international military tribunal for the far … · page numbers in braces refer to international...
TRANSCRIPT
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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
Judgment of 4 November 1948
Page numbers in braces refer to International Military Tribunal for the Far East, judgment of
12 November 1948, in John Pritchard and Sonia M. Zaide (eds.), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. 22
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{48,413}
Thursday, 4 November 1948
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan
The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at 0930.
Appearances:
For the Tribunal, all Members sitting.
For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
For the Defense Section, same as before.
(English to Japanese and Japanese to English interpretation was made by the Language Section, IMTFE.)
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Contents
PART A - CHAPTER I .............................................................................................. 26
Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal.................................................... 26
PART A - CHAPTER II ............................................................................................. 35
THE LAW .............................................................................................................. 35
(a) JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL ........................................................... 35
(b) RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES AGAINST PRISONERS ................ 37
(c) THE INDICTMENT....................................................................................... 40
PART A -- CHAPTER III ........................................................................................... 42
A SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 42
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY JAPAN...................... 44
EVENTS PRIOR TO 1 JANUARY 1928. ........................................................... 44
SINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-5. ................................................................. 44
FIRST PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE ............................................. 44
THE BOXER TROUBLES OF 1899-1901. ........................................................ 45
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR ................................................................................ 45
TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH............................................................................ 45
TREATY OF PEKING........................................................................................ 46
SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY ................................................ 46
OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CHINA...................................................................... 46
JAPANESE-AMERICAN IDENTIC NOTES OF 1908 ........................................ 47
ANNEXATION OF KOREA................................................................................ 47
CONFLICTING CLAIMS BY CHINA AND JAPAN............................................. 47
TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, SINO-JAPANESE TREATY OF 1915................... 48
ALLIED INTERVENTION IN RUSSIA, 1917-20 ................................................ 49
RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF PEKING, 1925................................... 49
TREATY OF PEACE, 1919 ............................................................................... 49
COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OP NATIONS.................................................. 50
MANDATE OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS ........................................................... 51
MANDATE CONVENTION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 1922........... 52
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE........................................................................ 52
FOUR-POWER TREATY OF 1921................................................................... 52
FOUR-POWER ASSURANCES TO THE NETHERLANDS AND PORTUGAL 53
WASHINGTON NAVAL LIMITATIONS TREATY.............................................. 53
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NINE-POWER TREATY ................................................................................... 54
OPIUM CONVENTION OF 1912....................................................................... 55
SECOND OPIUM CONFERENCE OF THE LEAGUE....................................... 56
OPIUM CONVENTION OF 1931....................................................................... 57
LAWS OF BELLIGERENCY.............................................................................. 57
FIRST HAGUE CONVENTION ......................................................................... 58
KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT................................................................................ 59
THIRD HAGUE CONVENTION......................................................................... 59
FIFTH HAGUE CONVENTION.......................................................................... 60
FOURTH HAGUE CONVENTION..................................................................... 60
GENEVA PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTION................................................ 62
GENEVA RED CROSS CONVENTION ............................................................ 64
TENTH HAGUE CONVENTION........................................................................ 65
JAPAN WAS A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF NATIONS............................... 66
PART B -- CHAPTER IV........................................................................................... 66
THE MILITARY DOMINATION OF JAPAN AND PREPARATION FOR WAR...... 66
INTRODUCTORY ............................................................................................. 66
THE "PRINCIPLES" OF KODO AND HAKKO ICHIU ........................................ 67
THE ADVOCACY OF THESE "PRINCIPLES" BY OKAWA .............................. 67
THE RISE OF THE ARMY UNDER THE TANAKA CABINET........................... 67
EXPANSIONIST PROPAGANDA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE
HAMAAGUCHI CABINET.................................................................................. 68
HASHIMOTO AND THE MARCH INCIDENT OF 1931. .................................... 69
THE WAKATSUKI CABINET AND THE MUKDEN INCIDENT.......................... 70
CONSOLIDATION OF THE ARMY'S POWER DURING THE PERIOD OF THE
WAKATSUKI CABIKET. .................................................................................... 71
THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA DURING THE PERIOD OF INUKAI' S
CABINET........................................................................................................... 72
THE ATTACK ON PARTY, GONVERNMENT AND ASSASSINATION OF
INUKAI. ............................................................................................................. 73
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO CABINET.
.......................................................................................................................... 74
THE PREPARATION OF PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR: ARAKI DISCLOSES
THE ARMY'S PLANS ........................................................................................ 75
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PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO CABINET:
AND THE AMAU STATEMENT......................................................................... 76
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HIROTA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SAITO
AND OKADA CABINETS .................................................................................. 77
ARMY EXPANSION AND GOVERMENTAL ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS ON
THE CONTINENT IN 1935................................................................................ 78
THE COORDINATION OF HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY WITH ARMY
PLANNING........................................................................................................ 79
THE INCREASING POWER OF THE ARMY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE
OKADA CABINET ............................................................................................. 80
THE 26 FEBRUARY 1936 INCIDENT, AND THE DOWNFALL OF THE OKADA
CABINET........................................................................................................... 80
OKADA'S POLICY AND DOWNFALL SHOW THE EXTREME NATURE OF THE
ARMY'S DEMANDE .......................................................................................... 80
HITORA AND HIS CABINET............................................................................. 82
THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING SERVICE MINISTERS TO BE CHOSEN FROM
GENERAL OFFICERS UPON THE ACTIVE LIST ............................................ 82
THE BASIC OF JAPAN'S NATIONAL POLICY WAS DECIDED ON 11 AUGUST
1936 .................................................................................................................. 82
THE PRINCIPLES DECIDED UPON................................................................ 83
THE MEASURE OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DEMANDED BY THE
1936 DECISION ............................................................................................... 84
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AIMS EXPRESSED IN THE 1936 POLICY
DECISION ........................................................................................................ 84
THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY DECISION................................. 85
THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT......................................................................... 85
ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR UNDER HIROTA
.......................................................................................................................... 86
PLANS FOR CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN TIME OF WAR .................. 87
NAVAL PREPARATIONS.................................................................................. 87
JAPAN'S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATIES FOR NAVAL
DISARMAMENT................................................................................................ 88
THE PERIOD OF GROWING OPPOSITION TO THE NAVAL TREATIES. ...... 89
THE POLICY OF THE COMMON UPPER LIMIT, 1934. ................................... 90
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WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LONDON CONFERENCE 1935........................... 91
NAVAL EXPANSION UNDER HIROTA............................................................. 92
THE HISTORY OF THE MANDATED ISLANDS............................................... 93
THE FORTIFICATION OF MANDATED ISLANDS BEFORE 1936 .................. 93
SECRECY IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS MAINTAINED DURING THE
PERIOD OF THE HIROTA CABINET............................................................... 94
NAVAL OFFICERS AS ADMINISTRATORS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS.. 94
POSITIONS OF ACCUSED UNDER HIROTA .................................................. 94
HASHIMOTO AND THE GREATER JAPAN YOUNG MEN'S SOCIETY .......... 95
THE HISTORY OF MILITARY TRAINING IN SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 96
THE HISTORY OF CENSORSHIP AND THE DISSEMINATION OF
PROPAGANDA ................................................................................................. 97
HASHIMOTO'S POLICY IN 1936 ...................................................................... 98
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF JANUARY 1937. ................................................. 98
THE DOWNFALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET AND THE NEFUSAL OF THE
ARMY TO PERMIT UGAKI TO FORM ONE ..................................................... 99
THE COMPOSITION OF THE HAYASHI AND FIRST KONOYE CABINETS. 100
NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR NORTH CHINA UNDER HAYASHI ......... 100
THE ARMY'S PART IN THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF MANCHURIA UNDER HIROTA AND HAYASHI ....................................... 101
THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR MANCHUKUO .................................................. 102
THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES 29 MAY 1937 ....... 102
THE DECISION TO EXPLOIT THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTINENT ..... 103
THE DETAILED PLANS FOR THE WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AND
FOR THE PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS ........................................... 103
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 1936 DECISIONS AND THE 1937 PLANS
........................................................................................................................ 104
THE PLANS SIGNIFIED THE ARMY'S INTENTION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET
UNION............................................................................................................. 104
THE ARMY'S PLANS WERE DIRECTED ALSO AGAINST THE WESTERN
POWERS ........................................................................................................ 105
NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN THE MANDATED
ISLANDS DURING 1937................................................................................. 106
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THE REFUSAL TO AGREE TO AN INTERNATIONAL LIMITATION OF NAVAL
GUN CALIBRE ................................................................................................ 107
SATO ON THE PURPOSE OF THE ARMY'S 1937 PLANS ........................... 108
THE EFFECT OF THE 1937 PLANS UPON THE INDUSTRIALIZATION
PROGRAM OF JAPAN ................................................................................... 108
THE CABINET PLANNING BOARD................................................................ 109
THE EFFECT OF THE CHINA WAR UPON THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS........... 110
THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT WAS INSTIGATED BY THE ARMY.............. 111
THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET ADOPTS THE ARMY POLICY OF WAR WITH
CHINA. ............................................................................................................ 112
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AND THE
CONQUEST OF CHINA. ................................................................................. 113
THE RELATION OF THE FIGHTING IN CHINA TO THE "PRINCIPLES" OF
KODO AND HAKKO ICHIU. ............................................................................ 114
HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT. ........ 114
THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE AND VIOLATION OF TREATY
OBLIGATIONS AS PART OF THE PATTERN OF PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.
........................................................................................................................ 116
INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN MANCHUKUO AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO
INCIDENT. ...................................................................................................... 117
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES AFTER THE
LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT............................................................................... 118
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTROLLED ECONOMY. ........................... 119
ARMY PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE USSR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO
INCIDENT ....................................................................................................... 120
THE CHINA WAR LED JAPAN TO ADOPT THE ARMY'S SCHEME FOR A
NATION-WIDE MOBILSATION....................................................................... 121
SATO ON NATIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO
INCIDENT ....................................................................................................... 121
THE CABINET ADVISORY COUNCIL, IMPERIAL GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS, AND THE WAR EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT. ................. 122
THE CONTROL OF PROPAGANDA AND THE USE OF CENSORSHIP AFTER
THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT....................................................................... 123
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THE USE MADE OF EDUCATION TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR WAR
AFTER THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT.......................................................... 124
KIDO AVERTS A CABINET CRISIS IN NOVEMBER 1937............................. 125
HIROTA STRENGTHENS THE CABINET'S RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE THE
CONQUEST OF CHINA.................................................................................. 126
THE ARMY CQNTINUES TO PLAN AND FREE ARE FOR THE, EXPECTED
WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION. .................................................................. 127
THE CONSOLIDATION OF JAPANESE POWER AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIES in CHINA........................................... 129
HIROTA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN 1938 WAS FOUNDED ON THE FIVE
MINISTERS' DECISION OF AUGUST 1936 ................................................... 130
DETERIORATION OF JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN
POWERS THE LUKOUCHIAO INCIDENT...................................................... 131
NAVAL PREPARATIONS AND PREPARATIONS IN THE MANDATED
ISLANDS DURING 1938................................................................................. 132
HIROTA REFUSES TO EXCHANGE NAVAL INFORMATION ....................... 133
HIROTA'S POLICY IS EXPLAINED IN THE WORDS OF THE BASIC
NATIONAL POLICY DECISION...................................................................... 133
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF HER SUBJECT
TERRITORIES ................................................................................................ 134
INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS: THE SYNTHETIC OIL AND PETROLEUM
INDUSTRY...................................................................................................... 136
OTHER INDUSTRIAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR....................................... 137
THE ARMY PREPARES THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW . 138
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF FEBRUARY 1938: AND THE ENACTMENT OF
THE MOBILIZATION LAW .............................................................................. 139
THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATI0N LAW AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
THE BASIC NATIONAL POLICY DECISION .................................................. 140
THE ARMY EXPLAINS THE PURPOSE OF THE MOBILIZATION LAW........ 141
THE ARMY HAD NOW SUCCEEDED IN COMMITTING JAPAN TO NATIONAL
MOBILISATION FOR WAR. ............................................................................ 142
THE MANCHUKUOAN LONG-RANGE INDUSTRIAL PROGRAMME OF MAY
1938. ............................................................................................................... 143
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THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF MAY 1938 THREATENED THE ARMY'S LONG-
RANGE PLANNING. ....................................................................................... 144
THE CABINET REORGANISATION OF MAY 1938........................................ 145
THE KONOYE CABINET TAKES NEW STEPS TO ACHIEVE THE GENERAL
MOBILISATION FOR WAR. ............................................................................ 146
ITAGAKI AND ARAKI OF THE NATIONAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR......... 147
CHANGES IN THE ARMY STAFF ACCOMPANIED THE CABINET
REORGANISATION OF MAY 1938. ............................................................... 148
A NEW OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL CHINA: JULY 1938. ................................ 149
CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION: THE
ARMY BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A MILIARY ALLIANCE WITH
GERMANY. ..................................................................................................... 149
THE ARMY'S INTENTION TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNION HAD ITS
ORIGINS IN THE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA........................................... 150
THE ARMY DEFERS ITS PLANS FOR AN ATTACK ON THE SOVIET UNION:
AUGUST 1938. ............................................................................................... 152
DESIGNS UPON THE SOVIET UNION LED THE ARMY TO SEEK A GERMAN
ALLIANCE....................................................................................................... 153
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY AFTER THE
CONCLUSION OF THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT........................................ 154
THE FAILURE OF HIROTA'S POLICY IN REGARD TO GERMAN ECONOMIC
COOPERATION IN CHINA ............................................................................. 155
THE ARMY MAINTAINS JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY ......... 156
THE ARMY INITIATES A PROPOSAL FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE AMONG
THE AXIS POWERS ....................................................................................... 157
THE ARMY RENEWS ITS DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE THE CONQUEST
OF CHINA: AUGUST 1938 ............................................................................. 158
THE ATTEMPT TO FORM A PRO-JAPANESS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF
CHINA ............................................................................................................. 159
THE MILITARY FACTION OPPOSES COMPROMISES IN CHINA................ 159
THE CABINET CRISIS OF SEPTEMBER 1938 LEADS TO THE RESIGNATION
OF FOREIGN MINISTER UGAXI.................................................................... 160
CHANGES IN ARMY POLICY: JULY 1937 - SEPTEMBER 1938................... 161
THE ARMY'S PART IN THE MOBILISATION OF PUBLIC OPINION ............. 162
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ARAKI'S INFLUENCE ON THE JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM ......... 164
THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL
MOBILISATION FOR WAR............................................................................. 164
THE EXTENSION OF JAPAN'S "NEW ORDER" TO THE OCCUPIED AREAS
OF CHINA ....................................................................................................... 165
THE ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD .............................................................. 166
MEASURES TAKEN TO PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL
EXPLOITATION OF CHINA ............................................................................ 167
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ARMY USED ITS ASSOCIATION WITH
GERMANY TO EXERCISE TO CONTROL OVER JAPANESE FOREIGN
POLICY ........................................................................................................... 168
CHANGES IN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION REVEAL THE CABINET'S
DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY...... 169
THE ARMY CONTINUES TO NEGOTIATE FOR A MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH
THE AXIS POWERS ....................................................................................... 171
THE CULTURAL TREATY WITH GERMANY AND THE KONOYE CABINET'S
POLICY TOWARDS THAT COUNTRY........................................................... 172
THE GENERAL DETERIORATION IN JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH THE
WESTERN POWERS DURING 1938.............................................................. 173
JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN
CHINA, JULY 1937 - SEPTEMBER 1938 ....................................................... 174
CONTINUED VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF THE WESTERN POWERS IN
CHINA AND THE EWERGENCE OF THE "GREATER EAST ASIA" DOCTRINE
OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1938 ........................................................................ 175
THE DECISION TO CAPTURE HAINAN AND TO BRING PRESSURE TO
BEAR UPON FRENCH INDO-CHINA ............................................................. 176
THE SEVERANCE OF JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE............................................................... 177
PREPARATIONS FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE, AND ARAKI UPON
JAPAN'S ULTIMATE AIMS ............................................................................. 178
JAPAN'S IMMEDIATE AIMS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW ORDER IN
EAST ASIA AND PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION 179
THE RESIGNATION OF THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET 4 JANUARY 1939;
AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET............................ 180
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THE BASIC CAUSES OF THE PACIFIC WAR ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE
CONQUEST OF CHINA.................................................................................. 182
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE
PRINCIPLE OF "NEIGHBOURLY FRIENDSHIP" ........................................... 183
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE
PRINCIPLE OF "JOINT DEFENCE AGAINST THE COMINTERN" ................ 183
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE, POLICY TOWARDS CHINA THE
PRINCIPLE OF "ECONOMIC COOPERATION"............................................. 184
THE CONTINUITY OF JAPAN'S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR DURING 1937 AND 1938. ................................ 185
THE PLAN FOR WAR-SUPPORTING INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION APPROVED
BY THE HIRANUMA CABINET IN JANUARY 1939........................................ 186
ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILISATION FOR WAR DURING THE
PERIOD OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET. ....................................................... 187
THE HIRANUMA CABINET'S POLICY TOWARDS CHINA, AND. THE
OCCUPATION OF HAINAN AND THE SPRATLFY ISLANDS........................ 189
THE GROWING DEMAND FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL AXIS ALLIANCE WHILE
THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET WAS IN POWER......................................... 190
FURTHER DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN
POWERS AS AN ADDED REASON FOR STRENGTHENING AXIS
RELATIONS. ................................................................................................... 192
DEVELOPMENT OF DIFFERENCE IN THE CABINET .................................. 193
THE MILITARY FACTION RESISTS A CABINET ATTEMPT TO REACH A
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY: APRIL 1939 ..................... 195
THE "HIRANUMA DECLARATION" OF 4 MAY 1939...................................... 197
THE DEADLOCK CONTINUES ...................................................................... 198
HIRANUMA SUPPORTS A MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO CONCLUDE AN
UNCONDITIONAL AXIS ALLIANCE ............................................................... 199
HASHIMOTO SUPPORTS THE AIMS OF THE MILITARY FACTION............ 200
HIRANUMA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY
FACTION......................................................................................................... 201
ITAGAKI ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE CONCLUSION OF AN ALLIANCE WITH
GERMANY AND ITALY................................................................................... 202
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THE CABINET'S DIFFICULTIES WERE INCREASED BY THE ARMY'S
ACTIVITIES IN CHINA, AND BY THE ATTACK OF THE SOVIET UNION AT
NOMONHAN. .................................................................................................. 203
THE OPPOSING POLICIES OF ARITA AND THE MILITARY FACTION
PREVENTED ANY NEW STEP BEING TAKEN DURING JUNE AND JULY
1939. ............................................................................................................... 204
THE HIRANUMA CABINET ATTEMPTS TO DECIDE ITS POLICY REGARDING
AN ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY 8 AUGUST 1939 ........................................ 205
THE GERMAN-SOVIET NEUTRALITY PACT OF 23 AUGUST 1939 CAUSED
THE DOWNFALL OF THE HIRANUMA CABINET.......................................... 205
THE ABE CABINET TAKES OFFICE 30 AUGUST......................................... 207
THE MILITARY FACTION CONSPIRES TO ALLY JAPAN with GERMANY
AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS............................................................. 210
OSHIMA, WITH GERMAN ENCOURAGEMENT, PLANS FOR A JAPANESE
ATTACK UPON THE PACIFIC POSSESSIONS OF THE WESTERN POWERS.
........................................................................................................................ 212
THE REASONS FOR THE DOWNFALL OF THE ABE CABINET AND THE
RESUMPTION OF A PRO-GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY BY THE YONAI
CABINET......................................................................................................... 212
THE YONAI CABINET ADHERES TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC
NATIONAL POLICY DECISION. ..................................................................... 214
JAPAN ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A FAVOURED ECONOMIC POSITION IN THE
NETHERLANDS FAST INDIES....................................................................... 215
THE YOKAI CABINET'S POLICY OF NON-INTERVEN TION IN THE
EUROPEAN WAR AROUSES STRONG OPPOSITION IN JAPAN................ 216
THE ARMY SUPPORTS THE NON-INTERVENTION POLICY IN ORDER TO
COMPETE THE CONQUEST OF CHINA AND THE NATIONAL MOBILISATION
FOR WAR. ...................................................................................................... 217
DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES OF RAW MATERIALS PREVENTED
JAPAN FROM OPENLY REPUDIATING THE NINE-POWER TREATY. ........ 218
JAPAN MAKES NEW PLANS FOR INDUSTRIAL SELFSUFFICIENCY IN
ORDER TO ELIMINATE DEPENDENCE UPON THE UNITED STATES. ...... 220
THE YONAI CABINET MAKES PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR A
SOUTHWARD ADVANCE............................................................................... 220
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IN VIEW OF GERMANY SUCCESSES IN EUROPE, AND CONTINUED
OPPOSITION FROM THE WESTERN POWERS, THE PRO-GERMAN
FACTION GAINS STRENGTH........................................................................ 221
SHIGEMITSU COUNSELS ARITA TO CONCILIATE WESTERN POWERS.. 223
JAPAN STRESSES HER SPECIAL INTERESTS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST
INDIES: MAY 1940.......................................................................................... 224
JAPAN PREPARES FOR THE ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH: GERMANY
DECLARE HER DIEINTEREST IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES....... 225
JAPAN CONTINUES TO PREPARR FOR A SOUTHWARD ADVANCE,
DISREGARDING SHIGEMITSU'S ADVICE .................................................... 227
THE YONAI CABINET, DESIRING A FREE HAND IN INDO-CHINA, MAKES
OVERTURES TO GERMANY FOR COOPERATION AGAINST THE WESTERN
POWERS. ....................................................................................................... 229
SHIGEMITSU REMAINS OPPOSED TO POLICY OF YONAI CABINET........ 230
ARITA REJECTS A PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED
STATES. ......................................................................................................... 231
ARITA SHOWS THAT JAPAN'S POLICY IS BASED ON COOPERATION WITH
GERMANY AGAINST THE WESTERN POWERS.......................................... 232
THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION PREPARES FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE
YONAI CABINET AND THE CONCLUSION OF AN AXIS ALLIANCE............ 232
MEMBERS OF THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION MAKE DIRECT APPROACHES
TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ................................................................ 234
POLITICAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPECTED KONOYE CABINET AND
A ONE-PARTY SYSTEM ................................................................................ 235
THE PRO-GERMAN FACTION PREPARE FOR A CHANGE IN CABINETS,
AND PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PRIME MINISTER YONAI AND OTHERS.... 236
GERMANY, BY REFUSAL TO DECLARE HER POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN
UNDERMINES THE YONAI CABINET'S POSITION ...................................... 237
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PLAN FOR AN AXIS ALLIANCE, WHICH WOULD
ENABLE JAPAN TO DOMINATE EAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC ... 238
THE REASONS FOR WHICH THE ARMY OPPOSED THE YONAI CABINET
........................................................................................................................ 239
THE ARMY BRINGS ABOUT THE DOWNFALL OF THE YONAI CABINET .. 240
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KIDO'S PART IN THE DOWNFALL OF THE YONAI CABINET AND
SELECTION OF KONOYE AS PHEMIER....................................................... 241
THE FORMATION AND POLICY OF THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET..... 243
THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET WAS RESOLVED TO COMPLETE THE
MILITARY DOMINATION OF JAPAN.............................................................. 244
THE LIAISON CONFERENCE AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE
DOMINATION OF THE MILITARY FACTION WAS MADE COMPLETE ........ 245
THE TENTATIVE PLAN FOR COLLABORATION WITH GERMANY AND THE
EXTENT OF JAPANESE PLANNING FOR THE DOMINATION OF GREATER
EAST ASIA...................................................................................................... 247
THE ADOPTIOH OF THE TENTATIVE PLAN BY THE SECOND KONOYE
CABINET......................................................................................................... 248
THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET'S POLICY WAS BASED UPON THE
NATIONAL POLICY DECISION OF 11 AUGUST 1936 .................................. 249
THE POLICY OF "SETTLING THE SOUTHERN PROBLEM WITHIN LIMITS"
........................................................................................................................ 250
SHIGEMITSU'S VIEWS ON THE "GREATER EAST ASIA" POLICY.............. 251
MATSUOKA PROPOSES TO GERMANY THE TERMS Of JAPANESE
COLLABORATION WITH THE AXIS POWERS.............................................. 252
THE DETAILED PLAN FOR A TRIPARTITE MILITARY ALLIANCE: FOUR
MINISTERS' CONFERENCE. 4 SEPTEMBER 1940. ..................................... 254
THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE 9 - 11 SEPTEMBER
1940. ............................................................................................................... 256
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CONCLUSION OF THE
TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE. ................................................................................ 257
THE TERMS OF THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND ASSURANCES
EXCHANCED BETWEEN JAPAN AND GERMANY 27 SEPTEMBER 1940. . 258
THE INTENTIONS OFJAPANESE LEADERS IN CONCLUDING THE
TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ................................................................................. 259
PART B. -- CHAPTER V......................................................................................... 261
JAPANESE AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA. .................................................. 261
SECTION I. INVASION & OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA. THE CHINA WAS
AND ITS PHASES........................................................................................... 261
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JAPAN'S FOOTHOLD IN MANCHURIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CHINA
WAR. .............................................................................................................. 261
THE TAMAKA CABINET AND ITS "POSITIVE POLICY." .............................. 262
AGITATION IN SUPPORT OF THE "POSITIVE POLICY." ............................ 262
THE TSINAN INCIDENT. ............................................................................... 263
MURDER OF HARSHAL CHANG TSO-LIN. .................................................. 264
MARSHAL CHANG HSUEH-LIANG, THE YOUNG MARSHAL ..................... 265
JAPANESE-CHINESE RELATIONS STRAINED ........................................... 265
RESIGNATION OF THE TANAKA CABINET................................................. 266
REINSTATEMENT OF THE "FRIENDSHIP POLICY".................................... 266
MANCHURIA AT- JAPAN'S "LIFELINE" ........................................................ 267
ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER HAMAGUCHI............................................. 268
THE MARCH INCIDENT ................................................................................ 268
THE WAKATSUKI CABINET CONTINUED THE "FRIENDSHIP POLICY" .... 269
THE WANPAOSHAN INCIDENT.................................................................... 269
THE NAKAMURA INCIDENT ......................................................................... 270
THE ARMY ATTITUDE STIFFENED.............................................................. 270
DOHIHARA INVESTIGATES.......................................................................... 271
FOREIGN MINISTER SHIDEHARA ALIO INVESTIGATED........................... 271
DOHIHARA REPORTED TO THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF........................ 272
FOREIGN MINISTER SHIDEHARA CONTINUED EFFORTS AT MEDIATION
....................................................................................................................... 272
NIGHT MANEUVERS BY THE KWANTUNG ARMY...................................... 273
MARSHAL CHANG HSUEH-LIANG'S COMMISSION RETURNEL TO MUKDEN
....................................................................................................................... 274
MINAMI'S EMISSARY WENT ASTRAY ......................................................... 274
THE MUKDEN INCIDENT.............................................................................. 275
ITAGAKI REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE............................................................ 276
THE MUKDEN INCIDENT WAS PLANNED.................................................... 277
GENERAL HONJO ASSUMED COMMAND AT MUKDEN ............................ 279
MINAMI SANCTIORED. THE KWANTUNG ARMY ACTION ......................... 279
COLONEL DOHIHARA RETURNED TO MUKDEN ....................................... 281
COLONEL DOHIHARA AS MAYOR OF MUKDEN ........................................ 281
SELF-COVERNMENT CUILING BOARD....................................................... 282
-
PROTESTS AND ASSURANCES .................................................................. 282
THE OCTOBER INCIDENT............................................................................ 283
DECISION TO ENTHONE PU YI ................................................................... 283
COLONEL DOHIHARA PHOCEEDS TO RETURN PU YI ............................. 284
ENTHRONEMENT OF PU YI DELAYED ....................................................... 285
THE ADVANCE ON CHINCHOW................................................................... 286
THE LEAGUE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY.......................... 287
THE WAKATSUKI CABINET WAS FORCED TO RESIGN............................ 288
THE INUKAI CABINET................................................................................... 288
HOHJO AND ITAGAKI MOVED TO EXECUTE HONJO'S PLAN................... 288
MANCHURIA WAS COMPLETELY OCCUPIED AFTER THE CAPTURE OF
CHINCHOW ................................................................................................... 289
ITAGAKI COMPLETED HIS MISSION AND RETURNED TO MUKDEN ........ 290
THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT GAINED IN INTENSITY ...................... 290
ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES BY JAPAN ...................................................... 291
HASHIMOTO OBJECTED TO THIS ASSURANCE ....................................... 291
DOHIHARA. NEGOTIATED WITH GENERAL MA CHAN-SHAN................... 292
FIRST INVASION OF SHANGHAI ................................................................. 293
CHINA MADE ANOTHER APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE .................................. 293
GENERAL MA BARGAINED WITH DOHIHARA............................................ 293
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL...................................................... 294
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE........................................................... 295
ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW STATE ........................................................ 295
JAPANESE CABINET APPROVED FAIT ACCOMPLI ................................... 296
THE LYTTON COMMISSION ARRIVED IN TOKYO...................................... 297
ARAKI DISPATCHED REINFORCEMENTS TO SHANGHAI......................... 297
THE LEAGUE TOOK ACTION ....................................................................... 298
MANCHUKUO WAS CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED AS A PUPPET..... 300
THE CONCORDIA SOCIETY AND THE "KINGLY WAY" .............................. 301
THE LYTTON COMMISSION VISITED MANCHURIA ................................... 302
THE ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER INUKAI .............................................. 302
RECOGNITION OF MANCHUKUO BY JAPAN.............................................. 303
PREPARATION FOR THE CONQUEST OF JKHOL ..................................... 306
THE LYTTON COMMISSION REFORTED .................................................... 307
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THE SHANHAIKWAN INCIDENT................................................................... 308
JAPAN DECLINED ALL EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN .. 309
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONDEMNED JAPAN..................................... 309
JAPAN WITHDREW FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS............................. 310
INVASION OF JEHOL.................................................................................... 310
TANGKU TRUCE ........................................................................................... 311
ARAKI, A POPULAR FIGURE........................................................................ 311
SECTION II. CONSOLIDATION AND EXPLOITATION OF MANCHURIA
REORGANIZATION OF MANCHUKUO.......................................................... 312
"TWO-IN-ONE" SYSTEM ............................................................................... 314
MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU ............................................................... 315
CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN MANCHURIA....................................... 315
HOSHINO BECAME DIRECTOR OF ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA ............. 315
ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA SEIZED .......................................................... 316
KWANTUNG ARMY'S ECONOMIC PLAN FOR GUIDING MANCHUKUO.... 316
ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR MANCHUKUO.................. 317
JAPAN-MANCHUKUO JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE............................. 317
YEN BLOC ORGANIZED ............................................................................... 318
RELEASE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY...................................................... 318
INDUSTRIAL BANK OF MANCHUKUO ......................................................... 319
SECOND PERIOD CONSTRUCTION PLAN ................................................. 319
CONTROL OF INDUSTRIES ......................................................................... 320
MANCHURIA HEAVY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.......... 320
MANCHUKUO A WORK-HOUSE FOR JAPAN.............................................. 321
OPIUM AND NARCOTICS ............................................................................. 321
SECTION III. THE PLAN TO ADVANCE FURTHER INTO CHINA. ................ 323
THE HOPEI INCIDENT. ................................................................................. 323
THE NORTH CHAHAR INCIDENT................................................................. 324
INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT................................ 325
ATTEMPT TO SET UP A NORTH CHINA AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT. 326
THE JAPANESE ARMY' S PLANS FOR AN ADVANCE INTO NORTH CHINA.
....................................................................................................................... 328
HIROTA'S THREE FRINCIPLES.................................................................... 330
THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT. ......................................................................... 332
-
FORMATION OF THE HIROTA CABINET..................................................... 332
FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER THE HIROTA CABINET................................. 333
ITAGAKI'S MONGOLIAN POLICY ................................................................. 333
STATE-FOUNDING CONFERENCE IN MONGOLIA..................................... 334
JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD NORTH CHINA - 1936-1937 ........................ 335
THE FENGTAI INCIDENT.............................................................................. 336
THE CHANG-KAWAGOE TALKS .................................................................. 336
THE FALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET.......................................................... 337
UGAKI FAILED TO FORM A CABINET.......................................................... 337
THE HAYASHI CABINET AND ITS NORTH CHINA POLICY ........................ 337
THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET FURTHER PLANNING AGAINST NORTH
CHINA ............................................................................................................ 338
SECTION IV. FROM THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT (7 July 1937) TO
THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938................................. 339
SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR TRUCE ............ 341
ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.......................................... 341
UNITED STATES OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES............................................ 343
THE LANGFANG INCIDENT.......................................................................... 344
JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM REJECTED ............................................................... 344
REACTION IN GERMANY ............................................................................. 344
PEIPING CAPTURED .................................................................................... 345
THE OYAMA INCIDENT................................................................................. 345
OTHER EVENTS PRECEDING THE SHANGHAI WAR ................................ 346
THE SHANGHAI WAR ................................................................................... 347
CONTINUED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CHINA.............................. 348
CHINA APPEALED TO THE LEAGUE OF MATICES .................................... 350
JAPAN'S TERMS FOR PEACE...................................................................... 350
BRITISH OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES.......................................................... 351
THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE .................................................................. 352
THE INGERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.............................................. 352
THE ATTACK ON NANKING.......................................................................... 352
GEMANY ACTED AS GO-BETWEEN............................................................ 353
THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE ON 11 JANUARY 1938............................... 354
THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938 ................................ 355
-
SECTION V. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CHINA......... 356
THE RENOVATION GOVERNMENT IN IN CENTRAL CHINA ...................... 357
OTHER CITIES INVADED BY JAPANESE TROOPS UNDER HATA'S
COMMAND..................................................................................................... 359
THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW ........................................ 360
CHINA POLICY AND THE FIVE MINISTERS CONFERENCE 1938 ............. 361
THE DOHIHARA AGENCY. ........................................................................... 363
THE "FEDERATED COMMITTEE" OF PUPPET REGIMES.......................... 364
OCCUPATION OF CANTON AND HANKOW ................................................ 364
JAPAN TE.RMINATED ALL RELATIONS WITH LEAGUE OF NATIONS...... 365
THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA ................................................................. 365
THE KO-A-IN OR ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD......................................... 367
WANG CHING-WEI DEPARTED CHUNGKING............................................. 368
KONOYE'S THREE PRINCIPLES.................................................................. 368
HIRANUMA FORMED A CABINET. ............................................................... 369
WANG CHING-WEI TAKEN TO SHANGHAI ................................................. 370
WANG CHING-WEI VISITED JAPAN ............................................................ 371
DECISION OF THE FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE-JUNE 1939............. 371
CABINET RESHUFFLED IN JAPAN AND CONTINUED MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN CHINA ............................................................................... 372
INAUGURATION OF THE PUPPET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT .................. 372
SECTION VI: GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE ............... 373
THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET ............................................................... 374
FURTHER MILITARY ACTION BY JAPAN AGAINST CHINA ....................... 374
JAPAN SIGNED A TREATY WITH WANG CHING-WEI GOVERNMENT...... 375
"TREATY CONCERNING THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND
CHINA" ........................................................................................................... 375
INTERMITTENT PEACE TALKS AND CONTINUED MILITARY OPERATIONS
....................................................................................................................... 376
HULL-NOMURA TALKS RELATING TO CHINA ............................................ 377
THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET.................................................................... 377
TOJO FORMED A CABINET.......................................................................... 379
CONTINUANCE OF UNITED STATES - JAPAN PARLEYS.......................... 379
CONTINUED MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN CHINA............................................ 379
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SECTION VII - JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION OF MANCHUKIA AND
OTHER PARTS OF CHINA............................................................................ 380
GENERAL ECONOMIC MATTERS................................................................ 380
PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES .......................................................................... 382
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS............................................ 382
NATURAL RESOURCES ............................................................................... 383
PUBLIC UTILITIES......................................................................................... 384
BANKING ....................................................................................................... 384
PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES......................................................... 384
NARCOTICS IN CHINA.................................................................................. 385
INNER MONGOLIA ........................................................................................ 386
CENTRAL CHINA........................................................................................... 386
CHAPTER VI ...................................................................................................... 387
JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARDS U.S.S.R. MANCHURIA, THE "LIFELINE" OF
JAPAN............................................................................................................. 387
"NATIONAL DEFENCE".................................................................................. 388
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES........................................................................... 388
CONTINUATION OF DESIGNS UPON U.S.S. R............................................ 389
THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT........................................................................... 389
THE 1936 STATEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY........................................... 390
EXPECTATION AND ADVOCACY OF WAR WITH THE U.S.S.R .................. 391
THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT....................................................................... 391
THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE ......................................................................... 393
JAPANESE ATTACKS ON BORDERS OF MANCHURIA............................... 395
NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION. ............ 395
GERMANY ATTACKS THE U.S.S.R. IN JUNE 1941...................................... 395
JAPAN DELAYS ATTACK ON U.S.S.R. ......................................................... 398
THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERI INCLUDES PART OF
SIBERIA. ......................................................................................................... 398
PLANNING AND PREPARING WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION........... 399
MANCHURIA AS A BASE AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. ....................................... 399
AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAR OFFICE AND GENERAL STAFF................. 401
MILITARY ATTACHE IN MOSCOW APVOCATES ATTACK.......................... 401
PLANS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. ................................................... 401
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ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R...................... 402
PLANS FOR CONTROL OF OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES................. 403
ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER GERMANY'S ATTACK UPON
THE U.S.S.R. .................................................................................................. 405
SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE.................................................................... 405
NEUTRALITY PACT........................................................................................ 406
GERMANY'S ATTACK ON THE U.S.S.R........................................................ 406
GENERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY JAPAN TO GERMANY................... 408
JAPAN GIVES GERMANY MILITARY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
U.S.S.R. .......................................................................................................... 409
JAPANESE INTERFERENCE WITH SOVIET SHIPPING............................... 409
JAPAN'S OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE U.S.S.R. IN 1938-39.. 410
HOSTILITIES IN THE LAKE KHASSAN AREA............................................... 410
OPERATIONS IN NOMONHAN (KHALKHIN GOL) ........................................ 413
THE DEFENSE OF CONDONATION.............................................................. 416
DEFENCE THAT MONGOLIA WAS NOT INDEPENDENT ............................ 416
PART B - CHAPTER VII ......................................................................................... 417
PACIFIC WAR .................................................................................................... 417
JAPANESE POLICY IN 1940 .......................................................................... 419
MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT POLICY .......................................................... 420
IMPERIAL RULE ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATION ............................................ 421
HASHIMOTO AND SHIRATORI APPEAL FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF WAR
POLICY ........................................................................................................... 422
TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE ........................................................... 423
COOPERATION UNDER TRIPARTITE PACT................................................ 424
PREPARATIONS FOR MOVE TO THE SOUTH............................................. 425
THAILAND'S CLAIMS ..................................................................................... 426
FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND THAILAND TO BE USED FOR ATTACK ON
SINGAPORE................................................................................................... 427
LIAISON CONFERENCES.............................................................................. 428
DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS......................................................................... 429
PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK UPON SINGAPORE ............................. 431
FURTHER PREPARATION............................................................................. 432
NEUTRALITY PACT - JAPAN - U.S.S.R......................................................... 433
-
FRENCH INDO-CHINA ................................................................................... 433
RELATIONS WITH THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES............................... 435
PREPARATIONS FOLLOWING TRI-PARTITE PACT. ................................... 443
RELATIONS WITH U.S.A. AND GREAT BRITAIN.......................................... 444
UNITED STATES CONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS................................... 448
UNITED STATES AGREES TO NEGOTIATE - May 1941.............................. 451
PREPARATIONS INTENSIFIED ..................................................................... 453
CABINET POLICY AND DECISIONS OF JUNE AND JULY 1941. ................. 453
THIRD KONOYE CABINET............................................................................. 456
OCCUPATION OF SOUTHERN FRENCH INDO-CHINA ............................... 457
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ............... 457
SUPPLY PROBLEMS ..................................................................................... 458
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ............... 459
IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 6th SEPTEMBER 1941........................................ 461
CONTINUED PREPARATIONS FOR WAR .................................................... 462
TALKS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONTINUED. ....................... 463
DECISION FOR WAR - 12 OCTOBER 1941. ................................................. 465
TOJO BECOMES PRIME MINISTER 18 OCTOBER 1941. ............................ 467
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR CARRIED ON UNDER TOJO........................... 468
NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RENEWED............ 470
NAVY ORDER FOR ATTACK......................................................................... 472
PROPOSAL "A" PRESENTED 7 NOVEMBER 1941....................................... 473
PROPOSAL "B" 20th NOVEMBER 1941 ........................................................ 475
LIAISON CONFERENCE 30 NOVEMBER 1941............................................. 478
IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1 DECEMBER 1941 ............................................ 479
TERMINATION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 480
PEARL HARBOR ............................................................................................ 480
KOTA BHARU................................................................................................. 481
THE PHILIPPINES, WAKE AND GUAM. ........................................................ 482
HONG KONG .................................................................................................. 482
SHANGHAI...................................................................................................... 482
THE JAPAMESE NOTE DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON ON 7th DECEMBER
1941 ................................................................................................................ 483
THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR........................................................ 484
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CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 485
PART B. CHAPTER VIII ......................................................................................... 489
CONVENTIONAL WAR CRIMES (Atrocities) ..................................................... 489
ALLEGATION THAT THE LAWS OF WAR DID NOT APPLY TO THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN CHINA .............................................................. 490
FORMULATION OF MILITARY POLICY......................................................... 491
CAPTIVES TAKEN IN THE CHINA WAR WERE TREATED AS BANDITS.... 492
THE POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED AFTER THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE
INCIDENT ....................................................................................................... 494
THE RAPE OF NANKING ............................................................................... 494
THE WAR WAS EXTENDED TO CANTON AND HANKOW........................... 497
RETURNING SOLDIERS TOLD OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THEM.. 499
MURDER OF CAPTURED AVIATORS........................................................... 500
MASSACRES.................................................................................................. 503
MASSACRES WERE ORDERED. .................................................................. 508
DEATH MARCHES. ........................................................................................ 509
OTHER FORCED MARCHES......................................................................... 511
BURMA-SIAM RAILWAY ................................................................................ 512
TORTURE AND OTHER INHUMANE TREATMENT ...................................... 516
VIVISECTION AND CANNIBALISM................................................................ 519
PRISON SHIPS WERE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK........................................ 521
SUBMARINE WARFARE ................................................................................ 523
ILLEGAL EMPLOYMENT, STAVATION AND NEGLECT OF PRISONERS AND
INTERNEES.................................................................................................... 524
CONSIDERATION FOR RACIAL NEEDS FOOD AND CLOTHING................ 526
HOUSING........................................................................................................ 527
Work ............................................................................................................... 528
Native Labor ................................................................................................... 528
PRISONERS AND INTERNESS FORCED TO SIGN PAROLE...................... 528
EXCESSIVE AND UNLAWFUL PUNISHMENT WAS IMPOSED.................... 530
PRISONERS OF WAR HUMILIATED. ............................................................ 533
THE SYTEM.................................................................................................... 534
JAPAN AGREED TO APPLY THE GENEVA CONVENTION, 1929 ............... 535
ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR A POLICY................................ 539
-
JAPANESE PURPOSE WAS TO PROTECT JAPANESE NATIONALS ......... 539
CREATION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR INFORMATION BUREAU........... 540
CREATION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR ADHINESTRATION SECTION ... 540
THE MILITARY AFFAIRS BUREAU RETAINED CONTROL .......................... 541
DETENTION CAMPS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION .................................. 541
THE NAVY PARTICIPATED IN THE SYSTEM ............................................... 542
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN JAPAN PROPER........................... 543
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN FORMOSA, KOREA AND SAKHALIN
........................................................................................................................ 543
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES .. 543
ACCUSED WHO ADMINISTERED THE SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES ................................................................................................ 544
ALLIED PROTESTS........................................................................................ 545
ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES WAS
CONDONED AND CONCEALED.................................................................... 549
PART C -- CHAPTER IX......................................................................................... 554
FINDINGS ON COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT ............................................... 554
PART C -- CHAPTER X.......................................................................................... 558
VERDICTS.......................................................................................................... 558
ARAKI, Sadao ................................................................................................. 558
DOHIHARA, Kenji ........................................................................................... 559
HASHIMOTO, Kingoro .................................................................................... 560
HATA, Shunroko ............................................................................................. 561
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 562
HIRANUMA, Kiichiro........................................................................................ 562
HIROTA, Koki.................................................................................................. 563
HOSHINO, Naoki ............................................................................................ 565
ITAGAKI, Seishiro ........................................................................................... 565
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 567
KAYA, Okinori ................................................................................................. 567
KIDO, Koichi.................................................................................................... 568
KIMURA, Heitaro............................................................................................. 569
KOISO, Kuniaki ............................................................................................... 571
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 571
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MATSUI, Iwane ............................................................................................... 572
MINAMI, Jiro.................................................................................................... 573
MUTO, Akira.................................................................................................... 574
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 574
OKA, Takasumi ............................................................................................... 575
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 575
OSHIMA, Hiroshi ............................................................................................. 575
SATO, Kenryo ................................................................................................. 576
SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru ................................................................................... 577
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 578
SHIMADA, Shigetaro....................................................................................... 579
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 579
SHIRATORI, Toshio ........................................................................................ 579
TOGO, Shigenori............................................................................................. 581
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 582
TOJO, Hideki................................................................................................... 582
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 583
UMEZU, Yoshijiro ............................................................................................ 585
War Crimes..................................................................................................... 585
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{48,414}
MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.
THE PRESIDENT: All of the accused are present except HIRANUMA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certificates will be recorded and filed.
CLERK OF THE COURT: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES.
AGAINST
ARAKI, Sadao, DOHIHARA, Kenji, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, HATA, Shunroku, HIMANUMA, Kiichiro, HIROTA, Koki, HOSHINO, Kaoki, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, KAYA, Okinori, KIDO, Koichi, KIKURA, Heitaro, KOISO, Kuniaki, MATSUI, Iwane, MATSUOKA, Yosuke, MINAMI, Jiro, MUTO, Akira, MAGANO, Osami, OKA, Takasumi, OKAWA, Shumei, OSHIMA, Hiroshi, SATO, Kenryo, SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, SHIMADA, Shigetaro, SHIRATORI, Toshio, SUZUKI, Teiichi- TOGO. Shigenori, TOJO, Hideki, OMEZU, Yoshijiro JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
{48,415}
FOR THE FAR EAST.
THE PRESIDENT: I will now read the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The title and formal parts will not be read.
PART A - CHAPTER I
Establishment and Proceedings of the Tribunal The Tribunal was established in virtue of and to implement the Cairo Declaration of the 1st of December, 1943, the Declaration of Potsdam of the 26th of July, 1945, the Instrument of Surrender of the 2nd of September 1945, and the Moscow Conference of the 26th of December, 1945.
The Cairo Declaration was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. It reads as follows:
"The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.
"The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan
{48,416}
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shall be stripped or all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid Three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
"With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan."
The Declaration of Potsdam (Annex No. A-1) was made by the President of the United States of America, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and later adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Its principal relevant provisions are:
"Japan shall be given on opportunity to end this war.
"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and
{48,417}
misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
"The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
"We do not intend that the Japanese people shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners."
The Instrument of Surrender (Annex No. A-2) was signed on behalf of the Emperor and Government of Japan and on behalf of the nine Allied Powers. It contains inter alia the following proclamation, undertaking, and order:
"We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated.
"We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government, and their successors, to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action
{48,418}
may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to the Declaration.
"The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender. We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority."
-
By the Moscow Conference (Annex No. A-3) it was agreed by and between the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the concurrence of China that:
"The Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender, the occupation and control of Japan and directives supplementary thereto."
Acting on this authority on the 19th day of January, 1946, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by Special Proclamation established the Tribunal for "the trial of those persons charged
{48,419}
individually or as member of organizations or in both capacities with offences which include crimes against peace." (Annex No. A-4) The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were by the Proclamation declared to be those set forth in the Charter of the Tribunal approved by the Supreme Commander on the same day. Before the opening of the Trial the Charter was amended in several respects. (A copy of the Charter as amended will be found in Annex No. A-5).
On the 15th day of February, 1946, the Supreme Commander issued an Order appointing the nine members of the Tribunal nominated respectively by each of the Allied Powers. This Order also provides that "the responsibilities, powers, and duties of the Members of the Tribunal are set forth in the Charter thereof. . ."
By one of the amendments to the Charter the maximum number of members was increased from nine to eleven to permit the appointment of members nominated by India and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. By subsequent Orders the present members from the United States and France were appointed to succeed the original appointees who resigned and the members from India and the Philippines were appointed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 9 (c) of the Charter each of the accused before the opening of
{48,420}
the Trial appointed counsel of his own choice to represent him; each accused being represented by American and Japanese counsel.
On the 29th of April, 1946, an indictment, which had previously been served on the accused in conformity with the rules of procedure adopted by the Tribunal, was lodged with the Tribunal.
The Indictment (Annex No. A-6) is long, containing fifty-five counts charging twenty-eight accused with Crimes against Peace, Conventional War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity during the period from the 1st of January, 1928, to the 2nd of September, 1945.
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It may be summarized as follows:
In Count 1 all accused are charged with conspiring as leaders, organisers, instigators or accomplices between 1st January 1928 and 2nd September 1945 to have Japan, either alone or with other countries, wage wars of aggression against any country or countries which might oppose her purpose of securing the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and Indian oceans and their adjoining countries and neighboring islands.
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Count 2 charges all accused with conspiring throughout the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang (Kanchuria), and Jehol."
Count 3 charges all accused with conspiracy over the same period to have Japan wage aggressive war against China to secure complete domination of China.
Count 4 charges all accused with conspiring to have Japan, alone or with other countries, wage aggressive war against the United States, the British Commonwealth, France, the Netherlands, China, Portugal, Thailand, the Philippines and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to secure the complete domination of East Asia and the Pacific Indian Oceans and their
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adjoining countries and neighboring islands.
Count 5 charges all accused with conspiring with Germany and Italy to have Japan, Germany and Italy mutually assist each other in aggressive warfare against any country which might oppose them for the purpose of having these three nations acquire complete domination of the entire world, each having special domination in its own sphere, Japan's sphere to cover East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Counts 6 to 17 charge all accused except SHIRATORI with having planned and prepared aggressive war against named countries.
Counts 18 to 26 charge all accused with initiating aggressive war against named countries.
Counts 27 to 36 charge all accused with waging aggressive war against named countries.
Count 37 charges certain accused with conspiring to murder members of the armed forces and civilians of the United States, the Philippines, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands and Thailand by initiating unlawful hostilities against those countries in breach of the Hague Convention No. III of 18th October 1907.
Count 38 charges the same accused with conspiring to murder the soldiers and civilians by initiating hostilities in violation of the agreement between the United
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States and Japan of 30th November 1908, the Treaty between Britain, France, Japan and the United States of 13th December 1921, the Pact of Paris of 27th August 1928, and the Treaty of Unity between Thailand and Japan of 12th June 1940.
Counts 39 to 43 charge the same accused with the commission on 7th and 8th December 1941 of murder at Pearl Harbour (Count 39) Kohta Behru (Count 40) Hong Kong (Count 41) on board H. M. S. Petrel at Shanghai (Count 42) and at Davao (Count 43).
Count 44 charges all accused with conspiring to murder on a wholesale scale prisoners of war and civilians in Japan's power.
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Counts 45 to 50 charge certain accused with the murder of disarmed soldiers and civilians at Nanking (Count 45) Canton (Count 46) Hankow (Count 47) Changsha (Count 48) Hengyang (Count 49) and Kweilin and Liuchow. (Count 50).
Count 51 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of Mongolia and the Soviet Union in the Khalkin-Gol River area in 1939.
Count 52 charges certain accused with the murder of members of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan area in July and August 1938.
Counts 53 and 54 charge all the accused except
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OKAWA and SHIRATORI with having conspired to order, authorize or permit the various Japanese Theatre Commanders, the officials of the War Ministry and local camp and labour unit officials frequently and habitually to commit breaches of the laws and customs of war against the armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilian internees of complaining powers and to have the Government of Japan abstain from taking adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.
Count 55 charges the same accused with having recklessly disregarded their legal duty by virtue of their offices to take adequate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws and customs of war.
There are five appendices to the Indictment:
Appendix A summarizes the principal matters and events upon which the counts are based.
Appendix B is a list of Treaty Articles.
Appendix C specifies the assurances Japan is alleged to have broken.
Appendix D contains the laws and customs of war alleged to have been infringed.
Appendix E is a partial statement of the facts with respect to the alleged individual responsibility of the accused.
These appendices are included in Annex A-6.
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During the course of the Trial two of the accused, MATSUOKA and NAGANO, died and the accused OKAWA was declared unfit to stand his trial and unable to defend himself. MATSUOKA and NAGANO were therefore discharged from the Indictment. Further proceedings upon the Indictment against OKAWA at this Trial were suspended.
On the 3rd and 4th of May the Indictment was read in open court in the presence of all the accused, the Tribunal when adjourning till the 6th to receive the pleas of the accused. On the latter date pleas of "not guilty" were entered by all the accused now before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal then fixed the 3rd of June following as the date for the commencement of the presentation of evidence by the Prosecution.
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In the interval the Defence presented motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear and decide the charges contained in the Indictment. On the 17th of May, 1946, after argument, judgment was delivered dismissing all the said motions "for reasons to be given later." These reasons will be given in dealing with the law of the case in Chapter II of this part of the judgment.
The Prosecution opened its case on the 3rd of June, 1945, and closed its case on the 24th of January 1947.
The presentation of evidence for the Defence opened on the 24th of February, 1947, and closed on the
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12th of January 1948, an adjournment having been granted from the 19th of June to the 4th of August 1947, to permit defense counsel to co-orginate their work in the presentation of evidence common to all the accused.
Prosecution evidence in rebuttal and defense evidence in reply were permitted; the reception of evidence terminating on the 10th of February 1948. In all 4335 exhibits were admitted in evidence, 419 witnesses testified in court, 779 witnesses gave evidence in depositions and affidavits, and the transcript of the proceedings covers 48,412 pages.
Closing arguments and summations of prosecution and defense counsel opened on the 11th of February and closed on the 16th of April 1948.
Having regard to Article 12 of the Charter, which requires "an expeditious hearing of the issues" and the taking of "strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay", the length of the present trial requires some explanation and comment
In order to avoid unnecessary delay which would have been incurred by adopting the ordinary method of translation by interrupting from time to time evidence, addresses and other matters which could be prepared in advance of delivery, an elaborate public address system was installed. Through this system whenever possible a simultaneous
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translation into English or Japanese was given and in addition when circumstances required from or into Chinese, Russian, and French. Without such aids the trial might well have occupied a very much longer period. Cross-examination and extempore argument on objections and other incidental proceedings had, however, to be translated in the ordinary way as they proceeded.
Article 13(a) of the Charter provides that "the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall . . . admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. . ." The application of this rule to the mass of documents and oral evidence offered inevitably resulted in a great expenditure of time. Moreover, the charges in the Indictment directly involved an inquiry into the history of Japan during seventeen years, the years between 1928 and 1945. In addition our inquiry has extended to a less detailed study of the earlier history of Japan, for without that the subsequent actions of Japan and her leaders could not be understood and assessed.
The period covered by the charges was one of intense activity in Japanese internal and external affairs.
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Internally, the Constitution promulgated during the Meiji Restoration was the subject of a major struggle
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between the military and the civilian persons who operated it. The military elements ultimately gained a predominance which enabled them to dictate, not only in matters of peace or war, but also in the conduct of foreign and domestic affairs. In the struggle between the civilian and the military elements in the Government, the Diet, the elected representatives of the people, early ceased to be of account. The battle between the civilians and the military was fought on the civilian side by the professional civil servants, who almost exclusively filled the civilian ministerial posts in the Cabinet and the advisory posts around the Emperor. The struggle between the military and the civil servants was protracted one. Many incidents marked the ebb and flow of the battle, and there was seldom agreement between the Prosecution and the Defence as to any incident. Both the facts and the meaning of each incident were the subject of controversy and the topic towards which a wealth of evidence was directed.
Internally, also, the period covered by the Indictment saw the completion of the conversion of Japan into a modern industrialized state, and the growth of the demand for the territory of other nations as an outlet for her rapidly increasing population, a source
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from which she might draw raw materials for her manufacturing plants, and a market for her manufactured goods. Externally the period saw the efforts of Japan to satisfy that demand. In this sphere also the occurrence and meaning of events was contested by the Defence, often to the extent of contesting the seemingly incontestable.
The parts played by twenty-five accused in these events had to be investigated, and again every foot of the way was fought.
The extensive field of time and place