international safeguards and the role of ssacs and rsacs
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International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and RSACs. Tom Ellacott Director-International Safeguards Division Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11 November 2011 Seminar – 20 Years of ABACC. Introduction. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and
RSACs
Tom Ellacott Director-International Safeguards Division
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission11 November 2011
Seminar – 20 Years of ABACC
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 2
Introduction• Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority
• Evolution of Safeguards in Canada– 1969 Non-Proliferation Treaty– 1972 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement– 2000 Additional Protocol– Sep 2005 Broad Safeguards Conclusion– Dec 2005 State-Level IS Approach for Canada– Jan 2010 SLA established for entire State
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 3
Canadian Fuel Cycle
Uranium Miningand Milling
U3O8
Uranium Refining
UO3
Uranium Conversion UraniumFuel Fabrication
Power Reactors
UO2
FreshFuel
Research and Development
Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs)and Research Reactors
SpentFuel
Spent Fuel
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 4
State-Level Concept
• Change in perspective
• IAEA’s Evaluation Process
• Optimization
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 5
Features of the State-Level ApproachMain Considerations for Canada
– Presence of an IAEA regional office– Natural uranium fuel cycle– Absence of enrichment or reprocessing
Elements– Division of the fuel cycle into Sectors– Secure electronic communication system– Randomization of inspections– Cooperative arrangements with the IAEA
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 6
Sector-Based ApproachSector 1
– Conversion and fuel fabrication facilities– On-load reactors and associated dry storage facilities
Sector 2– Chalk River Laboratories
Sector 3– Research reactors and critical assemblies– Static spent fuel dry storage facilities– Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs)
Sector 4– Mines, mills and decommissioned facilities
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 7
Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-1: Development of IAEA ProceduresCollaborative approach
– IAEA IS procedures developed through a consultative process involving IAEA, CNSC and facility operators
– Total of 10 procedures developed to cover all locations in Canada
– Ownership of documents with IAEA but used as the basis of IS implementation by CNSC and operators
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 8
Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-2: Provision of InformationSecure communication system
– Secure channel for provision of information electronically
– Provides near-real time overview of the flows of nuclear material
– Content and frequency of submissions specified in agreed procedures
– Digital signature provides sender authentication and non-repudiation
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 9
Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-3:Inspector AccessShort-Notice Random and
Unannounced Inspections– For the detection and deterrence of nuclear
material diversion and facility misuse– Detection of borrowing
Physical Inventory Verification– Randomized selection– Short notification– Non-simultaneous inventory takings
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 10
Enhanced Cooperation with SSAC-4:Expansion of Support ActivitiesPhysical Inventory Taking Evaluation
– Assessment to determine if a facility not selected for a physical inventory verification was properly prepared
Information flow– Supervision and administration of near-real
time accountancy and operational information through the mailbox
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 11
Implementation of the SLA-1• Considerations
– Sector-by-sector approach– Determination of priorities
• Established order:– Spent fuel transfers at CANDU stations– Research reactors and LOFs – CANDU stations and bulk handling
facilities– Chalk River Laboratories
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 12
Implementation of the SLA-2
Agreed work plani. Draft procedures agreed to by the
CNSC and the IAEAii. Bilateral meetings between the
CNSC and the facilitiesiii. Trilateral meetings among the
CNSC, the facilities and the IAEAiv. Field trials (as required)v. Operational experience and revision
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 13
Timeline of SLA Implementation
Facility/Activity Implementation Date
Research reactors, Locations Outside Facilities, static spent fuel dry storages
January 2007
Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit power reactors
March 2007
Multi-unit power reactor stations July 2008 Conversion and fuel fabrication facilities
October 2008
Single-unit power reactor stations January 2009 Chalk River Laboratories November 2009Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at single-unit power reactors
January 2010
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 14
PDIs in Canada
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 15
Lessons Learned / Good Practices•Importance of trilateral collaboration
•Recognition of evolutionary approach
•Need for synchronization
•Need for information management
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 16
Future Refinement
• Conceptual– DDG’s vision for information-driven and
objectives-based safeguards– Working group on a revised SLA for Canada
• Procedural/Technical– Quantity and type of information provided– Spent Fuel transfers at multi-unit stations– Material flows at Chalk River Laboratories
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 17
Conclusion
• Achieve the goal of a unified State level approach
• Achieve further efficiencies in the application of safeguards
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 18
Questions/discussions