Institutional Reform in PalestineA Foreign/Donors’ Perspective

Developments until 2005

Training Young Leaders – Democratization and Reform

Day two: Sunday, 9 December 2007

Ingo Büttner – Covernance Coordination Officer, Local Aid Coordination Secretariat (www.ldf.ps)

Addressed issues

• Nomenclature of Reform• Framework conditions for Reform• Dynamics of Reform• Evolution of the aid management system (Annex)

Nomenclature Defining Institutional Reform:1. Institutional Reform in Palestine figured under various exchangeable Notions only the emphasize is

slightly different with each notion: State / Institution Building PNA Reform Governance

State apparatus as a tool to govern the population and to deliver services to the population.

2. The Term “Governance” should not be seem in this context as an equivalent of the term “good Governance”

Framework conditions for Reform

• The Oslo Agreements• The Role of Israel• Heritage of the PLO• The influence of the Donor communityThe influence of the Donor community • Social fabric of the Palestinian society • Complex legal framework• Territorial Fragmentation (Gaza – West Bank) • Demographic factor

Framework conditions for Reform The influence of the Donor communityThe influence of the Donor community

Due to the high international profile of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict development cooperation is extremely politicized. In the oPt development cooperation has always to answer the question of its contribution to a conflict solution.

• On the surface the international Community as reflected in the Quartet presents a joint position. However, the interpretation of this position varies amongst the international Community.

• Internal conflict between the long term strategic goal of sustainable development and politically motivated tactic short term measures to promote a conflict solution. (e.g. creation of the position of a Prime minister)

The density of donors is exceptionally high both in the sheer number of active donors and regarding the level of support. This makes donor coordination in a highly competitive environment for political visibility a complex and difficult, but an even more important issue.

• Donor competition for example led in some cases to the support of competing PNA-Institutions and, hence, aided and abetted the fragmentation of PNA-Institutions

The weak planning, adsorption and enforcement capacities of the PNA undermined ownership particularly in the first years after the establishment of the PNA. This led to a donor driven development agenda.

Framework conditions for Reform The influence of the Donor communityThe influence of the Donor community

Donor activities that undermine sustainable Institution Building: - some examples• Payment of excessive salaries –> brain drain of highly qualifies Public Servants• Use of international short term experts “consultants” – (a) often the necessary skills are available

on the local labour marked, (b) if used in masses they could paralysing institutions during their inquiries, (c) no proper fallow up on the analytical work to implement recommendations, (d) asymmetric relationship between the expert/donor and recipient (scientific jargon / reports in foreign language)

• Creation of parallel implementing structures for Projects when local structures are available • Funding of departments within Institutions or payment of salaries or add on to the salaries of civil

servants endangers the sustainability of intended changes

OECD / DAC Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (March 2005):Key Words: Ownership – Alignment – Harmonisation

Good donor engagement in fragile States

Dynamics of Reform

Phases:1. Formation of the PNA 1994-1996

During this phase little attention was paid on the integrity of the emerging PNA and PNA-Agencies started to mushroom

2. Internal push for Change - The GCI report and the aftermath 1997-1998 The Report of the General Control Institute for the year 1996 steered up a strong internal call for change.

However, nobody was hold accountable and no chance occurred. During the same time efforts were made for a more coherent institutional development of the PNA. A “Core

Group on Public Administration” was formed. It interacted with the Sector Working Group on Public Administration. However, this structure did nor bear tangible results except a plan for the Development of the Sector as part of the National “Palestinian Development Plan 1998 – 2000)

In the frame of the cabinet reshuffle in August 1998 with the formation of the “Public Sector Reform Committee” for the first time the Term “Reform” was used. However, the PSRC met only one time.

3. External push for Reform - Rocard/Siegmann Report 1999-2000 The next push for Reform came in the vague of the anticipated Statehood at the end of the Oslo interims

period and was driven by the International Community (particularly the EU). An “Independent Task Force” was able to issues after some back and forth with President Arafat in June

1999 the fist comprehensive analysis of the Public Administration of the PNA entitled “Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions”.

Dynamics of Reform

Phases:3. External push for Reform - Rocard/Siegmann Report 1999-2000

Due to internal and external pressure to advance on the reform Agenda a “Higher National Committee for Institutional Development” (HNCID) was formed in August 2000. However, the reform enthusiasm of the PNA lost soon in 2000 its impetus despite strong donor efforts to support it at the technical/project and international level.

Despite strong external and internal pressure for change this reform attempt failed because necessity of reform was not internalized by the upper echelons of the PNA

4. Hiatus – form the outbreak of the 2nd Intifada to the reoccupation of Area A and the destruction of major PNA Infrastructure Fall 2000 – Spring 2002

• All reform efforts were effectively paralyzed by the outbreak of the second Intifada, because the internal as well as the external attention shifted.

• The disastrous results of the Israeli military Operations in Spring 2002 let to a forceful renewal of internal calls for reform in Mat 2002. This coincided with a strong external call for reforms in June 2002

5. Internal and External push for Reform – 100 Days Plan and the TFPR [Summer 2002 – Winter 2005]

• Based on the 100 Days Plan of the PNA the international Community formed a “Task Force on Palestinian Reform” (TFPR) to support and monitor the PNA Reform process which interacted with the Ministerial Reform Committee that had been formed in June 2002.

Dynamics of Reform

Phases:5. Internal and External push for Reform – 100 Days Plan and the TFPR [Summer 2002 – Winter

2005]Differences to former Efforts: • Capacitated secretariat (RCSU), • Strong follow up of the donor community (on a capital and local level)

Development: • Strong push until Spring 2003 – helped to overcome the usual reform setup and its weaknesses• Culminated in the change of the Basic Law and the release of the Road Map• Reform as integral part of the Road Map (Spring – Fall 2003) – externalization of reform demands• Steady decline of the Impetus of reform Fall 2003 – Winter 2005) – resignation of the Abu Mazan

cabinet, Crumbling of the Road Map and shift towards “Disengagement”, lost of comprehensive reform focus and emerging parallel reform efforts, discussion on restructuring of the Aid management System

Evolution of the aid management SystemAid Management System (2005) - Overview

Evolution of the aid management SystemSector Coordination (until 1998)

Evolution of the aid management SystemSector Coordination (until 1998)

Evolution of the aid management SystemReform support mechanism (2002-2005) - Overview

Evolution of the aid management SystemReform support mechanism (2002-2005) - Interaction