introduction: regulation in the european union

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This article was downloaded by: [University of Strathclyde] On: 02 December 2014, At: 04:00 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of European Public Policy Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20 Introduction: Regulation in the European Union Iain Begg a a Professor of International Economics , South Bank University , 103 Borough Road, London, SE1 OAA, UK Phone: 0171–815 8279 Fax: 0171–815 8279 E-mail: Published online: 19 Oct 2007. To cite this article: Iain Begg (1996) Introduction: Regulation in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 3:4, 525-535, DOI: 10.1080/13501769608407051 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501769608407051 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Introduction: Regulation in the European Union

This article was downloaded by: [University of Strathclyde]On: 02 December 2014, At: 04:00Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of European Public PolicyPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20

Introduction: Regulation in the European UnionIain Begg aa Professor of International Economics , South Bank University , 103 Borough Road, London,SE1 OAA, UK Phone: 0171–815 8279 Fax: 0171–815 8279 E-mail:Published online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Iain Begg (1996) Introduction: Regulation in the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy, 3:4,525-535, DOI: 10.1080/13501769608407051

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501769608407051

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Introduction: Regulation in the European Union

Journal of European Public Policy 3:4 December 1996:525-35

Introduction: Regulation in theEuropean UnionIain Begg*

ABSTRACT

Although the drive to create a single market in the European Union (EU) wasostensibly about market liberalization, it has led to a recasting of the role ofdifferent tiers of government in the EU. This article introduces the specialissue on regulation in the EU by summarizing some of the main features ofthe new regulatory environment. The article then assesses factors shaping theevolution of rules and points to topics in need of further work.

KEYWORDS

Contemporary capitalism; European integration; regulation; the singlemarket.

Regulation is a topic which lies at the heart of contemporary politicaleconomy and which evokes strong reactions from different parties. Forsome, regulation is the antithesis of the free market: a burden on businessimposed by over-zealous, unaccountable bureaucrats. Indeed, much ofthe impetus for the single European market (SEM) programme launchedin the mid-1980s came from a search for market liberalization, a beliefthat a bonfire of non-tariff barriers would unleash competitive forcesthat would transform the European economy. However, establishmentof the single market — the centrepiece of European integration in the lastdecade - has not been purely about liberalization. It has had a profoundeffect not only on product and factor markets, a recasting rather than asimplification of rules, but also on the nature of governance itself. In the

*The author is grateful to the ESRC for its financial support and for its wisdomin funding the research programme which underpins this special issue, to JeremyRichardson for advice and encouragement, and to the authors of the articles fortheir excellent contributions.

© 1996 Routledge 1350-1763

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process, key decision-making procedures have been radically changed(qualified majority voting), the involvement of European institutions inrule-setting has multiplied, and a substantial realignment of respon-sibilities for regulatory activities has taken place.

Although the European playing-field is now more level than it was,the lasting impact of the SEM programme on the EU may well comemore from a shift in the role of the public sector, which has seenregulation grow in prominence at the expense of other forms of gover-nance. Despite these developments, it is far from obvious that there is aconsensus on the definition and purposes of regulation, let alone on howit should evolve in the EU. As Wilks1 shows, these matters touch notonly on the immediate questions of who regulates and how, but are alsocentral to the future of European capitalism itself.

These issues have been the subject of a substantial programme ofwork, initiated in 1990 and funded by the UK Economic and SocialResearch Council, to explore the evolution of the rules for the singleEuropean market.2 This research programme draws on various dis-ciplines, notably law, political science and economics, but sought fromthe outset to approach the research questions from an interdisciplinaryperspective. It included several projects which looked at different facetsof regulation, many of which are represented in this special issue.Collectively, the research projects paint a picture of a regulatory systemthat has been radically transformed in the last decade, but whichstruggles to find a new stability to replace the national systems whichhave been eclipsed.

Among the questions that the articles in this issue seek to answer arethe following:

• Recognizing that a distinctive EU model of regulation has emerged,what are its principal characteristics and in what ways are theyunique?

• How has the distribution of regulatory responsibilities between tiersof government been decided and what constraints can be identifiedon subsequent evolution of rules?

• Are current (or anticipated) regulatory arrangements in the EU, ifnot optimal, at least well conceived?

• Whose interests are being served or neglected?• Does the regulatory system function effectively and as intended, or

are there obstacles which bedevil its implementation? If the latter,how tractable are they?

• Which further changes are needed to improve the effectiveness ofregulation?

This article introduces the special issue, and attempts to draw out someof the main conclusions and policy implications of the work. It startswith an overview of regulation in the EU and how it has evolved as a

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result of the single market. The following sections appraise the regu-latory system, point to constraints on its subsequent development, andspeculate on the way forward for regulation in Europe. A concludingsection considers policy issues and identifies areas for future research.

THE EU MODEL OF REGULATION

As the single market has been progressively completed, a distinctiveEuropean model of regulation has clearly evolved. The work of Majone(1994a, 1994b, 1996), Bulmer (1994) and others has brought out some ofthe key characteristics of this model, notably its unique combination ofnational and supranational rules and institutions. However, a difficultyin appraising regulation in the EU is that it is an elusive concept,embracing many different aspects of the relationship between the state,producers and other interest groups. One approach is to portrayregulation as an alternative to free markets as a means of mediatingbetween producers and other interests. Armstrong et al. (1994) observethat just as competition is an imperfect mechanism, so too is regulation,hence the trick for government is to strike the best balance between thetwo. This is far from straightforward: 'The economics of regulationwould be a relatively simple matter if regulators were omniscient,benevolent and able to precommit future policy, but in practice there areproblems arising from asymmetric information, policy credibility, andthe danger of "capture" ' (Armstrong et al. 1994).

Wilks goes further in observing that markets themselves are shaped bypolitical and social processes, rather than being some natural state thatwould exist, as in Smith's invisible hand, but for intervention. In the EU,the growth of regulation as a policy mode identified by Majone goesmuch further than simply liberalizing markets. Instead, it involvessignificant shifts in public ownership, the emergence of independentregulatory agencies along the lines of those in the US: in short, a shifttowards a 'regulatory state'. McGowan and Wallace suggest a furtherdimension, namely that regulation, in addition to correction of marketfailure, concerns provision of rights. The latter is essentially about equityand consequently raises the whole question of distribution of income andwealth.

DEFINITIONS: WHAT DO WE MEAN BY REGULATION?

Definitions of regulation abound and many are cited in this issue. Arelatively narrow use of the term, common in the economics literature, isthat regulation is the imposition of rules on economic agents designed toalter market behaviour. Such impositions are justified by market'failures' of various kinds, that is outcomes which can be shown to haveadverse social welfare consequences. Regulation requires the elaborationof a set of rules and their application in a consistent and apolitical manner

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-see the article by Doyle. Holmes and Kempton, however, argue that thevision of politics-free regulation is illusory. A broader approach is takenby, among others, Majone (1996) who regards regulation as comprisingmany of the activities of government other than public expenditure.With the EU tier of governance hemmed in by a small and strictlyhypothecated budget, an expansion of its role in regulatory activity is anobvious way of achieving more influence. This entrepreneurial (the term'predatory' might also be used) activity can be justified in so far as it putsin place a superior system of rules, but is inevitably open to the chargethat it adds to rather than rationalizes'red tape'.

Wilks sees regulation as encompassing a much broader spectrum ofactivity by various levels of government. This has interesting echoes inthe approach of the French regulation school (see, for example, Aglietta1976, or Boyer 1986). Instead of being an essentially microeconomicphenomenon in which rules are set for particular classes of economicagent, regulation in this sense can be equated with the framework forcontemporary capitalism. Michel Albert (1993) put this provocatively bysuggesting that the EU has to face up to a choice between the Rhinelandand Anglo-Saxon models of capitalism. Eisner (1993) identifies broadphases or regimes of regulation in the US, defined as 'political-institutional arrangements that define the relationship between socialinterests, the state, and economic actors such as corporations, laborunions, and agricultural associations'. He argues that the last twentyyears have witnessed the eclipse of the societal regime of the 1960s and1970s, which had goals of improving social conditions, and the emer-gence of an efficiency regime which has the objective of liberalizingmarkets and reducing the role of the state in order to enhance economicperformance.

It is, perhaps, futile to look for a single definition of regulation. Itclearly comprises more than just the explicit rules governing a specificactivity or sector, so that to equate it, as economists are inclined to do,simply with controls meant to overcome market failure by influencingstructure and conduct would probably be too narrow. But although thereare systematic features of regulation in the EU that could be held toconstitute a comprehensive regime in the sense used by Eisner, thefollowing, more limited, definition is adopted for this article: 'Regulationconsists of codified rules and other restrictions - statutory and dis-cretionary, but excluding obligations that involve direct financialtransfers - which circumscribe the freedom of agents to engage as theysee fit in economic activities.'

CHARACTERISTICS

What, then, are the defining features of the EU regulatory system? Firstis the manner in which it brings together different regulatory traditions,yet has manifestly evolved to become distinctive. Although an Anglo-

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Saxon emphasis on competitive markets can be discerned in thephilosophy of the single market, many of the instruments and pro-cedures owe more to French and German regulatory styles. In someareas, the form of regulation has manifestly developed from the approachchampioned by one of the member states (Heritier 1996), an examplebeing the adoption of the precautionary principle (a German preference)in environmental regulation. However, Weale observes that even thoughregulatory proposals in a certain domain may reflect the preferences ofone member state or a particular regulatory perspective, the process oftranslating this into agreed European rules will often introduce elementsuncongenial to the original proposers. Weale argues, further, that thisgives the Commission an incentive to be opportunistic in its promotionof measures, because of the need to cobble together a 'concurrentmajority' to secure acceptance of a measure. He shows how the evolutionof environmental policy illustrates these characteristics of regulation inthe EU.

Second, there is the unique relationship between member states andthe EU level in both the formulation and implementation of regulatorypolicy. This is, in part, the result of the legislative process in the EU andthe fact that the member states, through the Council, retain the strongestsay in decision-making. The strength of intergovernmentalism — judgedby some (for example, Moravcsik 1993) to be pre-eminent in any case -has, • if anything, been reinforced by the difficulties surroundingratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in a context of per-sistent recession and high unemployment. The character of the relation-ship between the supranational and national tiers of government is alsoshaped by the manner in which EU rules are transposed andimplemented by member states. This has a number of ramifications.

European regulators are generally more remote from the subjects ofregulation than in other jurisdictions. They must rely on member statesnot only to transpose Directives into national legal codes, but also toassure compliance. Maher shows that this can lead to inconsistency, if notalways unpredictability in the way that rules function. She demonstratesthat fewer problems arise where European rules are confluent withnational approaches and priorities, but that regulation which divergesradically from that historically applied in the member state can engenderprolonged resistance and procrastination in transposition. A relatedphenomenon is divergence in the interpretation of regulation. It oftenfalls to regional or local government to enforce Directives, and this canresult in significant variations in enforcement.

A third feature of the European system is the parallel operation andincidence of supranational, national and subnational regulation.Although one of the main justifications for the single market was toremove regulatory profusion as a source of barriers to entry, the resort tomutual recognition and the continuing involvement of multiple actorsleave considerable scope for discretion in the application of rules.

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McGowan and Wallace emphasize the dual character of the Europeanregulatory system, with the European level primarily concerned toregulate national regulators, while the latter deal directly with firms andindividuals. Wilks, however, identifies businesses as the main target ofregulation. It also paves the way for 'competition between rules',although the work of Woolcock and Wallace (1995) suggests that thismay be a case of a dog that didn't bark. The system of 'indirect rule'described by Maher has the merit of limiting the need for an excessivecentral bureaucracy and keeping regulation close to its subjects. But ithas its shortcomings, notably its vulnerability to inconsistencies in theapplication of the rules.

One interpretation of developments in the EU is that the regulatory-powers and responsibilities of the nation state are being reinvented at theEuropean level. McKenzie and Khalidi argue that this may prove to be aninappropriate response to an economic environment in which time andspace have become so compressed that the traditional methods ofregulation lose much of their effectiveness, and are easily overtaken byinnovation in the market place.

The sectoral organization of the Commission constitutes a fourthfeature of the EU system. Weale draws attention to the potential forregulatory conflict between, for instance, environmental and transportobjectives. This can lead regulators to engage in deal-making betweenthemselves to achieve acceptable compromises, rather than seeking tosolve problems. Although he finds that environmental policy has beenadvanced in an unanticipated manner by the single market - a genuinepolicy spillover - Weale does not believe that the resulting policyprovides adequate answers to environmental problems. He concludes,therefore, that the concurrent majority system of decision-making is ill-suited to achieving progress on environmental issues.

Fifth, there is the comparative lack of accountability of EU regulators,often aggravated by the exaggerated reactions in some member states topolicies emanating from 'Brussels'. This has two sides. That there is ademocratic deficit in the rule-making process is widely acknowledged.But there are also many instances where member states find initiativestaken by the Commission or rules that it tries to implement quite con-venient, because the blame for unpopular but desirable measures can bedeflected. Moravcsik (1993: 315) even suggests that 'Ironically, the EC's"democratic deficit" may be a fundamental source of its success.' Thesystem of indirect rule described by Maher also impinges on account-ability. One of its effects is to put the onus more on private agents toinitiate litigation where transposition is resisted. If, as is the case withimmigrants in the UK, there is no cohesive interest group, the likelihoodof transposition failure is heightened. Democratic control is underminedbecause organized interest groups are able not only to influence the formand content of Directives, but also to bring pressure to bear on recal-citrant member states where implementation is a problem.

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In many respects, however, the regulatory system is unsatisfactoryand incoherent. The legitimacy of much of the system is doubtful andthere are question marks over its effectiveness. Choices affecting regu-lation are made as a result of complex bargaining between interest groupsand compromises between tiers of government that reflect neither anyunderlying assessment of what is optimal nor a vision of how mattersshould evolve. The question this raises is whether a system apparently sobereft of clear-headed design will run into the buffers rather than beingdeepened and extended to new member states.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATION IN THE EU:CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

At times, the 'Europeanization' of regulation has seemed to be an inex-orable process, slowed only by the rearguard actions of member statesdesperate to hang on to traditional powers long past their sell-by dates.Indeed, the articulation in the TEU of the principle of subsidiarity couldbe viewed as such a stalling tactic. To portray the regulatory issue in theEU today as one of European Commission versus member states is toosimplistic. Instead, it can be argued that regulation is at the heart ofaccommodations between member states and the Commission, and thatmore subtle divisions of responsibility for regulatory policy and itsimplementation are emerging. This highlights problems of division oflabour between regulators, and of tension between approaches and tech-niques of regulation that will need to be resolved for the system tofunction effectively. Equally, a further transfer of responsibilities towardsthe European tier of government cannot always be justified, either oneconomic grounds or because it would not be politically acceptable.

A major issue is who bears the cost of regulation. Seeking to achievepublic policy aims through governance by regulation has the greatadvantage of imposing only small costs on the public purse. In arenowned article, Coase (1960: 18) points out that 'regulation will notnecessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved bythe market or the firm'. Equally, he concedes that regulation can improveeconomic efficiency. The inference to be drawn is that it would be wrongto look for a blanket endorsement or rejection of 'Europeanization' ofregulation; instead, a case-by-case approach is needed. Coase alsostresses that 'All solutions have costs and there is no reason to supposethat government regulation is called for simply because the problem isnot well handled by the market or the firm.' This is the nub of the issue:resort to European regulation may look attractive because it imposes fewcosts on the public purse, but the costs borne by other economic agentsmay be substantial.

The analysis by Byatt, reflecting the experience of a practitioner ofregulation of the water industry, shows that the costs borne by con-sumers can be substantial and would probably be hard to justify if

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subjected to rigorous cost-benefit analysis. These costs can also be, if notcapricious, unfair on constituencies which have little say in setting therules. Byatt also points out that customer bills will be affected by howregulators use their discretion in the interpretation of Directives, as wellas by purely national legislation. Inconsistency in the application of rulescan, moreover, add to customer bills without necessarily improvingquality of service.

A second issue concerns legitimacy and fairness in the process bywhich regulation is imposed, let alone whether it is the best wayforward. The area of anti-dumping discussed by Holmes and Kemptondemonstrates how difficult it is to disentangle rule-based anddiscretionary regulation. Indeed, a more general observation is thatregulation cannot easily be reduced to apolitical application of quasi-judicial rules. For the EU, this poses awkward problems of legitimacythat may point to limits on Europeanization. Not only are the rulesthemselves the outcome of political bargaining, but the manner inwhich they are operated also has a political dimension. The absence of asupranational political authority may, consequently, fatally weaken thecase for supranational regulation.

McKenzie and Khalidi point to the increasing resort to self-regulation by financial markets. They argue that this is attributable inlarge part to globalization, coupled with a pace of innovation in financialmarkets so rapid that existing regulatory mechanisms quickly becomeout of date. If their analysis is correct, the attempt to construct aspecifically European framework for regulation of these markets, asmapped out in the SEM programme, is doomed and will soon have to berecast. Europeanization of regulation would only have been a step on theway to a new regulatory accommodation. Moreover, permanentregulation may not be an answer. As Doyle notes, the question that has tobe posed about regulatory arrangements is whether they promoteeffective competition in a way that improves economic efficiency. Norcan regulation, as an instrument of policy, function effectively withouthaving regard to other policy tools. There is plainly a need to integrateregulation and other aspects of public policy so as to ensure overallcoherence in supply-side policy. In airlines, for example, the analysis byMcGowan and Wallace suggests a struggle between accepted practices(public ownership of national 'flag-carriers') and the new demands ofcompetition.

A fourth facet of European regulation is that there are entrenchedcultural variations in receptiveness to regulation, especially where thestyle of regulation is alien to the society, which are bound to diminish thescope for a homogenized European regulatory system. Wilks argues thatresistance to the 'regulatory state' is greatest in the southern memberstates, but that all countries will find some aspects to oppose. Indeed, oneof the ironies of the UK's position is that it is the member state appar-ently most at ease with regulation as a form of governance, yet it finds

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more than most to object to in European rules. Cultural resistance may,moreover, be an obstacle to the imposition of EU-style regulation on thecountries of Central and Eastern Europe.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

So, is the EU destined to become the textbook model of a regulatorystate, choosing this because it is denied public ownership or publicexpenditure as instruments of government? This is the essence of theargument developed by Majone. Alternatively, has regulation in the EUgone too far with the result that it risks becoming ossified and counter-productive?

Several areas for reform or in need of further research are revealed inthe articles in this issue. The first is how to reconcile 'Europeanization'with trends towards globalization. In financial markets, the work ofMcKenzie and Khalidi suggests that even though rules associated withthe single market have only just come into force, market trends alreadyrender them obsolete. This implies that attention needs to be paid to howthe EU can respond to rapidly changing international circumstances. Ananswer put forward by McKenzie and Khalidi is to rely more on marketdisciplines, underpinned by obligations to disclose information. Aresearch question here is whether such a conclusion is specific to thefinancial sector or will find wider applicability.

A second theme is policy assignment between tiers of government.What emerges from the research reported in this issue is that the currentmix of powers and responsibilities is the result as much of compromise oropportunism on the part of different policy actors as of well thought-outpolicy design. Plainly, we will never have the luxury of sitting down witha blank sheet of paper to design an optimal regulatory structure. But evenan articulation of a set of principles to guide future decisions would be anadvance.

Then there is the question of social regulation. Majone (1996) andothers have argued that because national institutions and social prioritiesare the outcome of complex and extended bargaining between differentconstituencies within member states, they represent delicatecompromises that cannot easily be superseded. Scharpf (1996) disputesthis, maintaining instead that the top-down, German model demon-strates that it is possible to have uniformity in the guiding principles ofsocial regulation. Even if this is tempered by implementation at lowerlevels of governance, an important advantage of common social norms isto prevent a sort of competitive deregulation that would be just asdisruptive to the European economy as competitive devaluation.Competitive imperatives have engendered much hand-wringing aboutthe future of the 'European social model', but it is undeniable that in anysociety which accepts an obligation towards those not earning a living,redistribution must occur through some channel, be it the extended

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family, income from returns on assets or the social protection system.A fourth area for further work is on the design of regulatory

machinery. The articles by Doyle and by Holmes and Kempton highlighttwo disturbing features of the current system of regulation: the difficultyin setting limits on the scope of regulation, and its struggle to begenuinely rule-based rather than political. These concerns are central tothe purposes of regulation. Doyle makes the case that regulation is ameans of making progress towards effective competition, with the impli-cation that once this 'state-of-grace' has been attained, the regulatorshould fade away. If Majone's depiction of regulation as a form ofgovernance that has flourished because others have been closed off iscorrect, this is likely to be at odds with the notion that the regulatorshould, in time, disappear. The research question here is whether it ispossible to design regulatory machinery that acknowledges both that theneed for regulation may diminish and that its focus should evolve inresponse to changes in markets. A further major challenge highlighted byMcGowan and Wallace is how to incorporate the countries of Centraland Eastern Europe into EU structures. The obligation rapidly to acceptthe acquis communautaire may be too demanding for countries whichstart from such unpromising positions.

The degree of politicization of regulation raises altogether differentquestions. Holmes and Kempton argue persuasively that the anti-dumping regime cannot, indeed should not, become or be seen as adisembodied set of rules that dictates how policy should be applied. Theresearch question is whether other forms of regulation should be viewedin a similar manner and, if so, whether the EU, acting through the Com-mission, can defend the position that it is above the fray in the politicalbargaining that shapes the regulatory system. If not, ascertaining how theCommission forms its views and decides which approach to favour willbe important research issues. In some respects, the Commission is more,not less, open to consultation or lobbying (Mazey and Richardson 1993)than at least some member states, and the evidence adduced byMcGowan and Wallace suggests that it has also been more willing to takeaccount of less well-organized interests such as consumers.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of questions about regulation inthe EU. Moreover, it is a moving target. The agenda can shift rapidly inresponse to competitive imperatives linked to globalization or changingpolitical demands. For such reasons, the EU system of regulation maynever be optimal and will always rely on compromise solutions. A finalquestion, therefore, is whether it is realistic to hope for more than this.

Address for correspondence: Professor Iain Begg, South Bank Univer-sity, 103 Borough Road, London SE1 OAA, UK. Tel: 0171-815 8279.Fax: 0171-815 8277. E-mail: [email protected]

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NOTES

1 Throughout this article, references without dates refer to articles in thisspecial issue.

2 The author is Programme Director of this research programme.

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