international politics, domestic imperatives, and identity mobilization: sectarianism in pakistan,...

7/22/2019 International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in Pakistan, 1979-1998

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International Politics, Domestic Imperatives, and Identity Mobilization: Sectarianism in

Pakistan, 1979-1998Author(s): Vali R. NasrSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Jan., 2000), pp. 171-190Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/422396.

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InternationalPolitics,Domestic Imperatives,andIdentityMobilization

Sectarianism n Pakistan,1979-1998Vali R. Nasr

Sectarianviolence has risen phenomenally n Pakistanover the past two decades. Ithas extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinalissues between Sunnis, whoconstitute90 percentof the world's Muslims and 75-85 percentof Pakistanis,andShi'is, who constitute 15-25 percentof Pakistanis,andmetamorphosedntopoliticalconflict aroundmobilizationof groupidentity.1 t has developedpoliticalutility,andmilitantorganizations hatchampion ts cause operatefor the most partin the politi-cal rather hanreligiousarena.The principle protagonists n this conflict are the Sunni Pakistan'sArmy of theProphet'sCompanions (Sipah-i Sahaba Pakistan, SSP, established in 1984) andPakistan'sShi'i Movement(Tahrik-iJafaria Pakistan,TJP,formed in 1979) and itsmilitant off-shoot,Armyof Muhammad Sipah-iMuhammad,SM, formedin 1991).They have waged a brutaland bloody campaignto safeguardthe interestsof theirrespective communities. Assassinations, attacks on mosques, and bomb blastsclaimed 581 lives and over 1,600 injuriesbetween 1990 and 1997.2One incident,afive day war nvolvingmortarguns, rocketlaunchers,andantiaircraftmissiles in ahamlet in northwestPakistan n 1996, alone claimed over 200 lives and left severaltimes that number njured.3The escalatingviolence cast a sombermood on the cele-brations of the fiftieth anniversaryof Pakistan'sindependence,which took placehours after a heated debatein the parliamentover a new antiterrorism aw that wasintroduced o combat the problem.The conflict has had a debilitatingeffect on lawand order,undermined he national ethos and the very sense of communityin manyurbanand ruralareas,andcomplicateddemocraticconsolidation.Sectarianismn the Pakistanicontext refersspecifically to organizedand militantreligiopoliticalactivism,whose specific aim is to safeguardandpromotethe sociopo-litical interestsof the particularMuslim sectariancommunity,Shi'i or Sunni, withwhich it is associated.Its discourse of power promises empowerment o that commu-nity in tandemwith greateradherence o Islamic normsin publiclife, as the religioussources and authoritiesof that community articulatethem. These goals are to beachievedthroughmobilizationof the sectarian dentityin questionandthe marginal-ization of the rivalsectarian ommunity, argelythroughprolificuse of violence.

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ComparativePolitics January2000The greaterprominenceof sectarianismin Pakistan'spolitics can be seen as anew phase in Islamistideology andpolitics, especiallyamongthe Sunnis,one that is

more militant and combines the demandfor an Islamic statewith a drive to margin-alize religious minorities,especially the Shi'is. Sectarianismcan, however,be betterunderstoodas a form of ethnic posturing:mobilizationof group identityforpoliti-cal ends in lieu of class, ideology,orpartyaffiliation.4Sectarianism s an enmeshingof the Islamist and ethnic discourses of powerin a state wherein both are prevalent.Sectarianism s tied to Islamism in that thedefining identityis elaborated n termsofIslam,and the ideologicalunderpinningof Islamism also informs the politics of sec-tarianism, although sectarianism places greater emphasis on sectarian purity asopposed to establishmentof a universal Islamic orthodoxy.Still, the sectarian dis-course of powerand its underlyingparadigmof politics are ethnic ; hey predicateparticipation n politics on group identity.Hence, whereas sectarianism n Pakistandisplays far more concern for religious orthodoxythanconfessionalismin Lebanonand Protestantand Catholicpolitics in NorthernIreland, he fundamentaldirectivesof theirpolitics are not dissimilar.The Islamistveneer shouldnot obfuscate the factthat at its core sectarianism s a form of religiopoliticalnationalism.Therefore,ourexaminationof its root causes is directlyrelatedto discussions of identitymobiliza-tion andethnic conflict.

Some Theoretical ConsiderationsIdentity Mobilization and Sectarianism The two principaltheoreticalapproachesin the social sciences to explainingethnicmobilizationhavebeen primordialismandinstrumentalism.5The first views ethnicityas a subjectivelyheld sense of sharedidentity, a natural phenomenonthat is deeply embedded in human psychologyand social relations.6Consequently,ethnic mobilization is integralto the politicallife of culturallyplural societies, especiallywhere class divisions are weak or absent.The second holds that ethnicity is adaptivein face of changing circumstancesandserves as a tool in furthering he interests of political leaders and their constituen-cies. Both the primordialistand instrumentalistpositions are relevantin explainingthe rise of sectarianism.Sectarian dentities could not have been politicized unlessdifferences in beliefs, values, and historical memoriescompelled Shi'is and Sunnisto collective action. Still, these differencesby themselves do not explain the rise insectarianismand its role in society andpolitics. Formost of Pakistan'shistorysectar-ianism has not been a political force. Differences between Shi'is and Sunnishaveonly recently become a notable divide in Pakistan'spolitics. Instrumentalistargu-ments, therefore,havegreaterutilityin explainingsectarianism.Instrumentalistxplanationsemphasizetwo causal factors: economic competitionand the political opportunitystructure.The first stipulates that competition over172



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ValiR. Nasrresourcesand wealth can serve as an impetusto ethnic mobilizationif winners andlosers are separatedby identityor if identitymobilizationholds the prospectof eco-nomic gain.7The second argues that identity mobilization is social and politicalconstruction...creations f elites, who draw upon, distort,and sometimes fabricatematerialsfrom the culturesof the groups they wish to representin orderto...gainpoliticaland economic advantage. 8t follows that,if the structureof a political sys-tem permits the use of identitymobilizationfor political gain or rewardspoliticalleadersfor engagingin identitypolitics, then the political system is likely to experi-ence identitymobilizationandconflict.9The instrumentalistapproachidentifies ethnic leaders as primaryagents inmobilizing identities.The choices and strategiesthey adopt in furthering heirinter-ests as well as the interestsof their communitiespropelethnicmobilization and con-flict.10Ethnic mobilizationis thereforea by-productof political leaders'projectofpower and/or a facet of a community'sdrive for securing economic advantage.1'Althoughrelevantto the discussion here, especially insofar as the actions of Shi'iand Sunni leaders and organizationsare concerned, the instrumentalistapproachdoes not providean adequateexplanationof sectarianism,for it does not take intoaccountthe agencyof international nd state actorsin identitymobilization.International ctorshavegenerallybeen creditedwith determining he context forethnic conflict but not with directly mobilizing the identities involved in it.l2Sectarianismin Pakistanprovides a valuable case study in examining the relationbetween identitymobilization n one stateandinterestsof other states in the interna-tional arena.The particularmix of Islamismandethnicposturing hat underpinssec-tarianismhas found political relevance because it so effectively relates regionalpoweralignmentsto specific politicalconstituenciesin Pakistan; t translates ranianand Saudi/Iraqicompetitionsof power,on the one hand,and tensions born of theAfghan war,on the other,into Shi'i-Sunnistrugglesfor domination.Thus, sectarianconflict in Pakistan highlights the importance of interplay of international anddomesticpolitical factorsin giving rise to, entrenching,and even radicalizing denti-ty cleavages.The high politics of international elationshas shapedthe low domesticpolitics of Pakistan.Theories of ethnic conflict have generallytreatedthe state as a passive actor inidentity mobilization.'3 States fall victim to assertive ethnic forces that serve theinterestsof substateactors who use state institutionsas the arena for their powerstruggles.The intensificationof these strugglesboth signals and causes the weaken-ing and ultimatelythe failure of the state. The case of Pakistansuggests that, farfrom beingpassive victims of identitymobilization,statescan be directlyinstrumen-tal in that process, manipulatinghe protagonistsandentrenching dentitycleavages.Identitymobilizationhere is rootedin the projectof powerof stateactors,not of anelite or a community.Theseactorsdo not championthe cause of any one communitybut see gain in the conflictbetweenthe competingidentities.Thispropositionallows

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ComparativePolitics January2000the theoreticaldiscussion to move beyond elite interests and primordialdifferencesin explaining identity mobilization to look at state behavior in the context of thestructureof state-societyrelationsas a causal factor.State Power and Identity Mobilization The rise of sectarianism suggests thatstates with limited capabilitiesare more proneto manipulatingcleavages of identi-ty.14Such statesarealso less ableto preventother statesfromdoing the same in theirborders.The state in Pakistan s largeand interventionist,but it enjoys only limitedpower and capacity.'5It is greatly constrictedin formulatingcoherentpolicies andfaces strongresistance to their implementation.Variousprivateinterests and socialgroups limit its reachinto society and compromiseits autonomy.It is able to exer-cise effective poweronly intermittently, nd then more clearlyvis-a-vis some socialgroupsand with regard o certainpolicy choices. The stateis thereforeconstrictedbywhat Joel Migdal has termed disperseddomination, circumstances n which nei-ther the state nor social forces enjoy countrywidedomination.l6However,whereasthe state is too weak to dominate, t is strongenoughto manipulateandcan also useforce to respondto challenges to nationalsecurityor regime survival.It is a lameleviathan, to borrow Thomas Callaghy's term in describing the state inZaire/Congo.l7That the state can use force at keyjunctures,however,does not com-pensatefor limitations o statepowerandlack of effective domination.Weakstates can not formulateand implementpolicies effectively (the final shapeof theirpolicies manifests the scope and nature of social resistance),and actions ofstate leadersoften reflect strategiesof survival. '8 n fact, theoreticaldiscussions ofweak stateshave for the most partremained focused on explainingpolicy outcomesin the face of limitations to statepower and capacity.The case of Pakistanexpandsthe purview of the theoretical discussion to include examination of ways in whichstates can contendwith limitationsbefore them proactivelyand in enterprisingways.Here, a weak statemanipulatessocial and culturaldivisions in orderto gain advan-tage vis-a-vis social forces; a divide and rule strategycompensates for failure tobuild statecapacity.This course of action does not make the weak state strong,but itgives it greaterroom to maneuver n the short run,albeit at the cost of underminingsocial cohesion and hence state interestsin the long run. It also suggests that stateactors are principalagents in identitymobilization and conflict in culturally pluralsocieties, and the manner in which politics of identity unfolds in a weak state is aproductof the dialectic of state-societyrelations.'9

International and Domestic Roots of Sectarian ConflictThe origins of the currentspateof sectarianconflict in Pakistancan be traced to theintensificationof regional politics after the Iranianrevolution of 1979 and start of174



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ValiR. NasrtheAfghanwar in 1980 andthe Pakistanistate'sfailure to prevent he political forcestheyunleashedfrominfluencingits domesticpolitics.The Iranianrevolutionof 1979hada profound mpacton the balance of relations between Shi'i and Sunnicommu-nities in Pakistanand thereforeon the country'spolitics as well. The Iranianrevolu-tion set in motion, first,a strugglefor dominationbetween the Pakistanistate anditsShi'i population and, later, a competition for influence and power in PakistanbetweenSaudiArabiaandIraq,on the one hand,andIran,on the other,an extensionof the Persian Gulf conflicts into South Asia. Both of these struggles for powerhelpedmobilizeandradicalizesectarian dentities.The Implications of Mobilization of Shi'i Identity The Iranian revolutionchanged the characterof both Sunni and Shi'i politics in Pakistan. Its impact onShi'is was, however,more directandin turn nfluencedthepolitics of Sunniactivismas well.20The ideological force of the revolution,combined with the fact that thefirst successful Islamic revolutionhad been carriedout by Shi'is, emboldened theShi'i communityandpoliticized its identity.Soon afterthe success of the revolutionin Tehran zealous emissaries of the revolutionary regime actively organizedPakistan'sShi'is, which led to the rise of the TJPand its variousoffshoots. Iranianswereno doubteagerto exporttheirrevolution o Pakistan.The leadershipof the rev-olutionwas also unhappywith GeneralMuhammadZia ul-Haq,the militaryruler ofPakistan,for having traveled to Iranin 1977-78 to shore up the shah'sregime. Inaddition,after the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan n 1980 General Zia'sgovernmentbecame closely allied with the United States, with whom Iranwas increasinglyatloggerheads.More important,Zia'sregimewas then in the midst of an ambitiousIslamizationprojectthat sought to transformstate institutions, aws, and policymakingin accor-dancewith Islamicprecepts.Pakistan's slamizationdifferedfromIran'sown experi-ment in many regards. In fact, it was this competition between Shi'i and SunniIslamisms-the Iranianand Pakistanimodels-that lay at the heart of Iran'spostur-ing towardPakistanand also providedPakistan'sShi'is with a cause to rally around.

The IslamizationpackagethatGeneralZia unveiledin 1979, despite its claims ofIslamic universalism, was in essence based on narrow Sunni interpretationsofIslamic law and was thereforeviewed by Shi'is as interferencewith their religiousconduct anda threat o theirsociopolitical interests.21n fact, the Islamizationpack-age produceda sense of siege among Shi'is thathas since animated heirmilitancy.Shi'is made theirposition clearwhen Zia'sregime sought to implementSunni lawsof inheritanceandthe rules thatgovernthe collection of the obligatory Islamicalmstax (zakU), whichthe statewas charged o collect in the name of Islam,as the law ofthe land. Throughout1979-80 Shi'is mobilized in opposition to these laws. Theirprotestsculminated in a two-day siege of Islamabad n July 1980. Faced with thestrong Shi'i protest and significant pressurebroughtto bear on Pakistanby Iran,175



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ComparativePolitics January2000Zia'sregime capitulated.It recognizedShi'i communalrights,thus legitimatingsec-tarianposturing, and exempted Shi'is from all those aspects of the Islamizationpackagethat contravenedShi'i law.The Shi'i victory was deemed ominous by many in the rulingregime.The mili-tarywas perturbedwith the Shi'i show of force, especiallybecause Shi'i demonstra-tors had defied martial aw with impunitythanks to Iranianpressure.Shi'i mobiliza-tion was thereforeviewed as a potential strategicproblemthat was involvingIraninthe domestic affairsof Pakistan.The formationof the TJP and its militant studentwing in 1979, their assertive politics and emulationof the Iranianmodel, and theemergenceof charismatic Khomeini-like eaders among the Shi'is, notablyArifHusaini,were also instrumental n convincingthe rulingestablishmentof the threatthatShi'i mobilizationposed to stateauthority,as well as to Pakistan's egional posi-tion.22The state'scapitulation o Shi'i demands n 1980 was seen by Zia's SunniIslamistallies as nothingshort of constrictingtheirenvisionedIslamic state and dilutingtheimpact of Islamization. Shi'i protests had in effect reduced Islamization toSunnification, underminingthe universal Islamic claims of the entire process.Sunni Islamistswere not prepared o accept separatebut equal domains for Sunnisand Shi'is. They argued hat Pakistanwas a Sunni stateandits minoritieshad to liveaccording to the norms and laws of the state, closely parallel to the way theBharatiyaJanataParty(IndianPeoples Party,BJP) argues against exemptionsfromcivil laws afforded to Muslims in India. They also denied the legitimacy of Shi'imobilizationby arguing that Sunnismwas Islam and, by implication,Shi'ism wasoutsidethe pale of Islam.The organizationalprowessof the TJP was meanwhileseen as a sign of hardeningof Shi'i identity.Sunni Islamizersconcluded thatthey would not be able to win overShi'is and integrate hem into their promised Islamic order.Shi'is exhibited disloy-alty to Pakistanand its Islamic ideology. Thus,Zia and his Islamistallies developeda concerted strategy for containing Shi'i mobilization and limiting both PakistaniShi'is and Iran's nfluence in Pakistan.

Pakistan nitially sought to resolve the problemthroughdiplomacy.For the betterpartof 1980-81, foreignministerAgha Shahi, who favored conciliationwith Tehran,soughtto dissuade Iranfrom meddling in Pakistan'sdomestic affairsand to enlist itssupportin pacifying the Shi'is.23 However, Iranwas implacable. Perturbedby thefailureof the diplomaticinitiative Zia looked for other ways of contendingwith theShi'i problem. Due to successful social resistance to the state'spolicy initiative,combined with the intrusion of outside forces into the body politic, state leaderslooked to mobilizing sectarianidentities as a means of contending with the chal-lenges beforethem.This course of action also respondedto the entwiningof Shi'i mobilization withthe prodemocracymovement and the channelingof its energies into opposition to176



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ValiR. Nasrmartial law. In 1983 the TJPjoined the multipartyMovement for RestorationofDemocracy.The movementwas formedby BenazirBhutto's PakistanPeoples Party(PPP)to oppose the military'sdominationof politics. Shi'is had been favorablydis-posed to the PPP ever since the 1970s.24By joining Bhutto's anti-Ziacoalition theTJP furtherentrenched hat supportand tied Shi'i sectarianposturingvis-a-vis thestate to the issue of democratization.The broadidentificationof the militaryregimewith Sunnismand,conversely,Shi'ism with the prodemocracymovementgave sec-tarian dentities new political significance.The militaryregimeassumed thatsectari-anism would problematize he PPP's close affiliation with Shi'is. For in an environ-mentof heightenedsectarianism-which the militaryhopedwould convenientlycastthe strugglefor democracyas one of Shi'i versus Sunni-the more numerousSunnicommunitywould likely move away from the PPP. To this end the ruling militaryregimelent support o Sunnisectarianismand soughtto use it as a means of balanc-ing the PPP'sbase of supportamong the Shi'i with an anti-PPPSunni one of itsown.25The Rise of Sunni Militancy Zia's regime began its efforts to contain Shi'iassertivenessby investing in Sunni institutionsin general and Sunni seminaries inparticular.26 urricular eformsin the seminariesopenedthe door for theirgraduatesto enter the modern sectors of the economy and join government service. Thischange, it hoped, would entrench Sunni identity in the public arenaand in variousstate institutionsand governmentagencies. The statethuspromoted Sunni Islamismonly to confront he political andgeostrategic hreatof Shi'i Islamism.With this aim in mind the state concentratedon strengtheningSunnism in areaswhere the Shi'i threat was perceivedto be greatest.Muchof this effort was under-taken by Pakistan's military and its elite intelligence wing, the Inter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI).Throughout he 1980s the militaryhelpedorganizemilitantSunnigroups in Punjaband North-WestFrontierProvinceandprovidedfundingfor semi-naries in Baluchistanand North-WestFrontierProvince,provincesthat abut Iran.27As one observerremarked, if you look at wherethe most [Sunni]madrassahs semi-naries] wereconstructedyou will realizethat they forma wall blockingIranoff fromPakistan. 28 he military's involvement in sectarianismwould grow over time asSunni militancy developed organizational ties to the Islamist resistance in theAfghanwar.As part of this strategy,in 1988 the central governmentpermitted maraudingbands of Sunniactivists to raidthe town of Gilgit, the center of the NorthernAreasof Pakistan,kill some 150 Shi'is, andburnshopsandhouses.29The government henproceededto build an imposing Sunni mosque in the center of the predominantlyShi'i city. (If the NorthernAreasbecame a province, it would be the only one with aShi'i majority.)In time this course of action gave rise to greatermilitancyand per-petuated the cycle of sectarianviolence. The ruling establishmenteventually foundthis strategyself-defeating.The mountingcosts of sectarianismpresentedthe state

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ComparativePolitics January2000with serious problemsonce thesnake began to devourthe snake-charmer, o usethe Gramscianmetaphor.State leadersdid not find it easy to reversethe trend.

The state's efforts to contain Shi'i resurgencewere complimentedby those ofSaudiArabiaandIraq,who were also concernedabout Shi'i activismin Pakistanandwhatthey saw as Iran'sgrowinginfluence there.In 1980 Iraqbegana warwith Iranthat lastedeight years, and Saudi Arabiawas waryof Iran's deological andmilitarythreatand was leading a bitter campaign to contain Iran'srevolutionaryzeal andlimit its power in the Persian Gulf region. Since then Saudi Arabia has sought tohardenSunni identity in countries aroundIran,a policy that extends into CentralAsia. Pakistanwas important n the strugglefor controlof the PersianGulf, as wellas in the erection of a Sunniwall aroundIran. Saudi Arabia and Iraqthereforedeveloped a vested interest in preserving the Sunni character of Pakistan'sIslamization.The two statesbegan to finance seminariesand militant Sunni organi-zations,the primarybeneficiaryof which was the SSP.The onset of the Afghanwar furtherdeepenedSaudi Arabia'scommitmentto itsSunni clients in Pakistan.In fact, the funding that Saudi ArabiaprovidedAfghanfighters also subsidizedmilitant Sunni organizations n Pakistan,often throughtheintermediaryof Pakistan'smilitary.Afghanistan'sTalibanand the SSP,as well as itsoffshoot in Kashmir, he Movement of the Companionsof the Prophet(Harakatul-Ansar), all hail from the same seminaries and receive trainingin the same militarycamps in North-WestFrontierProvinceandsouthernAfghanistanthatoperateunderthe supervisionof the Pakistanmilitary.The most famous of these facilities was theal-Badrcamp in southernAfghanistan,which was destroyedby the United States in1998 in retaliationof bombingof American embassies in East Africa. Since 1994 itserved as a principal training facility for the Taliban, SSP, and Harakat ul-Ansar.Similarly,Ramzi Ahmed Yusuf, convicted of bombing the WorldTradeCenter inNew York, was affiliated with a Saudi-financed seminary in Baluchistan that wasactive in the Afghan war but had also been prominent in anti-Shi'i activities inPakistan.Yusuf is allegedto have beenresponsiblefor a bomb blast that killed twen-ty-four people in the Shi'i holy shrineof Mashad n Iran n June 1994.30

The Saudi and Iraqi involvement in effect transplantedthe Iran-Iraqwar intoPakistanas the SSP and its allies and theTJPand its off-shoots began to do the bid-ding of their foreign patrons.The flow of funds from the Persian Gulf continued toradicalizethe Sunnigroupsas they sought to outdo one another n their use of vitriolandviolence in orderto get a largershare of the funding,turningsectarianposturinginto a form of rent-seeking.Since 1990 Sunni sectariangroups have assassinatedIraniandiplomats and military personnel and torched Iranian cultural centers inPunjab.Attacks on Iraniantargetshave been launched in retaliation for sectarianattacks on Sunnitargets. By openly implicatingIran in attacks on Sunnitargetsandretaliating against its representativesand properties in Pakistan, Sunni sectariangroups have sought to complicate relations between Tehranand Islamabad and to178



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ValiR. NasrportrayPakistaniShi'is as agents of a foreign power.When in September1997 fiveIranianmilitarypersonnelwereassassinated n Rawalpindi, he IranianandPakistanigovernmentsdepictedthe attackas a deliberateattempt o damagerelationsbetweenthe two countries.31 he killing oftwenty-two Shi'is in Lahore n January1998 esca-lated tensions between the two countries further as Iran openly warned Pakistanabout the spreadof Sunnimilitancy.32The use of sectarianism o contend with theimpactof the Iranianrevolutionthus produceda wider regional struggle for powerthatquicklywentout of the control of the Pakistanstate.

The Impact of the Afghan WarThe Afghan war,meanwhile,helped aggravatethe situation.33First, SaudiArabia'srole helped boost Sunni militancyin Pakistan-often in conjunctionwith elementsin Pakistan'smilitary-and limitedPakistan'swillingness or ability to containSaudiexercise of power within its borders.34In addition, the Afghan scene itself waswroughtwith sectariantensions as Shi'i and Persian-speakingpro-Iranian actionsvied for powerandpositionwith the SaudiandAmerican-backedMujahedingroupsbased in Pakistan.The rivalrybetween these groupsand the competitionfor controlof Afghanistan neluctablyspilled over into Pakistan.The advent of the Talibanonlyreinforced the linkage between regional power rivalries and sectarianism. Mostnotably, he escalationof tensionsbetweenthe Talibanand the Iraniangovernment nAugust-September1998 set the stage for a wider regional Shi'i-Sunni conflict thatwill likely furtheranimatesectarianism n Pakistan,controlits ebbs and flows, anddetermine he extentandnatureof the state'sresponseto it.35From the outset Pakistan'sresponseto sectarianismwas entangledwith its ownAfghan policy. For instance, in 1994-96, while the governmentbegan to reign inSunnimilitancywithin Pakistan,which was by then deemedto be out of control, itwas promoting it in Afghanistanand Kashmir.In 1994 the government launchedOperationSave Punjab,which led to the arrestof some forty sectarianactivists andsought to close seminariesto deny the TJP and SSP recruits.36Yet during 1994-96the governmentalso organizedmilitant Sunni seminary students into TalibanandHarakatul-Ansarunits for Pakistan-backed perations n Afghanistanand Kashmir.In the end, seminaries-and hence the SSP-thrived despitethe crackdown.In fact,since the advent of the Taliban Sunni militancy has become more prominent.Increasingly,young activists are looking to the Talibanas a model. Duringa recentdemonstration n Karachi,protesters auntedgovernment eaders,proclaiming: Donot think of us as weak. WehaveoustedSoviet troopsandinfidels fromAfghanistan,we can do the same in Pakistan. 37 ontainingsectariangroups thereforerequiresbalancingPakistan'smilitarycommitment o theTaliban n Afghanistanandthe gov-ernment'sdesireto maintain aw andorderwithinits borders.

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ComparativePolitics January2000TheAfghanwarwas also importantn otherregards.The decade-longwar flood-ed Pakistanwith weapons of all kinds and ensconced militancyin its political cul-

ture, especially among Islamist groups.The Kalashnikovculture made sectarianconflictsbloodierand transformedmilitantorganizations nto paramilitary nes. Thewar also gave rise to powerfulcriminalnetworks n Pakistan hatprofit fromtrade ncontraband ndnarcotics.The collapse of the statein Afghanistan ed to the markedrise in productionof heroin, which found its way to internationalmarketsvia thePakistaniport city of Karachi.38The heroinproductionspawned importantpoliticalrelations which includedMujahedin ighters,who used the narcoticstradeto subsi-dize theirwar against the Soviet Union, tribal leaders,Pakistanimilitarycomman-ders,andcriminalgangs in Pakistan.The narcotics tradeeventuallyproducedformi-dablecriminalnetworkswhose reach extendsthrough he lengthof the country, romthe borders of Afghanistan n the north to the port city of Karachi n the south. Therelation between criminal networks and militant activists first surfaced inAfghanistan itself. There, political and economic ties with some of the AfghanMujahedinunits worked in largely the same manner as those seen between druglords and leftist guerrillas n LatinAmerica.Over time the drugtradedevelopedties with sectarianorganizations,replicatingin Pakistan the economic and political relationshipthat had alreadydeveloped inAfghanistan between militant groups and drug traffickers. Many of the AfghanMujahedin ighterswho became tied to the narcoticstraffichave also been involvedin sectarian conflict. The Mujahedin thus helped forge linkages between theirPakistani sectarianallies and theirpartnersamong drugtraffickers.The drug trade,in addition, found sectarian violence a useful cover for its criminal operations.Sectarian organizations have accepted the pact with the devil for the most partbecause it has been financiallybeneficial and has providedthem with expertiseandresources in perpetuatingviolence. There are also cases where the criminalshaveactuallyset up sectarianorganizationsas fronts for criminalactivity.39Criminalnet-works have thus become deeply embeddedin the politics of sectarianism,and theirfinancial, political, and criminal interests in good measure control the ebbs andflows of sectarianism.The resultis an Islamizationof criminalactivity and criminal-izationof segmentsof Islamism n Pakistan.The authorities n Pakistan find it difficult to crack down on activities that areassociated with organizationsthat operate in the name of Islam and claim to bedefending its interests. Police action againstcriminals is seen as harassmentof thetrueservants of the faith and thus faces resistance from local communities.In addi-tion, since sectarianism nvolves religion, sectarian activists have had the tacit sup-portof some of largernationalpartiesthat haveroutinelyusedtheir influenceto pro-tect sectarianactivists from prosecution. By associating themselves with sectarian-ism, criminalorganizations,particularly maller criminalnetworks,have benefitedfrom thatprotection.The participationof the criminals n sectarianconflict has esca-180



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ValiR. Nasrlatedthe violence, for hardenedcriminalshavebeen morewilling to attackmosquesandpeople at prayerand have generallybeen more willing to kill. The rising powerof narcoticstradehas therefore annedthe flamesof sectarianism.Consequently, he state's control over both sectarianand criminal forces has beenweakened. Its ability to contend with violence has been restricted.And in manyplaces in the countrythe combined forces of sectarianand criminalorganizationshave eliminated stateauthorityaltogetherandreplacedit with local political controlrootedin criminalactivityandsectarianpolitics.

The Predicament of a Weak StateWhile intensification of regionalconflicts was instrumental n giving rise to sectar-ianism in Pakistan,the vicissitudes of Pakistanipolitics decided the directionthatthis form of identity mobilization has taken and the role it has come to play instate-society relations. Sectarianism has increased as the center in Pakistan hasweakened. Its raging violence manifests the debility of state institutions.Throughout the 1980s a bloody ethnic war escalated in Pakistan's southernprovinceof Sind.40The ethnic conflict posed a serious threatto political control ofruling governmentsboth underZia and the democraticallyelected prime ministerswho succeeded him after 1988. This trend has proved particularlyproblematicfordemocraticconsolidation. Weaknessat the centerhas limited the ability of the gov-ernments of Benazir Bhutto (1988-90 and 1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93and 1997-1999) to reform the economy,restore law andorder,andmanagedelicaterelationswith the military.4'The weakeningof the center has also led to greaterassertivenessof local power-brokers-the landed elite and theirnetworks of strongmenfor the most part.42ThePakistani state since its creation relied on these local powerbrokers o govern theruralareas.43As the center weakened over the years, especially after 1988, and com-petition between ruling governmentsand their oppositions grew more intense, thelanded elite became more autonomous,and the state'sauthority n rural areas dwin-dled. In Punjaband North-West Frontier Province an important space-liberatedzones of sorts-was createdin which sectarianorganizationsand criminal elementscould operate.In many instances, the landed elite has provided protection for theburgeoningsectarianand criminalnetworks.In these cases, it has received financialbenefits from criminal activities and used sectarian forces as privatemilitias.44Asstateauthorityhas begunto retract rom the ruralscene, thepowerstructureassociat-ed with the landedelite has acted as the de facto local government.Here, sectarianforces have served as the much neededorganizationalmuscle of the ascendantruralpowerstructure.The Islamic veneer of sectariangroups has conveniently served tolegitimate the authorityof the local power structureand limit the ability of the state

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ComparativePolitics January2000to infringe upon it. The rise in the political fortunes of the local powerbrokershasthereforeoccurredunder he coverof sectarianismandhelpedentrench t in politics.

This trend has been helped by the fact that the levers of power have becomeincreasingly neffective.This ineffectivenessis most evidentin limitationsbeforethepowersof the police, the force most immediatelyconcernedwith containingsectari-an violence. The police in Pakistan s not an effective force; it is corrupt,weak, andill-equipped.Accordingto one estimate,thereare five times as many Islamistmili-tants in the countryas there are policemen.45There is even evidence that sectarianforces have infiltrated the police force.46The ineffectiveness of the police becameclearly evident in October 1996 when it was barred from entry into the village ofThokarNiaz Beig in Punjab,where the militant Shi'i SM is headquarteredndmain-tainsa largecache of arms.In May 1997 the police was dealtyet anotherblow whenthe officer investigating he torchingof Iranianculturalcentersin January1997 wasassassinated.Since the assassination he police actually appear o fear confrontationwith sectariangroups,and officers have apologizedto sectariangroupsfor theirpastmisdeeds, hatis, arrestandprosecutionof activists.47The message of the assassi-nation was also not lost on judges, who are provingunwilling to convict sectarianactivists for fear of reprisals.48 n addition, since provincialauthoritiescontrol thepolice, it is difficult for the centerto rely on it to contendwith sectarianviolence.49The problemis compoundedwhen largernationalpartiesor landlords who protectsectarianelements use theirpowerandpositionto preventpolice action. The govern-ments at the center and in the provincesare compelled to restrain he police in theinterestsof maintainingparliamentaryoalitions.

Consequently,when violence reachesa criticalstage, the military has steppedinto restoreorder.In 1992 in Peshawar, n 1995 in Pachinar,and in August 1997 andMarch1998 in North-WestFrontierProvincethe militaryintervened o end the vio-lence. However, hese operationswere limited;the military merely imposed a cease-fire and ended the bloodshed.If the military wereto participate n disarmingmilitantorganizationsand rooting out sectarianism-which some elements in the militaryhave helped organize-it would need a broader mandate and would need to beallowed to assume a greaterpoliticalrole.That solution would not be in the interestsof democracy.This dilemma became clear in August 1997, when the governmentpushed through the parliamenta draconian antiterrorismbill. The bill gave broadpowersto the governmentand police to arrestand try suspects without due processandin contravention f civil rightsstipulated n the constitution.In the towns and hamlets of rural Punjab sectarianismhas also served the inter-ests of a differentsocial stratum.Throughout he late 1970s and the 1980s, owing topopulationpressureandlaborremittances rom PersianGulf states,the urbancentersof Punjabgrew in size, and new ones developedon the edge of agriculturalands.50Urbanization has changed patterns of authority,especially because these urbandevelopmentshave been dominated by the Sunni middle classes and bourgeoisie,182



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Vali R. Nasrtradersand merchantswho are tied to the agriculturaleconomy but are not partofthe ruralpower structure.Increasingly,the burgeoningSunni middle classes havedemandeda say in local politics and have thuschallengedthe politicalcontrol of thelanded elite. In these areas of Punjab,such as Jhangand Kabirwala,where Shi'ilandlords hold power over Sunni peasants, the rising Sunni middle classes haveemphasizedsectarian dentityin the mannerdescribedby instrumentalist heories asa means of weakeningthe Shi'i landedelite. Hence since 1986 urban areas in theJhangdistrict of Punjab,where Shi'i landlordsand Sunni middle classes now com-pete for the allegianceof Sunnipeasants,have been the centers for militantseminar-ies and the scene of most of the sectarianviolence.The Sunni middle class support or sectarianismn Punjabreinforcesthe effect ofsectarian organizations' alliances with other local powerbrokers to extend thepurview of Sunni militancyfrom towns to villages. The sectarianforces have usedthese circumstances o furtherweaken the state'spresenceat the local level, combin-ing theirattack on the statewith their desiredpurgeof Shi'is. Between JanuaryandMay 1997 the SSP assassinatedseventy-five Shi'i municipalofficials and communi-ty leaders.Althoughthe attacks had sectariancoloring, the targetswere also agentsof the state.51The purge of Shi'i local officials was designed to open the way forappointmentnot only of Sunni officials, but also of officials who would be morefavorablydisposedtowardstrengtheninghe rising local powerstructure.The attackon the state was unmistakable.

The responseof Shi'i landlordswith few exceptions has been to gravitate owardright-of-centerparties,most notablythe PakistanMuslimLeague (PML). They con-cludedthat,whereas traditional eligiousand feudalties could keep theirShi'i peas-ants in check, associationwith the PML was necessary to placatetheir Sunni con-stituents.As they became more powerful within the PML and were able to limitsomewhat the party's support for Sunni sectarianism,their positions within theirconstituenciesstrengthened.Shi'i landlordsthus created sectarianbridges and pro-tectedShi'i interests n the PML but did not eliminate sectarianism.Demographic changes in Karachi have been similarly instrumental n sectarianidentity mobilization in that city. In recent years the number of Pathans-fromNorth-West Frontier Province and Afghanistan-in Karachihas grown markedly.This communityhas been closely tied to both Sunni orthodoxy and militancy andhas benefited more directly from the legal as well as illegal financial linkages thathave been spawned by the Afghan war. Pathanascendancy eventually precipitatedconflict with Muhajirs, the dominant ethnic community in the city.52 Since theadventof this conflict in 1985 sectarianismhas served the interests of Pathansandthe financialnetworks hat are tied withthem,for it can draw a wedge between Shi'iand Sunni Muhajirsand weaken the hold of the dominant Muhajirparty (MQM),many of whose leaders are Shi'i, over thatcommunity.By redefining the main axisof conflict in Karachias sectarianrather han ethnic, Pathanshope to reduce resis-

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ComparativePolitics January2000tance to theirgrowing political and economic presencethere.In many ways Pakistanhas become an archipelagoof stability.The state'spowerexists in pocketsandregions andis absent in others.The statehas, as of late, begunto view this developmentwith alarm.Not only does it not look favorablyon limits toits powerandreach;the shrinkageof statepowerin the ruralareascan translate ntounmanageablesectarian conflict and criminal activity and weaken Pakistan in itsregionalpower strugglewith its perennialnemesis, India.The statehelpedfoster sectarianconflict in the first place butbecauseof its grad-ual weakeninghas been slow to controlit, particularlybecause in Pakistan he rise ofsectarian conflict has coincided with democratization.The fragility of democraticinstitutionscombinedwith intense competitionbetweenpolitical parties and actorshas furthereroded state power and created circumstancesthat are particularlyper-missive to sectarianconflict. For, ust as state institutionshave dithered n stymieingthe tide of sectarianism,variouspolitical actorshave followed the example of stateleaders in the 1980s in manipulatingsectarian identities to serve their interests.Problemsof democraticconsolidationhave consequentlyhelped ensconce sectarian-ism in the politicalprocess.

Sectarianism,Weak Democracy,and Crisis of GovernabilityThe first three generalelections after the returnof democracyto Pakistan, n 1988,1990, and 1993, failed to produceviable parliamentarymajorities.The election of1997 was the first to give a strong majorityto one party,Nawaz Sharif's PakistanMuslimLeague.The managementof parliamentaryoalitions thereforebecame cen-tral to national and provincial politics. The competition between rival coalitionsplaced a premium on every member of the national and provincial assemblies.Governmentand opposition partieswent to great lengths to curry favor with them.Fringe parties and independentsbenefited most from these circumstances,as theywere able to exertpower andinfluence beyond whattheir numberswarranted.

The first three elections also gave the oppositionparty direct or indirect controlof some provinces.Since manypolice andjudicialpowers lie with the provinces, thecenterfound it difficult to controlsectarianviolence, and the provinces-and, manyin Pakistanargue,the military-found it prudent o use the instabilitycreatedby theviolence to weaken the centralgovernment.Sectarianparties and their allies exploited these circumstancesto pursue theiractivities. After 1988 representativesassociated with sectarian parties, and after1990, when the SSP rancandidatesof its own andwon seats to nationaland provin-cial assemblies, members of sectarianparties could exert significant influence. Forinstance,the PPPhad to give the SSP a provincialministerialposition in the Punjabprovincial cabinetbetween 1993 and 1996 in orderto get the party'ssupport and184



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ValiR. Nasrdenyit to the PML.Theruling partiesturneda blindeye to sectarianactivitiesandinessence gave the activists immunityfromprosecutionfor criminaland violent acts.The SSP member of Punjab'scabinet between 1993 and 1996 had eight cases ofmurderregisteredagainsthim.53Not until the PML handilywon the 1997 generalelections and gained control at the center as well as in Punjab and North-WestFrontierProvince-and was thus relievedof the considerations hat hadhithertogov-ernedits position on sectarianism-did the governmentbegin to crack down on sec-tarianforces in earnest.It arrested1,500 activists between Februaryand May 1997,closed a Shi'i seminaryfor sectarianactivities in July, pushedthroughparliamentanew antiterrorismaw in August,androundedup more activistsafter the resumptionof sectarianviolence in January1998.54 t has become apparent hateffective gover-nanceat the center,which is directlytied to the questionof statepower,is necessaryfor contendingwith sectarian violence. Moreover,the fortunes of sectarianismaretied to those of democratic consolidation. Still, the scope of the problem extendsbeyondthe crisis of governability hat followed democratization.Forthis crisis pro-vided opportunityand encouragement o politiciansto use sectarianism n the man-nerfirst used by stateleaders,to serve theirpoliticalends as well as to shoreup gov-ernmentauthority.The patternof decision making of Benazir Bhutto'sgovernmentbetween 1993 and 1996 is particularlynstructive n this regard.Duringher second term of office (1993-96) BenazirBhutto'sgovernment ookedat the problemof sectarianismdifferently.She followed the policy of exchangingimmunityfrom prosecutionand freedomof activityfor sectarian orcesfor theirsup-portbutbeganmore directlyto use sectarianism o the advantageof her own govern-ment.At the time, her partystill enjoyedstrongsupportamong Shi'is, and the TJPwas tacitlyalliedwith her party.Confidentof Shi'i support,she beganto explorethepossibility of making inroads into the Sunni vote bank. Her main success in thisregardwas the Party of Ulamaof Islam(Jamiat-iUlamaIslam, JUI).The JUI madea deal with the PPP as a result of which it received access to importantaspects ofgovernmentpolicymaking.The JUI has had close organizationaland political tieswith the SSP; its prominencein government hereforetranslated nto protectionforSSP activists.Because Benazir Bhuttowas viewed as secularandlackedIslamiclegitimacy,andbecause her governmentwas in direneed of such legitimacy,she was overreliantonthe JUI. Initially Shi'is acceptedher deal with the JUI in the hope that she wouldreign in the JUIand its sectarianallies. However,she was unableto controlthe JUIand its sectarianallies, and instead the JUI began to use governmentresourcestosupport he SSP.This failurebeganto alienatethe PPP'sShi'i supporters.From 1994 onwardsit became increasinglyevidentthatthe governmentnot onlywas incapableof reiningin the JUI and SSP,but was actuallyfanningthe flames ofsectarianism. n local elections in the NorthernAreas, a predominantlyShi'i area,in1994 the TJP won six seats, and the PPP came in second with five. The TJPpro-

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ComparativePolitics January2000posed an alliancewith the PPPthatwould be led by the TJP;the vice-chairmanship(highestelected office) of the territorieswould be held by the TJP.The PPPrefused,demanding hat it lead the alliance andoccupythe majoradministrativepositions.55The PPP eventuallygot its way,took over all the majoroffices, formedthe ministryin the NorthernAreas,anddeniedthe TJPcontrolin its stronghold.The PPP'svicto-ry,however,came at the cost of a breach with theTJP.Shi'is, who were alreadyper-turbedby the PPP'salliance with the JUI, began to view Bhutto as only nominallypro-Shi'ibut in realityunfavorablydisposedtoward heir interests.The TJP was par-ticularlydisturbedby the tussle over controlof theNorthernAreas because the victo-ry therehad been the party'sonly strongelectoralshowing and its first opportunityto exercise power.The TJP flatly refused to accept the PPP's claim to representShi'is, viewing such an outcome as detrimental to its own interests. To make itspoint of view clear,the TJP held a largeanti-PPPrallyin Lahore,the first open signof unhappinessof Shi'is with Bhutto,and was thereforeviewed with alarmby hergovernment.The government,however,preferreddivideandrule strategies o addressingShi'iconcerns and accommodatingthe TJP.Bhutto turnedto the more militant Sipah-iMuhammad SM), forminga tacit alliance with the most sectarianelement amongthe Shi'is. Havinglost the TJP'ssupport,with Shi'i landlordsgravitating owardthePML,the SM was the only Shi'i organization o which the PPPcould turn n hope ofmaintaininga foothold in Shi'i politics. Bhutto was also hoping to use the SM toundermine heTJP'spositionwithin the Shi'i community.The PPPwas borrowingapage from Indira Gandhi'sstrategyin India'sPunjab province. There, in the early1980s, the Indianprime minister used Sikh militants to undermine the moderateSikh party, Akali Dal, which the Congress Party had alienated. Similarly inPakistan'sPunjab, supportfor the militant elements constricted the moderates butalso helped fuel the cycle of violence. By 1995 the PPP government ound itself inthe position of actively supporting he most militantsectarianforces on both sides:the SSP throughthe JUI and the SM in orderto weaken the TJP and maintain afoothold in Shi'i politics. Serving its immediateinterests,Bhutto'sgovernment husresortedto pulverizingcivic order and promotingviolence. Forthis reasonthe TJP,began to move in the direction of the PML. In March 1995 it joined efforts by theNational ReconciliationCouncil (Milli YikjahatiCouncil) to contain sectariancon-flict, which forthe TJPmeantcontaining he SM as well as the SSP.The mainstreamSunniIslamistpartiesand Islamist elements in the PML formedthe council in orderto end sectarianconflict. It also enjoyedthe supportof the Shi'ilanded elite andthe TJP.The Islamistpartiesbelieved that the violence was damag-ing theircause and would eventually providethe governmentand the militarywiththe excuse they needed to crack down on all Islamistparties. The council hoped toshow thatsectarianconflict did not enjoythe supportof mainstream slamist partiesand to dissociateIslamistpolitics from sectarianism.Since both the JUIand the TJP186



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ValiR.Nasrwere on the council, it was hoped that they would cooperatein reining in the SSPand SM.

The council soughtto defuse sectarian ensions by focusing attentionon what allIslamistpartiesshared: he demandfor an Islamic state. Bhutto viewed such a con-sensus as dangerous o herinterests.If Islamistpartieswereable to cobbletogetheraunited frontthatwould focus its energies on the demandfor an Islamic state, theycould pose a threat o her governmentand lay the groundsfor a strongIslamic elec-toral alliance in the next elections.56Bhutto concluded that it would be better forIslamistpartiesand theirconstituencies to fight each otherand spendtheirenergiesin sectarianconflict rather hanchallenge the existing political order.The PPP gov-ernment hereforeactivelyworkedto undermine he council. With the government'sprodding,the JUI distanced itself from the council, and the SSP and SM resumedtheir violent attacks, effectively ending the council.57This developmentwas viewed with alarm in all circles, and especially amongtheShi'i who beganto view the PPPas detrimental o their interests.Bhutto'sbrinkman-ship between 1993 and 1996 alienated the Shi'i community,TJP,and Shi'i landedelite, all of whom went over to the PML. She was never in a position to controlSunni Islamist or sectarianparties,but in attempting o controlthem she lost the oneconstituencythat since 1970 had been committed to the PPP.Bhutto'sstrategyinturnprovidedthe PML, which had been more closely associated with Sunni inter-ests, with inroads nto the Shi'i vote.

In Pakistan,problems facing consolidation of democracy have furtherweakenedthe center,creatingspace for sectarianism o grow and to use the political process toits own advantage. Faced with competition for power, the political leadership hasused sectarianism as a political tool, as have elements in the military, the landedelite, and criminal networks.The mannerin which state leaders manipulatedcleav-ages of identity in the 1980s has thus increasinglybecome institutionalized n thepolitical process.

ConclusionMobilizationof sectarian dentitiesin Pakistanhas producedan important ault linein the country'spolitics with broad ramificationsfor law and order,social cohesion,and ultimately government authorityand democratic consolidation. The manner inwhich largely theological differences between Shi'is and Sunnis have been trans-formed into a full-fledged political conflict providesnew insight into the root causesof identity mobilization;most notably,it includes internationaland state actors intheoreticaldiscussions.Italso relates the questionof statecapacityandpower, inter-nationally as well as domestically, to identity mobilization and thus provides thebasis for broader rameworks orexaminingit in the ThirdWorld.

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ComparativePolitics January2000Statesoperate n two intersectingarenas,the worldand the domestic.The relativestrengthand weakness of a state determineswhetheror not internationalorces will be

able to pursue heir nterestsn its bodypolitic.Weakstates aresusceptible o intrusionof outside forces and can become the arena for competitionbetween internationalactors.Thatintrusion an affect socialmobilizationandpolarizepolitics along identitylines.The resultant onflicts hen becomeproxywarsbetweenoutsideforces.Weak states are not likely to contend quickly or effectively with the conse-quences. Conversely, he structureof theirpolitics is likely to entrench he divisionsas state leaders'andeventuallysome politicians'manipulatehe emerging cleavagesto further heir interests.These actors are not directlyassociatedwith, speak for, orlead the identitiesthey help mobilize. Hence their fortunes are not directlytied toidentity mobilization, and they do not use it as a means to power in the mannerexplained by instrumentalistheories (althoughthat explanationstill holds true forsectarianactivists).The interests of these actors are ratherserved most immediatelyby the conflict and violence thatfollow identitymobilization.This patternof actionis a response to limitations before state power and capacity. It follows that weakstates are not simply victims of identity mobilization, but manipulate it and canthrive on it. For the state,however,this victory is only pyrrhic,for it gains momen-tary advantagevis-a-vis social forces at the cost of social division, violence, andpoliticalturmoil.

NOTESI would like to thankthe HarryFrankGuggenheim Foundation ndtheAmerican Instituteof Pakistan

Studies for their supportof fieldwork research and MumtazAhmad,MuhammadQasim Zaman,SuhaylHashmi, and anonymousreviewers for ComparativePolitics for their suggestions.The findings of thispaperdraw on personal nterviews withpoliticians, governmentofficials, police andmilitary officers, andmembersof Sunniand Shi'i sectarianorganizations.1. Mobilizationof identity refersto the process by which... a communitydefined in terms of identi-ty]...becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests andaspirations. Milton J. Esman,EthnicPolitics (Ithaca:CornellUniversity Press, 1994), p.28.2. Figureshave been compiled from Herald(Karachi), Sept. 1996, p. 78; Economist, May 10, 1997,p. 34; InternationalHeraldTribune,Aug. 16-17, 1997, p. 1.

3. Newsline(Karachi),Oct. 1996, pp.71-72.4. DonaldHorowitz,EthnicGroups n Conflict(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1985).5. See Esman,pp. 10-12.6. TimothyM. Frye, Ethnicity,Sovereigntyand Transitions rom Non-DemocraticRule, JournalofInternationalAffairs,45 (Winter 1992), 602; AnthonyD. Smith, The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,

Survival,35 (Spring 1993),50-55.7. Horowitz, pp. 105-35; CrawfordYoung,The Politics of Cultural Pluralism(Madison: Universityof WisconsinPress, 1976).8. PaulBrass, EthnicityandNationalism:Theoryand Comparison London:Sage, 1991), p.8.9. CharlesF.Keyes, The Dialectics of EthnicChange, n CharlesF.Keyes,EthnicChange (Seattle:Universityof WashingtonPress, 1981), pp.5-11.

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Vali R. Nasr10. See David Laitin, Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1986)11. The riseof Muslim nationalismand Islamism n South Asia has beenso explained.See PaulBrass,EliteGroups, Symbol Manipulationand EthnicIdentityamong the Muslims of SouthAsia, in David

TaylorandMalcolmYapp,eds., Political Identity n SouthAsia (London:CurzonPress, 1979),pp. 35-77;S. V. R. Nasr, Communalism and Fundamentalism: A Re-examination of the Origins of IslamicFundamentalism, ontention,4 (Winter 1995), 121-39.12. Horowitz, pp. 4-6; RaymondTaras and Rajat Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Conflict: TheInternationalDimension(New York:Longman,1998).13. Brass points to a role for the state in ethnic mobilizationin India,but not a deliberate one. Hearguesthat the centralizingdrive of the state in India since the 1970s has erased the boundariesbetweenfederal and local politics with the effect of makingthe politicalcentermore sensitive to ethnic politics.Brass,EthnicityandNationalism,pp. 111-12.14. On state capabilities,see Joel Migdal,StrongSocieties and WeakStates: State-SocietyRelationsand State Capabilitiesin the ThirdWorld Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1988); Michael Mann,TheAutonomous Power of the State: ItsOrigins,Mechanisms,and Results, ArchivesEuropeennesdeSociologie,25 (1984), 189-90.15. The term state underscores he institutionalbasis of Pakistan'spolitics and the continuityof itsfundamentalcharacteristicsaboveand beyondchanges in governments. See HamzaAlavi, TheStateinPostcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, eds.,Imperialismand Revolutionn SouthAsia (New York:MonthlyReview Press, 1973), pp. 145-73.16. Joel S. Migdal, Introduction:Developing a State-in-SocietyPerspective, n Joel S. Migdal, AtulKohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., State Powerand Social Forces:Domination and Transformationn theThirdWorld New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994), p. 8.17. ThomasCallaghy, FromReshapingto Resizinga FailingState:The Case of Zaire/Congo, n IanLustick, Thomas Callaghy,and BrendanO'Leary,eds., Rightsizing the State: The Politics of MovingBorders(forthcoming).

18. Migdal, StrongSocieties,pp. 26-27.19. See Migdal, Introduction.20. See S. V R. Nasr, TheRise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan:The Changing Role of Islamism andthe Ulama in Society and Politics, ModernAsian Studies (forthcoming). MuhammadQasim Zaman,Sectarianismn Pakistan:The Radicalizationof Shi'i and Sunni Identities, ModernAsian Studies, 32(July 1998),687-716.21. See CharlesKennedy, Islamizationand Legal Reform in Pakistan,1979-89, PacificAffairs,63(Spring 1990), pp. 62-77; MumtazAhmad, Islam and the State:The Case of Pakistan, n MatthewMoen and L. Gustafson,eds.. Religious Challenge to the State (Philadelphia:TempleUniversityPress,1992),pp. 230-40.22. Zaman,pp. 687-716.23. Interviewwith formerforeignministerAghaShahi.24. Syed MujawarHussain Shah, Religionand Politics in Pakistan(1972-88) (Islamabad:Quaid-i-AzamUniversity,1996), pp.261-62.25. It is arguedby manyin Pakistan hat the military uses the instabilitycaused by sectarianviolenceto pressure elected governments. See Samina Ahmed, Centralization, Authoritarianism, and theMismanagement of Ethnic Relations in Pakistan, in Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, eds.,GovernmentPolicies and EthnicRelationsinAsia and the Pacific (Cambridge,Mass.: MITPress, 1997),pp. 107-27.26. S. JamalMalik, Islamization n Pakistan1977-1985: The Ulama and TheirPlaces of Learning,IslamicStudies,28 (Spring1989),pp. 5-28.27. Herald,Aug. 1992, p.67.

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ComparativePolitics January200028. Herald,Sept. 1992,p. 34.29. Herald,Aug. 1992,p. 66.30. MaryAnn Weaver, Children f Jihad, The New Yorker,une12, 1995,p. 46.31. Dawn(Karachi),Sept.20, 1997.32. Dawn,Jan. 16,1998.33. The Afghan war with the Soviet Union ended in 1989 with the withdrawalof the Soviet troopsfromAfghanistan.Thencefortha civil warhas waged for control of the country.The anti-Soviet Islamistforces and the Pakistanimilitarycontinueto be involved in the strugglefor power in Afghanistan.Thealliances that oversawthe resistance to Soviet occupationarethereforestill in place. While the natureofthe Afghanwar has changedover time, from an anti-Sovietwarof independence n the 1980s to a civilwar in the 1990s, the strategicalliances andtheirpoliticalramifications for Pakistanhavechangedlittle.This article thereforedoes not distinguishbetweenthe variousperiodsin thatwar.34. See Marvin Weinbaum,Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder:Westview,1994).35. The escalation of tensions resultedfromthe abductionand murderof a numberof Iraniandiplo-mats andjournalistsby the Taliban n 1998. Iranhas, moreover,accusedthe Talibanof advocating eth-

nic-cleansing of Shi'is, openlycharacterizinghe stand-offbetween the two countriesas a sectariancon-flict. See the comments of the IranianSupreme Leader,AyatollahKhamene'i in Hamshahri (Tehran),Sept. 16, 1998.36. Far EasternEconomicReview,Mar.9, 1995,p. 24.37. Herald,Dec. 1997,p. 64.38. See IkramulHaq, Pak-AfghanDrugTrade in HistoricalPerspective, Asian Survey,36 (October1996), pp. 945-63.39. Interviewswithpolice officials in Karachiand Punjab.40. See Theodore P.Wright,Jr., Center-Periphery elationsandEthnicConflictin Pakistan:Sindhis,

Muhajirs,andPunjabis, ComparativePolitics, 23 (April 1991), 299-312; MoonisAhmar, EthnicityandState Power n Pakistan, AsianSurvey,36 (October1996), 1031-48.41. Nawa-iWaqtLahore),Aug. 24, 1997.42. S. V. R. Nasr, Democracy and the Crisis of Governability n Pakistan, Asian Survey,32 (June1992),521-37.43. S. V. R. Nasr, Pakistan:State, Agrarian Reform, and Islamization, International Journal ofPolitics, CultureandSociety, 10 (Winter1996),249-72.44. Herald,June1994,p. 29.45. Economist,Jan.28, 1996, p.37.46. Interviews, ormerministerof interiorGeneralNasirullahBabur.47. Herald,June1997, p. 53.48. Nawa-i Waqt,Aug. 27, 31, 1997.49. Nawa-i Waqt,Aug. 4, 1997.50. Zaman,pp. 687-716.51. Economist,May, 10, 1997, p. 34.52. FaridaShaheed, The Pathan-MuhajirConflict, 1985-6: A National Perspective, n Veena Das,ed., Mirrorsof Violence:Communities,Riots and Survivors n SouthAsia (Delhi: OxfordUniversityPress,1990), pp. 194-214.53. Herald,Sept. 1996, p. 78.54. Dawn, July 23, 1997.55. InterviewswithTJPleaders.56. InterviewswithQazi HusainAhmad,S. FaisalImam, and MawlanaAbdul-SattarNiazi, who sat onthe council.57. Herald, Oct. 1996, p. 53, June 1997,pp. 54-55.

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