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INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE IN SUPPORT OF FISHWORKERS

illEGAl TRAWliNG iN INdoNESiACANAdA'S CORpoRATE WARS

FisHERiES MANAGEMENT iN BARbAdos

CO'MANAGEMENT iN CANAdA

THE FiSHiNG LANGUAGE of MAORisMECHANiZATioN iN SRi LANkA

NEWS ROUNd,up

ContentsSAMUDRA No. 25 APRIL 2000 TRIANNUAL REPORT OF ICSF

COMMENT 1

INDONESIA Up against trawling 3

CANADA Corporate capers 7

BARBADOS Only partnerships work 10

CANADA The way forward 14

NEW ZEALANDFishing for a language 18

AUSTRALIA Shepherding the seas 24

MADAGASCAR Pink gold, muddy waters 27

ANALYSIS Angling for disaster 31

JAPAN A time of surrender 34

WEBSITE oneFish, many uses 37

RESPONSE Not an easy task 41

RESPONSE Redistributing wealth 44

SRI LANKAMechanization ahoy! 46

NEWS ROUND-UPBelgium, China, US, Argentina, Australia 50

Comment

A core issueIn the context of the crisis gripping the world’s fisheries, everyone seems to agree thatonly sound and judicious management of resources will salvage most fisheries. Isco-management one of the practicable tools in this mission?

In “Only Partnerships Work” (page 10 of this issue), Patrick McConney from Barbados,a Small Island Developing State in the Caribbean, observes, “Fisheries authorities mustrecognize that they need to form partnerships with the people in the fishing industry,whether the process is called co-management, community-based management or some-thing else.” Yet, in the context of Canada, a developed nation, where co-managementprocesses have been used to manage marine fisheries since 1995, Marc Allain tells usthat many leaders of fishermen see co-management as “yet another example of govern-ment talking about grass-roots participation and consultation, but doing the opposite”(‘The Way Forward’, page 14). He further points out the most serious criticism levelledagainst the co-management approach in Canada, that it is a “smokescreen to advancethe government’s agenda to privatize fish resources and force everyone on to individualtransferable quotas”. Based on a document produced by the Canadian Council ofProfessional Fish Harvesters, he elaborates how a co-management approach couldactually be adopted to a multi-species, inshore fisheries, to the potential satisfaction offishers.

This approach of co-management has its origins in the single-species fisheries ofdeveloped countries. However, how relevant is it to the multi-species fisheries ofdeveloping countries? Co-management essentially means an arrangement between thefishers and the government at different levels to manage fisheries through sharingdecision-making powers. Depending on how you use it, it can either lead to a dangeroussituation where genuine fishers are excluded from participating in a fishery or to a situationwhere fishers are given an opportunity to responsibly manage their fishery.

Although fish is an important source of animal protein, foreign exchange and employment,there is hardly any meaningful, planned fisheries management in most developingcountries. Fisheries are in crisis not because of poor management but often because ofno management at all. Many developing countries, although aware of the magnitude ofthe problem, are unable to do anything because of paucity of funds and conflictingpriorities. In this context, a well-designed co-management regime, based on clearlydefined rights and responsibilities, could be quite useful, especially to save costs and tolegitimately manage the resources.

Since most developing countries lack the institutional framework within which a co-management approach could succeed, attention should first be given to setting up sucharrangements. Though these are likely to be expensive in the short run, they shouldbecome priority areas for governments and donor agencies. If we are bothered aboutequity considerations, genuine fishworkers’ organizations are essential for the successof the co-management approach. The emphasis on building successful and genuinefishworkers’ organizations in the ‘development’ era in many Third World countries nowneeds to be re-emphasized in the ‘management’ era as well.

A bottom-up co-management approach that is cost-effective, participatory and enjoysthe confidence of fishworkers might work in developing countries. But it all depends onthe kind of institutional capacity that can be built beforehand. More importantly, it dependson building up genuine fishworkers’ organizations.

COMMENT

SAMUDRA APRIL 2000 1

Traditional fishers

Up against trawling

The traditional fishermen of North Sumatra have united to battle the threats posed by trawling

After the New Order government ofSuharto came into power in 1966,a new phase in Indonesia’s

development was initiated. This wasarticulated in the Trilogy Pembangunan(the Three Basic Principals ofDevelopment) that aimed to achieve acertain level of development. At the sametime, the New Order also took some stepsto maintain national stability, based on theassumption that development targetscould only be achieved if national stabilitywas guaranteed.

One of the strategies adopted for this wasto maintain the community’s focus ondevelopment efforts. Another was to keepthe community away from politicalactivities, including the activities ofpolitical parties. At the same time,political parties were not allowed to makecontact with communities, especially inrural areas.

The New Order also established people’sorganizations, such as HimpunanKerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI)/Indonesian Farmer BrotherhoodOrganization) and Himpunan NelayanSeluruh Indonesia (HNSI) / IndonesiaFishermen’s Organization). These wereactually linked to the ruling politicalparty. Fishworkers were allowed to joinonly HNSI and farmers only HKTI.Members of these organizations wereobliged to vote for the ruling party. Anyattempt to establish a new independentorganization would be branded as acommunist initiative by the government.In practice, this system blocked theaspirations of local people and made itdifficult for them to engage in any politicalactivity, except during the publicelections, once every five years.

To accelerate the country’s development,the government emphasized the

modernization of every sector. Infisheries, the emphasis was onsubstituting traditional fishing equipmentwith modern craft and gear, in order toimprove the income of fishers. As part ofthis drive, traditional fishers wereencouraged to replace traditional gearwith trawls, known in Indonesia as pukatharimau. Credit incentives were providedfor this. Trawls were seen as havingseveral advantages, particularly greaterefficiency, which made possible higherlevels of fish production with minimalhuman resources. Due to these variousbenefits, the trawl soon became the gear ofchoice in the modernization drive.

However, this policy did not take intoaccount the fact that traditional fishermenlacked the knowledge and trainingneeded to operate trawls. Moreover, theycould not afford to purchase the highlypriced trawls, despite credit incentives. Asa result, the policy actually benefited theprofessionals within the sector, and didlittle to improve the situation oftraditional fishermen. More often thannot, trawls were owned by investors, whoused skilled labour to operate the gear.

For the traditional sector, several negativeimpacts resulted. With the use of trawls,large catches became possible. But theiruse also destroyed the coastalenvironment and important spawningand breeding grounds. Most of thetrawlers operated in the same coastalwaters used by traditional fishermen,their ‘customary sea’, and competeddirectly with them.

Public propertyThis affected both the catches and theincome of the traditional fishermen.Significantly, the concept of the‘customary sea’ vanished when theGovernment of Indonesia declared the sea

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as ‘public property’, as stated in Ministryof Agriculture Decree No.607/KPTS/UM/9/1976.

Forced to respond to the protests oftraditional fishers, the Governmentimplemented a trawl ban in 1980,

through Presidential Decree No.39/1980.The use of trawls was banned in allIndonesian territory, except in Irian Jayaand Maluku, by Presidential DecreeNo.12/1982). This ban was also supportedby a Decree of the Indonesian SupremeCourt (No. 8/1988). Despite this, inpractice, the ban has not been operational.Vessels using trawls continue to operate inIndonesian territory, especially in theNorth Sumatra region. This situation hasforced the traditional fishers of NorthSumatra to undertake various actions.

It is also significant that, until now, theHNSI has failed to solve the problemsresulting from continued trawlingactivities and has not been able to worktowards the implementation of the ban.On the contrary, there is a tendency for theHNSI to favour the trawler owners and toeven protect and provide cover to theiroperations.

There are several reasons that make itdifficult to implement the trawl ban. Theban on trawling, under the PresidentialDecree No. 39/1980, was not supportedby effective monitoring and enforcementat the regional level. Other governmentpolicies have supported the continuationof trawling activities. For instance, afisheries regulation of 4 July 1996 supportsthe purchase of foreign boats by investors.This, in effect, means the procurement oftrawlers. This has occurred in Belawan,where there are at present 144 modernfishing boats using trawl-like gear, namedotherwise to get past the law.

There is no policy that specifically protectstraditional fishers, their gear and theircustomary area of operation, from theoperation of modern fishing gear such astrawls. Although there is a Fishery Lawthat acknowledges the rights of thesetraditional fishers to their customary sea,this regulation is not operational.

The Regional Government Offices thatissue permits to fish often do not take intoaccount their impacts on the traditional

sector or, for that matter, on the coastalenvironment. In fact, they tend to favourthe interests of the investors.

The institutions that are meant toimplement the trawl ban, such as themarine force, the police and the fisheriesdepartment, often have overlappingresponsibilities. Collusion tends to occurbetween trawl owners and governmentofficials. For example, trawls that havebeen confiscated by traditional fishers andhanded over to the authorities, arereleased the very next day.

This situation has angered traditionalfishermen. And, not surprisingly, theyhave taken several actions, such asburning of trawlers. They feel that theycannot depend on the official system totake care of their interests.

The resentment of traditional fishermentowards trawler owners is furtheraggravated by the fact that they haveestablished a three-tier marketingnetwork of intermediary middlemen thatcontrols fish prices. The price at which theconsumer finally purchases the fish is veryhigh. Since traditional fishermen can onlysell their fish to the first middleman, theyget a very low price. They have no otheroption but to go along with this system; ifnot, they run the risk of not being able tosell their catch at all. Any effort to establishan alternative marketing structure is soondestroyed by the marketing networkcontrolled by owners and investors. TheFish Auction House that was supposed tohave functioned as the place for fishermento auction their catches has become part ofthe owner-controlled marketing system.The situation is similar in fishermen’sco-operatives.

Several meetings were held byfishworkers between 1993 and 1998 todiscuss this situation. Fishermen and anumber of public figures in NorthSumatra participated in these meetings. Itbecame evident that to deal with theseproblems, traditional fishermen in NorthSumatra must establish an independentorganization managed by the fishersthemselves.

Independent organizationFinally, on 14 July 1998, in Medan, anindependent fishermen’s organization

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4 SAMUDRA APRIL 2000

was formed, called the Sarekat NelayanSumatera Utara (SNSU) or North SumatranFishers’ Union.

About 900 traditional fishermenfrom three regions in NorthSumatra (Langkat, Asahan and

Deli Serdang) participated in this event.SNSU aims primarily to draw the attentionof the government to the long-neglectedproblems of traditional fishermen—forinstance, the problems caused by trawlingand other similar operations, and theirimpacts on traditional fishermen and onthe coastal environment.

The SNSU declaration was presented to theGovernor of North Sumatra and to theHead of the Provincial FisheryDepartment in North Sumatra. This led toa dialogue between fishermen and theGovernor. The Governor promised thatthe problem of trawling would beresolved within a year.

But this promise was never fulfilled. Infact, the number of trawlers operating inthe area has increased, even as conflictsbetween the trawlers and traditional boatshave risen.

Along the Sialang Buah coast, in thedistrict of Mengkudu in the Deli Serdangregion alone, 51 fishermen were injuredbetween 1993 and 1998. Of these, 31fishermen lost their lives as a result ofinjuries from clashes between the

traditional boats and trawlers at sea. Therehave been several other such incidents inregions such as Langkat, Asahan andBelawan. However, there are no officialrecords of these incidents.

As an organization founded by fishermen,SNSU actively promotes the interests oftraditional fishermen by putting pressureon the Provincial Governor of NorthSumatra, the President of Indonesia, andagencies such as the Office of the AttorneyGeneral, the District Military Office ofBukit Barisan, Lantamal I Belawan,Provincial Fishery Department in NorthSumatra, and District Officers (Muspika) incoastal areas, etc.

A number of activities have beenundertaken to draw attention to theproblems of traditional fishermen, such asdelegations, demonstrations,presentations, and even the direct arrestsof trawlers.

The SNSU aims to create unity amongfishers in North Sumatra and to supportthem in their struggle for social, cultural,economic and legal justice, as citizens ofIndonesia. More specifically, it aims to:

• develop economic activities for allmembers through the formation offishermen’s co-operatives;

• improve the social welfare of allmembers;

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• train members througheducational activities;

• defend the interests of membersthrough advocacy; and

• establish fishermen’s groups inevery district along the coast ofNorth Sumatra.

In order to achieve these objectives,SNSU has developed variousprogrammes. These can be broadly

classified as Advocacy, CommunityEconomic Development, HumanResource Development, and Networking.

The present era of reform in Indonesia,where freedom to organize and expressone’s views is part of the democratizationprocess, has provided a good opportunityfor traditional fishermen to articulate theirconcerns. It is hoped that theestablishment of the Ocean Explorationand Fishery Department will promote thewelfare of traditional fishermen inIndonesia and particularly in NorthSumatra. Hopefully, the mistakes of thepast, when the traditional fishery sectorwas ignored, will not be repeated.

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This piece is by Tries Zamansyah,Secretary General of the SarekatNelayan Sumatera Utara (SNSU),North Sumatra, Indonesia


Seafood industry

Corporate capers

A takeover bid by a Canadian seafood company underlines the need for clear public policy on critical industries

In recent years, the fishing industry ofNewfoundland and Labrador,Canada’s newest and most easterly

province and one that has a traditionaldependence on the fishery, has seenmarket forces being relegated to secondplace by the organized strength of coastalpeople.

It all began with a bid by a newconsortium called NEOS Seafoods Inc. fora hostile takeover of Newfoundland’s(and indeed North America’s) largestseafood company, Fishery ProductsInternational (FPI), a publicly tradedcompany.

Eighty per cent of the equity of NEOS isdivided equally between the company’sNewfoundland and Nova Scotia partners,the seafood companies known as theBarry Group and Clearwater Fine Foodsrespectively, and the remainder 20 percent is owned by the Icelandic seafoodtrading company, Icelandic FreezingPlants Corp.

FPI is a seafood company which wasformed in the mid-1980s out of the ashesof a virtually bankrupt Newfoundlanddeep-sea fishing sector. To avoid massivejob loss, the federal and provincialgovernments of the day poured hundredsof millions of dollars into the restructuringof the deep-sea sector.

A number of virtually bankruptcompanies operating in Newfoundlandwere combined into FPI, a company inwhich both levels of government took anequity position. Provincial legislationincluded a requirement that the companymaintain its head office within theprovince and have majority ofNewfoundlanders on the Board ofDirectors. In addition, the legislationcontained a share restriction that limited

to 15 per cent the proportion of FPI sharesthat could be held by any one individualor association of individuals acting inconsort.

After highly profitable years in the mid- tolate-1980s, FPI bought out the governmentshares, privatized the company andrestructured itself into a company tradedon the stock exchange. It obtained rawmaterial both from offshore companyITQs and by buying from independentinshore and midshore harvesters.

The collapse of the key groundfish stocksin Atlantic Canada by 1992-93 createdanother crisis for FPI, which lost 95 per centof its groundfish allocations. Once again,the company went back to the drawingboard, shifting its emphasis tointernational seafood trading.

The company made this transitionsuccessfully, enjoying modestprofitability by 1998, and in the acquisitivemindset of the market, was seen to be“ripe for the picking”. The first potentialcherry picker was NEOS, a companycreated for that very purpose. On 5November 1999, NEOS offered Can$9 ashare for FPI shares, up from the thencurrent rate of about Can$7.20. But it wasa highly conditional offer, contingentupon, among other things, removal of thelegislated 15 per cent share restriction aswell as a similar provision in the FPIbyelaws, and also upon thepresumptuous condition that there be noreview of the matter by Canada’sCompetition Bureau.

More concentrationThis latter condition was significant inthat the takeover, if successful, would leadto an extremely high degree ofconcentration in the Newfoundlandfishery, one that had set off alarm bells

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among Newfoundland’s 10,000-stronginshore/midshore fish harvesting sector,as well as among fish plant workers.

The Fish, Food and Allied Workers(FFAW/CAW) Union representsboth fish harvesters and fish

processing plant workers, including about3,000 plant workers and 300 trawlermenemployed by FPI. Even during the darkestyears of the groundfish crisis of the 1990s,the union had negotiated wage increasesfor plant workers in every year but one,and labour relations with FPI were positiveand constructive.

Normally, shareholders could not careless what a union thinks about a shareoffering, but the 15 per cent sharerestriction made the takeover bid apolitical issue as well as a financial one.Without the approval of theNewfoundland and Labradorgovernments, the bid would fail.

The governments’ position was that theywould be convinced to lift the legislationonly if the people of the province wereconvinced. Suddenly, the union was in ahighly influential position, as were themunicipal councils in towns with FPIplants.

FFAW/CAW were first off the mark indeveloping a position on the takeover bid.A week after the bid was announced, theunion executive board, together with the

elected union leadership of the FPI plantsand CAW National President, BuzzHargrove, met first with the NEOSprincipals then with FPI management. Theunion then arrived at a position andmoved to an adjoining meeting room toadvise a press conference that it would beasking the provincial government tomaintain the 15 per cent share restriction.

The union’s position was based on threemain considerations:

1. The financial vulnerability of FPI arisingfrom the conversion of Can$150-Can$200million of shareholder equity into debt, asproposed by NEOS.

2. The high level of corporateconcentration that would have resulted inthe fishery in Newfoundland andLabrador, particularly detrimental to fishharvesters as a result of significantlessening of competitive forces in thebuying of raw material.

3. The positive labour relations historybetween FPI and its unionized workforce,in contrast with the pronounced,high-profile, anti-union background of atleast one of the partners in NEOS.

Election-style campaignNEOS expressed disappointment in theunion’s position, and immediatelylaunched an election-style campaign,including highly publicized visits by the

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NEOS principals to several towns in whichFPI operates. NEOS announced plans torebuild FPI’s oldest plant, at a cost ofCan$10 million, and also promised newfacilities in two additional locations. Italso promised year-round work in plantswhich had been limited to seasonal workby raw material constraints.

The reaction of the workforce andthe communities was one ofscepticism. Plant workers turned

out in large numbers at membershipmeetings to oppose the NEOS plan. One byone, municipal councils in towns with FPIplants followed the union’s lead inopposing the lifting of the sharerestrictions. The social democratic NewDemocratic Party had come out earlyopposing the takeover, and once it becameclear that public opinion was stronglyagainst the takeover, the oppositionProgressive Conservative party took asimilar position.

Having promised initially to respectpublic opinion, the provincialgovernment advised NEOS, on 7 December1999, that it would not lift the sharerestriction. The next day, NEOS withdrewits bid, less than five weeks after it had firstbeen announced.

Fundamentally, the NEOS bid failedbecause its proponents had developedtheir plan in isolation from organizedlabour, and failed to convince anyone thattheir plan would enhance and strengthenthe Newfoundland and Labrador fishingindustry generally and the prospects andjob security of FPI employees and fishharvesters in particular. The wholeexperience underlines the importance ofgovernment legislation to stabilize and setground rules for public policy for criticalindustries.

Pressure to remove the restrictions willcontinue, from FPI’s management andBoard of Directors as well, because thefinancial world prefers that only its rulesapply. But, as we enter the new century,the same vigilance that FPI workers, fishharvesters and their union displayedthrough five crucial weeks at the end ofthe 20th century will be needed even moreas workers respond to global pressures forunrestricted and untrammelled corporaterights.

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This article is by Earle McCurdy,President of FFAW/CAW,Newfoundland, Canada (email:[email protected])


Fisheries management

Only partnerships work

The experience of Barbados throws light on fisheries management plans, and not just for Small Island Developing States

The need to introduce FisheryManagement Plans (FMPs) was firstappreciated by eastern Caribbean

fisheries authorities in the early 1980s.Fisheries are important socially andculturally, if not economically, in theseSmall Island Developing States (SIDS).

The fishing industry of Barbados, the mosteastern of the islands in the Lesser Antilleschain, is small-scale and based largely onthe migratory pelagic fishes such as flyingfish, dolphin, tunas and billfish thattraverse its Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ). Due to their movement during someparts of their life cycles, these fishresources are shared with several othermarine jurisdictions and countries.

The Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) and the CARICOM Fisheries ResourceAssessment and ManagementProgramme (CFRAMP) assisted inproducing a draft FMP for Barbados tomeet the requirements of a 1993 FisheriesAct which took the provisions of the Lawof the Sea into account. The Fisheries Actrequires the Chief Fisheries Officer todevelop fishery-specific FMPs and keepthem under review. According to the Act,each fishery plan must include:

• The present state of fisheryexploitation

• Management and developmentobjectives

• Management and developmentmeasures and policies

• Statistical informationrequirements

• Specifications of licensing andlimitations to fishing

The work of developing the initial draftplans was confined largely to fisheriesconsultants and the fisheries officers of theFisheries Division in the Ministry ofAgriculture. However, the Fisheries Actrequires that the Minister appoint aFisheries Advisory Committee to advisehim on the development andmanagement of fisheries.

In the absence of functioning fisherfolkorganizations at the time, members fromthe fishing industry were selected on thebasis of their personal expertise throughan informal system of peerrecommendations and shortlisting. Theappointed members of the FisheriesAdvisory Committee were the ChiefFisheries Officer as Chairman, an offshorefisherman, an inshore fisherman, aboatowner, a fish processor, a fisheriesconsultant, and the Deputy Director of theCoastal Zone Management Unit. Early in1996, the newly formed FisheriesAdvisory Committee faced the task ofcompleting the FMP through consultationas promoted in the Fisheries Act.

The Committee anticipated that severalmonths of private and public meetingswould be required to re-formulate thedraft FMP. The Act recommended that thefishing industry and other stakeholdershave a meaningful say in determining thecontent of the FMP. These are the peoplewho will be most affected by the plan,whether it is successful or not. It is widelyrecognized that FMPs will succeed only ifthe fishing industry is an integral part ofplan formulation, implementation,monitoring and evaluation.

Legal guidanceClearly defining the task and then tacklingit methodically was important. The lawgave guidance on content, and theFisheries Advisory Committee decided on

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a sequence of steps, each with feedbackand a schedule, as follows:

1. Fisheries Division formulates thedraft FMP

2. Fishery Advisory Committee(FAC) appraises the draft FMP

3. Fishing industry and otherstakeholders review the draft FMPin public

4. Minister approves the final draftFMP (after several reviews andrevisions)

5. Fisheries Division and fishing in-dustry implement and monitor theFMP

6. Stakeholders and FisheriesDivision evaluate and improve theFMP

The circulation of the Fisheries AdvisoryCommittee’s draft FMP for public reviewstimulated active and constructiveparticipation. We intentionally wentbeyond the fishing industry, since thebenefits from managing fishery resourcesmust be shared among the general public.All taxpayers share the costs of fisheriesmanagement, and there are manyinteractions with stakeholders in othersectors of the economy such as tourismand agriculture. Therefore, special

attention was paid to coastal zone issuesand inter-sectoral linkages.

Public meetings were held in both centraland community locations. Although theFisheries Division took the lead, membersof the FAC also attended the site meetings.Copies of the draft Plan were distributed,and the public at large informed thatwritten comments were welcome.However, more emphasis was placed onreceiving the oral comments of fisherfolkat the informal field meetings. All issuesaffecting the fishing industry were openfor discussion, whether in the draft Planor not, so that the stakeholders set theagenda for the review. From the publicreview process, we got additional ideas toincorporate into the Plan. We were told,often in no uncertain terms, which werethe priority areas and burning issues.

The Fisheries Division and FisheriesAdvisory Committee revised the FMP toinclude the recommendations ofstakeholders, whether they agreed withthe government or not. The fact that theFMP was now the people’s plan made itmore acceptable to the politicaldirectorate.

Legal regulationsWhen legal regulations are drafted on thebasis of the plan, Ministers must feelconfident that the fishery managementmeasures will be supported by theordinary man in the street. It was easy to

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persuade the fisheries Minister to approvethe plan for implementation as requiredby law.

The first FMP for Barbados wasapproved in 1997, and theregulations to give effect to the

agreed upon management measuresbecame law in 1998. Meanwhile, theFisheries Division started a publiceducation programme to remindstakeholders and the public about thebenefits of fisheries management and theimportant role individuals and groupscan play to help it succeed. The majorityof participants in the fishing industry andthe public are unfamiliar with fisheriesmanagement planning. The first plan wasintended primarily as a communicationand education document. In this respect,it has been quite successful.

The legally required information for eachof the eight fisheries to be managed wasput in a format that was easy to followeven if one knew little about the fishingindustry. The first half of the plandocument gave a general overview of thefishing industry so the reader could placethe plans into context. Issues regardingfisheries development, which is of primeinterest to people in the industry, potentialinvestors, banks and donor agencies wereplaced in a separate section. Eachfishery-specific plan follows a commonlayout and minimizes the use of technicalor scientific language. For each, there is

also an implementation plan that seeks toaddress the main issues confronting theparticular fishery. This layout is intendedto facilitate quick access to the essentialinformation. A glossary is appended toexplain some essential technical terms andmanagement concepts.

The fishery-specific plan sections are:Target Species; Catch and Effort Trend;By-catch; Regulatory History; Ecology;Management Policies and Objectives;Description of Fishery; SelectedManagement Approaches; ManagementUnit Development Constraints; ResourceStatus; and Development Opportunities.

The plan has also been effective in havingits contents translated into legalregulations intended to manage thefishery. However, compliance with theregulations has been mixed largely due tothe inability of the small staff of theFisheries Division to follow up with thetechnical support required to establishsome of the fishing gear measures forresponsible fishing.

CollaborationsThe Fisheries Division has beenvigorously promoting and facilitating theformation of fisherfolk organizations inorder to improve participation andcollaboration in the process. Even thoughfisherfolk organize themselves mainly forincome-generating development, ratherthan fisheries resource conservation or

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management, the collective action ismutually beneficial for informationexchange and exploring shared interestswith other stakeholders and government.

The planning process recentlyintroduced in Barbados hasprovided a variety of lessons that

may apply elsewhere. First, the fishingindustry is not familiar with fisherymanagement issues and techniques.Therefore, it can not be assumed thatFisheries Advisory Committee membersdrawn from the industry, or the public, arein a position to contribute to the scientificand very technical aspects of the plan.However, their contributions on otheraspects are invaluable.

The planning process brought to the forethe wide array of responsibilities of theFisheries Division, and the urgent need forattention to many of these issues. It,therefore, underscored the limitedinstitutional capacity of the FisheriesDivision to address these issuesexpeditiously with its currently scarceresources (human, physical and financial).

The selected approach starts with arational framework that describes, insimple terms, what is known andgenerally agreed upon by themanagement stakeholders. It identifiesdesired end points and the approaches togetting there, based on the best availableand shared information.

In this manner, the foundation is laid forproceeding with management actions thatare reasonable and generally acceptableeven before there is a well-establishedscientific basis for them. These types ofapproaches, which rely less on largequantities of scientific information, andmore on negotiated objectives derivedfrom modest science and sharedperspectives, are perhaps better suited tosmall-scale fisheries management, giventhe limited capacities of most fisheriesmanagement units in SIDS.

The Barbadian approach is precautionaryin first setting up the management policiesand objectives with simple, achievablesteps to meet them. It is not based uponconducting stock assessment and detailedscientific research as an essentialprerequisite. It, therefore, includes

obtaining scientific information asmanagement proceeds.

At public meetings, the industry tended tofocus more on the problems associatedwith infrastructure and economicdevelopment, than on management orconservation issues. In preparing the FMPto meet local needs and expectations, itwas decided to explicitly include fisheriesdevelopment.

The close and complementary linkbetween management and developmentwas thought to be an importantperspective in the context of promotingsustainable resource use in a SIDS. Peopleand politicians in developing countriesexpect management to include bothconservation and development. However,the bias towards capital development isbased on an implicit assumption ofcontinued resource availability. This canbe a dangerously incorrect assumption.

These lessons reiterate the need forincreased and continuous informationexchange amongst stakeholders in thefisheries management process. This isnecessary to bring about more informed,meaningful and effective participation bythe fishing industry. It will also strengthenthe capability of the State to manage thefisheries successfully throughcollaboration and co-operation, ratherthan command and control. Indeed,exchange of information between thefishing industry and fishery managers isone of the most critical dimensions offisheries planning. This is especially so incountries like ours unable to engage inelaborate fisheries research. Fisheriesauthorities must recognize that they needto form partnerships with the people inthe fishing industry, whether the processis called co-management, community-based management or something else.

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This article is by Patrick McConney,Chief Fisheries Officer, FisheriesDivision, Barbados (email:[email protected])


Co-management

The way forward

Inshore harvesters throughout Atlantic Canada are gradually extending their influence over fisheries management through co-management processes

Creating New Wealth from the Sea,published by the CanadianCouncil of Professional Fish

Harvesters (CCPFH) in June 1996, includedthe following statement: “We support theconcept of co-management with industryshouldering more managementresponsibilities together withgovernment.”

Since the report was published, however,the idea of co-management has becomeincreasingly confused and controversial,and industry organizations now expressviews on the topic ranging from cautiousinterest to outright distrust.

Many harvester leaders seeco-management as yet another example ofgovernment talking about grass-rootsparticipation and consultation, but doingthe opposite. They point to top-downdecision-making on issues like fleetreduction, licence fees, small craftharbours, downloading of surveillanceand enforcement costs, and resourceallocations. The most serious criticism isthat the co-management policy of theDepartment of Fishery Operations (DFO) isjust a smokescreen to advance thegovernments agenda to privatize fishresources and force everyone on toindividual transferable quotas (ITQs).

The fact that the DFO has targetedspecialized corporate or mid-shore fleetsfor their initial ‘partnering’ agreements(on, for example, offshore scallops, Pacifichalibut, groundfish mobile gear, snowcrab, etc.) has also made the multi-speciesinshore sector suspicious of thegovernment’s motives.

Against this background of mistrust andcontroversy, the DFO asked the Council toconsult with its member organizationsabout guidelines for co-management in

the multi-licence inshore fishery. Theproject provided an opportunity for theCouncil to look closely at some of themany fisheries management activities thatinshore harvesters in Atlantic Canada andQuébec have initiated in their local areas,and for harvesters to discuss and debatewider policy issues related toco-management. What follows is a briefsummary of the Council’s report.

The DFO’s co-management policy has beenin place since 1995. It involves twoprincipal elements which impact on themulti-licence inshore sector: IntegratedFisheries Management Plans (IFMPs) andpartnering arrangements. IFMPs aregradually being introduced by the DFO foreach individual fishery. They are built onthe established system of advisorycommittees and fisheries managementplans, but are intended to involve widerconsultations with licence holders andother stakeholders. They are alsosupposed to pull together the activities ofall the DFO sectors—ResourceManagement, Science, Conservation andProtection, Policy and Economics, etc.—in one planning process.

Fisheries management ‘partneringarrangements’ involve negotiatedagreements between the DFO and industrygroups to share regulatory,administrative and other responsibilities.At present, such arrangements are set upas joint project agreements (JPAs) whichdefine the administrative and financialaspects of the legal contracts between thepartners.

MicromanagementIn most cases, industry is expected to takeon some responsibilities and costs for theday-to-day micromanagement of thefishery that were previously carried on bythe DFO, in return for greater security of

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access to resources and expanded controlover their own fishing operations.

A proposed new Fisheries Actcontains legislative mechanismsfor more comprehensive and

longer term transfers of managementauthority, subject to the Minister’scontinuing responsibility forconservation, through formal fisheriesmanagement agreements.

Multi-licensed inshore harvestersthroughout Atlantic Canada and Québechave consistently raised concerns aboutco-management throughout theconsultations leading up to the Council’sreport. These concerns can besummarized as follows:

1. The need for multi-species approachesto fisheries management: From aconservation perspective, as well as interms of the way they conduct theirmulti-species enterprises, inshoreharvesters want to see mechanisms thatpromote integrated planning andregulation of all fishing activities in agiven area.

2. Privatization of the resource:Co-management is seen by manyharvesters as part of a continuing push bythe DFO for privatization of fish resourcesand of the management system,particularly through the implementationof ITQ regimes.

3. Concerns about ‘economic viability’: Incontrast to the DFO’s narrow approach toenterprise viability based onsingle-species fisheries, multi-licenceharvesters favour a comprehensiveaccounting system that would also look atthe viability of fleets and fishingcommunities.

4. Cost downloading: Harvester groupsare concerned that the continueddownloading of costs through higherlicence fees, dockside monitoring costs,etc. is having negative impacts onenterprise viability in the inshore,multi-licence fleets.

5. Ineffective capacity reduction:Harvesters want to see more industrycontrol over capacity reduction andprogrammes that are sensitive to localconditions and will produce optimal gainsin terms of overall fleet viability.

Inshore harvesters would like to seeprovisions in the new Fisheries Act todefine clear roles and responsibilities forbroad-based organizations with regard toco-management in their sectors. They alsowant the Act to define clearly who can bepartners in a transparent process ofnegotiation for fisheries managementagreements.

Exciting projectsThe report of the Council describes anumber of exciting local projects where

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harvesters, with or without the support ofthe DFO, are taking the initiative to buildnew fisheries management systems thatwork effectively at the local level.

In Newfoundland’s EastportPeninsula, harvesters are doing theirown lobster stock assessment

research, after setting up a new system toenforce minimum size limits. In GulfNova Scotia, groups have come togetherto design a comprehensive capacityreduction strategy. On Digby Neck and inShelburne County, Nova Scotia, localharvester groups are managing theirgroundfish allocations throughinnovative community-basedmanagement systems.

All around the Atlantic region, localharvester groups are adapting newapproaches to research and education toimprove recruitment levels in thecritically important lobster fishery.

These current activities are clearly part ofa long tradition of multi-licence harvestergroups taking responsibility for themanagement of their industry.

While the DFO has only recently embracedthe concept of co-management, harvestergroups have long pushed for genuinepartnership with government wherebythe knowledge, competencies andeconomic interests of harvesters are fullyrecognized, and where they have a

meaningful say in the decisions that shapetheir working lives.

The Council’s Board of Directors iscirculating the co-management report tostimulate discussion among harvestersand their organizations and withingovernment. While it is not able to take aclear policy stance until its memberorganizations have fully considered theissues, the Council is putting forward fordiscussion the following three action stepsto advance co-management in themulti-licence inshore sector:

1. Co-Management Advisory Councils:The DFO and the legitimate harvesterorganizations could work together todesign and put in place representativeadvisory councils to act as consultation,planning and co-ordinating bodies for thecontinuing elaboration of co-managementin multi-licence inshore fisheries. Thecouncils would generate advice and seekindustry consensus in areas such asharvester registration systems,professionalization, long-term fleetplanning, community-basedmanagement, and locally basedco-management projects.

Harvester communitiesIn determining their coverage by area,such councils would be built from theground up and shaped by harvestercommunities who choose to grouptogether. DFO staff and harvester

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representatives would work togetherthrough the councils on fisheriesmanagement plans, local co-managementprojects and partnering agreements.

2. Regional Working Groups on CapacityBuilding: The DFO and the establishedharvester organizations in each regionwould work together to help harvestergroups to participate in co-managementfor multi-licence inshore fisheries. Amongthe issues to be addressed would be: theneed for stronger, better financedharvester organizations; education andtraining programmes to strengthen localknowledge and skills; better networkingamong local and regional harvestergroups; and ongoing evaluation ofregional and local co-managementinitiatives to support the sharing ofexperience, knowledge and skills.

3. A Co-management Investment Fund:These regional working groups couldundertake to set up funds for localharvester groups to support thedevelopment of co-management projects.Harvester groups often have excellentideas for ways to improve their fisheriesbut have difficulty getting the start-upmoney. An investment fund should beself-sustaining by investing in activitiesthat can pay for themselves over themedium term.

It is hoped that the CCPFH discussionpaper on co-management formulti-licence inshore fisheries willcontribute to a well-informed debate onfisheries management issues and to betterunderstanding among government andthe harvester community.

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This article is by Marc Allain, afisheries consultant based inQuebec, Canada (email:[email protected])



Fishing for a language

The experience of the Ngäi Tahu Maori tribe could be a model on how to implement a common language for fisheries management plan

At a certain level, everyoneinvolved in fisheries managementwould agree that our aim is to

manage the fisheries resourcessustainably. Divergence on what thismeans rapidly emerges in any discussionon the term ‘sustainability’. Thedivergence results from the lack of acommon language with which toapproach fisheries management.

This is not to say there is a lack of fisherieslanguage. On the contrary, the field offisheries management is renowned for itssubstantive and often peculiarterminology. Examples of ‘resource rents’,‘TACs’, ‘carrying capacity’ and ‘fishingdown’ are just a few that readily come tomind. These terms are widely bandiedabout by those involved in fisheriesmanagement. But what do they reallymean and how often has the lack ofcommon understanding of the languageof fisheries management led to disastrousresults for both the fisheries and thepeople who rely on this natural resource?

This article will briefly clarify some of thelanguage used in the context of customaryfisheries management in New Zealand. Itwill then go on to sketch the path taken byNew Zealand in grappling with thelanguage of Mäori fisheries, in the contextof a rights-based fisheries managementsystem. The bulk of the article will thendescribe how the Mäori tribe, Ngäi Tahu,implemented their customary fisheriesmanagement system and how theycommunicated the language of thissystem to the rest of New Zealand.

An oft-misunderstood concept is that ofproperty and how it relates to the fisheriesresource for indigenous peoples. Implicitin much of the discourse surroundingproperty rights and fisheries is the ideathat the fisheries resource is an asset that

can be owned, divided and transferred.Linked to this presupposition is the ideaof the State being the owner of the asset onbehalf of the public.

The indigenous people of New Zealand(Mäoris) have a different interpretation onthe relationship between people and thefisheries resource. It is widely held byMäoris that people do not, and can not,own the fisheries resource; rather, it is theresponsibility of people to steward theresource. They have the authority,confirmed by genealogy, to defineboundaries, to determine seasons andmethods and any other measure tomanage the fishing. Thus, the access to thefisheries that Mäoris had exercised overgenerations was a right undertaken inintimate relationship with theirresponsibilities to look after the resource.

With these beliefs guiding their access anduse of the fisheries resource, Mäoris wereunderstandably aghast at the action of theState in introducing a Quota ManagementSystem (QMS) over the fisheries resourcesin New Zealand’s EEZ.

In response, Mäoris then challenged thevery presupposition of patrimony beingadopted by the State, and launched thesuccessful litigation that then led to thesettlement of the Mäori fisheries claims.

A basis of the litigation was that the Statedid not have the patrimonial right toallocate the fisheries resources as an asset.The State did not have this right, as therewas a pre-existing relationship of rightsand responsibilities held by Mäoris for thefisheries resource.

Mäori aimsThe aim of Mäoris, throughout the yearsof litigation, negotiation and nowimplementation of fisheries settlement

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legislation, is to have sovereignty overtheir rights and responsibilities — that is,to determine for themselves how tomanage their access to the fisheriesresource and how best to fulfil theirresponsibilities in looking after theresource.

Legislation governing fisheriesmanagement in New Zealand had,since the late 1800s, made reference

to the “Mäori fishing right”. Thelegislative references did not define orarticulate what this right was in thecontext of the fisheries management of theday; rather, the references maintainedrecognition of the relationship of rightsand responsibilities held by Mäoris for thefisheries resource.

It was to these legislative references thatMäoris turned when faced with theintroduction of a QMS in the mid-1980s.The State, by acting on the presuppositionthat they could allocate the fisheriesresource as an asset, had contravenedlegislation, and directly affected therecognized Mäori fishing right.

The language understood by the State hadrun headlong into the languageunderstood by Mäoris. Mäoris resorted tolitigation to put their message across,which resulted in the Court directing theparties, Mäoris and the State, to negotiatea way through the impasse. The challengefacing the parties was how to reach a

common language with which theintentions of both parties could beachieved. In more detail, the key questionfacing the parties was how did the Mäorifishing right work in the context of thecurrent fisheries management system inNew Zealand? It was at this juncture thata crucial decision was made. The Mäorifishing right was separated intocommercial and customarynon-commercial facets. The commercialaspect of the right could then be alignedwith the language of property rights asunderstood by the State, that is, thefisheries resource could be regarded as anasset. The customary non-commercialaspects of the right would need to befurther defined and articulated bylegislation to enable a common languageand understanding.

With the decision to separate the Mäorifishing right in this manner, the path wascleared for subsequent negotiations toproceed, and the two settlements of 1989and 1992 to be reached. The 1989legislation was an interim settlement thatprovided for 10 per cent of quota currentlyin the QMS and NZ$10 million in cash to betransferred to Mäoris.

Cultural reasonsThis legislation also provided for areas tobe established that had customarily beenof special significance to a tribe as a sourceof food or for spiritual or cultural reasons.A management committee would then be

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established to give advice to the Ministerof Fisheries on how best to manage thefisheries in the area.

The 1992 legislation built on theearlier interim settlement andprovided additional assets to

Mäoris of a 50 per cent share of the fishingcompany, Sealord Ltd., and guaranteed 20per cent of the quota of future species tothe QMS. Provision was also made forregulations to be established that wouldconfirm the customary non-commercialrights of Mäori.

Progress on implementation of thecommercial aspect of the fisheriessettlements was rapidly undertaken, and,today, Mäori interests control (throughownership, lease or pre-emptive right)approximately 57 per cent of thecommercial quota in the New ZealandQMS. Final delivery of this control toindividual tribes has yet to be completed,with internal discrepancies amongstMäoris as how best to allocate the assets.

Progress on implementation of legislationdefining the customary non-commercialaspect of the fisheries settlements was lessrapid, and it was six years beforelegislation was promulgated forcustomary fisheries in the South Island ofNew Zealand. In 1998, the Fisheries(South Island Customary Fishing)Regulations were passed. Theseregulations were soon followed by similarlegislation for the North Island of NewZealand.

Ngäi Tahu, the largest Mäori tribe in theSouth Island, which has one of the longestcoastline, is a key player in themanagement of fisheries in New Zealand.The initiatives that Ngäi Tahu has taken inthe last few years with customary fisheriesmanagement are, without doubt,vanguard measures for the rest of theworld to consider.

It was Ngäi Tahu, along with the eighttribes at the top of the South Island, whoinitiated a final round of negotiations withthe State to agree on a set of regulationsgoverning customary fisheries. Thenational negotiations had grown staleafter years of mismatching languagebetween the State and Mäori negotiators.The negotiations between the State and

the tribes of the South Island were,however, successful, and, in 1998, a set ofregulations were promulgated. Theseregulations defined and articulated thecustomary non-commercial fishing rightwithin the context of the New Zealandfisheries management system.

Regulations alone, however, are notenough to communicate a commonlanguage to all people involved infisheries management. Ngäi Tahudecided to take a strategic approach to thechallenge of communicating theirunderstanding and language ofcustomary fisheries management. Theunderlying philosophy or missionstatement for all Ngäi Tahu customaryfisheries management is “to secure anddevelop Ngäi Tahu customary fishingrights within a context of sustainable useof the fisheries resource, empoweringNgäi Tahu whänui to take up theirresponsibilities in fisheries management”.

Ngäi Tahu then identified six key areas tobe their strategic framework forcustomary fisheries management:organisation; research; informationmanagement; education andempowerment; external relations; andcompliance and monitoring.

The aim of the customary fisheriesorganisation is to have in place thenecessary legislation, structures,processes and resources to be responsiveto the needs of the tribe and to achieve themission statement. This work area is thefoundation for all other work undertakenin customary fisheries management.

A customary fisheries management teamwas developed within Ngäi TahuDevelopment Corporation. The teamcomprises nine staff positions, six ofwhich are funded by contracts of servicewith the Ministry of Fisheries. Theremaining three positions are funded byNgäi Tahu internal funds. This is a crucialaspect of the robust managementstructure.

Contracts of serviceWithout the capability to managecontracts, it is doubtful whether thegovernment department would haveentered into the contracts of service.Equally, the ability to attract contracts of

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service provides the necessary motivationfor continuing internal funding. Thesecontracts are a new way for indigenouspeople to achieve the outcomes they want.

The key role of the nine-person teamis to support the role of TangataTiaki. Tangata Tiaki are those

people with recognized authority underthe customary fishing regulations tomanage the customary fisheries.

The aim of the research work componentis to establish priorities for research,identify and support key humanresources within Ngäi Tahu forundertaking research, and supportprojects that address Ngäi Tahu researchpriorities. Ngäi Tahu are well aware thatinformation is influence, and the moreinformation they can hold on the fisheriesresource, the better the Tangata Tiaki canmanage the resource.

Directly linked to undertaking researchfor information on fisheries is the abilityto hold and manage this information. Theaim of the information managementcomponent is to establish a user-friendlyand secure Geographic InformationSystem (GIS) that will support and informtribal development in customary fisheriesmanagement.

Spatial mapping technology is eminentlysuitable for the nature of customaryfisheries management, with the highly

visual characteristics of GIS appealing totangata whenua.

Ngäi Tahu commissioned a NewZealand-based GIS company, whoseManaging Director is of Ngäi Tahudescent, to design a GIS specifically for theneeds of customary fisheriesmanagement. The result is a user-friendlysystem that tracks the activities of thecustomary fishers, the Tangata Tiaki andany other people connected to thecustomary fisheries management system.The GIS was designed to be extensible andit is anticipated that, in time, the systemwill be utilized by other fisheriesmanagers.

The most effective message is one that iswell understood. The aim of the work areaof education and empowerment is towidely promote the role and function ofcustomary fisheries management,empowering and assisting Mäoris toidentify and pursue their aspirations. Thisarea has been a priority of the customaryfisheries management system, as it isbelieved that if people understand theprinciples and necessity for customaryfisheries management, they will supportmanagement initiatives.

Sense of ownershipIt has been important to encourage a senseof ownership by Mäoris for theircustomary fisheries. Educate andempower Mäoris first, then broaden the

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focus to educate others to supportcustomary fisheries management. In otherwords, ensure the language is wellunderstood at home and then, together,take it to others to understand.

The initiatives undertaken to spreadthe common language ofcustomary fisheries management

have ranged from production of resources(video, booklet, stickers and T-shirts) totraining programmes. A comprehensivetwo-day training course is available for allthe established Tangata Tiaki. Thecommon characteristics of all theinitiatives have been their simplicity,creativity and fun. That has allowed theinformation to be easily understood.

The message of Ngäi Tahu needscontinual promotion and discussion to befully understood as a language of fisheriesmanagement. The aim of the externalrelations component is for Ngäi Tahu to beproactive in developing their externalrelations, ensuring their strategicobjectives are reflected in the workprogrammes of all fisheries managementgroups and agencies. In some cases,relationship agreements are developedbetween the parties as a way of confirmingthat the common language is understood.Ngäi Tahu has found that strategicalliances with other stakeholders are apath to smoother relations and successfuloutcomes.

The aim of the compliance component isto encourage voluntary compliance withfisheries laws, and to monitor theeffectiveness of customary fisheriesmanagement. Ngäi Tahu is well awarethat the language of customary fisheriesmanagement is constantly evolving. Inorder to ensure adherence with thecurrent understanding of the languageand monitor any changes, Ngäi Tahu tookup a compliance contract with thegovernment.

It was a leap of faith for the governmentand Ngäi Tahu to enter into thecompliance contract. Yet it was a leap thathas been well rewarded. This contractenabled the employment of the five KaiArahi, and triggered the formation of theentire customary fisheries team. It has alsogiven visible and tangible proof to allwatching that the language of customary

fisheries management can be commonlyunderstood regardless of your culturalbackground.

It is this proof that makes the example ofNgäi Tahu customary fisheriesmanagement a model for others to studyand possibly follow. This modeldemonstrates how a languageincomprehensible to many, a language ofspiritual beliefs and connections to thenatural environment, was interpreted,articulated and defined in such a way thatpeople could understand it. That is not tosay that each individual understands thelanguage of customary fisheriesmanagement in the same way. After all,every individual reads the world in aunique way that is bound by her/hisbeliefs. Yet, the language of Ngäi Tahuand customary fisheries management hasbeen communicated well enough forpeople to understand and support thecommon intention.

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This article is by Miranda Cassidy,fisheries and communicationsconsultant, Amuri, New Zealand(email: [email protected])



Shepherding the seas

The International Operations Group of Fisheries Western Australia offers expert advice on issues of monitoring, control and surveillance

The modern environment offisheries and marine managementis complex and demanding.

High-seas management, raised levels oftechnology, and state-of-the-art vesseloperations all ensure that the monitoring,control and surveillance (MCS) of ourprecious marine resources needs to be ofthe highest standard.

The International Operations Group ofFisheries Western Australia is a dedicatedand experienced team of professionalcompliance officers who undertake a widevariety of demanding tasks on behalf ofthe Australian Fisheries ManagementAuthority (AFMA), Australia’s Federalfisheries management agency. Groupmembers possess a diverse range of skillsand qualifications in the areas of fisheriesmanagement, MCS of capture fisheries,environmental management, educationand enforcement techniques. All membershave Maritime Masters qualifications ofvarying levels.

The group has been operatingcontinuously since 1979. Officersregularly operate in such diverse regionsas the warm waters of the tropics and theless hospitable waters of thesub-Antarctic. Patrols cover theAustralian 200-nautical mile Fishing Zone(AFZ) adjacent to Western Australia, andthe remote offshore territories ofChristmas Island and Cocos Islands, aswell as the Antarctic regions of Heard andMcDonald Islands. They conduct aerialand surface patrols on vessels and aircraftsupplied by the Royal Australian Navy,Coastwatch and the Royal Australian AirForce, as well as private charter vessels.

In-port inspection of foreign and domesticfishing vessels is also a primary taskundertaken by the group. Theseinspections are conducted in ports

throughout Australia, covering the localtuna longline operators as well as thelarge-scale Japanese tuna fleet. Licenceand logbook checks, pre- and post-fishingbriefings, and freezer volumetricinspections are routine. More than 250vessels are checked annually. In the 1980s,licensed Taiwanese pair-trawlers werealso inspected on a regular basis in thenorthwest port of Broome.

International Operations staff operate inharsh and difficult conditions, usingcomprehensive occupational health andsafety guidelines. The group hasdeveloped specialized equipment andprocedures to operate effectively inextremely low temperature freezersaboard fishing vessels.

International Operations Officers haveextensive experience in the volumetricestimation of fish catches in freezer holds.Their methodology allows for auditing ofvessel catches that are subject to quotarestrictions in situ, without compromisingthe quality of the product by removing itfrom the freezer. Monitoring of quotas canoften be difficult in any fishery and, inmany circumstances, can be the weak linkin the chain when considering accuracy inthe measurement of fishing effort.Volumetric surveys are ideal where theunload can not be supervised ormeasured, as is the situation with visitingJapanese tuna vessels.

Illegal fishingOfficers have been kept extremely busysince the late 1980s, with a constant influxof Indonesian fishermen illegally fishingwithin the AFZ. A Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU) exists between theIndonesian Government and theAustralian Government to allowtraditional Indonesian fishermen to fishwithin the AFZ in an area off the northwest

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coast. Nearly all the Indonesian vesselsapprehended have been fishing outsidethis allocated area. The main target speciesfor these vessels are trochus, trepang andshark (for fins).

In addition to the surveillance in thenorthern waters adjacent to themainland, regular patrols are

conducted to Christmas Island and theCocos Islands in the northern IndianOcean. As territories of Australia, each hasa 200-nautical mile fishing zone and thuscomes under the care and protection of theInternational Operations Group. Fishingvessels from other nations areoccasionally found operating illegallywithin these waters. With the vastdistance to mainland Australia andlimited resources on the Islands, asuccessful prosecution becomes muchmore of a challenge for the group.

Another Australian territory comingunder the watchful eyes of theInternational Operations Officers is that ofthe Heard and McDonald Islands.Situated below the Antarctic ConvergenceZone and nearly 2,300 nautical milessouthwest of the Australian mainland, thesurrounding waters of these islands arehome to the highly prized Patagoniantoothfish (Dissostichus eliginoides).

Patrols have been made to the area sinceearly 1998. Over the years, these patrolshave resulted in the apprehension of

several illegal foreign fishing vessels. InJanuary this year, a patrol to the region setout with several aims. Initially meant tomaintain a surveillance presence in thearea, the patrol created history by takingthe first step in what will become anongoing level of internationalco-operation and assistance. Liaison withFrench authorities has paved the way forfuture joint support and operations in theregion.

Only two licensed Australian trawlers arepermitted to fish within the AFZ of theseislands. However, in recent years, othernations have fished illegally in the area.

Once again, the distance from themainland and the extreme weatherconditions prove hazardous to operationsconducted by the group in this region.

Specialized boarding procedures,equipment and techniques have beendeveloped by officers to ensure safe andeffective outcomes.

ProsecutionTwo Australian Navy patrols to the arearesulted in three illegal foreign fishingvessels being apprehended andprosecuted. Regular patrols to this remotearea are now being undertaken using acivilian chartered vessel. Illegal fishingactivity in the region appears to havelessened due to the much publicizedapprehension of the three fishing vessels

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and the presence of InternationalOperations Officers in the region.

Although surveillance andcompliance issues appear at theforefront of the group’s duties,

these highly trained officers are equippedwith a diverse range of skills andexperience. In situ delivery of educationservices to fisheries-related personnel inneighbouring countries has also becomean expanding function of the group.

While enforcement and subsequentprosecutions can be seen as a deterrent tobreaches of fishing laws, education andawareness can often help to deter theinitial illegal action. The result is a savingof time, effort and costs for all concerned,as well as the protection of naturalresources.

In Indonesia, in May 1999, the first stageof Project Wakatobi was completed. Thethree-month operation took place in theTukangbesi Islands group in southeasternSulawesi. International Operationsofficers trained 53 Marine Park Rangers inbasic marine skills and MCS techniques tobe used in the operation of the newlyestablished Wakatobi Marine NationalPark. Officers also provided communitydevelopment assistance by training andadvising locals in the construction of fishaggregating devices (FADs) and the initialdevelopment of seaweed maricultureprojects.

As an alternative to apprehension andprosecution, the project aims, in two ways,to try and reduce the number ofIndonesian fishermen coming to fishillegally in Australia—first, by ensuringthe sustainability of local fish stocks, andsecond, by developing alternative incomegenerating opportunities for thefishermen. Funding for the first stage wasprovided by AusAID. Further funding isbeing sought to continue the project.

The International Operations Group alsodelivers ‘in-country’ FisheriesProsecution Workshops on behalf ofForum Fisheries Agency (FFA) forsurveillance and fisheries officials ofmember nations. Countries benefitingfrom the group’s expertise include Fiji,Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and theFederated States of Micronesia. Topics

covered during these training coursesinclude :

• Regional (Pacific) Fisheries Law

• Distant-water Fishing Nation(DWFN) Operations

• Longline fishing

• Purse-seine fishing

• DWFN vessel construction

• Illegal reef platform fishing - use ofsodium cyanide and explosives

• Boarding procedures

• Evidence gathering

• Basic search techniques

• Note-taking techniques

• Preparation of acceptable writtenstatements

• Giving evidence in court

• Catch calculations and freezercapacities (volumetrics)

• Design and supervision of anapprehension boarding scenario

• Design and supervision of a mockfisheries prosecution trial.

As the world’s marine fishery resourcescome under greater pressure, the need foreffective management will become evenmore vital. The International OperationsGroup of Fisheries Western Australia iswell equipped to not only meet theworld’s current demands of MCS andtraining, but the future expectations aswell.

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This article is by Tom J. Morris,Fisheries Officer, InternationalOperations Group, Fisheries Western Australia (email:[email protected])


Traditional fishers

Pink gold, muddy waters

A neglect of its traditional fisheries sector could spell jeopardy for Madagascar

Looked at in terms of its resources,Madagascar is a rich country, withits spices, precious stones and rich

fish stocks. Yet, more than half ofMalagasies are living below the povertyline, with declining per capita incomes. Inrecent years, this increased poverty andhunger has encouraged a reversemigration from urban areas, such asTananarive, to traditional fishingcommunities. Up to 100,000 Malagasies,men and women, are employed in thetraditional fisheries sector, and thenumbers are growing. The traditionalfisheries sector provides not onlyemployment but also a source of proteinto coastal communities, with 70 per cent ofthe fish protein consumed in Madagascarderived from the sector.

However, the role of the fisheries sector inmeeting the protein needs of anincreasingly impoverished Malagasypopulation could be even greater, if theunderdeveloped nature of Madagascar’stransport and public utilitiesinfrastructure (poor or non-existent roadlinks, the absence of electricity and hencecold storage facilities, etc.) did noteffectively isolate coastal fishingcommunities from inland markets. Thislack of economic integration keepsnational fish consumption down to below7.5 kg per capita per annum. Thiseffectively limits the scope for thedevelopment of the traditional fisheriessector, which primarily serves theunderdeveloped national market.

Were these infrastructural constraints tobe addressed, a national market for cheapfish protein could be developed. Thiswould give a major stimulus to thetraditional fisheries sector, generatingemployment and increased cash incomesfor an expanding sector. This would,however, require substantial investments

to overcome the physical and economicisolation of traditional coastal fishingcommunities.

While the traditional sector accounts for50 per cent of the national fish catch, thislargely consists of small pelagic and spinylobsters. Access to the commerciallyhigh-value tuna and shrimp resources arelargely closed to the traditional fisherfolk.EU-based fisheries operators, however, arestrongly represented in these sectors.

Since 1986, the EU has concluded fivefisheries agreements with Madagascar.Initially, these agreements secured accessto both the shrimp and tuna fisheries. Atthe end of the 1980s, however, access forEU vessels to the shrimp fishery under thefisheries agreement was discontinued.Since then, the EU-Madagascar fisheriesagreement has been exclusively a tunaagreement.

The agreement has, however, providedaccess for an increasing number of EU tunavessels. Under the latest agreement,which runs from May 1998 until 2001,access is provided to 75 tuna purse-seinersand long-liners, up from 58 under theprevious agreement and 27 under theinitial fisheries agreement. This tunaagreement, along with similar agreementswith the Comoros, Seychelles andMauritius, provides EU tuna vessels withaccess to the entire Indian Ocean tunafishery.

DiscriminationMalagasy seafarers often face a hard timeon EU tuna vessels. Discrimination isrampant, with unequal salaries andcontractual conditions. Malagasyseafarers can find themselves dumped instrange lands at the end of their contracts,with no rights of repatriation. Since 1995,with the assistance of the Coalition for Fair

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Fisheries Agreements (CFFA) and CFDT (aFrench maritime trade union), the issue ofMalagasy seafarers’ rights has been raisedwith French boatowners.

To date, however, they have deniedbeing the employers of theMalagasy seafarers. Against this

background, a round-table discussion isplanned to: clarify the responsibilities ofemployers; elaborate on collectivebargaining rights; and discuss the possibleinclusion of a code of fair practice forworkers on board EU vessels in futurefisheries agreements.

Under the current fisheries agreement,175,000 euros have been allocated to theMaritime Institute in Madagascar for thetraining of seafarers, so they can obtain theinternationally recognized qualification.Unfortunately, this still requires a sizeable‘own contribution’ from seafarers and,hence, remains unaffordable. A further125,000 euros were allocated to thetraditional fisheries sector.

To date, however, as far as the fishermencan tell, these funds have not been used intheir sector. In addition, in recentnegotiations, the EU representativeexpressed the wish to preserve the coastalzone for traditional fishermen. Localfishworkers would like to see the 10-mileexclusion zone established for tunavessels applied to the shrimp fishery aswell.

Madagascar benefits from this agreementin two main ways: through the financialcompensation paid directly to thegovernment and through the tunaprocessing plant established at DiegoSuares. In the latest agreement, financialcompensation paid out totalled 2,280,000euros, with 60 per cent being deployed inthe fisheries sector in support of research,training, monitoring and control.However, only around 5.5 per cent hasbeen allocated to the development of thetraditional fisheries sector. Since 1992, theunit value of tuna exports has doubled,with tuna increasingly being exported inthe processed form.

The ending of EU access to the shrimpfishery under the EU-Madagascar fisheriesagreement did not result in thewithdrawal of European enterprises fromthe Malagasy shrimp fishery. Indeed,European enterprises continue to beheavily involved in what is the mostcommercially important component ofthe Malagasy fishery, the ‘pink gold’,namely, the shrimp sector.

Joint venturesWhile fisheries agreement access forshrimp has ended, EU vessels continue tooperate in the Malagasy shrimp fisherywithin the framework of joint ventures,occasionally with financial aid from theEU’s Financial Instrument for FisheriesGuidance (FIFG). EU and member States’aid has also been extended to European

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companies moving into shrimpaquaculture. This European corporateinvolvement in the Malagasy shrimpfishery is, however, often complex, withcommercial deals being struck withJapanese importers and sister companiesfrom Europe, everything being tiedtogether in a complex web ofcross-holdings. All in all, however,European enterprises still play adominant role.

While European investments inthe shrimp fishery do notgenerate much direct

competition for resources with thetraditional fisheries sector, they dogenerate competition for priority access tothe coastal fishing zone, while threateningthe sustainability of the coastal marineecosystem.

Malagasy law restricts access to fishing inthe two-mile coastal zone exclusively tonon-motorized activities, or, in otherwords, exclusively for traditional fishingactivities. This means that industrialshrimp trawlers are legally prohibitedfrom fishing there. However, the reality isthat these trawlers commonly fishillegally within this exclusion zone.Indeed, figures for 1998 show that morethan two-thirds of the industrial shrimptrawler catches were made within thistwo-mile zone.

The Malagasy Shrimp Boatowners Group(Groupement des Armateurs à la PêcheCrevettière de Madagascar—GAPCM),argues that respecting the two-mileexclusion zone imposed on shrimptrawlers would make exploiting theshrimp fishery uneconomic. Indeed, it hasgone so far as to suggest that “for strategicand foreign policy reasons, it would not beappropriate to apply international Law ofthe Sea in Malagasy fisheries rules.”

This flagrant disregard for regulationssafeguarding the two-mile coastal zonefor traditional fisherfolk has resulted insome serious consequences for thetraditional fisheries sector:

• pollution of the sea from thedumping of by-catches;

• destruction of fishing gear onwhich the traditional fishing

sector depends for its non-shrimpcatches;

• direct conflicts with sometraditional fishermen fishing forshrimp; and

• increased pressure on non-targetspecies in general, with seventonnes of dead by-catch oftenbeing dumped at sea for everytonne of live shrimp caught.

This situation of conflict with, andundermining of, traditional fishingactivities seems likely to intensify, for, asshrimp stocks decrease, industrial fishingpressure within the two-mile exclusionzone is likely to increase. Indeed, theGAPCM is strongly pressuring theMalagasy government to ‘regularize’ the‘illegal’ situation by lifting the currenttwo-mile exclusion zone.

Currently, the development of thetraditional sector is seriously constrainedby the lack of access to the domesticmarket. Malagasies have seen their percapita GDP decline from US$480 in 1976 toUS$200 in 2000. They have seen absolutelevels of hunger and malnutritionincrease. Concentrating on programmesto expand the traditional fisheries sector tomeet the growing food needs of anincreasingly impoverished populationwould appear an obvious priority.

However, between 1985 and 1995, of the17.8 million ECU in EU funds madeavailable to projects in the fisheries sector,less than one per cent was dedicated to thetraditional fisheries sector. As much as 67per cent went to aquaculture projects, anda further 13 per cent to a rice-cum-fishproject designed to enhance rural foodsecurity.

Shrimp fisheryWhile the traditional sector mainly fishesfor low-value species for the currentlylimited local market, in recent years,traditional fishermen have begun to moveinto the shrimp fishery. In 1998, around2,000 tonnes of shrimp—20 per cent of theofficial catches—were caught bytraditional fishermen, although this wasmainly for local consumption. In additionto poor infrastructure, a major constraintfor the traditional sector is its inability to

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meet the quality standards of theexport-orientated shrimp market.

Unfortunately, the initiatives madeso far by the traditional sector toexploit commercial shrimp

resources have only linked them to anetwork of collectors who supply exporthouses. Yet they gain little, due to pricefixing, problems of preserving the catchand the exploitative practices of thecollectors.

Currently, for every 100 tonnes of shrimpcaught by the industrial sector, only 42jobs are created, while for every 100tonnes of shrimp produced in theaquaculture sector, 44 jobs are created. Incontrast, for every 100 tonnes of shrimpcaught by the traditional sector, 230 jobsare created. Clearly, therefore, expandingthe role of the traditional sector in theshrimp fishery, while involvingcomparatively little investment, will offertremendous scope for alleviating povertyin Madagascar.

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This article has been written byBéatrice Gorez of CFFA, Brussels(email: [email protected])


Sport fishing

Angling for disaster

The growing power of sport fishing presents a bleak future for small-scale fishers in the West

Discussions about small-scalefishers are commonly driven bythe perspectives of less

developed countries and are analyzedthrough formulations such as East vsWest, capital-intensive vs small-scale,community-based, and private vspublic/community property.

This approach, however, ignores the factthat small-scale fisheries dominates thefishing industries of many Westerncountries such as Australia, the US andCanada, amongst others, at least in termsof employment. In Australia, for instance,registered fishing vessels under 10 m inlength far outnumber those consideredlarge (over 24 m).

The participants in these small-scalefisheries tend to be family businesses,often multigenerational and characterizedby low levels of both capital investmentand profitability. These fisheries facemany of the same issues as their Easterncounterparts such as poor fisheriesmanagement, competition from largerplayers, and habitat degradation.Although the issue of access alienation hascropped up in some of the Easternfisheries, Western small-scale fisheries arefacing a major assault on their abilities toaccess fish resources, primarily due to theincreasingly influential recreationalangling (sport fishing) sector.

Major fishing closures resulting frompolitical agitation by numericallydominant and, commonly, well-fundedangling groups have resulted inuncertainty, stress and unemployment incoastal fishing communities, asgovernments seek to appease therecreational sector.

For many of these small fishingcommunities, the debate over property

rights has assumed greater validity asthey seek to preserve their way of life andtheir ability to earn a living. The downsideof property rights are increasingly beingjuxtaposed against the possibility ofextinction.

For generations, recreational anglers havesought sole access to many inshore fishstocks. The larger area and greater timeclosures for the commercial sector reflectthe previously held view of many fisheryadministrators that recreational fishingwas harmless and, therefore, could beallowed to continue relatively unchecked,while the more important need ofcontrolling commercial catches wasaddressed.

If we ignore the (probably significant)impacts of habitat loss and pollution onthese inshore areas, there is mountingevidence that recreational catches (andbycatches) have a major impact on inshorefish stocks in many areas. Recreationalfisheries are not immune from bycatcheither. Discarding rates can be ofcommercial-sector proportions. Protectedspecies are often taken; hooking mortalitycan be high; and habitat modificationoccurs from intensive boating — these aresome of the more obvious impacts ofangling.

The rise of recreational catches has beendriven by a mix of technology andincreased leisure time. More reliableoutboard engines, cheaper (and better)fish finders and, more seriously, theadvent of cheap Global PositioningSystem (GPS) devices have putcommercial-sector fishing power into thehands of millions of anglers.

Slow to realizeFisheries administrators have generallybeen slow to recognize this threat. They

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also face handicaps, such as limitedaccess, for any effective control. A failureto address the burgeoning recreationalcatch has resulted in resource conflict anddemands for politically driven resourcereallocation solutions.

Even as recreational fishers movefurther offshore and begin takinglarger quantities of deeper water

species traditionally thought of as beinglimited to the commercial sector, there is areluctance by fisheries administrators toact to limit recreational catches.

The recreational sector makes use of linesas the dominant means of fishing, whilethe most common commercial sector gearis the net. What better way to limit thecatching power of the commercial sectorthan to campaign for net bans?

In the southern US, a number of Stateshave banned the use of nets as a result ofpressure by sport-fishing interests. Anumber of other States have been subjectto major anti-net campaigns. In Florida,around 5,000 small-scale commercialfishers were put out of business by a voteto ban nets. The vote was preceded by amajor television campaign against netsthat the small-scale fishers were unable tocounter, for lack of funds. Althoughgovernment funds were made available tobuy back the nets (thus providing somelimited ‘compensation’), the sport-fishingsector campaigned against such a buyout.

Since the net ban, many related businesseshave closed, rendering several fishersunemployed. This has become a majorissue, as many fishers were too old forother jobs, levels of education were low,and there was no exit programme toenable fishers to find alternative sourcesof employment. In short, the pre-votingvilification campaign made these peopleout to be resource rapists and unworthy ofthe support of the wider community.

Similar campaigns are also being wagedin Australia and Canada. In LakeMacquarie, New South Wales, Australia,small-scale fishing families have beensubject to five years of intense vilificationby an angling group in a campaign thathas caused great stress and uncertainty.This campaign has proceeded despiteindependent evidence that commercial

catches have been stable for decades, andrecreational catches continue to increase.Moreover, as occurs elsewhere, thecommercial catch is dominated bynon-angling species such as mullet, andthe recreational catch of many of theshared species exceeds the commercialcatch.

Small-scale fishers subject to campaignsby anglers face a major dilemma. Thecurrent management/licensing systemsare not based on strong property rights.Thus, there is little chance ofcompensation for loss of access rights.Such compensation could have been usedto move into another small business, or tomove elsewhere for fishing, or toundertake some retraining. Governmentsprefer this situation as they want theflexibility to cater to political pressure atno cost to the public, and the small size ofmany of these fishing communitiesmitigates against them forcinggovernment to allocate funds for an exitpackage.

Gone are the days when fisheriesadministrators would provide someprotection. The increasing politicizationof these agencies has increased theuncertainty for small-scale commercialfishers. Not surprisingly, many of thefishing communities facing recreationalfishing pressures are seeking greatersecurity of access. Stronger access rightshave their own downside. The allocationof tradeable rights, whether they be ITQsor tradeable input controls, willundoubtedly change the way fishingcommunities operate. Fishingcommunities face some hard choices—change or be phased out. However,tradeable rights systems do not exist bythemselves. They are the creations ofpeople, and can thus be designed toachieve the goals of those who designthem.

Innovative waysAt the FishRights Conference held inPerth, Australia in November 1999,among the highlights were the fewpresentations that dealt with innovativeways of designing rights-based systemsthat work for, and not against, fishingcommunities. Although the conferencewas dominated by the ITQ debate, andfull-fledged, corporate-orientated

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property rights, it was clear that there wasmuch to be learned from listening tosmaller groups that were designingrights-based systems that, while far fromperfect in an economic sense, providedincreased security and additionalmanagement tools.

Community ownership mayprovide a halfway house betweenindividual and public ownership,

and may thus provide some of theprotection required by fishers, without allof the negative consequences of fullprivatization.

Such a move may require someadventurous thinking and some realleadership from fisheries administrators,attributes which are not in great supply inmany fisheries agencies. The incentivesfor such behaviour are not strong.Politicians and their appointees, andangling lobbyists, would not want strongrights for the commercial sector, as theyhave no vested interest in the survival ofsmall-scale fishers. Fishing communities,however, do. There is thus a majorchallenge to ensure the continuation ofthese communities.

The strengthening of rights will causechanges in the ways these communitiesfunction. However, as the pressure oncoastal resources increases, and the threatof extinction of these communitiesbecomes ever present, the palatability of

these changes may also change. Even ifstronger rights do not become the key tosurvival, they may at least tip the balanceat the bargaining table when thereallocation axe falls.

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This article is by Duncan Leadbitter,Executive Director, Ocean WatchAustralia Ltd., New South Wales,Australia (email:[email protected])


Fishery co-operatives-5

A time of surrender

The fifth instalment in the series on the pioneer of Japan’s co-operative movement

Just when our co-operative movementwas starting to operate smoothly andwe saw some hope for the future, we

were faced with this crucial development.I became very worried about the future ofthe fishing villages and the FCAs inHokkaido.

At about that time, we had a large stock ofdried squid and, as there was anextraordinarily good harvest, the priceplummeted. The price of one bag of squidfell to ¥80, which was not even enough tocover our costs. The fishermen had to getat least ¥90 in order to make a profit. Themerchants in Hakkodate, who claimedthat their city was the nation’s majortrading centre for dried squid, also faceda severe lack of funds, and had to sell someof their stocks at a loss.

In an attempt to deal with these problems,they established the Japan SquidDistribution Association, and I hopedthat, by dealing with them, we could keepthe price at an acceptable level.

We sold all the dried squid that Dogyorencollected from the FCAs in the southernregions, as well as the stock of theindividual merchants. The price soonrebounded to ¥95, but the governmentagain set the official price at ¥80, therebyspoiling any advantages which theassociation had gained.

I had, in fact, negotiated with the FisheryAgency prior to the announcement, andthey had agreed to a price of ¥97.

I felt betrayed, but, at the same time, Irealized that this decision had been madenot by the Fishery Agency, but by officialsat the Ministry of Commerce and Industrywho had not researched the situation anddid not have enough information tounderstand the situation fully.

Furthermore, the aforementioned JapanMarine Products Trading Company hadconsiderable deficits. While we weretaking measures to bolster the prices,Matsuo and I became the subjects of apolice investigation. Certain anonymousletters had been posted to the policestating that we were trying to inflate theprices and keep some of the profit forourselves. We insisted that we wereworking solely for a system under whichthe fishermen could receive their justbenefits.

The merchants also testified in our favour,by stating that they agreed with the aimsof the association, and that they played anactive part in it and had a share of itscapital. They stated that if they did notco-operate with us to maintain the marketconditions, all production activitieswould stop. The police soon called offtheir investigation.

When Dogyoren was first established,nobody expected it to develop as much asit did, and, therefore, none of the directorshad wanted to become president ofDogyoren. Finally, Demachi, a member ofthe Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly andof the Kamoenai FCA, said that he mightundertake the post.

Managing directorThe other directors gave neither theirapproval nor disapproval. They simplysaid that it was best to leave all themanagement matters to me in my post asmanaging director. As Demachi alsoagreed to leave these affairs to me, heassumed the post of president. I wentabout my daily business, and whenquestions about hiring new personnelarose, I would ask Demachi for his adviceor approval. He always told me to decidewhom to hire, as I was the one who wouldwork with the employees.

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Nevertheless, he sometimes toldothers that I would never ask forhis advice, and, for a while, I

found his attitude troubling. Then, afterseveral years during which our businessand number of personnel increasedgreatly, Demachi announced a number ofpersonnel transfers and structural reformsthat I had not been consulted about.

Even though he had the power to makemost decisions regarding Dogyoren, Iprotested these moves, because he knewnothing about the abilities orcompatibility of the employees. Rumoursthat the relationship between thepresident and the managing director werebad spread rapidly through the fishingvillages of Hokkaido.

From 1937 to 1941, I was devoted to thedevelopment of Dogyoren, but I decidedto resign my post as managing director in1941. There was talk in the FCAs ofconvening a special general meetingwhere Demachi would be asked to resign,so that I could be promoted to the post ofpresident. I, however, intended to resignfrom Dogyoren, and persuaded them notto call a meeting. I then informed theboard of directors of my resignation, butmany of the directors still tried to convinceme to stay on.

However, I had worked hard forDogyoren and felt that I needed to rest fora while, so I decided not to continue.

Demachi resigned at the same time, andnew directors were elected in June 1941.

After I had been off for a year, I wasnominated to assume the post of presidentof the Hokkaido Marine ProductsWholesalers Co-operative Association inMay 1942. I accepted the position andworked for that co-operative for a yearand a half, during which time I learnedmuch more about fishing goods and aboutthe distribution of fishery products.

In 1944, I moved again, to the newlyestablished Hokkaido Fisheries IndustryOrganization, previously known asDogyoren, which had been restructuredand renamed by the military government.The FCAs were also forced to change backto Fisheries Associations, which wereestablished separately in eachmunicipality.

The co-operative movement, which wasbased on the principles of independenceand solidarity, was thus forced tosurrender its ideals to those of the militarygovernment.

No excusesAfter the war, many people tried to makeexcuses for their co-operation with thegovernment, but I firmly believed that Idid not have to make any excusesregarding my devotion to the fisheriesorganizations. My motivation had alwaysbeen simply to allow the fishermen to

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work for their mutual benefit, even duringwartime.

I remained in the position of managingdirector of the HFIO until 1949, when theNew Fishery Co-operative Law wasenacted. This law incorporated theinternational principles of co-operatives,which are standard the world over.

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This instalment is excerpted fromThe Autobiography of TakatoshiAndo, translated by Naoyuki Taoand James Colyn


Fisheries research

oneFish, many uses

The oneFish Community Directory is a new Web-based tool for researchers and academics working in the area of fisheries

The oneFish Community Directoryis a Web-based knowledgemanagement system that draws

together a broad cross-section ofstakeholders within the fisheries andaquatic research community. The primaryaim of oneFish is to raise the profile offisheries and aquatic research, andreinforce its impact on responsiblefisheries development.

oneFish represents a fundamentaladvance in devolved managementinformation systems. It responds to longsought-after information, communicationand networking needs of the manyagencies currently actively engaged in thecomplex process of promoting moreresponsive fisheries and aquatic resourcesresearch and development. These includedonors, NGOs, national aquatic researchcentres (NARS), internationalorganizations such as FAO, universities,consultancies and others. The design ofoneFish has been demand-led in that itintegrates into one interactive systemmany of the communication ideas andneeds articulated by these organizations.

It allows users to contribute informationin electronic form to specific subject areas,including by email for those with limitedWeb access; and to search and retrieveinformation, files and other linkagesacross the whole oneFish domain.Institutions and special interest groupswill be able to use oneFish to developdiscussion groups and create ‘virtual’offices; and many subject specialist TopicEditors will assist in the administration ofspecialized topics by editing, adding andranking the information submitted tothem.

The software underlying oneFish is beingdeveloped by SIFAR and the FAO FisheriesDepartment in partnership with the

World Agriculture Information Centre(WAICENT). The design team has spent thelast year developing a prototype which isnow undergoing intensive testing by asmall group of fisheries specialists.Version1 will be released during April2000.

Many of you who use the Internet willalready be familiar with directories orportals such as Yahoo! and Netscape.Over the last few years, these have playeda significant role in revolutionizing theways in which vast amounts ofinformation are both managed andaccessed on the Internet. You may also befamiliar with the new, ‘open-content’directories like Netscape’s OpenDirectory Project which recognize theneed to devolve the management ofinformation to the user community. Bymaking available powerful Webinfrastructure, they allow users to defineand manage their own information needs,a strategy which has proven massivelysuccessful, as it enhances users’ ability toobtain relevant information more easilyand efficiently from an ever increasingmorass of online electronic data.

The oneFish Community Directory drawson the design philosophy of theseopen-content directories; in fact, it goesmuch further. Rather like a thematiclibrary, its specialist focus will ensure bothquality of content and relevance to userneeds.

Powerful repositoryoneFish is a powerful repository forinformation based around specific subjectareas; however, in addition to linkingWebsites, it permits the uploading of mostcurrent electronic media (that file on yourC drive; that bibliography sitting in yourdusty diskette box; your favouriteListServe group; GIS maps, and so on) and

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the creation of multiple relationshipsbetween these; it enables theestablishment of virtual offices fromwhich individuals and organizations canmanage their knowledge (for example,projects, contacts) and share it, sometimesselectively, with others with similarinterests.

References to information that is notin electronic form can be added, ascan links to electronic information

stored elsewhere. In addition, oneFish willallow submission of notes and commentson other people’s contributions, and theestablishment and participation indiscussions and debates on their own andrelated topics. Finally, opinions on currentissues, news items and relevant diarydates can be added at any topic level inoneFish, thus enabling clearly identifiable,subject-specific headline pages.

Volunteer Topic Editors will assist inadministration, by editing, adding,collating and ranking the informationsubmitted to them. oneFish will deploy acomprehensive suite of editorial tools,allowing these Topic Editors tocollaborate in the administration anddevelopment of the system.

The Topic Editors will be responsible forthe content and quality of their ownparticular topic areas, culling out the badand obsolete material, and keeping onlythe best.

Although oneFish will provide theopportunity for everyone to contribute,like any community, it requires groundrules. An Editor-in-Chief is responsible fordeveloping and managing the top-levelcategories, overseeing the creation of newsub-categories, and removinginappropriate items. It will also be the roleof the Chief Editor to facilitate theselection of topical material for news,create user polls and update the fisheriescalendar.

To accommodate the many different waysin which individuals perceive things,oneFish offers several innovativeapproaches to information retrieval, oneof which is the introduction of‘worldviews’. oneFish worldviews aremultiple-topic trees, each of which leadsthe user down a unique pathway, butultimately arriving at the same piece ofinformation.

Different pathwaysThese pathways include: Top-down—amore formal approach to fisheriesresearch and development, andBottom-up—a more collaborative,people-centred and participatory view.Other worldviews are Geography;Ecosystem; Species; and People. Whilescientists might prefer Ecosystems orSpecies, field workers may findBottom-up more relevant; institutionalworkers may find Top-down moreappropriate to their needs. If you wish to

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find information on a particularinstitution or country, then the People andGeography worldviews may make senseto you. In addition to all these pathways,a powerful search engine will facilitatesimple and advanced searching andretrieval across the whole oneFishdomain.

While oneFish builds on thedesign philosophy of Internetopen-content directories, the

overall concept of oneFish is a natural stepforward in the development of aquaticinformation systems. For many years,various, often disparate, groups withinthe fisheries research community havebeen developing aquatic informationsystems—some on specialized subjectareas, some for special formats or types ofinformation—and providing, usuallylimited, access to these informationsystems through various means.

The most successful and enduring of theseinformation systems, for example, theAquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts(ASFA) database, are those that fosterinput, co-operation and participation bythose actually involved in fisheries andaquatic research.

Fisheries and aquatic bulletin boards anddiscussion lists are other examples ofinformation or communication servicesthat have grown to be very well used.Again, this is because they provide anavenue for those working within a specificthematic area to communicate, discussand proffer their ideas and opinions, andfeel that they are influencing the debate.

The concept of oneFish builds on thisparticipatory approach. oneFish does notcompete with other Internet resources—itunifies them within a holistic fisheriesportal, while simultaneously providingcontext for them within relevant subjectareas. In this sense, oneFish’s approach tocompiling and linking diverseinformation types from disparate sourcesis truly innovative.

oneFish is thus seen as an inclusive andfacilitating communications tool which,through raising the profile of fisheriesresearch, will encourage participatoryapproaches to disseminating and sharingof information.

oneFish will offer a new online FisheriesProject Information System (FIPIS) withseveral more dimensions to the originalsystem operated from FAO. From theoutset, oneFish will include over 5,500project records imported from the oldFIPIS. Soon after, project information fromseveral major fisheries donor agencies,international institutions and projectsinvolved in fisheries research will beadded. This will provide a greatervisibility of what research anddevelopment is being undertaken in thefisheries and aquatic sector, and who issupporting, funding and implementingthat research.

oneFish will allow researchers andscientists on active projects to fosterawareness of their work, and to morespeedily disseminate interim results ofresearch, including field notes, workingpapers and other data. It will also allowusers to establish links between anyproject and any related information.

Access to the World Wide Web by manyof the poorer developing countries iscurrently very limited or non-existent.Nevertheless, the explosion in globaltelecommunications, fuelled particularlyby private sector investment and loweringcosts, can not be ignored. There are alsoplans to provide regular CD-ROM outputsfrom oneFish from early 2001, as well asthe additional facility of selectivedissemination by email. This will ensureeven wider access in areas where using theInternet is not yet feasible.

In addition to its role as a global facilitatorof information flows, oneFish is expectedto play an ever growing role for staffs offisheries projects, in fisheries NARS, localfisheries organizations and NGOs.

Growing networkingAlready, in many countries, localorganizations and NGOs are using the Weband email for fostering more effectivecommunications. Day by day, thenumbers are accelerating. Linking thesegroups together will eventually serve tofacilitate the greater integration ofresearch with more general developmentobjectives, such as the sustainable andeconomic use of resources, povertyalleviation, and the development ofresearch proposals and projects that are

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more responsive to the needs andcapacities of all stakeholders.

oneFish aims to dissolve the traditionalboundaries between research and thepressing needs of sustainabledevelopment. As oneFish develops, it willprovide the fisheries research communitywith the largest fully integrated globalcollection of online information onfisheries research and development.oneFish will be a tool for all and, as aresult, it will grow and develop accordingto the needs and requirements of thosestakeholders, a truly responsive approachto the information needs of the fisheriesand aquatic research community.

oneFish development is currently beingsponsored by DFID (UK), Norway, ICEIDA,CIDA, IDRC, The World Bank, UNDP, andFAO. For more information, contact:oneFish Project, Support Unit forInternational Fisheries and AquaticResearch, FAO Fisheries Department, Vialedelle Terme di Caracalla, Rome 00100ITALY. (www.oneFish.org)

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This article has been written by TimBostock (email: [email protected]), Joan Baron (email:[email protected]) and GregSearle of FAO, Rome


South Africa

Not an easy task

These comments on the implementation of South Africa’s new fisheries policy are a rejoinder to an earlier SAMUDRA Report article

In SAMUDRA Report No. 24 (December1999), Brian O’Riordan presents anextensive review of the situation in

South Africa’s fishing sector. It is ratherdepressing reading: “a tale of chaos andcorruption”. Even for people who havespent more than two weeks touring thefisheries sector, there are disturbingtrends and accounts, running completelycounter to the goals of equity and theredressing of historical imbalances.Nevertheless, the article shows a poorunderstanding of the process, and it iseven poorer in advancing “sweeping andenlightened reforms”. Therefore, a fewcomments from another outsider, who hasfollowed the process since 1994.

The policy process leading up to theMarine Living Resources Act (MLRA) of1998 was a long and complicated one,from the first ANC-based initiatives in1994, through almost five years ofnegotiating within the Fisheries PolicyDevelopment Committee, leading to theWhite Paper and the MLR Bill and then tothe final MLR Act, approved by Parliamentin May 1998.

Of course, a lot of things could have beendone differently, but, by and large, thiswas an open process, incorporating a largenumber of actors, who had never metbefore. More groups could have beenconsulted and more effort could havebeen put into publicizing the final Act, butthis would hardly have changed theresult.

The fisheries policy of South Africa, just asin most other countries, is a compromise,where the outcome is defined by thepolitical strength of the contending forces.Compared to the situation in most otherAfrican countries and quite a fewEuropean ones as well, the fisheries policyprocess in South Africa was transparent

and inclusive. The most crucial issue allthrough the policy planning was theextent to which the transformationprocess should be allowed to disturb theexisting industrial set-up. Noting, asO’Riordan rightly does, that mostresources are fully utilized, redistributionmeans taking away from Peter in order togive to Paul.

The greatest impediment to a large-scaleredistribution has, of course, been ‘bigbusiness’, but not alone! Organized labourplayed along with big business all thewhile. Not surprisingly, the fishworkers’union (FAWU) and other unions would liketo protect the employment of theirmembers, thus emphasizing industrialstability. (That the same unions wouldnow like to operate as quota owners aswell is an interesting paradox, implyingall the familiar problems that go withwanting to sit on both sides of the table.But this is a general phenomenon in SouthAfrica, not limited to the fishing industryalone.)

At the end of the day, the South Africanfisheries policy is a ‘negotiatedrevolution’, just like the rest of the‘revolution’ leading to ANC’s remarkablerise to power in 1994. Parts of thenegotiations precisely ensured thatestablished owners and workers had acertain security and a ‘sunset clause’ forthe bureaucrats. That we can lament, butto little avail. The challenge is to see whatcan be accomplished, given theselimitations.

Pros and consA lot can be said of quota systems andtheir usefulness in small-scale fisheries. Itwas, nevertheless, the system preferred bya great majority of politicians in the SouthAfrican Parliament, including the ANCrepresentatives. It could have been much

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worse! In the White Paper, a suggestionwas made to hand out transferable fishingrights for perpetuity, while, in the finalAct, we are dealing with fishing rightsleased to the operators for a maximum of15 years duration. Furthermore, alltransfers have to be authorized by theState, thereby limiting the freedom of theestablished owners.

Again, there were alternatives, butthe alternatives presented by thesmall-scale fishers never

succeeded in attracting any politicalsupport. Open access within fixed TACsnever caught on because such a system isa waste of effort, bad for marketing andgenerally benefits only the established‘highliners’, that is, the most clever andefficient fishers. Other alternatives wererather unclear as to who should have theright to fish. That also applies to the ideaof community quotas, which had been anadministrative catastrophe in the past.Whatever the case, it is important to stressthat South Africa has got a system ratherdifferent from what was originallyenvisaged, based on the ITQ systems ofNew Zealand and Iceland.

No doubt, there has been a tremendousinterest for acquiring quotas. More than5,000 have applied for the 1999/2000fishing season. When one out of ten issuccessful, no wonder rumours quicklystart circulating about corruption andundue influence. It is still worth having ahistorical perspective of this process. Inthe past, until 1998, the so-called apoliticalQuota Board allocated the quotas. Then,friends and cronies of the Minister andmembers of the National Party were quitesuccessful, and, later, also people withgood ANC contacts. Today, it is clearlystated that the allocation of quotas is apolitical responsibility, where theMinister is accountable, together with thegovernment.

There are, furthermore, criteria as to whoshould get access, and there has beenestablished a process of redress for theunsuccessful. According to ourinvestigations, there are very few caseswhere the Minister has actuallyintervened, overruling therecommendations of the Chief Director,based on the screening process in theDirectorate of Marine and Coastal

Management (MCM). These procedurescan, no doubt, be improved, but they areconsiderably better than the old, at leastseen from the perspective of the newentrants.

Allocations, according to the new Act,have only been done for the last two years,so far with relatively modest results. If westart calculating from 1994, when the newdispensation got into power, theredistribution would constituteapproximately 25 per cent of theimportant hake quota and 31 per cent ofthe West Coast rock lobster quota, tomention only two of the most disputedfisheries. A relatively large number of newentrants have been brought into theindustry, with small quotas per entrant.

The large companies are still dominating,holding the lion’s share of the total quotas,but the trend is definitely working in thedirection of a more diversified ownership.Whether this is good or bad dependsentirely on what the new entrants aredoing with their quotas. At present, wehave a number of ‘paper quota owners’,people who have been allocated a smallquota and who then sell or lease it toestablished operators for cash. That is tobe expected, since the two years needed toacquire equity is too long a period if youhave no access to capital other than thevalue of the quota(s).

Whatever the result of the redistributionprocess, there are bound to be a largenumber of dissatisfied applicants.Everybody can not possibly receive aquota. In 1999/2000 alone, there weremore than 900 applicants for West Coastrock lobster. If all, excluding the oldoperators but including the recent newones, should have an equal share, thiswould have turned out to be 1.6 tonnes peroperator, to be diminished every year, asnew entrants enter the race. This is hardlythe quantity that would make for a viableindustry.

Difficult aimImplementing a new and rather ambitiouspolicy is difficult, and it will probably takeyears before the new administrativesystem is up and running. (Why do weexpect wonders from a Third Worldcountry like South Africa, when evenEuropean fishing nations would have

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problems of standing up to the samestandards?) Unfortunately, the ideas putup by the Artisanal Fishers Associationare not very helpful, even if they may havea considerable potential for politicalmobilization.

I certainly agree with O’Riordan thatapartheid destroyed the artisanalfisheries of South Africa, but precisely

for this reason, restitution is not a viableroute. (After 40 years, who should bemaking restitution and with what?)Looking forward is, therefore, moreproductive. As of year 2000, there are atleast five major problems which have to besolved:

The most important task at the moment isto get a transformation schedule or plan,outlining the political vision by year2000/2001 and then, five years from now,set specific targets on how much is goingto be reallocated in each of the 17 fisheries.Such a plan has been missing all along theprocess, creating considerable insecurityamong established operators, andconfusion among new entrants as to whatis realistic or possible in terms ofreallocation. Such a plan should alsocontain where (in which sector) newentrants can most easily beaccommodated. It goes without furthersaying that certain sectors like West Coastrock lobster, abalone, longlining, etc.require much less capital than others liketrawling for deep-sea hake.

Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen thecapacity and competence of the unitdealing with applications in the fisheriesdirectorate (MCM). This should alsoinclude the establishment of a watchdogunit to check the validity of theinformation forwarded by the applicantsand for follow-up, to see thatorganizational entrepreneurs do not kickout the true fishermen as soon as theyhave secured a fishing right. Furthermore,it is necessary to simplify the allocationcriteria, so that the process appears astransparent as possible.

Thirdly, there is an urgent need toestablish training schemes, especially inbusiness skills. Many of the new rightsholders do not have even the mostrudimentary business skills and,therefore, fall easy prey to established

owners in all types of ‘joint ventures’. Ifbusiness entrepreneurs are the ones goingto transform the South African fishingindustry, they certainly need assistancealso in terms of easy credit. Therequirement of obtaining equity withintwo years based on the fishing right as theonly collateral is clearly unrealistic.Assistance to create more efficientorganizations should also be considered,keeping in mind that a number ofprogrammes are much more efficient ifrun through organizations comprising thetarget groups.

Finally, there is a need to introduce aresource fee. In the MLR Act, there is aprovision for introducing a leasing fee forthe fishing right. This has not yet beenintroduced, probably due to heavyresistance from established operators.Nevertheless, a resource fee is, in the end,what society gets back from the fishingindustry for having the privilege of usinga national resource. Experiences, latelyfrom Iceland, show the weak legitimacy ofa policy where the national resource ishanded out for free, benefiting only theoriginal operators.

O’Riordan’s account ends with themoving in of a team of investigators,looking into the alleged corruption of thepresent fisheries administration. Today,we know that most of the fuss was due tocertain bureaucratic shortcuts and hadlittle to do with personal enrichmentthrough bribery. I do not deny thepossibility of bribes (quite common underthe old dispensation), but I do think this isoften too easy a way out of a dilemma, thatis, of explaining why everybody can notget a quota! In South Africa, just as inNorway or the EU, the challenge is toweigh social equity against biologicalsustainability and economic efficiency.That is a truly political task, with few fixedanswers.

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esponse

This response comes from BjøernHersoug of the Norwegian Collegeof Fishery Science, University ofTromsø, Norway (email:[email protected])


Common-property fishing rights

Redistributing wealth

The use of Individual Transferable Quotas as a resource management measure must not be summarily dismissed

Parzival Copes’ arguments againstthe use of Individual TransferableQuotas (ITQs) for the management

of fisheries (“Coastal resources forwhom?”, SAMUDRA Report No. 23,September 1999) are not particularlyhelpful to those responsible for makingdecisions on the formulation ofmanagement measures. Although ITQswill not work in many situations, they,nevertheless, provide an important toolwhich should not be rejected for thewrong reasons.

It is abundantly evident that overfishing isbecoming more severe and morepervasive throughout the world and thatit affects small-scale fisheries as much as itdoes large-scale fisheries. The basicproblem is that the supply of fish stocks islimited and yet the demand for fishproducts is growing. This leads to risingprices and, in the absence of effectivecontrols, increased fishing effort. Theresult is the depletion of stocks as well asthe excessive use of capital and labour.

Better management of fisheries isessential. Management measures can dealeither solely with the biological aspects orwith both biological and economicaspects. In the past, many of the measuresdealt only with the biological yield,ignoring the economic consequences.These kinds of measures included totalcatch limits, closed seasons, closed areas,mesh size controls and others designed torestore stocks to their maximumsustainable yields (MSY). These werefrequently adopted because theypresumably affected all fishermen equallyand did not change the distribution ofwealth (a presumption that was oftenwrong).

Although such measures may be desirablein conjunction with other measures, they

do not always achieve their objective ofrestoring the stocks. Moreover, they donothing to prevent excessive fishing effortor conflict among competing users. Thedifficulty is that measures that preventexcessive fishing effort or that deal withconflict, require decisions on thedistribution of wealth. This can not beavoided. As Copes has pointed out, an ITQsystem provides individual quotas tosome fishermen but not to others. What hedid not point out, however, is that asystem limiting fishing effort directly, bygranting licences to some of the fishermen,also distributes wealth. He states that “toremain economically healthy, thesmall-boat sector must accept the need tokeep fishing capacity in balance withavailable harvests. This will probablyrequire occasional reductions in fleet sizeby buy-back, in order to offset likelyadvances in fleet productivity.”

Copes has failed to note that the provisionof territorial rights to a community offishermen (which he advocates and whichI agree may generally be desirable)provides wealth to that community andexcludes fishermen who are not membersof the community.

Copes states that “typically, most inshorefish resources have lent themselves well toharvesting by locally based small-scalefishermen.” While this may currently betrue in certain situations, it is becomingless and less valid, and is unlikely tocontinue into the future.

Population growthIt is clear that eventually, as populationgrows and demand increases, decisionson the distribution of wealth will have tobe made. Even the exclusion of large-scalefishing vessels from the waters used bysmall-scale fishermen will not precludethe eventual necessity for determining

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how access within the group ofsmall-scale users will be allocated. Sincethis is presently necessary in manysituations and will be increasinglynecessary in the future, it is desirable toexamine all the various techniques forcontrolling access, including the use ofITQs.

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esponse

This response has been sent in byFrancis Christy, Senior ResearchOfficer, IMARIBA, Washington DC, US(email: [email protected])


Fishing technology

Mechanization ahoy!

Technological change has transformed the living standards of fishermen in southern Sri Lanka

The post-war period in Sri Lankawas characterized by rapid rates ofgrowth of population that exerted

tremendous pressure on food supplies. Inorder to face the new challenges, the State,which assumed a regulatory role duringthe pre-war period, took an activerole—one of reformism—to expand fishproduction. Many technologicalinnovations have been introduced tofisheries since then, with major emphasison mechanization. The State interventionin fisheries was mainly characterized bymeasures adopted to improve traditionalcrafts and gear, introduction of newfishing techniques and the developmentof fisheries infrastructure to facilitatereaping the full benefits of the abovemeasures. In order to help the asset-poorfishermen to adopt the new technology, alarge array of credit schemes wereimplemented through the State-ownedbanks. It was envisaged that all thesemeasures would lead to large increases inproduction, while improving the livingstandards of the resource users.

Since the late 1930s, experiments havebeen conducted by the State to introducesuitable mechanized crafts into Sri Lankanfisheries, and the results of suchexperiments led to the introduction of fourmain types of mechanized vessels;mechanized crafts with outboard engines(the most commonly used craft is the 17-23ft fibre-glass FRP boat); one-day operatingcraft (ODOC) with inboard engine;multi-day operating craft with inboardengine and ice compartment (MDOC);small trawlers (10-11 tonne boats).

The latter craft did not become verypopular among the fishermen in SriLanka, mainly due to its high initial cost.The MDOC is the only craft used by thefishermen to exploit deep-sea fishresources. Along with the mechanized

craft, new fishing gear and fishingtechniques were also introduced into SriLankan fisheries.

The new fish-catching technologyintroduced was essentially an‘output-enhancing’ technology. With itsability to engage in year-round fishing, themechanized craft enabled the fishermen tostabilize inter-temporal flows of fishingincomes. Yet, the new technology washighly capital-biased and its adoptiondemanded an array of inshore andoffshore facilities.

A modern craft, such as the MDOC withaccompanying gear, cost about SLRs1,593,000 in 1994, as against SLRs 24,500 fora non-mechanized traditional craft (NMTC)and accompanying gear. By 1998, the costof an MDOC with accessories amounted toSLRs 3-4 million (US$ 1 = SLRs 70).

Costs of crafts & accompanying gear (1994)

Type of Craft Cost of Craft(SLRs.)

Cost of Gear(SLRs.)

MDOC1 1,307,000 205,300

ODOC1 784,621 77,500

FRP2 72,000 78,000

MTC3 14,100 58,000

NMTC4 5,700 6,200

1 with 34 hp engine2 18.5 feet FRP boat with 15 hp OBM3 Mechanized Traditional Craft—17.8 feet fibre glass canoe with 8 hp OBM4 9 feet wooden theppam(Source: Field studies, 1994)

No savingsAlthough ordinary fishermen are unlikelyto have savings sufficient enough to meetthe heavy capital funds required for thepurchase of modern crafts and gear, thistechnology showed a high rate of

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diffusion within the coastal community ofSri Lanka.

The 1970s marked the era of a ‘bluerevolution’ (the technologicalrevolution in marine fisheries),

where the rate of adoption of mechanizedfishing took place at a rapid pace. Thisperiod also coincided with rapid increasesin fish production—from 85,229 tonnes offish in 1971 to 206,843 tonnes in 1981. Thedegree of mechanization of fishing craftsreached the 50 per cent mark by themid-1980s and remained around that levelsince then.

Quite interestingly, the State had played acommendable role as an agent of changeor a catalyst in the drive towards themechanization of Sri Lankan fisheries. Alarge amount of subsidies have gone intofisheries since the early 1960s to enablefishermen to acquire mechanized craftsand engines.

The increased craft issues during the 1960sand 1970s coincided with the period ofrapidly increasing rate of mechanizationof fishing crafts. The late 1970s and early1980s also marked a significant increase inthe amount of subsidies granted tofisheries.

It is quite apparent that the State has takenan active role in the process oftechnological change in fisheries. It hasalso been able to shift fishing effort from

one set of resources to another bychanging the nature of craft and engineissued under subsidy schemes.

For Sri Lankan fishermen, both formal andinformal sources of credit are important.The financial intermediaries involved inthe formal sector consist of State-ownedcommercial banks, fisheries co-operativesand the Ministry of Fisheries, while theinformal sources consist of privatemoneylenders, fish merchants, boutiqueowners, fellow fishermen and kinsmen.

While professional moneylenders of theinformal credit market and theinstitutional credit agencies of the formalcredit market are ready to advance creditat comparatively moderate rates ofinterest to the agriculturist who offers hisland as a collateral, those very samelenders are reluctant to advance money tofishermen, considering that the latter haveno reliable security to offer them, incompensation for the risk they take.

No collateralFishing craft and gear are the only assetsowned by fishermen, and these depreciaterapidly and also bear the risk of damageand loss at sea. Therefore, fishermen’saccess to credit is limited by‘collateral-specific risks’. Therefore,fishermen are put at a seriousdisadvantage in the credit market becausemany lenders consider them lesscreditworthy. State involvement in

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providing the fishermen with funds undervarious credit schemes can be viewed as ameasure taken to redress the abovesituation.

Fixed capital, such as crafts, engines,gear and other accessories amountto sizeable investments. All types of

craft owners in the south of Sri Lankadepend, to a considerable extent, onexternal funds to secure their fixed capitalneeds.

Credit has been important in theacquisition of both crafts and gear. Totalborrowals added up to large amounts. Thehigher the degree of mechanization, thehigher has been the average amount ofcredit required. Both formal and informalsources have been equally important forall types of craft owners in securing theirfixed capital needs.

Formal sources have provided almost 60per cent of all credit required byfishermen. Although they have played anequally important role, the co-operativelending schemes can be considered themost successful, taking into account thefact that lending facilities of this sourcewere extended to all types of craft owners.One should also not undermine theimportant role played by the fishmerchant, contributing 22 per cent to thetotal credit amount. Contributions of themoneylender and fellow fishermen havebeen quite low, which, among other

things, reveal the inability of these sourcesto meet the large loan amounts demandedby fishermen to acquire modern crafts andgear.

Naturally, we expect a fishermanadopting modern technology to performbetter and live better than one whocontinues to use traditional technology.Comparison of living standards offishermen across different technologicalcategories will provide us withinformation on the relative strength ofthese technological types in making thefishermen better-off and, also on thepattern of social stratification of fishingcommunities.

There is a very high degree of variation ofincomes of fishermen within a particulartechnological category. Interestingly,there are fishermen in modern fisherieswhose incomes exceed SLRs 20,000 amonth, which is comparable to themonthly salary of an executive in a privatecompany or a university academic in SriLanka.

Monthly returnsThe monthly returns of asset owners arehigher than the monthly income of crewworkers (with the exception of NMTC),indicating that asset owners earn morethan those who do not own fishing assets.Of course, if the asset owner is afisherman, his income would be muchhigher (because he will receive a

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crew-share as well). Evidently, the higherthe degree of mechanization of fishingcrafts, the higher would be the income ofcraft owners. Clearly, modernization offisheries has brought about an increase inthe living standards of fishermen.

Average incomes of selected occupational categories

Sub-sector Occupational category Average income(SLRs/month)

Agriculture Paddy ploughingTea pluckingRubber tappingCoconut huskingCoconut plucking

3,465 1,958 1,958 3,694 3,522

Buildingconstruction

Master CarpenterSkilled HelperMaster MasonUnskilled Helper

4,460 3,336 4,356 2,534

Fisheries Crew Share - MDOCCrew Share - ODOCCrew Share - FRPCrew Share - MTCCrew Share - NMTC

8,654 4,741 4,692 3,919 2,694

Adopted from Central Bank, 1998

The incomes of fishermen engaged onmechanized crafts appear to be higherthan those of other occupationalcategories (except crew workers of MTC,who earn incomes slightly below thoseearned by skilled workers in the buildingconstruction sector). The crew workers intraditional fishing earn the same monthlyincome as unskilled workers in othersectors, indicating their relative poverty,compared to many occupationalcategories.

In general, it is evident that fishermenwho have adopted modern technologyare earning higher incomes than skilledworkers in the unorganized sector.

The new fish-catching technologyintroduced to Sri Lanka was essentially aproductivity-enhancing technology thatled to higher average annual fish catches.However, the adoption of new technologyrequired the fishermen to make highcapital commitments. The State hasplayed an important role in helping theasset-poor fishermen in adopting the newtechnology, by way of craft and engineissues under subsidy schemes. Today,approximately half of Sri Lanka’s fishingfleet consist of mechanized crafts.

Fishermen depended heavily on externalfunds to secure their fixed capital needs.The higher the degree of mechanization,the higher was the average amount ofcredit obtained. While both formal andinformal sectors have catered to the fixedcapital demand, the formal sources, suchas the State-owned banks and fisheriesco-operatives, have played a moreimportant role in the provision of fundsfor the acquisition of modern mechanizedcrafts.

Comparison of incomes of fishermenacross different technological categoriesrevealed that fishermen who adoptedmechanized fishing were able to increasethe level of their incomes. Comparison offishing incomes with those of otheroccupational categories revealed thatfishermen engaged in mechanized craftswere earning higher incomes than thoseearned by most of the other occupationalcategories in the unorganized sector.

In general, it is well evident thatmodernization of fisheries has brought anincrease in the living standards of thefishermen of southern Sri Lanka.

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This article has been written byOscar Amarasinghe, Faculty ofAgriculture, University of Ruhuna, SriLanka (email:[email protected])


A new home

ICSF’s Brussels Officehas shifted to newpremises, and BrianO’Riordan has takenover from PierreGillet as secretary.Please note the nameof the new port ofcall: ICSF BrusselsOffice, Rue du Midi165, B-1000 Brussels,Belgium. Tel: (32) 2513 1565 Fax: (32) 2513 73 43 Email:[email protected]

Law’s claws

A new MarineEnvironmentalProtection Law,which went intoeffect on 1 April , isexpected to helpChina expand itsfishery industry.

In recent years, theFisheries Bureau,under the AgricultureMinistry, hasrecorded an averageof 80 contaminationcases in China’s seasannually.

This has resulted inyearly losses of 150million yuan (aboutUS$18.1 million).Marine pollution has

caused annual lossesof 240,000 tonnes ofaquatic products in

the Yellow and Bohaiseas.

Compared to the 1982version, the newmarine codedelegates the powerof environmentalprotection in fishinggrounds and fishingports to the FisheriesBureau, which willalso act as thesupervisor andinvestigator of waterpollution.

TED not dead

Remember thecontested US ban onimport of shrimpfrom all nations notcertified by the USState Department astrawling for shrimpswith mechanizedvessels fitted withturtle excluderdevices (TEDs)?

Well, TEDs live. TheWTO’s AppellateBody had found thatthe US nationalcertificationrequirementamounted to anobligation forexporters to adopt

essentially the samepolicy as the US and,as such, had anunjustifiably‘coercive effect’ onforeign governments’policy decisions.

National certificationalso discriminatedagainst exporters thatdid use TEDs inuncertified countries,as well as againstAsian countries,which were givenless time andtechnical assistance toadjust to the measurethan their LatinAmericancounterparts.

Furthermore, theAppellate Bodydeemed thecertification processto be non-transparentand arbitrary.

It also faulted the USfor not havingseriously soughtmultilateralenvironmentalco-operation aimed atprotectingendangered seaturtles.

In response to thesefindings, the US didnot lift the importembargo, butchanged its appli-cation guidelines.

The centrepiece of thenew guidelines isreplacing thenation-by-nationcertificationrequirement by ashipment-by-shipment certification

procedure. Changeswere also made toimplement the trademeasure in a moretransparent and non-discriminatoryfashion.

In addition to thenew guidelines, theUS will offer technicaltraining in the design,construction,installation andoperation of TEDs.

While the USgovernment thinks ithas implemented theWTO ruling in full, itscompliance measuresare contested fromtwo very differentquarters: thecomplainants in thecase and USconservationorganizations.

The complainants—India, Malaysia,Pakistan andThailand—stillmaintain that onlylifting the import banwould constitute‘good faithimplementation’.

US conservationorganizations areequally dissatisfied.Earth Island Institute,the Humane Societyof the United States,the American Societyfor the Prevention ofCruelty to Animalsand the Sierra Clubhave brought a caseagainst the newguidelines to the USCourt of International

News Round-up


Trade, claiming thatthey would beimpossible to monitorand enforce.

The litigants arguethat shipment-by-shipment certificationwould not effectivelyprotect sea turtles,and thus falls short ofadequately fulfillingthe law’s ultimatepurpose.

In April 1999, theCourt of InternationalTrade issued apreliminary rulingagainst shipment-by-shipmentcertification, findingit was ‘on its face notin accordance’ withCongressional intentin passing Section 609.

That section providesthat shrimpharvested withtechnology that mayadversely affect seaturtles protected bythe US EndangeredSpecies Act may notbe imported into theUS.

Both sides havesubmittedsupplementaryinformation to theCourt, whose finaldecision is stillpending.

Should the Courtoblige thegovernment to goback tonation-by-nationcertification, a WTOcompliance panelseems a nearcertainty.

Hake stake

Argentina hasdecided to cut thisyear’s hake catch by

almost two-thirds ofthe tonnage fished in1999, after a reportwarned that theSouth Atlantic stockwas in a “criticalstate”.

Hake is Argentina’stop catch, making uphalf of the US$1billion fishingindustry’s annualexports, mainly toSpain, Japan, Brazil,Italy and the US.

After a 1994 dealgranted the EuropeanUnion (EU) rights to

catch hake, squid andcod under quotas,catches of hake offArgentine shorestouched one milliontonnes.

Argentina’scommercial fleetcaught 312,051 tonnesof hake in 1999, eventhough Argentina’sNational FisheriesInstitute (NFI) had seta 188,200-tonne limit.

In a report, the NFIurged thegovernment tosuspend the hakecatch altogether thisyear or at least limit itto 110,000 tonnes.

“The total biomasshas been in declineover time, and thereproductive biomasswas found to bebelow biologically

acceptable levels andwas also showing thesame trend,” the NFIsaid. “The fall in thereproductive biomassis due to overfishing.Therefore, futurecatches will have tobe low,” it said. “Wecan only continuewith a low-level catchthis year.”

Last year, some EUships skirtedattempts to suspendthe hake catch, while12,000 otherfishermen were leftunemployed duringArgentina’s deepestrecession in a decade.Enforcement hasbeen a chronicproblem inArgentina’s 200-mileeconomic zone.

Gown under

In Australia, womenperform 50 per centof administrativetasks, and contributebetween 26 and 50per cent of the familyincome.

While most seemedsatisfied with theirrole, half of themyearn for betterrecognition andstatus for their work.

These findings comeon the heels of thelaunch of theWomen’s IndustryNetwork (WIN)Action Plan forwomen in theseafood industry anda Bureau of RuralSciences (BRS) reporton women in thefishing industry.

The Action Plan—Empowering FishingWomen to Capitalize

on Networks—responds to findingsin the BRS report andprovides a nationalframework forwomen in theseafood industry towork from, and set,goals.

The BRS report,Fishing for Women:UnderstandingWomen’s Roles in theFishing Industry,commissioned byWIN, is an importantpart of the ActionPlan. It provides thepreliminary researchnecessary to betterunderstand the roleof women in thefishing industry.

One of the majorfindings of the reportwas that women’sroles in the fishingindustry were poorlyreflected in statistics,including women’scontributions tooutput andproductivity.

The FederalGovernment ishelping a number of

national non-government ruralwomen’s groups inseveral ways.

Among other things,it has given a grant ofAus$10,000 for WINthrough aprogramme designedfor national NGOs.


'Tfre image of thejistieT1Tl£n conjures up tfap fuangs: '13iDlUa[resonances ofqafifa, edioes ofc/iiUfwoafupnns, nostafgia forttie fast true fiunters prying a traae tfiatgoes Dade to ttie veryorigins of fiumanity. 'Tfre mina's eyefastens on ttie fife eDDingfrom fiunt!retfs of tiny liarDours anacruliJ arounaour coasts. 'Wethin/(oftieroism in ttieface ofwinter aanger, of the sea itseif,ant! the struggle ofman£:frufwitfi the elements.

- from living the Fishing by Paul Thompsonwith Tony Wailey and Trevor Lununis

ICSF is an international NOOwOl'king on Issues that concernfishwoJ1«!rs the wor1d over. It ~In status with lhe Economic andSocial Council ol the UN and ison LO'S Speciai List 01 NonGovemmentaJ International Of·ganlzations. II also has UlisonStatus with FNJ. R~ered inGeneva. ICSf has offices inChannal, India and Brussels.Belgiom. As aglobal networ\( 01community organizers,teachers, technicians. tesearchers and scientJsls, ICSF'Sadivities encompass morvloI·iJ'lg and research, exchangeand IrUlilg, ca.P and~ as wei as (XlIrITuncabons.WILIOAA AEPOAT invites~ rod responses.Cooespoo dera sh:luId be addressed to fie Qlemai oItce.

The aprions and po5Ition:s

expressed " the articles areII'cse d ..aulhors concerned;n;I do noc necessarty tepeesen: the ofIidaI views d ICSF

SAIdlRA AEPORT can now be accessed on ICSF'S home page onthe WOI1d WJiB Wt!b att4tp:f~i::Sl.l'le(

Published bySebastian Mathew!of

International Collective in Suppon olF~rs27 College Road, CheMai 600 006, India

Telephone (91) 44-827 5303 Facstmile (91) 44·825 4457E·mall: [email protected]

lCSF Brussels Office:Rue du Midi 165, B-llXXJ Brussels, Bel9ium

T~epllone (32) 2-5131565 FaCSimiie (32)2·5t37343E·mail: [email protected]

EdiledbySAWl.I:lAA Emtorial

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"'...""'"Photographs courtesy of

AGA, $ebaslJan Malhew, Raben F\eIxoIJeremyHarlly, BnanO'RiWan, Sealood New Zealan:l

Additional news courtesy 01Mile Hagler. lHlG£S

PR Wi'll Austraia, em.. Daly

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