect VMBR• Normal virus (non-VMBR) can detect VMM

• refuse to run to avoid reverse engineering• Software that binds to hardware (e.g. MS Windows)

can refuse to run on top of VMM

• DRM systems may refuse to run on top of VMM

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VMM detection (red pill techniques)

1. VM platforms often emulate simple hardware• VMWare emulates an ancient i440bx chipset

… but report 8GB RAM, dual Opteron CPUs, etc.

2. VMM introduces time latency variances• Memory cache behavior differs in presence of

VMM• Results in relative latency in time variations

for any two operations3. VMM shares the TLB with GuestOS

• GuestOS can detect reduced TLB size4. Deduplication (VMM saves single copies of identical

pages)

… and many more methods [GAWF’07]

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VMM DetectionBottom line: The perfect VMM does not exist

• VMMs today (e.g. VMWare) focus on:Compatibility: ensure off the shelf software

worksPerformance: minimize virtualization

overhead

• VMMs do not provide transparency• Anomalies reveal existence of VMM

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Trusted Computing Architecture

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BackgroundTCG consortium. Founded in 1999 as TCPA. Main players (promoters): (>200

members) AMD, HP, IBM, Infineon, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Sun

Goals: Hardware protected (encrypted)

storage: Only “authorized” software can decrypt

data e.g.: protecting key for decrypting file

system Secure boot: method to “authorize”

software Attestation: Prove to remote server what

software is running on my machine.

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Secure bootHistory of BIOS/EFI malware:

CIH (1998): CIH virus corrupts system BIOS Heasman (2007):

System Management Mode (SMM) “rootkit” via EFI

Sacco, Ortega (2009): infect BIOS LZH decompressor CoreBOOT: generic BIOS flashing tool

Main point: BIOS runs before any defenses (e.g. antivirus)

Proposed defense: lock system configuration (BIOS + OS)

Today: TCG approach

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TCG: changes to PCExtra hardware: TPM Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip

Single 33MhZ clock. TPM Chip vendors: (~.3$)

Atmel, Infineon, National, STMicro Intel D875GRH motherboard

Software changes: BIOS, EFI (UEFI) OS and Apps

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TPMs in the real worldTPMs widely available on laptops, desktops and some servers

Software using TPMs: File/disk encryption: BitLocker, IBM, HP,

Softex Attestation for enterprise login: Cognizance,

Wave Client-side single sign on: IBM, Utimaco, Wave

TPM Basics

What the TPM does How to use it

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Components on TPM chip

I/O

Crypto Engine:RSA, SHA-1, HMAC, RNG

Non Volatile Storage

(> 1280 bytes)PCR Registers(16 registers)

OtherJunk

RSA: 1024, 2048 bit modulusSHA-1: Outputs 20 byte digest

LPCbus

API calls

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Non-volatile storage1. Endorsement Key (EK) (2048-bit RSA)

Created at manufacturing time. Cannot be changed.

Used for “attestation” (described later)2. Storage Root Key (SRK) (2048-bit RSA)

Used for implementing encrypted storage Created after running

TPM_TakeOwnership( OwnerPassword, … ) Can be cleared later with TPM_ForceClear from

BIOS3. OwnerPassword (160 bits) and persistent

flagsPrivate EK, SRK, and OwnerPwd never leave the

TPM

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PCR: the heart of the matter

PCR: Platform Configuration Registers Lots of PCR registers on chip (at least 16) Register contents: 20-byte SHA-1 digest

(+junk)

Updating PCR #n : TPM_Extend(n,D): PCR[n] SHA-1 ( PCR[n] || D

) TPM_PcrRead(n): returns value(PCR(n))

PCRs initialized to default value (e.g. 0) at boot time

TPM can be told to restore PCR values in NVRAM via TPM_SaveState and TPM_Startup(ST_STATE)

for system suspend/resume

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Using PCRs: the TCG boot process

BIOS boot block executes Calls TPM_Startup (ST_CLEAR) to initialize PCRs

to 0 Calls PCR_Extend( n, <BIOS code> ) Then loads and runs BIOS post boot code

BIOS executes: Calls PCR_Extend( n, <MBR code> ) Then runs MBR (master boot record), e.g.

GRUB.MBR executes: Calls PCR_Extend( n, <OS loader code,

config> ) Then runs OS loader … and so on

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In a diagram

BIOS boot block

BIOS MBR

TPM

Hardware

Root of trust in integrity measurement

Root of trust in integrity reporting

measuringExtend PCR

• After boot, PCRs contain hash chain of booted software• Collision resistance of SHA-1 ensures commitment

ApplicationOSOS

loader

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Example: Trusted GRUB (IBM’05)

What PCR # to use and what to measure specified in GRUB config file

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Using PCR values after boot

Application 1: encrypted (a.k.a sealed) storage.

Step 1: TPM_TakeOwnership( OwnerPassword, … ) Creates 2048-bit RSA Storage Root Key (SRK) on

TPM Cannot run TPM_TakeOwnership again without

OwnerPwd: Ownership Enabled Flag False

Done once by IT department or laptop owner.

(optional) Step 2: TPM_CreateWrapKey / TPM_LoadKey Create more RSA keys on TPM protected by SRK Each key identified by 32-bit keyhandle

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Protected StorageMain Step: Encrypt data using RSA key on TPM TPM_Seal (some) Arguments:

keyhandle: which TPM key to encrypt with KeyAuth: Password for using key

`keyhandle’ PcrValues: PCRs to embed in encrypted blob data block: at most 256 bytes (2048 bits)

Used to encrypt symmetric key (e.g. AES) Returns encrypted blob.

Main point: blob can only be decrypted with TPM_Unseal when PCR-reg-vals = PCR-vals in blob. TPM_Unseal will fail othrewise

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Protected Storage

Embedding PCR values in blob ensures that only certain apps can decrypt data. e.g.: Messing with MBR or OS kernel will

change PCR values.

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Sealed storage: applications

Lock software on machine: OS and apps sealed with MBR’s PCR. Any changes to MBR (to load other OS) will

prevent locked software from loading. Prevents tampering and reverse engineering

Web server: seal server’s SSL private key Goal: only unmodified Apache can access SSL

key Problem: updates to Apache or Apache config

General problem with software upgrades/patches:Upgrade process must re-seal all blobs with new PCRs

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Security?Resetting TPM after boot Attacker can disable TPM until after boot, then

extend PCRs arbitrarily(one-byte change to boot block)

[Kauer 07] Software attack: send TPM_Init on LPC bus

allows calling TPM_Startup again (to reset PCRs)

Simple hardware attack: use a wire to connect TPM reset pin to ground

Once PCRs are reset, they can be extended to reflect a fake configuration.

Rollback attack on encrypted blobs e.g. undo security patches without being

noticed. Can be mitigated using Data Integrity Regs

(DIR) Need OwnerPassword to write DIR