introduction. a new field: comparative law and regulation

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2016

Introduction. A New Field: Comparative Law and Regulation Introduction. A New Field: Comparative Law and Regulation

Francesca Bignami George Washington University Law School, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation Bignami, Francesca, Introduction. A New Field: Comparative Law and Regulation (2016). COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS, Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., Edward Elgar, 2016 ; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-49; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-49. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2845909

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Introduction.Anewfield:comparativelawandregulation

FrancescaBignami

In:ComparativeLawandRegulation:UnderstandingtheGlobalRegulatoryProcess

(FrancescaBignami&DavidZaringeds.,EdwardElgar2016)

When individuals post their photographs, shopping habits, and other personal data to social

networkingsitestheyaretrackedandpotentiallyharassedbythescoresofcorporateactorswith

access to their data. As governments worldwide have sprung into action to address this

regulatoryproblem,industrygroupsandconsumeradvocateshavealsomobilized.Togivebut

one example, in the past three years, the world’s leading social networking company has

defended lawsuits claiming unfair consumer tracking in the United States and the European

Union(EU),hassettledadministrativeandcivilenforcementactionsbroughtbytheU.S.Federal

Trade Commission, the BelgianData ProtectionAuthority, and theHamburgData Protection

Authority,andhaslobbiedforlooserconsumer-trackingrulesintheEuropeanUnion,theUnited

States,LatinAmericancountries,andtheAsia-PacificEconomicCooperationsystem.1Although

thereare substantial limitsonwhat social networking sites candowithpersonaldata in the

1 Inre:FacebookInternetTrackingLitigation,844F.Supp.2d1374(J.D.M.L.2012);CaseC-362/14,Schremsv.DataProtectionCommissioner,2013WL614CJ0362(Oct.6,2015);InreFacebook,Inc.,FTCFileNo.0923184,No.C-4365(F.T.C. July 27, 2012);Commissie voordebescherming vandepersoonlijke levenssfeer (BelgianDataProtectionCommission), Recommendation no. 04/2015 (May 13, 2015);HamburgischenBeauftragten fürDatenschutz undInformationsfreiheit(HamburgDataProtectionAuthority),PressRelease:Facebook’sBiometricDatabaseContinuesToBeUnlawful(Nov.10,2011);ProposalforaRegulationoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilontheProtectionofIndividualswithRegardtotheProcessingofPersonalDataandontheFreeMovementofSuchData(GeneralDataProtectionRegulation),COM(2012)11final(Jan.25,2012);TheWhiteHouse,ConsumerDataPrivacyinaNetworkedWorld:AFrameworkforProtectingPrivacyandPromotingInnovationintheGlobalEconomy15–18(2012); Camila Tobón, Data Privacy Laws in Latin America: An Overview, 44 International Law News 1 (2015)(reviewinglawsofArgentina,Chile,Colombia,CostaRica,Mexico,Nicaragua,Paraguay,Peru,andUruguay);Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),TheCross Border Privacy Rules System: Promoting Consumer Privacy andEconomicGrowthAcrosstheAPECRegion(Sept.5,2013).

Bignami—ComparativeLawandRegulation

2

EuropeanUnionandmanyLatinAmericancountries,therearerelativelyfewrestrictionsinthe

UnitedStatesandvariousAsianjurisdictions.

Parabensareagroupofchemicalswidelyusedincosmeticsandpersonalcareproducts.

Althoughtheysignificantlyextendtheshelflifeofcreamsandsprays,theyhavealsobeenlinked

to cancer and other types of health concerns. The regulatory battle overwhether to ban or

restrict their use is occurring in legislatures, administrative agencies, and international

organizations throughout the world. Multinational corporations, members of the scientific

community,andenvironmentalandconsumergroupshavesparredoverparabensinavastarray

of venues—to name just a few, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the European

Commission, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency, the United Nations Environment

Programme, and theAssociationof SoutheastAsianNations.While regulators in Europeand

partsofAsiahaverecentlybannedorrestrictedcertainparabensincosmetics,regulatorsinthe

UnitedStates,China,andLatinAmericancountriescontinuetoimposenolimitsandmightvery

wellbringachallengetoparabensregulationintheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).2

Thesearebuttwoexamplesoftheglobalregulatoryprocess.Regulatoryproblemsareno

longerconfinedtospecificcountries.Byvirtueofhowglobalcommunicationsnetworksoperate,

asinglesocialnetworkingsitecanbeusedbyindividualsanywhereandtriggerlegalactionina

hostof jurisdictions. Multinationalcosmeticscorporationssellthesameproductsthroughout

the globe and therefore regulators everywhere are called upon to assess their safety. The

process, however, by which these national and international jurisdictions decide common

regulatoryproblemsbears little resemblance to thedomestic regulatoryprocess.There isno

world government with the power to impose a single set of principles, institutions, and

2CommissionRegulation358/2014,2014O.J.(L107)5(EU);CommissionRegulation1004/2014,2014O.J.(L282)5(EU);Statutoryorderonrestrictiononimport,saleanduseofcertainparabensincosmeticproductsforchildrenunder 3 years (Denmark, Oct. 11, 2013); ASEAN Cosmetic Directive, Annex II (Association of South East AsianNations);TaylorL.Kraus,CaringAboutPersonalCareProducts:RegulationintheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion,andChinaintheAgeofGlobalConsumption,33WisconsinInternationalLawJournal167(2015)(reviewinglawoftheU.S.,EU,andChina)..


3

procedures on the multiple jurisdictions, and therefore the global regulatory process is

characterizedasmuchbydiversityanddiscordasitisbycoordinationandconvergence.

Asofyet,thelegaldisciplinehasfailedtodevelopasubfielddedicatedtounderstanding

theglobalregulatoryprocess.Thereasonforthelagbetweenthecontemporaryrealityandthe

organizationofresearchandknowledgebuildingintheacademyisrelatedtothenineteenth-

centuryrootsofthelegaldiscipline.Thedifferentsubfieldsoflawthatprevailstilltodaywere

carvedout intheheydayofthenationstate:private lawtoregulatemarket-basedandother

private relations, constitutional lawas thebasic framework for theorganizationof the state,

administrativelawtogovernpublicadministration,criminallawforthepoliceandprosecutors,

and international law for inter-state relations in the international sphere. Comparative law,

devotedtounderstandingthelawofmultiplejurisdictions,wassubdividedintothesedifferent

categories andwas almost exclusively focused on private law, in particular the contract law

essential to the global commerce of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.What ismore,

comparativelawwassegregatedfrominternationallaw,conceivedasoperatinginisolationfrom

theinternallawofthenationstate.

The global regulatory process, a quintessentially twenty-first-century phenomenon,

defies these nineteenth-century disciplinary boundaries. To begin with, regulation is an

inherentlyinstrumentalactivitythatisundertakenbyavarietyofpublic,andincreasinglyprivate,

bodiesandthereforecutsacrossmanyof thetraditionalsubfieldsof law—constitutional law,

administrativelaw,civilprocedure,criminalprocedure,anddifferenttypesofprivatelaw.More

tothepointoftheglobalcharacterofcontemporaryregulation,whatfieldoflawisimportant

fortheregulatoryfunctioncanvaryenormouslybetweenjurisdictions.Itmaybethatinsome

placesa rulesuchasabanonconsumer tracking isenforced largelybycriminalprosecutors,

under the principles of criminal procedure,while in other places administrative proceedings,

governed by administrative law, are more important. And the law of both national and

internationaljurisdictionsiscritical.ADanishrulebanningparabenscaneasilybeundonebya

contraryEUruleoranadverseWTOruling.Insum,theconventionalboundariesthatseparate

thedifferentsubfieldsoflawoperateasarealobstacletounderstandinghowglobalregulatory


4

problemsarehandledbythemultiplelegalsystems,domesticandinternational,thatarecalled

intoaction.

The purpose of this introduction and the volume as a whole is to overcome these

traditional disciplinary limitations and to set down the foundations for a new field of legal

researchcapableofilluminatingtheglobalregulatoryprocess—comparativelawandregulation.

To begin with, it is helpful to set forth a working definition of regulation. The concept of

regulationisusedinavarietyofwaysinthesocialscientificandlegalliteratures(Kahn,1970:11;

Selznick,1985:363–64;Black,2002:1).Sincethepurposeofthefieldofcomparativelawand

regulation is to cover the great variety of jurisdictions that interact in the global regulatory

process,thedefinitionproposedhereisbroad:regulationisaformofgovernancedesignedto

address complex social, environmental, and economic problems that relies heavily on rules,

enforcedagainstmarketactors,andadministrativeauthorities.Thisdefinitionrecognizesthat

administrativeauthoritiesarepivotal,butnotexclusive,institutionsintheregulatoryprocessand

that regulatory output is fashioned also by other institutions, including legislatures, public

prosecutors, courts, and private bodies. The definition employed here also identifies legally

binding rules, enforced against market actors, as the typical technique of regulation but

acknowledgesthatstandardscanbecontainedinothertypesofinstruments,suchassoftlaw,

andthatstandardscan,insomepolicyareas,beappliedagainstcivilsocietyandpublicactors.

Comparative law and regulation investigates the law that applies to this regulatory

function.Itcoversallthelawoftheregulatoryprocess,regardlessofthebranchoflawtowhich

it formally belongs, and it includes all jurisdictions inwhich such lawoperates, regardless of

whethersuchjurisdictionsareclassifiedasnationalorinternational.Sincethegoalofthefieldof

comparativelawandregulationistocapturethefundamentalelementsoftheglobalregulatory

process,thefocusismoreontheinstitutionalandlegalbuildingblocksofthemanyjurisdictions

and less on the technical substance of particular policy areas. Comparative policy studies,

however,canserveasadeviceforrevealingmoregeneralpropertiesoftheglobalregulatory

processand,totheextentthisisthecase,theyarealsoincluded.


5

Atthesametimeascomparativelawandregulationmovesbeyondthelimitationsofthe

established legal discipline, it is situated in the field of comparative law. That is because

comparativelawhasdevelopedaseriesoftheoreticalandanalyticaltools,albeitinthecontext

of private law, that are particularly apt for understanding the global regulatory process. The

disciplineofcomparativelawwasbornintheeraoftheglobalizationofcommerceandhasbeen

devotedinlargeparttobuildingtheintellectualapparatusnecessarytounderstandcommercial

transactions that straddle multiple jurisdictions (Zimmermann, 2008). The globalization of

regulationsharesmanyofthesameattributesastheearlierglobalizationandthereforethelines

of theoretical inquiry central to comparative law can serve, after extensivemodification, to

analyzetheregulatoryprocessasitunfoldsacrosstheworld.

Theglobalregulatoryprocessischaracterizedbythreeessentialproperties:jurisdictional

differencesandcommonalities;legalconvergenceanddivergenceovertimedrivenbysocialand

politicalprocesses;and theprescriptionofnew lawbypoliticaland legaloperatorsbasedon

comparison.3 To illustrate briefly with the examples of consumer tracking and parabens

regulation:Consumertrackingrulesandregulatoryenforcement in theUnitedStatesandthe

Asia-PacificEconomicCooperationsystemarefairlysimilar,anddifferconsiderablyfromthose

samerulesandregulatoryenforcementintheEuropeanUnionandArgentina.Althoughtherules

andlicensingproceduresforparabensvaryconsiderablyacrosstheworldtoday, inthefuture

theymay—ormaynot—converge.ConvergencemightbeontherelativelypermissiveAmerican

model,becausecountriesseektoattractinvestmentfromAmericanfirmsandareswayedbyfree

marketarguments,or itmightbeonthetougherEuropeanmodel,becausecountrieswishto

guaranteeaccess for theircorporationstotheEUmarketandarepersuadedbytheso-called

“precautionaryprinciple”(Scott,2009;Bradford,2012).Andregardlessofwhethertheoutcome

isconvergenceordivergence,thelegalandpoliticaloperatorsengagedintheglobalregulatory

processargueinfavorofnewlawbasedoncomparison.Theoddsarethatprivacyadvocateswill

makethecaseformorepublicenforcementofconsumer-trackingrulesintheUnitedStatesand

3Throughoutthischapter,theterms“prescribe”and“prescription”refertothenormativeactivityofrecommendingnewdomesticlawsandinternationallegalinstruments.“Prescribe”and“prescription”arenotusedtorefertotheactualenactmentofsuchlawsandlegalinstruments,whichmayormaynotbetheconsequenceoftheargumentsandrecommendationsoflegalandpoliticaloperators.


6

EastAsiabasedontheexampleofEuropeandataprotectionauthorities.Multinationalcosmetics

corporations, by contrast, are likely to draw inspiration from the U.S. system of chemicals

regulationtoopposelicensingforparabensandotherchemicalsinLatinAmerica.

Within the field of comparative law, there are three lines of inquiry that can, with

significantadaptationanddevelopment,shedlightoneachofthesekeycharacteristicsofthe

globalregulatoryprocess.Classificationsservetodescribeandchartlegalvariationgloballyand

are an important tool forunderstanding thedifferent legal responses generatedby common

policyproblems(DavidandBrierly,1978;ZweigertandKötz,1998).Thecausaltheoryof legal

transplants (Watson,1974),alsoknownasdiffusion in the social scientific literature (Dobbin,

Simmons, and Garrett, 2007), points to the conditions under which regulatory institutions,

principles,andproceduresarelikelytoconvergeacrossthemultiplejurisdictionsinvolvedinthe

global regulatory process. And the functionalmethod of comparative law, togetherwith the

manydebatesthatithasgenerated,istheprevalentnormativetheoryintheacademyforhow

politicalandlegaloperatorsshouldcomparetoprescribenewlaw(Rabel,[1924]1967;Zweigert,

1951;David,1955;ZweigertandKötz,1998;Basedow,2014).

Therestofthischapterproceedsasfollows.Thenextsectionreviewstheexistingfields

oflegalresearchthathaveconsideredaspectsoftheglobalregulatoryprocessandexplainstheir

shortcomings—comparative administrative law, global administrative law, and comparative

socio-legalstudies.Thechapterthenturnstoasystematicexpositionoftheobjectofstudyof

comparativelawandregulation.First,itoutlinestheelementsoflawthatarecomparedacross

thedifferentjurisdictions,bothdomesticandinternational,andthatareessentialtothemultiple

jurisdictionsthatcontributetotheglobalregulatoryprocess:thelawofrulemaking,regulatory

oversight,regulatoryenforcement,andjudicialreview.Secondly,theintroductionputsforward

thethreelinesoftheorization,drawnfromthefieldofcomparativelaw,thatofferthegreatest

promiseforunderstandingtheessentialcharacteristicsoftheglobalregulatoryprocessandthat

are central to the field of comparative law and regulation. In presenting classifications, legal

transplants, and the functional method, the chapter develops each area of theoretical

investigationforthepubliclawsphereandthenovelcontextofglobalregulatorygovernance.It


7

proposes two new classifications: in the first, the categories reflect historical and doctrinal

theoriesofhowpubliclawshoulddisciplinetheregulatoryfunction;inthesecond,thecategories

arebasedonmodelsoflegitimateprivateinvolvementinpublicregulation.Asexplainedbelow,

legaltransplantsintheregulatorydomaincanbecausedbyanumberofdifferentfactors,but

one in particular—power—has been neglected in the existing transplant literature. And, in

unpackingthefunctionalmethodoflegalprescription,thechapterdwellsonwhatisgenerally

the last stage of the comparative analysis, that is, recommending a new domestic law or

international legal instrument based on the “better” law that has been revealed by the

comparativesurvey.Thischapterunderscorestheneedforcomparativeanalysistobeexplicitas

tothenormativecriteriathatareusedtoidentifythelawofonejurisdictionassuperiortothe

laws of other jurisdictions, i.e., the “better” law. It also urges researchers to investigate

empiricallytheoperationofwhat,inappearance,isthe“better”law,toascertainthat,inactual

fact,itmeetsthenormativecriteria.

Theintroductionconcludeswithasurveyoftheindividualcontributionstothevolume.

Thesurveyshowsthateventhoughtheauthorsworkinanumberoftraditionalsubfieldsoflaw,

it is possible to construct an intellectually compelling topography of the emerging field of

comparativelawandregulation.Thereviewoftheindividualchaptersalsodiscusseshowthey

illuminatethetheoreticalconclusionsoutlinedinthemainpartoftheintroduction.Overall,the

chaptersrevealthepracticalandscholarlypayoffsthatcomefrombuildinganewfieldofinquiry

dedicatedtocomparativelawandregulation.

EXISTINGRESEARCHTRADITIONS

Therearethreeexistingfieldsoflegalresearchthathaveaddressedelementsofhowregulation

operatesworldwide:comparativeadministrativelaw,globaladministrativelaw,andsocio-legal

studies.Althoughtheseresearchtraditionshavemadesignificantadvances,theyalsosufferfrom

criticallimitationsrelatedtotheirdisciplinaryfoundations.Drivingscholarshipineachfieldisa


8

setofassumptionsandcategoriesthatindicatewhattostudy,usingwhichtheoriesandmethods.

Ineachcase,theassumptionsandcategoriesareillsuitedtounderstandinghowpolicyproblems

such as consumer tracking, parabens, andmanyothers are handledby the global regulatory

process.

ComparativeAdministrativeLaw

Comparative administrative law is focused on bureaucratic authority, broadly speaking. The

objectofcomparisonistheinstitutionofpublicadministrationandthenationallawsthatgovern

theoperationofpublic administration indifferent jurisdictions (Goodnow,1893; Ziller, 1993;

Fromont,2006;Bell,2008;Rose-AckermanandLindseth,2010).Sincetheworkofadministration

is,atleasttosomedegree,thefunctionaltaskofregulatingeconomyandsociety,comparingthe

lawofadministrationindifferentcountriescanshedlightonthemultiplelegalsystemsinvolved

inglobalregulation.Butnotethattheoverlapbetweenadministrationandregulation,together

with their respective governing laws, is imperfect to say the least. On the one hand,

administrativelaw,andhencecomparativeadministrativelaw,isunder-inclusive.Dependingon

thecountry,theregulatoryprocesscaninvolveanumberofpublicandprivatebodiesoutsideof

publicadministration:thepoliticalbranches,whichsetdowntheregulatoryagendaandwhich

are governed by constitutional law; public prosecutors, who pursue criminal actions for

regulatory offenses subject to the rules of criminal procedure; private litigants, who seek

compensationforregulatorybreachesinthecourtsunderthelawofcivilprocedure;andprivate

regulatorybodies,whichundertakeself-regulation,andwhichactunderacombinationofpublic

andprivatelaw(CoglianeseandKagan,2007).

Ontheotherhand,administrativelaw,andthereforecomparativeadministrativelawtoo,

canbeover-inclusivewithrespecttoregulation.InthecaseoftheUnitedStates,administration

is largely synonymous with regulation because of the early use of regulation to govern the

economy,asopposed to stateownershipand industrialplanning,andbecauseof the federal


9

organization of government, which leavesmost responsibility for functions such as land-use

planningtostateandlocalgovernmentandseparatesubfieldsoflaw(Breyeretal.,2011).But

theAmericanexperienceisunique.Inmostotherjurisdictions,theoppositeisthecase:thework

of administration is only in small part regulation and instead is focused on providing basic

services, managing welfare schemes, overseeing land-use planning, and other types of

governmentactivities.Thefunctionsofpublicadministrationcanentailalotbesidesregulation

andthereforeadministrativelawcanincluderulesandprinciplesthatarenotaimedspecifically

attheregulatoryfunctionbutatothertypesofgovernmentactivities(Ziller,1993).

Althoughthemismatchbetweenadministrativelawandregulatorylawisahandicapfor

anylegalinquiryfocusedonregulation,evenpurelydomesticregulation,itisespeciallysointhe

global context. Comparing administrative law falls into the trap of comparing the proverbial

applesandoranges(Dannemann,2008;Valcke,2012).Atbest,comparativeadministrativelaw

risksbeingrelativelyuninformativeonhowthelawgovernstheregulatoryfunctionindifferent

jurisdictions: in some countries, regulation may be handled by legal actors other than

administration,suchaslegislatorsandcriminalprosecutors,whileinothercountriestheremay

beverylittleregulationatall.Atworst,comparativeadministrativelawcanbemisleading:from

theoutside,certainprinciplesandproceduresofadministrativelawmightbemistakenforthe

lawapplicabletotheregulatoryfunctionwheninactualfacttheygovernonlyland-useplanning,

civilservicemanagement,oranotherfunctionofpublicadministrationthatismoreimportantin

theforeignjurisdiction.Insum,itisnecessarytodevelopanobjectoflegalstudythatiscentered

onthefunctionaltaskofregulating,notonthehistoricalandnation-specificcontoursofpublic

administration,inordertosuccessfullycrossbordersandunderstandtheregulatoryprocessin

themanyjurisdictionsthattodayweighinonglobalpolicyproblemssuchasconsumertracking

andparabens.


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GlobalAdministrativeLaw

Globaladministrative lawstudies thenumerous internationaladministrativebodies thathave

mushroomed over the past decades (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 2005; Cassese, 2016).

Broadly speaking, global administrative law is the international counterpart of comparative

administrative law: the object of inquiry is administration and the law that applies to

administration—justinternationalnotnational—andthetheoreticalconcernistheauthorityand

legitimacyofadministration.Byincludinginternationallegalsystemsamongthejurisdictionsthat

areimportanttotheregulatoryprocess,thisbookdrawsontheinsightsofglobaladministrative

law.Scholarshipinglobaladministrativelaw,however,tendstoconceptualizetheinternational

level as fundamentally different from the national level and to analyze global administrative

bodies in isolationor,atmost,asverticallysituatedabovenationalbodies. But,asdiscussed

earlier,theverysameregulatoryproblemcanbehandledbynationalsystemsliketheUnited

StatesandBelgium,internationalsystemsliketheWTOandtheUNEnvironmentProgramme,

and in-between systems like the EuropeanUnion. The different jurisdictions interact and, in

doingso,generatetheglobalregulatoryprocess.Therefore,tounderstandthisglobalregulatory

process, it is not enough to focus on only one set of actors and law, even though, being

international, global administrative bodies might appear to be the most important for

understandingtheworldwidedimensionofregulation.Inmanyregulatoryareas,andatmany

stagesoftheregulatoryprocess,nationaljurisdictionsarethekeyplayers.Evenmoreimportant,

theglobalregulatoryprocessistheproductofcomplexinteractionamongjurisdictions—vertical

and horizontal—and therefore it is essential to develop a single set of theoretical and

methodologicaltoolsaimedspecificallyatthatinteraction.


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Socio-legalResearch

The third line of scholarship to have addressed elements of the global regulatory process is

comparative socio-legal research (Kagan and Axelrad, 2000; Kagan, 2001). Studies in this

traditiongenerallyfocusonaspecifictypeofregulatoryobjective,suchassafenursinghomesor

cleanwater,investigateempiricallyhowtheseobjectivesareachievedindifferentnationallegal

systems,and,dependingonthestudy,assesswhethersomesystemsaremoreeffectivethan

others (Vogel,1986;BraithwaiteandBraithwaite,1995). This research is legal realistand,as

such, servesasanessential complement to the largelydoctrinal research conductedby legal

scholars.Nevertheless,theempiricalquestionsandtheoriesthatguidesocio-legalresearchare

quitenarrow.Sincethecentralconcernishowlawimpactssociety,comparativestudiesinthis

traditiongenerally investigatespecific typesofregulatorypolicywithdirectconsequences for

socialandeconomicoutcomes—healthregulations,environmentalregulations,andsoon—and

the enforcement of that policy by state officials (Hutter, 1988;May andWinter, 2000;May,

2003).Yettheglobalregulatoryprocessencompassesmanyothertypesoflawandinstitutional

actors:thebasiclegalframeworkthatguideshowregulationismadeandenforced,fromstartto

finish,andthepublicandprivateactorsresponsiblenotonlyforenforcing,butalsoformaking,

overseeing,andadjudicatingregulation.Inotherwords,itisnecessarytodevelopanempirically

sensitive research agenda that takes a broader view of the law that matters in the global

regulatoryprocess.Toreturntotheparabensexample,itisimportanttoanalyzeandassessnot

simplythepolicyoutputofparabensregulationbutthelegalandpoliticalprocessthatgaverise

to,andthatdrivestheoperationof,thatparabensregulation.

ESTABLISHINGTHEFIELD

Therearetwostepstooutliningthefieldofcomparativelawandregulation.Thefirstistoset

downsystematicallythelaw,throughouttheworld,thatistheobjectofstudy.Thesecondisto


12

sketchthetheoriesandmethodsthataremostpromisingforunderstandingtheglobalregulatory

processandhowthemultiplejurisdictions,domesticandinternational,interacttogeneratethe

globalregulatoryprocess.

WhatLaw?

Thefieldofcomparativelawandregulationinvestigatesthelawthatappliestotheregulatory

function,inwhateverjurisdictionthatfunctionisundertaken.Theregulatoryfunctionandthe

applicable law, that is, the regulatoryprocess, are conceived sequentially:making the rules,

overseeingandrevisingtherules,enforcingtherules,andreviewingtherulesincourt.Ateach

phase,certainactorsandcertainareasoflaw,asdefinedbythetraditionallegaldiscipline,play

amoreprominentrole.Whenrulesaremade,legislaturesandadministrativeagencies,operating

underconstitutionalandadministrative law,are important.Oversight is carriedoutbypublic

authorities acting largely under administrative law and, less often, constitutional law.

Enforcementisconductedbyadministrativeagenciesandcourts,atthebehestofeitherpublic

prosecutorsorprivateclassactions,and,dependingonthetypeofenforcement, triggers the

principlesofadministrativelawandcriminalandcivilprocedure.Judicialreviewishandledbythe

courtsandisguidedbyconstitutionalandadministrativelaw.Privatebodiescanbeallowedto

exerciseoneormoreoftheseregulatorypowersand,indoingso,theyaregovernedbycorporate

law,laborlaw,andcontractlaw,aswellaspubliclawonpermissibledelegationsandfreedomof

associationandspeech.Toillustratewithanexamplewellknowntolawyers,therulesofconduct

for theprofession canbedevelopedbyprivatebar associations, overseenby themedia and

privatewatchdogorganizations,enforcedbydisgruntledclientsinadisputeresolutionprocess

managedby thebar,andreviewed,at least in the first instance, in thecourseof thedispute

resolutionprocess.Althoughtheprimaryfocusofthefieldisregulatoryinstitutions,principles,

and procedures, comparative studies of specific regulatory policies—the details of when

consumertrackingdatacanbesold,whatchemicalsarecontainedincosmetics,andsoon—can

revealmoregeneralpropertiesoftheregulatoryprocessandthereforeareincludedtotheextent


13

that they serve those purposes. The terminology employed in this discussion reflects the

categories that have been developed in domestic law, not the vocabulary typically used in

internationallaw.Thereader,however,shouldkeepinmindthatthisexpositionofregulatory

lawisintendedtoapplytobothdomesticandinternationaljurisdictions.

[FigureI.1here]

FigureI.1setsoutthecomponentsoftheregulatoryprocessandthecorrespondinglawincluded

inthefieldofcomparativelawandregulation.Itshouldbekeptinmindthateventhoughthe

flowchartformatisausefulheuristic,theorderoftheregulatoryphasesisnotsetinstoneand

sometimestheycanoccurinadifferentsequence.

TableI.1belowsummarizesthecoverageofregulatorylawandjurisdictionsprovidedby

thecontributionstothisvolume.Foreachstageintheregulatoryprocess,itindicatestheprecise

typeoflawandthespecificjurisdictionsanalyzedintheindividualcontributions.Forpurposesof

clarity,thevolumefollowsaclassictripartiteschemethatmovesfromthemosttraditionalform

ofregulation—bystateauthoritiesatthedomesticlevel—toformsthatareconsideredrelatively

novel—private regulation (at both the domestic and international levels) and international

jurisdictions.ItisimportanttonotethattheEuropeanUniondefieseasyclassificationand,for

some purposes, is treated as a domestic jurisdiction and, for others, as an international

jurisdiction. The EU’s variable status is a reflection of the uneven character of European

integration: at the rulemaking stage, inmany policy areas, the EU exercises the power of a

domestic jurisdiction, but at the enforcement stage, the EU generally only has supervisory

powers,andauthoritycontinuestorestprimarilywiththememberstates.

[TableI.1here]

Beforeproceedinganyfurther,itisimportanttounderscoreonepointwhichmightnot

emergeclearlyenoughfromthisexpositionoftheregulatoryprocess.Formostlawyerstrained

inthelawofaparticularjurisdiction,thedefaultpositionisthattheregulatoryprocessoccurs,

fromstarttofinish,withinthatjurisdiction.Butthisassumptionnolongerholdsinthefaceof

globalization.Itisnotjustthatthereareparallelregulatoryprocessesoncommonproblemssuch


14

asconsumertrackingandparabensthatareoccurringsimultaneouslyindifferentjurisdictions

throughout the world. Rather, in some cases, before a specific set of rules can take effect,

multiplejurisdictionscanbecalledintoaction.Themostobviousjurisdictionalconfigurationis

theverticalrelationshipbetweeninternationalregimesandparticipatingstates.Domesticrules

are often subject to regulatory oversight and judicial review by international regimes. For

instance, an EU rule on parabensmust be notified to aWTO oversight committee4 and can

potentially trigger judicial review in theWTODisputeSettlementBody (Shaffer, thisvolume).

Interventioninthedomesticregulatoryprocesscanevenbehorizontal,fromanotherdomestic

jurisdiction.Forexample,aprivacyruleissuedbytheU.S.FederalTradeCommissionthatlimits

consumer tracking is subject to an adequacy determination in the EU, which entails both

regulatoryoversightbytheprivacyauthorityand,possibly,judicialreviewintheCourtofJustice

oftheEU.5Insum,tonavigatethecontemporary,global,regulatoryprocess,itisvitaltoknow

thelawofmultiplejurisdictionsandtoappreciatethat,atanypointintheregulatoryprocess,

thoselawsmayintersect.

To better understand the scope and the nature of the law covered by the field of

comparative law and regulation, it is necessary to provide some historical context. Like

constitutionalandadministrativelawandtheircomparativecounterparts,theemergenceofthe

field of comparative law and regulation is linked to a concrete set of political and social

developments.Regulation,likewrittenconstitutionsandpublicadministration,isadistincttype

of historical and social phenomenon that is not universal to all human societies. With the

exceptionoftheUnitedStates,regulationhasbecomeapervasiveformofstategovernanceonly

in thepast thirty years (Levi-Faur,2005; Scott, 2006;DubashandMorgan,2012). The riseof

regulation is directly tied to the extensive privatization and liberalization of markets that

occurredinmanycountriesbeginninginthe1980s(SuleimanandWaterbury,1990;Thatcher,

2007).Before,governmentinterventionintheeconomywasdirect—throughstateownershipof

4WorldTradeOrganization,CommitteeonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade,Notification,G/TBT/N/EU/157(Oct.1,2013).5Article29DataProtectionWorkingParty,Opinion4/2000onthelevelofprotectionprovidedbythe“SafeHarborPrinciples”(May16,2000);CommissionDecision520/2000/EC,2000O.J.(L215)7(EC);CaseC-362/14,Schremsv.Data Protection Commissioner, 2013 WL 614CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015). For these purposes, the EU operates as adomesticjurisdictionsinceithasnointernationallawclaimofauthorityovertheU.S.


15

marketsectorsandextensiveindustrialplanning.Sincethen,eventhoughcountriesstillseekto

accomplishmanyof thesamefundamentalpolicyobjectives, theydosobygoverningprivate

marketsactorswithrules(Majone,1994;S.Vogel,1996;Levi-FaurandGilad,2004;Kelemen,this

volume;Shaffer,thisvolume).Rulesarenownecessarybothtocreateandmaintaincompetitive

marketsandtofurtheravarietyofsocial,environmental,andredistributivepoliciesthatcanno

longerbeachievedbydirectlymanagingtheeconomy.Theregulatorytechniquealsohastended

tofavoracertaintypeofgovernmentinstitution:thespecializedadministrativeauthoritywith

theknowledgeandresourcesnecessarytoregulateaparticularmarketsectorandregulatory

problem(Kelemen,thisvolume;Shaffer,thisvolume).Asisunderscoredbythisexpositionofthe

regulatoryfunctionandtherelevantlaw,summarizedinFigureI.1,administrativeagenciesare

pivotal:theyengageinbothrulemakingandruleenforcementand,asaresult,theyaretheprime

targetofbothoversightandjudicialreview.

Theemergenceofthefieldofcomparativelawandregulationhasbeendrivennotonly

bytheriseofacommonmodeofgovernanceforachievingpolicyobjectives—regulation—but

alsoby thediffusionof a certain typeof legal system—liberal democracy (Huntington, 1991;

Simmons,Dobbin,andGarrett,2008).Thisdefinitionoftheregulatoryprocess,andwhatlaw

canbeanalyzedasbelongingtothatregulatoryprocessregardlessofthejurisdiction,isasmuch

aproductoftheinstrumentalactivityofregulatingasitisoftheregimetypeofliberaldemocracy.

Eventhesimpledivisionoflaborbetweenmakingrulesandenforcingrules,whichmightseem

necessarytoanareaofhumanactivity likegoverningmarkets, is theproductofadistinctive,

liberalorderthatinsiststhatfirstrulesbemadeandpublicizedandthatonlythencancitizensbe

subjecttoenforcementactionbytheirgovernments(MacCormick,1999:115). Theoversight

andjudicialreviewcomponentsoftheregulatoryprocessillustrateevenmoreclearlyhowthis

conceptualizationofanobjectoflegalstudythatcancrossnationalbordersanddomesticlaw

booksistiedtoacertainformofgovernmentwhich,withthediffusionofliberaldemocracy,has

becomemore prevalent today: the checks and balances afforded by external oversight and

judicialrevieware,bydefinition,irrelevanttoanautocraticregimebutessentialtoaliberalone

(MannoriandSordi,2001).


16

Thislogicofliberaldemocracyisallthemoretrueofthespecifictypesofregulatorylaw

includedinthisvolumeundereachstageoftheregulatoryprocess.Thelegalproceduresbywhich

thepublicparticipatesinrulemakingaregenerallyenactedtofurtherthepublicaccountability

important in liberaldemocracies.So too for lawsguaranteeingcitizensaccess togovernment

documentsandrequiringthatregulationtakeintoaccountenvironmentalandeconomicimpacts.

Thecriminalandcivilprocedureanalyzedinthisvolumeisassessedbasedonboththeeffective

implementationofregulatorypolicyandtherespect for liberalrights. Thesectionon judicial

reviewanalyzesprinciples—proportionality, the right tohealth,andparticipation rights—that

aremeaningfulwithinthebroadercontextofliberaldemocracy.

Insum,thefieldofcomparativelawandregulationandtheassessmentofwhatlawto

cover are built on the historical trend, experienced acrossmany parts of theworld, toward

regulatinginlinewithliberaldemocraticprinciplesofpubliclaw.Thatisafarcryfromsayingthat

theregulatoryprocessacrosstheglobeisidenticalandindeed,asdescribedbelow,oneofthe

essentialambitionsofthefieldistocapturetheextensivevariationthatseparatesjurisdictions.

Notall jurisdictionswillhaveall typesofregulatory lawandeven if theydo, itmayverywell

operateinquitedifferentways.Thisintellectualframeworkcanevenencompassauthoritarian

regimes:manyjurisdictionsthatareconsideredauthoritarianhavelawtocompareoncertain

elementsoftheregulatoryprocessand,inthosecasesinwhichthereisnolawtobefound,the

silencecanalsobe instructive. Inotherwords, it is important tobemindfulof thehistorical

originsofthecategoriesandassumptionsthatservetoorganizethefieldbut,atthesametime,

itisvitaltoincludeasmanyjurisdictionsaspossibleinthecomparativeprojectsofthefield.

Toconcludethissection,itbearspointingoutwhatisnotcoveredbycomparativelaw

andregulation.Althoughthedefinitionoftheregulatoryfunctionandtheapplicablelawmight

appearsocapaciousastoincludeall law,thereareplentyofareasthatareexcludedbecause

theyaretoofarremovedfromtheregulatoryfunction.Thisistrueforthesubstantiveprinciples

ofprivatelawandcriminallaw.Inbothcontexts,backgroundprinciplesonwhattypeofactions

cangiverisetocivilliabilityorcriminalpunishmentcansometimeslimitthescopeofregulatory

enforcement. Because those principles, however, are driven bymore general considerations


17

relatedtodutiesofcareandculpability,andnotbytheregulatoryschemesenactedtoaddress

particulareconomicandsocialproblems,theyareperipheraltothemainobjectofinquiry.The

constitutionallawthatgovernselectionsandotheraspectsofwhatmightbroadlybecalledthe

law of democracy is also excluded. Even though elections, political parties, and general

parliamentary procedure undoubtedly influence regulation, they, together with their legal

framework,aretoofarremovedfromtheprocessofenactingspecificregulatorynormstobe

consideredpartoflawandregulation.Last,aswasexplainedearlier,therearesubjectssuchas

land-use planning and civil service law that inmany legal systems are central to the field of

administrativelawbutarenotcoveredbycomparativelawandregulation.

WhichQuestions,Theories,andAnalyticalTools?

The fieldof comparative lawand regulation ismotivatedby the larger intellectual projectof

understanding the global regulatory process. How are social and economic problems like

consumertrackingandparabenshandledinthecontemporary,global,regulatoryprocess?The

objective isnottogeneratea laundry listofregulatory lawacrossthedozensofnationaland

international jurisdictions involved inthatprocess.Rather,thefieldseekstodeveloptheories

andanalyticaltoolsthat illuminatetheessentialpropertiesoftheglobalregulatoryprocess—

jurisdictionaldiversityandcommonality,includingbothdomesticandinternationaljurisdictions,

convergence or divergence over time, and prescription based on comparison.What are the

distinctivepublic institutions,procedures, andprinciples thatmarkdifferent jurisdictionsand

thatcangiverisetovariationinthetreatmentofcommonregulatoryproblemsacrosstheglobe?

Whatarethepoliticalandsocialprocessesthatcauseconvergenceinsomejurisdictions,with

respect to certain types of policy problems and regulatory law? How should comparative

argumentsinfavoroflawreform,afavoriterhetoricaldeviceintheglobalregulatoryprocess,be

assessedandimproved?


18

Themoregeneralfieldofcomparativelawoffersagoodpointofdepartureforaddressing

thesequestions.Thefieldemergedinthetwentiethcenturyinthecontextoftheglobalization

of commerce and has been dedicated, to a significant extent, to the project of facilitating

commercial transactionsacrossdifferent jurisdictions (Dubinsky,2005:219–20;Zimmermann,

2008).Manyofthetheoreticalandmethodologicaldebatesofthedisciplinehavebeendrivenby

the need for the law of contracts, essential to global transactions, to straddle multiple

jurisdictions. Traditional comparative law, therefore, serves as a useful springboard for

understandingglobalization,thistimenotintheprivatelawspherebutinthedifferentcontext

of public law, that is, the global regulatory process. Comparative law has developed three

promising lines of theoretical inquiry for understanding the defining features of the global

regulatoryprocess:descriptiveclassifications,causaltransplanttheory,andnormativetheoryon

howtocompareintheserviceoflawreformandlawunification,includingthefunctionalmethod.

Classification schemes serve to capture the important legal attributes that characterize

jurisdictionsandtounderstanddifferencesandsimilaritiesamongjurisdictions.Theoriesoflegal

transplantsaredesignedtoexplainwhetherornotlawspreadsandjurisdictionsconverge.And

the functional method provides a solid basis for evaluating and improving the comparative

argumentsusedbyregulatoryoperatorstorecommendnewlaw.

Differencesandcommonalities:paradigmsofpubliclawandpublic–privaterelations

One of the classic ambitions of comparative law is to describe and analyze deep-seated

differencesandsimilaritiesinlegalsystemsacrosstheworld(Reimann,2002;Glenn,2008,2011;

Pargendler,2012).Tothisend,classificationshaveservedasanimportantintellectualtool.They

cutthroughtheinevitablemorassofdetailsandlegalinstrumentsthatarerequiredfortheday-

to-day operation of the law in any particular system and identify the crucial elements that

generatethelawacrossmultiplejurisdictions.Thecategoriesthatconstituteaclassificationare

designed to capture complex patterns of behavior in the law and to convey the multiple,

interrelated characteristics that separate some jurisdictions and unite others. The categories

servetounderstandhow,insomecases,similardisputesandproblemscantriggerdifferentlegal


19

processesand,incertaininstances,culminateindifferentoutcomes.Becausetheyoperateasa

toolforunderstandingvariation,classificationsarethekeytomappinglegalsystemsworldwide.

They provide legal actorswith the intellectual resources necessary to navigate legal systems

outsidetheirhomejurisdictionandtointeractwiththemultiplejurisdictionsthatdecidetheir

legalproblems.

Althoughdescriptionandmappingbasedonclassificationsisamajorareaofacademic

endeavor in comparative law, it has also generated significant criticismwithin the discipline

(Riles,1999;Glenn,2008).Classificationsandtheircategoriesinevitablysimplifylegalsystems;

indeedthatisoneoftheirgreatvirtues.Butwithsimplificationcomesintellectualrisk:thatthe

categoriesfailtocapturethecrucialelementsoflegalsystems,thatthecategoriesonlyworkfor

somesystems,thatcertainjurisdictionsaremisclassified,orthatitisimpossibletotellwhether

one,orindeedany,jurisdictionshouldbeclassifiedasbelongingtooneortheothercategory.At

thesametime,classificationstendtobestatic.Thatis,onceajurisdictionisclassified,thereis

intellectualresistancetoadmittingthatwhat,bydefinition,arethefundamentalelementsofthe

jurisdictionhavechanged,andthat it isnecessary toswitch theclassificationandredrawthe

map. Although these undoubtedly are valid concerns that must be taken into account in

developinglegalclassifications,theconceptualexerciseremainsanimportantone.Aslongasthe

classificationschemedoesnotclaimtobeexclusiveordefinitive,itcanofferavaluableheuristic

topoliticalactorsandlegalscholars.

Asexplainedearlier,traditionalcomparativelawismainlypreoccupiedwithprivatelaw.

Thusitshouldcomeasnosurprisethattheprincipalclassificationinthefieldappliestothelegal

sourcesandcourtsthatareresponsiblefordecidingprivatelawdisputes—thecivillawtradition

versusthecommonlawtradition(DavidandBrierly,1978;Merryman,1985;ZweigertandKötz,

1998).6Inaddition,acoupleofclassificationshavebeendevelopedtocapturedifferencesand

6Althoughtheterms“civillawtradition”and“commonlawtradition”areoftenusedinthemoregeneralliteraturetoreferbothtoprivateandcriminallaw,thebest-knowntheoreticalandhistoricalelaborationsofthesecategoriesreferalmostexclusivelytothesystemfordecidingprivatelawdisputesindifferentjurisdictions.Theprivatelawemphasiscanalsobeseenintheuseoftheclassificationintherecentempiricalliteratureontheeffectsoflegaltraditiononeconomicandsocialoutcomes,knownasthelegaloriginsproject.Theprojectcodessystemsascommonlaworcivillawbasedonwhetheritusesjudicialprecedentoracodeasthesourceoflawfordecidingcommercialdisputes(Djankovetal.,2002:Table1,DescriptionoftheVariables;LaPortaetal.,1999:231).


20

similaritiesinhowlegalsystemsorganizeandresolvecriminalcasesbetweenprivatecitizensand

public prosecutors: the adversarial versus inquisitorialmodels of criminal procedure (Langer,

2014);andthehierarchicalversuscoordinateformsofauthorityforcivilandcriminalprocedure

(Damaška, 1986). In constitutional law, there are classifications built on categories such as

systems of judicial review (Ferreres Comella, 2011; Stone Sweet, 2012), the structure of

government (Halberstam, 2012), and constitutional amendment rules (Albert, 2014). In

administrative law, one source of variation has classically been traced between systems:

adjudicationofdisputesbetweenindividualsandadministrationbyatribunalconnectedtothe

executivebranchinthedroitadministratifandbytheordinarycourtsoflawinthecommonlaw

(Dicey,1885;Bignami,thisvolume).

Drawing on the methodological debates of comparative law on how to construct

classifications,itispossibletoisolatetwoimportantsourcesofsimilarityanddifferenceinthe

regulatorydomain,acrossbothdomesticandinternationaljurisdictions.Thefirstrelatestothe

paradigmsofpubliclawthatdisciplinetheregulatoryprocessandthesecondtothepermissible

forms of private involvement in public action. Not only do these classifications provide

intellectualtoolsforunderstandingthevariationthatmarkstheglobalregulatoryprocess,but

theyalsocanadvanceknowledgeinthemoregeneraldisciplineofcomparativelaw.Thefamiliar

classificationsmentionedearlierpresumefairlyrigiddistinctionsbetweentheoperationoflaw

intheprivateandpublicspheresandinthevariousdomainsofpubliclaw.Aclassificationscheme

foranarealikelawandregulation,however,mustdeploycategoriesthatcutacrossanumberof

subfieldsof law.Totheextent that this ispossible, it suggests that thegeneraldisciplinehas

ignoredimportantsocial,political,andintellectualforcesthat,liketheactivityofregulating,fail

to respect the conventional boundaries of the law but nonetheless have had significant

consequencesforhowthelawpermitsmarketsandsocietytoberegulated.Likewise,incontrast

withthetraditionaldiscipline,comparativelawandregulationincludesboththedomesticand

theinternationalspheresandseekstodevelopatheoreticalapparatus,includingclassifications,

thatencompassesboth.Theclassificationsadvancedbelowsuggestthat,atleastinthisareaof

law, thesocialand legalprocessesofglobalizationhaveadvancedtothepointwhere it isno

longer intellectually coherent to splinter theoretical investigation between the domestic and


21

international spheres and that traditional comparative law should seek to incorporate

internationaljurisdictionstoo.

The following discussion explains each classification scheme in turn, illustrating each

categoryintheclassificationwithspecificjurisdictions.Itidentifiesthedifferentelementsoflaw

andregulation—rulemaking,oversight,enforcement,and judicialreview—associatedwiththe

categoriesanddiscussesthehistoricalandintellectualoriginsofthecategories.Mindfulofthe

critiqueofclassificationsinthemoregeneraldiscipline,theargumentisnotthatalllegalsystems

canbeclassifiedasbelongingexclusivelytooneortheothercategoryorthatjurisdictionsremain

setinstoneovertime.Theclaimis,rather,thateventhoughjurisdictionscanpossessavariety

oflegalcurrents,somewillpredominate,andthereforeitisoftenpossibletocometoplausible

conclusionsastohowtoclassifythelegalsystem.Inotherwords,eventhoughtheclassifications

can and should be contested in particular cases, they remain a valuable heuristic for

understandingvariationintheglobalregulatoryprocess.

ParadigmsofpubliclawTodaythereareatleastfourdifferentparadigmsofwhatisprotected

bythepubliclawthatappliestotheregulatoryfunction:rulebylaw,fundamentalrights,ballot-

boxdemocracy,andtransformativedemocracy.Althoughtheseparadigmsaremostapparentin

whatcourtsdoandthejudicialreviewofregulation,theyalsoshaperegulatoryoversightand

regulatoryenforcement.

Rule by law refers to the classic theory that all state actionmust be authorized by a

writtenlawandmustadheretotheparametersofthatlaw(Allison,2007:157–85;Krygier,2012,

2015).7Thisparadigmemphasizes that legal certainty, rules,and independentpolicingof the

rulesbycourtsarecentraltothelegitimacyofpublicaction.Theoriginsandsubstanceofthe

lawaresomewhatsecondarytothefactthatthestateandthebureaucracyaremadesubjectto

the law.Historically, ruleby law isassociatedwith the riseof liberalism, theemergenceofa

7Although“ruleby law” isalsousedbyTomGinsburgandTamirMoustafa intheirbookon lawinauthoritarianregimes(2008),thetermisdefinedheremorebroadlyandincludessomeofthecoreelementsof“ruleoflaw”incontemporarywesterndemocracies.


22

private sphere separate from the state and in need of protection from the state, and the

administrativelawofthenineteenthcentury(MannoriandSordi,2001;Bignami,thisvolume).It

isevidentinclassiccommonlawandcontinentaldoctrinesofjudicialreviewsuchasreviewing

administrativeactsforbeingultraviresorinexcessofpower(Bignami,2011b:899).

Although,today,rulebylawhasbeenjoinedinwesterndemocraciesbyothertypesof

publiclaw,itoperatesastheprimaryformofjudicialoversightincertainnewerortransitional

democraciesandevenincertainauthoritariansystems.Itisassociatedwithastrongexecutive

andarelativelyweaklegislatureandjudicialsystem,eitherbecauseoftheauthoritarianpower

structureorbecauseofastrongcivilserviceandahistoricallegacyofone-partydominance.The

latteristhecasefortheEastAsiancountriesofJapanand,untilveryrecently,TaiwanandSouth

Korea(HuangandLaw,thisvolume;Ohnesorge,thisvolume).Inthoselegalsystems,muchof

theemphasisofadministrativelawreformhasbeentostrengthenthejudiciary,soastoensure

thatcourtswilltrulybeinapositiontoholdthestatetothelaw,butthesubstanceofjudicial

review remains focused on whether state action is authorized by the law and falls, roughly

speaking, within the parameters contemplated by the law (Huang and Law, this volume;

Ohnesorge,thisvolume).

The rule-by-law paradigm also has traction for understanding developments in

authoritariansystemslikeChinaandEgypt(GinsburgandMoustafa,2008).Whileintheclassic

formulation,rulebylawisdesignedtoprotectanautonomousprivatespherefromincursionsby

anarbitrary state, in the theories thathavebeenused tounderstand courts in authoritarian

systems,rulebylawcanserveasatoolthroughwhichanauthoritarianpartycanseektoestablish

controloverawaywardbureaucracy.Thatbureaucracycannotbecontrolledthroughhierarchical

organizationlinkingthebureaucracytotheauthoritarianpartybecauseofthecomplexitiesof

modern economic policymakingor becauseof entrenched cronyismand corruption. In these

politicalsciencetheories,judicialreviewofadministrativeactionbasedontheauthorizinglaw

can serve as a substitute for hierarchical control (Moustafa, 2007; Ginsburg, 2008). In such

systems, judicial reviewcanalsobeused to generate the legal certaintynecessary toattract

foreigninvestment(Moustafa,2007).


23

In jurisdictions spurred by the rule-by-law paradigm, other types of judicial reviewof

regulationsuchasproportionalityareeitherabsentorrelativelyinactive.Regulatoryoversight

mechanismsthataredesignedtoguaranteepublicaccountabilityandfundamentalrights,such

as freedom of information rights and independent ombudsmen, are rare or under-utilized

(Carmona,2011;Jianwei,2012;Xiao,2012;ChineseHumanRightsDefenders,2014).Regulatory

enforcementis,atleastintheory,drivenbytheimportanceoflegalcertaintyandtheneedto

demonstratethatthelawisnotarbitrarybutisenforcedequallyagainstallprivateactors(Vande

Walle,2013:127–44;vanRooij,thisvolume).Theinitiativerestslargelyinthehandsofpublic

actors,thatis,criminalprosecutorsandadministrativeauthorities,asopposedtoprivateclass

actions,anditcanbeusedsymbolicallytounderscoretheapplicationoflawtoall(vanRooij,this

volume).

Inthefundamentalrightsmodel,whichischaracteristicofmanyEuropeandemocracies,

theroleof lawintheregulatoryprocessgoesbeyondenforcingrulebylaw. It isdesignedto

ensurethatthestateactorsinvolvedintheregulatoryprocess―thelegislatureandthepolitical

executive as well as state administration and the various bodies responsible for

implementation―respectavarietyofliberalrightsand,toalesserextent,certainpositivesocial

andeconomicrights(Bignami,thisvolume).Thefundamentalrightsparadigmisthehistorical

product of a strong bureaucracy and a centrally organized state, powerful courts, and a

somewhatcautiousapproachtoelectoralpoliticsandthelegislativebranchinthewakeofthe

inter-warexperiencewithmassdemocracyanddictatorship.

Thefundamentalrightsparadigmisreflectedindoctrinesofjudicialreviewofregulation,

whichemphasizeeconomicandsocialrightsandproportionalitybalancingtosetlimitsonstate

interferencewiththoserights(Bignami,2011b:899–900;Bignami,thisvolume;Rose-Ackerman,

thisvolume).Itisalsoapparentinadistincttypeofoversightmechanismthathasmushroomed

since the1980s: independentombudsmenandgovernment commissionswith themissionof

safeguardingspecific fundamentalrights intheactivitiesofthestate, includingregulation(de

Beco,2009;EuropeanUnionAgencyforFundamentalRights,2010;Bignami,2011a).Consistent

with the historical tradition of strong bureaucracy and distrust of democratic populism,


24

regulatoryenforcementistriggeredlargelybystateactors,albeitwithamuchgreateremphasis

on safeguarding rights than in rule-by-law jurisdictions. In legal systems such as the United

Kingdomand Scandinavian countries,whichhistorically haveexperiencedgreaterdemocratic

stability, the emphasis on fundamental rights, especially as enforcedby formalist courts, has

traditionally been less significant. With the Europeanization of public law, however, that

differenceisfading.Intheinternationalsphere,withrespecttoalimitedsetofeconomicrights

andjudicialreview,theWTOappearstobeadoptingthefundamentalrightsmodel.TheWTO

agreementsestablishanumberoffreetraderightsbut,atthesametime,recognizethatnational

regulationinfurtheranceofpublicpolicygoalsislegitimate.TheDisputeResolutionBody,which

hasbeentaskedwithadjudicatingchallengestonationalregulationbasedontherightssetdown

intheWTOagreements,hasdevelopedadoctrinalapproachakintoproportionalitythatbalances

publicpurposesagainstfreetraderights(Shaffer,thisvolume).

In the ballot-box democracy paradigm, the public law that disciplines the regulatory

processisdesignedtopromotedemocraticproceduralism(Bignami,thisvolume).Inlegaltheory,

thelegitimacyofstateactionpivotsonthedemocraticprocessandthedirectlyelectedbranches

ofgovernment:allstateactionistobecontrolledbythelegislativeassemblyandthepolitical

executive, and the bureaucracy is required to follow procedures that promote popular

participation in policymaking. Thismodel is associatedwith aweak central bureaucracy and

executivebranch,strongcourts,andastableandlongtraditionofelectionsandlegislatures.The

United States, which is the prime example of ballot-box democracy, is characterized by an

outsized influence of the courts and the adversarial, common law model of government

administration. The courts are tasked with functions that are handled, elsewhere, by

administrative authorities; when powers are delegated to administrative agencies, their

procedureisadversarialandjudicialreviewisallbutcertain(Kagan,2001;Morag-Levine,2003;

Schiller, this volume). The proceduralism of the common law statewas, after the demise of

substantivedueprocessandeconomicandsocialrightsintheNewDeal,coupledwithavisionof

publiclawasahandmaidenoftheelectoralprocessanddemocracy(Bickel,1962;Ely,1980).In

otherwords, in the faceof thecontemporarystate functionof regulatingcomplexsocialand


25

economicproblemsandthecontemporarystateactorofbureaucracy,theambitionofpubliclaw

istosafeguardtheoriginal,constitutionalmodelofballot-boxdemocracy.

American ballot-box democracy is reflected in the doctrines employed in the judicial

reviewofadministrativerulemaking,whicharehighlyproceduralinnatureandarejustified,in

legaltheory,asameansofensuringthattheadministrativestatereplicatesthepluralismofthe

democraticprocess(Bignami,thisvolume;Rose-Ackerman,thisvolume;Wagner,thisvolume).

Intheregulatorysphere,thebestknownofthesedoctrinesisarbitraryandcapriciousreviewof

administrative rulemaking,what has become known as “hard-look review” or,more broadly

speaking,“proceduralizedrationalityreview”(Mashaw,2012:289).Thecorollaryofdemocratic

proceduralism is relatively little judicial review designed to safeguard substantive values

independent of the statutory framework. The importance of ballot-box democracy has also

undermined the emergence of oversight mechanisms outside of the tripartite scheme of

government, that is, independent ombudsmen and government commissions tasked with

enforcingrights(Grunewald,1988:53–55;Bignami,2007:696–97).Inthedomainofregulatory

enforcement,theprominenceofprivateclassactionsascomparedwithcriminalprosecutions

and administrative enforcement is a reflection of the ballot-boxmodel: the class action is a

historicalimportfromtheEnglishcommonlawwhichhasbeenfarmoresuccessfulinAmerica

than in England due to a weak state, strong courts, and democratic populism (Hensler, this

volume).

In the transformative democracy paradigm, the law is conceived not as a way of

overseeingregulatoryinstitutions, includingbureaucraciesandthepoliticalbranches,butasa

meansofsupplantingandprofoundlytransformingthoseinstitutions.Thisparadigmisevidentin

anumberofnewdemocracieswithahistoryofaweakorcorruptstate,whichinmanycasesalso

encompassesthetraditional judiciary,andafeebledemocraticprocess(Saiegh,2010;Zuvanic

and Iacoviello,2010;FrancheschetandDíez,2012). Examples include Indiaandanumberof

countriesinLatinAmerica.

Transformative democracy captures a wide swath of law and regulation. The courts

responsibleforjudicialreviewareoftennew,asinthecaseofnewlyestablishedconstitutional


26

courts, or newly invigorated, aswhere access to justice has been dramatically expanded for

individual litigants (Smulovitz, 2012). They enforce a wide range of positive rights—more

extensivethan inthefundamentalrightsmodel―basedonthevisionsofsubstantiveequality

anddistributivejusticecontainedintheirconstitutions(Gargarella,2006;GauriandBrinks,2008;

Lamprea,Forman,andChapman,thisvolume).Althoughwrittenconstitutionsintransformative

democracies tend to list a more comprehensive set of individual rights than in established

democracies,courtsaremotivatedasmuchbytheconstitutionaltextasbytheneedtoactinthe

face of weak bureaucracies and low state capacity (Lamprea, Forman, and Chapman, this

volume).Commonoversightmechanisms,suchastransparency,whichinotherdemocraciesare

conceived largelyasa supplement to theordinarypoliticalprocess, areused forpurposesof

subverting and transforming both the bureaucracy and the traditional system of political

competition (Worthy, this volume). These jurisdictions are relatively open to establishing

alternativeformsofregulatoryenforcementthatrelyonprivateinitiative(Gidi,2003;2012:901–

39) and additional, non-traditional oversight mechanisms, such as independent rights and

accountabilitybodies(Ackerman,2010;Reif,2011).

TableI.2summarizesthecategoriesofpubliclawandhowtheyshapejudicialreviewand

otherelementsofregulatorylaw.

[TableI.2here]

Modelsofpublic–privaterelationsAsecondmajorformofvariationthatseparateslegalsystems

and that can illuminate jurisdictional diversity and similarity in the global regulatory process

concernsthelegalrelationshipbetweenpublicandprivateactors(Bignami,2011b:884–90).The

differences affect primarily the law that applies to rulemaking, whether by government

authoritiesorbyprivatebodies,buttheyalsoshaperegulatoryenforcement.

Bydefinition,regulationactsuponprivatemarketstoachieveeconomic,environmental,

health,andotherpublicends.Theinterestsofahostofmarketandcivilsocietyactorsaredirectly

affectedandtheregulatoryprocessinmostplacesisdesignedtoincludeandaccommodatethese

privateactors.Althoughthelawgenerallyrecognizesthatprivateactorsplayalegitimaterolein

publicregulation,therolethatiscarvedoutbythelawdifferssystematicallyamongjurisdictions.


27

Inestablisheddemocracies,therearetwomajortypesofpublic–privaterelationsinregulatory

law:pluralism,theparadigmaticcasebeingtheUnitedStates,andneo-corporatism,classically

identifiedwithEurope,inparticularnorthernEuropeansystems(Schmitter,1974;Lijphart,1999;

Bignami,2011b).

Broadly speaking, the difference between pluralism and neo-corporatism can be

summarizedasfollows.8Inpluralistsystems,privategroupsareallowedtocompeteforinfluence

throughouttheregulatoryprocess,whetherhandledprimarilybypublicorprivatebodies,but

theyarenotpermittedtoformallyexerciseregulatoryfunctions.9Inneo-corporatistsystems,by

contrast,privategroupsareoftengivenanofficialroleinpolicymaking,bothtraditionalpublic

regulation and private self-regulation: representatives of interest groups sit on government

bodies and private associations take part in state-recognized self-regulatory schemes. This

organization of public–private relations is created and sustained by the general principles of

public law that reign in pluralist and neo-corporatist systems. In the pluralist United States,

constitutionallawconstructsafairlycategoricaldividebetweenthepublicandprivatespheres:

privategroupsarenotformallyallowedtoexercisepublicrulemakingpowers(cf.Volokh,2014)

whileatthesametimepublicactorsareheavilyrestrictedinhowtheyregulatetheinternalaffairs

ofprivategroups(Gardbaum,2003;Nelson,2015).Bycontrast,inneo-corporatistEurope,the

law allows the line between the public and private spheres to be routinely blurred. In

constitutionallaw,thismixingofpublicandprivateactionhasbeentestedlargelyintheareaof

workplace regulation, which allows for private bargains between labor unions and industry

associationstosupplantstateadministrativeaction,and,atthesametime,oftenimposespublic

8Thisclassificationisinspiredbypoliticalsciencetheoriesofpluralismandneo-corporatism(Adams,2004).Itshouldbenotedthattheclassicdefinitioninpoliticalscienceturnsnotonlyonhowinterestgroupsare incorporatedinpolicymaking but also on how they are organized in society: in pluralism, there are numerous, relatively smallorganizationswhileinneo-corporatismthereareafew,broadlyrepresentativeinterestassociations.9Politicalsciencetheoriestypicallyfocusonthehigh-levelpoliticsofsocialandeconomicpolicymaking(Schmitter,1974;Lijphart,1999). Inparticular,neo-corporatism isassociatedwith thesweeping tripartitebargainsbetweengovernmentandthepeakassociationsoflaborandindustrythatwerepopularinthe1970sand1980sandthatweredesignedtogovernahostofpoliciesrelatedtotheworkplace,macroeconomicindicators,andthewelfarestate.Neo-corporatist forms of interest representation, however, have never been limited to just labor and businessgroupsortograndmacroeconomicbargains.Theyextendtogovernmentregulationinareassuchashealthcare,theenvironment, and consumer policy, and to the entire sweep of the regulatory process, from rulemaking toenforcement.


28

requirementsontheinternalorganizationoflaborandcorporateactors.Perhapsthebest-known

illustrationistheGermanconstitutionalprincipleofthe“socialstate”andthepublicinterference

with,andempowermentof,privatemarketactorsthathasbeenallowedunderthatprinciple

(KommersandMiller,2012:659–65).

Pluralism and neo-corporatism have been linked to a variety of theories of political

philosophy.Americanpluralismisrootedinthenotionthatcompetitionamongeconomicand

social interests, free of state intervention, results in stable and fair outcomes, and that the

primary function of the political process is to serve as a neutral arena for interest group

competition(Truman,1951;Dahl,1971;TichenorandHarris,2005).Tosingleoutaparticular

group or set of groups, as part of a public regulatory scheme, would be to unfairly and

unproductivelyinterferewiththatcompetition.Neo-corporatism,bycontrast,restsonpolitical

theories inwhichsociety isconceivedasasetof interdependentsocialandeconomic,and in

somecases,territorialandreligious,units(Duguit,1901;Laski,1919;Romano,1946;Hayward,

1960;Gierke,1977).Thedutyofthestate,whichisinterconnectedwithsociety,istofosterthe

differentgroupsthatconstitutesocietyandtoensurebalancedrepresentationofthosegroups

inthepolicymakingactivitiesofthestate.Thetwotraditionsofpublic–privaterelationscanbe

captured with the contrasting metaphors of interest group competition and interconnected

socialsolidarities.

Although the difference between pluralism and neo-corporatism may seem quite

abstract, it is both cause and effect of a number of concrete aspects of regulatory law. In

American pluralism,when administrative agencies engage in rulemaking, the law guarantees

private parties formal equality before the bureaucracy: all private parties have a right to

participate in the administrative process, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and to

enforcethoserightsinthecourts(Wagner,thisvolume).Private,industrybodiesalsoroutinely

undertakerulemakingfunctions,butmostoftenintheshadowofthelaw,inthenumerousgaps

left open by the formal rules. Private associations, generally speaking, are not officially

mentionedandempoweredbystatuteand,insomepolicyareas,theymayactuallycompeteto

supplytherulesforanindustry.Atthesametime,theinternalgovernanceofprivatebodiesis


29

notregulatedbythestate,eventhough, inpractice,suchbodiesmaynotbecompetitorsbut

monopolists, that is,onepowerful industryassociationsetsthetermsofsocialandeconomic

relationsinitsparticularmarketsector.Agoodillustrationofthisprivatesideofpluralistsystems

isindustrystandard-settingassociations,whichareprivatebodiesthatmaketherulesforhow

productsaremanufacturedbutarenotsingledoutinpublichealthandsafetyregulationsnor

subjecttostaterequirementsonwhogetstojoinandhowstandardsaretobeset(Mattliand

Büthe, 2003: 23–25; Strauss, this volume). A final element of pluralist law is regulatory

enforcement.Asmentionedearlier,theUnitedStatesisremarkableintheextenttowhichprivate

litigantsenforcepublic regulatory schemes.ButAmerican lawalso standsout inhowprivate

actorsgetintocourt:iftheschemeincludesaprivaterightofaction,anyindividual,regardlessof

historyororganizationalaffiliation,isallowedtobringlitigationonbehalfoftheclassofvictims

aslongasthatindividualcandemonstratetothecourtthatheorsheistypicaloftheclassand

thatthemembersoftheclassaresimilarlysituated(Hensler,thisvolume).

InEuropeanneo-corporatism,theblurredlinebetweentheprivateandpublicspheresis

visible inbothpublic andprivate rulemaking. Inpublic rulemaking, certainmarket and social

actorsareoftensingledout,basedontheirmembershipnumbersandtheirtypeofconstituency,

tositonofficialadvisorycommittees,withtheaimofachievingbalancedrepresentationofcivil

societyinthepolicymakingactivitiesofthestate.OneprominentexampleistheEuropeanUnion

(Smismans, this volume).10 The law can also empower specific private bodies to enact self-

regulatoryrules,whilecontemporaneouslyrequiringthatsuchprivatebodiesgiveothersocial

actorstheopportunitytoparticipateintheirwork,henceachieving,atleastintheory,thesame

balanced representation as in public rulemaking. On this self-regulatory dimension of neo-

corporatism,Europeanstandardsettingprovidesan important illustration(SchepelandFalke,

2000;Strauss,thisvolume).Attheinternationallevelaswell,standardsettingfollowstheneo-

corporatist,notthepluralist,model:internationaltradeagreementsrelyheavilyontheworkof

10AsStijnSmismansrecountslaterinthisvolume,thesituationintheEuropeanUnionandmanyEuropeancountriesismorecomplexthancanberelatedinthisbriefdiscussion.Advisorycommittees,today,influencerulemakingandlawmakingintandemwithamorerecentprocessofpublicconsultation,opentoall.Thisprocess,however,isnotpluralist in theAmericansensebecause itdoesnot incorporate the formalequalityofU.S.notice-and-commentrulemaking.Rather,inpublicconsultations,governmentactorsarevestedwithconsiderablediscretiononwhetherandhowtoconsultandjudicialenforcementofconsultationrightsisminimalornon-existent.


30

two monopolist private bodies—the International Organization for Standardization and the

InternationalElectrotechnicalCommission—andthe twoorganizationsare legallydesignedto

achieve balanced territorial representation of industry groups, and to a lesser extent other

societalgroups(BütheandMattli,2011).Toconcludewithregulatoryenforcement:Asnoted

earlier,eventhoughEuropeanregulatorysystemsrelylargelyonpublicenforcement,theyalso

allowtheprivatebeneficiariesofregulatoryschemestosuecorporateoffendersincourt.Private

litigantsinEurope,however,lookverydifferentfromclassactionrepresentativesintheUnited

States.Inmanycases,onlyspecificcivilsocietyassociationsareallowedtosue,basedontheir

membershipnumbers,organizationalhistory,orothercharacteristics. Suchrequirementsare

designed to guarantee that private associations are representative of consumers, workers,

environmentalinterests,orotherclassesofregulatorybeneficiaries(Hensler,thisvolume).11

Sofar,thediscussionhasbeenlimitedtoEuropeandtheUnitedStates.Theanalysisof

public–private relations in the law of newer democracies is more complex. Before

democratization,thecountriesofLatinAmericawereconsideredinthepoliticalscienceliterature

asbelongingtothecategoryof“statecorporatism.”Thiswasaformofinterestrepresentation

inwhich,asinneo-corporatism,relativelyfewinterestgroupsandtheirpeakassociationswere

allowed a prominent role in policymaking, but in which, unlike neo-corporatism, the

authoritarian state tightly controlled the existence and operation of such peak associations

(Adams,2004).Thefunctionofinterestgroupsinstatecorporatismwasalsosomewhatdifferent

fromneo-corporatism:lessthanrepresentingimportantmarketandcivilsocietyinterestsinthe

regulatoryprocess, theyservedasaconduit inthecorruptandclientelisticnetworksthrough

which public jobs and benefits were exchanged in return for popular support of the regime

(Vellinga,2004).Priortothepluralizationofelectoralpolitics,EastAsiancountrieswerebelieved

torepresentyetanotherformofinterestgroupparticipationinstatepolicymaking:informaland

highlyone-sidedinvolvementofpowerfulindustrygroupsinthepolicymakingactivitiesofstrong

bureaucracies(BhattandKim,2000;Ohnesorge,thisvolume).

11Aswithrulemaking,thelawinEuropeonprivateregulatoryenforcementhasgraduallybecomemoreexpansive,and now contemplates a wider set of private actors. However, it still tends to vet those private actors moresystematicallythaninthepluralistAmericancase(Hensler,thisvolume).


31

Sincedemocratization,thesepoliticalandlegalarrangementsarebreakingdown.Itisfar

fromclear,however,whatistakingtheirplace.Ontheonehand,atleastinmostLatinAmerican

systems, the organization of private groups within society has pluralized immensely with

democratizationandtheemergenceofavibrantcivilsocietysector(Avritzer,2002;Risley,2015).

Ontheotherhand,thequestionofhowthelawgovernsprivateaccesstopublicrulemakingand

whether, overall, that law is informedby a competitiveormediated, i.e., balanced, visionof

state–societyrelationsremainsanopenone.Theevidenceismixed.Legalrequirementssimilar

topluralist,Americanrulemakingprocedurehaverecentlybeenadopted inanumberofEast

Asianjurisdictions, includingKorea,Taiwan,andJapan(Baum,2011;Ohnesorge,thisvolume),

butwithouttheaggressivejudicialreviewcharacteristicoftheAmericansystem(HuangandLaw,

this volume).The same is true for theverydifferent, LatinAmericancasesofVenezuela, the

DominicanRepublic,Mexico,andBrazil (forcertain independentagencies).Atthesametime,

manyLatinAmericancountries,includingBrazil,Colombia,Chile,CostaRica,andMexicooperate

withpublic–privateconsultativecouncils,typicallyidentifiedwithneo-corporatism,onwhichthe

majorbusinessassociationsarerepresented,aswellas,inafewcases,laborandotherorganized

socialgroups (Schneider,2010;Kröger,2012;PatroniandFelder,2012).TheEastAsiancases

mentionedearlieralsocontinue tooperatewith the institutionalizedconsultationof industry

actors,throughlegallyestablishedadvisorycouncilswhichareattachedtodifferentgovernment

ministriesandwhichareresponsiblefordifferenttypesof issuesandpolicyareas(Schneider,

2010).Whatbalancewillbestruckbetweenthesetwoformsofpublic–privaterelationsremains

tobeseen.

TableI.3summarizespluralismandneo-corporatismandhowtheyimpactthedifferent

elementsoflawandregulation.

[TableI.3here]

Lest these classifications appear too abstract to afford analytical traction on the

commonalities and diversities that mark the global regulatory process, let us return to the

examplesof consumer trackingandparabens.Theparadigmsofpublic laware likely tohave

profound consequences for the path taken by consumer-tracking regulation throughout the


32

world. Internet companies and privacy advocates can expect judicial review of any future

consumer-trackingrulestooperatequitedifferentlydependingonthejurisdictioninwhichthey

find themselves: in rule-by-law systems like Japan, a limited checking that theadministrative

regulationadherestotheletteroftheparliamentarystatute;intheEuropeanfundamentalrights

model,aroughbalancingtestinvolvingtherightstoprivacy,speech,andeconomicactivity;in

Americanballot-boxdemocracy,ameticuloussiftingoftheadministrativerecordtomakesure

thattheagencyrespondedtoalltheobjectionsenteredbytherulemakingparticipants;andin

LatinAmericantransformativedemocracies,affirmativeguidanceonhowtopromoteboththe

righttoprivacyandmarketfreedom.Regulatoryoversightofanyfutureconsumer-trackingrules

willalsodiffer:reviewbyindependentprivacycommissionsinEuropeandLatinAmerica;only

moretraditionalformsofoversight,suchasimpactassessmentbytheexecutivebranchinthe

UnitedStates;andrelativelylittleoversightinJapan.Althoughitisdifficulttoanticipatepolicy

outcomes, the regulatory resultsmay also verywell differ. Because regulatory problems like

consumertracking—andaccesstomedicines,discriminationintheworkplace,andmanyother

regulatoryissues—piteconomicrightsagainstothertypesofrights,thevariouselementsofthe

regulatoryprocessarelikelytoproducemorerestrictiverulesinEuropeandLatinAmericathan

inJapanandtheUnitedStates.

The implications of themodels of public–private relations can be illustratedwith the

parabensexample.Intheglobaldebateoverparabenssafety,thedividebetweenpluralismand

neo-corporatism points to the key venues where the regulatory battle is being fought:

administrative rulemaking procedure in the United States versus expert committees with

stakeholder representation in the European Union. Bureaucrats in the United States are

gatheringscientificandeconomicdataonparabensfromavarietyofindustrygroups,research

institutions,andconsumeractivistswithaneyetosurvivingacontentiousrulemakingprocedure.

Europeancivil servants,bycontrast,aredrawingon input fromtheircommitteesofscientific

experts, industry representatives, and civil society groups, as well as less formal types of

stakeholderconsultation,todeterminethedangersofparabensandtheappropriateregulatory

response.Itispossiblethatthesedifferenceswillaffectnotonlytheregulatoryprocessbutalso

regulatory outcomes: according to some accounts, pluralist rulemaking procedure is biased


33

towards high-stakes business actors (Wagner, this volume), and therefore restrictions on

parabensincosmeticsandotherproducts,currentlylessonerousintheUnitedStates,maystay

thatway.

Convergence:legaltransplantsanddiffusion

Althoughtherearemanypossiblewaysoftheorizingandexplaininglegalconvergence,thefield

ofcomparativelawhasfocusedononelineoftheorybuildinginparticular—transplants,asthe

phenomenonisknownincomparativelaw(Watson,1974),ordiffusion,asitisknowninarelated

avenueofinquiryinthesocialsciences(Weyland,2006;Dobbin,Simmons,andGarrett,2007).12

Research in the law and social sciences shares the common premise that legal systems are

interdependentandthatwhenconvergenceisobserveditcanbeexplained,atleastinpart,by

the decision of legal and political actors in one jurisdiction to follow prior developments in

another jurisdiction (Graziadei, 2008; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, 2008). In linewith this

premise, scholarship in both traditions generally employs a sequential conceptual schemeof

transferand reception (Short, thisvolume).At the frontend,under the influenceofexternal

forces, domestic elites make formal legal commitments by entering into international

agreements, enacting national laws, or adopting specific types of legal doctrines and

jurisprudence.Atthebackend,entrenchedsocial,legal,andpoliticalactorsmobilizeinfavorof

oragainstthetransplantedlaw,whichiseitherimplemented,modified,orsidelined.

Eventhoughtheysharecommonelements,researchinthelawandthesocialscienceson

convergence has also been driven by distinctive empirical and theoretical concerns. In

comparativelaw,thefocushasbeenoncorefigureswithinthelegalestablishment―judgesand

legalscholars―andhowtheyhavedrawnonforeignlegalconceptstodevelopcentral,generally

privatelaw,elementsofnationallegalsystems(Watson,1974;Ajani,1995;Graziadei,2003).In

otherwords,theobjectofanalysishasgenerallybeencommonlawdoctrines(adoptedbycourts)

andcivil lawcodes(draftedby legalcommissionsandlegislaturesandinterpretedbyscholars

12Foramorethoroughreviewoftheliterature,seeJodiShort’scontributiontothisvolume.


34

andcourts)andhowtheircontenthasbeeninspiredbyforeignlegalsources.Theexplanation

forthistendencytoborrowturnsontheauthorityofforeignlawintheeyesoflegalelitesand

therelativeinsulationoflegalelites,whenformulatingtherulesthatgoverndisputes,fromthe

conflicts and scrutiny of ordinary politics. That foreign authority, in turn, is linked to

characteristics such as historical vintage and completeness, for example Roman law, or

representativeness, for example regional or worldwide trends reflecting a common law of

mankind(Watson,1974:52,99;Monateri,1997–1998).

Turningtoreception,comparativescholarshavefocusednotsomuchontheempirical

operationoflegaltransplantsbutonthebroadernormativeissueofwhether,inlightofthedeep-

rooted,complexstructuresofthelawandthesymbioticrelationshipbetweenculturalidentity

and law, the transplant phenomenon is a desirable one (Nelken, 2003; Twining, 2005). In

traditional comparative scholarship, themost foundational lawof receiving jurisdictions, and

therefore themost vulnerable to thedisruptivepotential of transplants, is the structure and

content of private law: whether a system is common law or civil law, and within civil law

countries, the typeof code tradition towhich it belongs. The fear is that legal concepts and

principlesdrawnfromonesystemmaynotworkintheother.Thefieldhastraditionallybeen

dividedintotwocamps:betweenthosewhotakearelativelysanguineviewoftransplantsand

trustthattheborrowedconceptswillbemadetoworkbylegalelites,althoughofteninways

thatdepartfromtheiruseinthejurisdictionoforigin(Watson,1974);andthosewhopointto

thepotentialfortransplantstodisrupt,andpossiblyundermine,thefunctioningofthelawinthe

receivingjurisdiction(Allison,1996;Legrand,1997;Teubner,1998).Inasomewhatseparateline

of research, focused specifically on western legal transplants in developing countries,

comparativescholarshavebroughttolightthemanyabsurdcasesinwhichtransplantedlawis

sofarremovedfromsocialpracticesandlocalcustomsthatitfailstotakeholdandissidelined

byothertypesofrulesandformsofdisputeresolution(Gillespie,2006).

Incontrastwithcomparativelaw,thetypicalobjectofanalysisinthesocialsciencesisa

specifictypeofregulatorypolicyimposedbythestate,togetherwiththelawunderpinningthat

policy, such as environmental law (Holzinger, Knill, and Sommerer, 2008), corporate taxation


35

(Cao,2010),ortheprivatizationofretirementschemes(Weyland,2006).Thedomesticactors

responsible for policy adoption are generally not core legal elitesbutbureaucracies, political

executives,andlegislaturesthatdrawonexternalsources,includinginternationalorganizations,

internationalcapitalorcivilsocietyactors,andtheexperienceofforeigncountries.Significant

theoreticaleffortshavebeenmadetoidentifycompetingexplanationsanddifferentmechanisms

forpolicydiffusion(MaggettiandGilardi,2015).Inoneprominentformulation,therearefour

possible causalmechanisms: coercionexertedbypowerful actors suchaswealthy statesand

internationalorganizations;competitionamongstatesforforeigninvestmentandglobalmarket

share; rational learning from the policy experiences of other jurisdictions; and emulation of

policies thatareperceivedasnormativelysuperiorbecauseof theirprioradoptionbycertain

leaderjurisdictionsorexpertnetworks(Simmons,Dobbin,andGarrett,2008).

Thereisalsosocialscientificresearchonthedomesticreceptionofthelegalcommitments

madebypolicyelites.Althoughthis literatureissomewhatdifficulttodistill,perhapsbecause

thenotionofreceptioncoversavarietyofpoliticalandsocialprocessesthatmustoccurbefore

formallawcanexerciserealtractionoverhumanbehavior,onethemedoestendtoemerge―fit.

Ifasetof legalrules, institutions,ordoctrines fits thedomestic legalenvironment, it ismore

likelytotakeholdandregulatedisputesamongpoliticalandsocialactorsratherthanbeconfined

tothepaperofinternationalagreements,domesticstatutebooks,andsporadiccourtopinions.

Anumberofdifferentelementsoffithavebeenidentified:theextentofoverlapbetweenexisting

administrative structures and the newones required by the diffused policy (Knill, 2001); the

existenceofdomestic legalactorssuchashumanrightsNGOs(Koh,1997)andcorporate law

firms(HallidayandCarruthers,2009)withaconcreteinterestinmobilizingthetransplantedlaw;

andtheaccessibilityandcomprehensibilityofthetransplantedlawtomembersofthedomestic

legalcommunitybyvirtueofasharedlegalhistorybetweenthecountryoforiginandthecountry

ofreception(Berkowitz,Pistor,andRichard,2003).

Asafirstcut,thetheoriesdevelopedincomparativelawandthesocialsciencescanhelp

understandhowlawtravelsintheglobalregulatoryprocess.Rulesonparabensandconsumer

trackingcansometimesmigratebetweenjurisdictions,andthepoliticsexploredinthelegaland


36

socialscientific literaturepointtopossibleexplanationsforwhenandwhy.Atthesametime,

both sets of literature have largely overlooked the coreof regulatory law—not the technical

substanceofparabensandconsumer-trackingregulationbut the fundamentalprocedureand

principles of how that regulation ismade, overseen, enforced, and reviewed. The failure to

addresshead-onthisregulatorylawhaslimitedtheabilityoftheexistingtheoriestoexplainand

evaluatejurisdictionalconvergenceandrequiresareassessmentofthetheories.13

Beginwiththetransferoflaw.Asexplainedearlier,transferisexplainedincomparative

lawasafunctionoftheperceivedauthorityoftheexternalsourceoflawandinthesocialsciences

asaproductofoneoffour,alternativemechanisms―coercion,competition,rationallearning,

and emulation. In both research traditions, the role of power is fairly limited. In the legal

literature, power is largely discarded as amotive for contemporary transplants because it is

associatedwiththemilitaryforceofnineteenth-andtwentieth-centurycolonization(Graziadei,

2008).Inthesocialsciencesliterature,theconceptofpoweriscentraltothediffusionmechanism

of coercion, which is linked to the express use of economic leverage by international

organizations and wealthy countries to achieve policy change in dependent countries. The

empiricalworkonthecausesofdiffusion,however,hasproducedscantevidenceofcoercion

(Garrett, Dobbin, and Simmons, 2008: 346) and has come to emphasize the other three

mechanisms(Gilardi,2010;MaggettiandGilardi,2015).

The area of law covered by the field of comparative law and regulation raises the

possibilitythatpowermayplayamorecentralroleinexplaininglegaltransferthaniscurrently

acknowledgedinthetransplantanddiffusionliterature.Ontheonehand,theactorsinvolvedin

theglobalregulatoryprocessarenotonly,orevenprimarily,thejudges,legislators,andscholars

of legal transplant theory, sitting in their domestic chambers and deliberately and

opportunistically borrowing from foreign legal systems. They are also bureaucrats and

government officials engaged in ongoing negotiations in a variety of international regulatory

committees (Hofmann, this volume; Kelemen, this volume; Shaffer, this volume). These

13Inthisvolume,JodiShortexposesanotherweaknessofthetransplantanddiffusionliteratureinthecontextoftheglobalregulatoryprocess:thefailuretotakeseriouslythediffusionofprivateregulationandtoanalyzehowprivateactors,softlaw,andnon-statemechanismsshaperegulatorylawacrossmultiplejurisdictions.


37

international political processes produce a constant stream of harmonized legal rules, yet

national participation requires significant resources, and therefore it is highly plausible that

power differentials among states are reflected in the rules which are then transferred to

domestic jurisdictions (e.g., Gadinis, 2015). On the other hand, in contrast with the social

scientificliterature,thelawthatisbeingtransferrednotonlyinvolvesthetechnicalintricaciesof

specificregulatorypolicies,butalsothefundamentallawoftheregulatoryfunction—howpolicy

ismade,overseen,enforced,andreviewed.Toexercisecloutonsuchissues,governmentofficials

must be able to draw on an elaborate doctrinal apparatus, which in turn requires a well-

developedlegalestablishment,whichinturnrequiressignificantnationalwealthandpower.As

a result, it canbequitedifficult todisentangle the rational learningoremulation inspiredby

certainleadjurisdictionsfromtheunderlyingconditionofnationalwealthandpower(Dobbin,

Simmons,andGarrett,2007:455–57).Ifitisnotpossibletodevelopreliable,testableindicators

thatcandistinguishamongthesedifferentmechanisms,then,atleastforcertainareasoflegal

diffusion,categoriesotherthanpowerandcoercionmaynotbeparticularlyhelpful.Notonlydo

such categories undermine thepurposesof collective knowledgebuilding, but they generate

significantnormativeconfusion,giventhequitedifferentvalenceofcoercionvis-à-visrational

learningandemulation.

Nowconsiderreception.Thepubliclawandpublic–privateclassificationsadvancedinthe

previoussectionpointtoimportantculturalandstructuraldifferencesthathavebeenignoredin

comparativelawandthesocialsciences.Whatparadigmofpubliclaworwhichmodelofpublic–

private relations dominates in the receiving jurisdiction may operate as a source of fit and

contribute to theempirical investigationofdiffusion. To illustrate, theUnitedStates and the

European Union may forge agreement on regulatory policies such as consumer privacy or

chemicalssafety.Butaslongasthetwojurisdictionssubscribetodissimilarparadigmsofpublic

law and public–private relations, those policies will likely operate very differently in their

respective jurisdictions.More specific issues suchas consumer tracking andparabenswill be

decided through different procedures and public institutions and, in all likelihood, the two

jurisdictionswillgenerateastreamofregulationthatwillcontinuetodivergeonthesubstance.


38

Atthesametime,anypoliticalattempttoalterthisobstacletoconvergence—thebasic

regulatorylawofreceivingjurisdictions—triggersthenormativedebatesofthecomparativelaw

literature. Asalreadymentioned, transplanttheory focuses largelyonprivate law,thedivide

betweenthecommonlawandthecivillaw,andthepotentialproblemsgeneratedbyintroducing

foreignelements,drawnfromacrossthecivillaw–commonlawdivide,intowhatarebelievedto

be conceptually intricate, and culturally important, systems of legal authority. Research in

comparativelawandregulationshiftsattentiontothepubliclawsphereandprovidesevidence

ofotherculturallyandtheoreticallysignificantdifferencesinsystemsoflawandlegalauthority.

The countries that fall into one or the other category, as those which belong to either the

commonlaworcivillawtradition,donotnecessarilyrepresentradicallydifferentpoliticaland

socialworlds.Theirlaw,however,isbasedondifferenthistoricalandculturalpremisesastohow

toorganize regulatorygovernance. Asdomestic systemsof regulatory law increasinglycome

underpressuretoharmonizeandglobalize,itbearskeepinginmindthehistoricaltraditionsand

theoreticalcommitmentsthatunderpinthat law.Themostrecentgenerationof international

tradeandinvestmentagreements,someofwhicharecoveredinthisvolume(Shaffer;Yackee),

containselementsdesignedeithertoharmonizeregulatorylaw,throughcommonstandardsfor

rulemakingprocedureandotherelementsofregulatorylaw,ortosidelineit,withinternational

disputesettlementmechanismsthatreplacejudicialreviewinnationalcourts.Wetakenosides

inthenormativedebateonthedesirabilityoftransplants,whichisbestconductedforspecific

countriesandspecificareasofregulatorylaw.Whatiscrucialtonote,however,isthatregulatory

law is not simply amorassof technical rulesbut rather is part of a rich traditionof lawand

democracy, and therefore it is appropriate to use the analytical framework of transplants in

comparativelawtoevaluatepoliticaleffortsattransformation.14

Last,thefieldofcomparativelawandregulationpointstoanimportantsitefortransfer

and reception that has been overlooked in the existing literature: international jurisdictions

(Bignami,2013:1321–26). Incomparative lawandthesocialsciences, theprimarytarget for

transplantsisthenationstate.Internationaljurisdictionsareinterestingonlytotheextentthat

14SeeNicola(2015)foradiscussionofthenormativestakesinvolvedinthenegotiationsontheTransatlanticTradeInvestmentPartnership,oneofthemostimportanteffortsatregulatoryharmonizationtodate.


39

theyserveasaconduitfortransferringregulatorypoliciestonationstates.Butagain,regulatory

procedures, principles, and institutions are also transplanted and, unlike the substance of

regulatorypolicywhichgenerallybitesonlyatthenationallevel,thistypeoflawcangovernthe

regulatory function in both national and international jurisdictions. Since domestic and

international jurisdictions interact in the global regulatory process, it is quite possible that

regulatory lawmigrates between both types of jurisdictions. To illustrate with international

examplesfromthisvolume, itmightbethatthelawthatgovernsrulemakingbyinternational

financialnetworks (Zaring),oversightbyWTOcommittees (Shaffer),enforcement throughEU

compositeprocedures(Hofmann),anddisputeresolutionbyinternationalinvestmenttribunals

(Yackee) is borrowed from domestic jurisdictions.15 In other words, transplants should be

conceptualized as a single process that can operate inmultiple directions: law canmigrate

sideways, fromonecountryorgroupofcountries toanother,downwards, from international

systemstothenationallevel,andupwards,fromnationalgovernmentstothebasicoperating

rules of international jurisdictions. By influencing the legal procedures and principles of

internationalsystems,governmentofficials,firms,andothertypesofactorscanexpecttoshape

regulatoryoutputoverthelongrun(cf.FarberandO’Connell,2010)andthereforetheincentive

to transfer regulatory law operates sideward, downward, and upward, to international

jurisdictions.

Legalprescriptionbasedoncomparison:thefunctionalmethod

Whenregulatoryoperatorsnavigatethemyriad jurisdictions involved intheglobal regulatory

process, they do not simply mobilize the positive law as it stands. They make normative

argumentsastowhatthelawshouldbe.Inaregulatoryprocessmarkedbyinterdependenceand

globalization,legalcomparisonisgenerallyanimportant,ifnotthedominant,argumentusedto

justifydomesticlawreformandnewinternationallegalinstruments.Theresorttocomparisonis

apervasiverhetoricaldevice,eventhoughthatcomparisonoftenincludesonlytheregulatory

15DavidZaringandJasonYackeespecificallyconsiderthishypothesis.However,thefluidinstitutionalcontextandthecurrentstateoftheliteraturepreventthemfromcomingtoanyfirmconclusions.


40

actor’shomejurisdictionandthelawofasecondjurisdictionthatisallegedlysuperiororinferior

tothatofthehomejurisdiction.

Althoughtheuseofcomparisonasanargumentforlawreformmayseemself-evident,

thetechniquesnecessarytounderstandthelawofdifferentcountriesandtomakeprincipled

recommendationsbasedonthatlawarefarlessso.Sincethecodificationsofthenineteenth

century,thecategoriesandconceptsofthelawhavedevelopedwithintheconfinesofthenation

state. Because of these historical and cultural particularities, it can be difficult for legal and

politicalactors,schooledinthelawofonesovereign,totravelintellectuallytotheterritoryand

lawofanothersovereign.Therearemanypossiblewaysinwhichtheseborderscanbeovercome

andcomparativeanalysiscanbeusedinsupportoflawreformprojects.

The academic discipline of comparative law has elaborated a principled approach to

comparingintheserviceofevaluatingandprescribinglaw—thefunctionalmethod.Sincethe

earlytwentiethcentury,thedisciplineofcomparativelawhasbeenprofoundlyshapedbythe

prescriptivemission,albeitalmostexclusivelyintheprivatelawdomain(Zweigert,1951;David,

1955;Farnsworth,2008;Zimmermann,2009).Becausecommercewasglobal,therewasareal

politicaldemandforthecomparativestudyofcontractlawthatcouldservetoimprovenational

law and, even more important, could create the harmonized, international law that would

facilitate global commerce. Some of the oldest and most prominent institutions that fund

comparativeworkarededicatedtotheinternationalunificationofcontractlaw―tonamebuta

few,theInternationalInstitutefortheUnificationofPrivateLaw,theUnitedNationsCommission

onInternationalTradeLaw,theCommissiononEuropeanContractLaw,andtheStudyGroupon

aEuropeanCivilCode(Basedow,2014).

Todotheprescriptivework,thecomparativelawdisciplinedevelopedaseriesof legal

techniques,knowncollectivelyasthefunctionalmethod.Althoughtherearedifferenttypesof

organizationsandpoliticalprojectsthatcandrawoncomparativeanalysistomakenewlaw,the

mostprominenttraditionallyhavebeendomesticlegislatures,internationaltreatynegotiators,

andinternationalorganizations.Andalthoughtheaimwassometimessimplytoimprovethelaw,

intheoverwhelmingmajorityofcasestheambitionwasalsotocreateuniformlaw,onthetheory


41

thatitwouldfacilitatecommercialexchangeandhumanrelationsglobally.Withthefunctional

method,thishighlyideologicalandambitiousmissionofcreatinguniformlawwasconvertedinto

aseriesofroutinesteps:establishacommonproblem,sharedbymultiplejurisdictions,suchas

theformationofcontracts;identifythelegalsolutionstothatproblemthatexistineachofthe

jurisdictions; and assess the degree of similarity or difference that marks the various legal

solutions (Zweigert, 1951; David, 1955; Schlesinger, 1968; Zweigert and Kötz, 1998). If the

comparative analysis revealed a common solution, then, especially in the context of law

unification, thiswas the legal solutiontoberecommendedto lawmakers (ZweigertandKötz,

1998:24).Ifitwasnotpossibletofindacommonapproach,orifthegoalwasstrictlylimitedto

improvingdomesticlaw,thenthedifferentsolutionswereevaluatedtounderstandwhatwasthe

“better”lawtoberecommendedtolawmakers(ZweigertandKötz,1998:47).Toidentifyand

assessthelawofthevariousjurisdictions,suchpoliticallydrivencomparativeprojectsgenerally

limitedthemselvestothelawonthebooks,notthelawinaction,andthereforetheyreliedon

themethodologiesinternaltothelegaldisciplineratherthantheempiricalmethodologiesofthe

social sciences. This approach to comparative research has been very powerful in the legal

academy. It has profoundly influenced the contribution that has been made by scholars of

comparativelawtopoliticalprojectsofdomesticlawreformandinternationallawunification.

With the globalization of the regulatory process, the functional method of private

comparative law can be used equally productively in the domain of public law. The use of

comparison, as a rhetorical device in support of legal prescription, has become increasingly

prominent intheareaofregulatory law(e.g.,Linos,2013).The legaltechniquesandresearch

approachofthefunctionalmethodshouldbeusedtoassess,critique,andimprovecomparative

argumentintheglobalregulatoryprocess.Atthesametime,itisimportanttorecognizethatthe

functionalmethodhasanumberofflaws,whichareparticularlystarkintheareaofregulatory

law,andwhichrequiresignificantmethodologicalinnovation.Becausethefunctionalmethodis

closely associatedwith the political project of international legal harmonization, it is heavily

biasedtowardfindingsimilarity(Hill,1989;Michaels,2008).Researchersareinstructedthat,in

mostcases,theforeign jurisdictionwillcontaina legalsolutiontotheproblemandthateven

thoughthedoctrinalnicetiesofthelegalsolutionmightvary,thepracticalendresult—whowins


42

andwholoseswhenthelegalsolutionisapplied—willgenerallybethesame(ZweigertandKötz,

1998:39-40).Acommonlegalsolution,particularlyintheinternationalarena,isbothnormatively

andpoliticallypreferable:becauseitiscommon,itcarriesthemoralstatusofuniversalornatural

law, and it circumvents the potentially contentious political debates on which, among the

differentlaws,topickasthesingle,harmonizedlaw(Örücü,2004).Thedesiredresultofsimilarity

canshapethemethodusedtoframequestions,designresearch,anddrawconclusions.Forthe

outcometodrivetheresearchdesignisobviouslytroublesomefromascholarlyperspectivebut

whencomparativeresearchissocloselyconnectedtopolitics,thebiastowardsimilarityhasthe

addedconsequenceoflegitimizingtheprojectoflawunificationandminimizingtheimplications

oflegalchange.

Tobesure,thefunctionalmethoddoesacknowledgethatonsomecommonproblems,

there are significant differences in legal solutions among jurisdictions. It does not, however,

providesufficientintellectualtoolsforanalyzingthedifferentsolutionsandcomingtoprincipled

conclusionsastowhichonemakesforthe“better”law(Hill,1989;Michaels,2008).Twocriteria

that are oftenmentioned are doctrinal completeness and legal certainty (Zweigert andKötz,

1998),butthathardlyexhauststhelistofattributesthatmakelawdesirable.Inaddition,until

recently, the discipline of comparative law has made relatively little effort to use empirical

methodologies to evaluate how the law operates in society (Hirschl, 2005; Spamann, 2015).

Empiricalmethodologiesarecloselytiedtothelogicallypriorstepofdeterminingthenormative

criteriathatshouldbeusedtoevaluatethelawandselectthebetterlaw.Manylawshave,on

theirface,desirablepurposeswhicharenotachievedinpracticeanditisonlythroughempirical

investigationthatitispossibletomeasurethegapbetweennormativeambitionsandpractical

consequences.

Althoughtheseshortcomingsofthefunctionalmethodhavebeennotedelsewhere,they

areparticularlyacuteinthedomainofcomparativelawandregulation.Whileitmighthavebeen

possible,atonetime,tominimizethepoliticalstakesinareasofprivatelawlikecontracts,that

iscertainlynotthecaseinanarealikeregulatorylaw.When,aswithregulatorylaw,nationallaw

isinformedbytheoreticallyandculturallyimportantcommitmentstothelegitimateorganization


43

ofmarketsanddemocracy,thepresumptionshouldnotbesimilarityoflegalsolutions.Especially

inlightofthepoliticalconsequencesofinternationallawunificationandharmonizedregulatory

law,comparativeresearchshouldnotbedesignedtogiveafalseimpressionofsimilarity.Bythe

sametoken,ifdifferenceisrevealed,itiscrucialtobeexplicitastowhatmakesforbetterlaw

andwhy.Toreturnagaintotheexampleofcontractlaw,itisatleastplausibletotakean“Iknow

itwhenIseeit”approachtorecognizingthebetterlaw:sinceoneofthecommonpurposesof

contract law is to facilitate private transactions, it may be possible to use, without much

justification,normativecriteriasuchasclarityandsimplicitytoevaluatethatlaw.Inthedomain

of law and regulation, by contrast, the different theories of public law and public–private

relations caution against assuming agreement on the normative criteria for assessing law.

Instead,itisnecessarytoexplicitlyidentifyandjustifywhysomeinstitutions,procedures,and

principlesarebetterthanothers.

Tobe complete, comparative analysis should also employ empiricalmethods (Hirschl,

2014).Oncethenormativeattributesofbetterlawaresingledout,itisimportanttoassessthose

qualitiesbasednotonlyonthestatedpurposesofthelawbutalsoonitsempiricaloperation.It

is certainly true that empirical research can be time consuming and difficult and that it is

importanttosetrealisticexpectationsforresearchincomparativelaw,especiallyinthecaseof

researchdrivenbytheimmediateneedsoflawreformprojects(Palmer,2005:263-64;Basedow,

2014:857).Inmanycases,however,therelativemeritsofspecifictypesofregulatorylawhave

attractedsustainedattentionfromlegalscholars,beyondtheimperativesofthelatestreform

project or policy initiative. Some of that scholarly effort can fruitfully be dedicated to the

empiricalinvestigationoftheimpactoflawonregulatorypoliticsandpolicies.

Since discussions of research approaches and methodologies can be quite slippery

without concreteexamples, it isworthwhile illustratingwithexamples fromthisvolume.The

bookcontains twochaptersdedicated toassessingelementsofAmericanregulatory lawthat

havebeenpromotedasthebenchmark,i.e.,thebetterlaw,forinternationallegalharmonization

anddomesticlawreform:theprocedurethatgovernsadministrativerulemakingandprivateclass

actionsasadeviceforregulatoryenforcement.


44

ThechapterbyWendyWagnerconsidersU.S.rulemakingprocedure.Asexplainedearlier,

sincenotice-and-commentrulemakingprovidesforformalequalityamongprivategroupsinthe

publicrulemakingprocess, it representsthepluralistcategoryofpublic–privaterelations. It is

oftenclaimedtobethebetterlaw,ascomparedwithneo-corporatistandotherformsofprivate

participation, precisely because of the extensive, and formally equal, participation that is

guaranteed in administrative rulemaking. Wagner subjects this claim to thorough empirical

scrutiny,includingalarge-Nstudyofherown.Shefindsthateventhoughtheformallaw,onits

face,isextremelyparticipatory,thelegalincentivescreatedforbureaucratsandmarketactors

canleadtoquitethereverse:high-stakesindustryactorsaregenerallyfavoredoverdiffusepublic

interestgroups.

Deborah Hensler, in her analysis of private class actions, systematically reviews the

normativereasonswhyclassactionsmightbethebetter law―efficientmanagementofmass

claims, ensuring that small-value claims will be compensated (“collective redress”), and

improving the enforcement of economic regulation. The chapter thenmoves to a sustained

investigationoftheenforcementobjective.Itanalyzestheexistingempiricaldataonprivateclass

actions,whichincludeanumberoflarge-NstudiesontheUnitedStatesaswellasoneonIsrael

andoneonAustralia,toassesswhetherprivateclassactionscaneffectivelyenforceeconomic

regulation.Ultimately,Henslerfindsthattheevidenceisinconclusiveandmakesaproposalfor

aclassactiondatabasethatwouldconsiderablyimproveempiricaleffortsgoingforward.Insum,

these two contributions on rulemaking and regulatory enforcement adopt the comparative

methodproposedhere:theyisolatetheattributesoflawthat,intheirview,makeitnormatively

preferableandtheyemployempiricalmethodologiestoassesswhetherthelawfromaparticular

jurisdictionorsetofjurisdictionsdoes,infact,possessthoseattributes.

To conclude this discussion of how prescription based on comparative law should be

conducted,itbearshighlightingthat,aswiththetheorizationgearedatmappinglegalvariation

through classifications and explaining convergence through legal transplants, the field

incorporatesbothdomesticandinternationaljurisdictions.Incontrastwiththeearlierviewof

internationalorganizationsasmerelyinstrumentsofstates,thecontemporaryconsensusisthat,


45

atleastintheregulatorydomain,internationalbodiescanexercisepowerindependentoftheir

memberstatesandthereforeshouldthemselvesbegovernedbylaw(Alvarez,2005;Kingsbury,

2009;Stewart,2014).Inprinciplethereisnoreasonwhy,indevelopingthatlawandregulation,

lessonscannotbelearnedfromotherjurisdictions,includingdomesticjurisdictions(Schill,2010),

and,viceversa,whytheconstructiveprojectsofdomesticjurisdictionscannotbeinformedby

theexperienceofinternationalbodies(Whytock,2004:191–93).Certainlytherearesignificant

differences in institutional and legal context that separate the domestic sphere from the

internationaloneandthatcanmakeitdifficulttodrawlessons.But,asrevealedbythediscussion

ofreceptionintransplanttheory,therearealsoprofounddifferencesthatseparatenationallegal

systemsandthatmakeitdifficultforlawtotravel;yetnormativeanalysisbasedoncross-national

comparisonsisstandardfareinthelegalacademy.Especiallynowthatinternationalregulatory

activityhasintensifiedandagreatvarietyofinternationalbodieshavebeenestablished,ithas

become increasingly difficult to make the intellectual case for separating international from

domestic jurisdictions in comparative research aimed at improving the law. The regulatory

processstretchesacrossnationalandinternationaljurisdictions,asdopoliticaldemandsforlaw

togoverntheregulatoryprocess,andtherigorouscomparisonofregulatorylaw,whereveritis

tobefound,canassistwiththeglobalprojectofconstructinglaw.

[TableI.4here]

Table I.4 summarizes the characteristics of the global regulatory process and the

correspondinglinesoftheoreticalinquirythatarefundamentaltothefieldofcomparativelaw

andregulation.Itbearsrepeatingthathere,asintherestofthischapter,theterm“jurisdiction”

isusedtorefertobothinternationalanddomesticjurisdictions.


46

OVERVIEWOFTHEVOLUME

Thechaptersprovidewide-rangingcoverageofthelawoftheregulatoryfunctionthathasbeen

identifiedasthesubjectmatterofcomparativelawandregulation.Forpurposesofclarity,the

presentationof the lawandtheorganizationof thechaptersmove fromthemost traditional

venue for regulating—public authorities in domestic jurisdictions—to what are considered

relativelynovelregulatoryarenas—privatebodiesandinternationaljurisdictions.Thefollowing

overviewhighlights,foreachchapter,thespecificregulatory lawcovered. Italsoexploresthe

contributionmadebytheindividualchapterstothelinesoftheoreticalanalysis importantfor

understanding the global regulatory process and central to the field of comparative law and

regulation.Torepeat:paradigmsofpubliclawandmodelsofpublic–privaterelationstocapture

jurisdictional differences and commonalities; diffusion and legal transplants to explain

convergenceovertime;andtherevisedfunctionalmethodtoimprovelegalprescriptionbased

oncomparison.Takentogether,thechaptersdemonstratethevalueofestablishingaresearch

agendaandcreatingareservoirofknowledgededicatedtocomparativelawandregulation.

TheRegulatoryStateAcrosstheGlobe

Thefirstsectionofthebooksetsthestagebysurveyingthehistoricaldevelopmentoflawand

theregulatorystateintheUnitedStates,theEuropeanUnion,andEastAsia.SincetheUnited

Statesdidnotexperiencethemassiveexpansionofpublicownershipandindustrialplanningthat

wascommontomanypost-wardemocraciesandhasalwaysreliedextensivelyonregulationto

intervene inmarkets, it is often taken to be one of the first examples of the contemporary

regulatorystate(Levi-Faur,2005;Yeung,2010).Indeed,inAmericanlegalscholarship,theterms

“regulation”and“administrativeagency”areoftenusedinterchangeablywith”administration”

and “bureaucracy,”not as specific andmore recentlyestablished sub-typesof administrative

activity andbureaucraticorganizationas in scholarship focusedonother jurisdictions. Inhis


47

chapter on the United States, Reuel Schiller identifies two important characteristics of the

Americanregulatorystate:theunderdeveloped,“patchwork”organizationandpolicycapacityof

thestate,especiallythefederalstate,andtheoutsizedinfluenceofthejudiciaryandcourt-like

administrativeproceduresondecisionmaking.Schillershowshowthesequalitiesarerelatedto

anAmericanideologyofdistrustofthestate,whichhasitsoriginsintheintroductionofwide

suffragebeforethedevelopmentofacentralstate,andtheobstructiveinstitutionallandscape

offederalism,bicameralism,andlocallyorientedpoliticalparties.Theendresult,heargues,has

beenarelativelyweakregulatorystatewithlowpolicymakingcapacity.

AsexplainedbyR.DanielKelemeninChapter2,theriseoftheregulatorystateinEurope

datestothelate1970s,withmarketprivatization,liberalization,andre-regulationatthenational

level,and,somewhatlater,regulatoryharmonizationattheEUlevel.Turningspecificallytothe

EU,KelemenhighlightsthreeimportantcharacteristicsofEUregulatorygovernance.First,EU

regulationtendstobecopiousandstringent―reflectingthestandardsof“strictregulation”in

memberstatessuchasGermanyandFrance. Secondly,to implementandenforceregulatory

norms, theEUempowersprivate litigantsandcourts—aregulatorystylewhichKelemencalls

“Eurolegalism”—andincreasinglyitalsousesEUagenciestocoordinateandmobilizenetworks

ofnationalregulatoryagencies.Andthirdly,becauseofthelogicoftheglobalregulatoryprocess,

thestrictEUregulationgeneratedinBrusselshasdeeplyinfluencedthepolicychoicesofother

jurisdictions.

ThesectionconcludeswiththeregulatorystateinEastAsia.Torecallbrieflytheearlier

explanationofthefield,ascomparedwithEurope,theriseoftheregulatorystateinEastAsiais

associatedlesswithachangeinwhatstatesdo―regulating―andmorewithachangeinhow

theydoit—inlinewithliberaldemocraticprinciples.AsJohnOhnesorgeexplainsinChapter3,

prior to the late 1980s, countries in East Asiawere conceptualized as developmental states.

Althoughtherewaslittlestateownershipandmostindustrywasinprivatehands,governments

intervenedheavilytodirectinvestmentandproductioninstrategicallyselectedmarketsectors

and tomanage trade and capital relationswith the globalmarket. This industrial policywas

accomplished largely through opaque networks of firms and elite bureaucrats, with little


48

involvementofparliaments,thecourts,orcivilsocietyactorsoutsideofbusiness.Thepolitical

changes of the late 1980s worked significant changes to the institutional dimension of the

administrative state: with democratization (in Taiwan and South Korea) and greater party

competition (Japan), theadministrativeprocesshasbecomemore formaland legalized.With

respecttothecontentofstatepolicymaking,thechangehasbeenlesspronounced:themore

passiveregulatorymodelofsettingrulesforprivatemarketactorsappears,asinthepast,tobe

supplementedbyaheavydoseofinterventionist,state-drivenindustrialpolicy.

Rulemaking

Thesecondsectionturnstorulemakingandoneofthemostvisiblewaysinwhichrulemakingis

shaped by law: the legal procedure that governs public participation when administrative

authorities take the lead. The administrative authorities responsible formaking rules, either

aloneortogetherwiththelegislatureandthepoliticalexecutive,areoftenrequiredbylawto

allowprivatepartiestoparticipate.Thissectioncoversthepluralistandneo-corporatistvariants

ofrulemakingprocedurethatexistintheUnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion.

In Chapter 4, Wendy Wagner analyzes the law and empirical realities of rulemaking

procedureintheUnitedStates.Thisdiscussionisalsorelevantforotherjurisdictionsbecauseof

theeffortsthathavebeenmadetotransplantU.S.law,someofwhicharediscussedinthelast

sectionofthevolume.Thechapterchroniclestheelementsofthepluralistlaw,knownasnotice-

and-commentrulemaking,thatrequireextensiveprivateparticipation, formalequalityamong

theparties,andgovernmentimpartiality.Asexplainedearlier,however,Wagnershowsthatthe

empiricalrealityisquitedifferent:thepluralistlawgoverningrulemakinggeneratesincentives

thatenablehigh-stakesregulatedparties,asopposedtopublicinterestgroupsandsmallmarket

actors,toparticipatemoreintherulemakingprocessandtoexerciseadisproportionateinfluence

over outcomes. The chapter concludes with policy prescriptions, inspired by EU law, for

remedyingtherepresentationalimbalancesinU.S.rulemaking.


49

In Chapter 5, Stijn Smismans turns to the law of rulemaking in the European Union.

Historically,neo-corporatistadvisorycommitteesofindustry,labor,environmental,consumer,

andothersocietalgroupswerethemostimportantformofrulemakingprocedure;stilltoday,

theyarecentraltotheregulatoryprocess,numberingwellovereighthundred.SincetheEU’s

legitimacy crisis of the 1990s, advisory committees have been joined by additional legal

procedures. Someof theseprocedureshavebeen inspiredby theneo-corporatist impulse to

privilegemorerepresentativegroupsinthepolicymakingprocessandothershavebeendesigned

to facilitate full and free competition among all societal actors, more in the pluralist mold.

Smismans concludes that the current rulemaking system should be conceptualized as

“pluralisationwithoutproceduralisation”―expandedopportunitiesforparticipationbyawide

arrayofactorswithoutlegalisticenforcementofproceduralrightsincourt,asischaracteristicof

the American system. Although the EU system suffers from representational imbalances,

SmismansarguesthatthereisnoreasontomovetowardsthemorejudicializedAmericanmodel

inlightoftheempiricalrealitiesdiscussedinWagner’schapter.

Oversight

Althoughpoliticalandbureaucraticoversightcanoccuratanytimeduringtheregulatoryprocess,

thelawofoversighttendstobiteaftertheessentialsoftheruleshavebeendecided.Thesection

beginswithimpactassessment,whichisalegaltoolforevaluatingtheenvironmental,social,and

economicimpactsofgovernmentregulation.AsJonathanWienerandDanielRibeiroexplainin

Chapter 6, there are two common formsof impact assessment today: environmental impact

assessment,whichistriggeredbypublicprojectsandothertypesofgovernmentinitiativesthat

affect the environment; and regulatory impact assessment, which considers both costs and

benefits(generallyeconomic,environmental,andsocial)andisappliedtoalltypesofregulatory

policymaking.BothwereadoptedfirstintheUnitedStatesandhavesincediffusedthroughout

theworld,althoughwithsignificantlydifferentinstitutionalcharacteristics.Theauthorspointto

the proliferation of impact assessments required of regulatory agencies and the many


50

dysfunctionscreatedbytheiroverlappingand inconsistent legalobligations.Toaddressthese

shortcomings,WienerandRibeirocallfor“integration,”namelyasingleapproachthatwouldbe

triggeredbythesametypeofgovernmentaction,consideronesetofimpacts,adoptthesame

analyticalmethods,andemployasinglereviewprocess.

Chapter 7, by BenWorthy, turns to another important form of regulatory oversight:

transparencyand,inparticular,access-to-informationlawsintheUKandIndia.Undertheselaws,

citizenshavearighttotheinformationheldbygovernmentbodieswithinafixedtimeperiod,

enforceablebeforeanindependentbodyandthecourts,andgovernmentauthoritieshaveapro-

activedutytodiscloseinformationtothepublic.Therighttoinformationhasbeentheobjectof

successive waves of diffusion across the globe and therefore represents an ideal area to

investigatetheoriesoftransplantsanddiffusion.Worthy’schapterrevealshowreceptioninthe

UK and India has been shaped by the paradigms of public law developed earlier in this

introduction.Althoughtherearesimilaritiesbetweentheirlaws,theIndianexperiencehasbeen

markedbythetransformativedemocracyparadigm.IncontrastwiththeUK,wherefreedom-of-

informationlegislationwasbutonepieceofalargerpackageofmodernizationreforms,inIndia

itwas framedasa revolutionarymoment thatwould transformacorruptadministrationand

openuppoliticalparticipationtoexcludedsocialandeconomicgroups.Thetrackrecordonthe

groundalsoreflectsthedifferentparadigmsofpubliclaw.IntheUK,awiderangeofcivilsociety

actorsmakeuseofthelaw,includingbusinessandthepress,andimplementationhasbeenfairly

smooth. By contrast, in India the social justice and anti-corruption campaignerswho are the

heaviestusersofthelawroutinelyclashwithafeudalbureaucracyovercompliance.Theconflict

between the bureaucracy and the public has been quite dramatic,with reports of pervasive

intimidationandviolence.

Enforcement


51

Thenextstageoftheregulatoryprocessisenforcement.Thissectionconsiderstwoimportant

types of regulatory law that bite at this stage: the powers and procedures available to

administrativeofficialsandcriminalprosecutorstoenforceregulation;andclassactionlitigation

broughtbytheprivatebeneficiariesofpublicregulatoryschemes.

InChapter8,BenjaminvanRooijconsidersadministrativeandcriminalenforcementin

China.Hefocusesonwhathecallsthe“campaignenforcementstyle,”aninstitutionalandlegal

devicethatinrecentyearshasbeendeployedinawidearrayofpolicyareas,includingintellectual

property,foodsafety,andemploymentandlaborlaw.Enforcementcampaignsaretriggeredby

widelypublicizedepisodesofpolicyfailurethatpromptthepoliticalleadershiptotakeactionand

assert control over the bureaucracy. They involve a radical, brief change in China’s standard

enforcementstyle—laxandcapturedbyindustry—inwhichregulatorsresorttomoreformaland

punitivetactics.InvanRooij’saccount,thecampaignenforcementstyleisaproductoftherule-

by-law paradigm advanced earlier in this introduction: in the Chinese authoritarian system,

enforcement campaigns are designed to establish rational bureaucratic authority, through

enhancedhierarchicalcontrol,andtodemonstrateacommitmenttothe letterofthe law,by

vigorouslyapplyingthelawtoallprivateactors.Atthesametime,enforcementcampaignsalso

representaformofauthoritarianpopulism,deployedtodemonstratestateresponsivenessto

the public and tomaintain the legitimacy of the Communist Party. Van Rooij concludes by

observing the use of similar enforcement campaigns to respond to policy failures and public

outcry in the United States and the Netherlands. The pervasiveness of the phenomenon

underscoresthatthelawofregulatoryenforcementisdrivenasmuchbythetheoreticalconcern

forpolicyeffectivenessasbythepoliticaldesireforpopular legitimacyandauthority,even in

systemsthataffordgreaterprotectionforthefundamentalrightsofdefendants.

Chapter9,byDeborahHensler,analyzesprivateclassactions,aproceduraldevicethat

allowsonepartytocomeforwardandrepresentsimilarlysituatedothers(“theclass”)inlitigation

to obtain relief from regulatory harms. Although class actions now exist in over twenty-five

countries,Henslerrevealstheconsiderabledifferences intheirprecise legalform,whichhave

limitedtheiravailabilityinsomejurisdictionsandhaveinfluencedthetypesofprivateparties


52

thatareallowedtocomeforwardandrepresenttheclass.Asdiscussedabove,Henslerreviews

thesubstantial,butasitturnsout,inconclusiveempiricalevidenceontheeffectivenessofclass

actions,andputsforwardaresearchagendaforimprovingourknowledgeofclassactions.She

alsoarguesthatinviewofthewell-knownfailuresofpublicenforcement,policymakersshould

build“redundancy”intotheirsystemsandcreateandpreservetheprivateenforcementtrackas

acomplementtothepublicone.

JudicialReview

Courtsareomnipresentinregulatorylawbecauseoftheirroleinbothoversightandenforcement

andbecausemuchofthelegalframeworkthatguidestheregulatoryprocesshasbeendeveloped

intheirjurisprudence,notintheformaltextoflegislationandconstitutions.Mostcommonly,

however,courtsinterveneattheendoftheregulatoryprocess,inapplicationsforjudicialreview

oftherulesorindefensesagainstenforcementactions.Thechaptersinthissectionillustratethe

differentparadigmsofpubliclawdevelopedearlierinthisintroduction,whicharemostapparent

indoctrinesofjudicialreview.

In Chapter 10, I analyze the classifications used in the scholarly literature to capture

variation in judicial review of government policymaking in Europe and the United States.

Althoughthesetaxonomiesapplyto judicialreviewoftheadministrativestate ingeneral, the

chapter also draws out their implications for the regulatory function. The earliest, and still

relevant,divideisbetweenjudicialreviewofadministrativeactionbytheordinarycourtsinthe

Englishcommonlawandbyaspecialbody(Conseild’Etat)connectedtotheexecutivebranchin

theFrenchdroitadministratif.Almostacenturyafterthisfirstclassification,RobertKaganand

others drew attention to the contrast between the litigious and formal American system of

policymakingandtheinformalanddiscretionaryEuropeanprocess.Thechapterthenproposes

thefundamentalrightsandballot-boxdemocracyparadigmsofpubliclaw.InEurope,thecourts

employdoctrinessuchasproportionalityandequalitytoprotecteconomicandsocialrightsin


53

governmentpolicymaking;intheUnitedStates,theyimposeextensiveproceduralrequirements

onthebureaucracytopromotepluralisticdemocracywithinpublicadministration.Inlightofthe

potentialfordiffusion,thechapterarguesthatitwillbeimportanttodeveloparesearchagenda

toinvestigateempiricallytheeffectsofthetwoformsofjudicialreviewonsocialandeconomic

policymaking.

InChapter11,Cheng-YiHuangandDavidLawturnto judicial reviewofadministrative

actioninEastAsia.Theyfirstpresenttherule-by-lawparadigmthatwashistoricallydominant,

and continues to figureprominently, in the lawof Japan,Korea, andTaiwan―judicial review

focusedontheformallegalityofwhetheradministrativeactionrespectstheboundariessetdown

bylaw.Thecontributionthenanalyzesthevariablereceptionofthedoctrineofproportionality,

drawn from the fundamental rights model and used by East Asian courts to scrutinize the

substanceofadministrativedeterminations.HuangandLawobservethatproportionalityhashad

considerablymoretractioninKoreaandTaiwanthaninJapanandChina.Partoftheexplanation

for this variation, they suggest, is thepresenceof relativelynewandpowerful constitutional

courts in Korea and Taiwan. These new constitutional courts have sought to establish their

legitimacy by adopting what has emerged as the gold standard for constitutional review

throughouttheworld,namely,proportionality.Atthesametime,eveninKoreaandTaiwan,the

receptionofproportionalityhasnotbeencompletesinceinbothjurisdictionsaseparatesetof

courtshastraditionallybeenresponsibleforreviewingadministrativeaction;thesecourtshave

beenresistanttoproportionalityandhavecontinuedtoadjudicateinthemoldofrulebylaw.

In Chapter 12, Everaldo Lamprea, Lisa Forman, and Audrey R. Chapman analyze the

operation of the transformative democracy paradigm in Colombia, specifically constitutional

reviewof healthcare regulation. Likemany other relatively newdemocracies, the Colombian

Constitution of 1991 contains a comprehensive set of positive social and economic rights,

includingtherighttohealth,andestablishesanexpansivesystemofconstitutionaladjudication,

inwhich it is easy for individuals to bring constitutional complaints (tutela). As the chapter

explains, implementationofColombia’snewhealthcaresystem, introduced inthe1990s,was

extremelyproblematicbecauseoflowadministrativecapacityandthereforepatientsturned,in


54

thehundredsofthousands,tothecourtsbasedontheirconstitutionalrighttohealth.In2008,

theConstitutionalCourtsoughttoaddresssomeofthesystemicfailuresofthehealthcaresystem

(andstemtherisingtideoflitigation)withalandmarkdecision(T-760)thatoutlinedanumberof

structuralreformsforgovernmentpolicymakers.Italsocreatedamonitoringprocess,ledbya

speciallycreatedfollow-uppaneloftheCourt.Overall,thechapter’sassessmentispositive:the

remediesorderedbytheConstitutionalCourtallowedforconsiderablegovernmentdiscretion;

civil society actors were called upon to participate; and the process resulted in concrete

improvements to the healthcare system that very likely would not have been made in the

absenceofconstitutionallawandjudicialreview.

This section concludeswith Chapter 13 by Susan Rose-Ackerman, Stefanie Egidy, and

JamesFowkes.TheyanalyzejudicialreviewintheUnitedStates,Germany,SouthAfrica,andthe

EuropeanUnion, both judicial review of the rules adopted by administrative authorities and

thoseadoptedbylegislativeassemblies.Thechapterarguesinfavorofjudicialreviewdesigned

topromotedemocraticparticipationingeneratingtherules,reflectingtosomeextentU.S.law

foradministrativerulemakingandSouthAfrican lawfor legislativerulemaking.Theanalysis is

heavilyinformedbypositivepoliticaltheory,whichfocusesonthestrategicincentivesofpolitical

actors,and,inthecomparativecontext,onhowthoseincentivesdifferbetweenparliamentary

andpresidentialsystems.Thechapterhighlightshowpoliticalactors inbothtypesofsystems

resistdemocracy-enhancingjudicialreview.Italsoarguesthat,relativetoparliamentarysystems,

judicial review of legislative rulemaking should be somewhat less demanding in the U.S.

presidentialsystembecauseoftheinevitablypiecemealnatureoflegislationwhentheexecutive

branch,i.e.,thePresidentandthebureaucracy,playsarelativelyminorroleinlegislativedrafting.

PrivateRegulationandNewGovernance

Although private bodies have always undertaken regulatory functions, in lieu of public

institutions,theyhavebecomemoreimportantsincethe1990swiththegrowingpopularityof


55

newgovernanceregulatorytechniques.Incontrastwiththeclassicmodelofprescriptiverules

enforcedbygovernmentagencies,newgovernancetoolsaregenerallyhighlyflexibleandvest

significantinitiativeandpowerinprivateactors.Thisvolumeconsidersthreeprominentforms

ofnewgovernance—industrystandardsetting,performance-basedregulation,andprivatecodes

of conduct—which empower three categories of business actors—industry associations,

individual firms, and multinational corporations. The contributions also highlight different

aspects of the regulatory process that can be handled by private bodies: rulemaking in the

chaptersonstandardsettingandperformance-basedregulationandenforcementinthechapter

onprivatecodesofconduct.

In Chapter 14, Peter Strauss chronicles the extensive reliance, in both U.S. and EU

regulation,ontheprivatetechnicalstandardssetbyindustryassociations.Straussreviewssome

ofthedifferences,alongthelinesoftheneo-corporatistandpluralistmodels,thatseparatehow

private industry associations are regulated in the EU and the U.S. The bulk of the chapter

addressesthetroublesomepractice,inU.S.regulation,ofincorporatingbyreference,andmaking

binding,thetechnicalstandardssetbyindustryorganizations,eventhoughthosestandardsare

protectedbycopyrightandmustbepurchasedfromtherelevantindustryorganization.Thislack

oftransparency,or“secretlaw”asStrausscallsit,generatessignificantaccountabilityproblems

and,forapossiblefix,thechapterlookstotheEU.Therethelawrequiresthatthe“essential

requirements” of standards be stated on the face of the regulation and industry technical

standardsareconsideredsoft,notbinding,law,meaningthatcompliancewithsuchstandardsis

butonewayofdemonstratingcompliancewiththe“essentialrequirements.”Torestateinthe

language of the functionalmethod discussed above, Strauss argues that the EU approach—

essentialrequirementsplussoftlawstandards―isthebettersolutiontothecommonproblem

ofcopyright-protectedindustrystandards.Inhisview,thisbettersolutionoffersapossibilityfor

improvingU.S.law.

Chapter15,byCaryCoglianese,systematicallyassessesperformance-basedregulation,a

darlingof regulatory reformersacross theworld.Performance-basedregulationworksnotby

specifyingthemeansofcompliance,butratherbyrequiringparticularperformanceoroutcome


56

goals.Theideaisthatregulatedfirmswilldetermineforthemselveshowtoachievethosegoals.

Based on the American experience, Coglianese assesses the merits of performance-based

regulationandarguesthatitcanbesuperiortoclassiccommand-and-controlregulationbutonly

underaparticular,andbynomeansuniversal,setofcircumstances:whenthepolicyproblem

andregulatorycapacityaresuchthatfirmperformanceislikelytobeassessedaccuratelyand

whentheregulatedindustryisrelativelyheterogeneous.Insuchcases,thesectorcanadaptto

performance-basedgoalsindifferentways,perhapspromotinginnovation,andatthesametime

regulatorscanevaluatewhetherthosegoalshavebeenmetandcompliancehasbeenachieved.

Chapter16onprivatetransnationalregulation,byJodiShort,servesasabridgebetween

thepartofthevolumefocusedonprivatebodiesandthepartdedicatedtointernationalregimes.

Thechapterhighlightsrecentempiricalresearchononeimportantfacetoftransnationalprivate

regulation:codesofconductthatareusedbymultinationalcorporationstosetlaborstandards

fortheirsupplychainfactoriesandthatareenforced,atleastinpart,byprivateauditingfirms.

In a recent, large-N study, Short and her co-authors demonstrate that compliance with

transnationallaborstandards―toreferbacktotheearlierdiscussion,thedomesticreceptionof

transplanted law―variessystematicallyacrossnational jurisdictions. Inparticular, fourfactors

contribute to compliance: ratificationof ILO conventions by the state inwhich the factory is

located;highlyprotectivedomestic laborregulation;high levelsofpressfreedom;and, inthe

buyer markets served by the multinational corporation, a wealthy and socially conscious

consumer base. As Short argues, this and other research on private transnational regulation

makesanimportantcontributiontothecomparativelawtheoryoftransplants.Thetransplant

literaturehastraditionallyfocusedondiffusionofformallawbystateactors,nottheincreasingly

importantphenomenonofdiffusionofself-regulatorynormsbyprivateactors.Ithasalsofailed

toinvestigatethroughlarge-Nstudiestheimplementationandeffectivenessoflegaltransplants.


57

InternationalJurisdictions

The last sectionof thevolume isdedicated to international regulatory systems. International

jurisdictionshavecometofunctionincreasinglyasindependentsitesofregulatorypowerthat

interface with domestic jurisdictions and other international bodies in the global regulatory

process. Depending on the system, international bodies can intervene at any stage of the

regulatory process—rulemaking, oversight, enforcement, and judicial review. International

jurisdictions vary considerably, both in the scope of their powers and their degree of legal

formality,andthissectionisdesignedtoincludearepresentativesubset.

InChapter17,GregoryShafferdevelopsanovelanalyticalframeworkforunderstanding

the interplaybetweendomestic jurisdictionsandtheWorldTradeOrganization. Thechapter

proposesafour-partscheme,supportedbynumerousexamples,forunderstandingandassessing

theimpactoftheWTOonnationalregulatorygovernance:(1)changesintheboundarybetween

market and state through the liberalization of markets and the reconfiguration of national

regulation;(2)ashiftinthebalanceofinstitutionalpowerinfavorofadministrativeandjudicial

actors;(3)thecreationofnewprofessions,primarilylegalandeconomic,thatworkwiththenew

WTOrulesandpromotetheWTOagenda;and(4)thespreadoffreemarketnormativeframes

thatshapenationalperceptionsofpermissibleandappropriatepolicyoptions.Toreturntocausal

theories of diffusion, the WTO illustrates a number of different mechanisms by which

internationaljurisdictionstransferlawtoparticipatingstates,includingpowerashighlightedin

theprevious discussion. TheWTO’s eighteenmultilateral agreements on issues ranging from

customsinspectionstofoodsafetyareimplementedbytheDisputeSettlementBodyandover

seventymultilateralcommittees,whichmeet,accordingtoconservativeestimates,over1,000

timesperyear.Participatingeffectively,nottomentionjustshowingup,requiresconsiderable

resourcesandsystematicallydisadvantagessmallerdevelopingcountries.Atthesametime,the

type of regulation that diffuses is not necessarily the ultra-liberal, deregulatory law that is

associatedwithpowerincertainaccountsofglobalization.Rather,asShafferexplains,because

thegovernmentsandfirmsthatexercisepowerintheglobalregulatoryprocessgenerallycome


58

fromwealthy,high-regulationjurisdictions,theyhavesignificantstrategic incentivestoexport

thosehighregulatorystandardstootherjurisdictions.Forinstance,theycanpushforwestern

product standards in international committees or they can provide technical assistance to

developingcountriestosupportprotectiveregulatoryschemes.Theimportanceofthepotential

“racetothetop”inglobalregulationisunderscoredintheearlierchaptersbyKelemenandShort,

whichrevealsimilarpro-regulatorymechanismsatworkintheEuropeanUnionandmultinational

corporatecodes.

InChapter18,JasonYackeeturnstointernationalinvestmentlawandconductsawide-

ranging analysis of how this international system interactswith domestic jurisdictions in the

global regulatory process. As Yackee explains, bilateral investment treaties (and investment

chapters in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements) generally protect foreign investors

againstexpropriationsandregulatorytakingsbyestablishingprinciplesofnon-discriminationand

fairtreatmentandbygivingforeigninvestorstherighttosuestatesinadhocarbitraltribunals.

In recent years, investment treaties have also been used by the United States to transplant

administrative law toother countries, inparticular thepluralist rulemakingprocedure that is

considered earlier in the volume. At the same time, in light of the potentially far-reaching

consequencesof investor–statedisputeresolutionfordomesticregulation,therehavebeena

number of constructive efforts to design a better legal framework for international arbitral

tribunals.Theseincludeenhancedtransparencyandthird-partyparticipationininvestor–state

arbitrations. Overall, Yackee is cautious in his assessment of these many developments.

Domestically, because of the legal obstacles to reception noted earlier, he is skeptical that

rulemaking procedurewill operate as intended. Internationally, the international investment

regimeischaracterizedbyarelativelylowlevelofinstitutionalizationandthereforeinvestorsand

statescanfairlyeasilycircumventanyunwelcomelegalrequirementsthatemergeininvestor–

statearbitration.

Thevolumethenpresentsoneoftheleadingexamplesofaninformal,butnevertheless

highly powerful, international regulatory regime: international financial networks. As David

ZaringexplainsinChapter19,internationalnetworksoffinancialregulators—oneeachforthe


59

banking,securities,andinsuranceindustries―havesoughtforoverfourdecadestocoordinate

policiesanddevelopcommonregulatorystandards.Comparedwith internationalregimes like

theWTOorbilateralinvestmenttreaties,regulatorynetworksarehighlyinformal:theyarenot

established by treaty, but rather are created and operate pursuant to memoranda of

understanding and other low-level agreements between national regulatory agencies; their

membership is not global but is limited to the wealthy countries with the most developed

financialsectors;theydonothavetribunalsthatcanresolvedisputesbetweentheirparticipating

states;andtheirpolicyoutput,or,asZaringsays,theirrulemaking, isnotformallybindingon

theirparticipatingstateregulatoryagencies.Atthesametime,thebankingnetwork,inparticular

theBaselCommittee,wieldssignificantpowerbygeneratingaconsiderablebodyofrulesthat

haslargelybeenimplementedintonationallawbydomesticregulators.Increasingly,relatedto

thisexerciseof rulemakingpower, a legal frameworkhasemerged todiscipline international

financialnetworks. Inadditiontoobservinganumberofsubstantiveprinciples,Zaringargues

thattheBaselCommitteesubscribestoanotice-and-commentrulemakingprocedure.Although

insomerespectsthisproceduremirrorspluralistU.S.rulemaking,itisnotenforcedbythecourts,

andthereforeitaffordslessprotectionforformalequalityandinterestgroupcompetition.

The volume concludes with two cases that can be characterized as outliers on the

spectrumofinternationaljurisdictionsinvolvedintheglobalregulatoryprocess.Chapter20,by

HerwigHofmann,revealsthehighdegreeofpolitical,legal,andadministrativeintegrationthat

hasoccurredintheEuropeanUnionsinceitsfoundinginthe1950s.Nonetheless,asHofmann

explains,theEU’sregulatorysystemreliesoncoordinationamongformallyautonomousnational

regulatoryauthoritiesandhasgenerallyavoidedinstitutingafree-standingsetofgovernment

agencies,withindependentconstitutionalpowersofimplementationandenforcement,asexists

in federal systems like Germany and the United States. This structure of EU regulatory

cooperation has been criticized on the grounds that it undermines the accountability and

legitimacy of the regulatory process. Hofmann concludes that the accountability challenge is

serious indeed, in part because legal prescription basedon comparisondoes not havemuch

purchaseoverthecomplexrealitiesofEUgovernance.Indomesticjurisdictions,theprincipal–

agent model of legislatures and bureaucracies is generally used to craft the accountability


60

principlesofadministrativelaw.Bycontrast,asHofmannargues,theEuropeanUnionoperates

withadizzyingarrayofprincipalsandagentsandthereforeitcannot lookdirectlytonational

experiencetobuildgreateraccountabilityintoEUadministrativelaw.

Thelastchapter,byEricFeldmanandChelseaFish,analyzestheinternationalsystemfor

managingnaturalandnucleardisasters,whichasofyethasoperatedasarelativelyinsignificant

jurisdiction in global disaster regulation. The explanation for the low level of international

cooperationinthedisasterareaistwofold:thedomesticfoundationsareunderdevelopedsince

manycountries,evenwealthyones suchas Japan, lacka robust legal framework fordisaster

relief;internationally,especiallywithrespecttonaturaldisasters,countrieslackasharedsense

of reciprocal risk because the harms are often believed to be non-human in origin and

geographically restricted. Feldman and Fish conclude that the best disaster relief programs

reflect an ethic of social solidarity. This is a valuewhich can be found across very different

societiesandlegalsystemsandwhich,inthefuture,couldserveasthefoundationforaneffective

internationalsystemofdisasterregulation.

CONCLUSION

The contemporary regulatory process is global. Markets and the problems they generate—

consumertracking,parabenssafety,andmanyothers—crossbordersandsotoodoregulatory

effortstoaddressthoseproblems.Asnationalsovereigntyrecedesandmarketsandjurisdictions

become increasingly interdependent, the high-stakes game of regulation is no longer being

playedwithintheconfinesofthestateandthelawofsinglenations.Apluralityofjurisdictions

and regulatory bodies are called into action, sometimes in concert but just as often in

competition.

The field of comparative law and regulation is designed to create the intellectual

foundationsforanalyzingandassessingthisglobalregulatoryprocess.Itdoessobydefiningan

objectoflegalstudythatisunconfinedbythetraditionalorganizationofthelegaldisciplineand


61

thatiscapableofsweepinginthelawoftheregulatoryfunctionacrosstheworld.Thefieldis

thusflexibleenoughtoincludethewidearrayofdomesticandinternationaljurisdictionsthatare

mobilizedintheefforttoregulateglobalpolicyproblems.Thefieldalsorisestotheintellectual

challengeoftheglobalregulatoryprocessbyidentifyingthreecriticalfeaturesofthatprocess

thatrequiredifferenttypesoftheoreticalinquiry.Jurisdictionaldiversityandsimilarityarebest

captured by classifications based on paradigms of public law and models of public–private

relations.Thequestionofwhetherandhowconvergenceoccursshouldbestudiedusingcausal

theories of legal transplants and diffusion. In particular, it is important to investigate how

disparitiesinpoliticalandeconomicpowerinfluencethetransferofregulatorylawandhowthe

paradigmsofpubliclawandmodelsofpublic–privaterelationsshapethereceptionofregulatory

law.Legalprescriptionbasedoncomparison,afavoriterhetoricaldeviceintheglobalregulatory

process,shouldbeevaluatedbasedonanormativelyexplicitandempiricallysensitivefunctional

methodofcomparativelawresearch.Thesearecharacteristicsthatcutacrossthemanydomestic

andinternationaljurisdictionsinvolvedinregulationandthatshouldbeanalyzedusingthesame

conceptual and theoretical tools regardless of where they are to be found, domestically or

internationally. Today’sregulatoryprocessmaybecomplexandmayfailtofitthetraditional

moldofhierarchicalstatelawthatappliedwhenregulationoccurredprimarilywithinnational

borders.Butitisstillpossibletobringintellectualordertothecontemporaryrealityoftheglobal

regulatoryprocess.

The chapters in this book afford a vital demonstration of what is to be gained by

establishing a new field of inquiry. They show the value, for the various political and legal

operatorsengagedintheglobalregulatoryprocess,ofpresentingandanalyzinginasinglework

the diverse elements of law that govern the regulatory process and that shape regulatory

outcomes.Thecontributionstothisvolumealsoillustratetheproductivescholarlyconversations

andtheoreticaladvancesthatcanbemadebyanalyzingasinglesetofquestionsacrossthewhole

gamutofregulatorylaw, inbothdomesticandinternational jurisdictions,andappliedtoboth

publicandprivateactors.Insum,takentogether,thechaptersthatfollowrevealthepractical

and theoretical payoffs that come from staking out an independent domain of research and

knowledgebuildingdedicatedtounderstandingtheglobalregulatoryprocess.


62

Thisbookprovidesanimportantstatementofthefieldofcomparativelawandregulation.

Buttheresearchagendaofthefieldisambitious.Asexplainedabove,regulatorylawincludes

manifold topics and jurisdictions. This book covers some of themost important ones, but a

number of others have been left to future research endeavors. Likewise, the avenues of

theoretical inquiry that are central to the field are complex and will require sustained

investigationover time tobuild a solid understandingof the global regulatoryprocess. Legal

scholarshipmustkeepupwiththeworldwideexpansionofregulation.Thefieldofcomparative

lawandregulationsetsoutadisciplinaryroadmapforadvancingonthisnew,globalterrain.


63

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FigureI.1Theregulatoryprocess:actorsandrelevantlaw

PHASEONE:RULEMAKING PHASETWO:OVERSIGHT PHASETHREE:ENFORCEMENT PHASEFOUR:JUDICIALREVIEW

PUBLICACTORS-Legislature-AdministrativeagenciesRelevantLaw:

-Constitutional-Administrative-Publicinternational

è

PUBLICACTORS-Legislature-Politicalexecutive-Ombudsmen-Independentgovt.commissions-CourtsRelevantLaw:


è

PUBLICACTORS-Administrativeagencies-Courts (criminal prosecutions;classactions)RelevantLaw:

-Administrativeprocedure-Criminalprocedure-Civilprocedure

è

PUBLICACTORS-CourtsRelevantLaw:


PRIVATEACTORS-DependsonpolicysectorRelevantLaw:

-Corporate-Labor-Contract-Public(ondelegation)

PRIVATEACTORS-Media-NGOs-CorporationsRelevantLaw:

-Public (on freedom of speechandassociation)

PRIVATEACTORS-Auditingfirms-Alternative dispute resolutiontribunalsRelevantLaw:

-Contract-Public (on delegation andprocedure)

PRIVATEACTORS-Alternative dispute resolutiontribunals-InternationalarbitraltribunalsRelevantLaw:

-Public (on delegation andprocedure)


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TableI.1Coverageofregulatorylawchapterbychapter

RULEMAKING OVERSIGHT ENFORCEMENT JUDICIALREVIEW

Domesticjurisdictions(PartsIIthroughV)

(PartII)

Wagner (publicparticipation—U.S.)

Smismans (publicparticipation—EU)

(PartIII)

Wiener and Ribeiro(impact assessment—multiplejurisdictions)

Worthy (freedom ofinformation—UK andIndia)a

(PartIV)

Van Rooij (criminal andadministrativeenforcement—China)

Hensler (private classactions—multiplejurisdictions)

(PartV)

Bignami (general principles—U.S.andEurope)

Huang and Law(proportionality—SouthKorea,Japan,Taiwan,China)

Lamprea, Forman, andChapman (right to health—Colombia)

Rose-Ackerman, Egidy, andFowkes (proceduralprinciples—U.S.,EU,Germany,SouthAfrica)

Private regulation(domestic/international)(PartVI)

Strauss (industry standardsetting—U.S.andEU)

Coglianese (performance-basedregulation—U.S.)

Worthy (freedom ofinformation—UK andIndia)a

Short (corporate codes ofconduct—multiplejurisdictions)

Yackee (internationalinvestmentlaw)b

Internationaljurisdictions(PartVII)

Zaring (internationalfinancialnetworks)

Shaffer(WTO)c

Hofmann (EU compositeprocedures)d

Hofmann (EU compositeprocedures)d

Shaffer(WTO)c

Yackee (internationalinvestmentlaw)b

Note:ThechaptersinSectionIanalyzethehistoricaldevelopmentoftheregulatorystate.aWorthy’scontribution(includedinSectionIII)discussesboththepublicandtheprivatedimensionofoversight.bYackee’scontribution(includedinSectionVII)analyzesinternationalarbitraltribunals,whichareaformofprivateinternationalregulation.


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cShaffercoverstheWTOcommitteesystem,whichisanexampleofoversight,aswellastheWTOdisputeresolutionsystem,whichisaformofjudicialreview.dTheEUcompositeprocedurescoveredbyHofmannservethepurposesofbothregulatoryoversightandregulatoryenforcement.


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TableI.2Paradigmsofpubliclaw

Rulebylaw Fundamentalrights

Ballot-boxdemocracy

Transformativedemocracy

Theory State action pursuanttolaw

State action inaccordance withfundamentalrights

Proceduraldemocracy in allstateaction

State actiontransformed by lawandrights

Politicalcontext Strongexecutive,weaklegislatureandcourts

Strong executiveandcourts,distrustof democraticpopulism

Weak executive,strong courts andlegislature

Weak state(bureaucracy andtraditional judiciary),weak democraticprocess

Doctrines ofjudicialreview

Authorized by andwithinthescopeoflaw

Rights andproportionalitytest

“Proceduralizedrationality review,“i.e., “hard-lookreview”

Positive rights (civiland political, socialandeconomic)

Oversightmechanisms

RelativelyfewIndependent rightsbodies

Classic tripartitescheme

Independent rightsand accountabilitybodies

Regulatoryenforcement Publicinitiative

Mostly public,some privateinitiative

Public and privateinitiative (classactions)

Public and privateinitiative (classactions)

Cases Japan, South Korea(SupremeCourt),China

European Union,Europeancountries, WTOdispute resolution(freetraderights)

UnitedStatesLatin Americancountries,India


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TableI.3Modelsofpublic–privaterelations

Pluralism Neo-corporatismTheory of state–societyrelations Interestgroupcompetition Interconnectedsolidarities

Constitutional law onpublic–privatespheres Strictseparation Mixed

Publicrulemaking

Formally equal rights of privateparticipation, i.e., notice-and-commentrulemaking

Balanced representation of societalgroupsonadvisorycommittees

Privaterulemaking(self-regulation)

• No legal recognition of specificprivate bodies in publicregulatoryschemes

• No state regulation of privatebodies

• Legal recognition of privatebodies in public regulatoryschemes

• Balanced representation inprivate bodies required underlaw

Regulatoryenforcementinitiated by privateparties

Any individual as long as certified bycourtasrepresentativeofclass

Associationsrepresentativeofregulatorybeneficiaries

Cases UnitedStatesEuropean Union, European countries,ISO/IEC (international private standardsetting)


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TableI.4Mainlinesoftheoreticaldevelopmentincomparativelawandregulation

aThetraditionalfunctionalmethodentailsthefollowingsteps:definitionofacommonsocialproblem;identificationofthelegalsolutionsinjurisdictionsunder

investigation;analysisofwhetherthesesolutionsaresimilarordifferent;inthecaseofdifference,identificationofthe“better”solution.

Key characteristics of theglobalregulatoryprocess

Differences and commonalitiesbetweenjurisdictions

Convergence (ordivergence)ofjurisdictionsovertime

Legalprescriptionbasedoncomparisonacrossjurisdictions

Linesoftheorization

Classifications based on the

followingcategories:

• paradigms of public law:

rule by law, fundamental

rights, ballot-box

democracy;

transformative

democracy;

• models of public–private

relations: pluralism vs.

neo-corporatism

Studyofdiffusionprocessesand

legal transplants with emphasis

on:

• power imbalance as a

modeoflegaltransfer;

• paradigms of public law

and public–private

relations as sources of

successful or

unsuccessful legal

reception

Adaptationof functionalmethoda from

comparativeprivatelaw

• no presumption of similarity

whenassessinglegalsolutions;

• if different solutions: explicitly

posit attributes of “better” law

andinvestigateempiricallywhich

jurisdiction’slawpossessessuch

attributes

introduction. a new field: comparative law and regulation

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