institute for security studies the western balkans and the eu

7/31/2019 Institute for Security Studies the Western Balkans and the EU

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Today, more than fteen years after the end of the wars that accompanied Yugoslaviasdissolution, the Balkan question remains more than ever a European question. Inthe eyes of many Europeans in the 1990s, Bosnia was the symbol of a collectivefailure, while Kosovo later became a catalyst for an emerging Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP). In the last decade, however, the overall thrust of the EUsBalkans policy has moved from an agenda dominated by security issues related to thewar and its legacies to one focused on the perspective of the Western Balkan statesaccession to the European Union.

This Chaillot Paper, which features contributions from authors from various parts ofthe region, examines the current state of play in the countries of the Western Balkanswith regard to EU accession. It brings together both views from the Balkans statesthemselves and overarching thematic perspectives.

For the rst time the European Union has become involved in the formation of newnation-states that also aspire to become members of the Union. The EUs transformativepower has proved effective in integrating established states; now it is confrontedwith the challenge of integrating new and sometimes contested states. Against thisbackground, this paper makes the case for a concerted regional approach to EUenlargement, and a renewed and sustained commitment to the European integrationof the Western Balkans.

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TheWesternBalkansandtheEU:thehourofEurope

126

EditedbyJacquesRupnik

CHAILLOTPAPER

ISBN 978-92-9198-187-8

ISSN 1017-7566

QN-AA-11-126-EN-C

doi:10.2815/24268

published by

the European UnionInstitute for Security Studies

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The WesTern Balkans

and The eU:

The hoUr of eUropeEdited by Jacques Rupnik

Chaillot Papers | June 2011


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Cover photograph: The Mostar Bridge. Peter Barritt/SUPERSTOCK/SIPAThe original image has been modifed.

In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) became an

autonomous Paris-based agency o the European Union. Following an EU Council

Joint Action o 20 July 2001, modifed by the Joint Action o 21 December 2006,

it is now an integral part of the new structures that will support the further

development o the CFSP/CSDP. The Institutes core mission is to provide analyses

and recommendations that can b e o use and relevance to the ormulation o the

European security and deence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also actsas an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels.

Chaillot Papersare monographs on topical questions written either by a member

of the EUISS research team or by outside authors chosen and commissioned

by the Institute. Early drafts are normally discussed at a seminar or study

group of experts convened by the Institute and publication indicates that the

paper is considered by the EUISS as a useul and authoritative contribution to

the debate on CFSP/CSDP. Responsibility for the views expr essed in them lies

exclusively with authors. Chaillot Papers are also accessible via the Instituteswebsite: www.iss.europa.eu

125Apr 11 The G-20: a paThWay To

effecTive mUlTilaTeralism?

Juha Jokela

124

Dec 10 eUropean involvemenT in The

araB-israeli conflicT

Muriel Asseburg, Michael Bauer,

Agns Bertra nd-Sanz, Esra Bulut

Aymat, Jeroen Gu nning, Christi an-Peter Hanelt, Rosemary Hollis,

Daniel Mckli, Michelle Pace,

Nathalie Tocci;

edited by Esra Bulut Aymat

123

Nov 10 lUe eT lafriqUe : les dfis

de la cohrence

Damien Helly

122

Oct 10 violence poliTiqUe eT paix

dans le monde araBe

Abdallah Saaf

121

Sep 10 chinas foreiGn policy deBaTes

Zhu Liqun

120

Apr 10 nUclear Weapons afTer

The 2010 npT revieW conference

Ian Anthony, Camille Grand,

ukasz Kulesa, Christian Mlling,

Mark Smith; edited by Jean Pascal

Zanders

119Nov 09 Back from The cold?

The eU and BelarUs in 2009

Margarita M. Balmaceda,

Sabine Fischer, Grzegorz

Gromadzki, Andrei Liakhovich,

Astrid Sah m, Vitali Silitski a nd

Leonid Zlotnikov; edited by Sabine

Fischer

118Oct 09 GloBal secUriTy in a

mUlTipolar World

Feng Zhongping, Robert Hutchings,

Radha Kumar, Elizabeth

Sidiropoulos, Paulo Wrobel

and Andrei Zagorski;

edited by Luis Peral with an

introduction by lvaro de Vasconcelos

117Jul 09 eU secUriTy and defence.core docUmenTs 2008

volUme ix

compiled by Catherine Glire

(also published in French)

116Jun 09 War crimes, condiTionaliTy

and eU inTeGraTion in

The WesTern Balkans

Judy Batt, Vojin D imitrijev ic,

Florence Hartmann, Dejan Jovic,

Tija Memisevic and

Jelena Obra dovic-Wochnik;

edited by Judy Batt and

Jelena Obra dovic-Wochnik

115

Avr 09 maGhreB : vaincre la peUr

de la dmocraTie

Lus Martinez

114Dec 08 neGoTiaTinG The final sTaTUs

of kosovo

Marc Weller

113Nov 08 ToWards a eUropean

defence markeT

Erkki Aalto, Daniel Keohane,

Christian Mlling and

Sophie de Vaucorbeil;

edited by Daniel Keohane

112Oct 08 eU secUriTy and defence.

core docUmenTs 2007

volUme viii

compiled by Catherine Glire

(also published in French)

2010 qUelle dfense eUropenne

en 2020 ?

Claude-France Arnould, Juha

Auvinen, He nri Bentgeat, Nicole

Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth, F.

Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,

Jacek Saryu sz-Wolski, Stefano

Silvestri, Alexander Stubb, Nuno

Severiano Teixeira, lvaro

de Vasconcelos, Alexander Weis etRichard Wright;

Prface de Catherine Ashton

Sous la direction dlvaro de

Vasconcelos

2009 The oBama momenT

eUropean and american

perspecTives

Alexandra Bell, John Bruton,

Tom Cargill, Joseph Cirincione,

James F. Dobbins, Nik olas Foster,

Daniel S. Hamilton, Bruce Jones,

Erik Jones, Ibrahim Kalin,

Andrew C. Kuchi ns, Michael

O Hanlon, Rouzbeh Parsi,

Glen Rangwala, Pawel Swieboda,

lvaro de Vasconcelos, Alex Vines,

Marcin Zaborowski;

edited by lvaro de Vasconcelos

and Marcin Zaborowski

2009 eUropean secUriTy and defence

policy The firsT 10 years

(1999-2009)

edited by Giovanni Grevi,

Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane

2009 WhaT amBiTions for eUropeandefence in 2020?

Claude-France Arnould,

Juha Auvinen, Henri Ben tgeat,

Nicole Gnesotto, Jolyon Howorth,

F. Stephen Larrabee, Tomas Ries,

Jacek Saryu sz-Wolski,

Stefano Silvestri, Alexander Stubb,

Nuno Severiano Teixeira,

lvaro de Vasconcelos,

Alexande r Weis and

Richard Wright;

edited by lvaro de Vasconcelos;

preface by Ja vier Solana

CHAILLOT PAPERS BOOKS


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CHAILLOT PAPERS June 2011

The WesTern Balkansand The eU: The hoUr

o eUropeMorton Abramowitz, Florian Bieber, Dejan Jovi, Robert Manchin, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,Sao Ordanoski, Momilo Radulovi, Jacques Rupnik, Denisa Sarajli-Magli, Igor tiks,Veton Surroi, Jovan Teokarevic; edited by Jacques Rupnik

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Ititut scuity stui

eu Ui

Paris

Director: lvaro de Vasconcelos

EU Institute or Security Studies 2011. All rights reser ved.

No part o this publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system or transmitted in any orm or by anymeans, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or

otherwise without the prior permission o the EU Instituteor Security Studies.

ISBN 978-92-9198-187-8ISSN 1017-7566QN-AA-11-126-EN-Cdoi:10.2815/24268

Published by the EU Inst itute or Security Studies andprinted in Cond-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur.

Graphic design by Hanno Ranck in collaboration with CL

Design (Paris).

Acknowledgements

The original idea or this Chaillot Paper derived rom views on the Balkansexchanged at the EUISS conerence in Sarajevo in May 2010. The initialdrats were discussed at a seminar in Paris in January 2011. The EUISSwould like to thank Jacques Rupnik or putting this project together, andto thank all o the authors and also participants in both meetings or

their contributions and comments. The work o the EUISS publicationsdepartment in bringing out this publication in record time is also grateullyacknowledged.

lvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, May 2011

NB Disclaimer regarding use o Macedonia/FYROM: the Institute ollowsthe EU and UN decision concerning the name o this country: FYROM/

ARYM (UN Resolutions 817 and 845/93). However, in this volume, someexternal authors have chosen to use dierent wording.


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excutiv summy 7

T B eu quti 17

Jacques RupnikInternational actors: the hour o Europe 18Regional dimensions o state-building and EU integration 20Member States as vectors or EU integration? 25Conclusions 27

pt o: a viw m t B 31

Tuig tiit it eU ut: t c Cti 33Dejan JoviIntroduction 33Croatias veold transition: rom war to peace 36Constructing a new narrative: making nationalism compatiblewith EU membership 40Conclusion 43

Bih t t cti t iiui timim 47

Denisa Sarajli-Magli

Introduction post-election change? 47Relations with neighbours 48

A shadow over democracy in BiH 50EU integration a declarative goal only 53

Agenda or the international community 55Conclusion: the EU is losing a war o rhetoric 58

T y t-Mivic titi i sbi: bm

ct 59

Jovan Teokarevic

Introduction 59The economy 60Politics 62European integration 69Kosovo 75Conclusion 78


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Mtg juy tw eU cci 79

Momilo RaduloviThe 2006 reerendum and its atermath 79Future prospects 86On track towards European integration 88

Conclusion 93

T ty Mci uim: a w wt i vytig! 95

Sao OrdanoskiGoverning by the polls 97

When Disneyland meets les Champs Elyses 99Exit strategy: take out more loans 103The name dispute 105Sharp divisions on EU perspectives 107Future prospects 108

T ui tt() i t B t eU: t xt wv 111

Veton SurroiAnomalies resulting rom Kosovos contested status 111The EUs unnished policy 113Regional dynamics o integration and disintegration 114Possible uture scenarios 116

A change o paradigm 118

pt Tw: hizt ctiv 121

T eu Ui citizi gim i t Wt B 123

Igor tiksIntroduction 123The EU and citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans 124Five ways to (mis)manage citizenship regimes in the Western Balkans 126Conclusion 134


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8T Wt B t t ICJ oii 135

Florian BieberIntroduction 135ICJ decision: precedent or not? 136Partition debate and uture Serbia-Kosovo relations 138

Disintegration debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina 140In what state are the Western Balkan states? 143

a u c? Buiig t u w i t B 145

Alina Mungiu-PippidiThe EU as a promoter o the rule o law 145Explaining the evolution o the rule o law 146Explaining the control o corruption 155

What to do next? 160

B ubic ii eU cci 163Robert ManchinEU accession still supported but not so ervently 165Little change in expectations concerning the dates or EU accession except in Bosnia and Herzegovina 168

T Us t eU i B kbui 173

Morton AbramowitzIntroduction 173Lessons o the past 174

A new era o Western policy cooperation under EU leadership 176

ax 181

About the authors 181Abbreviations 185


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excutiv summy

Today, more than teen years ater the end o the wars o Yugoslaviasdissolution, the Balkan question remains more than ever a Europeanquestion. In the eyes o many Europeans in the 1990s, Bosnia was the

symbol o a collective ailure, while Kosovo later became a catalyst oran emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the lastdecade, with the completion o the process o redrawing the map o theregion, the overall thrust o the EUs Balkans policy has moved rom anagenda dominated by security issues related to the war and its legaciesto an agenda ocused on the perspective o the Western Balkan statesaccession to the European Union, to which there has been a ormalpolitical commitment on the part o all EU Member States since theThessaloniki Summit in June 2003. The ramework was set, the politicalelites in the region were at least verbally committed to making

Europe a priority and everyone was supposedly amiliar with the policytools thanks to the previous wave o Eastern enlargement. With theregions most contentious issues apparently having been deused, theEU could move rom stability through containment towards Europeanintegration.

There are avourable trends to make this possible: the EU has emergedas the unchallenged international actor in the Balkans; the region,exhausted by a decade o confict, is recovering stability and the capacityto cooperate; the EU has no other equally plausible enlargement agenda

in sight and could use the direct involvement o some o its MemberStates in the region to acilitate the accession process.

There are three international actors that have recently reinorced theEUs role as the key player in the region: these concern the evolution othe respective roles o the United States, Russia and Turkey

The US. There has been a gradual convergence o European andAmerican policies in contrast to the underlying transatlantic tensionsthat accompanied the two US-led military interventions in the 1990s. The

last decade was marked by a steady Europeanisation o the internationalpresence in the Balkans, while the ocus o US attention continued to shitto other international priorities, including a G-2 with China, a reset


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with Russia, nuclear non-prolieration in Iran, the war in Aghanistanas a test or NATO and relations with Pakistan, the Israeli-Palestinianconfict as the key to peace in the Middle East, and, most recently, thestrategic implications o the 2011 democratic wave in the Arab world.

The Balkans is close to the bottom o the list, something which is notalways ully appreciated in the region.

Although scaling down the US engagement in the Balkans is consistentwith the process o European integration, now seen as the only game intown, the EU should encourage that engagement to continue, especiallyin view o the act that the United States enjoys strong credibility in theregion (particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia) and that its proessed primarygoal, precisely, is to assist the regions accession to the EU. In short:European integration strengthened by an Atlantic insurance policy.

Russia. Moscows approach in recent years was to ocus primarily onits relationship with Belgrade, acquiring a major stake in Serbias energysector in exchange or Russian backing o Serbias position over Kosovoin the UN Security Council. Ater the ICJ ruling o August 2010 onKosovo independence and Belgrades newound pragmatism, Russia toohas had to adjust. There is thereore likely to be only limited Russianobstruction in the Balkans, in the orm o an occasional reminder thatthe Kosovo precedent has implications or secessionist enclaves in theCaucasus and elsewhere. In other words, or Moscow the Kosovo issue

remains primarily a bargaining chip to be used or the urtherance oits own geopolitical ambitions in its near-abroad.

Turkeys policies are the third positive actor in relation to the EUs rolein the Balkans. There have been signicant positive developments inrelations between Turkey and several Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Greeceand Serbia), which suggest that old animosities inherited rom the pastcan be overcome. Turkey opened enlargement negotiations with the EUin October 2005 together with Croatia. The latter, however, seems likelyto join the EU in 2013 while the Turkish negotiation seems open-ended,

suggesting there is no direct connection between Turkeys accessionprospects and those o the countries o the Western Balkans.

It remains to be seen whether the avourable international environmentmakes it any easier or the EU to shape a coherent regional approach.The question goes back to the debate o the 1990s about the regionalpriorities o the Stability Pact or the Balkans versus the individualcompetition encouraged by the Stabilisation and Association Process.Today the EU must reconcile the diverse situations and relationships ithas established with individual countries o the region with the need

to deal with state-building issues such as borders and minorities, aswell as single market issues such as trade and communications, whichrequire a regional approach.

T Wt B t eU: t u eu


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excutiv summy

There are two ways o assessing the situation in the region. One is toadopt the perspective o the EU Commission in its progress reports andto establish, in true regatta spirit, a ranking o the Western Balkanscountries in their onward march towards EU membership. The other

is to combine a broader regional picture with the view rom the Balkanstates themselves (the main aim o this volume), which shows the limitso individual, country-by-country approaches to the shared problemsand remaining contentious issues and to EU integration.

The EU is dealing basically with three main categories o countries.Croatia is about to conclude its entry negotiations and is set to join theEU in 2013, although given the pace o reorm o the judiciary, not evenCroatia can aord to be complacent; the Former Yugoslav Republico Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro (now about to be joined by

Serbia) have EU candidate status; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovoremain the most dicult cases o belated transition rom protectoratesto prospective EU members. Albania should have been in the secondcategory but given extreme domestic political polarisation does notseem quite ready yet to give priority to the European agenda.

However, quite apart rom these avourable developments, the maincase or a regional approach to EU enlargement in the Balkans stemsrom the specic nature o the regions predicament: to reconcile theapparently contradictory tasks o nation-state building and European

integration. The major dierence with the countries o Central Europeis not just a time-lag or the degree o democratic consolidation but thequestion o statehood and state capacity. A democratic polity requiresrst o all a consensus on its territorial ramework. As long as this wasnot established in the atermath o the break-up o Yugoslavia and aslong as issues pertaining to borders and national minorities shaped thepolitical agenda, the chances o democratic consolidation remainedslim. With the independence o Kosovo the redrawing o the map hasbeen completed, but the successor states are still in the making: Kosovoin search o sovereignty and recognition; Bosnia and Herzegovina in

search o a post-Dayton constitution (replacing a constitution designedto end the war with one or a unctioning democratic polity); Serbia insearch o accepted/acceptable borders with both abovementioned states(an equation complicated by its non-recognition o Kosovo and theambivalence o its relations with Republika Srpska); Macedonia/FYROMin search o an identity and a name. For the rst time the EuropeanUnion, a project conceived in order to relativise states sovereignty, hasbecome involved in the ormation o new nation-states that also aspireto become members o the Union. Until now the EUs transormativepower has proved eective in integrating established states; now it is

conronted with the challenge o integrating contested states.


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T Wt B t eU: t u eu

The process o accompanying the creation o uture Member States hasimplications or the other closely-related aspect o state capacity. It isone thing or EU accession prospects to acilitate a reormist consensusamong candidate states and sometimes to help tip the political balancein avour o democratic orces (as was the case a decade ago in Slovakia,Romania and Bulgaria) at the expense o post-communist nationalists.It is another to acilitate institution-building and state capacity. The dualquestion o statehood and state capacity is a specic eature o South-East Europe and invites a search or a modied, adapted EU approachto enlargement. The argument that border and minority issues in theapplicant states are interdependent strengthens the case or a concertedregional approach to EU enlargement. The shared European roo canhelp deuse contentious territorial and institutional issues in parallelto the EU accession process.

This is where the role o EU Member States directly involved in theregion is o importance, although the contentious issues concerningthe territorial waters between Croatia and Slovenia or concerning theMacedonia/FYROM name dispute are a reminder that an EU neighbourneed not be a vector o integration. No less importantly, the Cypruslesson suggests that contentious issues should be solved prior to EUaccession when the European leverage is strongest.

It would be unwise to let the current impression o drit spread in the

region. The regatta approach seems to work ne or the EU, as it makesthe enlargement process discreet enough to make it acceptable to Westernpublic opinion and allegedly stimulating enough or the political elitesreormist agenda in the Balkan countries concerned. But this is alsowhere enlargement atigue within the EU meets accession atigue in theBalkans. The latter has two aces: the regions political elites sometimesuse verbal commitments to EU integration as a smokescreen or politicsas a business model while we witness the erosion o popular support orEU accession: strongest where it is least advanced, in Albania, weakestwhere it is most advanced, in Croatia.

The EU should strengthen the regional approach by giving all thecountries o the region candidate status and a date or the opening onegotiations. The pace and completion o the process will then dependon each countrys capacity to deliver, thus making their respectiveresponsibilities clear and the political costs involved more palatableto political elites in the region. But that, in turn, requires the EU toovercome its hesitation between containment and integration and torenew its commitment to the Balkans European uture in order torestore its credibility in the region and at international level.


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excutiv summy

p t B cuti t t eUcci

Croatia: The rontrunner or EU accession, Croatia expects to join in

2013. However, as the chapter on Croatia suggests, its accession pathis overshadowed by three ambiguities: (1) the political identity o thenew state shaped by its sel-perception as both a victim o and a victorin the wars o Yugoslavias dissolution: a victim o Serbian aggressionwho was not helped by Europe, yet a victor in the war which achievedmost o its objectives in nation-state building; (2) Croatia clearly avoursthe EU accession o the other Western Balkan countries in the longrun yet it also oten sees its own early entry as entailing a separationrom the Balkans; (3) Croatias moderate nationalist elites have becomeEurorealists, avouring early entry into the EU, while the population

seems clearly divided about the merits o joining the EU.

Serbia: A decade ater the all o Milosevic Serbia presents a contrastingsituation. On the domestic ront, Serbia is conronted with serious crises.They range rom economic slowdown and signicant deterioration in theliving standards o the majority o the population, resulting in widespreaddisillusionment among citizens that is easily detectable in every aspecto public lie. Yet at the same time democratic institutions have beenconsolidated and recently progress has been made in EU integration:the SAA agreement in 2008, the application or EU membership in

2009, the introduction o visa-ree travel within the EU in 2010 andSerbias candidate status should be conrmed in 2011. The consensuson Europe has grown but so has domestic disappointment with thepost-Milosevic democratic elites.

BiH: Bosnia is acing its worst crisis since the end o the war in 1995and EU integration in BiH remains a distant goal. The persistence onationalism ollowing the October 2010 elections has dealt a severe blowto the integration process, with ethnic blocs sidelining the EU agenda.Furthermore, despite indications o public support or EU integration,

statistics paint a depressing picture o the situation in BiH, refecting thedepth o the countrys social divisions and its lack o a common visionor the uture. The EU Commissions Progress Report in November2010 drew attention to the BiH authorities ailure to make progresson key EU reorms and clearly identied obstacles standing in theway o EU integration. It highlighted yet again the need or unctionalconstitutional reorm, including mechanisms enabling the state toenorce harmonisation with EU legislation across the entire country,and took note o the Progress Reports assessment that there had beenlittle progress with improving governance and the unctionality o the

state. The international communitys attempts to urge constitutionalreorm on the country are continually undermined by resistance amongthe political elites, particularly in Republika Srpska, which has turned


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into a state within a state under the presidency o Milorad Dodik .Unortunately, in the current climate, it seems that in BiH the EU isengaged in a war against the logic o conficting nationalisms, and it isnot winning this war.

Montenegro: The status o EU candidate country granted to Montenegro inDecember 2010 oers many opportunities and challenges to Montenegroand its government. However, there are still many serious problematicissues that need to be addressed urgently in order to speed up the EUintegration process and the overall democratisation o Montenegro.These problems are well-recognised internally and most o them areaddressed in the seven requirements set out by the EU as a conditionor oering a date or the opening o membership negotiations with theEU. It is now up to the Montenegrin government to show that it can

meet these conditions.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM): The country,like the rest o the region, has been severely aected by the globaleconomic crisis (with one third o the population hit by unemployment).The government has responded by an expansion o the public sectorwith huge decit spending and international borrowing. There are alsoconcerns about rule o law, independent media, and civil society. Butthe main obstacle to the countrys Euro-Atlantic integration processremains ormally the dispute over the name issue with Greece. Ater

two decades o ruitless diplomatic eorts and despite more requentocial meetings between the prime ministers o both countries in thelast year, the matter has not moved orward in any signicant way: thenational posture on both sides prevails.

Kosovo: Since Kosovos declaration o independence in February 2008none o the predicted catastrophic scenarios have materialised. Now,ollowing the ruling o the International Court o Justice o August2010 which declared that the declaration o independence was not incontradiction o international law, a new context is emerging. The process

leading up to independence was quite careully managed although anumber o problems have arisen since independence.

Although independence was the product o an international process itaces problems o international legitimacy. Since the joint UN resolutiono 2010 was drated by the EU and Serbia the question has moved romthe UN to the EU. Yet Kosovo was recognised only by 22 out o 27 EUMember States, which hampers the unity and eectiveness o the EUpresence there (EULEX).

Internally, Kosovo must address a number o challenges ranging romweak institutions to ghting organised crime. But externally it has tocombine the search or a new relationship with Serbia and EU integration.


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excutiv summy

What are the objectives o the negotiations with Serbia? To nd a modusvivendi? I so, in which context and or what period o time? Or is theaim to search or a historical accord as part o parallel EU accession?For the EU Kosovo will be among the tests o the eectiveness o

the CFSP post-Lisbon. For the rst time the EU is dealing with anunnished state, something requiring the establishment o rule olaw and institution-building in Kosovo and consensus and politicalcommitment in the EU.


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The Western Balkans

Source: The University o Texas at Austin, Library website (modied)


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T B euquti

Jacques Rupnik

In the immediate atermath o World War I which had started in theBalkans, Arnold J. Toynbee observed that what was then known as theEastern question was in act a Western question.1 Today, a decade ater

the end o the wars o Yugoslavias dissolution, the Balkan questionremains more than ever a European question. Bosnia was, in the eyes omany Europeans in the 1990s, the symbol o a collective ailure, whileKosovo later became a catalyst or an emerging Common Foreign andSecurity Policy. In the last decade, with the completion o the process oredrawing the map o the region, the overall thrust o the EUs Balkanspolicy has moved rom an agenda dominated by security issues relatedto the war and its legacies to an agenda ocused on the perspective o the

Western Balkan states accession to the European Union, to which therehas been a ormal political commitment on the part o all EU member

states since the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. The ramework wasset, the political elites in the region were at least verbally makingEurope a priority and everyone was supposedly amiliar with the policytools thanks to the previous wave o eastwards enlargement. With theregions most contentious issues apparently having been deused, theEU could move rom stability through containment towards Europeanintegration. What then is the dierence between Central Europe andthe Balkans? The answer is ten or teen years, the lost decade o theBalkans wars o the 1990s.

Beore endorsing such a reassuring presentation about the WesternBalkans we should examine the avourable regional developmentsand international trends, but also the contentious issues and obstaclesto the process. Some have to do with the uneven pace o reorm anddemocratic change in the region, others with doubts about the existenceo sucient political will and momentum within the EU to support arenewed and sustained enlargement process.

1. Arnold J.Toynbee, TheWestern Question in Greeceand Turkey (London:Constable & Co, 1922).


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T B eu quti

Itti ct: t u eu

The hour o Europe, the memorable phrase coined by Jacques Poos,

the Foreign Aairs Minister o Luxembourg and President o the EUCouncil in July 1991, was read in the Balkans at the very outbreak othe war as a display o presumably involuntary black humour. But twodecades later the EU has indeed emerged as the main international actorin the Balkans. There are three actors that have recently reinorced itsrole as the key player in the region and which concern the evolution othe respective roles o the United States, Russia and Turkey.2

The United States. There has been a gradual convergence o Europeanand American policies in contrast to the underlying transatlantic tensions

that accompanied the two US-led military interventions in the 1990s. Thelast decade was marked by a steady Europeanisation o the internationalpresence in the Balkans, while US priorities continued the shit away romEurope that had begun with 9/11. The list o Washingtons internationalpriorities today includes a G2 with China, a reset with Russia, nuclearnon-prolieration in Iran, the war in Aghanistan as a test or NATOand relations with Pakistan, the Israeli-Palestinian confict as the key topeace in the Middle East, and, most recently, the strategic implicationso the 2011 democratic wave in the Arab world.3 The Balkans is close tothe bottom o the list, something which is not always ully appreciated

in the region. To be sure, the visits to the region by Vice-PresidentBiden in 2009 and Secretary Clinton in 2010 showed a continuing USengagement that several actors in the region (the Bosniaks, Kosovars,

Albanians and Croats) deem crucial. But the general trend is clear enoughand is not likely to change anytime soon. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Heado Policy Planning at the State Department, recently presented the rstQuadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.4 It lists amongthe main themes: human security (as much as the military aspects),development (as important today as arms control issues were duringthe cold war), confict prevention and the response to ragile states and

divided societies. The Balkans was not mentioned, although all threeissues are o course directly relevant or the region.

There are occasional transatlantic dierences concerning the assessmento the regions stability and over Bosnia in particular,5 with some policyimplications: should the OHR be maintained or not? Is there a needor a US special envoy? There is also a consistent American insistenceon a rm European commitment to prosecute war criminals throughthe ICTY in The Hague. Finally, there is concern about the possibleimplications o European disunity over the recognition o Kosovo.

Although scaling down the US engagement in the Balkans is consistentwith the process o European integration now seen as the only game in

2. To assess the contrast withthe situation a decade agosee the relevant chapter onthe US, Russian and Turkishpolicies and the transatlanticassessment by Pierre Hassnerand Dana Allin in JacquesRupnik (ed.) InternationalPerspectives on the Balkans(Clemensport, NS: CanadianPeacekeeping Press, 2003).

3. lvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.),The Arab Democratic Wave,Report no. 9, EuropeanUnion Institute or SecurityStudies, Paris, March 2011.

4. Anne-Mar ie Slaughter,lecture at CERI, SciencesPo, Paris, 20 January 2011.

5. Richard Holbrookeand Paddy Ashdown, ABosnian powder keg , TheGuardian, 22 October 2008;also Patrice McMahonand Jon Western, in TheDeath o Dayton, Foreign

Aairs, September/October2009, present Bosnia

as being on the verge odisintegration and callor international action toprevent a new confict.


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town, the EU should encourage that engagement to continue, especiallyin view o the act that the United States enjoys greater credibilitythan the Europeans, particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia, and that itsproessed primary goal, precisely, is to assist the regions accession to

the EU. In short: European integration strengthened by an Atlanticinsurance policy.

Russia under Putin has tried to regain a major role in the Balkans. Inrecent years it has acquired a signicant capacity to make a nuisance oitsel and has staged something o a comeback to the region, no longerwith a vague rhetoric about solidarity with its Slav Orthodox brothersunder threat, but seizing rather on the Kosovo question and the issueo energy supply. Russia has acquired a decisive position in the Serbianenergy sector and Putins visit to Belgrade on 23 March 2011 was meant

to breathe new lie into the South Stream pipeline project. The Russiansare trying to convey to the European states the message that they shouldwelcome this r ival to Nabucco as part o a necessary diversication oenergy supply, especially given the current turmoil in the Middle East.The second parallel vector or Russias return to the Balkans has beenthe support it has given to Serbias claims on Kosovo. The consistency othe EU position on Kosovos sel-determination and the rozen confictsin the Caucasus has, predictably, been called into question by Russia.To claim that these are sel-serving arguments does not dispense withthe need to address the tension that exists between the legitimacy o

Kosovos independence and its dicult quest or international legalityand recognition (by 65 states so ar). The International Court o Justicesruling on August 2010 has considerably altered the picture. The currentgovernment in Belgrade is seen as being the most avourable to the EUin two decades. Their jointly proposed resolution in the UN and themore pragmatic stance taken by President Tadi, now ready to engagein concrete negotiations with Pristina, also has also implications orRussias role. Initially Belgrades approach was to make a deal withRussia, giving Moscow a stake in its energy sector while relying on itsbacking in the UN Security Council over Kosovo. Ater the ICJ ruling

and Belgrades new pragmatism, Russia can hardly be more Serbianthan the Serbs. There is thereore likely to be only limited Russianobstruction in the Balkans, in the orm o an occasional reminder thatthe Kosovo precedent has implications or secessionist enclaves in theCaucasus and elsewhere. In other words, or Moscow the Kosovo issueremains primarily a bargaining chip to be used or its own claims inits near-abroad.

Turkeys policies are the third avourable actor or the EUs role inthe Balkans. There have been signicant and on the whole positive

developments in the relations between Turkey and several Balkancountries (Bulgaria, Greece and most recently Serbia), which suggeststhat old animosities inherited rom the imperial past can be overcome.


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T B eu qutiTurkey opened enlargement negotiations with the EU in October 2005,beore the Balkan countries, which given that they used to be part othe Ottoman Empire, was rom their perspective not least among theparadoxes o Europeanisation. To the extent that, historically, their

national and European identities were constructed in opposition tothe Ottoman legacy, it is by no means sel-evident or them now toproclaim a concerted process o EU accession with Turkey.6 On theroad to Brussels, hitch your wagon to the Orient Express rom Istanbul!Following enlargement to include the countries o the ormer HabsburgEmpire, is the next step a post-Ottoman enlargement embracing south-eastern Europe?

The case or geographic proximity and or the coherence o EU policywith regard to its south-eastern neighbours can and has been made.

However, independently o its merits, the public reluctance that exists(particularly in Germany and France) with regard to EU accession byTurkey and the latters new assertiveness as an international player (itsvote against the EU at the UN, presenting itsel together with Brazil asa go-between in the negotiations with Iran), would suggest that, i oneis serious about bringing the Western Balkan states into the EU, onemay consider decoupling their European agenda rom that o Turkey. Ineither case there is nothing in current Turkish policy that could weakenthe EUs position in the Balkans as the only game in town.

rgi imi tt-buiig

eU itgti

It remains to be seen whether the avourable international environmentmakes it any easier or the EU to shape a coherent regional approach.The question goes back to the debate o the 1990s about the regionalpriorities o the Stability Pact or the Balkans versus the individual

competition encouraged by the Stabilisation and Association Process.Today the EU must reconcile the diverse situations and relationships ithas established with individual countries o the region with the needto deal with state-building issues such as borders and minorities, aswell as single market issues such as trade and communications, whichrequire a regional approach.

There are two ways o assessing the situation in the region. One is toadopt the perspective o the EU Commission in its progress reports andto establish, in true regatta spirit, a ranking o the Western Balkans

countries in their onwards march towards EU membership. The otheris to combine a broader regional picture with the view rom the Balkanstates themselves (the main aim o this volume), which shows the limits

6. For a recent study o theevolving perception o

Turkey see Bozidar Jezernik(ed.), Imagining The Turk(Cambridge: ScholarsPublishing, 2010).


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o individual, country-by-country approaches to the shared problemsand remaining contentious issues and to EU integration.

The annual reports on the Western Balkan countries released in November

2010 by the European Commission reveal a amiliar blend o encouragingsigns o progress and a long to-do list: the glass is both hal ull andhal empty. In normal circumstances this might pass as the prosaicroutine o the pre-accession process. But these are not quite normalcircumstances, either or the EU or the Balkans A brie examination orecent changes and o the remaining obstacles can help set the rameworkor reconsidering and accelerating the enlargement process.

The EU is dealing basically with three main categories o countries.Croatia is about to conclude its entry negotiations and is set to join the

EU in 2013; the ormer Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia7 (FYROM) andMontenegro (now to be joined by Serbia) have EU candidate status;Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo still remain or all practical purposestwo Europeanised semi-protectorates. Albania should have been in thesecond category but now seems adamant to prove it remains a separatecase. As or the pace o reorm,8 not even Croatia, the rontrunner, canaord to be complacent. In terms o economic perormance, in 2007it surely could have joined the EU with Romania and Bulgaria, withwhich it also shares the need to ght corruption and reorm its judiciary,which until recently had a backlog o almost two million cases pending.

It certainly lacks a track record in appointing independent judges,particularly or the politically sensitive cases. Under pressure rom the EUthis may be changing: ormer Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, the man whohelped Europeanise the nationalist HDZ inherited rom the Tudjmanera, has been in custody in Austria since December 2010 on charges omoney-laundering and embezzlement, while several members o thegovernment are also acing corruption trials. President Ivo JosipovisEuropean vision combining regional cooperation and EU integration9is certainly appreciated abroad, but is now conronted with mountingsocial discontent and euroscepticism at home.

At the bottom o the list are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo wheredivided polities and a dysunctional institutional ramework account, atleast in part, or the inability to ght corruption and organised crime.A senior EU representative remarked with regard to Bosnia that thisyears report could have been called the non-progress report. Themiddle group comprises FYROM, Montenegro and Serbia, with theirshared concerns regarding the rule o law and good governance, butwhere some progress is being made in terms o economic reorm andregional cooperation. The EUs belated visa liberalisation was certainly

the most positive signal sent to the people o the region. How couldthey believe in the uture o their country within Europe as long as theywere not allowed to travel there? Only Kosovo remains set apart in a

7. The Institute ollowsthe EU and UN decisionconcerning the name o thiscountry: FYROM/ARYM (UNResolutions 817 and 845/93).However, in this volume,external authors may haveused dierent wording.

8. Neil Mac Donald, Pace oreorm sets back CroatiasEU hopes, FinancialTimes, 3 March 2011.

9. Ivo Josipovic, Regionalcooperation and EUintegration: two oundationso the same process, speech

given at the KennedySchool o Government,Harvard University,11 February 2011.


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T B eu qutighetto. Candidate status has been granted to FYROM and Montenegro,but postponed or Albania: it is not sel-evident to invite a countrywhose June 2009 election results have still not been recognised by theopposition. The extreme and violent political polarisation has brought

parliamentary lie to a halt and the country to the verge o its worstcrisis since the nancial pyramid scandal o 1997.10 Candidate statuswill now be given to Serbia, because it was Belgrade that initiated someo the most encouraging changes o importance or the whole region.

In a clear departure rom the tone and substance o the Kostunicagovernments policies, in 2010 under Tadis leadership Serbia hasreplaced its pro-European stock phrases with an actual pro-Europeanpolicy. The rst necessary step was the normalisation o its relationswith its neighbours. Ater a decade o wars o Yugoslav dissolution

ollowed by a decade o recovery and stalemate, we have now seen aseries o concrete steps being taken towards the recognition o crimescommitted and a U-turn on the issue o Kosovo. Following tenserelations with Croatia ater mutual charges o genocide that were takento the International Court o Justice in 2009, President Tadi ound inhis newly-elected Croatian counterpart, Ivo Josipovi, a partner or adierent approach.11 Tadis speeches during his visits to Srebrenicain Bosnia and to Vukovar in Croatia were meant as part o a processo reconciliation, opening a new phase in Serbias relations with itsneighbours. Probably the main persisting obstacle to change in Bosnia

and Herzegovina is Republika Srpska which under Dodik behavesas a state within a state. The dierence, however, is that Belgrade nolonger supports its implicit separatism (and the same goes or Zagrebsattitude towards the Croats in Herzegovina). On 31 March 2010 theSerbian Parliament passed by a narrow majority (127 votes in a 250-seat legislature) a resolution accepting responsibility or a major crimecommitted by General Mladis troops in Srebrenica in 1995.12 A Serbo-Croatian commission has been created to deal with the most dicultbilateral problems, a welcome precedent or Serbias relations withKosovo. Independently o government eorts, a project sponsored by

the Institute or Historical Justice and Reconciliation suggests ways inwhich scholars rom Serbia, Croatia and other ex-Yugoslav successorstates can attempt to rid historiography o nationalist mythology andseek a shared narrative.13

It is indeed with regard to Kosovo that signicant and unexpectedchanges have occurred. Serbias endorsement o a joint resolution withthe EU at the UN General Assembly in September 2010 heralded aundamental change in its dealings with Kosovo. In the past Kosovo

Albanians considered the question o status as paramount, while Serbia

preerred to deal with the technical issues. Ater Kosovos declaration oindependence in February 2008 there was a reversal o roles: Belgradeconsidered status talks to be a precondition or solving the practical

10. Three men killed and sixtywounded in oppositionprotest, Mathew Brunwasser,Two Men Jostle or Power,

The New York Times, 26Janua ry 2011. Edi Rama, theSocialist mayor o Tirana,called demonstrationsagainst violence and crimewhile Prime Minister Berishadenounced an attemptedcoup dEtat. See also Albaniaand Kosovo: a bad week,The Economist, 27 January2011. Without consolidationo democracy there will belittle chance o a Europeanprospect or Albania.

11. Marek Kubista, Reprisedu dialogue entre la Serbieet la Croatie, Euractiv.

r, 29 March 2010.

12. Stephen Castle, Serbiascensure o 1995 massacrealls short or EU,International HeraldTribune, 1 April 2010.

13. Darko Gavri lovic andVjekoslav Peric a (eds.),Political Myths in the ormerYugoslavia and SuccessorStates: a Shared Narrative,

Institute or HistoricalJust ice and Reconcil iation(Dordrecht: The Republico Letters, 2011).


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problems while Pristina preerred to ocus on specics. In September2010 Serbia agreed to unconditional direct talks with Kosovo, primarilyconcerning Kosovo Serbs relations with Serbia, but also a series oconcrete bilateral issues (ranging rom customs to energy supply).

This shit in the Serbian stance ollows the International Court oJustice ruling o 22 July 2010 to the eect that Kosovos declaration oindependence is not contrary to international law. This was a blow orSerbia, which considered that it had a strong legal argument even i thepolitical realities on the ground were moving in a dierent direction.What has happened since the summer o 2010 could be described asgiving satisaction to the Kosovars, with the ICJ ruling and above all thetriumph o pro-European realism in Serbian politics. It was certainly alsoa success or the EU to have been able to drat a joint resolution withSerbia and emerge as the acilitator in the relations between Belgrade

and Pristina. As a result, it was possible or direct talks between Serbiaand Kosovo to start on 8 March 2011. Nobody can tell how long theywill take or what the outcome will be once the most sensitive issues(such as Mitrovica and Northern Kosovo) are on the table. But i theEU provides the appropriate backing and political incentives, we maybe closer to overcoming the most dicult security issue in the Balkansand what is potentially the main stumbling block in the EUs attemptsto stabilise and integrate the region.

One o the political obstacles to the development o regional cooperation

in the immediate atermath o the war was the underlying suspicion,particularly in Croatia, that it was an externally induced attempt toput back together something resembling ormer Yugoslavia. This is nolonger so, as Tim Judah so pertinently observed: From Slovenia to theMacedonian border with Greece, most people in the region still have alot in common, even i they do not talk about it too much. Every daythe bonds between them, snapped in 1990, are being quietly restored.

Yugoslavia is long gone; in its place a Yugosphere is emerging.14 This goesbeyond the rhetorical posturing o Presidents Josipovi and Tadiandconcerns trade and restored links between companies, proessions

and citizens. Without overestimating the potential spillover eect othese developments, they create a avourable context or approachingEU integration beyond the logic o emulation and individual accessionstrategies.

However, besides these avourable developments, the main case or aregional approach to EU enlargement in the Balkans stems rom thespecic nature o the regions predicament: to reconcile the apparentlycontradictory tasks o nation-state building and European integration.The major dierence with the countries o Central Europe is not just

a time-lag or the degree o democratic consolidation but the questiono statehood and state capacity. A democratic polity requires rst oall a consensus on its territorial ramework. As long as this was not

14. Tim Judah, Entering theYugosphere, The Economist,20 August 2009. A longerand more elaborate analysis

o the subject was presentedby the author in a researchpaper or the LondonSchool o Economics.


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T B eu qutiestablished in the atermath o the break-up o Yugoslavia and as longas issues pertaining to borders and national minorities shaped thepolitical agenda, the chances o democratic consolidation remainedslim. With the independence o Kosovo the redrawing o the map hasbeen completed, but the successor states are still in the making. In 1988Zoran Djindic called Yugoslavia an unnished state. Today Veton Surroicalls its successors unnished states: Kosovo in search o sovereigntyand recognition; Bosnia and Herzegovina in search o a post-Daytonconstitution (replacing a constitution designed to end the war with one ora unctioning democratic polity); Serbia in search o accepted/acceptableborders with both abovementioned states (non-recognition o Kosovoand ambivalence o its relations with Republika Srpska); Macedoniain search o an identity and a name. For the rst time the EuropeanUnion, a project conceived in order to relativise states sovereignty, has

become involved in the ormation o new nation-states that also aspireto become members o the Union. Until now the EUs transormativepower has proved eective in integrating established states; now it isconronted with the challenge o integrating contested states.

The process o accompanying the creation o uture member states hasimplications or the other closely-related aspect o state capacity. It isone thing or EU accession prospects to acilitate a reormist consensusamong candidate states and sometimes to help tip the political balancein avour o democratic orces (as was the case in Slovakia, Romania and

Bulgaria) at the expense o post-communist nationalists. It is anotherto acilitate institution-building and state capacity. The dual question ostatehood and state capacity is a specic eature o South-East Europeand calls or a modied, adapted EU approach to enlargement. Theargument that border and minority issues in the applicant states areinterdependent strengthens the case or a concerted regional approachto enlargement. The shared European roo is meant to help deusecontentious territorial and institutional issues in parallel to the EUaccession process.

To be sure, this is not a very popular argument with the Commission orthe most advanced candidate countries. Indeed, no countrys accessionshould be hostage to the intransigence o its neighbour. But given,or instance, the interaction between dierent aspects o the Serbianquestion (with Kosovo or Bosnia) it seems wise to build on the recentpositive developments in order to encourage a regional approach to theresolution o those issues.15

To sum up the avourable trends: the EU has emerged as the unchallengedinternational actor in the Balkans; the region, exhausted by a decade

o confict, is recovering stability and the capacity to cooperate; theEU has no other plausible enlargement agenda in sight and could use

15. C. Pour une nouvelle

entente balkanique,special issue oAnatoli(CEMOTI), CNRS, Paris,September 2010.


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the direct involvement o some o its member states in the region toacilitate the accession process.

Mmb stt vct eU

itgti?

It seems prudent rom the EUs perspective to make sure that contestedissues in relation to unnished statehood are settled during the accessionprocess when the EUs leverage is strongest. A related assumption is thatneighbouring EU member states can act as acilitators or sponsors orthat process o Europeanisation. A brie examination o some o the

remaining obstacles casts doubt on this assumption.

There are several contentious bilateral issues that could become seriousobstacles to the EU accession process. Croatia, to take the rontrunner,has pending border issues with most o its neighbours. The easiest oneto solve, or so it seemed, was that o Slovenias access to internationalwaters. But in recent years this has escalated into a potential stumblingblock or Croatias EU accession.16 Slovenias 2010 reerendum on theproposed solution was a high-risk gamble that could have caused amajor setback or Croatias EU prospects, with repercussions or the

rest o the Western Balkans.

The second bilateral confict that is becoming a serious obstacle on theroad to the EU concerns Macedonias quest or a post-FYROM nameand identity acceptable to its Greek neighbour. In 2009 Greece vetoedFYROMs accession to NATO and there is little indication that it intends tobe more fexible as ar as EU accession is concerned. FYROMs government(also exploiting adversity or domestic purposes) has now taken thatobstruction to the International Court o Justice in The Hague, accusingGreece o having breached the provisions o their 1995 Agreement.17

Above and beyond the unresolved name issue between Athens andSkopje, the Greek case has broader relevance or the EUs enlargementto the Balkans.* Given its history, socio-economic development andpolitical culture, Greece gives us an idea o what Bulgaria or Serbiawould be like i they had not experienced a communist regime aterWorld War II. A country that has been in the EU or some 30 yearsand has beneted considerably rom its structural unds now revealsthat it is bankrupt and does not have a unctioning state. It is not clearwho is supposed to learn rom whom. In any case, the Greek crisis isbad news or the Balkans, as it aects the way the region is perceived

within the EU; unless the countrys current nancial crisis and massive

16. For a detailed presentation

o the negotiations seeVasilka Sancin, Sloven ia-Croatia Border Dispute:rom Drnovsek-Racan toPahor-Kosor Agreement,in European Perspectives,October 2010, pp. 93-111.

17. The ICJ started examiningthe case in March 2011. SeeDnevnik (Skopje) 7 March2011. Not surprisinglyGreece is perceived by thecitizens o Macedonia as theEU state most hostile to their

accession while in SerbiaGreece is, on the contrary,seen as the most avourable(Gallup Balkan Monitor).

* Georges Prevelakis writes about the rebalkanisation o Greece in La Grce: trois dcennies danesthsianteuropen, in Gostratgiques, no. 31, 2011, pp. 97-109.


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T B eu qutiaid rom its EU partners brings home the message that this is not thetime to obstruct EU policy in the Balkans.

The Macedonian question reveals the tensions between EU policies

in the Balkans and those o some o its member states. Some o them(Greece, Austria, Italy) or historical and geographic reasons have beendirectly involved and have been considered in Brussels as vectors oEU infuence in the region. Others, such as new EU members Slovenia,Bulgaria and Romania, have a direct stake in the regions stability andaccession prospects. However, the problems aced by the latter two in therealm o the rule o law and the ght against corruption have increasedreservations within the EU with regard to the premature accession oother post-communist Balkan states. Proximity and involvement thusdo not automatically make an EU member state a acilitator in the

enlargement process.

The third warning or the EU in the region comes rom Cyprus. Itwas included in the 2004 eastern enlargement at the insistence oGreece, on the assumption that accession to the European Union wouldsimultaneously overcome the partition o the island in accordance withthe Annan Plan.18 We know what happened to that assumption and theway the EU proved unwilling or unable to make ull use o the leverageit enjoys at the moment o accession o a new member. The EU mustnow bear this in mind as the Cyprus lesson in its uture dealings with

the Western Balkans. There will be no EU enlargement without thepending bilateral conficts having been resolved rst.

These developments should suce to qualiy the widespread assumptionthat an EU member state automatically acts as a stabiliser and as anadvocate o a neighbouring countrys accession. Croatias inclusionin the EU would certainly contribute to stabilising its democracy andthe rule o law. However, the impact on neighbouring Bosnia andHerzegovina remains debatable, as Croats rom Bosnia and Herzegovina,holders en masse o Croatian passports, are losing interest in the uture

o their state. Croatia is the only European state with more votersthan citizens! The passports delivered by Romania to an estimated800,000 citizens in Moldova, or by Bulgaria (on a much smaller scale) tocitizens o FYROM pose a similar problem. What then is the Europeannorm in the matter? In his essay Igor tiks seeks in vain a coherentanswer to this question. It surely cannot be that o Viktor OrbansHungary, holding the EU Presidency in 2011 while oering citizenshipto Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states.19 But it conrms theimportance o questions concerning the nature o citizenship andcertain potentially destabilising eects o EU enlargement on some o

its new neighbours. Any EU enlargement policy in the Balkans shouldentail careul consideration o its impact on ragile states that are not

18. The UN plan was rejectedin a reerendum by theGreek Cypriots on 24

Apri l 2004, literally on theeve o EU accession. Fora detailed analysis o thecase, see Olga Demetriou,Catalysis, Catachresis: theEU impact on the Cypruscrisis, in Thomas Diezet al. (eds.), The EuropeanUnion and Border Conficts(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2008).

19. It provoked a sharprebuke rom Slovakia andthe threat to deprive any

members o the Hungarianminority opting orHungarian citizenshipo Slovak citizenship.


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included, and hence o its relationship with the EUs neighbourhoodpolicy and Eastern partnership.

Ccui

These are some o the main challenges and dilemmas conronting theEU in its approaches to the Western Balkans. The common wisdom which surely must be questioned is that the regatta approach worksne or the EU, as it makes the enlargement process discreet enough tomake it acceptable to Western public opinion and stimulating enoughor the political elites reormist agenda in the countries concerned. Nowonder Europeanisation looks dierent depending on whether it is

seen rom Brussels or rom the countries at the receiving end.

This is also where enlargement atigue within the EU meets accessionatigue in the Balkans. The latter has two aces: the regions politicalelites sometimes use verbal commitments to EU membership as asmokescreen or politics as a business model. No less important is theerosion o popular support or EU accession (strongest where it is leastadvanced, in Albania; weakest where it is most advanced, in Croatia).20

According to the Gallup Balkan Monitor, the majority o citizens in all thecountries concerned (except Croatia) would vote or EU accession even

though a majority in each o the EU candidate countries believes theircountry to be heading in the wrong direction.21 Hence the importanceo checking such premature doubts about a process which has a longway to go and cannot succeed without the support o the societiesconcerned. This points to the limited eects o initiatives such as asummit to commemorate a summit (Sarajevo 2010 celebrates Zagreb2000) and to the need or tangible measures that citizens can directlyidentiy with Europe. There is no doubt that visa liberalisation has beenthe most important such measure, both symbolically and politically,although provisionally leaving out Kosovo.

The agenda or the countries o the Western Balkans and or the EU seemsclear enough. For the ormer it entails addressing the doubts raised aboutthe rule o law ater the accession o Romania and Bulgaria by tacklingcorruption, nepotism and the preerence or by-passing legal norms.That implies dealing with the main sources o those phenomena, legacieso socialism (social capital means corrupt networks to get around thelaw), o the war economy (getting around embargoes by cooperatingwith organised crime) and o the market transition (with an opaqueand largely corrupt privatisation process). Last but not least: the use o

public sector employment or political patronage and state capture.

20. In Croatia we are witnessingthe emergence o two typeso euroscepticism. Therst, more amiliar, comesrom the nationalists andsovereigntists on the right othe political spectrum whoconsider that the EU didlittle or Croatia during the1990s war and that GeneralGotovina is a national herowhose handing over to theICTY in The Hague wasmade a condition or openingaccession talks with Croatia.The second comes rom the

young generation on thelet: during their March2011 demonstrations inZagreb they called or newelections, but also demandedthe renationalisation osome parts o the economy,with slogans such as Noto capitalism, No to theEU. This dual challengeto EU accession makes theoutcome o the orthcomingreerendum on EU entrya very uncertain one.

21. Gallup Balkan Monitor,Brussels; see also thechapter by RobertManchin in this volume.


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T B eu qutiThe dividing line in Balkan politics is not (or only very rarely) betweenliberal democrats who connect Europe with their civil societies, onthe one hand, and authoritarian radical nationalists, on the other.In most cases one is dealing with a continuum o nationalisms and

today the task o EU accession is mostly in the hands o governmentscomposed o moderate nationalists. The case o Croatia suggests thatpragmatic nationalists can be made eurocompatible: the evolution othe governments o the post-22Tudjman HDZ under Ivo Sanader andnow Jadranka Kosor (under pressure rom the EU and two successivepresidents, Mesi and Josipovi) paved the way. The process is now atwork in Serbia, which has moved in a decade rom radical to moderatenationalism: rom Milosevi to Kostunica and now Tadi.23 This shit in thecentre o gravity o domestic politics, with the emergence o eurorealismand pragmatism, will be essential or overcoming the abovementioned

contentious issues and establishing a consensus on the reorms neededin order to complete the regions EU accession process.

Ater the obstacles in the Balkans there are those that exist in the EU.The crisis o the euro and the challenges it poses to the EUs cohesionand leadership raise concerns about the EUs ability at the same time tokeep an eye on the enlargement ball. It is not easy to promote opennessand generosity (without which EU expansion to the Balkans is a non-starter or merely a matter or technocrats) when the economy is in crisisand the politics o accountancy prevail. The result is mutual distrust or

pretence: We pretend we want you and you pretend youre getting ready.All this is only reviving suspicion in the Balkans about the plausibilityo the enlargement agenda. The EU is seen as ussy about the processbut uncertain about the outcome. For such doubts to be dispelled,two complementary things are needed. Firstly, a strong positive signalrom Brussels, in the orm o an accelerated and coherent EU regionalexpansion policy in the Balkans. Secondly, and no less importantly: thecapacity o local actors to tackle the European reorm agenda not justas something that is imposed rom outside, but as domestic homeworkor any democratic European society in the twenty-rst century.

The misunderstandings are not helped by the dierent and oten conusingdenitions o what Europe or the European project stands or. It can besummed up by three paradoxes. The European project since World WarII stands or peace through institutionalised interdependence: pooledsovereignties is just another term or the relativisation o nation-statesand European integration becoming a vector or post-1989 globalisation.However, in the Balkans, since the early nineteenth century, the pathto European modernity has been identied precisely with the buildingo nation-states. The EU is advocating the transposition o its model o

peace through institutionalised interdependence to the Balkans, while atthe same time, and most reluctantly, being drawn into a belated processo nation-state building or uture member state-building.

22. This argument was rstdeveloped by Jacques Rupnikin The demise o Baklannationalisms? A scepticalview, in Judy Batt (ed.),The Western Balkans:

Moving On, Chaillot Paperno. 70, European UnionInstitute or Security Studies,Paris, October 2004.

23. Milosevis heirs in theSocialist Party (SPS) arenow in the governmentcoalition, applying ormembership in the SocialistInternational and workingor EU accession. Even theRadical Party (with V. Seselj,its ounding-ather, at theICTY in The Hague) has

toned down its europhobicnationalism in order to ocusmore on social discontentin its search or voters.


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A second paradox concerns multiculturalism: the EU, rightly, resistsethnic partition in Kosovo, Bosnia or FYROM in the name o a civicconcept o the new nation-state in the making and o a multiculturalsociety. This argument was voiced loud and clear in the 1990s by Western

intellectuals, politicians and the media, creating legitimacy and publicsupport or a European engagement, and even or military interventionagainst ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo. Today the argument isbecoming blurred as, in all corners o old and new Europe, we see areturn o identity politics and the rise o national-populist orces on issuesrelated to immigration and integration. I Chancellor Merkel declaresthat there has been a complete ailure o multiculturalism in Germany,how then do you promote it in Bosnia? We opposed ethno-nationalistlogic in the Balkans only to discover it in our own midst.

The third paradox concerns public opinion in the applicant countries.According to various Gallup Balkan Monitor surveys,24 citizens becomemore sceptical the closer their country gets to EU accession. We knewabout public opinion in Western Europe which, in the midst o a majoreconomic crisis, might preer to close the door in order to preservean acquis (albeit one that is not always very communautaire). But nowin the Balkans we are discovering what could be called prematureeuroscepticism in proportion to the advancement o the accessionprocess: Albanians seem to love the EU rom a sae distance, the Croatsresent it on their doorstep. The Serbs are somewhere inbetween. I

conrmed, this trend would be extremely worrying, as there is nochance that enlargement could succeed without the support o publicopinion and the involvement o civil society actors.

None o the above mentioned paradoxes would be sucient on their ownto undermine condence in the process o the Balkans EU integration,but they happen to coincide with a crisis o condence and leadership atthe core o the EU. It is not easy to expand the Union to the peripherywhen its very core seems in doubt or otherwise engaged.

This situation may lead some to call or a combination o Gramscianpessimism o reason and optimism o the will. Indeed, some NGOs,think-tanks and indignant advocacy groups are calling or the process tobe speeded up and one can only sympathise with their eorts. It seemsto us, on the contrary, that there may well be grounds or pessimismabout political will in the EU, while remaining optimistic about theimperatives o reason. Unlike in the atermath o the 1989 revolutionsin eastern and central Europe, the case or the EUs expansion to theBalkans cannot be based on the emotional appeal o the return toEurope. Nor can the lan come rom the sympathy and humanitarian

response inspired by the tragedies o the 1990s. The European promiseto the Balkans must remain based on reasoned arguments about whatis at stake or the region and the EU.

24. Gallup Balkan Monitor,Brussels (see also thechapter by Robert Manchinin this volume).


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T B eu qutiHere are three (among a number o other) arguments to support a realistscase: political success, sel-interest and credibility. EU enlargement tothe Balkans represents the pursuit o its most successul policy sincethe all o the Berlin Wall. This is not called into question within the

EU and remains, or the oreseeable uture, the only plausible prospector EU enlargement. The inclusion o the countries o the WesternBalkans will represent an addition o some 20 million to the EUs ahal a billion citizens. When considering the costs o enlargement in acontext o budgetary restrictions one must not orget the costs o non-enlargement. The cost o the wars and subsequent recovery programmeshas been estimated at $100 billion or the 1990s alone.25 Without credibleprospects o accession to the EU the latters infuence will recede amongthe political elites and more radical orms o nationalism are likely toresurace around the unresolved contentious issues pertaining to the

unnished states o the Balkans. Without a tangible and assertiveEuropean commitment to the Balkans, the progress made over the lastdecade could unravel, at enormous political and nancial cost to anEU which would then be orced to return to a logic o protectorates.What such a ailure o Europes transormative power would do to itsattractiveness as an inspiring model o institutionalised interdependenceis open to debate. What is absolutely sure, however, is that this wouldshatter the EUs credibility as an international actor. What credibilitywould it have in dealing with crises in the Middle East, Arica or Asiai it were unable to x problems in its own backyard? Ivan Krastev

argued a ew years ago that the choice acing the EU in the Balkans isbetween enlargement and Empire. It would seem rather to be one oEuropean enlargement as a substitute or an empire,26 a common rooor the completion o the unnished states, with nation-state building,a regional approach and European integration as three dimensions othat process.

For these reasons the Balkans requires a rethink o the EU approach toenlargement, which cannot simply replicate the pattern so successullyapplied in Central Europe. The EU should strengthen the regional

approach by giving all the countries o the region candidate status anda date or the opening o negotiations. The pace and completion o theprocess will then depend on the capacity to deliver o each countryspolitical elite, thus making their respective responsibilities clear andthe political costs o ailure more palatable. But that, in turn, requiresthe EU to overcome its hesitation between containment and integrationand to renew its commitment to the Balkans European uture in orderto restore its credibility in the region and at international level.

25. A. Ross Johnston, Anassessment o the decadeo Western peacekeepingand nation-building in theBakans, East EuropeanStudies Special Report,

Woodrow Wilson Center,May 2003, p. 3.

26. Jacques Rupnik, LEuropecentrale et les Balkans larecherche dun substitutdempire, in Anne-Marie

Le Gloannec et AleksanderSmolar (eds.), Entre Kantet Kosovo (Paris: Pressesde Sciences Po, 2003).


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1 Tuig tiit it eU ut: t c Ctiopinion polls conducted by Eurobarometer in autumn 20104 show thatthe majority o Croats unlike the majority in the EU 27 support theEU membership bids o all the Western Balkan countries. For example,while 66 percent o Croats would support Montenegros membership, only

36 percent in the EU 27 are in avour o it. Support or other countriesis also high: or Bosnia and Herzegovina 74 percent (as against only 35percent in the EU 27), or the Former Yugoslav Republic o Macedonia(72 percent (as against 35 percent in the EU 27), or Kosovo 66 percent(29 percent), or Albania 65 percent (29 percent), and even or Serbia61 percent (and only 34 percent in the EU 27).

Paradoxically, by relying only on public opinion polls, one could indeedconclude that more Croats support Serbias EU membership than thato Croatia. Although the polls show that support or membership

has increased in the last year o negotiations, Croats remain largelyunconvinced o the benets o EU membership. The last Eurobarometersurvey shows that only 27 percent o Croats believe that EU membershipwould be good or their country, while 29 percent think it would bebad or Croatia (41 percent says it would be neither good nor bad). Only37 percent expect Croatia to benet rom EU membership, while 54percent think there would be no benets at all. There is a widespreadsense o unease that EU membership would bring new opportunities ororeigners (i.e. Europeans) to buy Croatian real estate, in particular onthe Adriatic coast. In addition, jobs that are now available exclusively

to Croatian nationals (and de acto this means all jobs, since very eware advertised without a request or domovnica, a certicate o Croatiannationality) would also be available to other EU citizens, irrespectiveo their nationality. Due to actors that will be explained below, thegeneral image o the EU is less positive in Croatia than in most otherEU countries. Only 28 percent o Croats have a predominantly positiveimage o the EU, while 25 percent have a predominantly negativeone.5 Nevertheless, a poll conducted by Croatian pollster Ipsos Puls inNovember 2010 shows that Croats are unlikely to reject EU membershipin an eventual reerendum. O the total population, 52 percent are in

avour o joining the EU and 35 percent are opposed to it. There was analleged increase o 10 percent in the number o people supporting EUmembership between June and November 2010, which goes to showhow volatile public opinion is with regard to this issue.6

Based on these data one might conclude that there is not much enthusiasmor EU membership in Croatia. Yet it is as i there is a sense o inevitabilityabout it. Media reports on the EU accession talks have been rathertechnical, oten using new jargon that means little to the general public.Most have simply stated which chapter in the EU negotiations has

been opened and closed, without describing the actual substance othe process and what it really means. This has let the impression thatthe entire EU accession process is something technical and better let

4. See: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_hr_hr_nat.pd.

5. See: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_hr_hr_nat.pd.

6. See: http://www.poslovni.hr/vijesti/istrazivanje-rast-podrske-pristupanju-eu-165356.aspx.


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to politicians, experts and the state administration. There again, thenegotiators themselves have preerred to be let to their own devices,rather than having to ace sometimes dicult questions and protestsby various segments o the general public. No politician anywhere is

likely to gain popularity by talking about the EU and the same was(and still is) the case in Croatia.

The public opinion data correspond to what can be seen in Croatiaitsel. Most Croats believe that it is decisions made somewhere elseand by somebody else that will (or will not) lead to EU membership.They do not eel that they can infuence the decision in any particularway. This is not really surprising. People (not only in Croatia) rarelyeel that they can infuence political decisions, be it on a local, nationalor supranational level. The less infuence they have, the more distant

these issues are rom their own personal lives. Croats are no exceptionto this general trend in Europe. Thus they believe that even i they votedNo in the reerendum on EU membership, the pro-EU political elitewould manage to nd a way to overturn the result; i in the end Croatiadid not achieve membership, then it would be due to decisions takenby external orces (the EU itsel or some o its Member States) and notbecause Croatia had done or ailed to do something. This sense o theoutcome being all but inevitable, regardless o what happens on theground, is at the root o the relative indierence in Croatia towards EUaccession. It also means that Croats expectations o the EU are airly

low, and consequently Croats are actually unlikely to be disappointedonce they enter the EU. Those who are likely to be disappointed arethose who expected much more than can be delivered, which is notthe case here.

Nevertheless, at this stage it does indeed look as i Croatia has advancedtowards achieving the paramount (and some would even say the only)oreign policy objective: membership o the EU; and it is indeed verylikely to become the 28th Member State. The act that there is not muchenthusiasm or membership still needs to be addressed during the

reerendum campaign on membership. The real challenge will be howto convince moderate (and as yet unconvinced) Croatian nationalists especially those who participated in the war o independence (knownin Croatia as the Homeland War) that joining the EU does not meanlosing sovereignty. To do this, the pro-EU political elite will need toget across the message that EU membership is the nal stage on thelong road o transition rom the Balkans (personied in the conceptoYugoslavia) to Europe (i.e. the European Union, which or all intentsand purposes is reerred to as Europe, and which in this paper we willalso call Europe). The aim is to show that, by joining the EU, Croatia

would be more protected, more infuential and more respected in thecommunity o nation states; that it will have achieved not only symbolicrecognition (such as in 1992) but real recognition o its statehood. I this


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1 Tuig tiit it eU ut: t c Ctistrategy is successul, the pro-EU orces are likely to win the day andsecure sucient support or a Yes vote. In this authors view, due tocircumstances that are specic to Croatia, this argument has perhapsmore chance o convincing nationalists in Croatia than in other EU

countries. However, as in all EU Member States, the battle betweennationalists and anti-nationalists will never be over. The orces onationalism will keep challenging the European Union as a concept andwill agree to compromise only when and i it is instrumental to theirnational interests. In the case o Croatia this is likely to be maniestedin a policy o opposing any urther EU enlargement towards Serbia andBosnia and Herzegovina, and imposing more bilateral conditions orsupporting urther enlargement into the remaining Western Balkanstates.

Cti v titi: m w t

c

Croatias accession to the European Union is a more complex processthan any previous one due to the act that the country was at the centreo the post-Yugoslav conficts and wars. While Slovenia also experiencedsome resistance to its independence in 1991, the violence was limited

to ten days o confict with only a dozen casualties. Soviet interventionwas also rather limited in scope in the Baltic states once they hadindicated their intention to break away rom the Soviet Union. But inCroatias case, the entire rst decade o independence was marked byinternal and external conficts over its borders and internal disputesover its constitutional structure. It was not until January 1998 that thelast part o the territory o what used to be the Socialist Republic oCroatia (1945-1991) was reintegrated into the post-Yugoslav Republico Croatia. The intensive military confict lasted rom August 1991until January 1992 but peace did not arrive until August 1995, when

the largest part o the sel sel-proclaimed secessionist Krajina regionwas deeated militarily and incorporated into the newly independentCroatia. The war claimed some 20,000 lives all told (including bothmilitary and civilian deaths). Even now, 20 years ater the beginningo the conficts, there are still about 2,000 people missing as a directresult o the atrocities. The bodies o some victims might never be ound,as they were most likely transported to other territories o the ormerYugoslavia, or even abroad. Some o those who died were reportedlyburied beneath or beyond the mineelds which have still not beencompletely cleared.7 Some were buried in unknown locations, while

other bodies were hidden in already existing graves, under other peoplesnames. The problem o missing people is still high on the agenda obilateral relations between Serbia and Croatia, as demonstrated at three

7. Croatia plans to clearthe remaining mineeldsby 2019. Currently, 994square kilometres arestill laid with mines. See:

http://www.24sata.hr/politika/razminiranje-hrvatske-bi-trebalo-zavrsiti-do-2019-50486.


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meetings between Serbian President Boris Tadi and Croatian PresidentIvo Josipovi in 2010.8

In addition, the Serbo-Croatian war o the early 1990s created abouthal a million reugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). In the rstphase o the war, there were about 250,000 registered IDPs and reugees,mostly ethnic Croats who had to leave Krajina and neighbouring Bosniaand Herzegovina which had been at war in 1992-1995. But ater 1995,most ethnic Serbs rom Croatia had become reugees in neighbouringSerbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result o the war, the ethnicSerb community in Croatia was reduced to approximately one third oits pre-war size. While in 1991 there were 581,663 Serbs (12.2 percento the total population o Croatia), in the 2001 census there were only201,631 (4.5 percent). Moreover, those who in previous censuses had

declared themselves as Yugoslavs in the ethnic sense also disappearedater the collapse o Yugoslavia. In 1981 there were 379,057 ethnicYugoslavs (8.2 percent o the Croatian population), while even in 1991(at the moment when the conficts in Yugoslavia had already started andthe process o disintegration was at an advanced stage) 106,041 Croatians(2.2 percent o the population) declared themselves Yugoslavs in theethnic sense. Most o them changed their ethnic sel-denition (whichin Yugoslavia and in all post-Yugoslav states was one o the undamentalmarkers o political and social identity) under heavy pressure and aspart o the policy ovoluntary or (in most cases) involuntary assimilation.

Consequently, ater the war, Croatia became a de acto mono-ethniccountry. While in 1991 ethnic Croats made up 78.1 percent o itspopulation, in 2001 they accounted or 89.6 percent.

The war thus dramatically changed the nature o Croatian society whichhistorically had been airly open to the infuences o other cultures.Croatias transition was thereore unique and much more complex thanin any other EU candidate country. It was a case not o triple9 or evenquadruple10 tr

institute for security studies the western balkans and the eu

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