institutional complementarities and gender diversity on ......institutional arguments on gender...

Corporate Governance An International Review 2015 bullbull(bullbull) bullbullndashbullbull

Institutional Complementarities and GenderDiversity on Boards A Configurational Approach

Michela Iannotta Mauro Gatti and Morten Huse

ABSTRACT

Manuscript Type EmpiricalResearch QuestionIssue To address the lack of a complementarities-based approach in studies of board diversity this paperseeks to understandwhether and how certain country-level factors are causally and jointly related towomen on boards and thenature of their complementarities (are they synergic or substitutes) Moreover we intend to learn more about theadoptiondiffusion of board gender quotas by taking into account their role in the existing national configurations (whetherthey are necessary andor sufficient conditions)Research FindingsInsights Using fsQCA our findings reveal a particular configuration of country-level conditions thatsupports the existence of a joint causal relation between given institutional arrangements Furthermore we find that boardgender quota legislation is not a sufficient condition on its own to achieve a higher number of women on boards Such evidencesuggests that its diffusion across countries could be the result of institutional isomorphism or social legitimacy more than torational reasonsTheoreticalAcademic Implications For scholars our paper refines and expands insights from the extant comparativecorporate governance literature By finding support for the ldquobundledrdquo or jointly causal nature of given institutional factorswe open a window for further research that investigates board-level phenomena in a complementarities-based perspectivePractitionerPolicy Implications For policymakers this study provides some insights that could better drive their choice aboutwhich mix of policies is necessary to improve female representation on boards and especially in which institutional areas theyshould be implemented It is particularly relevant because once gender quotas are endorsed at board level they could haveambiguous effects on firm performance and corporate governance

Keywords Corporate Governance Configurational Approach Qualitative Comparative Analysis Women on Boards

INTRODUCTION

There is a vigorous tradition in economic researchunderlining the influence of institutional environments

on a wide range of corporate governance phenomena Nota-ble examples concern studies of business behaviors andperformances (eg Ntim amp Soobaroyen 2013 ZattoniPedersen amp Kumar 2009) corporate governance legitimacy(eg Aguilera amp Jackson 2003 Judge Douglas amp Kutan2008) and corporate governance practices (eg Aguilera ampCuervo-Cazurra 2004 Denis amp McConnell 2003) such asthe adoptiondiffusion of international accounting standardsor codes of good governance (Alon 2013 Judge Li amp Pinsker2010 Zattoni amp Cuomo 2008) Furthermore a comparativeand country-level literature has explored the effects of institu-tional antecedents on the composition of corporate boards ofdirectors with particular regard to gender diversity issues(Adams amp Kirchmaier 2013 De Anca 2008 Grosvold 2011

Address for correspondence Michela Iannotta Sapienza University of Rome Via delCastro Laurenziano 9 00161 Rome Italy Tel (+39) 06 49766263 Fax (+39) 06 49766262E-mail michelaiannottauniroma1it

copy 2015 John Wiley amp Sons Ltddoi101111corg12140

Grosvold amp Brammer 2011 Terjesen amp Singh 2008) In detaillegal cultural and occupational environments have beenfound to play the most relevant role for the prevalence ofwomen on boards (Adams amp Kirchmaier 2013 Grosvold ampBrammer 2011) and interestingly a close interdependencebetween them has appeared in a parallel stream of research(eg Esping-Andersen 1990 Mandel amp Semyonov 2006Misra amp Moller 2005 Orloff 1993 1996) Alongsideinstitutional arguments have spread in the literature aboutthe adoption of gender quota legislation for boards ofdirectors For instance Terjesen Aguilera and Lorenz (2014)propose that it is highly coherent with the presence of certaininstitutional factors while Grosvold and Brammer (2011)support its compensatory role which likely makes up for thedeficiencies of others institutionsThis state of the art suggests that gender diversity on corpo-

rate boards may be the outcome of multiple complementaryinstitutional domains as regulatory policies welfare stateslabor and cultural institutions are not just independent fromeach other but they appear to be closely interrelated How-ever this literature presents two main limitations First priorempirical evidence suggests that a relationship between these

2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

institutional domains exists but a lack of holistic perspectivehas limited our knowledge of whether how and whichcountry-level factors in each institutional domain are inconjunctural causality with the representation of women onboards The second limitation is that the arguments aboutgender quotas have been relatively separate from studies ofinstitutional antecedents for women on boards with littleattention to the importance of existing national configurationsfor the introduction of new regulatory policies As a resultwhat remains rather unclear is whether gender quotas forcorporate boards are sufficient by themselves to achieve ahigher number of women on boards (Adams amp Kirchmaier2013 Bergstoslash 2013) or if they are substitutes or complementsin current national configurationsThis study adopts a configurational approach in exploring

the joint influence of particular institutional arrangements ondiversity on boards and the nature of their complementaritiesMore exhaustively we draw on institutional complementar-ities theory to argue that female representation on boards isthe outcome of a conjunctural causal relationship between cer-tain institutional conditions Furthermore we investigate therole of board gender quotas in the existing national configura-tions in terms of their sufficiency and necessity for genderbalance on boards In a comparative perspective the analysisexamines the 27 European Union countries and takes eachcountry as a configuration of specific conditions in four insti-tutional domains regulatory policies welfare states laborand cultural institutions In order to explore causal relationsand combinatory effects we employ fuzzy setQualitativeComparative Analysis (fsQCA) a set-theoretic methodparticularly suitable for studying countries in terms of theirmultiple memberships in sets of institutional attributes Ourfindings reveal a particular configuration of country-levelconditions where the effect of a single condition unfolds onlyin combination with other conditions supporting theexistence of complementarities and joint causal relationshipsIn addition they show that board gender quota legislation isneither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to achieve ahigher number of women on boards Such evidence suggeststhat their diffusion across countries could be due to institu-tional isomorphismmore than to efficiency or rational reasonsOverall this study makes two important contributions

First after identifying the key institutional domains to be in-vestigated we provide a systematic theoretical reasoningabout the influence of their complementarities in shaping gen-der balance on corporate board of directors Second the use ofa configurational approach provides an important methodo-logical contribution Through fsQCA we empiricallyexplore our theory-derived propositions and capture the com-plex relationships between country-level causal conditionsand the representation of women on boards As a result ourpaper refines and expands insights from the extant compara-tive corporate governance literature by opening a windowfor further complementary-based research concerning boardcomposition and demography For policy makers it providessome insights that can better drive their choice about whichmix of policies might be necessary to improve femalerepresentation on boards and especially inwhich institutionaldomains they should be implementedThe paper is structured as follows After the literature re-

view we discuss the theoretical framework and develop our

Volume bullbull Number bullbull bullbull 2015

propositions The following sections describe the researchmethodology and the main findings resulting from the com-parative analysis Discussion and conclusions are providedin the last section

LITERATURE REVIEW

Institutions and Institutional ComplementaritiesInstitutional theory points out that institutions influenceeconomic activities organizational structure and humanbehavior Institutions represent the formal (eg laws consti-tutions) and informal constraints (eg taboos traditionssocio-cultural norms) which limit individuals and organiza-tional choices (North 1990) In other words they shape theinteractions of human beings and form expectations of whatpeople will do (Nugent amp Lin 1995) (Scott 1987 499) definesinstitutions as relatively resilient ldquosystems of social beliefs andsocially organized practices associated with varying func-tional arenas within social systemsrdquo such as work politicslaws or regulations In this vein any institution ldquofits into asystem of institutionsrdquo (Neale 1988 245) in a way that theyco-exist and co-evolve within a given structure by showingmutually reinforcing characteristics (Ahlering amp Deakin2007 Deeg 2007 JacksonampDeeg 2008) Extant research refersto this interdependence with the concept of institutionalcomplementarities Such a perspective is widespread in thecomparative capitalism literature because institutional com-plementarities are acknowledged as an important mechanismto explain the diversity of national institutional systems andtheir resistance to change (eg Amable 2003 Aoki 2001North 1991) For instance Amable (2000) argues that theoverall coherence of a ldquonational modelrdquo can be betterunderstood by considering a large set of interacting andinterrelated institutional arrangements rather than isolatedinstitutions Indeed when complementarities occur the exis-tence of an institutional form reinforces the existence of theothers this generates a ldquodynamic stabilityrdquo (Amable 2003)Generally complementarity between some elements stems

from the circumstance that employing one of them increasesthe value of employing the others (Aoki 2001 Milgrom ampRoberts 1995) From the institutional perspective comple-mentarities imply that the conjunction of two or more insti-tutions together enhances the performance of a given actor(eg organizations or national economies) However twomain logics are embodied in institutional complementarityWhen two or more institutions are organized around similarproperties and common principles the logic is similarityConversely the logic of contrast occurs when institutionswith different or contrasting properties coexist and onemakes up for the deficiencies of the other (Crouch 2005)While the latter logic implies a sort of compensation the for-mer refers to the presence of synergies between institutionsSince similar structures make coexistent institutionsmutually reinforced (Campbell 2011) the more alignedand consistent the institutions the better a given country-level outcome (Amable 2003)Although the complementarities-based approach has

spread in financial (eg Amable Ernst amp Palombarini 2005Campbell 2011) and corporate governance research (egAguilera Filatotchev Gospel amp Jackson 2008 Garcigravea-Castro

copy 2015 John Wiley amp Sons Ltd

3COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS AND WOMEN ON BOARDS

Aguilera amp Arintildeo 2013 Houmlpner 2005 Jackson 2005 Kang ampMoon 2012 Rediker amp Seth 1995 Weimer amp Pape 1999) ithas been neglected in previous studies of diversity oncorporate boards It is in this gap that we place our research

Institutional Arguments on Gender Diversity onBoardsThe comparative and country-level research on corporateboards has addressed the role of national institutional charac-teristics in shaping gender diversity on boards of directorsespecially with regard to institutional systems (Grosvold2011 Grosvold amp Brammer 2011 Terjesen amp Singh 2008)infrastructures and public policies (Terjesen Sealy amp Singh2009) and occupational environments (Adams amp Kirchmaier2013)Grosvold and Brammer (2011) show that countries with

generous welfare provisions encouraging women to balancework and family (French and Germanic legal heritages) havefewer women board directors From a cultural perspectivethe authors find that Nordic European and Eastern Europeanculture-oriented countries have a significantly greater percent-age ofwomen on boards owing to their lower levels of genderdifferentiation Looking at labor institutions Adams andKirchmaier (2013) argue that the presence of (non-executive)women on boards is positively related to female employmentby excluding part-time and unemployed workers For thisreason the authors underline the importance of policiespromoting full-time and family services since part-time jobsfor taking on family responsibilities could underminewomenrsquos professional careers The rationale of focusing on ca-reers to search for the main causes of the under-representationof women on boards is that full participation in the labormarket allows women to acquire those competencesexperiences and social capital to sit on boards (eg Adamsamp Flynn 2005 Doldor Vinnicombe Gaughan amp Sealy 2012Singh amp Vinnicombe 2004 Terjesen et al 2009)Interestingly a parallel body of literature reveals that female

employment and careers are primarily affected by twoelements welfare institutions and culturalprescriptivenorms about gender roles in society In detail much researchdocuments that welfare states can fail to release women fromfamily responsibilities and increase unequal gender represen-tation between and within classes or exclude women frominfluential occupations (eg Esping-Andersen 1990 Mandelamp Semyonov 2006 Mandel amp Shalev 2009 Misra amp Moller2005) In a similar vein a number of scholars argue thatgender stereotypes and gender schemas in social culture arestrong impediments for both female career advancementand representation on boards (eg Adams amp Kirchmaier2013 Nelson amp Levesque 2007 Terjesen et al 2009 2014Williams 2000) In turn welfare states themselves are foundto play a key role in promoting equal opportunities (egEsping-Andersen 1990 1999 Grosvold amp Brammer 2011Mandelamp Semyonov 2006MisraampMoller 2005) They signif-icantly impact on gender relations aswell as on the gender di-vision of caring and domestic labor (Orloff 1993 1996) Theseinterdependencies are generally supported also by sociolo-gists who point out that the greatest share of variance in theindividual life courses is due to (1) external social structureslinked to the division of labor (2) the division of labor within


households and (3) the intervention of the state throughwelfare provisions (Mayer 2009)Although not exhaustively institutional arguments have in-

formed a number of studies about the adoption and diffusionof gender quotas for corporate boards In Teigenrsquos work(Teigen 2012) the spread of gender quota legislation isexplained according to mechanisms of diffusion path depen-dency and critical conjunctures of distinctive national condi-tions Terjesen et al (2014) argue that the establishment ofgender quotas for corporate boards arises from a particularinstitutional environment consisting in (1) gendered welfarestate provisions (2) left-leaning political government and (3)path-dependent policy initiatives for gender equality Thesecircumstances of institutional coherence between somecountry-level factors do not necessarily imply complementar-ities (Deeg 2007) albeit complementarities could existConversely Grosvold and Brammer (2011) discuss that moreradical affirmative action should be taken when nationalcultural heritages are slow to change In this way genderlegislation on boards might be a supplementary institutionlikely making up for the deficiencies of other institutions(according to Crouch 2005)Despite their contributions in the institutional understand-

ing of gender diversity on boards these studies have failedto investigate the effects of the joint influence of institutionson women on boards In this way the causal mechanismunderlying their relationships has remained less than clearMoreover a deeper analysis of the role of gender regulatorypolicies in the existing national configurations is still neededThere is therefore scope to explore their necessity orsufficiency as well as their complementary or supplementaryfunction in national institutional systemsGiven their close interconnection and their importance as

antecedents of women on boards welfare labor and culturalinstitutions are particularly suitable to be investigated interms of complementarities Accordingly we need to focuson how gender roles in these three institutional domains arecausally and jointly related to gender balance on boards Inline with Schneider and Wagemann (2012) this means thatwomen on boards could be re-framed as the outcomeresulting from sets of institutional attributes For the purposeof this study in the next section we theoretically argue forthe existence of complementarities between welfare laborand cultural institutions Therefore in order to exploreconjunctural causality we empirically explore our proposi-tions by taking countries as configurations of certaincountry-level causal conditions including gender quotas oncorporate boards

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

The subject of women on corporate boards clearly has socialorigins since it evokes a problem of equality in the distribu-tion of opportunity and power in a given social system As aresult the presence of women in top corporate positions canbe conceived as a subset of the overall power structure Ifthe problem of female under-representation on boards isconceptualized as embedded within broader gender-relatedsocial phenomena women on boards cannot be separatedfrom issues related to women in family workforce



politystate and culture The rationale is that gender itself isan institution intertwined with other institutions (Martin2004) as some gendered practices and processes have movedgender in multiple settings and contexts (Acker 1992) In thisframe ldquogender is a property of collectivities institutions andhistorical processesrdquo (Connell 1987 139) and it can be consid-ered ldquoan institution embedded in the workplace occupationsand occupational environments through formally definedrules roles and responsibilities and the lsquohabitusrsquo of mentalstructures through which individuals think about their socialworldrdquo (Terjesen et al 2009 324) Accordingly complemen-tarities between welfare labor and cultural institutions canbe established on the logic of similarity because of theirsimilar approaches with regard to the gender perspectiveWe discuss each in turnAmong the others welfare institutions show a profound

ldquogenderedrdquo nature In general states have had power overother institutions because they have ldquocodified many aspectsof gender into laws or regulationsrdquo (Martin 20041259) Insti-tutions reflect the interests of those who have power to makerules and they are not necessarily socially efficient (North1990) Thus menrsquos power over women has been supportedby legal institutions for many years (Connell 1987)Consistent with these arguments we find that motherhoodlegislation was enacted so many years earlier than laws forfatherhood rights (Table A1) and it has been particularlyresilient to change The extended length of maternity leave isa common feature in EU countries and it disguises anunbalanced protection of motherhood rather than fatherhoodor parenthood This is clear evidence that states havemobilized gender into welfare institutions In this way theyhave formally institutionalized the prevalent role of womenin childcare and housework by contributing to define genderroles in family and work institutions as well as in the overallsocietyIn this vein a similar gendered logic is embedded in labor

institutions According to Williams (2005) much of genderinequality in occupational environments depends on the factthat the prescriptive norm of the ideal worker (eg full-timeand full-force for working) comes into conflict with the preva-lent role of women in family responsibilities (eg full-timeand full-force for childbearing and childrearing) in a way thatmakes them not ldquoun-genderedrdquo norms For instance thetypical skill regimes of coordinatedmarket economies (CMEs)are found to be more appropriate to the male model offull-time and continuous employment by limiting women tocertain areas of employment (Mandel amp Shalev 2009) In viewof that welfare and labor institutions are closely complemen-tary in their ldquogenderedrdquo structures the presence of moregender unbalanced welfare polices enhances the presence ofgender imbalance in labor markets as well as in prescriptivenorms of what is expected by women and menFinally it is widely acknowledged that national cultures

have an important role in shaping gender roles in societyCulture stems from human behaviors recursive practicesnorms and beliefs of a given society Considering thefundamental sociality of gender (Lorber 1994) it is rationalto assume that when social actors take ldquogenderedrdquo behaviorsprocesses and practices gender itself ends up flowing intonational culture Moreover since individuals with commoncultural backgrounds share convergent mental models


ideologies and institutions it is reasonable that those institu-tions underlie common beliefs and cultural norms on what isexpected from individuals (DenzauampNorth 1994) Thereforeif gender is a property embedded in cultural institutions wecan argue that the presence of gender in national culturesenhances the presence of gender in other institutions The ideais that gender schemas in national cultures may lead to moregendered welfare and labor institutions In turn genderedwelfare institutions may contribute to intensify the presenceof gender imbalance in labor markets with consequent feweremployment and career opportunities for womenTaken together welfare cultural and labor institutions

complement each other and reciprocally strengthen their gen-dered nature The presence of institutional complementaritiescauses mutual reinforcement and synergistic effects on thedistribution of power and opportunity in a given institutionalsystem According to our rationale complementaritiesbetween these three institutional domains contribute toexplain the different performance in terms of female represen-tation on boards between EU countries Indeed if women onboards reflect the overall power structure of social systemswe expect that in countries where welfare labor and culturalinstitutions are aligned and highly consistent with anldquoun-genderedrdquo perspective performance in terms of womenon boards will be higher because of the synergistic effect ofcomplementaritiesTherefore we suggest the following

Proposition 1a The more ldquoun-genderedrdquo cultural welfare andlabor institutions the greater the number of women on boardsof directors

Clearly assuming the existence of institutional complemen-tarities posits that the effects of one institution are contingenton the presenceabsence of another (Jackson 2005) In thisvein complementarities underlie a causal effect and they per-mit the exploration of possible claims to causality (Deeg 2007Kogut amp Ragin 2006) Investigating causal relations consistsin unraveling the necessary and sufficient conditions andcombinations of these two types of causes for a given outcome(Schneider amp Wagemann 2012 53) When we propose thatcomplementary and aligned institutions have mutuallyreinforcing effects on female representation on boards weare assuming an underlying conjunctural causality This jointcausation can be intended in terms of conjunction orcombination of multiple conditions where no single causemay be either necessary or sufficient (Kogut amp Ragin200647 Ragin 2000) Set-theoretic methods are particularlysuitable for exploring these issues and their logic has beenapplied to empirically explore our propositionsConjunctural causal relationship is established when a

combination of causal conditions are linked by logical ANDoperators () For example ABC implies that a single condi-tion A plays a causal role only in combination with othercausal factors (B and C) In order to empirically verify theexistence of institutional complementarities the main causalconditions at national level have been selected according to(1) their significant impact on gender diversity on corporateboards (2) their capacity to generate complementarities withother institutional domains (Deeg 2007) and (3) their impor-tance in supporting the gendered nature of institutions



Therefore for each institutional domain we suggest thefollowing causal conditionsWelfare institutions operate at multiple levels through

several public policies and with different outcomes for thewellbeing of a number of social groups Consistent with ourarguments we look into the structure of parental leavepolicies (ie paternity maternity and parental leave) and theprovision of childcare services for assessing the presence ofgender in welfare institutions We are motivated by two as-pects Firstly if we include parental leave policies for motherfather and both parents we can have an important foregoerof the gender division of family and childcare responsibilitiesSecondly the nature of the welfare state is closely related togendered dimensions of maternity leave childcare servicesand female labor participation (Terjesen et al 2014) Motherrsquosentitlements and maternity leave were often chosen asexamples of the perverse effects of workfamily reconciliationpolicies on female employment and careers (eg Aschcraft1999 Grosvold amp Brammer 2011 Mandel amp Semyonov2006 Mandel amp Shalev 2009 Misra amp Moller 2005 Nelsonamp Levesque 2007) In a comparative perspective we expectcountries with more gender equality-oriented welfare institu-tions to have (1) higher levels of childcare serviceswhich releasewomen from their prevalent role in domestic responsibilities (2)a shorter difference in the lengths of paternity and maternityleave (meaning higher length of paternity leave and not higherlength of maternity leave) and (3) a higher level of parentalleave Taken together these conditions can reveal a moreegalitarian perception of gender roles in welfare institutionsConversely given the plurality of inputs underlying cultural

and labor institutions (eg labor regulation earnings gap ste-reotypes mental models recursive practices behaviors etc)their gendered structure is suitable to be assessed in terms ofaggregate measure and final outcome Consequently we referto the broader concept of gender equality in society to measurethe presence of gender in national culture meanwhile we takefemale employment and part-time female employment as avalid proxy of how gender perspective is embedded withinlabormarkets Since part-time jobs for taking on family respon-sibilities may undermine womenrsquos professional careers(AdamsampKirchmaier 2013) it is important to promote policiesfor full-time female employment and family services As aresult we expect that countries with more un-genderedcultural and labor institutions present high levels of genderequality in society high levels of female employment but nothigh levels of female part-time workIn terms of joint causation between the elected causal condi-

tions we propose the following empirically testableproposition

Proposition 1b High paternity leave not high maternity leavehigh parental leave high levels of childcare services high femaleemployment not high female part-time work AND high genderequality in society are sufficient conditions to achieve a highernumber of women on boards

The Role of Board Gender Quotas in NationalConfigurationsConfigurational and set-theoretical methods are particularlyvaluable to map countries as configurations of certain causal


conditions This property allows for the theoretical and empir-ical exploration of the necessary and sufficient function thatgender quotas on boards have in the existing nationalconfigurationsA condition is necessary if whenever the outcome occurs it

is present It is sufficient if whenever the condition occursacross cases the outcome is present In other words genderquotas should be a necessary condition if whenever countriesshow a higher level of women on boards they have beenenacted Meanwhile they should be a sufficient condition ifwhenever they occur countries show a higher number ofwomen on boards However if theory-informed Proposition1a is likely to be true the joint presence of highly alignedand consistent country-level causal conditions is sufficient toachieve a higher presence of women on boards (Proposition1b) without requiring any kind of regulation or self-regulation at board level In other words their internalconsistency and gender neutrality entail superior effects onfemale representation on boards because of the institutionalcomplementarities Since the outcome occurs even in theabsence of quotas in set-theoretic terms this means thatgender quotas are not a necessary condition to achieve ahigher number of women on boards However it is generallyand logically true that the presence of mandatory genderquotas at board level implies the presence of more women inboard positions In comparative perspective this means thatwhenever gender quota regulation occurs we expectcountries to have a higher number of women on boards Bydefinition of sufficiency in set-theoretic terms this leads tothe assumption that gender quotas are a sufficient conditionby themselves to have a higher number of women on boardsand they represent an alternative path to the outcome ofinterest Indeed several scholars have acknowledged that incountries where particular women-friendly conditions aremissing affirmative action may be a valuable alternative tohave more women on boards (eg Grosvold amp Brammer2011) More formally we propose the following propositions

Proposition 2a Board gender quotas are not a necessary condi-tion to achieve a higher number of women on boards

Proposition 2b Board gender quotas are a sufficient condition bythemselves to achieve a higher number of women on boards

Definitively if gender quotas on boards represent anothersufficient condition Propositions 1b and 2b reasonably showtwo equally effective and mutually non-exclusive pathwaysto a major presence of women on boards This circumstanceimplies equifinality A result is equifinal when differentcombinations of causal conditions are linked by logical ORoperators (+) For instance a resultant solution ldquoA+Brdquoimplies that A or B equally lead to the outcome

RESEARCH METHOD

Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative AnalysisFuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) has beenemployed here to map countries in terms of their multiplememberships in sets of institutional attributes The aim wasto explore which causal conditions combine and complement



each other to achieve the outcome under investigation Whenthe assumptions of configurational theory are involved thismethod is more suitable to assess the presence of equifinalityand conjunctural causation rather than statistical investiga-tion (eg Fiss 2007 2011) Unlike statistical methodologybased on linear algebra QCA relies on Boolean algebra andapplies a rigid logicmethodology to compare phenomena thatvary both qualitatively and quantitatively for instance in na-ture (eg present or absent) or degree (Ragin 2002 Rihoux2006) Through comparisons across cases QCA allows us touncover synergistic combinatory and equifinal effects bylogically reducing the number of possible combinations ofcausal conditions (Kogut amp Ragin 2006) For instance Kogutand Ragin (2006) note that QCA is able to identify eventuallogical contradictions this property represents an importantfeature to control even though it does not avoid the problemof omitted variables which can make spurious the inferredcausality (unobserved sources of variation such as culturaldisposition) Taken together these advantages have madeQCA very widespread in political economy managementand organization studies (Ragin amp Rihoux 2004 Rihoux2006 eg Fiss 2011 Garcigravea-Castro et al 2013 Grandori ampFurnari 2008 Kogut amp Ragin 2006)FsQCA requires the transformation of conventional

variables into sets ldquousing theoretical and substantive criteriaexternal to the data and taking into account the researcherrsquosconceptualization definition and labeling of the set inquestionrdquo (Ragin 2008b16) This process of calibration isparticularly significant as countriescases have to be assessedwith regard to their membership in previously defined sets ofcausal conditions (Schneider ampWagemann 2012) Instead of abinary logic (ldquo0rdquo for absence and ldquo1rdquo for presence) fsQCAinvolves the application of fuzzy logic for more fine-grainedmeasures of the attributes under investigation (Fiss 2007) Inparticular we make use of the ldquodirect methodrdquo of calibrationby specifying three threshold values one for full membershipto the set one for full non-membership to the set and one forthe crossover point or rather the point of maximumambiguity where cases have both a membership andnon-membership score of 5 in a given set (Ragin 20002008a) Furthermore a fuzzy set (A) can be negated and it isdenoted by ldquo~Ardquo (Ragin 2008b) The membership in the setldquo~Ardquo can be calculated as 1 minus the fuzzy membership inthe set ldquoArdquo For example if we have a countrywith amember-ship score in the set of ldquocountries with high maternity leaverdquoof 6 the membership score in the negated set ldquocountries withnot high maternity leaverdquo is 4 Thus denoting with k thenumber of causal conditions all their possible combinationswith their negations are 2k and they represent the rows of aldquotruth tablerdquoOur analysis is computed with the current version of the

fsQCA software package 25 (Ragin Drass amp Davey 2006)By relying on the Quine-McCluskey algorithm or method ofprime implicants it permits a logical reduction of the detectedcombinations After calculating the number of cases withgreater than 5 membership score in each combination therelevant combinations of causal conditions are selectedaccording to their frequency When the total number of casesis relatively small the frequency threshold should be 1 or 2(Ragin 2008b) We set as acceptable a frequency higher thanor equal to 1 Finally the validity of the detected combinations


is assessed with the calculation of consistency (the measure atwhich each combination can lead to the outcome) andcoverage (the measure of how many cases with an outcomeare the results of a particular causal condition) They arecalculated with the following

Consistency X lt Yeth THORN frac14 summin XYeth THORN=sumX

Coverage X lt Yeth THORN frac14 summin XYeth THORN=sumY

whereX is the membership score of cases in a given configura-tion of causal conditions and Y is the membership score ofcases in the outcome set The minimum recommended thresh-old to accept a solution as consistent is 75 (Ragin 2006 2008a)

Selection Criteria of Cases and ConditionsIn line with Kogut and Ragin (2006) the selection of cases andconditions was particularly consistent with our substantiveand theoretical interests and it required a systematic dialoguebetween ideas and evidence While the selection of causalconditions underlies a reasoned synthesis of theoreticalarguments and empirical evidence previously discussed thechoice of comparing the EU countries1 stems from two mainmotivations On the one hand EU countries show differentperformance in terms of female representation on boards ac-cording to their different economic cultural and regulatoryenvironments (Kang Chen amp Gray 2007) Given thisheterogeneity it is very challenging to explore whether arelative superiority of a particular institutional model existsOn the other hand the European Union is very committedin the debate about gender diversity on boards as it has askedpublicly listed companies to increase the female representa-tion on boards to 40 percent by 2020 While some countrieshave introduced some form of regulation others have optedfor voluntary or recommendatory initiatives (Huse ampSeierstad 2014) Furthermore recognizing the disproportion-ate involvement of women in part-time work and thepersistence of the traditional caregiver model the EuropeanUnion has asked member states to provide a major numberof inexpensive and high-quality childcare services suitableforms of parental leave for bothmen andwomen and bindingquotas for increasing the presence of women in positions ofresponsibility These circumstances have created a commonpurpose on how to have more women on boards but theyrequire further investigation A key questionwould bewhetherregulatory policies enacted in some countries might be transfe-rable to others and the role that institutional complementaritiesmay have in shaping female representation on boardsIn this study countries are analyzed as configurations of

welfare labor and cultural institutions We also include regu-latory policies about board gender quotas to investigate theirrole in the existing national configurations With the aim ofelecting the causal conditions to be included in the analysisthe three main institutional domains have been detailed inspecific national attributes While welfare institutions includemeasures about maternity leave paternity leave parentalleave and childcare services labor institutions are expressedin terms of the total amount of female labor force and thepercentage of women involved in part-time work Nationalculture corresponds to the overall level of gender equality in



society and it can be measured using the Global Gender GapIndex Finally regulatory policies refer to the form ofregulation for female participation on board (gender quotasor corporate governance codes) Moreover in order to expressthese conditions quantitatively we conducted a documentaryanalysis of the main legal texts statistics and documentswhich contain information about the phenomenon under in-vestigation (Bailey 1994 Payne amp Payne 2004 Scott 1990)They are mainly provided by the Council of Europe FamilyPolicy database (2009) OECD Family Database (2012)Margherita OrsquoDorchai and Bosch (2009) EU-SILC (2012)the International Review of Leave Policies and RelatedResearch (Moss 2014) the International Labor Organization(2010) the EUrsquos Mutual Information System on Social Protec-tion (MISSOC 2014) and World Economic Forum (2013) Inthis way a systematic review of legislation for each one ofthe 27 European Union countries was madeTables A1 andA2 in the appendix show our datamatrix and

descriptive statistics In the following section we detail thedescription of both causal conditions and outcome and wediscuss the criteria of their calibration in fuzzy sets

Data Description and Set CalibrationOutcome Measures A higher number of women on

boards is the outcome of our interest Data about women onboardswere taken from the European Commissionrsquos databaseon women and men in decision making (European Commis-sion 2012a) containing information on 582 companies corre-sponding to 5910 board members The companies coveredare the largest (primarily blue-chip index members) publiclylisted2 companies in each of the 27 European member states(maximum 50 per country) As described in the methodologi-cal section of the European Commission database (EuropeanCommission 2014) in countries with unitary (one-tier) sys-tems the board of directors is counted as including non-executive and executive members and data cover the mainboard plus the members of the most senior executive body(eg executive committee) In countrieswith two-tier systemsdata cover executive and non-executive members of bothboards but only the supervisory board is counted Individualssitting on more than one decision-making body are countedonly once and employee representatives are excluded Inorder to express how many women there are on boardscompared with the total number of board members we usethe percentage and not the absolute values Moreover we takeinto account data from both executive and non-executiveboardmembers as we are interested in the attainment of thosepositions held by women through their career paths ratherthan their performance in the boards of directors While toachieve perfect balance between men and women requiresthe presence of 50 percent women on the boardmuch researchhas demonstrated that the critical mass of women directors isreached when boards of directors have at least 30 percentwomen The President of the European Commission invitedpublicly listed companies to voluntarily increase womenrsquospresence on corporate boards to 30 percent by 2015 and 40percent by 2020 while following the example of Norway theEuropean Womenrsquos Lobby recommended European memberstates to adopt legislation requiring certain companies to have40 percent of women on their boards of directors by 2015 and


50 percent by 2020 (Armstrong amp Walby 2012) By applyingthese substantive guidelines as external criteria to calibratemeasures of sufficient or insufficient presence of women onboards in a country we considered 30 percent as the fullmembership threshold for sufficient gender diversity onboards Although this does not constitute adequate proof ofequality it does represent a significant achievement Thus thethree thresholds chosen to calibrate our outcome are 30 percentfor full membership 20 percent for the crossover point of max-imum ambiguity and 10 percent for the full non-membershipFor these reasons we specify this target as the set of ldquoEUcountries with a higher number of women on boardsrdquo

Maternity Leave3 Since parental leave can be designed invery different ways we have adopted careful criteria to makewelfare institutions between EU countries more comparableIn particular only the statutory amount for maternity and pa-ternity leave was considered Moreover thanks to fuzzy logicwe are able to take into account the level of generosity of ma-ternity and paternity leave by using a more fine-grained mea-sure of these attributes rather than their mere presence (1) orabsence (0) Finally even though uptake of leave can differgreatly from that allowed for by legislation the laws providea condition that precedes the possibility of actually takingleave Thus they mirror the gendered nature of welfare poli-cies which potentially emphasize the prevailing role ofwomen in family responsibilities The calibration was doneconsidering a crossover point of maximum ambiguity of150days approximately corresponding to the minimumvalue of days recommended by the European ParliamentThe thresholds for full membership and full non-membershipwere defined with an equal distance interval from the cross-over point 250days and 50days respectively The result is atarget set of ldquoEU countries with high maternity leaverdquo

Paternity Leave4 A majority of members of the EU Parlia-ment have approved a full paid paternity leave of at least twoweeks (Thomsen amp Urth 2010) For this reason the paternityleave set calibration was computed by considering theminimum number of days recommended by the European Par-liament as the full membership threshold ie 15days Conse-quently the crossover point and the full non-membershipthreshold were defined with an equal distance interval fromthe fullmembership value 9days and 3days respectively Itwillbe the target set of ldquoEU countries with high paternity leaverdquo

Parental Leave5 In our analysis we considered only paidparental leave as the sum of both mother and father quotasFrom Directive 201018 of the Council of Europe we knowthat a minimum period of four months of parental leave foreach parent is recommended (European Union 2010) There-fore in order to consider a countrywith a significant provisionof parental leave we established a full membership thresholdof 240days corresponding to about eight months if we con-sider both parents As above the crossover point of maximumambiguity and the full non-membership threshold are140days and 40days respectively We called this target theset of ldquoEU countries with high parental leaverdquo

Childcare Services6 This concept refers to the availabilityof childcare services across EU countries Data were taken


TABLE1

Truth

Table

High

maternity

leav

e

High

paternity

leav

e

High

parental

leav

e

High

child

care

services

High

gend

ereq

uality

High

leve

lof

regu

latio

n

High

female

labo

rforce

High

female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

tNo

ofcasesa

High

numbe

rof

wom

enon

boards

Raw

consistencyb

PRI

consistency

SYM

consistency

01

11

11

10

11

100

100

100

01

11

11

11

11

100

100

100

01

11

10

11

11

91

72

79

01

11

10

10

21

861

72

11

00

10

11

10

74

00

00

11

10

11

10

61

29

29

01

00

11

11

10

61

31

31

00

11

11

11

10

52

18

18

00

10

11

11

10

50

00

01

01

01

12

049

05

05

01

10

10

10

40

48

24

24

00

00

10

11

10

47

19

19

11

10

10

10

10

44

11

10

10

10

10

20

408

08

00

10

10

10

20

39

13

13

01

01

10

10

10

30

01

00

01

01

11

028

00

00

00

10

01

10

20

00

00

01

01

02

01

00

a No

ofcasesTh

enu

mberof

theEurop

eancoun

trieswith

greaterthan

5mem

bershipin

that

combina

tionof

cond

ition

sThe

ydisplaythoseconfi

guratio

ns

bRaw

consistencyrepresen

tstheprop

ortio

nof

casesin

each

truthtablerow

that

displaytheou

tcom

e


copy 2015 John Wiley amp Sons LtdVolume bullbull Number bullbull bullbull 2015

TABLE 2Truth Table Analysis

Model HighWOBa

= f(HighPALpb

HighMLc

HighPLd

HighFCHse

HighFlff

HighGEg

HighREGh

HighFpti

)

Rows 19

Algorithm Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---

Frequency cutoff 1

Consistency cutoff 080

Rawcoverage

Uniquecoverage

j

Consistency

HighPALp ~HighML HighPL HighFCHs HighFlf HighGE 49 49 85Solution Coverage 49Solution Consistency 85Cases with greater than 5 membership in terms of the solution Slovenia SwedenFinland Denmark France

aHigh Number of Women on BoardsbHigh Parental LeavecHigh Maternity LeavedHigh Paternity LeaveeHigh Formal Childcare ServicesfHigh Female Labor ForcegHigh Gender EqualityhHigh RegulationiHigh Female Part-Time EmploymentjUnique coverage is the rate of the sample that is covered by this specific pathway

FIGURE 1Representation of the Solution

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y-se

t mem

bers

hip

in th

e ou

tcom

e H

igh

WO

B

Fuzzy-set membership in solution HighPALp ~ HighML HighPL HighFCHs HighFlf HighGE

Typical Cases

Deviant Cases for Consistency


from Eurostat the statistical office of the European Union Forour analysis data relating to formal services with durationhigher than or equal to 30hours for children aged less than


3years (0ndash2 years) were chosen According to the objectivesof the Barcelona Summit member states aimed to removeobstacles to female participation in the labor force and tomeet



the demand for more childcare services for at least 33 percentof children less than 3years of age This target represents ourthreshold of full membership Following the principle of rangeequality the crossover point was established at 20 percent asthis percentage is neither too far nor too close to the Barcelonaobjectives In a similar vein the full non-membership wasdefined as 10 percent as it does not get close to meeting theseobjectives This will be the target set of ldquoEU countries withhigh level of formal childcare servicesrdquo

Female Participation in the LaborMarket Data on femaleemployment was taken from the Global Gender Gap Reportof the World Economic Forum (2013) and include a measureof the proportion of a countryrsquos working-age population(15ndash64) that engages in the labor market The agenda ofEurope 2020 proposes as a main goal the achievement of ageneral employment rate for women and men of 75 percentfor the 20ndash64 years age group as 75 percent is estimated tobe full employment where everybody who wants to get ajob should be able to do so At the same time the LisbonStrategy aimed to achieve by 2010 female employment of 60percent In line with EU recommendations we propose athreshold of full membership at 65 percent of female employ-ment That represents a middle point between what had to bedone and what may be done in the coming years Then thecrossover point of maximum ambiguity and the fullnon-membership threshold are 45 percent and 25 percentrespectively with equal intervals from the crossover pointWe called this target the set of ldquoEU countries with high levelof female labor forcerdquo

Female Involvement in Part-Time Jobs Female part-timeemployment rates were taken from the Global Gender GapReport of the World Economic Forum (2013) and representthe percentage of women of the total female employment ina country involved in part-time jobs Since 1997 (Directive81) the European Union has urged the removal of discrimina-tion against part-time workers and the promotion of qualitypart-time work (Burri amp Aune 2013 Eszter 2013) Womenare the majority of part-time workers in the EU with 321percent of women working part-time compared with only 9percent of men This circumstance has a negative impact onfemale career progression training opportunities and the gen-der pay gap (Burri amp Aune 2013) Then in order to consider acountry as having a significant female involvement in part-time work we argued that a value of 35 percent of the wholefemale labor force indicates a strong imbalance between theway in which women and men stay in the labor marketFollowing the principle of range equality the crossover pointwas established at 20 percent and the threshold for full non-membership was defined as 5 percent This will be the targetset of ldquoEU countries with high level of female part-timeworkrdquo

Global Gender Gap Index Data regarding the global gen-der gap index were taken from the Global Gender Gap Reportof the World Economic Forum (2013) This index was devel-oped to capture the magnitude of gender-based disparitiesIn particular it seeks to measure important aspects of genderequality across four key areas namely health educationeconomics and politics and it ranks a large set of countriesin accordance with their scores in gender equality between 0


and 1 For our aims this index represents a suitable aggregatemeasure to assess the presence of gender equality in societiesFirstly it is independent from the countriesrsquo levels of develop-ment For example it is clear that rich countries can offer moreeducation and health opportunities to all members of theirsocieties Secondly it is based on outcome rather than inputsThis means that its focus is on the results achieved in outcomeindicators (eg the number of legislators managers or seniorofficials) rather than in policy indicators (eg length ofmaternity leave) According to the logic with which the globalgender gap index has been constructed we have calibratedcases by establishing a threshold of 5 for the crossover pointof maximum ambiguity 1 for full membership and 0 for fullnon-membership The result is a target set of ldquoEU countrieswith high level of gender equalityrdquo

Forms of Regulation Data regarding the legal or volun-tary regulation of female representation on boards were takenfrom several sources such as the European Commissionrsquosprogress report (2012b) the European Commission NationalFactsheets (European Commission 2013) Catalyst Report(2014) Terjesen et al (2014) By recognizing that the forms ofregulation differ greatly between EU countries we made aparticular distinction between countries with gender boardquotas and countries with forms of self-regulation (such ascodes of good governance) In this way we assigned the valueof 1 to EU countrieswhere gender quotas occur 5 to EU coun-tries with some forms of self-regulation and 0 to countriesthat do not adopt any of the foregoingHowever if a thresholdof the crossover point is established at 5 for example thecalibration becomes problematic as several countries presentthis value and their membership score in the fuzzy set wouldbe 5 In this way cases can be conceptually ambiguousbecause they are neither in nor out of the target set (Ragin2008b) For this reason we established that 55 could be thecrossover point of maximum ambiguity Following the princi-ple of range equality the thresholds for full membership andfull non-membership were defined with an equal distanceinterval from the crossover point In particular the formercorresponds to a level of regulation more than or equal to90 percent (9) the latter corresponds to less than or equal to20 percent (2) because it does not satisfy in any way theaim of gender balance on boards This target set correspondsto the set of ldquoEU countries with a high form of regulation forfemale representation on boardsrdquo

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The truth table resulting from calibrations is shown inTable A3 The analysis was made at two levels Firstly weindividually analyzed the sufficiency and necessity of eachcausal condition of a higher number of women on boardsAfterwards we proceeded to examine their combinedsufficiency in order to explore joint causation and equifinalityBy definition a necessary condition represents a superset of

the outcome set in away that no case could show the outcomewithout the condition Hence the fuzzymembership scores inthe causal conditions must be greater than or equal to fuzzymembership in the outcome (Ragin 2008b) The consistencyof necessary conditions is the result of the following



Consistency Y lt Xeth THORN frac14 summin XYeth THORNsumY

To reduce the likelihood of true logical contradictions theconsistency threshold for considering a condition as necessaryneeds to be 90 or higher (Schneider amp Wagemann 2012) Asshown in Table A4 the conditions that pass this thresholdare (1) high level of labor force (100) (2) high level of genderequality (98) and (3) not high level of maternity leave (92)However the different size of sets requires an evaluation ofthe corresponding values of coverage in order to check forrelevance and triviality The formula of coverage of necessaryconditions is useful to establish whether the outcome set ismuch smaller than the condition set It is

Coverage Y lt Xeth THORN frac14 summin XYeth THORNsumX

Figures A1-A3 report the graphical representations of thedistributions of countries in each necessary condition Sincethe greater the value of coverage the greater the relevance ofnecessary conditions we should consider ldquonot high maternityleaverdquo as a necessary condition to achieve a higher number ofwomen on boards because it is fully consistent and has agreater value of coverage than the others (39) Neverthelessthere is another form of triviality that should be avoided iewhen the necessary condition might be a constant because itoccurs in most of the cases under investigation (Schneider ampWagemann 2012) To check relevance without triviality wemade use of the formula proposed by Schneider andWagemann (2012)

Relevance of Necessity frac14 sum 1 xeth THORNsum 1min x yeth THORNeth

According to Schneider and Wagemann if a necessarycondition is a constant the resulting values of relevance areclose to 0 and they indicate triviality conversely they are closeto 1 Table A4 shows that for each condition that passes thethreshold of consistency we obtained very low values ofrelevance Definitively these conditions cannot be consideredrelevant due to their constancyFurthermore we tested the individual sufficiency of each

causal condition employed in our analysis Interestingly wefound that none of them can be considered a sufficient condi-tion leading by itself to a higher number of women on boardsIndeed their consistency values are not considerably accept-able for establishing individual sufficiency In line with thecriteria of calibration the condition ldquohigh level of regulationrdquorefers to the presence of gender quotas at board level Itsconsistency value is around 50 showing that gender quotasare not a sufficient condition by themselves to achieve ahigher number of women on boards The correspondingresults are shown in Table A4The existence of necessary but non-sufficient conditions

(individually) implies a conjunctural causation because theycould be sufficient if combined with others (Schneider ampWagemann 2012) In order to explore conjunctural causationwe performed the joint analysis of sufficient conditions andthe logical minimization of the truth table After calculating


all the possible combinations (28) the number of cases for eachconfiguration was determined by selecting a frequencythreshold of 10 The outcomewas found by setting ldquocountrieswith a higher number of women on boardsrdquo to 1 for eachconfiguration (row) whose consistency level meets andorexceeds the threshold of 75 as shown in Table 1Since there were not logical reminders (logically possible

configurations which were not empirically observed acrosscases) in Table 2 we report the results corresponding tothe complex solution or rather that solution which limitsthe analysis to the observed cases without counterfactualsFor this reason the complex solution is also defined as aconservative solution (Schneider amp Wagemann 2012)Conversely when certain types of assumptions are madeabout logical reminders the analysis produces even theparsimonious and intermediate solutions as broadlydescribed elsewhere (eg Ragin 2008b 2009 Schneider ampWagemann 2012)Our complex solution provides a single configuration of suf-

ficient country-level conditions leading to a higher number ofwomen on boards This pathway displays a consistencyhigher than the threshold of 85 which coincides with theoverall solution consistency while the coverage shows a valueof 49 which is very acceptable More in depth this configura-tion corresponds to the EU countries with high paternityleave not highmaternity leave high parental leave high levelof childcare services high level of female labor force and highlevel of gender equality They are Slovenia Denmark SwedenFinland and France which have greater than 5 membershipin this configuration

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

To address the lack of a complementary-based approach in theliterature about gender diversity on boards this study investi-gates whether and how certain institutional domains in na-tional environments are causally and jointly related to agreater presence of women on boards and explores the natureof their complementarities Alongside it seeks to empiricallyassess the role of board gender quotas in the existing nationalconfigurations to infer more about the reasons for their adop-tion and diffusion The core assumption in Proposition 1adraws on institutional complementarities theory to argue thatthe more ldquonon-genderedrdquo the welfare labor and culturalinstitutions the higher the number of women on boardsThe empirical evidence provides support for a number of

our propositions Particularly Proposition 1b has been sup-ported by the presence of countries with particular nationalconfigurations where high paternity leave not high maternityleave high parental leave high level of childcare serviceshigh level of female labor force and high level of gender equal-ity are sufficient conditions to achieve a higher number ofwomen on boards Moreover these results support that takenjointly certain institutional arrangements inwelfare labor andcultural environments are causally related to female represen-tation on boards of directors However we cannot infer thesame for the condition ldquonot high level of female part-time em-ploymentrdquo since it is missing in the unique configurationThis was probably due to its lack of consistency with the otherconditions because there are countries such as Denmark and



France where female part-time employment is higher than inthe others even though their values are closer to the crossoverpoints than to the threshold of full-membership in the set ofldquohigh level of female part-time employmentrdquoIn line with our expectations in Proposition 2a board

gender quotas are found not to be a necessary condition toachieve a higher number of women on boards In practicalterms there are countries where the particular configurationof national institutions is sufficient to foster the presence ofwomen in top corporate positions without enacting genderquotas at board level (ie Slovenia Denmark and Sweden)However contrary to our assumption in Proposition 2b wefind that board gender quotas are not a sufficient conditionto achieve a higher number of women on boards Bearing inmind the definition of sufficient conditions this result issupported by the existence of countries which do not show ahigher number of women on boards despite the enactmentof mandatory gender quotas (eg Belgium Spain and Italy)As gender quotas are found not to be a sufficient condition bythemselves our findings do not support the existence ofequifinal pathwayswhich can lead to greater female represen-tation on boards As a result they cannot be considered asequally effective andmutual substitutes of a ldquonational modelrdquoin which gender equality is radically embedded in eachinstitutional domainIn Figure 1 we graphically display our findings As suffi-

ciency implies that conditions are subsets of the outcomethe membership score of a country in the sets of the formerhave to be equal to or smaller than its membership in the setof the latter This means that all cases should be above or onthe main diagonal Interestingly the XY plot shows somequalitative differences between countries By discussing thesedifferences we propose comparative within-case studies tocorroborate our assumptions and assess the role of boardgender quotas within the existing national configurationsAccording to the principles of post-QCA cases studies de-

scribed in Schneider and Wagemann (2012) ldquotypical casesrdquoabove the main diagonal are those which satisfy high valueof consistency and coverage in both the sufficient configura-tion and the outcome (Finland Sweden and France) whilecases with good values in the sufficient solution but not inthe outcome set are labeled ldquodeviant cases for consistencyrdquo(Slovenia) Denmark represents a very difficult case as it staysbelow the main diagonal Denmark contradicts the statementof sufficiency despite its membership in both solution andoutcome This circumstance substantiates what has beennoted elsewhere exactly that Denmark represents a ldquodeviantrdquocase among the Nordic countries (Teigen 2012) due to itsmore limited gender equality tradition in politics In fact theskepticism about gender quotas on boards has led Denmarkto opt for soft regulationBy focusing on typical cases Finnish French and Swedish

national configurations show that the high gender neutralityand consistency between their institutions are sufficient tolead to more women on boards In line with the results ofGrosvold and Brammer (2011) most of these typical casesare primarily Nordic European culture-oriented countrieswhere the embeddedness of gender equality in national cul-ture is widely recognized Conversely we reveal that Francehas a good performance in terms of female representationon boards While this finding diverges from the evidence


that generous welfare institutions in countries with Frenchand Germanic legal heritages lead to lower levels of womenon boards (Grosvold amp Brammer 2011) it is really consis-tent with our assumptions Indeed France Sweden andFinland share the highest provision of childcare serviceshighest paternity and parental leaves and highest level offemale employment between EU countries Taken togetherthis evidence highlights that assessing the influence ofwelfare institutions on women on boards requires anadditional focus on their level of gender equality more thanon their mere generosity The presence of more gender-neutral institutions which are aligned and mutually rein-forcing enhances the presence of un-gendered structures inpower institutions and leads countries to better perform interms of gender diversity on boards Under our rationaleit is not surprising that Sweden France and Finland presentsome of the highest rates of women on boards between EUcountries Given the assumption of institutional complemen-tarities underlying the theory-informed Proposition 1a it isreasonable to conclude that the less the gender perspectiveis embedded in these institutional domains the higher thepresence of women on boardsAlthough they were not necessary in this ldquoidealrdquo configura-

tion gender quotas for boards of directors have been enactedin Finland and France This circumstance suggests that inthese countries the implementation of gender quotas mightbe due more to diffusion or legitimization reasons rather thanto rational sources Kogut ampRagin (2006 47) argue that ldquodiffu-sion depends upon existing configurations This means that ifnorthern European countries share a thousand years of insti-tutional and ideational diffusion they aremore likely to adoptinstitutions from each other than from other regions becausethe institutional compliance is more likelyrdquo Certainly the in-troduction of board-level gender quotas has become a sociallyexpected policy followingNorwayrsquos initiative and their diffu-sion among EU countries seems to be not so much related torational and efficiency reasons Even though gender quotasare a near zero-cost policy for nations (Brogi 2013) other costsmay arise for companies In this vein several scholars contendthat the introduction of board-level gender quotas can haveambiguous effects on firm performance (eg Ahern ampDittmar 2012 Ferreira 2014 Terjesen et al 2014 Toomey2008) but isomorphic behaviors or reasons of sociallegitimacy tend to disguise these aspects As shown in therecent work of Seierstad Warner-Soslashderholm Torchia andHuse (2015) the EU represents a key influential actor inpolitical debates on potential regulations for female represen-tation on boards The EU pressure has been particularlyvisible in the case of Germany Despite great skepticism andstrong political disagreement about gender quotas Germanyhas recently enacted quotas law 30 percent of supervisoryboard positions must be held by women from 2016 Theseinsights underline an important implication if reasons ofinstitutional isomorphism or social legitimization prevail wecan expect that changes might occur in other particularlyskeptical countries (eg Denmark) as well as in countries likeFinland or France where the institutional setting is alreadyfavorable to having more women on boardsAnother relevant implication of our research is related to the

fact that the presence of institutional complementarities canexplain why introducing a new institution into a given system



might fail to achieve the intended objective (Deeg 2007) Onthe one hand our findings give evidence of what has beennoted in previous research (eg Adams amp Kirchmaier 2013Bergstoslash 2013) if gender quotas contribute to reinforcegendered or negative attitudes toward women they cannotbe very effective and they need to be combined andcomplemented with more gender-neutral family laws andpolicies promotingwomen at all levels of their career advance-ment not just at board level On the other hand the highcomplementarity between institutions in a ldquogenderedrdquoperspective might contribute to slow down the changemaking gender quotas not a sufficient condition by them-selves to achieve a greater presence of women on boards Thismight be the case for countries such as Italy Belgium orSpain where gender quotas are not combined with a nationalenvironment particularly devoted to gender equality Forinstance Italy is not considered as a gender-egalitarian societyand its performance in terms of women in board positions israther disappointing (Seierstad et al 2015)Overall this study makes several contributions For

scholars we refine and expand insights from the extant litera-ture on gender diversity on corporate boards We make afurther step in this stream of research by finding theoreticaland empirical support for the existence of complementaritiesbetween the main institutional domains affecting women onboards In this way we open a window for future researchwhich might address a plurality of phenomena related to cor-porate boards in a configurational and complementarities-based approach (eg composition and demography ofcorporate boards the effectiveness of corporate governancedesign or corporate governance practices) We also preparethe ground for future investigations on institutional changefor women on boards Indeed ldquoif institutional complementa-rities exist then change in one institution should precipitatechange in complementary institutionsrdquo (Deeg 2007 622) Bytaking a configurational perspective this study also makesan important methodological contribution to the corporategovernance literature Set-theoretic methods enable theempirical investigation of the theoretically derived existenceof conjunctural relations between certain causal conditionsBy employing them we provide an empirical demonstrationof the joint influence ofwelfare labor and cultural institutionson the presence of women on boards Moreover fsQCAallows for a depth comparison between countries particularlyuseful to gain relevant insights about the mechanisms of thediffusionadoption of board gender regulationFrom a practical perspective this research presents notable

implications for policymakers Our insights may better drivetheir choice about which mix of policies might be necessaryto improve female representation on boards and especiallyin which institutional domains they should be endorsed Ifthe determinants of female representation on boards stemfrom particular institutional arrangements the aim shouldbe to achieve gender neutrality in each institutional domainGiven the high interconnection between welfare labor andcultural institutions and the mutually reinforcing effects oftheir complementarities it may be more effective to imple-ment policies involving all these institutional domains ratherthan introducing regulatory policies just at board level Inaddition as quota laws may have ambiguous effects onboards of directors and firm performance (see eg Ahern amp


Dittmar 2012 Ferreira 2014 Terjesen et al 2014 Toomey2008) more rational-driven policies might consider the actualnecessity and sufficiency of gender quotas in the existingnational configurationsHowever this study suffers some limitations First even

though fsQCA methodology allows for the exploration ofcausal relationships complementarities and synergisticeffects it relies mainly on the subjectivism of researcherchoices To contain this limitation we made our criteria inthe selection of cases causal conditions and calibrationparticularly transparent Second we focus mainly on institu-tional environments without taking into account the charac-teristics of national companies and corporate governancesystems and practices Our choice stems from the evidencethat legal and cultural environments play the most role inshaping gender balance on boards rather than governanceand business systems (Grosvold amp Brammer 2011)However as the national differences in types and systemsof corporate governance may have some effects future re-search could investigate the existence of complementaritiesbetween firm-level and corporate board-level characteristicsin a comparative perspective and their joint influence onwomen on boards Third our analysis included the differ-ence between the implementation of gender quotas and softregulation but the enforcement of the law varies greatlyClearly when the enforcement is strong as in Norway orFrance then there is a direct relationship between thenumber of women on boards and quota However whenthe enforcement is weak ndash as in Spain ndash the consequencesmay be feeble Further in-depth case studies could overcomethis limitation by exploring the role of enforcement withregard to the actual necessity and sufficiency of genderquotas on boards Finally as our sample was limited in sizewe did not perform additional statistical tests Futuredevelopment of this research could include European andnon-European countries In doing so it would be particu-larly interesting to deepen our insights relating to themechanisms of adoption and diffusion of gender regulatorypolicies for boards of directorsTo conclude through this research we contribute to concep-

tualizing the problem of female underrepresentation onboards as embedded within broader gender-related socialissues According to our assumption we propose women onboards as the outcome of a set of complementary institutionsand re-frame them in terms of set relations In line withAmable (2000) acknowledging the effects of interacting insti-tutions is very important for theoretical research and policyrecommendations Thus we reveal that the more the genderperspective is embedded in several institutional domainsthe lower the presence of women in the overall powerstructure and therefore in top corporate positions Thereforelegislative initiatives should consider that the introduction ofgender quotas at board level might not be sufficient if genderinequality persists in other institutions

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank the Associate Editor and fiveanonymous reviewers for their valuable comments andsuggestions that significantly improved this manuscript


TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES

1 The EuropeanUnionwas established on 1November 1993with 12member states Their number has grown to the present 28 througha series of enlargements Since we compared EU countries fromJanuary 2013 to June 2013 we had to exclude Croatia from theanalysis because its entry in the European Union has occurredon July 2013 Thus the number of cases we employed in ouranalysis is 27 but they constitute de facto a population rather thana sample

2 Publicly listedmeans that the shares of the company are traded onthe stock exchange The largest companies are taken to be themembers (max 50) of the primary blue-chip index which is anindex maintained by the stock exchange covering the largest com-panies by market capitalization andor market trades (EuropeanCommissionrsquos Database 2012a) More in depth a) in cases wherethe blue chip index covers a large number of companies only the50 largest are taken into account b) in cases where the blue chipindex does not cover enough companies companies with the nextlargestmarket capitalization are taken into accountwhen possiblec) non-national companies (ie those registered in another countryaccording to the ISIN code) are excluded so that the data for eachcountry cover only companies registered in that country(European Commission 2014)

3 According to OECDrsquos definition maternity leave is anemployment-protected absence for employed women in a periodaround the time of childbirth As the aim is to protect the healthof the mother and newborn child this leave is generally takenprior to (pre-birth leave) and immediately after childbirth (post-birth leave) Most EU countries have compulsory pre-birth leaveand they provide public income support payments during thisperiod In some countries maternity leave is included in generalparental leave schemes (eg Sweden Germany)

4 Paternity leave is an employment-protected absence for employedfathers It is much shorter than maternity leave and it usuallystarts soon after the birth of child Because of the short period ofabsence workers on paternity leave often continue to receive fullwage payments In some countries paternity leave is part of theparental leave schemes (fatherrsquos quotas) rather than establishedas a separate right In our analysis we considered paternity leaveavailable to fathers only

5 Parental leave provides paid or unpaid leave to parents for childcare It is often supplementary to specific maternity and paternityleave periods and it usually follows the period ofmaternity leave

6 Data were provided by the EU-SILC and the European statisticson income and living conditions the reference source for compar-ative statistics on income distribution and social inclusion in theEuropean Union Formal childcare services include fourEU-SILC survey variables namely pre-school or equivalenteducation compulsory education centre of childcare servicesoutside school hours and day-care centre of child care organizedor controlled by public or private sector Formal childcare servicesare classified by age group and duration as the percentage of thepopulation of each age group

Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69


copy 2015 John Wiley amp Sons Ltd Volume bullbull Number bullbull bullbull 2015

TABLE A2Descriptive Statistics

Criteria of calibration

Variable MeanStddev Minimum Maximum

Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership

Women on Boards 1468 675 35 286 27 0 30 20 10Maternity Leave 12848 3293 98 227 27 0 250 150 50Paternity Leave 1048 1715 0 90 27 0 15 9 3Parental Leave 43544 41508 0 1095 27 0 240 140 40Form of Regulation -- -- 0 1 27 0 090 055 020Childcare Services 1603 1334 1 59 27 0 33 20 10Female Part-timeEmployment

2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5

Female Labor Force 6474 762 43 77 27 0 65 45 25Gender Equality 73 04 6707 8453 27 0 1 05 0

TABLE A3Results of Calibration and Fuzzy Sets

EUcountries

Set of EUcountrieswith ahigher

number ofwomen onboards

Set of EUcountrieswith highlevel of

maternityleave

Set of EUcountrieswith highlevel ofpaternityleave

Set of EUcountrieswith highlevel ofparentalleave

Set of EUcountrieswith highlevel offormal

childcareservices

Set of EUcountrieswith highlevel ofgenderequality

Set of EUcountries withhigh level ofregulation for

femalerepresentation

on board


female part-time

employment

Set of EUcountrieswith highlevel offemale

labor force

HighWOB HighML HighPL HighPALp HighFCHs HighGE HighREG HighFpt HighFlf

AT 08 24 01 100 02 81 39 93 91BE 11 21 05 77 83 84 98 92 81BG 07 91 95 100 03 81 01 03 83CY 02 33 01 01 43 74 01 20 88CZ 25 80 01 100 000 74 01 07 79DE 35 17 01 100 18 84 39 97 93DK 56 33 92 93 100 86 39 73 96EE 03 43 62 100 14 77 01 17 93EL 03 28 03 01 18 74 01 23 72ES 09 24 95 01 18 80 98 60 87FI 93 21 99 63 61 89 98 31 94FR 82 24 92 100 67 83 98 60 87HU 02 63 12 100 01 74 01 06 70IE 03 72 01 01 06 85 01 98 81IT 06 43 02 100 06 77 98 90 53LT 34 33 100 95 01 79 01 12 91LU 04 24 03 100 83 80 39 88 77LV 92 24 62 100 43 83 01 14 93MT 01 17 02 01 000 74 01 77 30NL 61 24 03 01 02 84 39 100 94PL 08 24 92 100 01 77 39 17 75PT 02 29 62 01 96 79 39 23 92

(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91

TABLE A4Analysis and Relevance of Necessity Conditions

Analysis of sufficientconditions

Outcome variable HighWOBOutcome variable HighWOB

Description Conditions tested Consistency Coverage Relevance Consistency Raw coverage

High Maternity Leave HighML 50 39 39 50Not High Maternity Leave ~HighML 92 39 20 39 92High Paternity Leave HighPL 72 46 46 72Not High Paternity Leave ~HighPL 41 20 19 41High Formal Childcare Services HighFCHs 57 49 49 57Not High Formal Childcare Services ~HighFCHs 57 23 23 57High Female Labor Force HighFlf 100 33 24 33 100Not High Female Labor Force ~HighFlf 26 39 39 26High Female Part Time Employment HighFpt 61 35 35 61Not High Female Part Time Employment ~HighFpt 64 33 33 64High Gender Equality HighGE 98 33 27 33 98Not High Gender Equality ~HighGE 38 51 51 38High Regulation HighREG 58 50 50 58Not High Regulation ~HighREG 71 28 28 70High Parental Leave HighPALp 80 32 32 80Not High Parental leave ~HighPALp 25 21 21 25



FIGURE A1XY PLOT ndash Distribution of Countries for Necessary Condi-

tion ldquoHigh Level of Gender Equalityrdquo


tion ldquoNot High Maternity Leaverdquo


tion ldquoHigh Female Labor Forcerdquo

FIGURE A4Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for ldquoHigh Level

of Maternity Leaverdquo

AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t

Maternity Leave (days)


of Paternity Leaverdquo

AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t

Paternity Leave (days)


of Parental Leaverdquo

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t

Parental Leave (days)




of Formal Childcare Servicesrdquo

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t

Formal Childcare Services ()


of Gender Equalityrdquo

AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation


of Female Part Time Employmentrdquo

AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t

Female Part Time Employment ()


of Female Labor Forcerdquo

AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t

Female Labor Force ()

FIGURE A12Distribution of Countries in the Fuzzy Set for ldquoHigh Num-

ber of Women on Boardrdquo

AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES

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Adams R B ampKirchmaier T 2013Making it to the top From femalelabor force participation to boardroom gender diversity ECGI Fi-nance Working Paper 3472013

Adams S M amp Flynn P M 2005 Local knowledge advanceswomenrsquos access to corporate boards Corporate Governance AnInternational Review 13 836ndash846

Aguilera R V amp Cuervo-Cazurra A 2004 Codes of good gover-nance worldwide What is the trigger Organization Studies 25415ndash443

Aguilera R V Filatotchev I Gospel H amp Jackson G 2008 An or-ganizational approach to comparative corporate governanceCosts contingencies and complementarities Organization Sci-ence 19 475ndash492

Aguilera R V amp Jackson G 2003 The cross-national diversity of cor-porate governance Dimensions and determinants Academy ofManagement Review 28 447ndash465

Ahern K R amp Dittmar A K 2012 The changing of the boards Theimpact on firm valuation of mandated female board representa-tion Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 137ndash197

Ahlering B amp Deakin S 2007 Labor regulation corporate gover-nance and legal origin A case of institutional complementarityLaw amp Society Review 41 865ndash908

Alon A 2013 Complexity and dual institutionality The case of IFRSadoption in Russia Corporate Governance An International Re-view 21 42ndash57

Amable B 2000 Institutional complementarity and diversity of so-cial systems of innovation and production Review of Interna-tional Political Economy 7 645ndash687

Amable B 2003 The diversity of modern capitalism Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

Amable B Ernst E amp Palombarini S 2005 How do financial mar-kets affect industrial relations An institutional complementarityapproach Socio-Economic Review 3 311ndash330

Aoki M 2001 Toward a comparative institutional analysis Cam-bridge MA MIT Press

Armstrong J amp Walby S 2012 Gender quotas in managementboards Brussels European Parliament

Aschcraft K L 1999 Managingmaternity leave A qualitative analy-sis of temporary executive succession Administrative ScienceQuarterly 44 240ndash280

Bailey K 1994 Methods of social research 4th edn New York FreePress

Bergstoslash K 2013 Women mean business Why and howNorway leg-islated gender balance on the boards of listed companies In SMachold M Huse K Hansen amp M Brogi (Eds) Getting womenon to corporate boards ndash A snowball starting in Norway Chelten-ham Edward Elgar

Brogi M 2013 Italyrsquos lessons learnt fromNorway In S Machold MHuse K Hansen amp M Brogi (Eds) Getting women on to corpo-rate boards ndash A snowball starting in Norway Cheltenham Ed-ward Elgar

Burri S amp Aune H 2013 Sex discrimination in relation to part-time and fixed-term work The application of EU and nationallaw in practice in 33 European countries Brussels EuropeanUnion

Campbell J L 2011 The US financial crisis Lessons for theories ofinstitutional complementarity Socio-Economic Review 9211ndash234

Connell R W 1987 Gender and power Society the person andsexual politics Stanford CA Stanford University Press

Council of Europe Family Policy Database 2009 Reconciliation ofwork and family life Available at wwwcoeintfamilypolicyda-tabase (accessed April 30 2009)


Crouch C 2005 Complementarity and fit in the study of compara-tive capitalisms In G Morgan R Whitley amp E Moen (Eds)Changing capitalisms Internationalization institutional changeand systems of economic organization 167ndash189 Oxford OxfordUniversity Press

De Anca C 2008Women on corporate boards of directors in Spanishlisted companies In S Vinnicombe V Singh R Burke DBilimoria amp M Huse (Eds)Women on corporate boards of direc-tors International research and practice 96ndash107 Cheltenham Ed-ward Elgar

Deeg R 2007 Complementarity and institutional change in capitalistsystems Journal of European Public Policy 14 611ndash630

Denis D K amp McConnell J J 2003 International corporate gover-nance Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38 1ndash36

Denzau A T amp North D C 1994 Shared mental models Ideologiesand institutions Kyklos 47 3ndash31

Doldor E Vinnicombe S GaughanM amp Sealy R 2012 Gender di-versity on boards The appointment process and the role of execu-tive search firms Equality and Human Rights CommissionResearch report 85

Esping-Andersen G 1990 The three worlds of welfare capitalismCambridge Polity

Esping-Andersen G 1999 Social foundations of postindustrialeconomies Oxford Oxford University Press

Eszter S 2013 Part-timework in EuropeAvailable at httpswwweurofoundeuropaeupublicationsreport2011working-con-ditions-law-and-regulationpart-time-work-in-europe (accessedAugust 11 2013)

European Commission 2012a Women and men in decision-makingAvailable at httpeceuropaeujusticegender-equalitygen-der-decision-makingdatabaseindex_enhtm (accessed August31 2015)

European Commission 2012b Women in economic decision-makingin the EU Progress report Luxembourg Publications Office of theEuropean Union

European Commission 2013 National factsheets Gender balance onboards Available at httpeceuropaeujusticegender-equal-ityfileswomenonboardswomenonboards-factsheet (accessedJanuary 2013)

European Commission 2014 Database on women and men indecision-making Methodology Available at httpeceuropaeujusticegender-equalityfilesdatabasewmid_methodology_dec_2014pdf (accessed August 31 2015)

EU-SILC 2012 Childcare arrangements Available at httpeceu-ropaeueurostattgmtabledotab=tableampinit=1amplanguage=enamppcode=tps00185ampplugin=1 (accessed September 2014)

European Union 2010 Directive 201018EU Implementing the re-vised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded byBUSINESSEUROPE UEAPME CEEP and ETUC and repealingDirective 9634EC Official Journal of the European UnionL6813ndashL6820

Ferreira D 2014 Board diversity Should we trust research to informpolicy Corporate Governance An International Review 23108ndash111

Fiss P C 2007 A set-theoretic approach to organizational configura-tions Academy of Management Review 32 1180ndash1198

Fiss P C 2011 Building better causal theories A fuzzy set approachto typologies in organization research Academy of ManagementJournal 54 393ndash420

Garcigravea-Castro R Aguilera V R amp Arintildeo M A 2013 Bundles offirm corporate governance practices A fuzzy set analysis Corpo-rate Governance An International Review 21 390ndash407

Grandori A amp Furnari S 2008 A chemistry of organization Combi-natory analysis and design Organization Studies 29 459ndash485

Grosvold J 2011 Where are all the women Institutional context andthe prevalence of women on the corporate boards of directorsBusiness and Society 50 531ndash555



Grosvold J amp Brammer S 2011 National institutional systems asantecedents of female board representation An empirical studyCorporate Governance An International Review 19 116ndash135

Houmlpner M 2005 What connects industrial relations and corporategovernance Explaining institutional complementarity Socio-Economic Review 3 331ndash358

Huse M amp Seierstad C 2014 Getting women on to corporateboards Consequences of the Norwegian gender balance law TheEuropean Financial Review 37ndash39

International Labor Organization 2010 Maternity at work A reviewof national legislation Findings from the ILO Database of Condi-tions of Work and Employment Laws Geneva ILO Availableat httpwwwiloorgwcmsp5groupspublicdgreportsdcommpubldocumentspublicationwcms_124442pdf(accessed August 31 2015)

Jackson G 2005 Toward a comparative perspective on corporategovernance and labour management RIETI Discussion PaperSeries 04-E-023

Jackson G amp Deeg R 2008 Comparing capitalisms Under-standing institutional diversity and its implications for interna-tional business Journal of International Business Studies 39540ndash561

Judge W Q Douglas T J amp Kutan A M 2008 Institutional ante-cedents of corporate governance legitimacy Journal of Manage-ment 34 765ndash785

Judge W Li S amp Pinsker R 2010 National adoption of interna-tional accounting standards An institutional perspective Corpo-rate Governance An International Review 18 161ndash174

Kang H Chen G amp Gray S J 2007 Corporate governance andboard composition Diversity and independence of Australianboards Corporate Governance An International Review 15194ndash207

Kang N amp Moon J 2012 Institutional complementarity betweencorporate governance and corporate social responsibility A com-parative institutional analysis of three capitalisms Socio-EconomicReview 10 85ndash108

Kogut B amp Ragin C C 2006 Exploring complexity when diversityis limited Institutional complementarity in theories of rule of lawand national systems revisited European Management Review 344ndash59

Lorber J 1994Paradoxes of gender NewHaven CT Yale UniversityPress

Mandel H amp Semyonov M 2006 A welfare state paradox Stateinterventions and womenrsquos employment opportunities in 22countries American Journal of Sociology 11 1910ndash1949

Mandel H amp Shalev M 2009 How welfare states shape the genderpay gap A theoretical and comparative analysis Social Forces87 1873ndash1912

Margherita A OrsquoDorchai S amp Bosch J 2009 Reconciliationbetween work private and family life in the European UnionLuxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Com-munities Available at httpeceuropaeueurostatdocuments32174945705547KS-78-09-908-ENPDF6180b5e6-e482-4d5f-a681-6a9bce05d733version=10 (accessed August 31 2015)

Martin P Y 2004 Gender as social institution Social Forces 821249ndash1273

Mayer K U 2009 Whose lives How history societies and institu-tions define and shape life courses Research in Human Develop-ment 1 161ndash187

Milgrom P amp Roberts J 1995 Complementarities and fit strategystructure and organizational change in manufacturing Journal ofAccounting and Economics 19 179ndash208

Misra J amp Moller S 2005 Familialism and welfare regimesPoverty employment and family policies Working Paper 399Luxembourg Income Study

MISSOC 2014 Comparative tables database Available athttpwwwmissocorgMISSOCINFORMATIONBASE


COMPARATIVETABLESMISSOCDATABASEcomparativeTable-Searchjsp (accessed August 31 2015)

Moss P (Ed) 2014 10th International Review of Leave Policies andRelated Research 2014 London International Network on LeavePolicies and Research Available at httpwwwleavenetworkorgfileadminLeavenetworkAnnual_reviews2014_annual_review_korrpdf (accessed August 31 2014)

Neale W C 1988 Institutions In M Tools (Ed) Foundations ofinstitutional thought vol 1 227ndash256 New York ME Sharpe

Nelson T amp Levesque L L 2007 The status of women in corporategovernance in high-growth high-potential firms Entrepreneur-ship Theory and Practice 31 209ndash232

North D C 1990 Institutions institutional change and economicperformance Oxford Oxford University Press

North D C 1991 Institutions Journal of Economic Perspectives 597ndash112

NtimCGamp Soobaroyen T 2013 Corporate governance and perfor-mance in socially responsible corporations New empirical insightfrom a neo-institutional frameworkCorporate Governance An In-ternational Review 21 468ndash494

Nugent J B amp Lin J Y 1995 Institutions and economic develop-ment In H Chenery T N Srinivasan amp J Behrman (Eds) Hand-book of development economics Amsterdam North-Holland

OECD 2012 Family database Available at wwwoecdorgsocialfamilydatabase (accessed August 31 2015)

Orloff A S 1993 Gender and the social rights of citizenship Thecomparative analysis of gender relations and welfare statesAmerican Sociological Review 58 303ndash328

Orloff A S 1996 Gender in the welfare state Annual Review ofSociology 22 51ndash78

Payne G amp Payne J 2004 Key concepts in social research LondonSage Publications

Ragin C C 2000 Fuzzy-set social science Chicago IL University ofChicago Press

Ragin C C 2002 Preacuteface In G De Meur amp B Rihoux (Eds)LrsquoAnalyse qualiquantitative compareacutee (AQQC-QCA) Approchetechniques et applications en sciences humaines 11ndash14 Louvain-la-Neuve Academia-Bruylant

Ragin C C 2006 Set relations in social research Evaluating theirconsistency and courage Political Analysis 14 291ndash310

Ragin C C 2008a Re-designing social inquiry Chicago IL Univer-sity of Chicago Press

Ragin C C 2008b Userrsquos guide to fuzzy-setqualitative compara-tive analysis Available at httpwwwuarizonaedu~craginfsQCAdownloadfsQCAManualpdf (accessed August 31 2015)

Ragin C C 2009 Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets(fsQCA) In B Rihoux amp C C Ragin (Eds) Configurationalcomparative methods Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA)and related techniques 87ndash121 London Sage Publications

Ragin C Drass K amp Davey S 2006 Fuzzy-SetQualitativeComparative Analysis 20 Tucson AZ Department of SociologyUniversity of Arizona

Ragin C C amp Rihoux B 2004 Qualitative comparative analysis(QCA) State of the art and prospects Qualitative Methods 23ndash13

Rediker K amp Seth A 1995 Boards of directors and substitutioneffects of alternative governance mechanisms Strategic Manage-ment Journal 16 85ndash99

Rihoux B 2006 Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and relatedsystematic comparative methods Recent advances and remainingchallenges for social science research International Sociology 21679ndash706

Schneider C Q ampWagemann C 2012 Set-theoretic methods for thesocial sciences A guide to qualitative comparative analysisCambridge Cambridge University Press

Scott J 1990 A matter of record Documentary sources in socialresearch Cambridge Polity



ScottW R 1987 The adolescence of institutional theoryAdministra-tive Science Quarterly 32 493ndash511

Seierstad C Warner-Soslashderholm G Torchia M amp Huse M 2015Increasing the number of women on boards The role of actorsand processes Journal of Business Ethics DOI101007s10551-015-2715-0

Singh V amp Vinnicombe S 2004 Why so few women directors in topUKboardrooms Evidence and theoretical explanationsCorporateGovernance An International Review 12 479ndash488

TeigenM 2012 Gender quotas on corporate boards On the diffusionof a distinct national policy reform In F Engelstad amp M Teigen(Eds) Firms boards and gender quotas Comparative perspec-tives 115ndash146 Bingley Emerald Group Publishing

Terjesen S Aguilera R V amp Lorenz R 2014 Legislating a womanrsquosseat on the board Institutional factors driving gender quotas forboards of directors Journal of Business Ethics 50 177ndash186

Terjesen S Sealy R amp Singh V 2009Women directors on corporateboards A review and research agenda Corporate Governance AnInternational Review 17 320ndash327

Terjesen S amp Singh V 2008 Female presence on corporate boards Amulti-country study of environmental context Journal of BusinessEthics 83 55ndash63

Thomsen H amp Urth H 2010 Costs and benefits of maternity andpaternity leave Brussels European Parliament

Toomey C 2008 Quotas forwomen on the boardDo theywork TheSunday Times June 8

Weimer J amp Pape J C 1999 A taxonomy of systems of corporategovernance Corporate Governance An International Review 7152ndash166

Williams J 2000 Unbending gender Why work and family conflictand what to do about it New York Oxford University Press

Williams J C 2005 The glass ceiling and the maternal wall inacademia New Directions for Higher Education 2005 91ndash105

World Economic Forum 2013 The Global Gender Gap ReportGeneva World Economic Forum

Zattoni A amp Cuomo F 2008Why adopt codes of good governanceA comparison of institutional and efficiency perspectivesCorporate Governance An International Review 16 1ndash15

Zattoni A Pedersen T amp Kumar V 2009 The performance ofgroup-affiliated firms during institutional transitions A longitudi-nal study of Indian firmsCorporate Governance An InternationalReview 17 510ndash523


Michela Iannotta is a PhD candidate in Management atSapienza University of Rome Italy She has published severalarticles in the area of human resource management and diver-sity management Her main research interests include institu-tional theory and its application in organizational studiesconfigurational theory complementarities-based approachesand research methods in organizational research

Mauro Gatti is Full Professor of Business Organization andHumanResourceManagement in the Department ofManage-ment at Sapienza University of Rome Italy He published sev-eral articles and monographs on corporate governancehuman resource practices and value creation with particularfocus on diversity management and corporate welfare Hismain research interests include firm governance and institu-tional theory work organization corporate welfare trainingand corporate universities

Morten Huse is Professor of Organization andManagement atBI Norwegian Business School and holds a Chair ofUnternehmensfuumlhrung Wirtschaftsethik und gesellschaftlichenWandel at the University of WittenHerdecke Most of hisrecent work concerns value-creating boards and womenon boards and he has published widely on these topicsBetween 2008 and 2014 he was member of Catalyst EuropeAdvisory Board and between 2010 and 2012 President ofthe European Academy of Management In 2013 he wonan awarded from TIAW (The International Alliance ofWomen) for Championing the Economic Empowerment ofWomen For 2014 he was awarded a research grant atSapienza University He is board chair of Goumlttingen Univer-sity Diversity Institute



institutional domains exists but a lack of holistic perspectivehas limited our knowledge of whether how and whichcountry-level factors in each institutional domain are inconjunctural causality with the representation of women onboards The second limitation is that the arguments aboutgender quotas have been relatively separate from studies ofinstitutional antecedents for women on boards with littleattention to the importance of existing national configurationsfor the introduction of new regulatory policies As a resultwhat remains rather unclear is whether gender quotas forcorporate boards are sufficient by themselves to achieve ahigher number of women on boards (Adams amp Kirchmaier2013 Bergstoslash 2013) or if they are substitutes or complementsin current national configurationsThis study adopts a configurational approach in exploring

the joint influence of particular institutional arrangements ondiversity on boards and the nature of their complementaritiesMore exhaustively we draw on institutional complementar-ities theory to argue that female representation on boards isthe outcome of a conjunctural causal relationship between cer-tain institutional conditions Furthermore we investigate therole of board gender quotas in the existing national configura-tions in terms of their sufficiency and necessity for genderbalance on boards In a comparative perspective the analysisexamines the 27 European Union countries and takes eachcountry as a configuration of specific conditions in four insti-tutional domains regulatory policies welfare states laborand cultural institutions In order to explore causal relationsand combinatory effects we employ fuzzy setQualitativeComparative Analysis (fsQCA) a set-theoretic methodparticularly suitable for studying countries in terms of theirmultiple memberships in sets of institutional attributes Ourfindings reveal a particular configuration of country-levelconditions where the effect of a single condition unfolds onlyin combination with other conditions supporting theexistence of complementarities and joint causal relationshipsIn addition they show that board gender quota legislation isneither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to achieve ahigher number of women on boards Such evidence suggeststhat their diffusion across countries could be due to institu-tional isomorphismmore than to efficiency or rational reasonsOverall this study makes two important contributions

First after identifying the key institutional domains to be in-vestigated we provide a systematic theoretical reasoningabout the influence of their complementarities in shaping gen-der balance on corporate board of directors Second the use ofa configurational approach provides an important methodo-logical contribution Through fsQCA we empiricallyexplore our theory-derived propositions and capture the com-plex relationships between country-level causal conditionsand the representation of women on boards As a result ourpaper refines and expands insights from the extant compara-tive corporate governance literature by opening a windowfor further complementary-based research concerning boardcomposition and demography For policy makers it providessome insights that can better drive their choice about whichmix of policies might be necessary to improve femalerepresentation on boards and especially inwhich institutionaldomains they should be implementedThe paper is structured as follows After the literature re-

view we discuss the theoretical framework and develop our


propositions The following sections describe the researchmethodology and the main findings resulting from the com-parative analysis Discussion and conclusions are providedin the last section

LITERATURE REVIEW

Institutions and Institutional ComplementaritiesInstitutional theory points out that institutions influenceeconomic activities organizational structure and humanbehavior Institutions represent the formal (eg laws consti-tutions) and informal constraints (eg taboos traditionssocio-cultural norms) which limit individuals and organiza-tional choices (North 1990) In other words they shape theinteractions of human beings and form expectations of whatpeople will do (Nugent amp Lin 1995) (Scott 1987 499) definesinstitutions as relatively resilient ldquosystems of social beliefs andsocially organized practices associated with varying func-tional arenas within social systemsrdquo such as work politicslaws or regulations In this vein any institution ldquofits into asystem of institutionsrdquo (Neale 1988 245) in a way that theyco-exist and co-evolve within a given structure by showingmutually reinforcing characteristics (Ahlering amp Deakin2007 Deeg 2007 JacksonampDeeg 2008) Extant research refersto this interdependence with the concept of institutionalcomplementarities Such a perspective is widespread in thecomparative capitalism literature because institutional com-plementarities are acknowledged as an important mechanismto explain the diversity of national institutional systems andtheir resistance to change (eg Amable 2003 Aoki 2001North 1991) For instance Amable (2000) argues that theoverall coherence of a ldquonational modelrdquo can be betterunderstood by considering a large set of interacting andinterrelated institutional arrangements rather than isolatedinstitutions Indeed when complementarities occur the exis-tence of an institutional form reinforces the existence of theothers this generates a ldquodynamic stabilityrdquo (Amable 2003)Generally complementarity between some elements stems

from the circumstance that employing one of them increasesthe value of employing the others (Aoki 2001 Milgrom ampRoberts 1995) From the institutional perspective comple-mentarities imply that the conjunction of two or more insti-tutions together enhances the performance of a given actor(eg organizations or national economies) However twomain logics are embodied in institutional complementarityWhen two or more institutions are organized around similarproperties and common principles the logic is similarityConversely the logic of contrast occurs when institutionswith different or contrasting properties coexist and onemakes up for the deficiencies of the other (Crouch 2005)While the latter logic implies a sort of compensation the for-mer refers to the presence of synergies between institutionsSince similar structures make coexistent institutionsmutually reinforced (Campbell 2011) the more alignedand consistent the institutions the better a given country-level outcome (Amable 2003)Although the complementarities-based approach has

spread in financial (eg Amable Ernst amp Palombarini 2005Campbell 2011) and corporate governance research (egAguilera Filatotchev Gospel amp Jackson 2008 Garcigravea-Castro








































RESEARCH METHOD



























TABLE1

Truth

Table

High

maternity

leav

e

High

paternity

leav

e

High

parental

leav

e

High

child

care

services

High

gend

ereq

uality

High

leve

lof

regu

latio

n

High

female

labo

rforce

High

female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

tNo

ofcasesa

High

numbe

rof

wom

enon

boards

Raw

consistencyb

PRI

consistency

SYM

consistency

01

11

11

10

11

100

100

100

01

11

11

11

11

100

100

100

01

11

10

11

11

91

72

79

01

11

10

10

21

861

72

11

00

10

11

10

74

00

00

11

10

11

10

61

29

29

01

00

11

11

10

61

31

31

00

11

11

11

10

52

18

18

00

10

11

11

10

50

00

01

01

01

12

049

05

05

01

10

10

10

40

48

24

24

00

00

10

11

10

47

19

19

11

10

10

10

10

44

11

10

10

10

10

20

408

08

00

10

10

10

20

39

13

13

01

01

10

10

10

30

01

00

01

01

11

028

00

00

00

10

01

10

20

00

00

01

01

02

01

00

a No

ofcasesTh

enu

mberof

theEurop

eancoun

trieswith

greaterthan

5mem

bershipin

that

combina

tionof

cond

ition

sThe

ydisplaythoseconfi

guratio

ns

bRaw

consistencyrepresen

tstheprop

ortio

nof

casesin

each

truthtablerow

that

displaytheou

tcom

e




Model HighWOBa

= f(HighPALpb

HighMLc

HighPLd

HighFCHse

HighFlff

HighGEg

HighREGh

HighFpti

)

Rows 19



Frequency cutoff 1


Rawcoverage

Uniquecoverage

j

Consistency




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y-se

t mem

bers

hip

in th

e ou

tcom

e H

igh

WO

B


Typical Cases























































ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES







Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t






AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation



AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES
























































































































































RESEARCH METHOD



























TABLE1

Truth

Table

High

maternity

leav

e

High

paternity

leav

e

High

parental

leav

e

High

child

care

services

High

gend

ereq

uality

High

leve

lof

regu

latio

n

High

female

labo

rforce

High

female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

tNo

ofcasesa

High

numbe

rof

wom

enon

boards

Raw

consistencyb

PRI

consistency

SYM

consistency

01

11

11

10

11

100

100

100

01

11

11

11

11

100

100

100

01

11

10

11

11

91

72

79

01

11

10

10

21

861

72

11

00

10

11

10

74

00

00

11

10

11

10

61

29

29

01

00

11

11

10

61

31

31

00

11

11

11

10

52

18

18

00

10

11

11

10

50

00

01

01

01

12

049

05

05

01

10

10

10

40

48

24

24

00

00

10

11

10

47

19

19

11

10

10

10

10

44

11

10

10

10

10

20

408

08

00

10

10

10

20

39

13

13

01

01

10

10

10

30

01

00

01

01

11

028

00

00

00

10

01

10

20

00

00

01

01

02

01

00

a No

ofcasesTh

enu

mberof

theEurop

eancoun

trieswith

greaterthan

5mem

bershipin

that

combina

tionof

cond

ition

sThe

ydisplaythoseconfi

guratio

ns

bRaw

consistencyrepresen

tstheprop

ortio

nof

casesin

each

truthtablerow

that

displaytheou

tcom

e




Model HighWOBa

= f(HighPALpb

HighMLc

HighPLd

HighFCHse

HighFlff

HighGEg

HighREGh

HighFpti

)

Rows 19



Frequency cutoff 1


Rawcoverage

Uniquecoverage

j

Consistency




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y-se

t mem

bers

hip

in th

e ou

tcom

e H

igh

WO

B


Typical Cases























































ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES







Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t






AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation



AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES










































































































































TABLE1

Truth

Table

High

maternity

leav

e

High

paternity

leav

e

High

parental

leav

e

High

child

care

services

High

gend

ereq

uality

High

leve

lof

regu

latio

n

High

female

labo

rforce

High

female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

tNo

ofcasesa

High

numbe

rof

wom

enon

boards

Raw

consistencyb

PRI

consistency

SYM

consistency

01

11

11

10

11

100

100

100

01

11

11

11

11

100

100

100

01

11

10

11

11

91

72

79

01

11

10

10

21

861

72

11

00

10

11

10

74

00

00

11

10

11

10

61

29

29

01

00

11

11

10

61

31

31

00

11

11

11

10

52

18

18

00

10

11

11

10

50

00

01

01

01

12

049

05

05

01

10

10

10

40

48

24

24

00

00

10

11

10

47

19

19

11

10

10

10

10

44

11

10

10

10

10

20

408

08

00

10

10

10

20

39

13

13

01

01

10

10

10

30

01

00

01

01

11

028

00

00

00

10

01

10

20

00

00

01

01

02

01

00

a No

ofcasesTh

enu

mberof

theEurop

eancoun

trieswith

greaterthan

5mem

bershipin

that

combina

tionof

cond

ition

sThe

ydisplaythoseconfi

guratio

ns

bRaw

consistencyrepresen

tstheprop

ortio

nof

casesin

each

truthtablerow

that

displaytheou

tcom

e




Model HighWOBa

= f(HighPALpb

HighMLc

HighPLd

HighFCHse

HighFlff

HighGEg

HighREGh

HighFpti

)

Rows 19



Frequency cutoff 1


Rawcoverage

Uniquecoverage

j

Consistency




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y-se

t mem

bers

hip

in th

e ou

tcom

e H

igh

WO

B


Typical Cases























































ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES







Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t






AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation



AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES



















































































































Model HighWOBa

= f(HighPALpb

HighMLc

HighPLd

HighFCHse

HighFlff

HighGEg

HighREGh

HighFpti

)

Rows 19



Frequency cutoff 1


Rawcoverage

Uniquecoverage

j

Consistency




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y-se

t mem

bers

hip

in th

e ou

tcom

e H

igh

WO

B


Typical Cases























































ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES







Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t






AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation



AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES


































































































































































ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS



TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES







Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t






AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation



AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES


















































































































TABLEA1

DataMatrix

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Boa

rd-Lev

elregu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

ompa

nies

Introduction

Improvem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

red

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

201979

112

1989

0540

7727

533

6918

1971

105

2002

3180

27781

132

6215

1987

227

2009

15547

8744

03

6320

1988

126

NA

00

19674

013

67

APPENDIX

(Contin

ues)


NOTES







Wom

enon

boards

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

C

WOB

Cov

e

AT

Austria

119

20BE

Belgium

129

18BG

Bulgaria

116

15CY

Rep

ublic

ofCyp

rus

77

20


TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT LT LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO SE

SI SK

UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 500 1000 1500

Fuzz

y se

t






AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SE SI

SK UK 0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT BE BG CY CZ

DE DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

06 07 08 09 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Gender Equality


of Regulationrdquo

AT

BG

CY CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

HU

IE LT

LU

LV MT

NL

PL PT

RO

SE

SI SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 02 04 06 08 1

Fuzz

y se

t

Regulation



AT BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 20 40 60 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE BG

CY

CZ

DE EE

EL

ES

FI FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

30 40 50 60 70 80

Fuzz

y se

t




AT

BE

BG CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE EL ES

FI

FR

HU

IE IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

0

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

1

0 10 20 30 40

Fuz

zy s

et

Women on board ()




REFERENCES


















































































































TABLEA1

(Con

tinue

d)

Wom

enon

boards

Welfare

prov

isions

Gen

der

equa

lity

Board-Le

vel

regu

latory

policy

Female

Participation

inthe

labo

rmarket

EU coun

tries

Wom

enon

boards

()

Com

panies

Introductio

nIm

provem

ent

ofmaternity

leave

Statutory

maternity

leav

e(day

s)

Introduction

improvem

ento

fpaternity

leave

Statutory

paternity

leav

e(day

s)

Paid

parental

leav

efor

mothe

rs

fathers

Form

alchild

care

services

()

Globa

lgend

erga

p

Form

ofregu

latio

nfor

female

represen

tatio

non

board

Female

part-tim

eem

ploy

men

t(

)

Female

labo

rforce

()

WOB

Cov

ered

With

data

ML

PLPA

LpFC

Hs

GGG

REG

Fpt

Flf

CZ

Czech

Rep

ublic

164

99

1968

196

NA

01095

1674

07

61DE

German

y179

3030

18781

968

98NA

01092

15778

538

71DK

Den

mark

208

1818

18921

960

126

1984

14224

59803

525

76EE

Estonia

78

1616

1999

140

2004

10435

14702

012

71EL

Greece

79

2424

19211

969

119

2000

20

15678

014

58ES

Spain

123

3333

19001

969

112

19311

980

2007

150

15733

122

66FI

Finlan

d286

2323

1978

105

1971

18158

22845

116

73FR

Fran

ce251

3636

19091

969

112

2002

141092

23759

122

66HU

Hun

gary

74

1414

1969

168

2002

5924

6676

06

57IE

Irelan

d87

1919

1969

182

NA

00

11785

039

62IT

Italy

110

3737

19501

972

140

2012

1330

11697

131

51LT

Lithua

nia

178

2424

1995

126

1995

28238

5721

010

69LU

Luxembo

urg

97

1010

1969

112

1962

2364

27733

530

60LV

Latvia

282

3030

1996

112

2002

101080

19760

011

71MT

Malta

35

2121

1996

981996

10

1671

026

43NL

TheNethe

rlan

ds215

2222

18891

966

112

2001

20

7773

561

73PL

Poland

118

1919

19241

972

112

20102

012

141092

5705

512

59PT

Portug

al74

1818

1963

120

1999

100

34724

514

70RO

Rom

ania

119

1010

2002

126

2004

5594

4694

012

56SE

Swed

en255

2626

19631

974

981980

10420

35817

518

77SI

Slov

enia

187

2020

1993

105

1993

90260

36744

011

67SK

Slov

akia

138

1010

19681

993

98NA

01092

4681

06

61UK

United

Kingd

om188

4444

19481

976

182

2003

140

3738

539

69






Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















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CY

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Women on board ()




REFERENCES





















































































































Nocases Missing

Fullmembership

Crossoverpoint

Full non-membership


2085 1327 3 61 27 0 35 20 5



EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force



(Continues)



TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















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Women on board ()




REFERENCES


















































































































TABLE A3(Continued)

EUcountries




maternityleave




childcareservices




on board


female part-time

employment


labor force


RO 08 33 12 100 01 76 01 17 67SE 84 17 62 100 97 87 39 40 96SI 40 21 100 97 98 81 01 14 88SK 13 17 01 100 01 75 01 06 79UK 41 72 92 01 01 81 39 98 91
















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REFERENCES


























































































































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REFERENCES




















































































































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REFERENCES



















































































































REFERENCES


















































































































institutional complementarities and gender diversity on ......institutional arguments on gender...

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