integration report: gray zone conflicts, challenges, and

July 2017

Preparedfor

StrategicMulti-LayerAssessment

GrayZoneConflicts,Challenges,andOpportunities:AMulti-AgencyDeepDiveAssessment

POC:BelindaBragg,[email protected]

DeeperAnalysesClarifyingInsightsBetterDecisions

www.NSIteam.com

IntegrationReport:GrayZoneConflicts,Challenges,andOpportunities

Citation:Bragg,B.(2017).GrayZoneConflicts,Challenges,andOpportunities:IntegrationReport.Arlington,VA:StrategicMulti-layerAssessment(SMA).

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G r a y Z o n e C o n f l i c t s , C h a l l e n g e s , a n d O p p o r t u n i t i e s : I n t e g r a t i o n R e p o r t

Executive Summary

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) requested a Strategic MultilayerAssessmenteffort“todeterminehowtheUSGcanidentify,diagnose,andassessindirectstrategies,and develop response options against associated types of gray zone conflicts.” This integrationreportprovidesasynthesisofalltheteamprojects.Theirworkhasadvancedunderstandingofthecontours of the gray zone terrain, and the challenges inherent in navigating that terrain. Byidentifying the critical features of the gray zone, their findings also provide a guide to whereUSSOCOM and other DoD entities should focus future efforts in this area to facilitate thedevelopmentofoperationallevelplanningandresponsestrategies.Thekeyresultsoftheeffortfallintofourareasassummarizedbelow.

What is the nature of gray zone conflict?

• There isnosingleconditionthatcan identifyanactionasgray, independentofactororunderstandingofthebroaderstrategiccontext

• We need to think on multiple timescales, across multiple arenas (e.g. political, social, economic), andunderstandandengagewithmultiplesociallevels(state,group,individual)

• Populationsarethekeydimensioningrayzoneconflict• Normviolationshelpdefinethethresholdbetweenordinarycompetitionandthegrayzone

What motivates actors to engage in gray zone activities? • SuccessfulUSdeterrencehasnoteliminatedthemotivationsofotheractorstofurthertheirowninterests• Acting in thegrayzone isaneffective lowrisk, lowcost strategy thathasprovendifficult for theUSand

partnernationstocounter,andforvulnerablestatestodefendagainst• USmilitaryplacesprimacyonphysicalmaneuver,andouradversariesknowthis

How should the US respond to gray zone activities?

• Incorporatethehuman/cognitivedomaino Thinkandplanbeyondkineticresponsesalone;expandDoDdefinitionsofmaneuverandobjectiveto

accountforthehumanaspectsofmilitaryoperationso Shapetheinternationalenvironmenttoreducethemotivationsforengagingingrayzoneactivities

• Developaclear,compellingstrategicnarrativeso Providealternativenarrativesandleveragesocialandmassmediatocommunicatethemo Buildtrustandcredibilitywithpartnernationstoenableunityofefforto Anenduring,proactivepresenceandconsistentmessagingacrossallUSGagencies isasignificantly

superiorapproachtotakingselectactionsinresponsetospecificgrayactions• ScopeandtimingofUSresponsematters

o Inactioninthefaceoflowlevelactions(e.g.ChineseIslandbuildingintheSCS)canovertimecreatea“newreality”thatthreatensUSinterestsandsecurity

o EarlyandeffectiveresponsetograyactionsandstrategiesrequiresaconsistentUSpresence • Focusnowshouldbelessondefiningspecificactionsasgrayzonethreats,andmoreonhowtoleverageall

instrumentsofnationalpowertorespondtothem

What capabilities does the US need to respond effectively to gray zone activities?

• Human/CognitiveDomainInformation&Expertiseo Grayzonestrategiesexploitmultiple instrumentsofpower.Operating inthisenvironmentrequires

informationacrossalloftheseinstruments• ConceptualModelsandFrameworks

o Scopeofgrayzoneactivitieswillmake informationrequirementsoverwhelmingwithoutmodels toguidesearchandinterpretation

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Introduction

The United States currently faces a complex and dynamic security environment. States are nolongertheonlycriticalactorsintheinternationalarena;rather,adiverserangeofnon-stateentitiesalso has the potential to affect US interests and security—for good or bad. Economic influence,informationcontrolandpropaganda,politicalinfluence,andsocialdiscontentcanbeandarebeingutilizedbystateandnon-stateactorsaliketoachievetheirgoals,inmanycasesbypassingtheneedfordirectmilitary action. In response, theUSmilitary is challenged toaccomplishmore, across agreatervarietyofdomains,whilefacingaconstrainedbudgetsetting.

FortheUSmilitarytodoitsjobintheevolvingsecurityenvironment,itneedstomovebeyonditsexpertiseintraditionalmilitarydomainsandrelianceonkineticsolutionsalone.Economic,human,cognitive, and other domains are critical factors in the USgovernment’s ability to respond to and shape the currentsecurityenvironment,especiallyinthegrayzone.

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)requested a StrategicMultilayer Assessment (SMA) effort “todetermine how the USG can identify, diagnose, and assessindirect strategies, and develop response options againstassociatedtypesofgrayzoneconflicts.”Thisreportprovidesanintegratedsynthesisofalltheteamfindingsandrecommendations1,andidentifieskeythemesemergingfromtheprojectasawhole.ItisstructuredaroundUSSOCCOM’sfourkeyquestions:

1. Whatisthenatureofgrayzoneconflict?2. Whatmotivatesactorstoengageingrayzoneactivities?3. HowshouldtheUSrespondtograyzoneactivities?4. WhatcapabilitiesdoestheUSneedtorespondeffectivelytograyzoneactivities?

Defining the Gray Zone

Beforethesequestionscouldbeaddressed,itwasessentialtodevelopaconsensusdefinitionofthegrayzone.ThecontinueddebateoverwhetherRussianactionsinCrimeaaregrayornot,isjustoneexample of the prior lack of common agreement regarding what is, and is not, gray. It’s notsurprising that the boundaries of such a complex and amorphous concept as the GZ remaincontested,butitisaproblem.WecannotadvanceourunderstandingofgrayzonechallengesifwecannotcombinetheworkthatisgoingonacrossthevariouscommandsandDoDoffices.Thiscanonlybedoneifwehaveacarefullycraftedandgenerallyaccepteddefinitionofwhatisin,andwhatis out, of the gray zone. Developing early I&W also requires that various groups working thisproblem can systematically and consistently measure gray activities. Additionally, developingdoctrine to address gray zone challenges will be most effective if it is based on a consistent,operationaldefinition.

1AllteamreportsareavailableontheSMApublicationwebsite:http://nsiteam.com/nsi-grid-search-filter/IMAGECREDITS:www.bitaf.org;SashaMaksymenko;GettyImages.

“If USG is to respond to increasingly gray security environment it requires a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the space between peace and war than we currently possess”

GEN Joseph L. Votel

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Oneofthesignificantcontributionsofthiseffortisthatitprovidesafoundationforfutureworkbydevelopingadefinitionofthegrayzonespecific(operational)enoughtoguidefurtherworkinthisarea.

Particularattentionwaspaidtodefiningtheupperandlowerthresholdsofthegrayzone.Thatis,the thresholdbeyondwhich steady stateor acceptable competitionbecomesagray zoneaction,andthepointorconditionsthatsignalgrayactionshavecrossedoverintodirectmilitaryconflict.

The SMA team definition distinguished between the gray zone as a conceptual space, and thebehaviors actors engage in in that space. This allows for a distinction to bemade between grayactionsandgraystrategies,thatisshowninotherworkfromthisefforttobeacriticalfactorinbothidentifyingandrespondingtograyzonechallenges.ThefulltextoftheSMAdefinitionofgrayzoneis provided in the box below. It balances the need for greater precision with recognition of thedangerofoverspecifyingsuchacomplexconcept.Itisourexpectationthat,asourunderstandingofthenatureofgrayzonechallengesdevelops,andconversationscontinue,thisdefinitionmaybefurtherrefined.

Direct Military Conflict Ordinary Competition Gray Zone

Gray Zone Activity

An adversary's purposeful use of single or multiple elements of power to achieve security objectives by way of activities that are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution, and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the level of open warfare.

• In most cases, once significant, attributable coercive force has been used, the activities are no longer considered to be in the gray zone but have transitioned into the realm of traditional warfare.

• While gray zone activities may involve non-security domains and elements of national power, they are activities taken by an actor for the purpose of gaining some broadly defined security advantage over another.

Gray Zone Strategies

A series of actions by a state or non-state actor that challenge or violate international customs, norms, and laws for the purpose of pursuing one or more broadly-defined national security interests without provoking direct military response.

Gray zone strategies can occur in three ways relative to international rules and norms, they can: 1. Challenge common understandings, conventions, and international norms while stopping short of

clear violations of international law (e.g., much of China's use of the Chinese Coast Guard and Chinese Maritime Militia);

2. Employ violations of both international norms and laws in ways intended to avoid the penalties associated with legal violations (e.g., Russian activities in Crimea); or

3. Consist of states using violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and non-state actors as proxies in an effort to integrate elements of power to advance particular security interests.

Nature of the Gray Zone

The grayzone is a conceptual space between peace and war, where activities are typically ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold of ordinary competition yet

intentionally fall below the level of large-scale direct military conflict.

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Nature of the Gray Zone

Building on the definition above, team analyses identify four defining elements of the gray zone(Figure 1 below) that are crucial to understanding the capabilities required for operatingsuccessfullyinthisenvironment.

• Thegrayzonemustbeunderstoodtoworkonmultipletimescales.TheUSneedstoconsiderboth ongoing strategies that evolve over years as well as the discrete actions that oftentrigger short-termcrises.Theconnectionofa specificaction toabroader strategicgoal isone of the necessary conditions for distinguishing when an action crosses the thresholdfromordinarycompetitionintothegrayzone.

• Gray zone strategies and actionsoccur inmultiple arenas, not justtraditional military domains.These can include but are notrestricted to political, economic,cyber,socialandmedia.

• Consequently,grayactivitiesmustbeconsideredatmultiplelevelsofsocial integration. We cannotthinkofstatesastheonlyrelevantactors in the gray zone; groupsand populations can also beinfluential as either target orinstigatorsofgrayactions.

• Finally, violations of internationalrulesandnorms (implicitlysharedunderstandings) have beenhighlightedbymanyof the teamsasoneof theaspectsofgrayactivities thatmake themdestructivetothefunctioningoftheinternationalsystem.Furthermore,actionsthatviolatenormswithout breaking explicit rules pose a particular challenge, as there are few if anyestablished response procedures, other than “naming and shaming”, which relies on theassumptionthatthenormsviolatorcaresabout,orbelievesthe“shaming”willimpacttheirinternational reputation.As recentactionsbyRussia inparticulardemonstrate, this isnotalwaysthecase.

These four elements demonstrate the scope of the gray zone and the challenge developingeffectiveindicatorsandwarnings(I&W)andresponseoptionsposesfortheUSandpartnernations.Crossing all of these elements is the potential for ambiguity, which is a strong theme runningthroughmostdiscussionsofthegrayzone.Ambiguitywasrecognizedatthestartofthisprojecttobeacommonfeatureofthegrayzone,butwasinitiallyframedintermsofspecific“gray”actions

Int’lRules&Norms

Multiple Timescales

Ongoing Strategy

Single Action

Multiple Arenas

Military

Political Economic

Cyber

Social Media

Multiple Levels

Region

State

Group

Individual (population)

Figure 1: Nature of the Gray Zone

There is no single condition that can identify an action as gray, independent of actor or understanding of the broader strategic context

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themselves.Thevariousprojectsandanalyseshaveshownusthatambiguityderivesfrommultiplesourcesandformultiplereasons.

• The potential effect of a gray activity on US interests can be ambiguous making earlyidentificationchallengingastherelevanceofspecificactionsmayonlybecomeclearafterthefact.

• The interests of other actors –whether of the instigators or targets of gray actions andstrategies–canbeambiguous.Eitherbecausewejustaren'tpayingenoughattentionpriorto observing an action, or because we lack the depth of understanding necessary tointerpretthoseinterests.

• Thenatureoftheinternationalsystemitselfismoreambiguousthanwethought.Werelymoreonthenormsthatsupport thestatusquoandformal“rulesof thegame”thanwerealized before actors such as China and Russia began to challenge those implicitbehavioralexpectations.

• Inanenvironmentwheremilitarycapability isnolongerthedefiningfactorinpowerandinfluence,USdominanceintheinternationalsystemisalsomoreambiguous.

Challenges for the US and Partner Nations

Wecannolongerassumeallpowerfulstatesaresatisfiedwiththestatusquo

Throughtheworkdonebytheprojectteams,normsandnormsviolationsemergeascentraltoourunderstandingofhowweconceptualizethegrayzone,andwhyweseemtofindtheseactionsandstrategiessoresistanttoourcurrentdeterrentandresponsestrategies,andthussofrustrating.Tothe extent that existing international norms reflect the worldview of the US, violations of thesenormssignaladecreaseintheinfluenceofthatworldviewontheactionsofotherstateandnon-stateactors.

TheUSiscominglatetothepartyonthis,partlyasaresultofourrelianceonmilitarycapabilityastheprimaryarbiterofpowerandinfluence,andpartlyastherelativecapabilityoftheUSinthisandotherareas(particularlyeconomic)hasbeguntowane.Thisrebalancingofpowerhasincreasedour

sensitivity to loss. At the same time, it has increased thewillingnessofrisingpowerssuchasChinatochallengeorfindloopholes in existing international rules and norms, asevidencedbytheirisland-buildingactivitiesintheSouthChinaSea. Dissatisfied powers such as Russia have shown throughmilitary actions in Ukraine and their wider political influenceoperations,awillingnesstofloutrulesandnormsmoreopenlytoachievetheirstrategicgoals.

"[W]e have Russia as a competitor that is willing, and did, break international law," ... and "I think Russia will continue to press against the international norms.”

Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, commander of USEUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Allied Command Operations, March 2017, House Armed Services Committee

Think and plan beyond kinetic responses alone

Shape the international environment to reduce the motivations for actors to engage in gray zone actions and strategies

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Populationsareacriticaldimensioningrayzoneconflict

Populations and popular support have always been critical aspects of conflict. In the gray zone,however,theirimportanceandinfluenceisincreasedasgrayactionsare,unliketraditionalmilitaryconflict,notrestrictedtothemilitarydomain.Asdiscussedabove,grayzoneactivitiesoccuracrossmultiplearenas,andthuspresentawiderrangeofpotentialpointsofintersectionwithpopulations.Inparticular,inrecentyearswehaveseenresurgenceintheuseofinformationanddisinformationtodestabilizestatesandreduceapopulation’strustintheirgovernment.RussianpoliticalinfluenceoperationsinUkraineandtheirnearabroadreflectarecognitionthatcontrolandmanipulationofinformation,andthroughthispopulationperceptions,canbeapowerful tool in generating influence over the foreign anddomestic policy choices made by governments. This use ofinformation to shape the decision making of RussianadversariesisamodernexampleofSoviet-erareflexivecontroltheory.

Atthesametime,thereappearstobeawidespreadsensethattheUSis“losing”intheinfluencegameatthesametimethatinfluenceisbecomingmorecriticaltostrategicsuccess.TheUSand its partner nations are increasingly finding themselvescountering established narratives, rather than directing the narrative. The US and the west,particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, took for granted that, all things being equal,peopledesireddemocracyandsharedwesternvaluesandinstitutions.Secureinthisbeliefwedidlittle groundwork to establish a coherent and compelling “story” by which other people couldunderstandour actions. In away, this reflects the increasing contingencyof internationalnorms.TheUSandtheWesthaverarelyquestionedtheassumptionthatthenormsthatunderpinthepost-WW II international order are “universal”. Instead, violations of these laws have been seen asinstances of bad behavior, rather than expressions of an alternative set of norms.What we areincreasingly seeing is that neither of these assumptions is necessarily true. Furthermore,populationsweseektoinfluenceareinmanycasesprimedbyalternativenarratives,aswellaspastUSactions,todistrustUSwordsandactions.

Why are Actors “Going Gray”?

In the post-WWII era, US and allied efforts to establish credible conventional and nucleardeterrencehave,onthewhole,succeeded.Bydoingsotheyhaveincreasedtheperceivedcostandriskofdirectmilitaryaction.However,successfuldeterrencehasnoteliminatedthemotivationsofotheractorstofurthertheirowninterests.Ratherithaspromptedactorstofocustheireffortsonactionsabovethelevelofordinarycompetition,yetbelowthethresholdofmilitaryaction.Thatis,withinthegrayzone.

“The emphasis in the content of methods of confrontation shifts towards broad application of political, economic, diplomatic, information and other non-military measures implemented with the connection of the protest potential of the population.”

Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia

Acting in the gray zone is an effective low risk, low cost strategy that has proven difficult for the US and partner nations to counter, and for vulnerable states to defend against

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Keepingactionsbelowthelevelofconflictthatwouldjustifyandprovokeamilitaryresponseoffersgrayzoneactorstheopportunitytoachievetheirstrategicobjectiveswithouttherisksandcostsofdirectmilitary conflict. Furthermore, asour competitors know, theUSmilitaryplacesprimacyonphysicalmaneuvers,andhasfoundgrayactionsandstrategiesdifficulttoidentifyearlyandrespondto effectively. Gray zone activity, therefore, has the additional advantage of playing to USweaknesses.

While gray zone-type activities are by no means new,their apparent increase in recent years can partly beexplainedbytechnologicaldevelopmentsthathavemadeleveragingnon-military instrumentsofpowereasierandlesscostly.Thisaccountsforthecapabilityaspectofgrayactorschoices,butnottheirmotivation.Asdiscussedbymultiple teams, and consistent with the expandeddefinitionofgrayzonedevelopedforthisproject,norms

violationsareaconsistentandkeyfactoringrayactivity.Thissuggeststhattheuseofgrayactionsandstrategiessignalsanactorisdissatisfiedwiththesomeaspectoftheinternationalsystemthosenorms reflect and support. Not all states that challenge international norms do so for the samereasonhowever.

There is a general consensus that China does not seek to overturn and replace the currentinternational system, as it has clearly been able to benefit greatly from the existing rules of thegame. This does notmean, however, that the norms that support those rules are consistent orcompatiblewithChina’sworldview.Or, thatChinawillnot takeactions thatviolatenorms if theyfurtherChinese interests.On theotherhand,China’sdesire forgreater influenceandstanding inthe international community has also seen it take amore active role in supporting internationalnormsthatareconsistentwithits interests,whendoingsocanenhanceits internationalprestige.China’s recent active championing of the Paris agreement and commitment to reducing carbonemissionsfollowingtheUSwithdrawalfromParisisagoodexampleofthis.

Russia,ontheotherhand,seemstobemoreinterestedinestablishinganentirelydifferentsetofrulesofthegame2.Theyhavedemonstratedawillingnesstounequivocallyviolateinternationallawand norms, as their actions in Ukraine and Crimea show. Additionally they have attempted toestablish alternative international institutions, especially economic, to counter the dominance ofexistingwestern institutions such as the EU. Russia’s desire to undermine international norms isalsodemonstratedbyRussiannarrativesregardingUSsupport for theArabSpringandotherpro-democratic socialmovements. Russia contends that US support for protests and in particular itssupportofSyrianrebels,violatesinternationallawbyactivelysubvertingtheauthorityandstabilityoflegitimatesovereigngovernments.

2MoredetaileddiscussionofRussia’sworldviewandattitudetowardtheUSandthewestcanalsobefoundinthe2016SMAprojectDriversofConflictandConvergenceinEurasiaintheNext5-25YearsIntegrationReportandteamreports.

"Our traditional approach is either we're at peace or conflict. And I think that's insufficient to deal with actors that actually seek to advance their interests while avoiding our strengths.”

GEN Joseph F. Dunford Jr., CJCS, Remarks at CSIS, Mar 2016

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How Should the US Respond?

Understandwhyandhowactorsareviolatingnorms–andthusmovingintothegrayzone. Inthecase of China, direct confrontation could increase the probability of escalation. If there is noincentive for China tobreak the system, then abetter optionmight be to close loopholes in therules.InthecaseofRussia,failuretoconfront,oratleastcalloutgrayactions,ismorelikelytoleadto escalation.Understandingwhy actors are violatingnorms therefore reduces theprobability ofunintendedescalationandinformsdevelopmentofdeterrentmeasures.

Considerwhy actors are supporting international norms.Narratives are not the only non-militarymeansofexercising influence in the internationalarena.Demonstrating thedesire tobea “goodinternational citizen” by voluntarily and publically championing international norms, a positionoftentakenbytheUS, increasesastate’sprestigeandgeneratesgoodwill thatcanspillover intootherareas.China’srecenthighprofilesupportoftheParisclimateagreementcanbeinterpretedinthislight.ThemoretheUSstepsbackfromthisrole,themorespacewecreateforotherstostepin.

Determineintenttoavoidunintendedescalation.Attributingaggressiveintentwhenanactionwastaken in ignorance of the consequences, or out of self-defense or protection, may lead tointerpreting the action as gray – and therefore potentially threatening – incorrectly. A responsebasedonsuchafaultyinterpretation,maybeperceivedasaggressiveaswellasunprovoked,thusincreasingtensionsandtheprobabilityofunwantedescalation.Conversely, interpretingasbenignan action that is fact part of a gray strategy risksmissing thewindow of opportunity for derailing that strategy before itbecomesafaitaccompli.

Consider thescopeandtimingof responseactions. Inaction inthefaceoflowlevelactions(suchasChineseislandbuildingintheSouthChinaSea)canovertimecreatea“newreality”thatthreatensUSinterestsandsecurity.Atthatpoint,reversiontothepriorstatusquowill likelyrequiremuchgreaterandmorecostlyactions, if it isevenpossiblewithouttheuseofmilitaryforce.Partofthereasonwhyactorsarechoosingtooperateinthegrayzone is their perception that the US will not respond to these lower level actions for fear oftriggering escalation. US failure to develop early, effective response options reinforces thisperception.Anenduring,proactivepresenceandconsistentmessagingacrossallUSGagenciesisasignificantlysuperiorapproachtotakingselectactionsinresponsetoaggressionbyexternalactors.ThisapproachwouldbeaidedbytheDoDexpanding itsdefinitionsofmaneuverandobjectivetoaccountforhumanaspectsofmilitaryoperations.

"Preventing or deterring hybrid conflict short of all-out war is demanding. It requires constant, adaptation, innovation, and institutional agility.”

LTG Kenneth E. Tovo, Commander, USASOC, USASOC Strategy-2035, Apr 2016

Early detection of gray strategies increases the range of possible response options

Identifying the broader strategic goal behind gray actions is critical to countering undesired outcomes and avoiding unintended escalation

Early and effective response to gray actions and strategies requires a consistent US presence and messaging strategy

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Where did we end up: Influence

Muchofthediscussionandfindingsregardingresponseoptionsinthegrayzonecoalescedaroundthe role of influence. In particular, how the US can increase its ability to influence internationalstate and non-state actors, and minimize the influence of actors potentially detrimental to thestatusquo,orUS interests specifically.Whilebynomeans theonly formof influence,narrativeswereidentifiedasacriticalcomponentofeffectivemaneuverinthegrayzoneforbothgrayactorsandthosedesiringtocountergrayactivity.

Theroleofnarrativesininfluence

The centralityofnarratives inboth counter terror andnowcounter gray zoneactivities iswidelyaccepted,butthespecificsremainhotlydebated.Therehasbeenalotofdiscussionofhowwecaneffectively counter competing narratives that are bolstering the influence of other actors. In thecontext of the gray zone much of this has focused on countering Russian influence in EasternEurope and beyond. Two approaches (and hybrids between) have emerged. The first advocatesdirectlychallengingthelegitimacyofexistingnarratives(e.g.:Putinislyingtoyou),theotherarguesthat such challenges aredoomed to fail, and theUS should rather concentrateondeveloping itsown,morecompellingalternativenarratives.

There was a general consensus among the teams that counter narrative, that is narratives thatfocus on undermining the content of an opponent’s established narratives, have been less thaneffectiveandaremore liable toblowback. Thispresents aproblem for theUS,which, the teamsconsider,doesnot currentlyhave compellingor credible alternativenarratives.While theUShasbecome better at explaining what is untrue or harmful about what others are saying, it lacks acompelling“story”toreplaceopponents’establishednarratives.

What capabilities does the US need to operate effectively in the Gray Zone?

Population engagement across multiple arenas (economic, political, media, etc.) is a definingcharacteristic of many gray actions and all gray strategies. Gray zone actors are consistentlyengagingwithpopulationswithinandoutsidetheirbordersacrossmultiplearenasandeffectively

setting the narrative for both their actions and motivations,andthereforethoseoftheUS.UnlessanduntiltheUSdoesthesame we will be at a consistent disadvantage in addressinggray zone challenges. Across all aspects of gray zoneidentificationand response,one central themeemerges fromall the work done for this project: We need to think morebroadly and deepen our understanding of the human /cognitivedomain.Wecannotafford to ignorepopulations,orengagewiththemonlyonceacrisishaserupted.

Information that provides a richer understanding of the operating environment and emphasizes the human/cognitive domain

Models and expertise to interpret that information

In today's information age, we must recognize that the essential key terrain is the will of a host nation's population...[This] permits us to gain the trust of skeptical populations, thus frustrating the enemy’s efforts and suffocating their ideology.”

Gen J. N. Mattis, USMC, Foreword to Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications 2008

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A richer understanding of the operational environment provides the essential context foridentifying those actors that are likely to engage in behavior theUS considers to be gray, and apotentialthreattoUSand/orpartnernationinterests.Understandingofthedriversandbuffersofstabilitywithinspecificregionsandcountriescanhelpidentifyactorsthatarelikelytobevulnerabletograyactionsandstrategies,andtheactorstheyarevulnerabletoinspecificareas(e.g.domesticpolitical influence by Russia, or economic pressure or reward from China). For any response ordeterrentaction takenby theUSandpartnernations tobeeffective,wealsoneed tobeable toanticipatewithgreateraccuracythelikelypopulationresponse(atthegrouplevel,notjustthestatelevel) to our actions. Figure 2 below highlights the aspects of the gray zone that team analysesindicatetheUSandpartnernationsneedtofocusandbuildunderstanding.And,flowingfromthis,theareaswhereweneedtofurtherdevelopinordertoimprovebothindicatorsandwarningandresponsestograyzonechallenges.

Ifwe are to improveour understandingof thebroader context of gray actions and strategies, inparticular the human/cognitive domain, we need lots of information. As a whole, the USG hasexpertise,dataandinformationthatcanbeleveragedtoaddressmanyoftherecommendationsforI&Wandresponsethatcomeoutofthisproject.Forthistohappen,however,weneedtoaddresstheinstitutionalbarrierstogreaterinteragencycollaboration,bothauthorities(therules)andhabitandawareness(thenorms).Knowledgealoneisuseless,however,ifitcan’tbecoupledtoacourseofaction.Tomake informationworkforusweneedframeworksandconceptualmodelstoguidehowweinterpretandapplythisinformation.OnlythencanwebuildeffectivetoolstohelpplannersandoperatorsincorporateenvironmentalfactorsintheirI&Wandresponseoptions.

Figure 2: US Capability Gaps for Addressing Gray Zone Challenges

I&W

AREAS to DEVELOP Human / cognitive domain Info

Conceptual models

AREAS to DEVELOP Strategy Narrative Credibility

Timing Attribution

Human/cognitive domain expertise Partner nation coordination

DETER / ASSURE / RESPOND

Int’lRules&Norms

Multiple Timescales

Ongoing Strategy

Single Action

Multiple Arenas

Military

Political Economic

Cyber

Social Media

Multiple Levels

Region

State

Group

Individual (population)

Areas US and partner nations need to focus and build understanding

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Recommendations and Moving Forward

Thehighlevelobservationsandrecommendationsfromthevariousteamsreflecttheimportanceofpopulationsandinfluencetosuccessfuloperationinthegrayzone.

Incorporate the human/cognitive domain

• Broadenourunderstandingofthestrategicandoperationalenvironmenttoincorporatethehuman/cognitivedomain

• Considerthenon-militaryarenasandnon-statelevel(seeFigure2)ofthegrayzonewhendevelopingI&W,anddeterrenceandresponseoptions

• Thinkbeyondpurelykineticresponses,towaystoshapethe internationalenvironmenttoreduce the motivation for actors to engage in gray activities in the first place. This willrequireaddressingthebroadquestionofthesustainabilityofasystembuiltonnormsthatarenotimplicitlyacceptedbyallmajorpowers

• Build trust and credibility with partner nations toenablegreatercoordinationofeffort incollectivegrayzone deterrence and response activities, as well asearlier I&W or gray zone activity against vulnerablepartners

• Narrativesarenot theonly tool forbuilding influence.Exploreother(non-military)leversofpowertheUScanuse to increase its influence without violating orundermininginternationalnorms

Develop clear and compelling strategic narratives

• TheUSlacksacompelling“story”topresentasacountertocompetingnarratives.WeneedtobetterarticulateUSinterestsandstrategytobothourselfandothers

• Establish the extent to which the target population trusts the US, and have in placestrategiestobolsterthattrustwhenitislowpriortoengaginginanynarrativemessaging

• USmessaging (andobjectives)mustbeconsistentacrossUSGagenciesworking inspecificregionsandcountries.Thiswillrequirecoordinationandcommunicationacrossagencies

Conclusion

Attentionon“grayzone”activitiesbeganwithanarticlebyGenVotelthatresonatedwithpeople,and gave shape to a recognized but ill-defined problem. The work done by the SMA teams hassubstantiallyadvancedourunderstandingofthegrayzoneterrain,andthechallenges inherent innavigatingthatterrain.Theiroperationaldefinitionofgrayzone,amajoraccomplishment in itselfhasdefinedthebordersandmajorfeaturesoftheGZterrain,andenabledtheidentificationofthenecessaryconditionsforsystematicallyidentifyingactionsasgrayornot.

Building from this, the teams’mapping of the gray zone terrain (see Figure 2) has identified theareas where we most need to focus future research. Their work exploring I&W, and responseoptions has similarly provided guideposts for where to go next. Taken as a whole, this effort

“Combining a deep understanding of the environment and a realistic appraisal of the relevant partner relationships with the policy aim, allows commanders and staffs to derive … feasible, productive military options that lead to sustainable and acceptable outcomes.”

Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, 13 Apr 2017 draft

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providestheessentialfoundationnecessaryformovingforwardonacomplexproblem,suchasthis.Itisabeginning,ratherthananend.Wenowhaveaconsensusonwhatthatproblemis–andisn’t.ThiswillenableallofthedifferentgroupsandentitiesworkinginthisareatoaligntheireffortstodevelopoperationalI&Wandplanningoptions.And,begintheprocessofdevelopingdoctrinethatenablestheDoDtoeffectivelyconfrontthischallenge.

integration report: gray zone conflicts, challenges, and

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