international relations theory

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORYTHEORY

Zhou QiujunZhou Qiujun

Private email: [email protected] email: [email protected]

Public email: [email protected] email: [email protected]

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ContentsContents1.1. INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION

2.2. METHODS FOR STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORYMETHODS FOR STUDYING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

3.3. REALISMREALISM

4.4. LIBERALISMLIBERALISM

5.5. CONSTRUCTIVISM CONSTRUCTIVISM

6.6. THE ENGLISH SCHOOL THE ENGLISH SCHOOL

7.7. CRITICAL THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS CRITICAL THEORIES OF WORLD POLITICS

8.8. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND GLOBALIZATIONINTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND GLOBALIZATION

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Chapter 3: RealismChapter 3: Realism

I.I. Origin and evolutionOrigin and evolution

II.II. From Classical Realism to NeorealismFrom Classical Realism to Neorealism

III.III. Realist approach to international Realist approach to international cooperationcooperation

IV.IV. Conclusion: strengths and weakness Conclusion: strengths and weakness

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I.I. Origin and evolutionOrigin and evolution

1.1. Founders of Realism-1: Founders of Realism-1: Thucydides Thucydides (c.460 BC-(c.460 BC-c.395 BC), c.395 BC), History of the Peloponnesian WarHistory of the Peloponnesian War, 5, 5thth century BC. century BC.

2.2. The war between Sparta and Athens was inevitable The war between Sparta and Athens was inevitable because of the shift in the because of the shift in the balance of power:balance of power:

The growth of the Athenians to greatness brought The growth of the Athenians to greatness brought fear to the Spartans and forced them to war.fear to the Spartans and forced them to war.

The The unbalance of powerunbalance of power caused by one actor incurs caused by one actor incurs fear and suspicion of the others, and (the others) to fear and suspicion of the others, and (the others) to sustain the status quo, a war is the final solution.sustain the status quo, a war is the final solution.

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““The powerful exact what they can, while the weak The powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must.”yield what they must.”

- Thucydides- Thucydides

Basis of interstate relations: Basis of interstate relations: mightmight rather rather than than rightright

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1.1. Founders of Realism-2: Founders of Realism-2: Niccolò Machiavelli Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-(1469-1527), 1527), The PrinceThe Prince, 16, 16thth century. century.

2.2. The PrinceThe Prince is about the arts by which a Prince (a ruler), is about the arts by which a Prince (a ruler), can retain control of his realm. can retain control of his realm.

3.3. Three fundamental assumptions:Three fundamental assumptions:

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①① The human nature is inherently evil. The human nature is inherently evil.

““men are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, men are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they and as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life and children […] will offer you their blood, property, life and children […] when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they when the need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you.” In this case, princes who rely entirely turn against you.” In this case, princes who rely entirely on their promises and neglected other precautions will be on their promises and neglected other precautions will be ruined because friendships are obtained by payments, ruined because friendships are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind. “Men have less and not by greatness or nobility of mind. “Men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails.”by a dread of punishment which never fails.”

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②② Power politicsPower politics

The essence of politics is to gain and preserve power. In The essence of politics is to gain and preserve power. In that man’s self-desire is endless, a prince, if he wants to that man’s self-desire is endless, a prince, if he wants to control his people and consolidate his dominant position, control his people and consolidate his dominant position, ought to have no other aim or thought than war and ought to have no other aim or thought than war and rules. This is the sole art not only for the rulers but also rules. This is the sole art not only for the rulers but also for those who want to rise from a private station to top for those who want to rise from a private station to top rank. rank.

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Chapter 3: RealismChapter 3: Realism③③ The arts of rulingThe arts of ruling

Two ways of contesting: one by the law and the other by Two ways of contesting: one by the law and the other by force — the first method is proper to men and the second is force — the first method is proper to men and the second is to beasts. However, since the first is frequently insufficient, to beasts. However, since the first is frequently insufficient, a prince is “compelled knowingly to adopt the beast.” A a prince is “compelled knowingly to adopt the beast.” A proper approach is to choose the fox and the lion at the proper approach is to choose the fox and the lion at the same time. “Because the lion cannot defend himself against same time. “Because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. So snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. So it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves.” Whatever ruling arts are adopted, to to terrify the wolves.” Whatever ruling arts are adopted, to maintain the state interests is the key job for any rulers. In maintain the state interests is the key job for any rulers. In order to achieve the state interests, the rulers may order to achieve the state interests, the rulers may manoeuvre any means even unscrupulously. manoeuvre any means even unscrupulously.

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Basis of interstate relations: Basis of interstate relations:

①① evil evil human naturehuman nature

②② power politicspower politics state interestsstate interests

③③ art of rulingart of ruling

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1.1. Founders of Realism-3: Founders of Realism-3: Thomas HobbesThomas Hobbes (1588-1679), (1588-1679), LeviathanLeviathan, 1651., 1651.

2.2. 背景：背景： LeviathanLeviathan was written during the English Civil was written during the English Civil War which resulted in an exodus of the royalists; thus War which resulted in an exodus of the royalists; thus the book emphases the necessity of a strong central the book emphases the necessity of a strong central authority to avoid the evil of disorder and civil war. authority to avoid the evil of disorder and civil war.

3.3. 核心：核心： The The state of naturestate of nature: men are essentially equal in : men are essentially equal in mind and body, and because of this equality of ability, mind and body, and because of this equality of ability, diffidence easily proceeded among them. If two men diffidence easily proceeded among them. If two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; under this condition, both enjoy, they become enemies; under this condition, they will endeavor to destroy or subdue one another. they will endeavor to destroy or subdue one another.

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Chapter 3: RealismChapter 3: Realism4.4. Three main causes for quarrel: Three main causes for quarrel: ①① CompetitionCompetition②② DiffidenceDiffidence③③ GloryGlory

In a world where there is a scarcity of resources, men In a world where there is a scarcity of resources, men exercise force for gains. They do it to exercise force for gains. They do it to guarantee their guarantee their survival and safetysurvival and safety, but also to , but also to make themselves make themselves masters of the other menmasters of the other men. Meanwhile, men may fight . Meanwhile, men may fight just for just for reputationreputation, “as a word, a smile, a different , “as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.” In friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.” In short, when men live without a common power to keep short, when men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in the condition of them in awe, they are in the condition of every man every man against every managainst every man,, where there is “no arts; no letters; where there is “no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”poor, nasty, brutish and short.”

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5.5. Solution for the civil society: all men cede partially their Solution for the civil society: all men cede partially their natural rights to “Leviathan”, a sovereign body with natural rights to “Leviathan”, a sovereign body with supreme authority by means of social contracts to avoid supreme authority by means of social contracts to avoid the perpetual state of war. the perpetual state of war.

Q:Q:

How about the international society? How about the international society?

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On the one hand, the status of sovereign states on the On the one hand, the status of sovereign states on the

international level is akin to that of men in the civil society; international level is akin to that of men in the civil society; they act similarly as the men do in the “state of nature”. they act similarly as the men do in the “state of nature”.

On the other hand, since there is no supreme authority On the other hand, since there is no supreme authority beyond the states in the international society, the “state of beyond the states in the international society, the “state of nature” in international relations is still the state of war.nature” in international relations is still the state of war.

Basis of interstate relations: Basis of interstate relations: anarchyanarchy of international of international society [society [anarchyanarchy=disorder+chaos]=disorder+chaos]

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1.1. E. H. Carr E. H. Carr (1892-1982), (1892-1982), The Twenty Years’ Crisis, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-19391919-1939, 1939., 1939.

2.2. 背景：背景： Carr wrote this book at the eve of the WWII. Carr wrote this book at the eve of the WWII. During that time, the idealist ideas represented by During that time, the idealist ideas represented by the US President Woodrow Wilson’s “fourteen points” the US President Woodrow Wilson’s “fourteen points” after the WWI did not show its success; the incapacity after the WWI did not show its success; the incapacity of the League of Nations, the defects of the Versailles of the League of Nations, the defects of the Versailles system, the national conflicts in Central and Eastern system, the national conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, and the economic crisis in 1929-1933 Europe, and the economic crisis in 1929-1933 plagued the world into a chaos. Under these plagued the world into a chaos. Under these circumstances, Realism which measures the circumstances, Realism which measures the international relations in terms of power showed more international relations in terms of power showed more explanatory strength.explanatory strength.

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3.3. 核心：核心： three major disciplines:three major disciplines:①① power is the decisive element of politics; power is the decisive element of politics;

“politics in one sense is always power politics.”“politics in one sense is always power politics.”②② Morality is rather relative than universal; it is Morality is rather relative than universal; it is

sometimes created by some power’s coercion.sometimes created by some power’s coercion.③③ Both power and morality are indispensable for Both power and morality are indispensable for

an international order, yet compared with the an international order, yet compared with the effects of power, those of morality, public effects of power, those of morality, public opinions or international laws are all limited. opinions or international laws are all limited.

With these perspectives, Carr became the first With these perspectives, Carr became the first to turn Realism into a theoretic system, and the to turn Realism into a theoretic system, and the WWII added a convictive footnote to it.WWII added a convictive footnote to it.

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1.1. Hans J. MorgenthauHans J. Morgenthau (1904-1980), (1904-1980), Politics Among Nations: The Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and PeaceStruggle for Power and Peace, 1948., 1948.

2.2. Six principles of political realism: Six principles of political realism:

①① Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.their roots in human nature.

②② The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. in terms of power.

③③ The concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which The concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.that is fixed once and for all.

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④④ Political realism is aware of the moral significance of Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action, but the universal moral principles cannot political action, but the universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation. They must be filtered through the universal formulation. They must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.concrete circumstances of time and place.

⑤⑤ Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It believes that every nation will justify its universe. It believes that every nation will justify its action by applying the moral laws in its own way.action by applying the moral laws in its own way.

⑥⑥ The difference between political realism and other The difference between political realism and other schools of though is real and profound. Though much of schools of though is real and profound. Though much of the theory of political realism may have been the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political. political.

Hans J. Morgenthau, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Hans J. Morgenthau, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics among Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peacenations: the struggle for power and peace (6 (6thth Edn.) (New York, St. Louis: Edn.) (New York, St. Louis: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1985), pp.4-17.McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1985), pp.4-17.

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ConclusionConclusion

1.1. Key assumptions:Key assumptions:

①① Mankind is inherently evil. Men are born selfish and Mankind is inherently evil. Men are born selfish and competitive.competitive.

②② The international system is anarchical. There is no supreme The international system is anarchical. There is no supreme authority above the states to regulate their interactions; authority above the states to regulate their interactions; the nature of the anarchy is hostile.the nature of the anarchy is hostile.

③③ Sovereign states are the key units of actions in the Sovereign states are the key units of actions in the international system.international system.

④④ States are all rational actors, acting towards their own States are all rational actors, acting towards their own interests instead of those of the other states or the world interests instead of those of the other states or the world as a whole.as a whole.

⑤⑤ States regard security and survival as their overriding States regard security and survival as their overriding interests and power as the best guarantee to ensure them, interests and power as the best guarantee to ensure them, so they “seek power, either as an end in itself or as a so they “seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends”.means to other ends”.

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ConclusionConclusion

2.2. Key words:Key words:

①① Human nature (evil)Human nature (evil)

②② State of nature (international anarchy)State of nature (international anarchy)

③③ State interestsState interests

④④ Power politicsPower politics

⑤⑤ CompetitionCompetition

⑥⑥ Conflict/warConflict/war

……

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II.II. From Classical Realism to NeorealismFrom Classical Realism to Neorealism

1.1. Kenneth N. WaltzKenneth N. Waltz (1924- ): “Structural Realism” (1924- ): “Structural Realism”

2.2. 代表作：代表作： Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Man, the State and War: a Theoretical AnalysisAnalysis (1959), (1959), Foreign Policy and Democratic Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British ExperiencePolitics: The American and British Experience (1967) and (1967) and Theory of international politicsTheory of international politics (1979). (1979).

3.3. Other Neorealists: Robert Jervis, Stephen M. Walt, Other Neorealists: Robert Jervis, Stephen M. Walt, Robert Gilpin, John J. Mearsheimer, etc.Robert Gilpin, John J. Mearsheimer, etc.

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Chapter 3: RealismChapter 3: Realism4.4. Waltz’s Waltz’s Man, the State and War Man, the State and War (1959) analyses the (1959) analyses the

causes of wars by inserting three “images”causes of wars by inserting three “images” （意象）（意象） : :

①① human nature and behaviorhuman nature and behavior““Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive Wars result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity.”impulses, from stupidity.”

②② internal structure of statesinternal structure of states(think about its relations with human nature: water-(think about its relations with human nature: water-container) “the best way of preserving a state, and container) “the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause.” (Jean Bodin) common cause.” (Jean Bodin)

让让 ·· 博丹（博丹（ Jean Bodin, 1530-1596Jean Bodin, 1530-1596 ），法国政治哲学家，以主权理论闻名，代表作），法国政治哲学家，以主权理论闻名，代表作《《国国家论六卷家论六卷》》（（ Les Six livres de la RépubliqueLes Six livres de la République, 1576, 1576 ）奠定了近代政治科学的基础。他将）奠定了近代政治科学的基础。他将“主权”定义为：一个共和国所拥有的绝对和永恒的权力。“主权”定义为：一个共和国所拥有的绝对和永恒的权力。

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③③ international systeminternational system““Each state pursues its own Each state pursues its own interestsinterests defined in ways it defined in ways it judges best. judges best. ForceForce is a means of achieving the external is a means of achieving the external ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable ends of states because there exists no consistent, reliable process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that process of reconciling the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise among inevitably arise among similar unitssimilar units in a condition of in a condition of anarchyanarchy.”.”

5.5. 三“意象”之关系：三“意象”之关系： The first two images are the immediate The first two images are the immediate causes of wars, but their influences can only be causes of wars, but their influences can only be determined when the significance of the third has been determined when the significance of the third has been reconsidered. reconsidered. ““ without the first and second images there without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; while without the third image it is impossible to assess while without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.” their importance or predict their results.”

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6.6. Waltz’s Waltz’s Theory of international politicsTheory of international politics (1979) was (1979) was published at the time when the IRT was experiencing the published at the time when the IRT was experiencing the third Debate over methodology, between traditionalism third Debate over methodology, between traditionalism and science. Absorbing the elements of scientific and science. Absorbing the elements of scientific behaviorism, Waltz constructed his behaviorism, Waltz constructed his system theorysystem theory called called “structural realism”.“structural realism”.

7.7. Waltz’s definitionWaltz’s definition ：：①① ““systemsystem”: a set of interacting units. On one level, it ”: a set of interacting units. On one level, it

comprises a structure which is the systems-level comprises a structure which is the systems-level component making the units form a set rather than a mere component making the units form a set rather than a mere collection. On the other level, the system consists of collection. On the other level, the system consists of interacting units.interacting units.

②② ““system theorysystem theory”: is to show how these two levels operate ”: is to show how these two levels operate and interact. Waltz then simplified the international and interact. Waltz then simplified the international relations to the relations of two variables: the relations to the relations of two variables: the structurestructure of of the international system (system-level) and the the international system (system-level) and the statesstates interacting in it (unit-level). interacting in it (unit-level).

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③③ ““ political structurepolitical structure”: defined by three disciplines: first, ”: defined by three disciplines: first, the principle by which it is ordered; second, the the principle by which it is ordered; second, the specification of the functions of formally differentiated specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; third, the distribution of capabilities across those units; third, the distribution of capabilities across those units.units.

8.8. 国际政治结构三原则：国际政治结构三原则：

①① The ordering principles of international system are The ordering principles of international system are decentralized and anarchic which means there is no decentralized and anarchic which means there is no sovereign authority arranging the interactions of states. But sovereign authority arranging the interactions of states. But it is not inherently disorder; the system is the outcome of it is not inherently disorder; the system is the outcome of the coexistence of self-regarding states. It is “individualist the coexistence of self-regarding states. It is “individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended.”in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended.”

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②② The character of the units in the international-political The character of the units in the international-political structures is like that of the economic units in markets. structures is like that of the economic units in markets. States are “like units” which means that each state is like States are “like units” which means that each state is like all other states in being an autonomous political unit. all other states in being an autonomous political unit. States are functionally similar; they perform or try to States are functionally similar; they perform or try to perform the common tasks. What is different among them perform the common tasks. What is different among them is the possession of capability. is the possession of capability.

③③ As the units of an anarchic system are functionally similar; As the units of an anarchic system are functionally similar; distinctions are made only according to how much distinctions are made only according to how much capability a state has to achieve its goals. Therefore, capability a state has to achieve its goals. Therefore, “states are differently placed by their power.” Waltz “states are differently placed by their power.” Waltz abstract from every attribute of states except their abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities. After doing this, the international-political capabilities. After doing this, the international-political systems become a positional one, in which we see the systems become a positional one, in which we see the placement of like units rather than their own characters.placement of like units rather than their own characters.

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Basis of interstate relations: Basis of interstate relations: structure structure of the international of the international systemsystem

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参考文献参考文献 ((Waltz):Waltz): Waltz, Waltz, Man, the State and WarMan, the State and War,, 重点三意象（重点三意象（ imageimage ）） // 层次分析法，见层次分析法，见

Marc A. Genest,Marc A. Genest, 《《冲突与合作：演进中的国际关系理论冲突与合作：演进中的国际关系理论》》，北大影印版，，北大影印版， 20032003年，第年，第 11-2811-28 页。页。

Waltz, Waltz, Theory of International PoliticsTheory of International Politics, , 北大影印版；可参照上海人民出版社的北大影印版；可参照上海人民出版社的中译本（信强译，中译本（信强译， 20032003 年）。年）。

Waltz, “ The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Waltz, “ The Stability of a Bipolar World,” DaedalusDaedalus, Vol.93, No.3 , Vol.93, No.3 (Summer 1964), pp.881-909. ((Summer 1964), pp.881-909. ( 见见 Phil Williams et al., Phil Williams et al., 《《国际关系经典选国际关系经典选读读》》，北大影印版，，北大影印版， 20032003 年，第年，第 77-8577-85 页。页。

Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Journal of Interdisciplinary HistoryInterdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp.615-28., Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp.615-28. （见邮（见邮箱）箱）

Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International SecurityInternational Security, , Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp.5-41.Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp.5-41. （见邮箱）（见邮箱）

沃尔兹：沃尔兹：《《政治结构政治结构》》，秦亚青编：，秦亚青编：《《西方国际关系理论经典导读西方国际关系理论经典导读》》，北京大学出，北京大学出版社，版社， 20092009 年，第年，第 40-6340-63 页。页。

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III.III. Neorealist approach to international Neorealist approach to international cooperationcooperation

Q:Q: Possibilities of cooperationPossibilities of cooperation Constraints of cooperationConstraints of cooperation Approaches to cooperationApproaches to cooperation

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1.1. Possibilities of cooperationPossibilities of cooperation

In an anarchic world, cooperation could happen on a low In an anarchic world, cooperation could happen on a low level. level.

Classical Realism: a “rational” state seeks power as its Classical Realism: a “rational” state seeks power as its highest end, which makes the anarchic world be filled highest end, which makes the anarchic world be filled with fierce with fierce competitioncompetition. .

Neorealism: an anarchic structure is spontaneously Neorealism: an anarchic structure is spontaneously formed by the interactions of states rather than a formed by the interactions of states rather than a prerequisite of the latter (no causal link). States are prerequisite of the latter (no causal link). States are possible to possible to cooperate if they have interests in commoncooperate if they have interests in common..

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2.2. Constraints of cooperationConstraints of cooperation

①① the logic of “individual rationality” and the logic of “individual rationality” and “collective action problem”“collective action problem”

②② states’ sensitivity on interdependencestates’ sensitivity on interdependence

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Constraints of cooperation-1/2: Constraints of cooperation-1/2: “individual rationality” and “collective action problem”“individual rationality” and “collective action problem”

1. 1. 涵义：涵义：In an anarchic world, every state is In an anarchic world, every state is individualistically rational to maximize its individualistically rational to maximize its national interests; but when each acts upon its national interests; but when each acts upon its own estimation, the “individualistically rational” own estimation, the “individualistically rational” will result in a “collective irrational”. will result in a “collective irrational”.

2. 2. 囚徒困境囚徒困境 && 安全困境安全困境Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Security Dilemma (SD). Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Security Dilemma (SD).

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PD: Cooperation or DefectPD: Cooperation or Defect ？？

TT>>RR>>PP>>SS

R R : the reward for mutual cooperation: the reward for mutual cooperationTT : the temptation to defect : the temptation to defectSS : the sucker’s payoff : the sucker’s payoffPP : the punishment for mutual defection : the punishment for mutual defection

CooperationCooperation DefectDefect

CooperationCooperation RR=3, =3, RR=3=3 SS=0, =0, TT=5=5

DefectDefect TT=5, =5, SS=0=0 PP=1, =1, PP=1=1

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PD: Cooperation or DefectPD: Cooperation or Defect ？？

The ideal case: both players cooperate. This outcome is not The ideal case: both players cooperate. This outcome is not only better than the mutual defect (2R>2P), but also better only better than the mutual defect (2R>2P), but also better than alternating defection and cooperation (2R>T+S).than alternating defection and cooperation (2R>T+S).

The real case: no matter what one player acts, the other The real case: no matter what one player acts, the other will “rationally” choose to defect because defection will will “rationally” choose to defect because defection will gain each player a personal high payoff (DC>CC>DD>CD). gain each player a personal high payoff (DC>CC>DD>CD). If both of the players choose the same strategy, then both If both of the players choose the same strategy, then both of them will defect and attain a payoff of of them will defect and attain a payoff of PP. .

The best choice for individuals is not

that for the group. Individual rationality results in a worse outcome for both players.

DilemmaDilemma

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SD: Offense or DefenseSD: Offense or Defense ？？PD proves that states have little incentive to cooperate in PD proves that states have little incentive to cooperate in an insecure world, which yields “security dilemma” in an insecure world, which yields “security dilemma” in international relations. (arms race)international relations. (arms race)

参考文献：参考文献： Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” Dilemma,” World PoliticsWorld Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (Jan. 1978), pp.186-214., Vol.30, No.2 (Jan. 1978), pp.186-214.

Offense has Offense has advantageadvantage

Defense hasDefense has

advantageadvantage

Not Not DistinguishableDistinguishable Doubly dangerousDoubly dangerous

SD, but security SD, but security requirements may requirements may

be compatible be compatible

DistinguishableDistinguishable No SD, but No SD, but aggression possibleaggression possible Doubly Stable Doubly Stable

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Constraints of cooperation-1/2: Constraints of cooperation-1/2: “individual rationality” and “collective action problem”“individual rationality” and “collective action problem”

3. 3. 绝对收益绝对收益 && 相对收益：相对收益：

““absolute gains”absolute gains” ：： how well they fare how well they fare themselvesthemselves

““relative gains”relative gains” ：： how well they fare how well they fare compared to compared to other statesother states

The relationship among states is a The relationship among states is a zero-sum gamezero-sum game and cooperation is and cooperation is difficult to realize.difficult to realize.

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Constraints of cooperation-2/2: Constraints of cooperation-2/2: states’ sensitivity on interdependencestates’ sensitivity on interdependence

Waltz (2000) affirmed that among the forces that shape Waltz (2000) affirmed that among the forces that shape international politics, interdependence has weak effects. international politics, interdependence has weak effects. Interdependence in some ways promotes peace by Interdependence in some ways promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states and contributing to multiplying contacts among states and contributing to mutual understanding. However it also multiplies the mutual understanding. However it also multiplies the occasions for conflicts that may promote resentment and occasions for conflicts that may promote resentment and even war. To some extent, a good cooperation means close even war. To some extent, a good cooperation means close interdependence which requires the partners to share their interdependence which requires the partners to share their individual information, goods and service. In this case, one individual information, goods and service. In this case, one cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others’ cannot sensibly pursue an interest without taking others’ interests into account and it will be inclined to treat the interests into account and it will be inclined to treat the opposite’s acts as events within its own polity and to opposite’s acts as events within its own polity and to attempt to control them. attempt to control them.

The sensitivity of interdependence makes states fear The sensitivity of interdependence makes states fear and reluctant to cooperate.and reluctant to cooperate.

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3.3. Approaches to cooperationApproaches to cooperation

great powers c. great powers c. power cooperationpower cooperation hegemonic c. hegemonic c.

balance of power c.balance of power c.

核心区别：核心区别： the number of states which is most the number of states which is most proper for cooperation.proper for cooperation.

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①① Great powers cooperationGreat powers cooperation

代表人物：代表人物： Kenneth N. WaltzKenneth N. Waltz主要观点：主要观点： As long as the structure of international politics remains As long as the structure of international politics remains

anarchic, one can never know whether today’s friend will be anarchic, one can never know whether today’s friend will be tomorrow’s enemy, so the only way for global governance tomorrow’s enemy, so the only way for global governance is the dominance by great powers.is the dominance by great powers.

The smaller the number of great powers, the better it is for The smaller the number of great powers, the better it is for the world stability, because it is easier for the state to the world stability, because it is easier for the state to understand the other’s behavior and manage to achieve understand the other’s behavior and manage to achieve mutual benefits. When the number increases, uncertainties mutual benefits. When the number increases, uncertainties will also increase.will also increase.Waltz prefers a bipolar system where “the big two” (“Waltz prefers a bipolar system where “the big two” (“frère frère ennemi”ennemi”) aim to: first, insure the two powers’ own ) aim to: first, insure the two powers’ own autonomy and mobility in action; second, guarantee the autonomy and mobility in action; second, guarantee the maintenance and transformation of the system; third, maintenance and transformation of the system; third, contribute efforts on solving common problems (4P—contribute efforts on solving common problems (4P—poverty, population, pollution and proliferation).poverty, population, pollution and proliferation).

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②② Hegemonic cooperationHegemonic cooperation代表人物：代表人物： Robert GilpinRobert Gilpin主要观点：主要观点： ““logic of collective action”: the problems of public goods—free logic of collective action”: the problems of public goods—free

ride—market failure—necessity of a supreme authority. This ride—market failure—necessity of a supreme authority. This authority has two features: first, it is sufficiently large relative authority has two features: first, it is sufficiently large relative to all others that it will capture a share of the benefit of the to all others that it will capture a share of the benefit of the public good larger than the entire cost of providing it. Second, public good larger than the entire cost of providing it. Second, it has sufficient interest in the good to be willing to bear the full it has sufficient interest in the good to be willing to bear the full costs of its provision. In the civil market, it is the central costs of its provision. In the civil market, it is the central government that can play such role of market intervention. In government that can play such role of market intervention. In the international society, the analogous role is played “by the international society, the analogous role is played “by empires, hegemonies, and great powers that have risen and empires, hegemonies, and great powers that have risen and fallen over the millennia.”fallen over the millennia.”

The “theory of hegemonic stability” argues that the presence The “theory of hegemonic stability” argues that the presence of a single, strongly dominant actor (a hegemon) in of a single, strongly dominant actor (a hegemon) in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for all states in the international system. Either without such a for all states in the international system. Either without such a hegemonic state or the hegemon is in decline can drag the hegemonic state or the hegemon is in decline can drag the international system into chaos and even wars.international system into chaos and even wars.

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Three objectives of the hegemonThree objectives of the hegemon (Gilpin) (Gilpin)

①① To increase its wealth and power by increasing its To increase its wealth and power by increasing its control over territory and conquering other control over territory and conquering other peoples.peoples.

②② To gain political dominance over other states by To gain political dominance over other states by using threats and coercion, the formation of using threats and coercion, the formation of alliances, and the creation of exclusive spheres of alliances, and the creation of exclusive spheres of influence.influence.

③③ To control or at least exercise influence over the To control or at least exercise influence over the world economy (more properly, the international world economy (more properly, the international division of labor). division of labor).

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③③ Balance of power cooperationBalance of power cooperation

代表人物：代表人物： John J. MearsheimerJohn J. Mearsheimer

主要观点：主要观点： ““offensive realism” offensive realism”

The structure of the international system forces states to The structure of the international system forces states to act aggressively toward each other rather than just seek act aggressively toward each other rather than just seek security and maintain status quo. This derives from three security and maintain status quo. This derives from three features of the international system: features of the international system:

①① the absence of a central authoritythe absence of a central authority②② states always have some offensive military capabilitystates always have some offensive military capability③③ states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. It states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. It

is this “fear” compels states to strive for more power and is this “fear” compels states to strive for more power and compete for more share of world power. compete for more share of world power.

The great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest The great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great power but to be the only great one in the of all the great power but to be the only great one in the system—the hegemon.system—the hegemon.

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Human Nature Human Nature RealismRealism

Defensive Defensive

RealismRealismOffensive Offensive RealismRealism

What causes What causes states to states to

compete for compete for power?power?

Lust for power Lust for power inherent in statesinherent in states

Structure of the Structure of the systemsystem

Structure of the Structure of the systemsystem

How much How much power do power do

states want?states want?

All they can get. All they can get. States maximize States maximize

relative power, with relative power, with hegemony as their hegemony as their

ultimate goal.ultimate goal.

Not much more than Not much more than what they have. what they have.

States concentrate States concentrate on maintaining the on maintaining the balance of power.balance of power.

All they can get. All they can get. States maximize States maximize relative power, relative power,

with hegemony as with hegemony as their ultimate goal. their ultimate goal.

The major Realist theories:

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IV.IV. Conclusion: strengths and weaknessConclusion: strengths and weakness

(--1990)(--1990)

Joseph M. Grieco:Joseph M. Grieco:①① it helps us appreciate the impact of the anarchical it helps us appreciate the impact of the anarchical

structure of the international system on the structure of the international system on the preferences, strategies, interactions, and domestic preferences, strategies, interactions, and domestic institutions of states;institutions of states;

②② it helps us appreciate the impact of inequalities on it helps us appreciate the impact of inequalities on international affairs, and in particular inequalities in international affairs, and in particular inequalities in power;power;

③③ it helps us appreciate the importance of continuity in it helps us appreciate the importance of continuity in international affairs, but it also alerts us to the international affairs, but it also alerts us to the pervasiveness of change.pervasiveness of change.

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(1990--)(1990--)

John J. Mearsheimer:John J. Mearsheimer:“The world has not simply moved from bipolarity to multipolarity, but instead we have entered an era where there is little prospect of security competition among the great powers, not to mention war,and where concepts such as polarity and the balance of power matterlittle for understanding international relations. Most states view eachother as members of an emerging “international community,” not as potential military rivals. Opportunities for cooperation are abundant in this new world, and the result is likely to be increased prosperity and peace for almost all the states in the system.”

参考文献： Mearsheimer, “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy,” in Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey (eds.), Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002).

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症结：症结： the causality between the the causality between the world hegemonyworld hegemony and the and the stability of the international systemstability of the international system, which implies: , which implies:

On the one hand, hegemonic powers should intentionally On the one hand, hegemonic powers should intentionally maintain the hegemonic structure to keep the world peace maintain the hegemonic structure to keep the world peace and stability; interstate cooperation is the corollary of such and stability; interstate cooperation is the corollary of such structure. structure.

On the other hand, there is a positive correlation between On the other hand, there is a positive correlation between the hegemonic power and the world stability. Stability the hegemonic power and the world stability. Stability varies according to the rise and fall of the hegemonic varies according to the rise and fall of the hegemonic power, so the hegemons should always increase their power, so the hegemons should always increase their capabilities to increase the stability of the international capabilities to increase the stability of the international system.system.

反例：反例： US hegemonic power —— world conflicts US hegemonic power —— world conflicts

(correlation?)

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例例 ①① ::During the 60s-80s, the US share of world GDP During the 60s-80s, the US share of world GDP (US+EEC+Japan) fell from 60% to 40%, while the (US+EEC+Japan) fell from 60% to 40%, while the international system is dynamic rather than static; it has international system is dynamic rather than static; it has been in transition.been in transition.

例例 ②② ::It is proved invalid that the stronger the hegemonic power It is proved invalid that the stronger the hegemonic power is, the more stable the international system will be. The is, the more stable the international system will be. The decline of the hegemonic power will drag the whole system decline of the hegemonic power will drag the whole system into instability. into instability.

Microsoft Word ÎÄµµ

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参考文献：参考文献： Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the

Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International

Trade,” World Politics, Vol.28, No.3 (April 1976). Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics,

Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978). Robert Axelrod, “The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists,” The

American Political Science Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (June 1981). Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International

Organization, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn 1985). Duncan Snidal, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International

Cooperation,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991).

Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).

Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NY. and London: W.W.Norton & Company, 2001).

夏安凌、黄真：《论新现实主义的国际合作理论》，载《教学与研究》 2006 年第11 期，第 43-49 页。

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