interop - dyn inc on dnssec for interopnet
DESCRIPTION
Education sessionTRANSCRIPT
Securing InteropNET with DNSSEC
Cory von WallensteinVP, Engineering – Dyn Inc.
Internet Infrastructure
as a Service
DynECT Managed DNS
& Email Delivery
• DNS is names to numberstwitter.com -> 199.59.148.82
• 5+ Million active users/clients
• 1000+ Enterprise clients
• 250,000+ Zones managed
• 100,000+ Domains registered
• 17 World-wide datacenters
• Billions of queries per day
• Billions of messages annually
User My Bank
Insecure HTTP… end user beware!
http – http://www.local.mybank.com
User My Bank
Add HTTPS… verify domain owner.
https – https://www.local.mybank.com
Is the domain correct?
User My Bank
But what verifies the IP in DNS?
https – https://www.local.mybank.com
Is the domain correct?
But what about the IP address 1.2.3.4 that www.local.mybank.com resolved to…
What verifies that?
www.local.mybank.com A 1.2.3.4
Quick DNS Terminology
Recap
• Authoritative DNS– The “authority” for DNS records– You as a web site owner or
operator designate your authoritative DNS servers at your registrar.
– Trusted information. Keys to the kingdom.
• Recursive DNS– Query authoritative servers on
behalf of clients (performing recursion as necessary) and caching answers for faster future lookups by other clients.
DNS Recursion – Query the recursive server
DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries root...
DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries com
DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries mybank.com
DNS Recursion – Recursive server queries local.mybank.com
DNS Recursion – Recursive server responds to original request
But I see the lock in the
browser window! I see “https” in the
URL!
Aren’t I safe?
• Partially!– The domain is verified– The IP address is not– Implicit trust in your
recursive DNS servers.
• Attack vectors– Single computer
• Edit /etc/hosts– One or more computers
• Man in the middle attack– Many, many computers
• Recursive DNS cache poisoning
DNS Cache Poisoning
You would be securely connected... but to the wrong computer!
Need a way to verify the
information in DNS.
Enter DNSSEC.
• Recursive resolvers and end users alike can verify the information in DNS.
• Chain of trust.– I trust the root nameservers.– The root servers trust .com,
and give me the information I need to verify .com hasn’t been tampered with.
– The .com servers trust mybank.com, and give me the information I need to verify mybank.com hasn’t been tampered with…
DNSSEC Secured
Cisco providing DHCP service through their
CNR
CNR pushes updates to Dynect show
floor hidden master
It's good to have redundancy plus
redundancy is good to have
Sign the update and propagate it to Dynect
Need to handle DNS requests too!
Handle it by show floor anycast recursive
servers.... and here is the complete DNS
picture
How do you sign a zone?
The BIND way (for each and every zone...)– Generate the keys using dnssec-keygen twice, once for the ZSK and
once for the KSK– Store the private keys someplace safe (since anyone with the private
keys can sign as you)– Include the correct keys in the zone file– Actually sign the zone using dnssec-signzone
The DynECT way...
Click “Add DNSSEC”, publish to registrar!
dnsviz.net • Great visualization and debugging tool
• Verify chain of trust
• There’s a computer on this network called:– soloru.ny.enet.interop.n
et.
Get started with DNSSEC.
• Visit our booth - 236
• Reach out–[email protected]–@cvonwallenstei
n–@DynInc–Dyn.com