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INTRODUCTION
This study aims to determine the growth of maritime power in India and
China during the 1990s. It undertakes an in-depth analysis of several elements of
maritime power. These elements include both the classical (Mahanian) as also
those elements that have emerged due to technological developments and the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).
Historic;ally, maritime power has been associated with economic wealth.
During the glorious Greek and Roman eras, the Mediterranean was the centre of
maritime power. With the decline of European colonial domination and the ascent
ofthe United States of America, the axis of maritime power shifted to the Atlantic.
Likewise economic growth among several Asia Pacific countries has resulted in a
change of the maritime power axis. The Asia Pacific region has experienced
economic dynamism and booming trade. Importantly, maritime developments
occupy a significant place in the regional economic environment.
Meanwhile, the security architecture in the Asia Pacific region has
undergone a change. For many countries in the region, economic vitality is
dependent on long sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Regional waterways have
therefore strategic significance for both merchant and naval shipping. Regional
economic prosperity is intertwined with maritime affairs. Most of these nations
are either island states or have long coastlines. Besides, there is a determination to
assert greater control over newly acquired maritime territories under UNCLOS III
and to safeguard maritime interests. Hence, regional military modernisation has a
maritime orientation. Navies have been given greater priority than armies and air
forces. Regional countries are engaged in aggressive arms acquisition programmes.
Some of the new hardware has offensive capabilities.
2
Economists and security specialists have viewed the shift in the economic
and maritime axis with great attention. To an economist, the Asia Pacific security
environment appears to be calm, stable and confident. On the other hand, for a
security specialist, the region is full of flash points due to territorial disputes, and
ongoing military modernisation is marked by the ambition to dominate the regional
balance of power. Every time there is a shift in the balance of power, regional
countries perceive it as a security problem.
RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
There are at least three important reasons for this study. First, both India
and China have experienced substantial growth in their maritime power in the
1990s. Good economic growth rates, increased energy demands to support the
economy, recognition of the importance of SLOCs, and the safety of marine wealth
in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) have led to the modernization of navies.
Secondly, during the last five decades, conflict has been the dominant
characteristic in India-China relations. 1 In 1951, China annexed Tibet leading to a
mounting nervousness in New Delhi about the permanent stationing of the Chinese
military on its northern borders. This also obviated the buffer that insulated India
from the north. The capture of Aksai Chin in 1962 (claimed by India as part of
Jammu and Kashmir), the border dispute involving 90,000 square kilometer in
John W Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Washington: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 377. Garver notes that given Chinese economic growth and military capabilities, it is likely that India will accommodate itself to a steadily expanding Chinese presence and role in South Asia. According to Garver, the major question for India is whether it can accept such an arrangement. He also notes that emergence of China, as a superpower, will depend upon New Delhi's future equations with Russia and the United States. Also, unification with Taiwan and the tenor of its relations with Japan will also impact upon Beijing's long-term relations with India.
3
Arunachal Pradesh, und the extensive military infrastructure build up in Tibet also
impacted on Indian security and added to uneasiness in New Delhi. The situation
worsened in 1963. whL·n Pakistan ceded more than five thousand square kilometers
of territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to China that culminated in the
construction of the Karakoram Friendship Highway.
Indian threat perceptions are well grounded in China's nuclear capability,
and New Delhi's efforts at redressing the nuclear asymmetry have led Beijing to
help Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons, thus complicating India's nuclear
calculations? China is also actively involved in modernising Pakistan's maritime
infrastructure, particularly Gwadar, which is geo-strategically located astride the
sea-lane originating from the strategic choke point ofHormuz.3 Similarly, Chinese
military aid and investment in strategic infrastructure resulted in an Asian diplomat
in Bangkok noting that: ''Myanmar is close to being a Chinese satellit~." 4
Given Indian and Chinese economic growth and naval capabilities, neither
side is willing to accommodate the other and be the junior partner. 5 India is
building relations with the US which China views as the only global competitor. In
response, China is actively engaged in a competition for influence in South Asia
among the small states, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
2
3
4
5
C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C.Khanna, India and China: The Way Ahead After Mao's India War (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000), pp.149-154.
Vijay Sakhuja, "Sino-Pakistan Maritime Initiatives", Article No 730, April 10, 2002, available at the website of Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at http://www .ipcs.org.
Dermot Tatlow, "China's Shadow: A Growing Presence From Next Door Spurs a Rethink in Yangon", see website of Asia Week at http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/99/0528/nat4.html.
C.V. Ranganathan and Vinod C. Khanna, op.cit., p.l55.
4
Thirdly, the Indian and Chinese navies have not had a very satisfying
relationship going back to 1956. Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Enlai visited an
Indian naval ship in Mumbai (then Bombay) and was hosted at a luncheon. Earlier,
a Chinese military delegation had spent a day at sea off Cochin on board the Indian
Flagship. However, this nascent naval relationship was marred by some incidents
caused by the Chinese."'
At the time of the 1962 Indo-China war, the Indian military leadership
perceived a combined naval threat from China and Pakistan. 7 The Chinese navy
had 25 submarines, and twenty-one of these had the capability to operate in the
Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. A reassessment of the Chinese naval threat ruled
out naval conflict but the presence of Chinese submarines had been confirmed. 8
Interestingly, an American aircraft carrier was present in the Bay of Bengal to offer
air cover over Calcutta in case the conflict escalated.9
6
7
8
9
Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Blueprint to Bluewater: The Indian Nmy 1951-65 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992), pp.486-488. In 1958, Mysore, a cruiser of the Indian navy paid a goodwill visit to Shanghai. Enroute, she visited Hong Kong for fuelling and had to pass within 12 miles of the Chinese coastline but well outside the then internationally accepted three-mile territorial waters limit. A suitable reply, rejecting the Chinese protests, was made. But there was worse waiting to happen. At Shanghai, the Chinese did their best to sow seeds of distrust among Indian sailors over some boxes of beer they had sent to the ship for the seamen. Incidentally, Indian sailors are not permitted to drink alcoholic beverages.
Ibid., pp.57-58.
Ibid.
K.R. Singh, Navies of South Asia (New Delhi: Rupa Co., 2002), p.63. By some accounts, it was the USS Enterprise. Interestingly, Indians appear to have a "love and hate" relationship with the Enterprise. During the 1971 IndoPakistan conflict, it was the same carrier and its escorts that sailed through the Bay of Bengal to deter India against Pakistan. It is believed that the motive of this display of force was to ensure protection ofUS interests in the area. But Indian naval officers, particularly Vice Admiral M.K. Roy, argue that no Indian naval vessel encountered the US Task Force 74. However, he notes that during his meeting with Admiral S.G.Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief, Soviet navy, it was revealed that a Soviet nuclear submarine deliberately surfaced in the Bay
After the 1962 war, relations between Beijing and New Delhi remained
sour. Interaction between the two navies, however, finally began in 1994 with the
visit by a Chinese naval ship Zhang He to Mumbai and, as a reciprocal gesture, in
September 1995 two Indian navy ships visited Shanghai. 10 Again, in 2000, while
enroute to Pusan, South Korea, to participate in the South Korean International
Fleet Review, two Indian ships visited Shanghai on a goodwill visit, but this time
they faced a situation that had elements of the 1958 visit by Indian ship Mysore.
China objected to the presence of the Indian navy in the South China Sea,
claiming that the responsibility of patrolling the sea was that ofthe Chinese navy.
The Chinese had to be told that the Indian ships were passing through and would
even carry out Passex (passage exercises) with the Chinese navy. According to
Admiral R H Tahiliani, former Indian Chief of Naval Staff, the Chinese protests
only amounted to "pressure tactics". 11 In response, the Chinese navy "backed out"
and declined to participate in the Indian navy's International Fleet Review
(IFR),"bridges of friendship" to commemorate India's 50 years of independence.
Chinese protests over Indian naval manoeuvres in the South China Sea may have
been one of the reasons. Another reason may have been that the Pakistan navy had
not been invited to participate in the event. 12
of Bengal to send a signal to the US that the Soviets could intervene if the Americans were to get involved in the India-Pakistan war.
10 The author was present onboard the ship Juring the visit to Shanghai in September1995.
11 Gaurav C. Sawant, "China Objects to Indian Presence in South China Sea", Indian Express, October 14, 2000.
12 Interestingly, just three months later, in May 2001, two Chinese naval ships Harbin and Taicang, with Rear Admiral Zhang Yan, Deputy Commander of the North Sea Fleet on board, visited Karachi in connection with the 50th anniversary celebrations of the Pakistan-China relations. Rear Admiral Zhang noted that the two countries were close neighbours, and their friendship enjoyed a long history and was time-tested. Rear Admiral Shahid Karimullah,
5
A NOTE ON EARLIER WORKS ON INDIAN AND CHINESE
MARITIME POWER
In the past, several scholars and experts have written on Indian naval
power. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury's, India's Maritime Security, undertakes a
comprehensive analysis of the economic, political and military dimensions of
6
India's maritime power. 13 Roy-Chaudhury argues that India lacks a comprehensive
maritime security policy and highlights the need for a holistic approach to the
various elements of maritime power. As regards Chinese activities in the Indian
Ocean, the book notes that China has been actively involved in developing
economic, political and military relations with several states in the Indian Ocean
and it could have a naval presence in the coming years. 14 Roy-Chaudhury's earlier
work, Sea Power and Indian Security, undertakes an analysis of the growth of the
Indian navy and provides important inputs with regard to naval acquisition
polices. 15
Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns and Blueprint to
Bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951-65 trace Indian navy's history from 1945 to
Commander, Pakistan Fleet, said that Pakistan-China relations represented a model for peaceful, co-operative and friendly relations between countries with different political and social systems and cultural backgrounds and the friendship had stood the test of time under all circumstances, whether it be war or peace, economic or political difficulties or even international pressure. For more details, see "Chinese Admiral Lauds Pakistan Foreign Policy", The Dawn, May 21 ,2001 available at website of Defence News at http:/ /www.PakistaniDefence.com.
13 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000).
14 Ibid., p.1 02. 15 Rahul Roy-Chaudhary, Sea Power and Indian Security (London: Brassy's,
1995).
7
1950 and from 1951 to 1965 respectively. 16 This was followed by Vice Admiral
G.N. Hiranandani Transition to Triumph: History ofthe Indian Navy, 1965-
197 5. 17 These are very good accounts of the growth of the Indian navy but do not
cover developments in India's maritime power.
G.V.C. Naidu's The Indian Navy and South East Asia examines the growth
and development of the Indian navy in the context of South East Asia. 18 He notes
that the Chinese navy is undergoing modernization both in terms of doctrine and
capability. Similarly, the Japanese navy is expanding and remains technologically
superior. The Indian navy, despite recent funding constraints, continues to develop
a limited power projection capability. According to Naidu, India's major concern
in the Bay of Bengal arise as a result of Chinese military activity in Myanmar. 19
Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars by Rear Admiral K. Raja Menon
culls from postulates of many maritime strategists and argues that the benchmark
for maritime strategy is how it affects the national political purpose.20 Menon
resurrects Philip Colomb and contrasts him with Mahan. The book examines
several wars in operational and tactical contexts.
As regards China, Lieutenant Commander David G Muller, Jr. US Navy
authored China as a Maritime Power and traced developments in China's maritime
16 Rear Admiral Satyindra Singh, Under Two Ensigns (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1989) and Blueprint to Bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951-65 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1992).
17 Vice Admiral G.M. Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975 (New Delhi: Lancer International, 2000).
18 G.V.C.Naidu, The Indian Navy and South East Asia (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000).
19 Ibid., pp.191-192. 20 Rear Admiral K. Raja Menon, Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars
(London: Frank Cass, 2000).
8
power during the period 1945-1983.21 Muller argues that maritime power is often
defined in terms of naval strength, but a study of China as a maritime power cannot
be limited to an account of the development ofthe Chinese navy. He undertakes a
comprehensive analysis of Chinese maritime economy, domestic political
influences on naval developments and its status in the Chinese political system.
The work also describes maritime foreign relations and the evolution of China's
position on the Law of the Sea. The study, however, does not deal with maritime
history.
This aspect has been dealt with by Gang Deng in Maritime Sector,
Institutions, ·and Sea Power of Premodern China.22 Deng argues that China once
had a continental outlook, it neglected its maritime frontiers and there was no
significant maritime tradition. This was so because China's greatest military
threats, b~fore the nineteenth century, came from the grasslands of inner Asia. In
the later years, however, China's economic superiority among its maritime trading
partners was driven by superiority in maritime technology. This was challenged by
the European fleets in the nineteenth century that led to a long century of
degradation and humiliation at the hands of the Europeans and, later, the Japanese.
Cole D. Bernard's The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the
Twenty-first Century argues that China is the most important and dangerous rising
power and is usfng its continuing economic growth to restore its historical position
of regional dominance in Asia. 23 Cole notes that in the last two decades China has
21 D~vid G Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power (Colorado: Westview Press, 1983).
22 Gang Deng, Maritime Sector, Institutions, and Sea Power of Premodern China (Westport: Greenwood, 1999).
23 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001).
9
focused on economic development and is currently building a navy capable of
projecting its power beyond its littorals. How it will choose to use its increasingly
capable military has global implications.
Srikanth Kondapalli's China's Naval Power focuses its attention on the
command structure and organization, personnel and training, and the near and
long-term strategic intentions of China's navy.24 The work warns that China's
other neighbours, such as India, will certainly be affected by these changes as
"tensions are bound to rise with the rise of China's naval power. "25
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai's authored China's Strategic Seapower:
The Politics· of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age. 26 It documents China's
acquisition of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines, a programme that
dates back to the 1950s. The book shows that despite China's technological
backwardness, it was able to develop advanced weapon systems. The authors
conclude by noting that China's military industry can shed the legacy of past
political upheavals and move into the modem age.
As is evident, in the past, several scholars and experts have written on the
diverse facets of the broad theme of maritime power in India and China. However,
no work has been undertaken that compares contemporary developments,
particularly in the 1990s, in terms of the growth of the maritime power of India and
China. Besides examining the classical elements of maritime power, this study also
examines the impact of information technology on the Indian and Chinese
24 Srikanth Kondapalli, China's Naval Power (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001).
25 Ibid., p.218. 26 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of
Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
understanding of naval warfare. It is hoped that this study will contribute to a
greater awareness of the maritime ambitions of India and China, and how this
instrument of power is employed for regional influence.
STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND MARITIME POWER: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW
The very location oflndia on the globe lends it 'maritimeness' .27
Cartographers have aptly named an entire ocean after India. Although this fact is
deeply rooted in the maritime strategic thinking of India, no theories for the
10
application of maritime power have been developed. Much of the understanding of
matters maritime is still based on British thought and practice. Besides, there is a
tendency to look at maritime power as narrowly as the navy or simply maritime
infrastructure.
Indian writings on maritime power or sea power draw inspiration from
Western concepts of maritime power.28 Naval forces are considered an element of
maritime power to further national interests, be they economic, diplomatic or
strategic. Admiral O.S. Dawson, former navy chief and subsequent High
27 Commodore S.W. Bateman, Australian navy, a retired navy officer notes that 'maritimeness' is based on the state's dependence on the sea and this is an amalgam of factors such as maritime traditions, size of the navy and merchant fleet, dependence on sea borne trade, size of EEZ, value of offshore resources, and the capability of the domestic shipbuilding industry. For more details see his "Sea Change in Asia-Pacific", Jane's Navy International, October 1996, p.26.
28 S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and Indian Ocean: With Special Reference to India (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 1978), pp.23-26. Admiral S.N. Kohli, former Chief ofNaval Staff, Indian navy, notes that there is a mistaken belief that sea is synonym for a strong navy. He believes that this is a myopic view and argues that sea power embraces all that makes nations great by the use of sea. He then goes on to examine the Mahanian elements of maritime power against Indian settings.
11
Commissioner of India to New Zealand argues, "Sea power is an important
commodity. A country likes India without sea power is a weak state".29
The more contemporary writings also describe maritime power as military,
political and economic power exerted through an ability to use the seas. Rear
Admiral K. Sridharan has argued that sea power is not merely warships and cites
Jawaharlal Nehru:
Mercantile marine represents power of a different type; not power of armed might but the power of a country's growing wealth and prosperity.30
Given these views and those of other Indian practitioners, it is generally
agreed that maritime power encompasses a much wider definition. 31
India's maritime interests envisage a secure maritime environment for
sustained national development. 32 This demands maritime areas are secure and that
the sea is used effectively both as a medium of trade and resource generation.
Protecting India's energy lifelines, promoting overseas markets and fulfilling
international commitments like peacekeeping and upholding maritime order under
UNCLOS III are some of the other interests that have been identified.
India lays claim to an EEZ of2.3 million square kilometers that is a
repository of great wealth in terms of oil and gas, as well as marine resources, both
29 Raju G.C. Thomas, "The Sources oflndian Naval Expansion", in Robert H. Bruce ( ed. ), The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean (Perth: Curtin University of Technology, 1989), p.90.
30 Rear Admiral K. Sridharan, Sea: Our Saviour (New Delhi: New Age International, 2000), pp.l57-158.
31 Discussions with Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, former Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admirals M. K. Roy, I Bedi, and R.B. Suri, all former Commanders-in-Chief, and Rear Admiral K. Raja Menon during September-October 2000 ..
32 Rear Admiral K. Sridharan, op.cit., pp.159-161.
12
living and non-living.33 India also holds "pioneer investor" status with mining
rights in the central Indian Ocean region to extract poly-metallic nodules rich in
critical materials.
India's entire development process rests on the availability of energy
resources, and therefore energy availability and affordability are absolutely vital to
the country. Ninety percent of Indian oil comes from offshore oil fields or is
transported over the sea from abroad. 34 Ensuring the security of energy supplies is
one of the important facets of India's maritime challenge.
As far as China is concerned, there have been periods of maritime glory in
ancient times. During the period between the Song Dynasty and the Ming Dynasty,
China's imperial system focused its attention overseas and several voyages were
dispatched to distant lands as far as Africa and Persian Gulf.35 China was regarded
as one of the strongest sea powers in that period. But this was short-lived because
subsequent Chinese rulers began to look inwards and maritime enterprise took a
back seat.
However, after the communists came to power in China in 1949, the
leadership once again began to salvage some of their ancient maritime glory and
maritime infrastructure was developed with the Soviet Union's assistance.36 Since
independence Chinese maritime strategic thinking has grown and developed into a
33 R.C. Sharma and P .C. Sinha, India's Ocean Policy (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1994), pp.25-63.
34 P.K. Ghosh, "The Maritime Dimension", in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Oil and Gas in India's Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001), p.75.
35 C.P. Fitzgerald, The Horizon History of China (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1969), pp.239-242.
36 Muller, op.cit., pp.l1-12.
13
sophisticated maritime strategy.37 The Chinese believe that, to build China into a
real maritime power, the country must intensify maritime resource studies and
invest in the sinews of maritime power. 38
Much of contemporary Chinese maritime understanding traces its origin to
the writings of Admiral Liu Huaqing, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese
navy (1982-86) and later Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission.39 He
believed that if China was to become a great power it must develop maritime
capabilities and build a navy capable of defending its maritime interests.40
China's maritime economy involves more than twenty sectors, including
maritime transportation, fishing, salt industry, and offshore marine resources (both
living and non- living). In addition, high-tech marine industries have begun to take
shape in terms of the utilization of seawater, sea energy and the exploitations of
seabed resources. 41 During the last decades, Chinese r.1aritime economy has grown
at a rapid pace and the coastal provinces have played an important role towards the
d 1 f . . 42
eve opment o maritime power.
37 Ibid., p.44. According to Muller, the Chinese did not inherit a national maritime strategy and the primary purpose of the navy was to assist in moving ground forces into and out of coastal areas.
38 Ibid., pp.57-68.Durihg the first decade of the Communist rule, economics of sea-borne trade and developmP.nt of fishing industry were in the forefront and served as the motivation for Chinese naval development in the 1950s.
39 For a detailed career profile of Admiral Liu Huaqing, see Srikanth Kondapalli China's Naval Power (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2001 ), pp.190-196.
4° For an interesting discourse on Admiral Liu Huaqing's maritime thought, see You Ji, "The Evolution of China's Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949-2001 ", Paper No 22, The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, pp.6-8.
41 The Chinese government White Paper titled "Development of China's Marine Programs", available at the website of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China Washington, D.C. at http://www.chinaguide.org/e-white/index.htm.
42 Li Rongxia, "Marine Economy: New Economic Growth Point", Beijing Review, November! 0-December 6, 1998.
14
As noted above, there is a general sense of insecurity in the region. There is
also a widespread apprehension throughout the Asia Pacific region concerning the
. future of the balance of power. 43 Both India and China are seeking a greater role in
regional political and security affairs that is commensurate \\ith their economic and
military capabilities. The ongoing modernisation of the tv.'o navies is a reflection of
the intention of these countries to develop a greater and more assertive role in
determining regional affairs. Given the active arms buildup in the Asia-Pacific
region, and the desire to safeguard maritime interests, there is a potential for
conflict. Such a scenario would have profound consequences for most nations of
the Asia-Pacific including the US, Japan, South East Asian countries and Russia in
the long run.
ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY
The study is based on an analyses of empirical data obtained from several
sources. An attempt has been made to discuss maritime infrastructure, naval
equipment and capabilities, the impact of information technologies on maritime
power, and an appreciation of the maritime environment in India and China.
Several primary sources like official government publications, white papers, media
reports and interviews with practitioners of maritime power, naval specialists and
planners have supported the study. Likewise, visits to maritime infrastructure
(ports, shipyards and dockyards) in India have provided a rich source of data. It
was not possible to visit China during the study. Ho\vever, an earlier visit to
Chinese and Taiwanese naval bases, shipyards, ports, and recent interaction with
43 Jing Dong Yuan, "China's Defence Modernisation: Implications for AsiaPacific Security"', Contemporary South East Asia, vol.l7, no .I, June 1995, p. 76. Also see Harry Harding, "A Chinese Colossus?", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.18, no.3., September 1995, p.120.
15
Chinese maritime specialists during Track II meetings provided valuable data for
the study.44
Inputs for this study include the author's meetings with the Chinese,
Taiwanese and the Indian naval Commanders-in-Chief. In 1995, on a visit to
Shanghai onboard the 1\irpan, the author met Admiral Zhang Lianzhong during an
official call. In 2000. the author visited Taipai and met the Taiwanese navy chief
Admiral Wu Shih-Wen. These meetings, though brief, provided important inputs in
terms of strategic thinking in China and the China threat as perceived by the
Taiwanese. Discussions with several Indian navy Commanders-in-Chief (both
serving and retired) helped in understanding maritime thinking among Indian
maritime practitioners and experts.
It is true that a realistic assessment of maritime power is an extraordinarily
complex empirical problem. The input elements of maritime power are both
objective and subjective. In this study, an attempt has been made to determine the
maritime power of India and China as systematically as possible. The study has
relied on RayS Cline's formula for calculating the power ofnations.45 Based on
this, the study created a model to determine the comprehensive maritime power of
a nation. This model is suitable because it encompasses the changes in the nautical
regime brought about by UNCLOS III and the impact of information technology
on the maritime power of a state.
44 The author is a member of the Indian Maritime Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and has attended several meetings.
45 RayS Cline, World Power Trends and US Foreign Policy for the 1980's (Colorado: Westview Press,l980), p.27. Cline put forth a formula to determine the power of nations for planning American defence and foreign policy.
16
The study has been divided into seven chapters. These chapters in tum look
at maritime power comparatively, i.e. they discuses various determinants of
maritime power in both the Indian and Chinese context. The chapters seek to
identify developments as also areas of neglect in maritime affairs. The study
analyses the commitment of the national leadership to maritime power and their
understanding of its utility in national strategy.
Chapter I examines the concept of maritime power as it has developed over
the years in the US, Britain, USSR/Russia, India and China. It analyses the
writings of several maritime strategists, academics, and practitioners, and argues
that the constituents of maritime power have undergone a change with UNCLOS
III and the ongoing revolution brought about by information technology. It
develops an input/output model for computing the maritime power of a state. It
also high!ights how states have used their maritime power to safeguard their
national interests.
Chapter II establishes a link between geography and maritime power. It
argues that the two are closely linked to each other and are vital determinants in a
country's march towards becoming a maritime power. The chapter examines in
detail the maritime geography of India and China. Chapter III analyzes Indian and
Chinese naval strategy, force structure and capabilities to achieve strategic
objectives set by the leadership.
Chapter IV examines the economic components of maritime power. It
examines shipbuilding, shipping, port infrastructure and the fishing industry of
India and China. It shows that both countries have intensified their efforts to build
:maritime infrastructure to harness the wealth available from the sea. Chapter V
examines the political component of maritime power. It argues that there is
17
continuity from the past with regard to the use of navies for coercion and gunboat
diplomacy. Importantly, the navy is the only instrument of the state that can be
legally deployed in peace or war anywhere on the seas for political purposes. Both
India and China have used their navies for diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region.
Chapter VI examines the impact of information-based technologies on the
growth of maritime power in India and China. Both countries have kept abreast of
developments in information warfare and are slowly adapting to changes brought
about by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The chapter also highlights
critical deficiencies in the RMA capabilities of China and India.
Finally, Chapter VII notes that the central feature of the Asia Pacific
security environment is a general sense of insecurity. It argues that, in the post
Cold War period, a new "quadrile" (India, China, Japan and the US) has emerged
that is shaping the regional balance of power. These countries want a favourable
and stable security environment for economic growth, but have adopted aggressive
arms acquisitions strategies that are indicative of the fact that the security
environment is fragile and has the potential to tum into a regional conflict.