interdoc and west european psychological warfare: the american connection (giles scott-smith, 2011)

Interdoc and West EuropeanPsychological Warfare: The American

Connection

GILES SCOTT-SMITH

ABSTRACT Interdoc, or the International Documentation and Information Center, wasestablished in The Hague in early 1963 in order to coordinate a transnational networkof institutes active in the field of analysing trends in communist ideology and societies.The product of deliberations between intelligence agencies and the private sector inWestern Europe during the late 1950s, Interdoc reflected a need to develop and projecta European stance on Cold War issues separate from an all-dominant US influence. Yetthe Americans were present from the beginning, and their involvement graduallyincreased over time. This article covers the details of this involvement and uses it tocomment on how Interdoc represents an interesting case of inter-service cooperation inanti-communist activities in the West.

Introduction

While the study of intelligence and security services is obviously hamperedby national security considerations, the study of cooperation betweenintelligence services is even more problematic. The extent to which and themanner in which services cooperate is often a closely guarded secret, notleast due to concerns (and jealousies) over the control of information andterritory, how far such cooperation can occur between equals, and whethera common cause can actually exist enough to justify full compliance. Recentresearch has indicated that tensions existed between even the closest ofallies.1 Power differences and lack of trust played an important role. Ontheir respective sides of the Iron Curtain, the CIA and the KGB were thesenior partners in intra-bloc security relations, and the covert Cold War islargely seen as a running contest between these two.2 As one study has put it,in the Cold War period, the overarching nature of US power within Western

1For instance see Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War SecretIntelligence (London: John Murray 2001).2See for instance Edward Jay Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War between the CIA and theKGB (New York: Simon & Schuster 1989); David E. Murphy, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs.KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997); Milt Beardon and James

Intelligence and National SecurityVol. 26, Nos. 23, 355376, AprilJune 2011

ISSN 0268-4527 Print/ISSN 1743-9019 Online/11/230355-22 2011 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/02684527.2011.559324

Europe ensured that the strategic values of Washington held sway, and theemergence of a specifically European strategic culture was furtherconstrained.3

This essay covers an organization which does not easily fit this dominantmodel of Cold War (intelligence) historiography, namely Interdoc or theInternational Documentation and Information Center. Established inFebruary 1963 in The Hague, Interdoc originated out of close collaborationbetween the French, West German, and Dutch security services. Between1963 and 1971 it was predominantly a DutchGerman operation withsignificant contacts in Britain, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, and the UnitedStates. Following the withdrawal of German support in 1971 due to theconsequences of Ostpolitik, Interdoc continued as a kind of holdingoperation for a variety of projects run mainly in the Netherlands and acrossEurope, before officially folding in 1986. While some aspects of Interdocsoperations have come to light, its full extent is still to be recorded.4 Whatwill be covered here is the level of American involvement in this story.The fundamental cause of Interdocs existence was the challenge to

Western interests posed by the Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistencefollowing Stalins death in 1953. It was understood in certain circles that itno longer served any purpose to simply demonize the Soviet Union orcommunism in general in a world where the power balance was changingrapidly due to decolonization. The gradual normalization of EastWestrelations, from the spirit of Geneva onwards, highlighted that thecontinuing appeal of communist ideology, particularly among youth andintellectuals, needed to be understood. Deliberations on these issues inWestern Europe eventually led to the formation of Interdoc. The originalintention was that it would function as an international clearing-house forinformation and advice on the theory and practice of communism both asattributed and unattributed material through a network of associatednational institutes and contacts around Europe, North America and,

Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIAs Final Showdown with the KGB (NewYork: Random House 2003).3Wyn Rees and Richard J. Aldrich, European and US Approaches to Counterterrorism: TwoContrasting Cultures?, in R. Tiersky and E. Jones (eds.) Europe Today: A Twenty-FirstCentury Introduction (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield 2007) pp.44142.4This essay is part of a book project that will examine the activities and the importance of thisorganization in the Cold War. See Paul Koedijk, Van Vrede en Vrijheid tot Volk enVerdediging: Veranderingen in Anti-Communistische Psychologische Oorlogvoering inNederland, 19501965, in B. Schoenmaker and J.A.M.M. Janssen (eds.) In De Schaduw VanDe Muur: Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht rond 1960 (The Hague: Sdu 1997); Giles Scott-Smith, Interdoc: Dutch-German Cooperation in Psychological Warfare, in B.de Graaff, B.deJong and W. Platje (eds.) Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence Operations in theNetherlands and Germany in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis 2007); GilesScott-Smith, Confronting Peaceful Coexistence: Psychological Warfare and the Role ofInterdoc 19631972, Cold War History 7/1 (2007) pp.1943; David Teacher, Rogue Agents:Le Cercle Pinay Complex 19511991 (2008), pp.1116,5http://www.isgp.eu/organisations/Rogue_Agents_the_Cercle_Pinay_complex_1951_1991.pdf4 (accessed 20 October 2009).

356 Intelligence and National Security

increasingly during the 1960s, through the Third World. While it alsopossessed a special operations function (mainly in relation to the majorinternational youth festivals sponsored by Soviet-backed fronts), Interdocwas primarily about counter-acting the ideological threat posed by Sovietand Chinese communism by ensuring that Western societies could (literally)withstand its siren call.What is intriguing about Interdoc is the extent to which it was a European

operation. There is no doubt that the early discussions (or colloques as theywere termed by the French) were driven by a desire for Franco-Germanrapprochement following the Federal Republics (FRGs) entry into NATOin 1955, coupled with a French urge for European solutions to Europeanproblems following Suez in 1956. However, as recent research has indicated,the Franco-German relation was complicated severely by the Algerian warand the determination of the French secret service to eliminate the supply ofthe Algerian nationalists by German businesses.5 While the French under-stood by 1959 that their hard-line stance was causing their own isolation, itwas only the settlement of the Algerian issue in 1962 that opened the door tosubstantial cooperation something which, as outlined below, never came.The Dutch were invited to join the discussions in 1958 due to theinternational repute of security service head Louis Einthoven. Although thecolloques expanded to involve the Italians, Belgians, and British, it wasultimately the FrenchGermanDutch core that proceeded with the aim toestablish the permanent institute known as Interdoc.In the ensuing discussions on the theory and practice of Interdoc, a

document from October 1959 from General Hermann Foertsch (at the timethe Deputy Chief of Staff for NATO Forces Europe) includes a significantaside.6 Referring to the necessity of obtaining funding, the documentremarks that ideally this could be arranged through the authority of one ormore major promotors (a personality of the Catholic Church, a prominentJewish personality, not an American).7 Even as a passing comment, this isrevealing in that it indicates the extent to which Interdoc was intended tomove away from a US-centric outlook on Cold War ideology. Of course, US

5See Mathilde von Bulow, The Telefunken Affair and the Internationalisation of theAlgerian War, 195759, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/4 (2005) pp.70329; Mathildevon Bulow, Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in FederalGermany during the Algerian War, 195661, Intelligence and National Security 22/6(2007) pp.787820.6Foertsch, chief of staff of the German army in the Balkans in 1941, was part of the widercircle of former General Staff officers around BND chief Reinhard Gehlen and a key player inthe moves to remilitarize West Germany within NATO. See James Critchfield, Partners at theCreation: The Men behind Postwar Germanys Defense and Intelligence Establishments(Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2003), p.100.7die Autoritat eines oder mehrer grober Forderer (Personlichkeit der kath. Kirche,prominente judische Personlichkeit, kein Amerikaner), Gedanken zur Errichtung einerZentrale . . ., October 1959, in Hoofdlijnen van een International Instituut ter Bestrijdingvan de Psychologische Oorlogvoering van het Communisme. This Interdoc planningdocument was made available to the author from C.C. van den Heuvels private archive.

Interdoc and West European Psychological Warfare 357

involvement in the establishment of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst(BND) was critical.8 But this does not mean that it controlled its entireoutlook intelligence and security services are after all operating in thenational interest. In this sense BND interest in Interdoc exactly represented amove towards establishing its own perspective on the division of Germany inparticular and the Cold War ideological contest in general. In relation tothis, the location of The Hague for Interdoc was important. It made use ofboth the networking and informal bridge-building skills of the Dutch (thinkof Bilderberg), and it recognized the value of the Netherlands as a moreneutral site than any of the larger powers. But it also, due to the closerelations between the Dutch and American security services, seemed to openup the possibility for greater American influence in the organization.Relations between the CIA and the Dutch Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst(BVD) were extraordinarily close. As ex-BVD officer Fritz Hoekstra hasrecorded, in the 1950s the Americans started to strengthen their ties withthe Dutch services by providing aid: They simply purchased a more or lessmasterservant relationship with a substantial amount of dollars.9 CIAtechnical and financial support provided up to 10% of the total BVD budgetduring the 1950s, BVD personnel took part in CIA training programmes,and the Dutch willingly supplied intelligence to the Americans without therebeing a quid pro quo arrangement (or, for that matter, a formalgovernmental authorization for such an exchange).10 It is certainly truethat the Dutch continually tried to bring the Americans into the Interdoccircle, but with mixed results.Interdoc suffered from the loss of two major patrons within a decade. The

French brought their interest and input in action psychologique to thediscussions, but their official role as a contributing founder member endedjust as Interdoc came into existence in 1963. Partly this was due to deGaulles wish for a real detente and rapprochement with Moscow, a goalwhich obviously problematized direct involvement in an internationalcoalition developing anti-communist psychological warfare. But the Frenchwithdrawal was more immediately part of the fall-out from Algerianindependence, since de Gaulle rightly did not trust elements in the militaryand intelligence apparatus who opposed his decision, and he sought toreorganize and re-affirm his control over ces affaires de basse police as aresult.11 Already in January 1962 Dutch intelligence chief Louis Einthovenlearnt from his BND partners that French cooperation could no longer be

8See Mary Ellen Rees, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax: GeorgeMason University Press 1990); Critchfield, Partners at the Creation.9Fritz Hoekstra, The Dutch BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation during the Cold War Era:Some Experiences, Journal of Intelligence History 3/1 (2003) p.48.10CIA funding for the BVD was officially terminated in 1967. See Bob de Graaff and CeesWiebes, Intelligence and the Cold War behind the Dykes: The Relationship between theAmerican and Dutch Intelligence Communities 19461994, in R. Jeffreys-Jones and C.Andrew (eds.) Eternal Vigilance: 50 years of the CIA (London: Frank Cass 1997) pp.4445.11Richard Deacon, The French Secret Service (London: Grafton 1990) p.190.


guaranteed, and that France could only symbolically join in withInterdoc.12 In early 1963 de Gaulle closed down the French militaryspsychological warfare section known as the Cinquie`me Bureaux, effectivelyexcluding its leader, Antoine Bonnemaison, from further involvement.13

Cooperation would continue, but it was to be based purely on personalcontacts and confined to liaison and some coordination of effort in theinformation field.14

This situation mistrust between elected officials and the secretintelligence service undermining the Interdoc project played out inGermany as well. By the early 1960s the German impulse for supporting theformation of Interdoc came from a determination to turn increasing contactswith the East from a threat to a psychological advantage. Eventualrecognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would be thebitterest of pills, but it could be swallowed if it was to take place within abroad strategy to loosen the hold of communist doctrine in Soviet-blocsocieties.15 In this respect, during the early 1960s the otherwise estrangedpartners the Sozial-Democratisch Partei Deutschland (SPD, then in opposi-tion) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) were on the same line, seeingOstpolitik as a means not to stabilize European divisions but to transformthe East. The formation of Interdoc in February 1963 symbolically coincidedwith significant speeches by SPD notables Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr inJuly that same year on the need to increase FRGGDR contacts andrecognize the other sides interests.16 Therefore, when the SPD entered thegoverning grand coalition in 1967, there were high hopes within the BNDthat this would lead to a major role for Interdoc, and as a result the latterorganization established an international Advisory Council for greaterpublic respectability. But the arrival of Willy Brandt as Chancellor in 1969instead spelled the end of such hopes. SPD suspicion of BND activities forcedthe sudden cancellation of Munichs support in late 1970. As with theFrench, private links would be maintained, but from 1971 the Germans wereeffectively out of the picture.

12Reis Amsterdam-Munchen-Zurich-Bern-Geneve-Amsterdam, 2226 januari, L. Eintho-ven, n.d. [1962], File: Reisverslagen, Zwitserland, archive of CC van den Heuvel, NationalArchives, The Hague [hereafter CC].13On the formation of the Cinquie`me Bureaux in 1957 and their role in the Algerian war seePaul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La Republique et son armee face au peril subversif:Guerre et action psychologiques 19451960 (Paris: Les Indes Savantes 2005) pp.45992.14Interdoc, January 1963, File: Interdoc UK Algemeen Map 1 (1962, 1963), 196465, CC.Charles Howard (Dick) Ellis, a close colleague of Interdoc Director Cees van den Heuvelduring the 1960s, reported in 1966: Incidentally I met Bonnemaison at lunch with [Brian]Crozier. He asked after Interdoc and said he regretted very much not being able to attendmeetings. Ellis to van den Heuvel, 25 February 1966, File: UK Ellis 1966, CC.15See on this point Oliver Bange, An Intricate Web: Ostpolitiek, the European SecuritySystem and German Unification, in O. Bange and G. Niedhart (eds.) Helsinki 1975 and theTransformation of Europe (New York: Berghahn Books 2008).16Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (CambridgeMA: Harvard University Press 2003) p.217.


But what of the American connection? What was the American stake inInterdoc?

US Influence in the Formation of Interdoc

In terms of thinking on psychological warfare, the American influence on theEuropean designs for Interdoc is palpable. Several aspects of this influencewill be given here.The first concerns Project Troy, established at MIT in 1950 to examine

ways to overcome Soviet radio jamming but which developed into a full-scale study of political warfare and a carefully planned series offundamental steps to erode the [sic] Russian power.17 The ensuing reportin February 1951 emphasized that a greater effort had to be made to takeinto account the needs and wishes of the audiences aimed at. The UnitedStates could not be packaged as a universally-acceptable message that wouldbe understood similarly by all recipients. The report recommended that weshould avoid the position, expressed or implied, that communism is bad, orany implication of contempt for communism . . . There should be noappearance of an all out overt attack upon the intellectual foundations ofSoviet Society.18 The way forward in psychological operations, in otherwords, was exactly to respect the views of the other side and treat themseriously, not denigrate them.The second concerns Militant Liberty, the plan of US Colonel and Joint

Chiefs of Staff advisor John Broger to train freedom cadres to proselytizethe values of the democratic, capitalist, self-reliant, god-fearing way of lifearound the world.19 Using a straight-forward logic, Broger argued that sinceCommunism is a dynamic ideology it can only be defeated by a strongerdynamic ideology.20 Significantly, neither Troy nor Militant Liberty securedmuch of an impact on the practice of US psychological warfare, althoughBroger did proceed with various follow-through projects from 1956onwards. Yet their influence on the Interdoc circle is not to be denied.Crucially, however, the difference is that while the American positions weredefined by an outright fear of communism, the Europeans were searching forways to implement these ideas from a position of confidence.Following on from this, the third aspect concerns the need for a positive

message with which to overcome the appeal of leftist propaganda. Simplydisplaying the merits of the free world and opposing Soviet lies with the

17Project TROY report, 1 February 1951, quoted in Scott Lucas, Freedoms War: TheAmerican Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York: New York University Press 1999)p.100.18Project TROY report, quoted in Allan A. Needell, Truth is Our Weapon: Project TROY,Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State,Diplomatic History 17/3 (1993) p.411.19Ken Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhowers Secret Propaganda Battle at Home andAbroad (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2006) p.314.20Ibid., p.321.


truth was not enough, since it did not engage with the roots of the threat. Butthis was not as simple as it seemed. In the wake of Hungary in 1956 C.D.Jackson, Eisenhowers special advisor on psychological warfare, bemoanedthe fact that it was apparently so difficult for the West to project a positiverather than a negative approach to the peoples of the Soviet bloc, despite therealities of communist rule.21 Interdocs early moves revolved largely aroundthis point. In 1964 its first publication, Tasks for the Free World Today,made this explicit:

Negative anti-communism tends to picture things in connection tocommunism in terms of black and white. It only wants to criticizecommunism, which is often done in a purely negative and emotionalmanner.

Positive anti-communism wants to study communism as objectively aspossible, in order to base its criticism on scientific research. It maintainsan open mind regarding the possibility of favourable changes incommunism and in EastWest relations.22

The crucial elements here are the scientific methodology as opposed toemotional response and the positive outlook as regards possibilities forsocio-political change at both domestic and international levels. Interdocsought to move with ahead of even the times, away from EastWestrelations as a contest between monolithic blocs, away from the attempts inthe late 1940s and early 1950s to stoke insurgency in the East, insteadsearching for more psychological and sociological channels through whichto engage and alter mindsets and belief systems.23

The fourth aspect concerns the issue of brainwashing. CIA interest in mindcontrol had begun seriously in 1949 following the Cardinal Mindszentyshow-trial in Hungary, leading to large budgets for a rolling researchprogramme known successively as Bluebird (1950), Artichoke (1952), andMKUltra (1953), a process stimulated further by the scare during the Koreanwar of US prisoners of war (POWs) undergoing Chinese brainwashingtechniques and renouncing their homeland as a result (a scare partly fuelledby CIA propagandist-journalist Edward Hunter, who gave us the term in hisexpose of this phenomenon in 1950).24 The possibilities offered by the

21Jackson to National Security Advisor Robert Cutler, 26 February 1957, quoted in Lucas,Freedoms War, p.266.22Notes on Terminology, Tasks for the Free World Today (The Hague: Interdoc 1964) p.9.23These gradations of anti-communism would be present throughout the existence ofInterdoc. Thus in 1965 van den Heuvel wrote of a film project of the British anti-communistgroup Common Cause as exactly the old fashioned negative approach to communism whichwe want to change for a more positive anti-communism. Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 6 January1965, File: UK, Ellis 1965, CC.24See Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Defied It (New York: Pyramid1956).


programming and controlling of particular individuals, using everythingfrom sensory deprivation to experimental drug concoctions, was taken to anew level with the founding of the Society for the Investigation of HumanEcology by Cornell University Medical College professor Harold Wolff andhis colleague Lawrence Hinkle in 1955.25 Assembled and presented as a fullylegitimate research centre, this CIA treated human ecology as the study ofways to control the interaction between humans and their immediateenvironment, thereby manipulating behaviour.In early 1959 Cees van den Heuvel, the BVDs head of training, led a study

group of four other Dutchmen to the United States to learn at first handAmerican approaches to psychological defense against Soviet influence, andthe Society, contacted by van den Heuvels chief Louis Entihoven via CIAlink-man John Gittinger, provided the contacts.26 Special attention wasgiven to the vulnerabilities of Western working classes, intellectuals, youth,and the military to the Soviet cultural offensive under peaceful coex-istence,27 with the goal being the immunizing of our people against thisinfluence which is often very refined beginning with the removal ofignorance.28 Included in the itinerary was a special conference onbrainwashing held at the Societys office on Connecticut Avenue inWashington DC, involving various scientists connected with US Air Forceresearch programmes on POWs. The report made clear that attention forthis subject was due to the fact that

brainwashing in its narrow sense (as applied by Chinese and Russiancommunists to prisoners) is assumed to be related in some way orother to brainwashing in its wider sense (such as the politicalindoctrination of the Chinese people) and with brainwashing in itswidest sense (such as the communist propaganda to the non-communist world).29

The Wests political environment, from this perspective, was beinginfluenced by communism was an object of active interest and it wasnecessary to reverse this trend by studying and applying the communist

25John Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control (NewYork: W.W. Norton 1979) p.159. The Society became the Human Ecology Fund in 1961, andwas eventually folded in 1965.26Contact between the Society and the Netherlands was already in progress in 1958, when agrant of $15,000 was paid to Nijmegen University for a study of Hungarian refugees as partof a wider research programme on what led people to defect. See Marks, The Search for theManchurian Candidate, p.164.27Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Influence (report of the study groupvisit to the United States), April 1959, p.7. Authors copy from van den Heuvels privatearchive.28Van den Heuvel to Einthoven, 8 October 1958, Stichting voor Onderzoek van EcologischeVraagstukken (SOEV) File 1, CC.29Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Influence, p.13.


methods in reverse.30 Brainwashing had potential if it could offer blueprintsfor the appliance of influence on a societal basis. The key was to link themicro and macro levels of analysis to study the forces used to maintain thecohesion of communist societies from the perspective of the individual in acontrolled environment. Thus the report promoted studying brainwashingtechniques to enable approaching the macro situation of communism inworld politics from a micro investigation involving psychology andpsychiatry, both being cutting-edge fields in American positivist socialscience during the 1950s and early 1960s.31 The group returned to theNetherlands convinced of the need to establish an institute for this purposeand for conducting political education on Western values and thecommunist threat via strategic channels: the media, trade unions,universities, churches, the armed forces. This Dutch initiative the Stichtingvoor Onderzoek van Ecologische Vraagstukken (Foundation for theInvestigation of Problems of Ecology), founded in April 1960 and runinitially from van den Heuvels front room in The Hague became thenational base for the formation of the international Interdoc network threeyears later.Contacts were maintained between the Societys Executive Secretary

James Monroe and the Dutch. Monroe himself visited the Netherlands inOctober 1959 and returned to the United States with plans for cooperationwith several institutes in Scandinavia and elsewhere. He was also active insoliciting support in various business and military circles for the Dutchinitiative, it proved difficult. In November Monroe reported that theNational War Colleges seminar on national strategy (which was closelylinked to the Foreign Policy Institute at the University of Pennsylvania) hadestablished an association, which, he hoped, would provide a ready-madeUS Committee and a continuing source of financial support.32 Van denHeuvel responded by referring to the scattered nature of European activitiesin psychological warfare and the need for coordination of all those forces.Contacts were being developed with the French, Germans, Italians, andBritish, but if American and European forces join in such a project, muchcould be achieved.33 Van den Heuvel reiterated his belief in the possibilitiesfor a joint USEuropean operation in early 1960, stating that eventuallythere would be insistence on the invitation of an American observer for ageneral conference.34 But things did not work out so smoothly thereafter.US interest in the Interdoc project required specific details of its motivation,purpose, and activities, while the delicate business of establishing thisEuropean network, involving the coordination of already-existing nationalinstitutes (and consequently the overcoming of some spheres of interest and

30Annual Report of the Foundation for the Investigation of Problems of Ecology, JaarverslagSOEV: 1960, pp.67.31Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Influence, p.60.32Monroe to van den Heuvel, 10 November 1959, SOEV File 1, CC.33Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 3 December 1959, SOEV File 1, CC.34Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 30 May 1960, SOEV File 1, CC.


suspicion), could only move along gradually.35 Contact faded due to theinability to bridge this gap, and was more or less ended with the departure ofMonroe from the renamed Human Ecology Society in January 1962.36

The NSIC: The US Link?

Despite the auspicious beginnings in transatlantic contacts, it is noticeablethat little came of it. US support for European initiatives was also absentwithin NATO. Before committing to Interdoc, during 196061 the Germanspushed for a psychological warfare apparatus within NATO to coordinateWestern activities and prevent the Soviet Union benefiting from divisions inthe alliance surrounding the Berlin crisis. The Americans, along with theBritish, refused to back the proposal, and as a result the Interdoc plan wasmoved wholly into the civilian sphere.37 But even there the hoped-forcollaboration did not emerge.In a letter from Einthoven to Prince Bernhard from early 1962, the now

retired head of the BVD stated that he had undertaken the task ofestablishing Interdoc due to requests from French, German and Americanfriends (Allen Dulles) to make use of his remarkable array of contacts inboth NATO and the neutrals (Sweden and Switzerland).38 But this did nottranslate into direct support from either the CIA or from the private sector.A primary reason for this was two major scandals that rocked the BNDduring 19611962. Heinz Felfe, a former SS officer and member of WalterSchellenbergs foreign intelligence section of the RHSA (Nazi Reich SecurityCentral Office) was recruited by the KGB in 1951. Soon afterwards he joinedthe counter-intelligence wing of Reinhard Gehlens BND, and over the nextten years he manoeuvred himself into a place of utmost confidence next toGehlen. Despite growing suspicions over the next decade, it took until therevelations of Polish intelligence defector Michal Goleniewski in 1961 tofinally convince the CIA that Felfe was a traitor and, in turn, convinceGehlen. Felfes arrest and interrogation during 1962 then coincided with aserious confrontation between the BND and the German Ministry ofDefence, which ended up with Gehlen being summoned to AdenauersChancellery in November for his alleged involvement in leaking informationto Der Spiegel to undermine Franz Joseph Strauss.39 The combination ofthese two factors ensured that the BND looked like badly damaged goods,and it is not surprising there was hesitation on the part of the CIA at thattime to undertake a new cooperative venture.

35Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 7 January 1961, SOEV File 1, CC.36Monroe to van den Heuvel, 18 January 1962, SOEV File 1, CC.37See Giles Scott-Smith, Not a NATO Responsibility? Psychological Warfare, the BerlinCrisis, and the Formation of Interdoc, in A. Wenger, A. Locher and C. Nuenlist (eds.)Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London:Routledge 2007) pp.3149.38Einthoven to Bernhard, 15 January 1962, NL File 55 Bernhard, CC.39See Ellen Reese, pp.14367.


Meanwhile, Einthoven persisted in his search for US partners. Heapproached both the Ford and Carnegie Foundations the latter thanks toBernhards contact with J. Johnson, both Carnegie representative andhonorary secretary of the American wing of Bilderberg but was refusedfinancial support on the basis that we are not neutral enough. An earlierattempt by Einthoven to gain $10,000 from the Free Europe Committee probably connected to a larger proposal on covert operations in Europe was also turned down.40 In January 1963 Einthoven discussed with Dulles amemo with the title The Dialogue between West and East which called forthe necessity of conducting increasing relations with the Soviet bloc from aposition of psychological strength. This required the propagation of Westernvalues among the population in general to enable them to understand thethreat, and the training of cadres for the purpose of taking the ideologicalstruggle to the East. Special attention was to be given to youth education dueto the susceptibility of students to the blandishments of communist peacefulexistence propaganda. Einthoven explained that while Stichting voorOnderzoek van Ecologische Vraagstukken (SOEV) was already playing thisrole, it did not have the necessary funds to expand its operations as hoped.He duly asked Dulles for an annual contribution of 350,000 guilders, with astart-up amount of 150,000 to get things moving. Yet the reaction wasnegative: he eventually let me know that there was no money available forthese goals.41 Einthoven further reported to Bernhard that via Allen DullesI tried to gain an entrance to the smaller funds, but was told that Europemust now pod its own peas [zijn eigen boontjes maar moest doppen].42

Structural funding from the United States therefore seemed to be ruled out.If there was not to be an immediate source of funding from across the

Atlantic, this did not prevent continuing efforts to bring the Americans in.The important point here, however, is that this effort became a purely Dutchexercise. The French had never been interested in American input, and theGermans were equally unenthusiastic. It was the Dutch all along who triedto turn Interdoc into a transatlantic affair, probably due to ideologicalreasons (the ingrained Atlanticism of the Dutch, which partly stemmed fromthe experience of World War II) and practical reasons (the desire for acombined Western effort, and the hope for US funding to expand activities).For the French and the Germans it was precisely the opposite: Americanthinking on the Cold War and relations with the East was going nowhereand was preventing Europe from finding solutions that could overcome itsown division. Nevertheless, the DutchGerman relationship in Interdocduring the 1960s does not seem to have been undermined by the efforts fromThe Hague to build bridges across the Atlantic.The focus soon lay on the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC),

founded in 1962 and an outgrowth of the national strategy seminar

40Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 18 January 1961, and memo concerning Eugene Metz of theFree Europe Committee, n.d. [January 1961], SOEV File 1, CC.41Einthoven to Bernhard, 19 August 1963, NL File 55 Bernhard, CC.42Einthoven to Bernhard, 22 July 1963, ibid.


mentioned by Monroe in collaboration with several neoconservativeinstitutions such as the Institute for American Strategy and the AmericanStrategy Council, the latter stemming originally from informal contactsbetween the likes of Henry Luce, Clair Booth Luce, and Jay Lovestone. NSICwas led by Frank Barnett, who was previously the director of research withthe Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Centers early directors andadvisors included Joseph Coors of the brewing conglomerate, FrankShakespeare (later of USIA and the Heritage Foundation), and William J.Casey. From the early 1970s the NSIC began to receive large-scale fundingfrom Richard Scaifes various philanthropic outlets, and it worked closelywith the Committee on the Present Danger as part of the right-wing anti-Detente movement that was active in the United States during that decade.NSIC is now led by Roy Godson, emeritus professor of government atGeorgetown University and a well-known link-man in the Iran-Contraapparatus, whose contacts with the Center (and with a whole host of othersimilar institutions on the political right) go back to the late 1960s.43

In short, Interdocs contacts in the USA were firmly planted in the right-wing think-tank milieu, and here lay the central problem. The basis forDutchGerman thinking on relations with the East, as developed withinInterdoc circles, was strongly related to the transformative power of anenlightened Ostpolitik. This required once the necessary preparations hadbeen made actively pursuing increased contacts with the East at all levelsand in all fields, in order, literally, to spread Western values and weakencommunist rule. For the conservative right, however (and this did not justapply to the Americans, of course), such contacts were anathema andbetrayed the necessity to contain the communist world by rejecting itwholesale. Dutch entrepreneurship in looking to the Americans wastherefore potentially divisive for the Interdoc operation itself. In 1961Barnett explained his position in Military Review:

Political warfare, in short, is warfare not public relations . . . The aimof political warfare is not to promote mutual understanding betweendifferent points of view; it is to discredit, displace, and neutralize anopponent, to destroy a competing ideology, and to reduce the adherentsto political impotence.44

Nevertheless, the approach Barnet laid out in this article did connect with thedeliberations going on in Western Europe on how best to inform the publicand make them aware of the continuing threat from the East. Barnett spoke ofthe Institute for American Strategy as a kind of traveling civilian war college,holding public and professional seminars around the country to promote thecontinuing study of the Cold War confrontation. There are connections herewith similar ideas in Europe particularly in Germany on the need to

43On NSIC see the information on RightWeb, run by Political Research Associates, 5http://rightweb.irc-online.org/gw/2806.html4 (accessed 12 February 2009).44Frank R. Barnett, A Proposal for Political Warfare, Military Review (March 1961), p.3.


encourage a responsible citizenry as part of the process of maintaining ademocratic society. Interdoc would make use of the network of Akademies furpolitische Bildung, and particularly the Ostkolleg in Koln, for the purpose oftraining students, journalists, academics, and members of the military in thefiner points of the ideological contest. But Barnetts more radical neoconser-vative perspective did jar with the views expressed in Europe.The link with Barnett continued through the 1960s. In MayJune 1966

van den Heuvel made a three-week trip to North America, stopping off inMontreal, New York, and Washington DC. Contacts were established forhim via former MI6 agent C.H. (Dick) Ellis, effectively the main Interdoclink-man in Britain during the 1960s, and K. Donaldson of FoundationInternational Services Ltd, a front-man for US philanthropy (Ford, Rock-efeller) in London.45 Although Donaldson did not come through with anysources, van den Heuvel felt confident enough to report in March 1966 thatI have so many contacts now in the US that it will be difficult to restrictmyself to the most valuable ones.46 Foremost among them was the NSIC.On 31 May van den Heuvel attended a meeting at the offices of the NationalAssociation of Manufacturers (NAM) in New York, presided over byStewart Baeder of NAM and with both Barnett and Admiral (retired)William C. Mott of NSIC present. The Dutchman reported later that bothBaeder and Mott are pressing Barnett to come to a more definitearrangement with Interdoc,47 but Baeders departure from NAM later thatyear effectively sabotaged the hope of finding the necessary finance to openan Interdoc office in New York.48 By late 1966 the situation looked bleak, asvan den Heuvel explained to Ellis:

What I expected has come true; Barnett who was as you willremember rather critical is even more now. Obviously he is stillthinking entirely in terms of cold war and does not think much of thepositive opportunities the West has in regard to increasing EastWestcontacts . . . we shall have to look for someone else who is inclined toact as a focal point for Interdoc in the United States. I would not regretthis development as I have always had my doubts about Barnett inregard to the right attitude towards the present EastWest situation.49

By early 1967 there seemed to be some movement. Ellis, referring to recentcorrespondence from Barnett, remarked that it looks as though he has had achange of heart . . . I am a bit suspicious of US mergers but there may be

45Ellis to van den Heuvel, 20 February 1966, File: UK Ellis 1966, CC. Ellis suggestedcontacting Ernest Cuneo to assist with US funding options. During World War II Cuneo hadbeen the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) liaison officer between William Donovan andPresident Roosevelt.46Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 25 March 1966, ibid.47Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 25 July 1966, ibid.48Ellis to van den Heuvel, 17 November 1966, ibid.49Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 14 November 1966, ibid.


something in the concept of a closer link between certain Europeangroups and a sort of combined US organization.50 Clearly Barnett wasnow interested in joining forces. Ellis reported a week later that MI6(codename Power), which had been involved in long-running dealings overan Interdoc UK office, had no objection to talks with the Americansproceeding provided you are certain that you are not going to be mergedinto something too big, and liable to be political.51 As part of thisdevelopment, Barnett and the NSIC were aiming to hold a conference inBrussels some time in late 1967 to gather together allied forces on both sidesof the Atlantic.52

During JuneAugust 1967 van den Heuvel had the opportunity to takethese discussions further thanks to an invitation to participate in the USEmbassys International Visitor Program, an exchange programme used tobring influential individuals to the United States for a mix of consultationwith their professional counter-parts and a tour through American society.The strong implication here is that the CIA used this element of theembassys public diplomacy activities to propel the NSICInterdoc link. Vanden Heuvels invitation, in his own words, was a sort of reward for thethings Id done, under strong pressure from the CIA . . . They asked me to dothings, not in their service but just in my own orbit. Many speculated that Iwas a CIA agent but I wasnt.53 Taking advantage of the trip, he conductedlengthy discussions with Barnett and others on the proposed USEuropeanconference, which was now postponed to early 1968. It was agreed thiswould be held with the purpose of interesting the private sector, notablyindustry, in foreign policy, strategy, psychological warfare etc. dealing withthe evolving communist threat, the significance of contacts with the East inthe context of expanding EastWest trade, and the role of businessmen andnon-governmental organisations in the EastWest confrontation.54 Thetwist in all this was matching the original aims of a conference on EastWesttrade (which appealed to the NAM) with the psywar concerns overcommunist ideology (which appealed to Barnett). Van den Heuvel did returnfrom the United States with one breakthrough Crosby Kelly of NAMsForeign Relations Committee agreed to function as a promoter of Interdocinterests and a distributor of its material within the United States, althoughhe backed away from being the Interdoc representative. Kelly, a well-known PR guru with Litton Industries, and a member of the famed

50Ellis to van den Heuvel, 6 February 1967, File: UK Ellis 1967, CC.51Ellis to van den Heuvel, 15 February 1967, ibid.52Ellis to van den Heuvel, 15 May 1967, ibid.53C.C. van den Heuvel, interview with the author, The Hague, 6 August 2002. On thecircumstances of his participation on the IVP see G. Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: TheUS State Departments Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain19501970 (Brussels: Peter Lang 2008) pp.29697.54Report on a visit to the United States, 26 June5 August 1967, archive of theGovernmental Affairs Institute, Washington DC (hereafter GAI). Van den Heuvels trip alsoincluded a visit to the Institute of Human Ecology.


anti-Marxist network the Pinay Circle,55 explained that there were severalinfluential individuals in the NAM who favour EastWest trade, not in thefirst place because of the expectation of any considerable profits, but as thistrade will contribute to reinforce the structural changes now apparent inCommunist countries.56

What happened next remains somewhat obscure. It is not clear if Barnettsplan for a Euro-American gathering in Brussels (or anywhere else) wentahead. Van den Heuvel returned to the United States in 1968, this timetogether with Colonel Rolf Geyer, the head of BND section III F whicheffectively ran Interdoc for the Germans. The fact that Geyer accompaniedthe Dutchman indicates that this was a serious move towards closing somekind of partnership deal with associates in the United States. Geyer, in thewords of one of his former employees in III F, didnt trust the Americans.57

Interdocs Progress Report 1968 stated clearly that top of the list for thistrip was to accelerate the realisation of an Interdoc-USA. Moves to securefunding from US sources was also under way, including from the FordFoundation, which would require submitting proposals with clearly-definedprojects.58

By 1969 the American presence within Interdoc was becoming clearer.After the Interdoc conference of 21 September 1969 a report from a memberof the British Foreign Offices Information Research Department remarkedthat On this occasion the presence of a relatively large American groupwhich took a very active part in the discussions was especially pleasing.59

The Progress Report for that also year concluded the following:

Despite the abundance of institutes in America concerned with EastWest affairs it appears that, in very many cases, particular interest isstill being shown in Interdoc work and Interdoc publications. Interdochas such good connections with some of these institutes and people thatan Interdoc office in the United States can already be considered. To setup a permanent central office in the United States still remains theobject of Interdoc aspirations.60

Van den Heuvel continued to expand his American network, meeting NSICmember William Casey for the first time in June 1970.61 But up to this pointit is not clear what the relationship between Interdoc and the NSIC was. Acase in point concerns the formation of Brian Croziers Institute for the

55Robert Hutchinson, Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei (NewYork: Doubleday 1997) pp.15358.56Report, GAI.57Interview with the author, Munich, 3 July 2008.58Interdoc Progress Report 1968, Interdoc, The Hague.59Papers of the Information Research Department, FCO 95/907 Interdoc, National Archives,London.60Interdoc Progress Report 1969, p.6.61Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 17 June 1970, File: UK Ellis 196974, CC.


Study of Conflict (ISC) in 1969. ISC only established itself thanks to a$100,000 annual grant from the Scaife Family Charitable Trusts. At firstglance it looks as if Crozier, more militant in approach, was chosen in favourof van den Heuvel to be the NSICs European outpost. This is significant alsobecause Crozier himself mentions that his connection to Richard MellonScaife was arranged by his CIA contacts, with Barnett as middle-man.62 Yetlater in 1970 a major upheaval took place that allowed the American stakein Interdoc to determine the future of the institution itself. At the Interdocconference held in Rimini in October the Germans announced the cessationof their involvement. Having heard that the German financial contribution,running at more than 500,000 Dutch Guilders by the end of the 1960s,would be severely cut back if not stopped entirely, van den Heuvel went tothe United States in November 1970 for the specific purpose of raising funds.His two contacts were Barnett and R. Daniel McMichael, a representative ofvarious US foundations, foremost among them being Mellon Scaife. Havinglaid out various scenarios, the Americans agreed to make a serious effort tocontribute upwards of 200,000 Guilders to enable the institution to continuefunctioning. Special attention was given to preparing Westerners forattendance at conferences and other meetings in the East (and encouragingcertain processes of liberalization going on there), and the publication in theWest of Soviet dissident literature exposing negative traits and defendingbasic human rights.63 To formalize this arrangement it was agreed thatBarnett and NSIC/American Bar Association colleague Admiral (rtd.)William Mott would become Interdoc board members. Looking ahead,efforts would be made for closer international co-operation betweenInterdoc, the NSIC, Croziers ISC, and the EastWest Institute in Bern,Switzerland.64

Into the 1970s

The first fruits of this closer relationship came in early 1971. Barnett directedvan den Heuvel to make a request for $30,000 from AmericanAsianEducational Exchange (AAEE), and in March the reply came that the requesthad been granted. With the American funding came new demands. Van denHeuvel, aware of the success of ISCs approach with the Americans, hadpitched a series of publications on the theory and practice of Chineseinfluence, and a conference on guerrilla warfare in Asia to be held later thatyear. Interdoc did already possess some resources in this field, since an Asia

62Brian Crozier, Free Agent: The Unseen War 19411991 (London: HarperCollins 1993)p.90.63Van den Heuvel, Report on a visit to the United States, 1120 November 1970, File:Financing and Reorganisation 19701973, CC.64Ibid. Interesting is that a report on Interdoc reorganization by German Interdoc deputy J.H.Hoheisel from September 1970 mentioned alongside these three institutions also Est &Ouest, Paris (George Albertini) as a closer partner, but this was excluded from van denHeuvels American report.


Institute had been established at its address principally to examine Chineseand Taiwanese affairs. The AAEE agreed, but also wanted to see moreattention for the relationship between the Soviet Union and Asian affairs.65

Van den Heuvel let Ellis know in mid-1971 that I expect an increasingAmerican cooperation, and after a further trip to the United States in Mayhe could report that his workload had increased considerably because thenew American support also includes certain tasks.66

The transition of Interdoc from a German to an American sphere ofinfluence had one final twist. The $30,000 was a vital life-line, but the totalcollapse of German funding in 1971 left the Interdoc operation with a seriousshortfall for 1972. McMichael reported in August that there was nopossibility of new funds from the Scaife network, and that neither Barnettnor AAEEs Frank Trager could produce anything in the short term.67 Planswere proceeding for a major conference, together with the American BarAssociations Committee on Education about Communism, to be held inNovember at the Freedoms Foundation in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. Underthe title of American-European Relations vis-a`-vis Communist Objectives inEurope, this was intended to solidify the Interdoc operation in the UnitedStates and pave the way ahead. But with two months to go, it was lookingmore like the last hurrah. Despite some promises of alternative channels beingfound, German funds had after all dried up entirely. Desperately searching forfunds to prevent bankruptcy and closure, van den Heuvel tried one last throwof the dice when in August 1972 he contacted the chief of the Chancellory(and supervisor of relations with the BND) in Bonn, Horst Ehmke.68

Amazingly, Ehmke came through, transferring a sum of DM 60,000 at theend of September.69 Van den Heuvel, in his thankful reply, fully acknowl-edged that this was a one-off transaction. But it had saved Interdoc.But the transition was not just a question of money, since the focus of

Interdoc would also change. Van den Heuvel was quite forthcoming toCrozier about the different opinions involved:

I think that practically all of us want to consolidate the American linkwith Interdoc. One or two may have small reservations as they fear thatthe Americans might get a too predominant position in Interdoc. I donot share that fear, Interdoc is in the first place a Europeanorganization and it will stay that. However, for many reasons, a closeco-operation with the Americans is essential. Western Europe andNorth America form the Western world. The unity of this Western

65Barnett to van den Heuvel, 20 January 1971, Van den Heuvel to Frank Trager (AAEE), 26January 1971, Trager to van den Heuvel, 4 February 1971, Van den Heuvel to Trager, 11February 1971, and Trager to van den Heuvel, 5 March 1971, ibid.66Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 6 April and 2 June 1971, File: UK Ellis 196974, CC.67McMichael to van den Heuvel, 3 August 1972, File: Financing and Reorganisation 19701973, CC.68Van den Heuvel to Ehmke, 10 August 1972, ibid.69Ehmke to van den Heuvel, 26 September 1972, ibid.


World is all important and should be promoted with all possible means,also by Interdoc.70

The early 1970s were of course a period of transition in the USEuropeanrelationship as a whole. With Detente altering the EastWest relationshipthere were calls from various sectors to re-align the global posture of the USmilitary, including Senator Mike Mansfields amendment to Congress in1971 to halve the number of US forces stationed Western Europe. Althoughthis was defeated 6136 in the Senate, it was taken as a sign that the USmilitary guarantee could no longer be taken for granted.The conference that solidified the US link went ahead in November 1972.

Including contributions from former Secretary of State Dean Rusk (onNegotiating with the East) and Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsU. Alexis Johnson (on East Policy of the West), the event had enough of ahigh profile to raise the presence of Interdoc across the Atlantic. Other panelsessions addressed The US Presence in Europe and Frictions within theAlliance, and the conference served as a general gathering of representativesfrom research institutes concerned with Atlantic and EastWest issues.Barnett closed the conference by initiating a discussion on what next?,himself indicating that his real interest lay in a new international setup,perhaps funded by multi-national companies, which would study theproblems of international security. Van den Heuvel followed up by placingInterdoc firmly within this new configuration of forces, stating that TheHague was perfectly placed as the location for a briefing centre for thosedoing business or otherwise travelling to the East.71

American finance was certainly present in the Interdoc set-up during the1970s. The financial report for 1976 for van den Heuvels Dutch base, theEastWest Institute, refers to foreign funds (buitenlandse fondsen)providing 90,000 Guilders, half of the total received from benefactors as awhole. In 1977 this was 92,000, and in 1978 71,000.72 It is hard to imaginethat this money was coming from anywhere else than the United States. Vanden Heuvel was travelling every year to the United States in this period insearch of funds. The US input had a major effect on Interdocs set of goals,which included the following: firstly, a strengthening of opinion in civilsociety to promote support for the continuing presence of US forces inWestern Europe. Secondly, and closely related to this, a determined attemptto build bridges with upcoming generations in order to normalize thisrelationship and USEuropean relations in general within a younger age-group. Thirdly, to analyse the rising trend in political violence, terrorism,and guerrilla-type actions in the West, in conjunction with similar groupsaround Europe. Fourthly, to track developments in EastWest relations and

70Van den Heuvel to Crozier, 11 October 1971, File: UK 19 (Crozier), CC.71American-European Relations vis-a`-vis Communist Objectives in Europe, 1718November 1972, conference booklet, pp.3334.72File: AK NL 30, Finances OWI 19691978, CC.


promote wherever possible an increasing dialogue in order to open up theEast to Western ideas.As regards the first move, results were soon in coming. In 1971 Crozier

had proposed forming a pressure group to keep the Americans in Europe, aplan that van den Heuvel took up with enthusiasm. The Dutch wing of thisproposed Europe-wide organization which van den Heuvel envisioned tocounteract anti-American propaganda in Europe in the press, in televisionetc. was eventually established in 1973 as the Foundation for Solidarityand Alliance Netherlands United States (Stichting Solidariteit enVerbondenheid Nederland Verenigde Staten), and continues to this day.73

For the second move van den Heuvel operated on two fronts. An activemember of World War II veterans groups, he had been occupied in the late1960s with the fact that the New Left and its hangers-on were disdainful ofthe causes fought for 25 years before. Taking these concerns to theinternational stage, in 1970, as a member of the International Union ofResistance and Deportee Movements (UIRD), he established a Resistanceand Youth Committee to promote a better understanding of democraticvalues. The key to this move was the suggestion that younger generations didcare about human rights if a connection could be made between the olderand younger generations on this ground, some consensus could be found.74

In 1974 van den Heuvel also manoeuvred his way into a prominent positionas information advisor for the Dutch Atlantic Committee, the publicinstitution created in the early 1950s to promote the goals of the Atlanticalliance within Dutch society. By October 1975 he could report severalsuccesses, the most significant of which was the revival of the Committeesyouth wing under the name of JASON (Jong Atlantisch SamenwerkingsOrgaan Nederland).75 Working closely with students from the StudentInternational Relations Society at the University of Leiden, van den Heuvelnurtured JASON into the most active element of the Committee, to the pointwhere his JASON protegee, Rio Praaning, became Committee director inNovember 1979 (with van den Heuvel himself moving to the position ofTreasurer).76 The Committees location even moved to van den Heuvelstrusted address on van Stolkweg in The Hague. One month later NATOtook its Double-Track decision on the upgrading of its nuclear force inWestern Europe, and for the next decade Praaning led the organization as anactive and effective participant in the political battle over the placement ofCruise Missiles in the Netherlands. One of the van den Heuvel-esque movesduring this period was the formation of the Foundation for Peace Politics(Stichting Vredespolitiek or SVP), a gathering of pro-Cruise civil society

73Crozier to van den Heuvel, 5 October 1971, and van den Heuvel to Crozier, 11 October1971, File: UK 19 (Crozier), CC.74File: AK International 36 / UIRD Resistance et Jeurnesse (197074), CC.75Van den Heuvel, Nota Activiteit Voorlichtingsadviseur Atlantische Commissie, 28October 1975, File: Atlantische Commissie 197487, CC.76Remco van Diepen, Beschaafd ageren voor de NAVO: 50 Jaar Atlantische Commissie (TheHague: Atlantische Commissie, 2002) p.74.


groups (some of which were more or less fictional) designed to operate as ahigh-profile platform for voices in support of NATO policy. The Americanconnection played a role here too. According to the treasurer, at aparticularly cash-strapped moment 10,000 Dutch Guilders was providedfor the Foundation by the US Embassy consisting of ten crisp 1000 Guilderbanknotes in a brown paper bag.77 Van den Heuvel was not one of thevisible orchestrators of the SVP, but his guiding spirit is written all over it.The third aspect, analysing political violence, had already become an

Interdoc priority during its research into the New Left during the late 1960s.Conferences on Radicalism and Security (Noordwijk, April 1970) andGuerrilla Warfare in Asia (Noordwijk, June 1970) had explored this terrain,as had two publications on guerrilla warfare in Latin America by AlphonseMax. In June 1973 this took another turn with a conference in The Hagueentitled Resistance and the New Generation, which involved participantsfrom the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, and Germany, and which wascentred around a proposal from the Resistance and Psychological Opera-tions Committee of the British Reserve Forces Association a member ofwhich, Arnhem veteran, Daily Telegraph military correspondent, and ISCboard member Brigadier W.F. Thompson, was also the new president ofInterdoc (replacing Louis Einthoven).78 The Committee proposed thatInterdoc become the base for a research programme into what was termedInternational Revolutionary Anarchy, including the teaching of hostileideologies in our State schools and Universities, the interference byrevolutionary groups from abroad in the affairs of our countries, and thedeliberate use of drugs to undermine the structure of the State. The proposalwas adamant that

We are NOT trying to set up any kind of secret organization. What wewant is material that has been given publicity and is obviously aimed atcreating doubt and unrest in the minds of the public owing toexaggeration and the distortion of facts.79

The fourth move increasingly concerned the Helsinki Accords and theirfollow-up. The conference Development of EastRelations through FreerMovement of People, Ideas and Information (Noordwijk, September 1973),which included a paper by the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in TheHague, V.N. Kuznetsov, was a clear move to capitalize on and cultivatethe links that were being set up under Detente. In the aftermath of theConference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975 van den Heuvelmoved his Dutch operations increasingly in the direction of a monitoring ofpost-Helsinki developments, thereby capitalizing on the attention given to

77Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, interview with the author, Middelburg 9 January 2009.78On the military career of Thompson, who died in 1980, see5http://www.unithistories.com/officers/1AirbDiv_officersT.htm4 (accessed 19 February 2009).79Politics, Violence, and the Threat to International Law and Order, G.L. [Gordon Lett],File: AK International 36 / UIRD Resistance et Jeurnesse (197074), CC.


human rights by the Dutch government and the interests within Dutchbusiness for increasing trade with the East. This led eventually to theformation of the Centrum voor Europese Veiligheid en Samenwerking(Centre for European Security and Cooperation, CEVS) in 1979, designed toonce again gather together European allies under one umbrella in order topush for greater freedoms in the Eastern bloc as laid out in Helsinkis BasketIII. CEVS ultimately had to be given up in 1982 due to a lack of funding, butvan den Heuvel remained active in this field throughout that decade.

Conclusion

To an extent, Interdoc displayed more the inability to achieve effectiveinternational cooperation than its full realization. Hopes for a committedinput from the British, Swiss, and Italians, for instance, in the form ofnational Interdoc offices, never reached the levels hoped for, althoughcontacts were maintained throughout. The Americans only seriously cameon board when it was clear that they could take a commanding role. In thissense Interdoc partly mirrored the problems encountered within NATOwhenever attempts were made to establish a centralized psychologicalwarfare capacity.Interdoc proved to be especially vulnerable to shifts in diplomatic and

geopolitical outlook. Twice with the withdrawal of the French due toGaullism and the Germans due to Ostpolitik the operation was placed injeopardy, the second time only coming through from bankruptcy thanks to ahighly irregular one-off payment from the Chancellory in Bonn.The role of the Dutch in this affair was crucial. In the 1960s they provided

international credibility for an essentially German-funded and orchestratedoperation, while at the same time maintaining their own wish to build aWestern network that spanned the Atlantic. This displays not onlycommitment and flexibility, but also a form of entrepreneurship. To anextent van den Heuvel was able to move with the times according to whatwas required of him and his institute by others, while at the same time ableto maintain and pursue his own particular interests. In this way, withconsiderable skill, he was able to maintain the Interdoc set-up for the bestpart of 25 years, in doing so fulfilling the original intention that Interdocwould function as an international clearing house for information andinstitutes worldwide.Throughout its existence, Interdoc maintained contacts with the United

States. These ranged from informal liaison with CIA representatives in TheHague and Washington DC and the fulfilling of specific tasks on some kindof contract basis, to the establishment of direct association with the NSICand the invitation for Americans such as Barnett and Mott to join theInterdoc board. Overall, Interdoc was a hybrid. In the beginning itrepresented European Cold War concerns and priorities as something of areaction to the perceived failure of US approaches. Yet the Americaninfluence is evident throughout, from the study trip of the Dutch in 1959 tothe 10,000 Guilders in a brown paper bag in 1982. For this reason it is worth


considering to what extent Interdoc represented a European strategic culturein psychological warfare, and to what extent it was always a blend ofEuropean and American approaches, with the Dutch, primarily, doing theblending.Serious differences of opinion did open up within Interdoc circles

concerning EastWest contacts. During the 1970s van den Heuvel followedthrough the approach of making use of an opening-up of the Iron Curtainwith several trips to Poland, Hungary, and Moscow, meeting and engagingforeign policy institutes in dialogue on the situation in Europe. But this wasnot appreciated by everybody. At a conference in Winchester in November1976 Crozier, who considered Detente and the Helsinki Accords to be amassive confidence trick benefiting Moscow, accused the Dutchman of goingsoft on communism. Colleagues jumped to van den Heuvels defence, inparticular to reassure Barnett and the Americans, but an irreparable breachhad been opened up.80 Not for nothing did he say, with much amusement,that while half of The Hague thought he was working for the CIA the otherhalf thought he was working for the KGB.81 Ultimately, Interdocs valuecomes from it being a remarkable example of the way European securityservices sought to engage with and manipulate the public sphere, initially outof serious concerns for the effects of peaceful coexistence on Westernideological solidity, and eventually as a means to secure a strategicadvantage in the Cold War.

Acknowledgment

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Robbert Jan Hageman at theNational Archives in The Hague, Christiaan van den Heuvel, Marona vanden Heuvel, and an anonymous reviewer.

80See van Eeghen (Berkenrode overleg) to Barnett, 30 November 1976, File: UK 19(Crozier), CC.81Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, interview with the author, Middelburg 9 January 2009.


interdoc and west european psychological warfare: the american connection (giles scott-smith, 2011)

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