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TRANSCRIPT
Specialized Committee
International Atomic
Energy Agency
2016
CHS MiniMUN 2016
Contents
Table of Contents
A Letter from the Secretariat 3
Description of Committee 4-4
Future of Nuclear Power 6
Introduction 6-7
Background 810
Recent Development 11-12
International Action 13-14
Recommentations for Creating A Resolution 14
Further Research 15
Resources 16
This background guide has been adopted and reformatted from
UNA-USA 2014 Model United Nations Conference Background Guide for the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
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CHS MiniMUN 2016
A Letter from the Secretariat
Delegates,
Welcome to the background guides for MiniMUN 2016! Whether it is your first or third Model
United Nations conference, it is our hope at MiniMUN that you will continue to further expand your
knowledge of MUN, world issues, and the UN itself.
By opening this document, you are taking the first step towards being a participant. The purpose
of this background guide is to introduce the committee and the topic. Further research is required along
with the submission of a position paper. Details on position paper and submission are available under the
Position Paper tab on our website: http://chsminimun.weebly.com/position-papers.html
The topics and committees were chosen to reflect the problems that our world leaders face. From
the basic idea of access to vaccines to avoiding the possible conflict in outer space, these issues have to be
dealt with. As a delegate, you will be stepping into the role of world leaders. You will take on perspectives
different from your own, and you will push for what your country believes to be right.
If at any time you are having trouble finding information on your topic or need help with the
position paper, contact the MiniMUN staff. We are more than willing to help!
We are very excited to see you at MiniMUN 2016!
Karla Chavez and Ashwin Rathie
Secretary-General and Director-General, MiniMUN 2016
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CHS MiniMUN 2016
Description of Committee
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an independent intergovernmental
organization of the United Nations. The IAEA was formed on July 29, 1957 twelve years after the first
detonation of an atomic bomb in 1945. Immediately, world leaders realized the dangerous power of the
weapon, and sought to create a body to open dialogue to ensure security of the materials and deter their use.
The IAEA’s headquarters are in Vienna, Austria, and it seeks to fulfill three pillars of nuclear safety:
security, safety, and safe technology transfer. Currently it contains a system of policy bodies that include
the Board of Governors, the General Conference, and the Director General. The Board of Governors is a
body of representatives from 35 countries that generally meet about five times a year. They make
suggestions for the General Conference about the IAEA’s budget, program, and applications for
membership. In addition the Board of Governors is also responsible for approving safeguard agreements
and appointing the Director General.1 The current Director General of the IAEA is Yukiya Amano. The
General Conference is composed of a representative from every Member State and meets once a year around
September to discuss the issues brought up by the Board of Governors and/or the concerns of the states.2
The IAEA’s mission includes:
• To serve as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation;
• To assist its Member States in planning for and using nuclear technology for various
peaceful purposes and facilitates the transfer of such technology and knowledge in a
sustainable manner;
• To promote the maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of nuclear energy,
as well as the protection of human health and the environment against ionizing radiation;
• To regulate States’ compliance with their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful
purposes.
CHS MiniMUN 2016
The IAEA also manages and oversees the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. It is an agreement that
was negotiated by the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom prohibiting nuclear devices to be
tested or used in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, thus
driving all legal nuclear testing underground.
The International Atomic Energy currently has 159 Member States. Most of the member states of
the UN are members of IAEA including the Holy See. States such as Cape Verde, Tonga, San Marino, the
Bahamas, and Brunei have been approved for membership and will become full member states once they
implement the necessary legal plans.
Still it is important to note that there is one country that has withdrawn from the IAEA. North Korea
was a member state from 1974-1994. It withdrew after it was
"National governments are redoubling their efforts to prevent and to counter nuclear terrorism, both at home
and abroad. The IAEA is serving as a catalyst for these efforts. Governments and the IAEA are working
overtime on this problem, and we have every intention of continuing until the threat has been vastly reduced.
But this will not happen overnight; bringing the global inventory of radioactive material under proper
controls will require a sustained and concerted effort." – Mohamed ElBaradei, July 2002 found in non-
compliance with its required safeguards. Other than North Korea the only state to withdraw was Cambodia.
Cambodia withdrew from the IAEA in 2003 but rejoined in 2009.
IAEA website: http:// www.iaea.org
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The Future of Nuclear Power
Introduction
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international agreement that allows for the
permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council – the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China – to possess the capability for a nuclear weapons program. The NPT
also allows states to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. All other parties to the treaty had
agreed to remain as non-nuclear states and to only use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
However, the possibility of states using nuclear energy to develop weapons has become an
increasing threat. As the United States and Russia have been progressively de-arming for the past few
decades, other states have seized the opportunity to seek or develop weapons, usually secretly and
illegally. The spreading of nuclear weapons is called nuclear proliferation.
This desire for nuclear weapons and subsequent proliferation is attributed to the need for one’s
sovereignty to be secure. Sovereignty is a very important international relations concept that means every
state is guaranteed the right to administer its own affairs within its own borders without interference. If
the international community decides that those affairs threaten other states, the question is often debated
whether or not it is justifiable to violate a state’s sovereignty.
Problems have arisen from three states that have never joined the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan)
and from North Korea, who withdrew from the NPT. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly tested
nuclear weapons. Israel has remained secretive about its nuclear capabilities, neither denying nor affirming
their existence. South Africa admitted in the early 1990s to having developed a small nuclear program but
has since de-nuclearized.
Currently, the international community faces several challenges. The first is on-going tensions
between nuclear weapon states India and Pakistan, which could lead to nuclear war. The second is the
alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea. Iran and Israel also have on-going tensions.
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Iran is a party to the NPT and a Member State of the IAEA yet fails to remain transparent about its
nuclear activity and with its compliance of IAEA safeguards. Currently the situation in the Middle East
remains tense because of Iran’s instability and desire
to sustain a nuclear program not supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The suspicion that Iran’s nuclear program may have military
motives has garnered huge international attention. The focus on the implications of possible Iranian nuclear
weapon acquisition stem from the Iran’s non-compliant history with the IAEA and its hostility towards
Israel and even the United States. The way the Iran situation is handled could be very descriptive of how
the international community will work together to ensure nuclear safety in the future.
With aggression coming from Iran and North Korea, especially, and the existential threat that they
pose to Israel and South Korea, respectively, the international community feels the pressure and is
working towards immediate solutions to avoid an intentional strike, or even a miscalculation, in which one
country strikes because it thinks the other is about to strike through misunderstandings about a threat.
With efforts from international organizations and committees in the United Nations such as the
Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as other actors like the European
External Action Service, the world is perhaps on its way to an understanding on nuclear proliferation and
greater compliance, or adherence to, with nuclear safety regulations. In the past the Security Council has
enacted economic sanctions, meaning they have prohibited some type of or all trade with a country in order
to economically punish the country for misconduct and force the country to desist in exchange for removing
sanctions. Iran and North Korea are both currently subjects of intense sanctions from the international
community.
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Background
History of the NPT
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968 and aimed to prevent the spread
and misuse of nuclear weapons and technology. The goal of the treaty was to maintain international security
by promoting non-proliferation, disarmament, and a continued support of the peaceful use of nuclear
energy.
The document classifies the difference between nuclear and non-nuclear states in Articles I and II.
The nuclear weapon states must not “assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such
weapons or explosive devices”. Non-nuclear states are “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Parties to the NPT agreed that only the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
France were to be recognized as nuclear weapons states – by 1963, they were the only states that possessed
nuclear weapons, and were also the Permanent Five (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council.
The IAEA intended to enforce these rules by creating detailed safeguards for how to treat nuclear
technology and weapons, as well as mechanisms to inspect facilities in any member state to ensure
compliance.
Currently there are 189 parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes 188 of the 193 UN
Member States. However, out of the 193 members of the United Nations four have refused to become
signatories to the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea and now South Sudan.6 Iran, which has been
party of the NPT since 1970, has been suspected to be in violation of the treaty from 2002 until present
because the IAEA suspected that Tehran (the capital of Iran) was not complying with the safeguards that
were put in place. Tehran allegedly consistently resisted inspections and manipulated evidence.
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India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan
In the spirit of cooperation, the United States and the Soviet Union pushed forth the Limited Test-
Ban Treaty of 1963, prohibiting nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.
However, it failed to ban all testing.
Yet from an early point in history nuclear non-proliferation proved to be a difficult task. In 1974
India conducted an atmospheric test of a nuclear device. They were non-signatory to the NPT and a
specified non-nuclear-weapons state. As a result, long-time rival Pakistan began its own program, and in
1998 both Pakistan and India had conducted underground nuclear tests that resulted in international scrutiny
and a round of sanctions.
The Israeli nuclear weapons program was something of a rumor in the 1970s and was allegedly
verified in the mid-1980s. Much evidence has come forth about the existence of Israeli weapons, but the
state of Israel still refuses to admit and define itself as weapons-state. India, ‘Israel’, and Pakistan are now
all in possession of nuclear weapons and non-parties to the NPT. In addition to those three states, North
Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 1994. The announcement came after repeated
hints by North Korean representatives that their country already possessed a few nuclear weapons and were
conducting experiments.
Iran, the NPT, the Future of Nuclear Weapons
Although Iran has been a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since 1970, its
compliance has been historically poor and conspicuous. In 2002, Iran fell under serious suspicion for
potential violations of the safeguards set in place and was suspected of pursuing development of nuclear
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weapons technology despite the obligations of the NPT that prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons
or technology for non-peaceful energy purposes.
The international community began to believe that Iran could not be trusted and that the reactors
it has being constructing over the years were for the pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite Iranian defenses
that the reactors were solely for peaceful civilian energy. Since 2002, the U.N. Security Council has set in
place several resolutions, specifically resolution 1929, in attempts to require Iran to cooperate with the
IAEA and its safeguards, as well as to urge Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program (the reactive
material that, once enriched enough, becomes unstable enough for a weapon reaction as opposed to a
calmer, civilian-energy appropriate reaction) and the construction of its reactors.8
After Iran was found to be in violation of its agreement to IAEA safeguards in 2005, the IAEA was
patient in giving Tehran additional time to comply with its demands. Despite the patience of the U.N. and
the international community Iran still remains a huge concern today, taking the international spotlight in
light of talks with High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union, Baroness Catherine
Ashton, and others over several months.
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Recent Development
The current fear of an Iranian bomb in the Middle East has prompted similarly aggressive rhetoric
from Israel, whose existence is constantly threatened by the power of neighboring countries who do not
recognize its right to exist. Historically, Israel and Iran have been at odds, thus the existence of an Iranian
has Israel pushing the international community to act harshly against Iran and has prompted Israel to even
international support and backing for its actions. The danger of miscalculation also exists – if Iran or
Israel were to perceive aggressive action coming from either, the region could erupt into violence.
The situation with Iran’s nuclear program has become a determinant in the future of nuclear
weapons proliferation. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met in Geneva with the other Permanent 5
members (Russia, China, France, and the UK) along with Germany and Israel several times in November
2013 to discuss measures on how to restrain Iran from developing its nuclear weapons program. Iran
proved to be more cooperative than in the past despite continuing tense relations with the United States.
The international community made progress on a deal on November 11, 2013 when Iran signed an accord
with the International Atomic Energy Agency that would grant UN inspectors limited access to some of
their nuclear reactors, and on the 25th with a sanctions relief deal. Iran agreed to provide access to the
Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas and other heavy water plants. In addition Iran would be expected to provide
information on new nuclear research and on their 16 sites for nuclear power. On November 25th in a
second round of talks, Iran agreed to an interim, six-month agreement that would require Iran to curb its
production in exchange for breaks on sanctions. Iranians and Western diplomats alike hailed this as a
breakthrough in discussions.
Although the talks included Secretary of State John Kerry, some remain skeptical of the quality of
deal. Israel and France were among the first to raise concerns. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
urged the leaders to rethink the deal and not rush into a plan that would not be effective in working towards
the ultimate goal of disarming Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu even went so far to call this a “bad deal”
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because "Iran isn't even required to take apart even one centrifuge, but the international community is
relieving sanctions on Iran.”
A good deal from this perspective would thus call for transparency into the nuclear capabilities of
the Iranian military, and no deal should be hurriedly struck stating otherwise. Iran has not been honest with
or given the IAEA access to the nuclear developments within their military base and has been deceitful
with information concerning their current nuclear capabilities. There is still a long way to go and many
obstacles to overcome to reach a permanent consensus on the Iranian program, especially as the United
States Congress rejected some of the certain sanction breaks and countries like Israel and France argue that
such a small, temporary deal does little to curb the security risks of the region. With efforts from both the
IAEA and U.N. inspectors, Iran should start to get some relief from its sanctions starting in January if it
successfully fulfills its end of the deal.
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International Action
Over ten years, the international community has passed numerous resolutions, sanctions, and
condemnations of the Iranian program to no avail. Iran has been fickle with its compliance, sometimes
allowing inspectors and other times blocking access or concealing evidence. As a result, in the past year,
more direct discussions between specifically the P5 countries, Israel, Germany, and the European Union
have taken place to target pressure on Iran with more force.
There remain issues with the deal. The International Atomic Energy Agency will be faced with a
tight budget and a need for more money in order to oversee the implementation of the nuclear deal between
Iran and six world powers. Already about 10 percent of the IAEA’s annual $164 million budget is used
solely for inspections in Iran. The IAEA has on average two to four staff members in Iran virtually every
day of the year.13 Successful implementation of the Iran deal is essential for resolving this situation and
making international security and promoting nuclear non-proliferation.
Director General Yukiya Amano stated that Iran has agreed and invited the IAEA to visit the Arak
heavy-water production plant on December 8, which would be the first major step in ensuring that Iran’s
nuclear program remains only for peaceful purposes.
The main conditions of the interim deal are:
1. No enrichment of Uranium above 5% U-235, which is a form that can also be used to create a
nuclear device, it must be blended down to less than 5% or altered to a form that cannot be used to
create weapons.
2. No additional centrifuges (a key machinery component to create a reaction) are to be installed or
created, and three-fourths of the centrifuges at Fordow and half of the centrifuges at Natanz will
become inoperable.
3. Iran is to stop all work on the reactor at Arak. It may not fuel the reactor and must provide design
details on the reactor.
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4. Iran is to grant full access to IAEA inspectors to all of its nuclear facilities, including daily
visitation to Natanz and Fordow, as well as camera surveillance to key sites.14
Should Iran maintain these conditions, no new sanctions shall be placed on Iran and there would
be limited relief on the sanctions on trade of gold and petrochemicals.15 Many of the negotiators agreed
that this is step in the right direction to assure the stability of the Middle East and to ease tensions between
Israel and Iran, but others argued the deal has not gone far enough to change the situation. Countries retain
the sovereign right to exercise trade policy (except the European Union which retains rights over its states),
so each country currently exercising sanctions against Iran will need to enact its own reliefs once they
begin to feel confident in Iran’s commitment to the deal.
Recommendations for Creating a Resolution
Debate should focus on establishing a relationship with Iran that is transparent and allows the
international community to be confident that Iran is following its NPT obligations, and if it is not following
those obligations, to establish an action plan for bringing Iran into compliance. It is essential to address
how to properly implement the Iran deal and how the IAEA and UN Security Council can help to ensure
that this time, Iran remains committed to the deal and that the international community maintains its
agreements to roll back sanctions in return for compliance to keep Iran motivated to cooperate.
In addition, delegates should consider how these practices in cooperation with Iran could apply to
future nuclear proliferation crises in other potential rogue countries, and what standards the international
community should set for dealing with proliferation crises. The situation with North Korea is very similar
and could be another issue to address. Finally, delegates may also want to solve the long-term implications
of nuclear weapon states that are not part of the NPT such as India, Israel, and Pakistan.
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Further Research
Questions to Consider:
1. What is your country’s position on nuclear weapons? Do they have weapons? Do they use nuclear
energy for civilian purposes?
2. Is your country a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? What are the strengths
and weaknesses of the NPT?
3. Should the NPT ever recognize the right of other non-permanent five states to possess weapons?
4. How effective are sanctions when it comes to deterring or ending illicit behaviors of states?
5. How does your country think Iran could gain back confidence and trust from the international
community?
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Resources