introduction to bowtie methodology for a laboratory setting · 2016-03-20 · introduction to...

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SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER DNV GL © 2016 Introduction to Bowtie Methodology for a Laboratory Setting 1 ACS 251st National Meeting Division of Chemical Health and Safety Developing, Implementing & Teaching Hazard Assessment Tools Mary Beth Mulcahy, Ph.D., U.S. Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board Chris Boylan, DNV GL 15 March 2016

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DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER DNV GL © 2016

Introduction to Bowtie Methodology for a Laboratory Setting

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ACS 251st National Meeting

Division of Chemical Health and Safety

Developing, Implementing & Teaching Hazard Assessment Tools

Mary Beth Mulcahy, Ph.D., U.S. Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board

Chris Boylan, DNV GL

15 March 2016

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Accident

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Culture

Commitment Policies and

Procedures to Improve Safety

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Poor Commitment Good Commitment

Good Safety Policies and Procedures

Poor Policies and Procedures

Safety Culture

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Good Commitment

Good Safety Policies and Procedures

Safety Culture

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Accident

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Loss of Control

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Top Event

Loss of Control

Hazard/Top Event

Hazard • Health Hazard (carcinogen, toxin, etc.) • Physical Hazard

(flammable, explosive, etc.)

When do you have to change your response? • Threshold amount •  Loss of containment •  Loss of utilities

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Barriers

Major Accident

Top Event

Loss of Control

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Barriers

Alarms

Preventative Maintenance

Back-up Systems

PPE

Evacuation

Automatic Shutdown

System

Preventative Mitigative

Major Accident

Top Event

Loss of Control

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Management Systems

Preventative Barriers

Mitigative Barriers

• Hazard Identification • Procedures •  Incident Investigations •  Indicators

Top Event

Loss of Control

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Loss of Control

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About DNV GL

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350

offices

100 countries

16,000

employees

150 years

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

DNV GL Organization

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OIL & GAS

MARITIME

ENERGY

BUSINESS

ASSURANCE

SOFTWARE

RESEARCH & INNOVATION

MARINE CYBERNETICS

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Together we will cover

2:30pm - Overview of Bowtie

3pm-5:30pm - Workshop

!  Basic principles

!  Best practices (do’s and don’ts)

!  Plenary and group exercises – develop bowties

!  Link to organizational and safety culture

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

What is a bowtie, and how can it be used?

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Excellent communication tool

Not good for hazard identification

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Bowtie Risk Process

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Identify – Assess – Control – Recover

Identify

Recover

Identify and Assess

Control and Recover

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Bowties link physical controls to your management system

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Regulatory

University

Laboratory

Persons accountable (job titles)

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Accident Causation Model – James Reason

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Bowties – Brief History

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1979

1988

1990s

2000s 2016

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Bowties - History

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!  It is said that the first ‘real’ Bowtie diagrams appeared in the (Imperial Chemistry Industry) course notes of a lecture on HAZAN (Hazard Analysis) given at The University of Queensland, Australia (in 1979), but how and when the method found its exact origin is not completely clear.

!  The catastrophic incident on the Piper Alpha platform in 1988 awoke the oil & gas industry. After the report of Lord Cullen, who concluded that there was far too little understanding of Hazards and their accompanying risks that are part of operations, the urge rose to gain more insight in the causality of seemingly independent events and conditions and to develop a systematic/systemic way of assuring Barrier over these Hazards.

!  In the early nineties the Royal Dutch / Shell Group adopted the Bowtie method as company standard for analysing and managing risks. Shell facilitated extensive research in the application of the Bowtie method and developed a strict rule set for the definition of all parts, based on their ideas of best practice. The primary motivation of Shell was the necessity of assurance that appropriate risk Barriers are consistently in place throughout all worldwide operations.

!  Following Shell, the Bowtie method rapidly gained support throughout the industry, as Bowtie diagrams appeared to be a suitable visual tool to keep overview of risk management practices, rather than replacing any of the commonly used systems.

!  In the last decade the Bowtie method also spread outside of the oil & gas industry to include aviation, mining, maritime, chemical and health care to name a few.

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Bowtie’s parents . . .

Event tree Fault tree

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

. . . Connect them

Causation Top Event Consequences

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. . . Flatten them out = Bowtie

Threats ⇒ Prevention barriers ⇒ Top Event ⇒ Mitigation Barriers ⇒ Consequences

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Next

!  Discuss bowtie elements !  Best practices, do’s and don’ts

!  Class exercise – identify the bowtie faults

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Example Bowtie diagram

!  Underpinned by Fault Tree and Event Tree methodology !  Excellent tool for hazard and risk communication

–  Simple for a diverse team to understand

–  But easy to get it wrong

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DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

Best practices

! Construct in order: 1.  Hazard / Top Event (most important step) 2.  All Consequences

3.  All Threats

4.  Preventive Barriers 5.  Mitigation Barriers

6.  Escalation Factors

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Example – Do’s and Don’ts

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ISO 17776, Haz-01.02 Hydrocarbons in Formation

Anything wrong?

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Example – Do’s and Don’ts

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ISO 17776, Haz-01.02 Hydrocarbons in Formation

(Expanded)

What are you communicating? Who is your audience?

DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

What’s wrong with this bowtie? - Driving

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What’s wrong with this bowtie? - Driving

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Better?

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What’s wrong with this bowtie? - Titanic

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What’s wrong with this bowtie? - Titanic

Hazard / Top Event are better - what about the barriers?

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What’s wrong with this bowtie? - Titanic

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Corrected Bowtie

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What is wrong with this Bowtie? - Chemical

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DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

What is wrong with this Bowtie? - Chemical

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What is wrong with this Bowtie? - Chemical

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DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

What is wrong with this Bowtie? - Chemical

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DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

What is wrong with this Bowtie? – Laboratory

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DNV GL © 2016 15 March 2016

What is wrong with this Bowtie? – Laboratory

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Next

! Group workshops –  Instructors will assign groups

–  15mins to work on 1st exercise + 5mins class discussion

–  30mins for 2nd exercise

–  Then review CSB investigation of laboratory incident and final group work

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Exercise 1 – Example solution

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Exercise 2 – Copper Digestion

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Exercise 2 – Example solution

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Exercise 3 – TTU Incident

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Exercise 3 – Example TTU Solution

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Exercise 3 – Example TTU Solution - Barrier Incident Diagram

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Conclusions

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SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER

www.dnvgl.com

End

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Bowtie Risk Model

Prevention Mitigation

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What is wrong with this Bowtie? - Mechanical

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What is wrong with this Bowtie? - Mechanical

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Crane Ops - Are these Controls independent?

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Crane Ops - Are these Controls independent?

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Bowtie Analysis – What it really looks like

! Large number of routes ! Large number of barriers ! Only some are critical

! Easier to analyze ! Easier to communicate

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Bowtie Example - Driving Vehicle

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