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David PolizziPerspective

Agnew's General Strain Theory Reconsidered: A Phenomenological

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International Journal of

Offender Therapy and

Comparative Criminology

55(7) 10511071 2011 SAGE Publications

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380846 IJO

1Indiana State University, Terre Haute

Corresponding Author:

David Polizzi, Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice, 210 Holmstedt Hall, Indiana State University,

Terre Haute, IN 47809

Email: [email protected]

Agnews General Strain

Theory Reconsidered:

A PhenomenologicalPerspective

David Polizzi1

Abstract

Since its inception, strain theory has attempted to explore the dynamic evoked betweenthe process of goal identification and the process of goal acquisition as this relates tosubsequent criminal behavior. Over the years of its development, strain theorists haveattempted to broaden the initial scope of this perspective. Robert Agnew with hisgeneral strain theory has sought to introduce a variety of other factors relative to theexperience of strain and the capacity they represent concerning subsequent criminalactivity. However, these recent developments have not addressed until recently, and

only in somewhat limited ways, the theoretical and methodologic implications andlimits of this theoretical approach. This article proposes that the way in which Agnewsformulation of general strain, particularly in its most recent conceptualization as storylines, fundamentally transforms the theoretical and methodological grounding of thisapproach but fails to offer a clearly articulated alternative theoretical perspective bywhich to conceptualize this turn. Phenomenology provides such an alternativeperspective and helps to greatly expand our understanding of the human experienceof strain.

Keywords

general strain theory, lived experience, phenomenology

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1052 International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology55(7)

Introduction

Prior to 1915, theoretical perspectives concerning the causes of criminal behavior were

for the most part focused primarily on the belief that crime was something that emergedfrom within the individual. Although the specific location of these causesbe it the

soul, the mind, the genes, or somewhere within the confines of human biology

remained in doubt and open to scientific, religious, or theoretical speculation, one thing

remained seemingly indisputable: Criminal behavior was believed to be a specific arti-

fact of a dysfunctional or disordered individual (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2002). All this

changed with the emergence and evolving prominence of the Chicago School (Cortese,

1995) and its emphasis on evolving environmental factors caused by the effects of

American industrialization and its relationship to the onset of criminal behavior.

Robert Merton, although not officially a member of the Chicago School, offered asimilar perspective regarding the genesis of criminal behavior in his now classic article

Social Structure and Anomie, which rejected a solely individualist explanation for

criminal behavior (Bernard, 1995; Cullen & Messner, 2007; Merton, 1938, 1968).

Merton (1938), who borrowed the termif not its exact meaningfrom the work of

Emile Durkheim (1897/1951), defined this concept as the perceived relationship

between the creation and pursuit of culturally desired goals, and ones ability to achieve

those goals through socially permitted conduct. By situating the possibility for criminal

behavior between the interplay of individual and societal dynamics, Merton was able to

avoid the purely structuralist conclusions of Durkheim and the deterministic fatalism ofclassical Freudian theory, thereby rejecting the notion of the individual as a powerless

social agent (Konty, 2005). Such an observation is also reflected in a variety of contem-

porary theoretically compatible approaches to the study of crime that emphasize the

interplay between lived experience and preexisting social structures (Gadd & Jefferson,

2007; Jefferson, 2004; Lippens, 2009; Maruna, 2001; Polizzi & Arrigo, 2009; Presdee,

2005; Quinney, 2000; Williams & Arrigo, 2005). Quinney (2000) describes this inter-

play well when he identifies what is most important to the study of crime. He states,

The question of what precedes crime is far more significant to our understanding than

the act of crime itself. Crime is the reflection of something large and deeper (p. 21).More recently, newer versions of strain theory have also sought to focus on those

experiences and situations that precede crime and that serve as a psychological correc-

tive to the immediate experience of strain evoked by these situations (Agnew, 1990;

Agnew, Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002). Perhaps the best-known proponent of these

newer formulations of this theoretical approach is found in the work of Robert Agnew

and his general strain theory (GST). Agnew, along with a variety of other theorists, has

identified three major types of strain believed most likely to contribute to subsequent

criminal behavior: the negative treatment by others, the loss of something of value, and

the inability to achieve specific goals (Agnew, 2006a). Taken from this social psycho-logical perspective, criminal behavior is intended to be viewed as a corrective or sub-

jective response to the perceived injury or slight experienced by the individual in these

types of social interactions. A similar dynamic is discussed by Katz (1988) in Seductions

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Polizzi 1053

of Crime, whereby righteous rage comes to represent the corrective response to the

experience of humiliation. However, it is important to note that the degree and character

of such criminogenic responses are directly related to the specific lived experience of

the affected individual, which must recognize both the way in which the individualconstructs the meaning of these situations as well as the specific lived context from

which these solutions must emerge (Katz, 1988; Pavlich, 2009).

Stated another way, the experience of strain represents the phenomenology of a

specific type of lived experience, which is fundamentally social but also made mean-

ingful by the way the individual and others in his or her life construct the meaning of

their social worlds. Phenomenology, the theoretical creation of Edmund Husserl and

Martin Heidegger, is concerned with the way in which things appear to conscious-

ness (Husserl) and the meaning of being(Heidegger). Although specific theoretical

differences exist between these two approaches of phenomenology, it is possible tomake some general theoretical observations concerning this philosophical system as

well as how this approach may be applied to the discussion of GST, which will be the

main emphasis of this article.

More traditional theoretical conversations concerning GST have sought to use posi-

tivist formulations by which to study criminal behavior. In so doing, these attempts

have focused primarily on the construction of a general theory of crime, which tends

to overemphasize the importance of objective variables relative to the subjective

understanding of the experience of crime and criminal behavior (Gadd & Jefferson,

2007; Wender, 2004). Given that GST is ultimately examining the way in which nega-tive individual experience results in criminal behavior, a more individually focused

constructionist theoretical approach is required, so as to be better able to recognize the

unique realities of individual social experience and the influence that these experi-

ences have on subsequent criminal behavior. The grounding of GST within a phenom-

enological theoretical frame of reference provides a different view of the relationship

between individual experience and criminal behavior by refusing to privilege either

individual perception or environmental predetermination. Phenomenology begins

from the premise that human experience or what Heidegger has described as being-in-

the-world, a hyphenated term used to note the inseparable quality of human being andworld, is fundamentally social in nature. From this perspective, it is impossible to

understand human experience or perception as a philosophical category that is sepa-

rate from the social world. Human experience always finds itself situated within a

world that becomes meaningful from a specific perspective (Gadd & Jefferson, 2007;

Gurwitsch, 1964; Heidegger, 1953/1996; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Moustakas, 1995).

The purpose of this article will be to first trace and explore the development of

Agnews GST and then apply that development to the theoretical approach offered by

the phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger as this relates to

Agnews conceptualization of story lines. This attempt will be to provide a reformulationof GST and story lines within a phenomenological frame of reference. A brief peniten-

tiary case study of an experience of strain will be presented and will provide a compara-

tive analysis of this experience from these two compatible theoretical perspectives.



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Agnews General Strain Theory

In their influential article An Empirical Test of General Strain Theory, Agnew and

White (1992) describe strain theory in the following way: Strain theory focuses onnegative relationships with others; that is relationships in which others do not treat the

individual as he or she would like to be treated (p. 476). The description of strain

presented by Agnew and White expanded the definitional parameters of this theory by

including a variety of emotional and contextual components of lived experience that

were not specifically tied to the pursuit of goal acquisition or structural inequalities,

most commonly discussed in the criminological literature. Although this new formu-

lation or revision of strain theory retained the prevention of goal acquisition as a major

contributing factor to subsequent criminal behavior, the definition of strain was

expanded to include the threat of losing something of value, as well as the threat ofexperiencing some unwanted negative situation or consequence (Agnew, 2006;

Agnew & White, 1992; Brody, 2001).

Taken from this revised theoretical context, the experience of strain represents a

breakdown of social interaction emerging from a variety of social situations. By focus-

ing on the ways in which individuals respond to negative life situations, the integrity

and uniqueness of those individual solutions to the experience of strain is retained.

However, it is important to note that such a formulation seems to reject a linear causal

relationship between the experience of strain and the individuals response to this

experience, regardless its specific articulation. Stated another way, strain does notcause one to react in any specific manner; rather, it becomes an aspect or factor within

the confines of our lived experience that is made meaningful from the uniqueness of

our individual perspective (Agnew, 2006a, 2006c). Absent the presence of causal

determinism, ones response to strain becomes a fluid articulation of lived experience

that will construct the way in which this specific event becomes meaningful for the

individual (Agnew, 2006a, 2006b; Agnew et al., 2002).

In his bookPressured Into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory, Agnew

(2006a) identifies four specific types of strain: objective, subjective, vicarious, and

anticipatory. Objective strain is defined as an event or condition that most individualswould perceive as negative. However, Agnew (2006a) admits that the experience of

objective strain will differ based on the subjective evaluation of the same events and

conditionseven those events and conditions classified as objective strain (p. 9). In

other words, the meaning of objective strain will only find significance within the

specific lived experience of the individual who is confronting this event or situation.

Subjective strain refers to an event or condition that is disliked by the particular per-

son or persons being examined (Agnew, 2006a, p. 10). Even though Agnew makes a

distinction between the objective and subjective nature of strain, it is clear that the

more significant aspect of this relationship is evoked through the way in which indi-vidual perspective provides specific meaning to this experience.

The death of an associate or fellow gang member represents a situation of subjective

strain. Most important here, of course, is not so much the fact of the individuals death



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Polizzi 1055

but the perceived meaning others will give to this event. For example, a former client

used one of his therapeutic sessions to discuss the murder of his close friend. Although

he seemed angered by his personal loss and potentially bent on revenge, he added that

his friend must have done something to get shot. No one gets shot for nothing. Thereaint no incident victims in this game. In this encounter, the presence of subjective

strain not only evokes a specific set of negative emotions directed toward the perpetra-

tors of this act but also seeks to include, in a very intentional way, the contextual mean-

ing this act has for a very specific type of shared lived experience. The additional

inclusion of the victims possible complicity in this event, based on his own rule-

breaking behavior, allowed this young man to define the death of his friend differently,

which in turn seemed to have a significant impact on his subsequent behavior (Agnew,

2006a, 2006b).

Whereas objective and subjective strains are more related to the specific individualor group experience of a negative event, vicarious and anticipated strains are more

indirect in nature insofar as they reflect a once removed type of subjective experi-

ence. Vicarious strain can be best described as the emotional response one encounters

when something bad happens to a loved one, close friend, or associate. Anticipated

strain represents the belief that ones current experience of strain will continue or that

new strains will be experienced (Agnew, 2006a, p. 12). In the above example, the

presence of vicarious strain as represented by the loss of a close friend can be seen.

Vicarious strain is experienced by the young man through the ambivalent feelings of

anger and rationalization used to construct the meaning of his friends death. The pos-sibility of anticipatory strain exists within the confluence between his specific response

to this situation and the way in which his social context demands or expects him to

respond based on how the meaning of this event is constructed by others.

Most important to the above discussion of the various types of strain identified by

Agnew is the fundamentally subjective quality of these experiences. Although various

attempts have been made to generalize the factors of strain so as to provide quantita-

tive legitimacy to this theoretical perspective, such a methodological approach ignores

the socially constructed reality of these meanings and lessens the all-too-human qual-

ity of these encounters. Strain represents a fundamental assault on the way in whichexistence is lived and made meaningful through the everyday interaction with the

social world. Agnew (2006a) admits as much through his reformulation of this

approach. However, because the experience of strain emerges from a specific moment

of lived experience, attempts to generalize this phenomenon do great harm to the

unique quality of this type of human encounter. Furthermore, because most attempts

to explore the experience of strain seem to take for granted the social contexts from

which these encounters emerge, the incongruent aspects of lived experience are rarely

examined with any power or depth.

In a more recent article, Agnew attempts to address the subjective aspects of strainthat have been mostly ignored by more traditional theoretical perspectives in criminol-

ogy through his conceptualization of what he identifies as the story line. Agnew

(2006b) defines story line as a temporally limited, interrelated set of events and



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conditions that increases the likelihood that individuals will engage in a crime or a

series of related crimes (p. 121). The story line represents some type of unexpected

change in the normal existence of the individual, which disrupts normal day-to-day

lived experience. This disruption, rather than representing the introduction of yetanother factor related to subsequent criminal behavior, comes to symbolize a disrup-

tion of personal meaning for the individual, whose truth is now threatened by the pres-

ence of this dangerous intrusion on lived experience.

Although Agnew (2006b) continues to agree with those who tend to focus on back-

ground and situational factors as legitimate explanations of crime, he argues that the

neglect of storylines is a major shortcoming of criminological research (p. 120).

Absent from this overemphasis of quantifiable variables is the lived meaning these

factors and situations hold for the individual relative to their subsequent criminal

behavior. Story lines represent the way in which individuals construct the meaning oftheir personal experience and give flesh to those situational factors that are most often

emphasized by traditional criminological research.

Most significant then to Agnews use of story lines is the way in which this approach

recognizes the importance of individual perspective when attempting to understand

criminal behavior. Those factors that help lead an individual to a criminal lifestyle are

never value-free and never separate from the lived reality that provides them their

specific meaning. Such facts are always contextual to the specific lived experience of

the individual, and lose much of their significance when examined outside of this

unique frame of reference. Story lines help to reconfigure the relationship between thefactors believed responsible for criminal behavior and the subjective experience from

which these facts are inseparably linked.

Toward a Phenomenology of Strain:

A Preliminary Reflection

Taken in its most general sense, phenomenology, the theoretical system first intro-

duced by Edmund Husserl, is primarily concerned with the way in which we experi-

ence or perceive the world around us (Edie, 1987; Husserl, 1960, 1962, 1970; Smith,2006). Fundamental to this exploration of the perceived world is the role played by

consciousness, which not only structures the perceptual field but provides that struc-

ture its specific meaning (Cerbone, 2006; Gurwitsch, 1964). Because consciousness

is always a consciousness of something for Husserl, little emphasis is given to the

study of the objective reality of the world as a separate philosophical category (Edie,

1987; Kohak, 1978; Marion, 1998). It is important to note, however, that such a stance

is not intended to either place the physical reality of the world into question or to

assume that our experience of the world is somehow just in our head. Such a dis-

tinction is an important one, insofar as it seeks to make explicit the way that ourinvolvement with the world is real and not merely a mental construction of the per-

ceiving subject. Such a stance also recognizes the limits of consciousness, given that

our specific perception of the world can never exhaust the various ways in which this



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Polizzi 1057

world is given to us (Marion, 1998) and is, therefore, always open to multiple inter-

pretations that are not exclusive to any single perceiving subject. Taken from this

vantage, human perception is always engaged with the world from a specific percep-

tive, which then in turn provides the contents of consciousness their specific quality,character, and meaning (Cerbone, 2006; Kohak, 1978; Marion, 1998; Natanson, 1973;

Spinelli, 2005).

However, if consciousness is always a consciousness of something and the appear-

ance and givenness of that something are accessible only from a specific perspective

within a real interaction with the world, how is it that individuals may experience the

same situation, event, or encounter in sometimes very different ways? For Husserl, the

answer to this problem is found through the way in which a perceiving subject struc-

tures the perceptual field from a certain perspective, thereby evoking a particular

engagement with the world, and by so doing, eliciting a very specific meaning for theexperience being perceived (Cerbone, 2006; Gurwitsch, 1964). Intentionality, the con-

cept used by Husserl to describe this dynamic (Gurwitsch, 1964; Husserl, 1962, 1970;

Natanson, 1973; Smith, 2006) is concerned with the way in which we direct or intend

our conscious awareness toward a specific target of perception from a specific point of

view. Most important to this relationship between the perceiving individual and the

thing perceived is that we are never able to apprehend or access the object(s) of con-

sciousness in any complete or totalizing manner. Perhaps stated more simply, there is

always more to the object than meets the eye. What is implied in this arrangement is

that individual perspective is the foundation from which our experience of the object,whether material or ideal, is possible. However, it is important to add that individual

perspective does not create the objects of consciousness, only the point of reference

by which the object becomes accessible for him or her.

For example, Agnew identifies strain as those experiences predicated on the threat

of losing something of value or as some form of unwanted threat yet to be confronted.

The meaning of the experience of strain for the individual emerges from a very spe-

cific subjective understanding of what that threat or loss means for the individual in

that situation. The perceived experience of loss or threat does not become meaningful

for the individual based on some set of abstracted factors or variables, or on the wayin which a group of individuals would be predicted to act in the aggregate, but by the

way in which these events are viewed by the individual engaged in this experience or

event. It is through ones intentional relationship with the world, through the way in

which I intend the meaning of my experience that the significance of these encounters

becomes important for me.

For Husserl, the structure of our experience of the world, then, is predicated on this

intentional interaction between perceiving subject and world. As was stated above,

this relationship to the world does not create the world, but neither does it reduce the

world to an epiphenomenal artifact of human perception. The way in which someoneexperiences, for example, social humiliation or personal loss is predicated on the way

in which the meaning of that event or situation is perceived. However, such experi-

ences never occur as socially isolated moments and are therefore always influenced by



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the specific social context from which they emerge (Katz, 1988). The way one under-

stands the infidelity of a lover or the disloyal act of a friend will likely be influenced

by the way in which others construct that event as well. Although experienced as a

personal loss or slight, this remains a public act whose meaning is not exclusivelyconstructed by the individual (Katz, 1988).

In describing the experience of humiliation, Katz (1998) offers the following obser-

vation concerning the social meaning of this event: Humiliation, however, is already

a socialized emotion, reflecting an immediate, unquestionable connection between

ones discomfort and anothers attack (p. 26). Humiliation, then, becomes for Katz a

social artifact of individual experience that finds its meaning not as an exclusively

isolated personal experience but as a social encounter with specific implications for

the individual. In fact, it is the presence of this social component that provides this

experience its lived significance. Katz (1988) goes on to state,

Hence, in humiliation, I presume a self-conscious and overt intention by others

to degrade me. If I realize that they silently perceived my incompetence, I will

be ashamed. If I understand that they conspired to share and hide their degrad-

ing view of me, then I will also be humiliated. (p. 27)

The experience of humiliation powerfully reflects the complex social implications

of human interaction. Rather than represent a moment of private self-loathing, humili-

ation helps to exemplify the fundamental social quality of human existence. By sodoing, the phenomenology of humiliation recognizes our engagement with the social

world and the powerful influence such a relationship implies for individual human

experience and meaning. However, such a formulation moves us away from the phe-

nomenology of Edmund Husserl, away from a particular emphasis on perception and

consciousness, and toward what has been famously labeled phenomenologys existen-

tial turn initiated by the work of Martin Heidegger.

Heidegger (1953/1996), in his classic workBeing and Time, reformulates the proj-

ect of phenomenology. Rather than focusing solely on the contents of conscious-

ness, Heidegger (1953/1996) seeks to explore the meaning ofbeing. Being-in-the-worldorDaseinidentifies the way in which we encounter the nature of our own existence

through a specific interaction with the social world. For Heidegger, Daseins relation

to the world is not to be thought of as the formal relations between one thing (Dasein)

and another (that with which Dasein concerns itself) (McCann, 1993, p. 72). Rather,

the world is, for Heidegger, the fundamental characteristic of Dasein itself. Such a

formulation of human existence rejects any attempt to separate human being and world

as individual philosophical categories.

Dasein is what it makes of itself, as it presses ahead into its various projects,tasks, and relationships within its world and community, but since Dasein is

always thrown into a particular social world and finds its own self-interpretations

already guided in advance by larger frameworks of normativity, this means that



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Polizzi 1059

Dasein is not free in an absolute, Sartrean sense simply to choose its essence

(Salem-Wiseman, 2003).

Being-in-the-world, then, always entails an inseparable engagement with the world,which reveals the specific project for individual existence. However, being-in-the-

world is never an exclusive possibility for the individual alone and therefore cannot be

understood as exclusively mine. Rather, such a formulation represents the funda-

mental ontological character of all human experience that always occurs within a spe-

cific historical or cultural context. Although being-in-the-world as gang member,

working mom, or husband retains an individual quality and meaning specific to that

individual, it is not the sole author of the meaning of lived experience. For Heidegger,

being-in-the-world is fundamentally social in its nature and is therefore intertwined

with a variety of social meanings that are not of its own design (Heidegger, 1953/1996).The social quality of human existence and interaction is predicated on what

Heidegger has called Publicness. Publicness describes for Heidegger the ontological

social character of human existence. Publicness is that which structures our social

relatedness and gives shared meaning to our everyday experience. Heidegger has

defined this possibility as the they-self. It is the they-self that removes from us the

burden of trying to figure out what the world means. Heidegger (1962), in his discus-

sion of the they-self, states the following:

Thus the they maintains itself factically in the averageness of that whichbelongs to it, of that which it regards as valid, and that which it does not, and of

that to which it grants success and to that which it denies. In this averageness

with which it prescribes what can and cannot be ventured, it keeps watch over

everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. (p. 165)

From this perspective, social reality can never be understood as the exclusive con-

struct of an individual subject; rather, it is that possibility that is brought forth through

Daseins being-in-the-world that is always in relationship to any number of manifesta-

tions of the they-self (Polizzi, 2003). Within this context, Heideggers conceptualiza-tion of the they-self describes the way in which our everyday actions make sense only

because they instantiate or exemplify the taken-for-granted patterns and norms of the

shared life world (Guignon, 1993, p. 225). Social experience, then, emerges from this

encounter with the they-self that is reflective of the specific cultural meanings of a

given social context. Although human choice always remains an open potentiality for

Heidegger, this potential is not limitless and is always in some way influenced or

restricted by the specifics of ones social context or what Heidegger (1953/1996) has

called our thrownness or facticity.

The thrown nature of human being, or what Heidegger (1953/1996) has describedas the thrownnessof human existence, is fundamental to being-in-the-world insofar as

it describes the cultural, historical, social, and familial quality of our specific exis-

tence. Thrownness describes for Heidegger the specific way in which human



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experience encounters the possibilities for being human. To be thrown simply implies

that human existence always finds itself within a specific sociohistorical context that

brings with it a set of predetermined social meanings or constructions that are not

made or necessarily controlled by the individual (Polizzi, 2010). For example, the factthat someone lives in a culture that embraces racism, sexism, religious prejudice, or

other types of experience-negating social constructions may have an overwhelming

influence on day-to-day experience and literally may challenge ones ability to be

(Polizzi, 2007; Spinelli, 2005; Zimmerman, 1981).

Thrownness, then, implies a specific contextualized ground for human existence

that is both open to possibility and choice and yet limited by preexisting cultural and

social meanings concerning the limits of human expression and potential (Cerbone,

2006; May, 1983; Mulhall, 1996; Spinelli, 2005). For example, it could be argued that

the general experience of strain as described by Agnew is a relatively common humanexperience, regardless the socioeconomic status of the individual involved; however,

what gives this phenomena its unique significance is reflected through the way in

which individual experience collides with the specific demands of the they-self or

social context that in tandem construct the meaning of that event or encounter.

The experience of strain is made meaningful not simply through the way in which

a particular event is perceived; such experiences are social events that are often held

hostage by a specific set of predetermined social meanings. The more publically

shared this experience is, the less likely I will be able to retain sole ownership of its

meaning. Each social context brings with it a set of preestablished social expectationsthat cannot be easily ignored. The distinction that Katz (1988) makes in Seductions of

Crimeis helpful here, insofar as it is the social experience and construction of humili-

ation that evokes the response of rage from the attacked and belittled individual.

However, it is important to note that for Heidegger, the they-self does not represent

a fixed set of social meanings and is always contingent on the specific social context

from which human experience emerges. An example of the variability of the they-self

can be witnessed in gang ritual or the morality of organized criminal behavior, the

military, the police, or ones family. Regardless the context, a certain set of prescrip-

tive social meanings emerge that are relevant to all members of that cultural group. Infact, being-in-the-world as gang member or as wise guy, as police officer, or family

member carries with it an oath of fidelity to those attitudes and beliefs prescribed by

the they-self that is specific to that unique social context (Polizzi, 2010).

As stated above, the they-self is concerned with that which it regards as valid and

that which it does not (Heidegger, 1962). Within this context validity is prescribed by

the they-self insofar as it is the they-self that provides being-in-the-world meanings for

human experience that will be deemed valid and those that will be denied that validity

(Katz, 1988; Maruna, 2001). The experience of strain and, more importantly, the

response that this experience evokes, is fundamentally tied to this relationship giventhat even private experience is not always isolated from public construction

(Zimmerman, 1981). The private experience of loss or humiliation is rarely confined

to a solely private moment and, therefore, may demand a response that is more public



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Polizzi 1061

in nature. The drug dealer who is not paid in full for his product must confront the

potential loss of not only his money but his street cred as well. When he acts to

resolve this unacceptable transgression of the law of the street, he not only retains his

respect in the eyes of this very specific manifestation of the they-self but also sends aclear signal as to which behavior will be valued and which behavior will not.

The determination of value appears fundamental to the experience of strain insofar

as it is this value that is determined by the they-self that, in turn, helps to evoke a spe-

cific response from the individual involved. Implicit in this experience of value is the

expectation that certain situations or events will likely demand a very specific response

or resolution. However, it is important to note that this value emerges from the rela-

tionship between being-in-the-world and the they-self, a relationship that is always in

a state of flux. Although a specific experience of strain may hold a specific set of

meanings for the individual confronting that event, the way in which this strain isultimately resolved will oftentimes be informed by what the they-self demands, but

such complicity is not always required.

The nature of being-in-the-world is defined as a finite openness that is influenced,

but not necessarily fatalistically determined, by the prescriptions of the they-self

(Gelven, 1989; Spinelli, 2005; Zimmerman, 1981). Being-in-the-world collides with

the prohibitions and expectations of the they-self in its attempt to determine what the

world means. Individuals are often thrown into situations that are ultimately resolved

in ways that do not necessarily reflect the attitudes or beliefs of what they say. Such

opportunities reveal being-in-the-worlds openness to its own potentiality, whichallows it to be as others are allowed to be (Gelven, 1989). However, this quality for

human beings presupposes a relationship to the they-self that provides the possibility

for such human expressions. Certain social contexts are so riddled by the toxic effects

of racism, sexism, prejudice, poverty, or oppressive institutional structures that the

possibility for such being is simply denied and the failure to comply is not easily toler-

ated. The experience of strain is no different (Polizzi, 2007).

Taken from this perspective, the phenomenology of strain represents a specific type

of human experience that is always situated within a very specific constellation of

social meaning (Katz, 1999). Whether it is experienced as subjective strain, anticipa-tory strain, or the strain reflected in individual story lines, these situations or events

only become meaningful insofar as they exist as social artifacts from a specific type of

being-in-the-world that is in relation to a specific they-self (Gelven, 1989). How an

individual reacts to the experience of strain will likely be influenced by the circum-

stances of his or her social situation as well as the expectations this situation imposes

on personal experience. Certain social contexts will demand a specific response to the

experience of strain that from another perspective is likely to be viewed as deviant or

criminal (Polizzi, 2010); though such observations may be juridically correct, such a

stance fails to recognize the way in which the experience of strain also articulates avery specific set of social expectations concerning the meaning of the world that can-

not in all cases be so easily ignored (Gelven, 1989; Katz, 1999; Polizzi, 2010). Failure



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to act as the they-self instructs may not only reflect a repudiation of social expectations

for certain types of behavior, but may prove to be fatal.

What the phenomenology of strain helps to clarify is the variability between indi-

vidual experience and the influencing presence of social context. The probabilitythat a specific experience of strain will result in a criminal response may be largely

determined by influencing power of the they-self. In any number of situations, the

they-self may be experienced as rather benign, allowing personal choice to move as it

will; however, in those situations or contexts where a specific response is expected or

demanded, a criminal resolution to the experience of strain is more likely. It is coun-

terproductive to construct a set of objectively derived assumptions concerning crim-

inal behavior without gaining much greater insight into the way in which offending

individuals perceive and give meaning to their own behavior and the social worlds

they inhabit. Too often, the personal histories, experiences, or story lines of offendersare reduced to the category of excuse making, rendering invalid any attempt by the

individual to make sense of the lived reality of their own lives.

This discussion will now move to the analysis of a specific story line that was told

by the subject during the course of treatment in a maximum-security penitentiary set-

ting. The discussion begins with a brief description of the event, and then a brief analy-

sis will be offered from the perspective of GST and phenomenology. This discussion

will conclude by attempting to show how the experience of strain, in its uniquely sub-

jective character, is very well conceptualized within the theoretical framework offered

by phenomenology. The individual in this case study will be identified as C.

The Experience of Strain: Two Different Perspectives

The Case of C: A Brief Description of the Problem

C, a middle-aged African American male, was serving a 10- to 20-year sentence for

armed robbery in a maximum-security penitentiary in the northeastern United States.

During the course of treatment, C informed his therapist that his sister was a victim

of criminal homicide. He stated that his sister was murdered by a young man whoentered the home looking for money or drugs. The intruder, who was acting alone at

the time of the crime, instructed his sister and her boyfriend at gun point to go into the

basement of the house and kneel on the floor. Once in the basement, the intruder

demanded that the woman read a verse from the Bible while he stood behind her with

a loaded weapon. As she was reading, and in full view of her boyfriend, the young

intruder shot her at point blank range in the back of the head, killing her instantly. Her

boyfriend was spared from a similar fate when the killers weapon misfired, allowing

him to flee the premises. The boyfriend immediately decided to cooperate with police,

allowing for the perpetrator of this chilling crime to be subsequently arrested, con-victed, and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

During the trial of his sisters killer and within the context of the therapeutic relation-

ship, C inquired if it was possible for this individual to be sent to this prison to serve his



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Polizzi 1063

sentence. His question was relevant given that it was common practice at that time for the

Department of Corrections to house individuals from the eastern part of the state in peni-

tentiaries farther west. At the time, C was assured that such an eventuality would be highly

unlikely for what appeared to be rather obvious reasons. However, the rather obviousquickly was transformed into the absurd. Although therapist and client did from time to

time entertain such an eventuality, neither took this to be a real possibility. All such specu-

lation came to an end when a call was received from the cell block, which reported that

the killer of Cs sister was not only in the same penitentiary but was enrolled in the same

general equivalency diploma (GED) classes and was housed in the same cell block.

C stated that it was during one of his GED classes that he recognized the name of a

new inmate who had recently joined his group. Initially, he was uncertain of the exact

identity of the newcomer but quickly realized that he had heard the name before. Once

he was able to verify the true identity of the individual, his emotional dilemma began(Katz, 1988, 1999). His initial inclination was simply to kill the young man with his

bare hands. He stated, Dave, that young boy had no idea how close he was to dead.

However, it was at this time that he also started to think through a variety of potential

consequences that overwhelmed him with feelings of intense anger, sadness, and

uncertainty as to how he should proceed.

C was confronted with a variety of concerns related to his realization that the killer

of his sister was now living within the same penitentiary. Perhaps most important to

this process was his realization that although no one else currently knew the circum-

stances of the young mans incarceration, these details would sooner or later becomepublic knowledge within the penitentiary, which in turn would demand an immediate

response by him. C, an active member with one of the religious groups within the peni-

tentiary, formulated a variety of possible scenarios that would likely emerge once this

information became public (Katz, 1999).

The first scenario simply reflected Cs desire to address the situation himself and

take the life of the man who murdered his sister. Although such a solution appealed to

his sense of manhood and desire for a just end to this situation, he also saw that such

revenge, regardless how justified, would do little to resolve the problem. He also felt

that if he shared this information with individuals within his group, one of them mayhave volunteered to take care of the situation, thereby saving him from any further

repercussions that could prevent his eventual release. Given that there were a number

of individuals within his immediate circle of friends who were already serving a sen-

tence of life without parole, such an eventuality would certainly be within the realm of

reason. However, this was also unacceptable given the inevitable repercussions such

an act would visit on the perpetrator of such a violent act. He also envisioned the pos-

sibility of being ostracized by his community if he failed to avenge his sisters death.

Such a failure to act would likely be viewed by many within his community, and the

more general inmate culture as an act of cowardice, leaving him potentially vulnerableto future acts of violence and possibly death (Katz, 1988, 1999).

As he attempted to struggle with the profound and intense emotions that this situa-

tion evoked, he also realized that he needed to make a decision immediately before



15/22


that choice would be taken from him. Finally, he decided to inform his cell block case

manager of the situation with the hope that his dilemma would be discreetly but

quickly resolved. Given Cs involvement in psychotherapy at the time of this event,

his counselor was immediately notified of the situation. He requested that he be admit-ted into the mental health unit of the penitentiary where he would be allowed to recover

from this difficult situation. The young inmate was immediately removed from general

population and was transferred that night to a more suitable facility without incident.

Story line and the Experience of Loss

When exploring the meaning of Cs situation or story line from the perspective of

GST, we are confronted by what Agnew has defined as the experiences of vicarious

and anticipated strain. Agnew defines the concept of vicarious strain as an experienceof strain resulting from the knowledge that someone close to you has in some way

been either hurt, injured, or killed (Agnew, 2002). In the case of C, the strain experi-

enced by the murder of his sister evoked normal feelings of anger, deep regret, and

loss, as well as a sense of personal failure given that he was unable to be with his

family as a result of his incarceration. His perspective at the time of her death held

little concern for the perpetrator of this crime, and remained focused on the meaning

of her death for him and his family. However, after realizing that the individual

responsible for taking his sister lifes was now literally only an arms reach away, his

experience of vicarious strain greatly intensified.The possibility for retribution seemed only to intensify his experience, insofar as

the person responsible for murdering his sister was now no longer an anonymous

name in a newspaper article but a flesh-and-blood individual who he would likely see

every day. However, this realization also evoked what Agnew has described as antici-

pated strain, which refers to the expectation that this current experience of strain will

extend into the future or be the cause of new strains (Agnew, 2006a, 2006b). C realized

that he must resolve this issue immediately before it became public knowledge within

the penitentiary, and in so doing, result in a very different conclusion.

From this context, it is important to recognize the way in which the experiences ofvicarious and anticipated strain emerge from the very specific story line of Cs incar-

ceration. The experience of his sisters death unfolds from Cs perception as an inmate

in a maximum-security penitentiary. The reality of his incarceration restricts the way

in which he can take up the meaning of this loss while at the same time forcing him to

recognize the limits this context imposes on this meaning-generating process.

Fundamental to this story line is the ever-present influencing force of penitentiary

culture and the demands that it imposes on those individuals under its control. Story lines,

then, rather than simply representing a specific subjective view toward a set of factors

and situations, also reveal a shared aspect of social existence, which also influencesand constructs the process by which the experience of strain becomes meaningful for

the individual. This discussion will now move to a brief phenomenological analysis on

the same set of experiences.



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Polizzi 1065

The Phenomenology of Strain

Seen from the vantage of phenomenology, Cs experiences represent the way in which

the meaning of human existence is contingent on individual perspective and sharedsocial context. The various factors of Cs experience really do not gain their ultimate

meaning until they are contextualized within the culture of the penitentiary. If this

terrible event had occurred prior to his incarceration, its meaning would be fundamentally

different. Absent the unique demands of the penitentiary culture, his response to the loss

of his sister would likely retain a greater degree of flexibility. Such a distinction is

necessary, given the absence of one very important factor: The perpetrator of this hor-

rible crime was incarcerated, and therefore spared from any personal retribution. The

fact that his sisters killer was housed in the very same facility changes every aspect

of this experience and greatly limits its possible resolution.Such conceptual formulations as vicarious and anticipated strain become superflu-

ous to a phenomenological understanding of this phenomenon insofar as each category

simply represents an aspect of subjective experience. Cs unfolding understanding of

his situation far exceeds the fact of his sisters death and must take into account at

every turn the way in which others around him will construct the meaning of this expe-

rience. Cs concern, predicated on the way in which his social context will construct

his story line, reflects another premise of phenomenology: the fact that human exis-

tence is fundamentally social in nature (Heidegger, 1962; Katz, 1988; Merleau-Ponty,

1962). It is not surprising that C is able to focus more completely on the death of hissister prior to the arrival of her killer given that his absence represents no intrusion on

his process of grieving. However, once confronted by the meaning represented by the

actual presence of the perpetrator, Cs experience is fundamentally transformed. Such

a change does not diminish the degree of Cs emotional loss; it merely reflects the

degree to which subjective experience is contingent on social context (Berger &

Luckmann, 1966; Cerbone, 2006; Crewe, 2009; Polizzi, 2007, 2010; Spinelli, 2005).

Within the context of phenomenology, the story line of C becomes meaningful

through the way in which the implicit context of the penitentiary is made explicit and

included into the total meaning of this experience. Although Agnew is correct toinclude the importance of personal perception in his concept of story line, it still leaves

unexplored the way in which subjective story lines emerge and take shape from a very

specific social perspective that is often not under the control of the individual experi-

encing this event. Story lines never take place in a subjective vacuum and are never the

exclusive possession of the individual involved. In the end, story lines become the

lived artifacts of our social existence, revealing the interplay between subjective per-

ception and the reality of our social existence.

Conclusion

The attempt of this article has been to begin a reformulation of GST within the theoretical

context of phenomenology: a reformulation that attempts to embrace the specifically



17/22


qualitative nature of this experience. Such a theoretical emphasis seeks to liberate the

conclusions of GST from some of its currently positivistic leanings. By so doing, it seeks

to expand the ways in which strain helps to describe the unique relationship between

individual and the specific lived experience of social existence (Giorgi, 1970). Bygrounding the study of strain within a philosophical context that is able to account for the

variability and richness of everyday social experience, the greater integrity of the theory

is retained. In its most general formulation, strain theory attempts to understand the ways

in which human experience and choice are influenced by the presence of emotional loss

or physical harm. Although this sense of loss is played out in a variety of different ways,

it is not the quantity of these factors, characteristics, or situations that provide us the

authentic meaning of these events; rather, it is the way in which these facts reveal their

fundamentally all too human nature. However, if measurability and replication are not to

be the main focus of such an approach, then how do we validate our science?This question is not new and is one that has dogged the social sciences since the late

1880s with psychologys liberation from the speculative muses of philosophical

introspection. The search for empirical certainty, if not legitimacy, relative to the sci-

entific project of the natural sciences, helped to turn the social science enterprise

toward the use of inductive methods capable of establishing the scientific facts of its

endeavors (Bernstein, 1983, 1995; Giorgi, 1970). Sociology and criminology, as well

as a variety of other fields within the social sciences, were soon to evoke their own

claims of scientific legitimacy based on the appropriation of scientific method initially

formulated by and for the disciplines of the natural sciences (Durkheim, 1897/1951).Included within this appropriation of the methodological project of the natural sci-

ences was the scientific belief that quantitative terms should be accurate expressions

of qualitative dimensions (Giorgi, 1970, p. 67), which, generally speaking, they are

not. The quantification of a certain set of facts is simply not the same as exploring the

qualitative or phenomenological depth that each of these facts has for the individuals

involved. For example, a headline that reads Twenty-Five Killed in Suicide Bomb

Attack, though quantitatively accurate, is unable to reflect the quality that such a loss

visits on all those affected by this event. And the study of GST is no different.

However, such an observation leads us to the other purpose of this article, which isless about the theoretical formulation of GST and more about the underlying method-

ological assumptions and exclusions, which directs this theory to its object of study.

Our ability to analyze and ultimately understand the phenomenon of strain, or for that

matter any topic of inquiry, must first begin not with method but with a theoretical

frame of reference that will then to able to reasonably justify all subsequent claims of

truth or scientific validity reflected in the theoretical formulation of the problem.

Methodology absent this relationship loses the very foundation by which its claims of

truth are made meaningful and can become a self-serving process (Ferrell, 2009). It

cannot be forgotten that methodology is nothing more than a specific scientific instru-ment used to elucidate a specific set of epistemological claims concerning the nature

of truth; method, therefore, is not analogous to theory but a way in which to explicate

the claims of that theory (Rosenau, 1992; Wender, 2008).



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Polizzi 1067

In his textPsychology as a Human Science: A Phenomenologically Based Approach,

Giorgi (1970) explores what he identifies as the constant dialogue between approach,

method and content of the phenomenon under study (p. 127). Within this formula-

tion, approach represents the theoretical foundations from which method and contentemerge. In other words, the way in which we theorize about a particular phenomenon

under study already helps to shape and direct the way in which we make sense of the

object(s) of our investigations. For example, if we decide to dismiss the uniquely qual-

itative aspects of the experience of strain, one should not be surprised if we also fail to

develop a method of study geared to elucidate such types of data. What would be the

point? As a result, the content of the phenomenon is forced to adhere to the contours

imposed by the limits of our theoretical reflection and creativity, ascribing scientific

validity only to those aspects of the phenomenon that reflect our preconceived notions

concerning the object of our study and rejecting or ignoring all aspects of the phenom-enon that do not (Rosenau, 1992).

Through the conceptualization of strain as a quantitative object of study, the content

revealed in this phenomenon will also tend to become overly reliant on its ability to be

measured and therefore legitimized by a numbers-driven methodology (Giorgi, 1970).

Such an observation should not be seen as a total rejection of quantitative method but

as an attempt to make explicit the potential pitfalls of any methodological inquiry,

phenomenology included, that seeks to cover over or ignore the philosophical ground

from which its claims of truth emerge. A constructionist or phenomenological concep-

tualization of strain seeks to liberate the content of this phenomenon away from the apriori demands that may be imposed by quantitative methodology, and by so doing

allows for the actual experience of strain to shine forth. By explicitly recognizing the

relationship between theory, method, and content in this way, the experience of strain

can take on a new significance and provide a new point of reference by which to

understand this phenomenon.

The current discussion has attempted to not only explore the possibilities for GST

but has indirectly attempted to explore the theoretical direction of the field of crimi-

nology as well. Recent examples of this reemerging conversation and critique can be

found in recent publications related to critical and postmodern theory as well ashumanistic, existential, and phenomenological themes related to the experience of

crime and the phenomenology of desistance (Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009; Arrigo,

Milovanovic, & Schehr, 2005; Gadd & Jefferson, 2007; Lippens & Crewe, 2009;

Maruna, 2001; Polizzi & Braswell, 2009; Presser, 2009; Wender, 2004; Williams &

Arrigo, 2005) as well as a focus on a reconsideration of the underlying philosophical

foundations of our discipline. These emerging voices seek to rethink core notions

related to subjectivity, lived experience, the construction of social responsibility, the

influence of social structures and institutions, and the unexploded theoretical assump-

tions that are the bedrock of traditional criminology. Such theoretical and philosophi-cal clarifications are essential to the ongoing development of the disciplinary project

of criminology and criminal justice insofar as these explorations help to better situate

our general understanding of the all too human nature of crime.



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Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication

of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

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