intro to bayesian mechanism design - mitpeople.csail.mit.edu/costis/bayesian/jason.pdf · mechanism...
TRANSCRIPT
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Intro to Bayesian Mechanism Design
Jason D. HartlineNorthwestern University
October 20, 2012
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Mechanism Design
Basic Mechanism Design Question: How should an economicsystem be designed so that selfish agent behavior leads to goodoutcomes?
BAYESIAN MD – OCTOBER 20, 20121
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Mechanism Design
Basic Mechanism Design Question: How should an economicsystem be designed so that selfish agent behavior leads to goodoutcomes?
Internet Applications: file sharing, reputation systems, web search,web advertising, email, Internet auctions, congestion control, etc.
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Mechanism Design
Basic Mechanism Design Question: How should an economicsystem be designed so that selfish agent behavior leads to goodoutcomes?
Internet Applications: file sharing, reputation systems, web search,web advertising, email, Internet auctions, congestion control, etc.
General Theme: resource allocation.
BAYESIAN MD – OCTOBER 20, 20121
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Overview
Optimal Mechanism Design:
• single-item auction.
• objectives: social welfare vs. seller profit.
• characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
• consequences: solving for and optimizing over BNE.
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Single-item Auction
Mechanism Design Problem: Single-item Auction
Given:
• one item for sale.
• n bidders (with unknown private values for item, v1, . . . , vn)
• Bidders’ objective: maximize utility = value − price paid.
Design:
• Auction to solicit bids and choose winner and payments.
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Single-item Auction
Mechanism Design Problem: Single-item Auction
Given:
• one item for sale.
• n bidders (with unknown private values for item, v1, . . . , vn)
• Bidders’ objective: maximize utility = value − price paid.
Design:
• Auction to solicit bids and choose winner and payments.
Possible Auction Objectives:
• Maximize social surplus, i.e., the value of the winner.
• Maximize seller profit, i.e., the payment of the winner.
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Objective 1: maximize social surplus
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Example Auctions
First-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner their bid.
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Example Auctions
First-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner their bid.
Example Input: b = (2, 6, 4, 1).
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Example Auctions
First-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner their bid.
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner thesecond-highest bid.
Example Input: b = (2, 6, 4, 1).
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Example Auctions
First-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner their bid.
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner thesecond-highest bid.
Example Input: b = (2, 6, 4, 1).
Questions:
• what are equilibrium strategies?
• what is equilibrium outcome?
• which has higher surplus in equilibrium?
• which has higher profit in equilibrium?
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Second-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
How should bidder i bid?
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Second-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
How should bidder i bid?
• Let ti = maxj 6=i bj .
• If bi > ti, bidder i wins and pays ti; otherwise loses.
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Second-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
How should bidder i bid?
• Let ti = maxj 6=i bj .
• If bi > ti, bidder i wins and pays ti; otherwise loses.
Case 1: vi > ti Case 2: vi < ti
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Second-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
How should bidder i bid?
• Let ti = maxj 6=i bj .
• If bi > ti, bidder i wins and pays ti; otherwise loses.
Case 1: vi > ti Case 2: vi < ti
Util
ity
Bid Value
0
vi−ti
tivi
Util
ity
Bid Value
0
vi−ti
tivi
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Second-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
How should bidder i bid?
• Let ti = maxj 6=i bj .
• If bi > ti, bidder i wins and pays ti; otherwise loses.
Case 1: vi > ti Case 2: vi < ti
Util
ity
Bid Value
0
vi−ti
tivi
Util
ity
Bid Value
0
vi−ti
tivi
Result: Bidder i’s dominant strategy is to bid bi = vi!
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Second-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
How should bidder i bid?
• Let ti = maxj 6=i bj . ⇐ “critical value”
• If bi > ti, bidder i wins and pays ti; otherwise loses.
Case 1: vi > ti Case 2: vi < ti
Util
ity
Bid Value
0
vi−ti
tivi
Util
ity
Bid Value
0
vi−ti
tivi
Result: Bidder i’s dominant strategy is to bid bi = vi!
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Second-price Auction Conclusion
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
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Second-price Auction Conclusion
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
Lemma: [Vickrey ’61] Truthful bidding is dominant strategy inSecond-price Auction.
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Second-price Auction Conclusion
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
Lemma: [Vickrey ’61] Truthful bidding is dominant strategy inSecond-price Auction.
Corollary: Second-price Auction maximizes social surplus.
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Second-price Auction Conclusion
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
Lemma: [Vickrey ’61] Truthful bidding is dominant strategy inSecond-price Auction.
Corollary: Second-price Auction maximizes social surplus.
• bids = values (from Lemma).
• winner is highest bidder (by definition).
⇒ winner is bidder with highest valuation (optimal social surplus).
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Second-price Auction Conclusion
Second-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids. 2. Winner is highest bidder.3. Charge winner the second-highest bid.
Lemma: [Vickrey ’61] Truthful bidding is dominant strategy inSecond-price Auction.
Corollary: Second-price Auction maximizes social surplus.
• bids = values (from Lemma).
• winner is highest bidder (by definition).
⇒ winner is bidder with highest valuation (optimal social surplus).
What about first-price auction?
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Recall First-price Auction
First-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner their bid.
How would you bid?
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Recall First-price Auction
First-price Auction
1. Solicit sealed bids.
2. Winner is highest bidder.
3. Charge winner their bid.
How would you bid?
Note: first-price auction has no DSE.
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Review: Uniform Distributions
Uniform Distribution: draw value v uniformly from the interval [0, 1].
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Review: Uniform Distributions
Uniform Distribution: draw value v uniformly from the interval [0, 1].
Cumulative Distribution Function: F (z) = Pr[v ≤ z] = z.
Probability Density Function: f(z) = 1dz
Pr[v ≤ z] = 1.
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Review: Uniform Distributions
Uniform Distribution: draw value v uniformly from the interval [0, 1].
Cumulative Distribution Function: F (z) = Pr[v ≤ z] = z.
Probability Density Function: f(z) = 1dz
Pr[v ≤ z] = 1.
Order Statistics: in expectation, uniform random variables evenlydivide interval.
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Review: Uniform Distributions
Uniform Distribution: draw value v uniformly from the interval [0, 1].
Cumulative Distribution Function: F (z) = Pr[v ≤ z] = z.
Probability Density Function: f(z) = 1dz
Pr[v ≤ z] = 1.
Order Statistics: in expectation, uniform random variables evenlydivide interval.
0 1E[v2] E[v1]
6 6
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[my bid ≤ b] = Prh
12
my value ≤ b
i
= Pr[my value ≤ 2b] = 2b
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[my bid ≤ b] = Prh
12
my value ≤ b
i
= Pr[my value ≤ 2b] = 2b
= (v − b) × 2b
= 2vb − 2b2
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[my bid ≤ b] = Prh
12
my value ≤ b
i
= Pr[my value ≤ 2b] = 2b
= (v − b) × 2b
= 2vb − 2b2
• to maximize, take derivative ddb
and set to zero, solve
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[my bid ≤ b] = Prh
12
my value ≤ b
i
= Pr[my value ≤ 2b] = 2b
= (v − b) × 2b
= 2vb − 2b2
• to maximize, take derivative ddb
and set to zero, solve
• optimal to bid b = v/2 (bid half your value!)
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[my bid ≤ b] = Prh
12
my value ≤ b
i
= Pr[my value ≤ 2b] = 2b
= (v − b) × 2b
= 2vb − 2b2
• to maximize, take derivative ddb
and set to zero, solve
• optimal to bid b = v/2 (bid half your value!)
Conclusion 1: bidding “half of value” is equilibrium
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First-price Auction Equilibrium Analysis
Example: two bidders (you and me), uniform values.
• Suppose I bid half my value.
• How should you bid?
• What’s your expected utility with value v and bid b?
E[utility(v, b)] = (v − b) × Pr[you win]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr[my bid ≤ b] = Prh
12
my value ≤ b
i
= Pr[my value ≤ 2b] = 2b
= (v − b) × 2b
= 2vb − 2b2
• to maximize, take derivative ddb
and set to zero, solve
• optimal to bid b = v/2 (bid half your value!)
Conclusion 1: bidding “half of value” is equilibriumConclusion 2: bidder with highest value winsConclusion 3: first-price auction maximizes social surplus!
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Defn: a strategy maps value to bid, i.e., bi = si(vi).
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Defn: a strategy maps value to bid, i.e., bi = si(vi).
Defn: the common prior assumption: bidders’ values are drawn from aknown distribution, i.e., vi ∼ Fi.
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Defn: a strategy maps value to bid, i.e., bi = si(vi).
Defn: the common prior assumption: bidders’ values are drawn from aknown distribution, i.e., vi ∼ Fi.
Notation:
• Fi(z) = Pr[vi ≤ z] is cumulative distribution function,(e.g., Fi(z) = z for uniform distribution)
• fi(z) = dFi(z)dz
is probability density function,
(e.g., fi(z) = 1 for uniform distribution)
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Bayes-Nash equilibrium
Defn: a strategy maps value to bid, i.e., bi = si(vi).
Defn: the common prior assumption: bidders’ values are drawn from aknown distribution, i.e., vi ∼ Fi.
Notation:
• Fi(z) = Pr[vi ≤ z] is cumulative distribution function,(e.g., Fi(z) = z for uniform distribution)
• fi(z) = dFi(z)dz
is probability density function,
(e.g., fi(z) = 1 for uniform distribution)
Definition: a strategy profile is in Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if forall i, si(vi) is best response when others play sj(vj) and vj ∼ Fj .
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Surplus Maximization Conclusions
Conclusions:
• second-price auction maximizes surplus in DSE regardless ofdistribution.
• first-price auction maximize surplus in BNE for i.i.d. distributions.
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Surplus Maximization Conclusions
Conclusions:
• second-price auction maximizes surplus in DSE regardless ofdistribution.
• first-price auction maximize surplus in BNE for i.i.d. distributions.
Surprising Result: a single auction is optimal for any distribution.
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Surplus Maximization Conclusions
Conclusions:
• second-price auction maximizes surplus in DSE regardless ofdistribution.
• first-price auction maximize surplus in BNE for i.i.d. distributions.
Surprising Result: a single auction is optimal for any distribution.
Questions?
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Objective 2: maximize seller profit
(other objectives are similar)
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v1• Sort values.
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v16 6• Sort values.
• In expectation, values evenly divide unit interval.
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v16 6• Sort values.
• In expectation, values evenly divide unit interval.
• E[Profit] = E[v2]
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v16 6• Sort values.
• In expectation, values evenly divide unit interval.
• E[Profit] = E[v2] = 1/3.
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v16 6• Sort values.
• In expectation, values evenly divide unit interval.
• E[Profit] = E[v2] = 1/3.
What is profit of first-price auction?
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v16 6• Sort values.
• In expectation, values evenly divide unit interval.
• E[Profit] = E[v2] = 1/3.
What is profit of first-price auction?
• E[Profit] = E[v1] /2 = 1/3.
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An example
Example Scenario: two bidders, uniform values
What is profit of second-price auction?
• draw values from unit interval.
0 1v2 ≤ v16 6• Sort values.
• In expectation, values evenly divide unit interval.
• E[Profit] = E[v2] = 1/3.
What is profit of first-price auction?
• E[Profit] = E[v1] /2 = 1/3.
Surprising Result: second-price and first-price auctions have sameexpected profit.
Can we get more profit?
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.
• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.
• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
Case Analysis: Pr [Case i] E[Profit]
Case 1: 12 > v1 ≥ v2
Case 2: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 12
Case 3: v1 ≥ 12 > v2
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.
• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
Case Analysis: Pr [Case i] E[Profit]
Case 1: 12 > v1 ≥ v2 1/4
Case 2: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 12 1/4
Case 3: v1 ≥ 12 > v2 1/2
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.
• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
Case Analysis: Pr [Case i] E[Profit]
Case 1: 12 > v1 ≥ v2 1/4 0
Case 2: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 12 1/4 E[v2 | Case 2]
Case 3: v1 ≥ 12 > v2 1/2 1
2
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.0 1v2 v1
6 6• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
Case Analysis: Pr [Case i] E[Profit]
Case 1: 12 > v1 ≥ v2 1/4 0
Case 2: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 12 1/4 E[v2 | Case 2] = 2
3
Case 3: v1 ≥ 12 > v2 1/2 1
2
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.0 1v2 v1
6 6• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
Case Analysis: Pr [Case i] E[Profit]
Case 1: 12 > v1 ≥ v2 1/4 0
Case 2: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 12 1/4 E[v2 | Case 2] = 2
3
Case 3: v1 ≥ 12 > v2 1/2 1
2
E[profit of 2nd-price with reserve] = 14 · 0 + 1
4 · 23 + 1
2 · 12 = 5
12
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Second-price with reserve price
Second-price Auction with reserve r
0. Insert seller-bid at r. 1. Solicit bids. 2. Winner ishighest bidder. 3. Charge 2nd-highest bid.
Lemma: Second-price with reserve r has truthful DSE.
What is profit of Second-price with reserve 12 on two bidders U [0, 1]?
• draw values from unit interval.0 1v2 v1
6 6• Sort values, v1 ≥ v2
Case Analysis: Pr [Case i] E[Profit]
Case 1: 12 > v1 ≥ v2 1/4 0
Case 2: v1 ≥ v2 ≥ 12 1/4 E[v2 | Case 2] = 2
3
Case 3: v1 ≥ 12 > v2 1/2 1
2
E[profit of 2nd-price with reserve] = 14 · 0 + 1
4 · 23 + 1
2 · 12 = 5
12≥ E[profit of 2nd-price] = 1
3 .
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Profit Maximization Observations
Observations:
• pretending to value the good increases seller profit.
• optimal profit depends on distribution.
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Profit Maximization Observations
Observations:
• pretending to value the good increases seller profit.
• optimal profit depends on distribution.
Questions?
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Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Characterization and Consequences
• solving for BNE
• optimizing over BNE
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Notation
Notation:
• x is an allocation, xi the allocation for i.
• x(v) is BNE allocation of mech. on valuations v.
• v i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, ?, vi+1, . . . , vn).
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Notation
Notation:
• x is an allocation, xi the allocation for i.
• x(v) is BNE allocation of mech. on valuations v.
• v i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, ?, vi+1, . . . , vn).
• xi(vi) = Ev−i[xi(vi,v−i)] .
(Agent i’s interim prob. of allocation with v−i from F−i)
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Notation
Notation:
• x is an allocation, xi the allocation for i.
• x(v) is BNE allocation of mech. on valuations v.
• v i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, ?, vi+1, . . . , vn).
• xi(vi) = Ev−i[xi(vi,v−i)] .
(Agent i’s interim prob. of allocation with v−i from F−i)
Analogously, define p, p(v), and pi(vi) for payments.
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Characterization of BNE
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
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Characterization of BNE
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
vi
xi(vi)
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Characterization of BNE
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
vi
xi(vi)
Surplus
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Characterization of BNE
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
vi
xi(vi)
Surplus Utility
vi
xi(vi)
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Characterization of BNE
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
Payment
vi
xi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
Surplus Utility
vi
xi(vi)
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Characterization of BNE
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
Payment
vi
xi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
Surplus Utility
vi
xi(vi)
Consequence: (revenue equivalence) in BNE, auctions with sameoutcome have same revenue (e.g., first and second-price auctions)
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Questions?
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
• p(v) = Pr[v wins] × b(v) (because first-price)
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
• p(v) = Pr[v wins] × b(v) (because first-price)
• p(v) = E[expected second-price payment | v] (by rev. equiv.)
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
• p(v) = Pr[v wins] × b(v) (because first-price)
• p(v) = E[expected second-price payment | v] (by rev. equiv.)
p(v) = Pr[v wins] × E[second highest value | v wins]
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
• p(v) = Pr[v wins] × b(v) (because first-price)
• p(v) = E[expected second-price payment | v] (by rev. equiv.)
p(v) = Pr[v wins] × E[second highest value | v wins]
⇒ b(v) = E[second highest value | v wins]
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
• p(v) = Pr[v wins] × b(v) (because first-price)
• p(v) = E[expected second-price payment | v] (by rev. equiv.)
p(v) = Pr[v wins] × E[second highest value | v wins]
⇒ b(v) = E[second highest value | v wins](e.g., for two uniform bidders: b(v) = v/2.)
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Solving for BNE
Solving for equilbrium:
1. What happens in first-price auction equilibrium?
Guess: higher values bid more
⇒ agents ranked by value
⇒ same outcome as second-price auction.
⇒ same expected payments as second-price auction.
2. What are equilibrium strategies?
• p(v) = Pr[v wins] × b(v) (because first-price)
• p(v) = E[expected second-price payment | v] (by rev. equiv.)
p(v) = Pr[v wins] × E[second highest value | v wins]
⇒ b(v) = E[second highest value | v wins](e.g., for two uniform bidders: b(v) = v/2.)
3. Verify guess and BNE: b(v) continuous, strictly increasing,symmetric.
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Questions?
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Optimizing BNE
Defn: virtual value for i is φi(vi) = vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi).
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Optimizing BNE
Defn: virtual value for i is φi(vi) = vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi).
Lemma: [Myerson 81] In BNE, E[pi(vi)] = E[φi(vi)xi(vi)]
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Optimizing BNE
Defn: virtual value for i is φi(vi) = vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi).
Lemma: [Myerson 81] In BNE, E[pi(vi)] = E[φi(vi)xi(vi)]General Approach:
• optimize revenue without incentive constraints (i.e., monotonicity).
⇒ winner is agent with highest positive virtual value.
• check to see if incentive constraints are satisfied.
⇒ if φi(·) is monotone then mechanism is monotone.
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Optimizing BNE
Defn: virtual value for i is φi(vi) = vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi).
Lemma: [Myerson 81] In BNE, E[pi(vi)] = E[φi(vi)xi(vi)]General Approach:
• optimize revenue without incentive constraints (i.e., monotonicity).
⇒ winner is agent with highest positive virtual value.
• check to see if incentive constraints are satisfied.
⇒ if φi(·) is monotone then mechanism is monotone.
Defn: distribution Fi is regular if φi(·) is monotone.
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Optimizing BNE
Defn: virtual value for i is φi(vi) = vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi).
Lemma: [Myerson 81] In BNE, E[pi(vi)] = E[φi(vi)xi(vi)]General Approach:
• optimize revenue without incentive constraints (i.e., monotonicity).
⇒ winner is agent with highest positive virtual value.
• check to see if incentive constraints are satisfied.
⇒ if φi(·) is monotone then mechanism is monotone.
Defn: distribution Fi is regular if φi(·) is monotone.
Thm: [Myerson 81] If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item tobidder with highest positive virtual valuation.
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Optimizing BNE
Defn: virtual value for i is φi(vi) = vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi).
Lemma: [Myerson 81] In BNE, E[pi(vi)] = E[φi(vi)xi(vi)]General Approach:
• optimize revenue without incentive constraints (i.e., monotonicity).
⇒ winner is agent with highest positive virtual value.
• check to see if incentive constraints are satisfied.
⇒ if φi(·) is monotone then mechanism is monotone.
Defn: distribution Fi is regular if φi(·) is monotone.
Thm: [Myerson 81] If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item tobidder with highest positive virtual valuation.
Proof: expected virtual valuation of winner = expected payment.
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Proof of Lemma
Recall Lemma: In BNE, E[pi(vi)] = E[(
vi −1−Fi(vi)
fi(vi)
)
xi(vi)]
.
Proof Sketch:
• Use characterization: pi(vi) = vixi(vi) −∫ vi
0xi(v)dv.
• Use definition of expectation (integrate payment × density).
• Swap order of integration.
• Simplify.
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
• I.i.d. implies φi = φj = φ.
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
• I.i.d. implies φi = φj = φ.
• So, vi ≥ max(vj , φ−1(0)).
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
• I.i.d. implies φi = φj = φ.
• So, vi ≥ max(vj , φ−1(0)).
• So, “critical value” = payment = max(vj , φ−1(0))
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
• I.i.d. implies φi = φj = φ.
• So, vi ≥ max(vj , φ−1(0)).
• So, “critical value” = payment = max(vj , φ−1(0))
• What is this auction?
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
• I.i.d. implies φi = φj = φ.
• So, vi ≥ max(vj , φ−1(0)).
• So, “critical value” = payment = max(vj , φ−1(0))
• What is this auction? second-price auction with reserve φ−1(0)!
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Interpretation
Recall Thm: If F is regular, optimal auction is to sell item to bidder withhighest positive virtual valuation.
What does this mean in i.i.d. case?
• Winner i satisfies φi(vi) ≥ max(φj(vj), 0)
• I.i.d. implies φi = φj = φ.
• So, vi ≥ max(vj , φ−1(0)).
• So, “critical value” = payment = max(vj , φ−1(0))
• What is this auction? second-price auction with reserve φ−1(0)!
What is optimal single-item auction for U [0, 1]?
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Optimal Auction for U [0, 1]
Optimal auction for U [0, 1]:
• F (vi) = vi.
• f(vi) = 1.
• So, φ(vi) = vi −1−F (vi)
f(vi)= 2vi − 1.
• So, φ−1(0) = 1/2.
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Optimal Auction for U [0, 1]
Optimal auction for U [0, 1]:
• F (vi) = vi.
• f(vi) = 1.
• So, φ(vi) = vi −1−F (vi)
f(vi)= 2vi − 1.
• So, φ−1(0) = 1/2.
• So, optimal auction is Second-price Auction with reserve 1/2!
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Optimal Mechanisms Conclusions
Conclusions:
• expected virtual value = expected revenue
• optimal mechanism maximizes virtual surplus.
• optimal auction depends on distribution.
• i.i.d., regular distributions: second-price with reserve is optimal.
• theory is “descriptive”.
Questions?
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Bayes-Nash Equilibrium Characterization Proof
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Proof Overview
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
Proof Overview:
1.=⇒ BNE ⇐ M & PI
2. BNE ⇒ M
3. BNE ⇒ PI
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)Defn: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)Defn: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)Defn: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)Defn: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
pi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)Defn: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
pi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
ui(vi, z)
vi z
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 1: mimicking z > vi
Defn: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)Defn: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).
loss
vi z
xi(z)xi(vi)
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
pi(z)
vi z
xi(z)
ui(vi, z)
vi z
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
Recall: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).Recall: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
Recall: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).Recall: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
Recall: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).Recall: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
viz
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
Recall: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).Recall: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
viz
xi(z)
pi(z)
viz
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
Recall: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).Recall: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
viz
xi(z)
pi(z)
viz
xi(z)
ui(vi, z)
viz
xi(z)
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BNE ⇐ M & PI (cont)
Claim: BNE ⇐ M & PICase 2: mimicking z < vi
Recall: loss = ui(vi, vi) − ui(vi, z).Recall: ui(vi, z) = vixi(z) − pi(z)
loss
viz
xi(z)xi(vi)
vixi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
pi(vi)
vi
xi(vi)
ui(vi, vi)
vi
xi(vi)
vixi(z)
viz
xi(z)
pi(z)
viz
xi(z)
ui(vi, z)
viz
xi(z)
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Proof Overview
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
Proof Overview:
1. BNE ⇐ M & PI
2.=⇒ BNE ⇒ M
3. BNE ⇒ PI
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BNE ⇒ M
Claim: BNE ⇒ M.
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BNE ⇒ M
Claim: BNE ⇒ M.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
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BNE ⇒ M
Claim: BNE ⇒ M.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
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BNE ⇒ M
Claim: BNE ⇒ M.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• Add and cancel payments:
z′′xi(z′′) + z′xi(z
′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) + z′xi(z
′′)
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BNE ⇒ M
Claim: BNE ⇒ M.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• Add and cancel payments:
z′′xi(z′′) + z′xi(z
′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) + z′xi(z
′′)
• Regroup:
(z′′ − z′)(xi(z′′) − xi(z
′)) ≥ 0
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BNE ⇒ M
Claim: BNE ⇒ M.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• Add and cancel payments:
z′′xi(z′′) + z′xi(z
′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) + z′xi(z
′′)
• Regroup:
(z′′ − z′)(xi(z′′) − xi(z
′)) ≥ 0
• So xi(z) is monotone:
z′′ − z′ > 0 ⇒ x(z′′) ≥ x(z′)
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Proof Overview
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
Proof Overview:
1. BNE ⇐ M & PI
2. BNE ⇒ M
3.=⇒ BNE ⇒ PI
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• solve for pi(z′′) − pi(z
′):
z′′xi(z′′) − z′′xi(z
′) ≥ pi(z′′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − z′xi(z
′)
• Picture:
BAYESIAN MD – OCTOBER 20, 201235
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• solve for pi(z′′) − pi(z
′):
z′′xi(z′′) − z′′xi(z
′) ≥ pi(z′′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − z′xi(z
′)
• Picture:
z′′
xi(z′′)
z′
xi(z′)
upper bound
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• solve for pi(z′′) − pi(z
′):
z′′xi(z′′) − z′′xi(z
′) ≥ pi(z′′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − z′xi(z
′)
• Picture:
z′′
xi(z′′)
z′
xi(z′)
z′′
xi(z′′)
z′
xi(z′)
upper bound lower bound
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BNE ⇒ PI
Claim: BNE ⇒ PI.
• BNE ⇒ ui(vi, vi) ≥ ui(vi, z)
• Take vi = z′ and z = z′′ and vice versa:
z′′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′) ≥ z′′xi(z′) − pi(z
′)
z′xi(z′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − pi(z
′′)
• solve for pi(z′′) − pi(z
′):
z′′xi(z′′) − z′′xi(z
′) ≥ pi(z′′) − pi(z
′) ≥ z′xi(z′′) − z′xi(z
′)
• Picture:
z′′
xi(z′′)
z′
xi(z′)
≥
xi(z′)
xi(z′′)
z′′
z′ ≥
z′′
xi(z′′)
z′
xi(z′)
upper bound only solution lower bound
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Characterization Conclusion
Thm: a mechanism and strategy profile is in BNE iff
1. monotonicity (M): xi(vi) is monotone in vi.
2. payment identity (PI): pi(vi) = vixi(vi)−∫ vi
0xi(z)dz + pi(0).
and usually pi(0) = 0.
Questions?
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Workshop Overview
• Are there simple mechanisms that are approximately optimal? Arethere prior-independent mechanisms that are approximatelyoptimal? [Roughgarden 10am & 11am]
• What are optimal auctions for multi-dimensional agent preferences,is it tractable to compute? [Daskalakis 11:30am]
• Are there black-box reductions for converting generic algorithms tomechanisms? [Immorlica 2:30pm]
• Are there good mechanisms for non-linear objectives(e.g., makespan)? [Chawla 3:30pm & 4:30pm]
• Are practical mechanisms good in equilibrium (e.g., “price ofanarchy”)? [Tardos 5pm]
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