introduction of maths

8/12/2019 Introduction of maths

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS PAGE NO

CERTIFICATE i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 01

LIST OF FIGURES 02

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 03

ABSTRACT 04

INTRODUCTION 05

RATIONALE BEHIND UNMANNED SHIPS 06

SHIP TO SHORE COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS 10

SHIP ARCHITECTURE SPECIFICATION 15

PROCESS MAP FOR AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION 19

GENERAL TECHNICAL SYSTEM REDESIGN 24

CHALLENGES OF UNMANNED SHIPPING 30

CONCLUSION 32

REFERENCES 33


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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES PAGE NO

FIGURE 1.1 07

FIGURE 2.1 08

FIGURE 3.1 10

FIGURE 3.2 11

FIGURE 4.1 15

FIGURE 4.2 16

FIGURE 4.3 17

FIGURE 4.4 18


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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3G, 4G Third and Fourth generation mobile telephony systems

AIS Automatic Identification Systems

ASC Autonomous Ship Controller

COLREG International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea

DSC Digital Selective Calling (for VHF radio)

EPIRB Emergency PositionIndicating Radio Beacon

GLONASS Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

ICS International Chamber of Shipping

IMO International Maritime Organization

INS Integrated Navigation System

ISC Integrated Ship Control

ISM Instrumentation, Scientific and Medical frequency bands (unlicensed)

ITS Intelligent Transport System

ITU International Telecommunication Union

kbps Kilobits per second

Mbps Megabits per second

NAVTEX Navigational Telex

OOW Officer of Watch

RCU Rendezvous Control Unit

SART Search and Rescue Transponder

TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/IP

UDP Unreliable Datagram Protocol (IP)

WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access

VHF Very high frequency

VPN Virtual Private Network (Protocol)

VHF Very High Frequency


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ABSTRACT

The shift from manned to unmanned and autonomous navigation raises fundamental questions on

how operational processes should be structured in order to ensure the safety of future shipping.

This paper provides an overview of the initial position and rationale regarding the development

of an unmanned ship. It goes through some critical issues related to communication in

autonomous ship systems. This includes ship to shore, internal ship and internal shore issues. The

report develops general requirements to communication for unmanned ships and analyses current

technology to see how it can be used to satisfy these requirements. This report also gives an

overview of the MiTS (Maritime Intelligent Transport System) architecture which is an on

going initiative to link the e

navigation and e

maritime initiatives in such a way that the shippingcommunity gets workable and efficient communication standards to work with. In addition,

present manned ship operation is analysed, taking into account technology, information

requirements, legal framework, processes and responsibilities, and finally necessary measures

and the scope of redesign are derived based on an analysis of technical failures in the machinery

systems.

This evaluation shows that there many technical, organizational and legal issues so vision of

unmanned ships cannot be realized in short term. However efforts are on to update the currentfleet and allow a gradual change from manned to unmanned fleets.


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1. INTRODUCTION

Europe played an important part in maritime trading already shortly after its historical roots five

millennia ago. Despite several radical changes over the last century, like e.g. the transition from

sail to steam ships, then again to diesel engines, the introduction of containerized cargo and

changing trade centres all around the globe, Europe still manages to maintain a leading global

position in numerous maritime domains. To maintain and strengthen this position, the European

Waterborne Technology Platform (Waterborne TP), which is a cluster of leading maritime-

related European stakeholders, has created a vision for the waterborne industry in 2020 that is

based on three pillars :

Safe, sustainable and efficient waterborne transport,

a competitive European waterborne industry and

growth in transport volumes and changes in trade patterns.

On the basis of this vision, Waterborne TP has identified twelve prioritized exploitation

outcomes that shall help Europe developing its maritime sector within these pillars. One outcome

that is important for all three pillars is the Autonomous Ship or Drone Ship, which is defined

as a vessel with: next generation modular control systems and communications technology that

will enable wireless monitoring and control functions both on and off board . These will include

advanced decision support systems to provide a capability to operate ships remotely under semi

or fully autonomous control. Existing ships are equipped with anticollision, electronic

positioning and satellite communication systems. New sensor systems, such as those based on

infrared technology, are also becoming increasingly common. Much of the technology needed

for autonomy is therefore already available.

These next generation crewless ships would have multiple redundancy built into all systems

to protect from any single or multiple system failure. And to deal with piracy the ships would be

fitted with a range of countermeasures that could easily disable anyone unauthorized who

attempts to board.


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Figure 1.1: Costs Of Dry Bulkers

2.2 Ecological sustainability

Besides efforts to increase efficiency, the shipping business also has to acknowledge an

increasing awareness in the public of the environmental sustainability of maritime transport.

While international shipping represents a relatively small part of current greenhouse gasemissions of about 3%, the industry has acknowledged that it also needs to contribute to future

reductions [10]. One of the most obvious areas where fuel can be saved and emissions reduced is

by slow steaming. Looking at an exemplary route from Porto de Tubarao to Hamburg, a transit

speed reduction from 16 to 11 knots should reduce fuel consumption by about 54% and thus

avoid about 1.000 tons of carbon dioxide emissions(Figure 2.1). Of course, the idea to save fuel

through slower transit speeds is not only motivated by environmental friendliness, but also by an

economic rationale as slow steaming results in a trade-off between bunker and charter costs. A

general costs calculation of the same exemplary route is shown in table 2. Although bunker cost

reductions of 46% represents a huge savings in money, this is offset by a correspondingly higher

charter cost and the net benefit with the average charter rates are only on the order of USD 7000

over the voyage.

However, an additional savings of USD 50 000 could conceivably have been made if the


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Figure 2.1: Exemplary Costs Calculation To Show Slow Steaming Benefits

ship had been unmanned. Even with a relatively much more substantial savings on a forecasted

lower charter rate, the manning cost could contribute an additional 50% to the USD 100 000

saved on normal operations in this case.

Economically, the benefits of slow steaming for this type of bulker are not very high given

historical charter rates. However, if crew costs could be eliminated, one would get significant

savings also for this trade. For lower charter rates, the crew savings will be less, but is still on the

order of one third of the overall voyage savings for slow steaming.

Thereby, an unmanned vessel could diminish this effect as it focuses on the reduction of the

demand side of the maritime labour market.

3.3 Social sustainability

Of course, in economic theory, a shortage of labour would lead to higher wages making it more

attractive for workers and thus possibly solving the deadlock situation. It might be argued that

instead of investigating automation technology, education and the labour market should be

encouraged to avoid the described scenario. However, especially in Europe the labour market for

seagoing personnel faces an inherent problem: It is unattractive for youngsters and suffers from

an obvious lack of family and social life friendliness. In several studies, experts and institutions

have highlighted that the isolation from family and friends as well as the decreasing ratio

between sailing and berthing times make this profession uninteresting .

While most of the deep-sea transit represents routine and undemanding tasks, economic

pressure in the business has already decreased crew sizes to a minimum. When emergenciesarise, human errors resulting from fatigue are one of the main causes for ship incidents

worldwide. In contrast, an autonomous and unmanned vessel would free officers from routine


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tasks and let them focus on more cognitively demanding and challenging tasks in a shore side

operations centre. This could ensure a more interesting working environment for the maritime

professionals while also having the potential to increase the safety of shipping. Due to the fact

that such a centre would be located ashore, the navigating and engineering professions would get

the same characteristics regarding family friendliness and social contact as a normal continuously

manned workplace


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3. SHIP TO SHORE COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS

The general conclusion from studies undertaken is that the communication services that are

available today are sufficient to implement an unmanned ship. However, there are some special

issues that need to be taken into consideration during design of autonomous control system and

communication services and they are summarized in the following sections:

3.1 Communication Channel Requirements

Table 1 lists the general communication channel requirements identified there together with the

three main communication modes and what parts of the communication streams they utilize. The

columns are capacity in kbps, maximum latency in seconds, security rating and reliability (1 is

highest quality for both)

Figure 3.1 Summary Of General Communication Requirements

The unmanned ship needs satellite communication for all data streams except the rendezvous

type communication. The latter needs to be operational in a range up to 2 km from the ship and

will be used to control the ship directly through boarding and disembarkation processes. The

accumulated bandwidth requirement of up to 4 Mbps will not be required at all times. The high

capacity services are mainly used to handle unexpected situations where intervention often can

be delayed until bandwidth becomes available. However, certain situations such as analysis of

objects detected in the sea may need to be prioritized and may also require high definition (HD)

video. If this can be handled with still pictures or lower definition video, bandwidth requirementsare lower than indicated in the table.


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A high capacity line of sight service (LOS) may also be used for other data streams when the

ship is within range of shore mobile telecommunication services.

Within each of these categories, different data streams have different importance. Table 4 lists

some of these streams and indicates their importance. The classification shown here is tentative

and may be changed over the projects life time. Classification is also relative so low does not

mean one can generally do without that particular data channel. The intention is mainly to show

what types of traffic need to be supported and that each type has different properties with respect

to what services it requires.

The bandwidth column indicates required bandwidths for the different streams and the

latency column specifies the maximum acceptable latency. The actual delay perceived by the

user will typically be twice this value as most interactions require controls sent to ship and

thereafter some response.

Figure 3.2 : Importance Of Data Streams

The streams listed are:

Rendezvous: This is a communication channel used to control the ship by a boarding team to

facilitate entry to the ship. This may be after loss of communication or during normal boarding

and disembarkation procedures. This needs to have high reliability and security, i.e. protection

against false control signals and listening in to the exchange of data as well as good protection

against link or message loss. Only simple telemetry such as position, speed, heading and

similarly simple controls are transmitted so a 2 kbps channel should be sufficient (see also next

paragraph).

Remote control: This includes communication between ship and shore for high level

monitoring and control of the ship. Security has to be high, but reliability requirements are lower

than for the previous as the ship has the possibility to go to autonomous modes if communicationis lost. Bandwidth requirements are more or less the same as for rendezvous. ITU estimates that

an unmanned aircraft will be able to operate with a maximum requirement of about 15 kbps in


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flying mode for remote control functions .A ship should be able to operate at substantially lower

bandwidth due to much slower changes in operational status, so around 2 kbps should be

sufficient.

Telemetry: This is status updates from the ship beyond high level m onitoring, but excluding

visual data streams such as radar and video images. Here, both security and reliability is a

medium strong requirement. Security is lower than previous as it is assumed that hostile

intervention in transmission will be less critical here than for remote control. 32 kbps is sufficient

for about 5000 data values updated each 2.5 seconds. This satisfies most requirements except

very high sample rate signals from engines or other fast moving equipment. Telemetry is not

normally mission-critical, but is important in cases where problems have developed and

diagnostic procedures are required.

Radar and radar targets: These data are similar to telemetry, but the transmission requires

higher bandwidth. The calculation here is that the operator may need one image of 1024*1240

pixels transferred each 30 second with an effective compression down to 2 bits per pixel. This

data stream may also include some still pictures from video systems. Reliability is set to medium.

HD Video: This stream contains high definition live video from the ship. This can include

external as well as internal views. It is assumed that basic control of the ship normally can be

done without video, so the criticality is set to low. ITU-T Recommendation G.1010 /5/ lists about

400 kbps as needed for video conferencing and similar applications. A typical bandwidth

requirement for high definition video (films etc.) is between 2 and 4 mbps according to various

Internet resources. Thus, 3 mbps is selected to allow a mix of at least one high quality channel

and one or more lower quality channels. This will also allow transfer of high bandwidth

telemetry data that can be used, e.g. in detailed engine diagnostics.

The quantitative bandwidth requirements are not based on very accurate analysis at this

stage, but have been set from previous experience and estimates. It is believed that they arerepresentative, but they may be updated in later publications from the projects undertaken.

3.2 Evaluation Of Various Communication Means

The analysis of means of communication available today in a manned ship and their further

requirements is given below:

3.2.3 High capacity satellite data links

The high capacity communication link for use at high seas should be able to provide around 4

Mbps bandwidth. This can be supplied by modern VSAT services in the Ka and Ku bands. The


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availability of bandwidth may be lower in certain deep sea areas as there are very few customers

there and services will probably be provided by wide beam transponders only. This is based on

commercial considerations and satellite communication providers will be sure to satisfy users'

demands, but at a cost. The new Inmarsat Global Express or any of a number of competing

service providers should be able to deliver the required bandwidth if somebody is able to pay for

it.3.2.4 High capacity Line of Sight (LOS) data link

4G or advanced 3G mobile telephony services will be good alternatives to satellite

communication in shore areas, with high security and reliability for ship to shore communication.

However, these will only be secondary to satellite as the latter still is necessary outside shore

radio range.

WiMAX is technically also a very good candidate. However, problems with licensing and

frequencies make this technology less relevant.

3.2.4 Transmission protocols

For high latency and relatively low bandwidth links where there are possibilities for packet loss,

it may be necessary to use a more efficient protocol than TCP/IP for transmitting time critical

information . A simpler UDP based protocol with periodic handshakes as well as negative

acknowledgements only will be investigated.

3.3 Security issues

Communication security is a main factor for unmanned ship. Pirates could conceivably use

security holes in command data links to hijack ships and intentional jamming could lead to

serious accidents. To address this, the following measures must be taken:

- The rendezvous and command data link must be secure against hostile attacks as they are

intended to be used close to the ship and will be attractive for hijacking attempts. All critical data

must be encrypted and authenticated before use.

- Other data links must also be protected from attacks, but these links are somewhat less critical

to the operations and may use less strict security arrangements. - The ship must have fail to safe

procedures to handle loss of communication due to hostile attacks.

- The ship also needs to have fail-to-safe procedures for loss of GNSS data feeds.

Scenarios will be developed to address GNSS and rendezvous communication loss.


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3.5 Radio propagation and coverage issues

This section discusses radio propagation issues in general, but with a strong emphasis on satellite

communication. The reason for this is that satellites normally have a more restricted link budget

than terrestrial communication systems as power must be generated from limited area solar

panels and also because transmission distances are much longer.

3.5.1 Signal degradation sources

There are different external influences on communication systems that can lead to reduced

bandwidth, higher latency, lower reliability and security and they can occur within different parts

of communication system architecture.

Degradation factors for radio transmissions can loosely be collected in three groups. The

main group is loss due to distance and frequency which is independent of the medium the radio

signal passes through:

Free space dispersion loss is caused by the spatial propagation of the radio signal and will be

proportional to the square of the distance.

Antenna aperture loss, which is generally proportional to the square of the frequency.

Transmitter electronics loss, which can be expected to be about linear with frequency. This is

mainly an issue for the satellite with a limited power budget.

Other examples of environmental degradation factors for radio communication are listed

below. These factors are normally relatively small, but can have significance in some cases.

Ionospheric losses: Mostly for lower frequency signals and vary considerably with time of day

and sunspot activity.

Beam dissipation: Loss due to the spreading of signals passing through the atmosphere.

Polarization loss: Losses due to phase rotation of the signal passing through atmosphere.

Rayleigh fading: Interference between main signals and the same signal arriving through other

paths through the atmosphere.

3.5.2 Frequency allocation

One potential challenge for safety critical systems is the frequency allocation plan. If maritime

mobile services need to share frequency spectrum with other types of mobile services, this can

lead to crowded spectrum and possibilities for interference.


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4. SHIP ARCHITECTURE SPECIFICATION

This section contains the description of an information architecture framework for the

autonomous ship,based on Maritime Intelligence Transport System(MiTS).

The purpose of the general architecture is to define a standard framework for development of

autonomous and remotely controlled ships and other systems. The The MiTS (Maritime

Intelligent Transport System) architecture is a proposed system of information technology

components that shall ensure efficient and safe interoperability between ship and shore services

/1/ . The focus is on merchant shipping and related activities, such as marine offshore operations.

4.1 Domain Model And Semantics

The domain of the MiTS Architecture as defined in /1/ is illustrate d in Figure 7. This shows the

onboard operations as the focus of attention and th e main groups of stakeholders

surrounding it.

Figure 4.1:General MiTS Domain Model

4.2 Thesystemcontextand modularisation

The main components internally to the autonomous ship system are:

ASS: Advanced sensor systems, comprising radar, video and other systems for lookout,

object detections and in general sensing the ship's environment.

BAS:Bridge Automation System, comprising all bridge systems and equipmentrelated to

navigation of the ship. These are likely to be modified somewhat to be used on an unmanned

ship, but should in basic functionality correspond to what is found on ships today. However, one

should assume that it is implemented as an Integrated Bridge System(IBS) with a high degree

of interconnectivity andintegrationbetweencomponents.

EAS: Engine Automation System comprising all power generation and propulsion requirements.

ASC: The Autonomous Ship Controller, which is the additional control and monitoring

functions implemented on the ship to allow autonomous operation. This also include an


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"Autonomous Engine Monitoring and Control" (AEMC) function as well as the "Autonomous

Navigation System" (ANS) modules. The ASC will also include communication management

functions for all communication between ship and SCC.

SCC: The Shore Control Centre, containing all on shore functions to handle the unmanned ship.

This also includes remote bridge and engine control modules that may be used to directly

control the ship in certain case s. Additionally, the initially voyage planning for the vessel

will be pe formed h ere and any voice communication to the ship will be relayed to the

operator.

Context

The ship will operate in a context as illustrated in Figure 1. This diagra m shows the main objects

that influences or are responsible for ship control as well as their relationships.

Figure 4.2: Operational Context Relationship Diagram

This shows the autonomous ship as linked to certain environment al constraints and someinternal ship restrictions while it executes its voyage phases. The execution of each phase will

require most of the functions the ship can perform, but obviously with different

constraints and purpose .The voyage ship as well as ship internal and external constraints will

determine the overall situation the ship is in.The ASC together with other ship function controls

implements the autonomy of autonomous ship. It controls the different ship functions to

perform the voyage. The performance of these functions together with the ships situation is used

to generate status indicators for the different function groups. The ASC have different modes,

partly dependent on the status of the function and partly by commands from SSC.


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4.3 The Autonomous Voyage

Figure 4.3 The Autonomous Voyage

The voyage will be performed in several distinct phases:

Berth:The ship is berthed and normal loading and unloading o perations can take place.

Parts of or the whole Onboard Control Team (OCT) is on

board to assist. This may be a

different OCT than that used during voyage.

Pilotage:The first and last part of the voyage will be done with a pilot and a minimal

OCT on board. The ship will be under full manual co ntrol, but will not need full manning due to

highly automated systems.

Approach:Between ports and points where the ship can sail at full speed in open sea,

normally the points "Full Away On Passage" (FAOP) and "End Of Sea Passage" (EOSP),

an OCT will have manual control of ship.

Rendezvous: A special phase exists when OCT or Emergency C ontrol Team (ECT) is

boarding or leaving the ship.

Unmanned: In open and unhindered sea passages the ship can sail in fully

unmanned mode. In this phase, different operational modes exist .

Emergency:If anything happens with the ship during unmanned passage, it will be

necessary to put an Emergency Control team (ECT) on board. This is not detailed in the MUNIN

scenarios, but is included here for completeness. The ECT may have different composition,depending on the type of incident. The ECT may also consist of personnel from passing ships in

some cases.


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4.4 Ship Modes

The figure shows three main modes where two are sub-divided into sub-modes each. The

main are autonomous control (green, top), remote control(blue, bottom) and fail to safe.

Figure 4.4: Main Ship Modes

The full set of five modes is defined as follows:

1.Autonomous execution:The ship follows a predefined "program" supplied by the SCC.It

does not need intervention from SCC, except for periodic updates of plans etc.

2.Autonomous control:The ship deviates from predefined plans within envelope allowed for

by SCC. Does not need intervention from SCC, except for periodic updates ofplans etc.

3.Direct remote control: The SCC has taken over all direct control of ship systems.

ASC is not participating or interfering in control operations.

4.Fail to safe:Ship has lost contact with SCC and has identified a condition, where an update

from the SCC is needed. It then selects one of several fail to safe plans, previously provided

by SCC. Ship is waiting for the SCC or emergency control team to reestablish contact

with the ship. Fail to safe may also be invoked if the SCC is slow in responding to a critical

situation. For details in the scenario and functional descriptions, the ship modes need

to be examined in conjunction with the SCC modes.

5.Indirect remote control: Ship is under control from SSC with SSC giving update plans toASC. The ASC is transferring these to new set-points and controls the ship.


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5. PROCESS MAP FOR AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION

This section represents the first integral layout for bridge processes from restructuring the task

of ship navigation for unmanned and autonomous deep sea voyages.

5.1 As-Is-Analysis Of Present Manned Ship Operation

5.1 Stateoftheart technology analysisSince the introduction of satellite navigation for civil use, GNSS has changed the face of

navigation. Reliable position data is ever since available on every spot of the planets surface.

GPS receivers which are in use on present day merchant ships work with an accuracy of 10 to

20 meters on the open sea and DGPS with the correction of land-based reference stations

with an accuracy of 3 to 10 meters. The use of GNSS devices is the most preferred method

of producing valid position data. Both GPS and GLONASS offer worldwide coverage at a

sufficient position data quality. To be prepared for a malfunction of these GNSS devices,

other means to determine the ships position have to be available. Another means of

positioning commonly used on manned ships is celestial navigation.

5.1.1Heading measurement

Every ship is equipped with a gyro compass and a magnetic compass to indicate the ships

heading. The gyro compass is used as the principle compass on board, mainly for its high

accuracy and low likeliness of breakdown. The magnetic compass may appear to be a relic

from another age. Yet actually, it is still in use because of its robustness and its complete

independence from electric power supply. Both of these compass types have the disadvantage

of relatively low course accuracy during heavy sea or intense maneuvering so that thedisplayed heading cantbe precisely relied upon for navigationDepth measurement

The echo sounding devices which are in use in commercial shipping measure the vertical

depth below the ships keel by means of acoustic sound waves. The current and past depth

contour is displayed with a possible error in accuracy of approximately 2.5 % of the

measured depth which ranges up to 1500 meters. A threshold can be set so that a depth alarm

will sound in case the preselected depth contour is underrun.

5.1.2 Speed and distance measurement


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The ships voyage speed can be determined by four d ifferent measurement devices. A

hydromechanic speed log measures the aheadspeed through water by the pressure at an

impact tube with the major disadvantage that this tube gets easily clogged. A less errorprone

method for speed measurement through water is by an electromagnetic log, where voltage is

being induced between a probe and a pair of electrodes to determine the speed through water.

5.1.3 Track pilot

On todays ships the steering control can easily be automated to a great extent. Modern track

control autopilots are able to precisely follow the course over ground laid out by the voyage

plan with deviations of only about half of the ships breadth. Furthermore, through self

tuning adoption many steering parameters are determined by the system itself. The ships

loading characteristics and the indirect steering compensated. Through the rudder actuating

values the permissible rate of turn and the radius of turn can be set,

5.1.4 AIS

The use of AIS transceivers has had a major impact on the safety of shipping .Information

about as many as 500 targets within a range of up to 30 nm has become easily available. The

device transmits and receives data about a shipsname, type, size, status, position, heading,

speed, cargo and next port of call. The data is either fixed input, needs to be entered manually

or originates directly from the ship sensors. Due to the fact that the displayed data accuracy

and reliability can be assessed, AIS is accredited as an aid to navigation only.

5.1.5 Radar/ARPA

The most proven method to detect and monitor objects is by the use of radar which works

through the emission and reception of electromagnetic impulses. Merchant ships are always

equipped with one short pulse Xband antenna for high resolution and one long pulse S

band

antenna for high range. Both of them operate with an error in accuracy of no more than 1.0 %

of their current working range or 30 meters at the most.

5.1.6 ECDIS/INS

The vast majority of merchant ships which travel the oceans nowadays are obliged to be

fitted with an ECDIS. The performance capabilities vary to some degree, depending on the

manufacturer and the age of the application. But all of them must generally be able to fullyreplace paper charts on a ships bridge as a twounitinstallation. The navigation information


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system displays digital navigable sea charts and offers the possibility for integration of

nautical publications. Furthermore, sensor data from AIS, echo sounder, GNSS, NAVTEX,

radar/ARPA can also be interfaced with the system and displayed on the screen.

5.1.7 VDR

A Voyage Data Recorder gathers and stores all available information about the own

ships status, position and movement as well as all sounds from within the wheelhouse and

from voice radio. The recorded data of at least the past twelve hours is kept within a

retrievable unit to be used for future analysis in case of an incident and must therefore be

secured against any attempts of tampering. The VDR must be equipped with an emergency

power supply to be able to operate even in case of blackout for at least 2 hours.

5.1.8 Telecommunication

All means of maritime telecommunication are part of the Global Maritime Distress and

Safety System which is based on both radio and satellite communication devices. DSC

radiotelephony operates on VHF, MF and HF and is used for the transmission and reception

of voice radio, distress alert and distress relay messages. Also, mobile VHF devices are in use

for voice radio communication, while radiotelex transceivers for written communication andNAVTEX receivers for navigational and meteorological warnings operate on MF and HF.

for distress alerting while EPIRB and SART are installed on board for that sole purpose only.

5.2 Processes And Responsibilities

5.2.1Activities related to voyage planning

Before commencing an oversea passage, a thorough voyage plan needs to be prepared. On

conventional ships, this activity is carried out completely on board. Only in some specific

cases data might be required from shoreside information providers. For voyage planning,

various routing information has to be gathered and applied from nautical publications and the

ships stability has to be calculated. Also, the required provisions for the upcoming voyage

have to be accounted for. From this information, the voyage plan is prepared by the

navigational officer and verified by the ships master.

5.2.2 Activities related to lookout


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During the conduct of an overseas passage the keeping of a thorough lookout is the main

source of information to the navigator. These activities must be performed continuously using

visual, acoustic and technical means. This comprises e.g. monitoring of the ships

environmental and traffic situation, keeping a radio watch and determining of the ships

position using methods of terrestrial, celestial and technical navigation. Furthermore, all

available bridge devices must be operated correctly to gather information relevant for safe

navigation such as heading, speed and underkeel clearance.

5.2.3 Activities related to bridge watch

The information which have been gathered in the preceding chapter about lookout activities

are required to carry out bridge watch activities. It is the obligation of the OOW to check the

bridge equipment for proper functioning and to follow the approved voyage plan and the

order books. All available information has to be utilized to ensure the safety of navigation.

The ships movements and maneuvers have to be operated and controlled. while all COLREG

regulations have to be complied with in all respects. Also, safety and alarm systems have to

be monitored and appropriate responses to contingency and emergency situations have to be

taken.

5.2.4 Activities related to maneuvering

To be aware of the ships capabilities and limitations when it comes to maneuverability,

various factors have to be accounted for. Besides the ships specific fixed and variable

properties, changing external forces and effects have to be identified and compensated, if

applicable. On conventional ships this is done mostly by using data from sea trials, by

calculating buoyancy and stability and by observing the sea state.

5.2.5 Activities related to communication

Information exchange on a ship can roughly be divided into two groups. On the one hand

communication can occur internally between different compartments of the same ship and

will either be done by automatic data exchange between interlinked technical devices or by

voice telephony or voice radio. External communication between the ship and another sea

based or landbased station on the other hand takes always place either by means of radio or

satellite communication. The only exemptions are visual and acoustic distress signals, of

course.


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5.2.6 Activities related to administration

From the perspective of many mariners administrative work does consume a lot of their

working time on board. Correcting of sea charts and other nautical publications, filling out of

checklists and log books, updating of ship and crew certification and keeping up with

information demands from shoreside stakeholders are just some of the examples.

5.2.7Activities related to emergencies

Any case of emergency poses a potential significant threat to safety and requires high

attention from all available onboard resources. Especially on the open seas, ship crews

depend very much on their own capabilities for problemsolving as external assistance is

often several days time away. Upon detection of asituation which might endanger ship

safety, the crew has to assess the situation and react to it accordingly, usually accompanied

by an alarm of some kind.


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6. GENERAL TECHNICAL SYSTEM REDESIGN

In this section, the system boundaries of monitoring and control and the scope of the

unmanned machinery plant were defined for a bulk carrier. Based on this, the main

components used in the involved systems are described and the analysis of technical failures

is done.

6.1 Technical failures in the system groups

The flagindependent results demonstrated that the main system groups main engine, fuel

oil system, cooling water system, electrical system and rudder plant were the most

frequently affected groups.

Technical failures in the system groups are:

Main engine 37.3%

Fuel oil system 15.5%

Cooling water system 13.6%

Propulsion plant, shafting 5.5%

Diesel generator 3.6%

6.2 Possibilities Of Operation With Faulty systems,Interactions In Terms Of

Maintenance

The unmanned machinery operation should take place during the open sea voyage. This

operation is the basis of the evaluation of the failures named in chapter 6.1. It also is the focus

of the now following possibility of ship engine operation with faulty main engine groups.

6.2.1 Main engine failures

In cases of main engine power losses, there is enough ship service power supplied by the

GenSets.The GenSets are able to deliver roughly enough power to the emergency propulsion

and steering unit pump jet.

6.2.2 Start, reverse and control devices

The starting air system is rarely used during open sea operation. Therefore, possible failures

cannot be determined. Neither are they highly critical. However, these devices are necessary

if sudden maneuvers (e.g. in dangerous situations) must be executed. In these cases, possible

failures must be analysed, because they would be highly critical. Through integration into the


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electronically control individual cylinders or parts of the system, these devices can be

decommissioned, or redundancies can be used.

6.2.3 Faulty inlet/outlet valves

Since an electronically controlled motor is used as a basis, it is possible to exclude the

affected cylinders from the operation. It is then possible to operate the engine with reduced

power.

6.2.4 Sticking injection pumps



power. If a high pressure fuel common rail is used, it is not necessary to install an injection

pump for every single cylinder. The injection pressure is created by high pressure pump units

with their own redundancies.

6.2.5 Cracked or leaking cylinder covers

It is very risky to operate engines with cracked or leaking cylinder covers, because there is no

way to eliminate these failures during engine operation. An immediate exchange of these

cylinder covers is necessary. The engine has to be stopped. It is necessary to develop

diagnosis systems, which can detect such crack formations

6.2.6 Cracked cylinder liners

It is also very risky to operate engines with cracked cylinder liners, because there is no way to

eliminate this failure during engine operation. An immediate exchange of the cylinder liner is

necessary. The engine has to be stopped. It is also necessary to develop diagnostic systems,

which can detect cylinder liner crack formations.

6.2.7 Broken or leaking injection pipes



power.

6.2.8 Total failures of Exhaust Gas Turbochargers (EGT)


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In case of a total failure of an EGT, it is necessary to fix the rotating parts (e.g. brake

redesign).A system to automatically fix the rotor of the affected turbocharger must be

developed for that. It is possible to operate the ship with matched load (reduced) by using the

engines auxiliary blowers. All functions of the turbocharger must be electronically

controlled, including a daily cleaning of compressor and turbine side.

6.2.9 Incompatibility of mixing fuel oils

It is extremely unlikely that mixing fuel oils are incompatible because the unmanned ships

engine is only operated with distillate fuels

6.2.10 Failures in supply systems

6.2.10.1Cooling water pumpsWhen the pump malfunctions, it is possible to continue operation automatically with standby

pumps. The defective pump can be replaced in port. Piping, controller and sensors of the high

temperature, low temperature and seawater systems.It is necessary to have double

implementation of sensors and monitoring, which detect cable breaks. In case contamination

is detected, it is possible to operate with a correspondingly reduced load.

6.2.10.2Electrical system

Black out, caused by over or underload switch off, over or underfrequency

The immediate transfer to an emergency supply of key consumer and the ecommissioning,

activation of GenSets and the normal load distribution must be automatically done.

6.2.10.3Problems on electronics, e.g. failure of the main switch board

The major systems of the main switchboard must be redundant and switched automatically.

Sufficient redundancies, like the redundancy at the electronic controls of the engines, must

reduce the total failures to zero.

6.2.11 Rudder plants

If the main steering gear fails, the redundant steering gear is usually of limited use only.

Therefore, there should be the possibility to supply energy (2 large GenSets) to the pump jet

and thus obtain maneuverability. In the individual assessment of errors in supply systems, it

has to be considered that this has an impact on main and auxiliary engine operation. Because


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there is no crew on board during the open sea voyage, the input of human operator errors is

only possible by the SCC.The usual repair and maintenance works done by the crew (e.g.

pump overhaul) are no longer feasible.

6.3 Minimum scope of necessary systems for reduced emergency operation

6.3.1Minimum shaft power

To ensure a minimum shaft power, which may be different depending on the operating

conditions of the vessel, e.g. decreasing the main engine output, 4000 kW can be fed through

the electrical shaft motor as additional power to the shaft or they can be used over the pump

jet for propulsion purposes.

6.3.2 Minimum electrical power

In normal sea operation, an electric power of 600 kW should be sufficient. For the maneuver

operation an additional 1000 kW must be available (e.g. bow thruster, anchor). To provide

minimal electric power during open sea operation with the main engine, the electrical output

of the steam generator and the three redundant GenSets are available. In maneuver operation,

the supply with electrical energy could be carried out by one of the two large auxiliary diesel

engines.

6.3.2 Minimum function of steering

Steering the ship must always be guaranteed. In cases of failures of the rudder gear, this can

be done via steering by the emergency rudder gear. But it is not sure that the emergency

operation can be carried out for all kinds of failures of the steering gear. Therefore, it is

proposed that an additional pump jet in the forward part of the ship can be put into operation

and thus ensures steering and maneuvering.

6.3.3 Emergency function of main fire system

Flooding the holds and the engine room with inert gas must be possible, i.e. the current

amount of carried along gas must be significantly increased and distributed on board in a

different manner. The initiation must be automatic or it can be controlled by the SCC. In

addition to the installed fire alarms, hotspots can also be detected by infrared cameras; smoke

or leaking fluids by regular cameras.

6.3.4 Emergency functions of bilge and ballast system


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The emergency bilge suction or bilge injection valve is used to prevent the flooding of the

ship. It is a direct suction from the machinery space bilge, which is connected to the largest

capacity pump or pumps. It must be a completely independent unit capable of operation even

if submerged. The power supply for the pump is arranged via the emergency generator. The

various pumps and lines are interconnected to some extent so that each pump can act as an

alternative or standby of the other pump.

6.4 Derived measures, additional redundancies, additional condition monitoring systems

1If necessary, all operating functions that are possible in the engine control room (ECR)

must be carried out from shoreside control center.

2Pump jet as a solution for defective main propulsion or steering system to obtain a

minimum of maneuverability .

3Full access to the electronic control systems of the main engine for the shoreside

operation center (incl. monitoring, modifying of parameters, orders).

4Double implementation of sensors and monitoring of cable breaks.

5High redundancy in electrical power generation, that means that one GenSet is able to

deliver the required electrical power.

6Additional standby pumps in the supply systems of the main engine and the auxiliary

engines are not necessary because operation with only one pump is possible, optionally

with reduced load.

7Additional automatic filters for fuel oil and lubrication oil of the main engine.

8Installation of an electrically driven shaft motor (or electric motor to an engine

installed power take in gear) for more shaft power, if necessary, by taking electrical

power from the GenSets.

9Automatically, autonomously functioning module for waste heat recovery (exhaust gas

boiler, steam turbine with generator, feeding into main switchboard).

10Changeover of all necessary heating and preheating to electrical .

11Design an automatic, redundant system for switching the tanks .

12Possibility of shorebased control of the Exhaust Gas Turbocharger (EGT) during

operation (lubrication, cooling, fixing of rotor).

13Shorebased control of the normally installed emergency steering plant, diagnostic

system for the steering plant is necessary.

14Additional noise, vibration monitoring in the machinery spaces.


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15Monitoring of the machinery spaces and bilges via infrared cameras and corresponding

lighting for normal cameras.

16More fire alarm and bilge monitoring.

17Filling the main engine crankcase with inert gas so that explosions are avoided and the

risk of fire is reduced.

7.CHALLENGES OF UNMANNED SHIPPINGIt is doubtful if the unmanned merchant ships will be a reality in the short term. This doubt is

not primarily caused by technical obstacles, although there certainly are some technical

problems to be solved related to sensor and decision technology and, in particular, the

increased technical system robustness that is required in unmanned ships.

The main problem is arguably the integration of the autonomous ship into the existing


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maritime transport systems as well as the lack of legal and contractual frameworks suitable

for this type of ships. These issues are organizational rather than technical. The followingsubsections will give a brief overview of some important technical and organizational

challenges.

7.1 Communication, sensor and control technology

Ships are already equipped with a number of systems to support remote or even autonomous

operations. One can argue that the technology needed to supporting autonomy is not the

biggest challenge.

However, the following main areas where more research is needed have been identified:

1.Merging of detected targets from different sensor systems to classify into objects that either

can be ignored, or that can be automatically avoided or that require the attention of a shore

operator.

2.Automatic avoidance of detected and recognized targets in accordance with good

seamanship and established rules.

3.Reception of new sailing plans from shore or weather routing services and automatic and

safe integration into current sailing plans. This may include remote control from pilot, vessel

traffic service (VTS) or shore side operations center.

4.Fail to safe functions in case of missing communication during critical operations or other

unexpected situations, including assisted or automatic recovery from fail to safe modes.

7.2 Improved system robustness

Ship systems are today designed and built to utilize a combination of maintenance strategies

to provide a sufficient safety and reliability level for the complete system. This includes the

use of technical and operational redundancy, periodic maintenance intervals and the

possibility to repair or replace components by the crew. In the case of an unmanned ship, the

latter strategy is obviously not available. Thus, a major challenge for unmanned ships is to

improve the system robustness to a degree where the operator can have a very high

confidence that critical subsystems will not fail during the trip. Some important research

issues here include:

1.Looking at critical system design and improving where necessary to avoid single points of

failures with sufficiently high confidence.

2.Current preventive maintenance procedures need to be updated to ensure operability during


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intervals at sea also for components that currently have been designed to be replaceable

during voyage.

3.Determining the need for new sensors as well as new procedures and analysis methodology

to detect early signs of degradation and failure.

4.Developing fail-to-safe procedures in case of major system failure. This needs to be

complemented with appropriate recovery strategies.

7.3 Integration with existing transport system

Another challenge is the design of a ship concept that can be used in a world where the

majority of vessels are still controlled by humans. This puts particularly pressure on an

autonomous navigation system, as it also has to interact with manned vessels according to

existing rules of road and practices for good seamanship. It also needs to include new

concepts for rescue operations at sea. Some issues that MUNIN will investigate are:

1.Remote pilotage including integration with ship and the shore side operations centre.

2.More advanced VTS with some direct control over ship and routes, again in cooperation

with a shore side operations centre.

3.Participation of an autonomously operated ship in a search and rescue operation(SAR). This

includes detection of emergency situations, e.g., identifying life boats or rafts and reporting

this to the appropriate SAR authority.

7.4 Legal and contractual issues

One of the main obstacles to the fully autonomous ship is arguably existing regulations and

contract forms. Some issues that will be addressed in the project are:

Required updates to general laws of the sea. This includes liability for any accidents and the

enforcement of the unmanned ship as flag state "territory".

8. CONCLUSION

The concept of an autonomous ship provides one important pathway for a sustainable

development for bulk shipping. The feasibility of autonomous ships will be investigated

within the next three years by developing technical solutions and suggestions for legal and

contractual changes for the challenges that unmanned vessels represent. The developed

concepts will be validated in an integrated simulation prototype of an autonomous vessel. An


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explicit aim is to generate a solution that also allows updating the current fleet and which

allows a gradual change from manned to unmanned fleets. Although full autonomy may be

difficult to realize, the results from research will have direct applications in the short term:

1.Better navigation support and obstacle detection can reduce accidents by providing decision

support for the officer of the watch.

2. Small object detection can provide valuable assistance in search and rescue operations. 3.

Better maintenance strategies can reduce technical incidents and off-hire costs.

4.Improved ship-shore communication and coordination can be used to simplify pilotage,

VTS operations and management of the ship.

Thus, the expected results of research also provide a significant potential to make

manned shipping safer and less stressful for the mariners in the near future.

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