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Connecting the AV industry Igor Muttik, McAfee Avert Labs™ VB’2009 - Geneva 24 September 2009 biquitous malware and ubiquitous A Igor Muttik – Intel’s McAfee Labs TM CARO’2011 Prague

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Introduction. Amy. Agenda – follow Amy for a day. Timing and coverage . Amy’s home. Amy’s router. Router-to-router worm (psyb0t, discovered on Netcomm NB5) MIPS CPUs running Linux Had a collection of ~55 shellcode attacks (30 – for LinkSys, 10 – for Netgear, 15 – for other types) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Introduction

Connecting the AV industryIgor Muttik, McAfee Avert Labs™

VB’2009 - Geneva24 September 2009

Ubiquitous malware and ubiquitous AVIgor Muttik – Intel’s McAfee LabsTM

CARO’2011Prague

Page 2: Introduction

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Introduction

Amy

Page 3: Introduction

TIMING AND COVERAGE

Agenda – follow Amy for a day

Page 4: Introduction

Amy’s home

Page 5: Introduction

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Router-to-router worm (psyb0t, discovered on Netcomm NB5)MIPS CPUs running LinuxHad a collection of ~55 shellcode attacks(30 – for LinkSys, 10 – for Netgear, 15 – for other types)It could

Manipulate the DNSBe an invisible MitMRe-flash the router

Invisible for AVWe see only where we look

Amy’s router

Page 6: Introduction

Amy’s car

Page 7: Introduction

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Amy’s car – bluetooth and MP3 vulnerabilities

Bluetooth vulnerability in mass-production 2009 car (Kohno & Savage)Brakes, door locks and dashboard, remotely read tyre pressure

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Amy’s mobile phone

Android marketplace calamity in March 2011 Zeus and SpyEye attacks on dual authentication

Phones usually have 2 CPUs and both can be attacked

Consumerisation of ITIT policies

Sometimes – not a good thing!

Remote lock/wipe/backupWill be misused

Computrace and LoJack on PCs – RPCNET.DLL from Absolute.com

Page 9: Introduction

Guys, these smart devices are everywhere…You do protect me, don’t you?

Page 10: Introduction

TIMING AND COVERAGE

At a bank

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Amy’s payment terminals

QIWI Has 100,000 terminals in Russia alonePWS trojan infection (PWS.OSMP)

Windows is in places you would not expectInformation screens in airportsBluescreen on a boat navigation system in Amsterdam during CARO 2008

It is not just Windows and IntelEmbedded LinuxMIPSAndroid

You only seewhere you look!

Page 12: Introduction

TIMING AND COVERAGE

Near a factory

Page 13: Introduction

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Industrial processes (like 235U enrichment)

Page 14: Introduction

TIMING AND COVERAGE

At work

Page 15: Introduction

TIMING AND COVERAGE

Amy’s computer has a bootkit

Page 16: Introduction

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Pre-OS

MBR and boot-sector virusesW95/CIHBIOS quick-boot vulnerability (Schouwenberg)Bootkits grow

EFI, UEFI and GPT (GUID Partition Table)A standard of pre-OS environment and driversIn the BIOS or in a separate partitionEFI is a platform like an OSA protected place for malware droppers

Getting common - Macs, many laptops and PCs

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You cannot detect what you cannot see…Do you see this malware?

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EFI platform

EFI has scripting (NSH)All open sourceOVMF – virtual machines

NTFS.EFI – NTFS driver

EBC (EFI Byte Code)32-bit interpreted bytecode Cross-platform

Computers can boot into EFI shell

Page 19: Introduction

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Enabling UEFI boot

Page 20: Introduction

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EFI shell startup video

Youtube link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrybDw9UL5E

Page 21: Introduction

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EFI shell

Page 22: Introduction

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EFI shell startup video and HEXEDIT.EFI demo

Youtube link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiRsaaS1mbM

Page 23: Introduction

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EFI shell commands (1/4)

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EFI shell commands (2/4)

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EFI shell commands (3/4)

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EFI shell commands (4/4)

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EFI nightmares

Nightmare scenarios1. EFI boots

Sends HDD image out (or selected files)Continues to boot the OS

2. EFI bootsEFI launches Windows in a virtual machineHas full control after that

3. EFI boots and drops malware into the file system

As powerful as BAT scripting. + Has networking+ Has unrestricted access to local devices

Page 28: Introduction

Guys, you need a wide and hardened net to catch all these nasties everywhere …

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Hardening the net

Protection should be where it is neededOS ?AV (when OS is lacking) ?CPU

TrustIsolationAudit of data-flowEconomics

Security on CPUsOpen for security companiesSeparate “security” core?

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What can we trust?Digital signatures – Yes (almost always)SSL certificates – Maybe (mostly yes)

What would be nice to trustOSSoftwareLAN and WAN agents

TPM did not work

Technological Trust

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Example: Trust enforced at the CPU level

A software vendorSubmits code to the root authorityPays for a certificateGets a key back which matches the codeThen they can run their “trusted” code

Enforced in CPU, not by the OS!

Rather restrictiveIf applied to all softwarePerhaps OK if applied to “important” software Or certain CPU opcodes which will get special security privileges

“Economics” driving security

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Conclusions

• Malware gets into many new places

• We see only where we look and if we have access

• We need a wider, ubiquitous net

• We would benefit from more low-level trust and security

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References1. Routers:

http://apcmag.com/Content.aspx?id=3687 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/10/router_rooting_malware/

2. Cars: http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/35094/?nlid=4233

3. Mobile: http://securityblog.s21sec.com/2010/09/zeus-mitmo-man-in-mobile-i.htmlhttp://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002135.html

4. Antitheft:http://www.geek.com/articles/news/stolen-pcs-disabled-over-internet-20030528/http://www.intel.com/technology/anti-theft/index.htmhttp://communities.intel.com/docs/DOC-2384http://shop.lenovo.com/ISS_Static/WW/AG/merchandising/US/PDFs/lenovo_anti_theft_protection.pdf

5. Qiwi: www.lenta.ru/news/2011/03/16/qiwi/

6. ATMs: http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9179796/Update_ATM_hack_gives_cash_on_demand http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/security/16042/more-dodgy-atms-in-las-vegas-found-by-defcon-attendees/

7. Stuxnet:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00002066.html

8. EFI: http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/efi-shells-and-scripting/ www.tianocore.org http://www.logic.nl/Products/Technology/BIOS-and-EFI.aspx

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Questions