ingold - biology

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An Anthropologist Looks at Biology

Author(s): Tim IngoldSource: Man, New Series, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 208-229Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and IrelandStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2804561

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AN ANTHROPOLOGIST LOOKS AT BIOLOGY*TIM INGOLD

UniversityfManchester

Thls article etsout the foundations or n adequate integration fanthropologywithin he wider fieldof biology. In the discourseof social anthropology, he concept of biology' is commonly matched toone side of an oppositionbetween humamty nd nature, etting p personsand organisms s mutuallyexclusiveobjects of study. n biology itself, owever,the establishedneo-Darwinian synthesis irtuallyelimnates the organismas a real entity, nd the extension of thisparadigmto incorporate culturalinheritance' ikewise elimnates theperson.An alternative iology sproposed that akes theorganism sitsstarting oint, and thatcomprehends he social life ofpersonsas an aspectof organic ife n general.Thus ananthropology fpersons sencompassedwithin biologyoforganismswhosefocus sonprocessesrather hanevents,replacing he population thinking' fDarwinian evolutionary iologywith a logicofrelationships.

Biology sthe cience of iving rganisms;nthropologys the cience of iving eople.In this rticle wantto proposethat nthropology-includingwhatpassesas 'social'or 'cultural' n orientation-falls ntirelywithinthe domain ofbiology.But do notjump to conclusions. am not a belated convert o sociobiology.To thecontrary,argue hatnsociobiology, nimpoverished iologythathas ost touch with herealityoforganismsmeetsan equally mpoverished ocial science that eaves no conceptualspace forrealpeople. It is most unfortunatehatthe terms fthedialoguebetweenbiologyand anthropologyhould have been thuspre-empted. intend o show thatcentral roblemsncurrentnthropologicalheory, oncerning hegeneration,main-tenanceand transformationfstructuresn theprocessofsocial life,have their xactparallelsnbiology, utthat heir olution emands napproach hat akes s far eyondtheprevailing eo-Darwinianorthodoxy.nplaceofthekindof population hinking'(Mayr 1982: 45-7) thatsthehallmark fDarwinianbiology t snecessaryosubstitutea kindof relationships hinking',which locatestheorganism r personas a creativeagentwithin a total fieldof relationswhose transformationsescribea process ofevolution. am offering,hen,theprospect f a new synthesis etween biology andsocial or cultural nthropology,ut no morethana prospect, ince muchtheoreticalworkremains o be done. I am also ssuing challenge, or he ncorporationfhumansocial life ntoa unified heory forganicevolutionwill requirenothing ess thanaparadigm-shiftithinbiology tselfThere aresigns hat ucha shifts already akingplace1,yet it seems that n the oppositionalcontext of its confrontation ith thehumanities, eo-Darwinism s destined o takea last tand.So much is at stake.I shallproceed as follows.First, shall show how 'biology' has been construedwithin he discourse fanthropology hroughts ssimilationoone sideofan ancientdichotomybetween humanity nd nature. go on to describe how the notion of

*Curl Lecture 1989 (Thlis rticlewas accepted forpublicationand processed by theprevious editor.)Man (N.S.) 25, 208-29


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TIM INGOLD 209biologyhas faredwithin hediscipline owhich thasgiven tsname,and whose scopeis definedby the distinctive roperties f living things. arguethatthe triumph fneo-Darwinismheralded hefinal isappearance ftheorganismrommodembiology,and in the third artof the article shallproposean alternative iology that akes heorganism s its point of departure. urningfrom rganic ife n general o social lifein particular, show thatneo-Darwinian sociobiology eaves us withouta theory fthe person. n recapturing ersons or nthropology follow the same approachas inmy recapturing f organisms orbiology. conclude by bringing he anthropology fpersonswithin he compassofa biologyoforganismshat s at once post-Darwinianandyetharks ack to an earlier ra whenthemodern eparation etween the sciencesof mind andnaturehad yetto be established.Biologys human atureThere is a tension ttheheart f western hought, ne thathasbeen withus formanycenturies, etween thethesis fhumanity's eparation rom he world ofnature, ndthe ounter-thesishat umankind xists longside ther ife-formsn anuninterruptedcontinuumor chain ofbeing.Each has been generated n response o thechallengeof the other: thus claims to human uniqueness,ofman's absolute ascendancy nddominationover nature, re counteredby assertions f the fellowship nd interde-pendence of all living beings. The discipline of biology is constitutedwithinthisdialogue,bounded on theone sidebytheoppositionbetweenhumanityndnature,and on the other sideby theoppositionbetweenlivingand non-living hings.Thefirst f theseoppositions, fcourse,underwrites he established ivisionofacademiclabourbetweennatural cience nd thosedisciplines ollectively nown as thehumani-ties', the former lassically oncerned with the compositionand structures f thephysicalworld,the atterwith theforms ndmanifestationsfthehumanspirit.t isinterms fthis pposition hatmosthumanists hink fbiology:for hem,t spreciselywhat the studyof languageand thought, fhistory nd civilisation,s not.But theorigins fbiology n fact ie in the counter-current,n assertionsfthecontinuity flifethatdissolved heboundarybetweenhumanitynd nature, r recast t as one ofdegreerather hankind, yet only by invoking thoroughgoing istinction etweenliving ndnon-living hings. arly ttemptso attributehisdistinction o thepresenceor absence of some non-material, ital forcenaturally ompromisedbiology's claimto scientifictatus.Byand arge,humanists avecontinued oframeheir onceptions fbiologywithina preconceivedview of theunique natureofour species. ndeed, the termbiology'has simply een substitutedor hemuch more venerableconceptofhumannature,without ppreciably lteringtssignificance2.ut as accounts of humannaturevary,so do thecorresponding otionsofbiology. want to distinguishour uchaccounts,all ofwhich arefrequentlyo be found n the iterature f social and cultural nthro-pology.The firsts couched in terms f a cardinaldistinction etween the contraryconditions fhumanitynd animality. he second appealsto theeighteenth-centurydoctrine fthepsychic nity fmankind'. he third ocuses n theopposition etweenthe ndividual ndsociety,whilst hefourth orces distinction, ithin he ndividual,between innate and acquired characteristics. ll fouraccounts are linked by thecommon assumptions hat humans are unique in the animal kingdom,thattheiruniqueness ies na shared ssenceonceknownas spirit' utnowcommonlydentified


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210 TIM INGOLDwith the 'capacityforculture', and that thiscapacityhas enabled itspossessors otranscendheforces f thematerialworld withinwhich all otherbeings reenmeshed.Now to assert hathumans reunique isnot, n itself, emotely bjectionable.Forone could say the same ofanyother nimal kind.Elephantsfor xampleareunique;so are beavers.Yet we are nclined o think felephants nd beavers s mereanimals',whereas to be human-we say-is to be more han ust an animalor 'just anotherunique species' (Foley 1987: 274). We like to pictureourselves s animals lus. Andtheplusfactor urns ut ofcourse o be that ommonessence, he capacity or ulture',whosediversemanifestationsurnishnthropology ith ts ubjectmatter3. ccordingto thisview of humans s animalsplus,we are all constitutionallyividedcreatures,split etweenthephysical ondition f nimalitynd themoral ondition fhumanity.Moreover, ifhumanuniqueness ies preciselyn thepartof us thatfalls utside thematerialworld ofnature, hen oviewhumanbeings nnature, sparts fthematerialworld, s to focusnot so much on species-specific ifferencess on those features ywhich humansare indistinguishableromother animals.Hence we reach thepara-doxical result hatwhereaselephantnaturecomprises haracteristicsfmorphologyand behaviourpeculiarto elephants, nd beaver nature characteristicseculiar tobeavers,human nature-on this ccount-appears to comprise haracteristicshat renotpeculiarto humans,but are rather ommonto elephants, eavers, nd anyotherspecies you careto name. In short, hehumanbeingis represented ot as a specificmanifestation f animality, ut as the manifestation f a specifichuman essencesuperimposed pon a generalisednimal ubstrate.I believe that heprimary eference f the termbiology', nmuchanthropologicalliterature,s to some such notion ofgenericanimality,etup by itsopposition to anotionofculture s theessenceofhumanity. ulture,however, s revealed sdiversity,whereasthecapacityor ulture ssupposedto dependon certain eneralproperties fmental unctioning.his eads to a second andequallyprevalent iew ofhumannature,by which it is equatedwithputativepsychicuniversals.Whatever humans have incommon is accordinglyttributedobiology,whereastheirdifferencesre attributedto culture.Thus biologybecomes, n thisview,a questfor he bottom ine or lowestcommondenominator' fhumanityEisenberg 978: 171), somethinghat ouldonlybedirectlybserved-rather han nferredhroughomparativetudy-amonghumansliving t or nearthe absolute eroof cultural evelopment.A good deal ofthepopularinterest irected owards ontemporary opulationsofhunters nd gatherersan beput down to the (whollymistaken)notion thattheyare livingexemplars f a pro-totypical umanity, childhoodof man fromwhich therest f us havegrown up.I have so faroutlinedtwo closely connectedsensesof human nature, and of'biology': as a generalised nimal substratend as a universalbaseline forculturaldevelopment.Both carry onnotations funiformityhich stand n stark ontrast otheemphasisnmodernbiological science on inter- ndintra-speciesariability.hethird ense I wish to adduce is a by-product fthe notion ofsocietyor culture s asuperorganism,collective ntityhathasa lifeof tsown over and above the ivesofits ndividual onstituents.haveconsidered hehistoryfthisnotionelsewhere, ndcannotgo into it now (see Ingold 1986: 223-41). Suffice o saythat the effect ftransferringverything ertainingo themutual nvolvement fhumansubjects o anexternal, uperorganic omain of 'society'is to leave the individualorganism s ahermeticallyealedbundle of nnatedispositions, iven n advance ofanyrelationst


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TIM INGOLD 211may orm ith therndividuals.s Durkheim roten a classictatement,ndividualhuman rganismsre, bynature,losed o eachother'1960 1914]:337)4.Biology,according o this onception,s a science f iving hings hat reatstsobjects spreconstituted,elf-containedystems.nthropologistsrequentlyppeal othis iewofbiologynmakinghe laim, sdoesSahlins,hat t eaves voidto be filled yascience f ulture1976:16).What hey ail orealises that uch nastringentiologycouldnotbegin oprovide n adequate ccount f he ife f ny rganisms,et lonehuman nes. For ife tselfepends ponthefact hat rganismsre notclosedbutopen ystems.In contrasto thesuperorganicismf Durkheim nd its socialanthropologicalderivatives,ainstreamulturalnthropologyas ended otake he iew hat ulture,althoughn ubstancedeal atherhanmaterial,as ts ltimateocus nsidendividuals'heads atherhan omingo them romnexteriorource nsociety.hus hehumanorganismsconstruedsa culture-beare-r,ithin hich he ppositionetween atureand cultures assimilatedo onebetween hehereditaryndtraditionalomponentsof ndividualndowment.heformerrenowadaysnown sgenes, he atter sedto be called ultural raits.Whathappenshen o theconcept fbiology? umanbeings, e aretold,arebothbiologicalnd ulturalrganisms',ndtheir ehaviouris a product f cultural ndbiological nfluences'Boyd & Richerson 985: 281;Durham 979:42). Biology, ere,has ceased o haveany pecific eferenceo theorganismt ll, nd s dentified,urelynd imply,ith ts enes. biologicalccountisonethat eals xclusivelyith eneticsopposedo ulturalauses nd ffects.ppliedto non-culturalrganisms,uch biologyouldbe nomore,ndno ess, han theoryofgeneticeterminism.his onstructionfbiologyesonatestronglyith dominanttrendnmodem iologicalcience.t s hereforecarcelyurprisinghat ithiniologyitself,nthropologystypicallyonstructeds theoryf ulturaleterminismnwhichthetraitmerelyubstitutesor hegene as a unit faccount. returno this ointbelow.Darwinismnd hemodernynthesisArrivingttheir ariousonceptionsfbiologyn termsf noverridingppositionbetween umanityndnature,ocial nd ulturalnthropologistsave, s have hown,matched he domainofbiologicalnquiry o the residue f common nimality,behaviouralniversals,nnate ispositionsrgenetic ndowmenthat s leftwheneverythingpparentlysociocultural'speeled way. et whenLamarck irstnventedthe oncept fbiology,n1802,his ntention asentirelyifferent.t was tosignalfundamentalontrastetweenivingndnon-livinghingssobjectsfstudy,contrastthat inged pon hepostulationf vital orce,aunchednto hematerialubstanceof rganismsut bsent romnorganic atter,hichmpelledheiremporaldvancealong he cale fnature.notherwords, ar romeing efinedfromhe opdown',to theexclusion fhumanity,iologywas definedfrom hebottom p', includinghumanitysthehighestrder fthe ivingtate.The coining f term oesnot, fcourse,ufficeocreate science.AsMayrhasobserved,here as nLamarck'saynobiologicalcience,nd he mbitiouschemesthat eand hiscontemporariesresented erebut prospectusesor to-be-createdbiology' Mayr 982:108).There xisted t that ime nassortmentfmore r essseparatenterprises,fwhich hemostmportanteremedicineincludingnatomy


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212 TIM INGOLDandphysiology)ndnaturalistoryincludingotanynd oology). heestablishmentofbiology roper, ayr rgues,adto await heunificationfthese ields. s oneofthemost loquent rchitectsf hegrand volutionaryynthesisf wentieth-centurybiology,Mayrspredictablynclined o ocate heoriginsfbiologicalciencentheintellectualermenthat ccompaniedhepublication,n1859,ofDarwin'swork nTheorigin f pecies.he importance f thiswork, sregardsheunification f biology,lay n itsdemonstrationhat he tructuresnd processestudied y anatomistsndphysiologistsere themselvesheprecipitatesf an evolutionaryistory,ne thatDarwinso accuratelyharacteriseds 'descentwithmodification',uidedby theuniversal echanismfvariationnder aturalelection.It wasnot,however,usttheremarkableower fDarwin's heoryn ntegratingpreviouslyisparateields f nquiry hatmade a science ut ofbiology. he onlypreviouslternativeoLamarckianitalismadbeena Cartesianonceptionftheorganismsa mechanicalutomaton,hich issolvedhedistinctionetweenife ndnon-lifendthus eprived iology f he utonomyf ts ubjectmatter. hechoice,then, adbeenbetween sciencehat-viewingife s theworkingf mechanism-wasnot articularlyiological,nd biologyhat-infusedy italist etaphysics-wasnotparticularlycientific.arwinianheoryffered resolutiono this ilemmanfurnishingnaccount f he volution forganicorms hichargely ispensed ithvitalisticotions, hilst etainingbasicdistinctionetweeniving ndnon-livingstates. ccordingothe heory,ll iving hingsave wo essentialnddistinguishingproperties.he firsts that hey revariable,uch hat o individuals ever xactlylike another. he second s that hey recapable ftransmittinghecomponentsfvariabilityhrough eproduction.ivenpopulationsf entitiesharing hese woproperties, ultiplyingithin finitenvironment,aturalelection ill nevitablyoccur, esultingn a third,erivativeropertyf iving hings-ostensiblyhemoststriking-namelyhat ach s endowedwith esign.Darwinwasunsure bout he ource fheritableariabilitynpopulations,houghhe thoughthat tcouldbe induced yenvironmentalhange, ever oubtinghatacquiredharacteristicsouldbe inherited.he refutationf his iewbyWeismann,in thefinal ecades f the ast entury,as hadan influencelmost sprofoundsDarwinianheorytselfpon he onstitutionfmoderniologicalcience.Weismannintroducedhenotion hatveryiving hings dividednto woparts, hich e calledthegerm lasmndthe omatoplasm.hegerm lasm,heheritableart,ontainsllthe nstructionsecessaryo assemblehe rganism,he omatoplasm,hich espondspassivelyo ts ommands. nlythe omatoplasm,owever, as direct ontact iththe nvironment.incegerm lasmnd omatoplasmre inked y one-wayelationof causaldetermination,nvironmentallynducedmodificationsnthe atter annotbe translatednto hangesntheformer.he inheritancefcharacteristicscquiredbyan organism uringtsown life-history,hroughhe mpact f environmentalexperience,sthereforeogicalmpossibility.evelopmentsngeneticsndmolecularbiology uringhe resententuryppearooffertrikingonfirmationfWeismann'stheory.hegerm lasm,nitiallyraced o the hromosomesn the ellnucleus, asbeen identified ith a biochemical ubstance, NA, whosespecific ucleotidesequences nilaterallyriggerhe ssemblyfproteins hich orm hebuildinglocksofsuccessivelyigher-leveltructuresp to,and ncluding,hewholeorganism.n


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TIM INGOLD 213modernterminology,Weismann's germplasm' has become the genotype,whilsthis'somatoplasm'has become the phenotype.The dichotomybetween genotype nd phenotype, oupled with the categoricaldenial of anyreversenfluence fphenotype n genotype, as established conceptualbasisfor he complete eparation f ontogeny rom hylogeny. o study he develop-ment of organisms epigenesis) s regardedas quite different rom studying heirevolution. Developmental biologists, t is said, are concerned only with proximatecausation,with unravelling he chain of commands thattranslates rompreformedgeneticprogrammes omanifesthenotypic ffects.volutionary iologists, y con-trast, laim to be concerned with ultimateausation,that s with the genesis of theprogrammes hemselves. omethingmore than an academic division of labour isimpliedhere, ince t s supposed hat llthefeatures f iving rganismsmaybe referredback, n thefinal nalysis,othe ctionofnaturalelection n their enetic onstituents.These constituents,he genes, are believed to providea complete specification fdevelopmental ossibilities. he ultimate xplanation or heorigination fnovel formsmustthereforeie in the historical ircumstances f variation nd selection, n so faras they affect he composition of the genotype,and not in the properties f theepigenetic ystemhat ntervenes etweenthegenotype nd tsphenotypic xpression.Epigenesis, sMonod hasdeclared, is not a creation,t is a revelation'1972: 87).I do not now intend to dwell on thehistory fgenetics, n how Mendel's laws,when first ediscovered, eemed to refuteDarwin's gradualist iew of evolutionarychange, and on how the Darwinian and Mendelian perspectiveswere eventuallyconjoined through isher's onstructionf mathematicalheory fpopulationgenet-ics. It is sufficiento note that he modern synthesis' fevolutionary iology,whoseadventwasproclaimedbyJulianHuxleyin 1942, effectivelyncorporatedMendelianparticulate eredityndWeismann'sbarrier etween phenotype ndgenotype nto acomprehensiveccount oforganic daptation ndernatural election.Withtheestab-lishmentfthis ynthesis,owadays sually nown asneo-Darwinism, atural electionlost its status s a theory nd has come to assume that of an axiomaticframeworkconstitutivefbiologicalscience itselfA biologicalapproachto natural henomenais taken to mean n approach couched in termsof the neo-Darwinianexplanatoryparadigm.t scommonly sserted, y biologists f eminence ndrepute, hat hetruthof natural election s now proven beyond any shadow of doubt, and that we canconfidentlyxpectthe future fbiologyto consist ffootnotes o Theorigin f pecies.Over theyears hese assertions ave become increasinglytridentnd doctrinaire,sthe thesis hatDarwin modestly roposedto account foradaptivemodification asbeen elevated into a total, all-embracing xplanationforthe phenomena of life5.Alternatives hatcannotbe accommodatedwithinthe neo-Darwinianparadigm reconsigned, longwith reationismndothernonsense, o thewastebin fwhatDawkins(1986: 287) calls doomed rivals'.

Thebiologyf rganismsWith thearrogantssurance f thezealot,Dawkins affirmshatDarwiniantheory sin principle apable ofexplainingife.No othertheory hathas ever been suggestedis inprinciple apableofexplainingife' 1986: 288). I wishto argue, o thecontrary,that hemost trikingeature f neo-Darwinism sthat t offersn accountofadaptivemodificationhatsnot, nany ense,n explanation f ife6. ndeed, tpresents s with


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214 TIM INGOLDtheodd spectacleof a biologyfromwhichorganisms,s realentities, ave effectivelydisappeared Goodwin 1984: 221). There can,ofcourse,be no adaptivemodificationoforganic ormswithout rganic ormso be modified; hus n adequate evolutionarybiologymustbe cbncerned,n the first lace, to construct theory fhoworganismsare ossible. uch a theorywould be no mereadjuncttoDarwinism.For one thing,tmustbeginwith the process and properties f epigenesis, hus nverting he neo-Darwinian prioritisationf ultimate over proximatecausation. 'Surely the mosteffective ayto makepredictionsbout evolution s first o try o discoverwhat sortof changesa given epigenetic ystems capable ofproducing, nd onlythen to askwhich are likelyto be selected' (Ho & Saunders 1982: 345). For anotherthing, tshould be capable of generating he rangeof forms hatorganisms an take,bothwithin life-cyclen the course ofepigenesis, ndbetween therecognisably istinctclasses hat ive ivingnature he ppearance f logical ystemndthereby nderwritetheprojectoftaxonomy. volution hasthentobe understood s an exploration,vertime, fthetransformativeotentialsf totalgenerative ystemWebster& Goodwin1982: 46). As Ho and Saunders orrectlytate,thephenomenon hat astobe explainedinevolutionsthat fthe ransmutationfform'1979:575). Neo-Darwinism,however,can onlyconceiveofevolution n terms fchanges n thedistributionndfrequencyofgenes.My assertion hatDarwinianbiology acks a theory f the organismmight eemperverse, iven myearlier bservation hat trests n certain istinguishingropertiesofthe iving tate.Let me recallwhat theseproperties re. First, very iving hing sa unique historicalntity, bsolutely istinct rom tspredecessorsnd successors,ndfrom heenvironment f other hingswith which it coexists.The uniquenessof theindividual,Montalenti tates,is themost mportantharacteristicf ife, heone whichdifferentiatesoresubstantiallyivingfromnon-living hings, hysics rombiology'(1974: 11). Secondly,whatgivesthe ndividual tsunique identitys a non-recurrentcombinationof particulateunitsof heredity genes), which are transmitted ithoccasionalcopyingerrors rom ncestors o progenywithin a population.Thus thedifferencesetween individuals re combinatonialMedawar 1957: 134). Thirdly, hegenes togetherncode a programmewhose outputconsists fmanifesttructureshathave adaptivefunctions,uch that iving things ppearto be endowed withdesign.Fourthly,hese tructures,onstitutinghephenotype, hroughwhich the ndividualinteracts ith ts xternalnvironment,ave no direct, everse ffectsn thegenotypicinstructions or their ssembly.Consequentlythe selectivepressure' xertedby theenvironmentakesthe indirectorm f a bias in favourofthereproduction fbetteradaptedvariants,ncreasingherepresentationftheirgenes n future enerations.Now considerwhat this istofpropertieseavesout. The mostobviousomission sthe simplefact hatorganisms row.To be sure,Darwinism assumes n ontogeneticprocess bywhich the informationontained n thegenotype s 'written ut' in theform ftheadaptive haractersf thephenotype.But it hasnothing o sayabout thisprocess. ndeed in supposing hat heconjunctionofgenotype lus phenotypeyieldsan exhaustiveccount of the ndividualiving hing, o conceptual pace s eft or hecomplex physiological elations hat ntervene etween the one and theother.Yetthisfieldofrelations, ather han tsgenotypic nputs ndphenotypic utputs, orre-sponds reciselyo whatwe calltheorganism.Moreover t sto thegenerative ropertiesofthisfield hat he term life'essentiallyefers. o mystical rvitalistic onnotations


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TIM INGOLD 215are ntendedhere. Life s not something eparatelynfusednto nertmatter. t s rathera name for what s going n in the generative ieldwithinwhich organic forms relocated and held in place'. Thus life s not in' organisms, utorganisms re in' life.Taking this view of the living organism s our starting oint,what implicationsfollow?There are three ets ofimplications hat should ike to drawout. The firsthaveto do with therelative riorityfprocesses ver events.The second concernthenature fan orderthat s foundedon relationships.he third eal with thequestionof how we aretounderstandhe nterface etweenorganismsndtheir nvironments.In Darwiniantheory,heappearanceofevery rganism epresents singular ventin a history f things,markedby a novel configurationf fixedhereditaryraits.Individuals, rom hispointofview, areevents Ingold 1986: 105), and each existsonly obe itself,oexpress preformed roject, lbeit nways onditional pon externalcircumstances.he lifeof theorganisms lived out in an extendedpresent,wrappedup in the nstant f theevent trepresents.t s a matter fbeingrather hanbecoming,or to recallMonod's terms,t is revelatoryather hancreative.Our alternatives toview the organism ot as an individual ntity ut as theembodiment f a life-process(Ingold1986: 153). 'Organic ife', s Cassirer aswritten,exists nly o far s t evolvesintime. t s nota thing ut a process-a never-restingtream fevents...The organismis never ocated n a single nstant.n its ife he threemodes oftime-the past,presentand future-forma whole which cannot be split nto individual elements' 1944:49-50). Bergson ikewise maintained hat he ivingbeingshould notbe regarded san object,for t srathera thing hat ndures. tspast, n itsentirety,sprolonged ntoitspresent' 1911: 16). Movement,then, s ofthe essence,whereas he tabilityfformis derived.We do not startwith the organism s a given entityndbring tto lifebysettingt nmotion, s one would a clockworkmachine.We start nsteadwith ife sa movement which progressivelyuilds itself nto emergent tructures.n short,contraryoDarwinismbut withdue acknowledgementoD'Arcy Thompson (1917),growth s notmerely evelatory,t is thegeneration f form.To recognise hat rganisms row s also to appreciate hat hey re notsequentially'put together' rom re-existent arts,s onemight onstruct machine7.The Darwin-ianmetaphor or pigenesis s an assembly,with thegenesas instructions,s thereforequite misleading. n themachine,as Bohm explains, each part s formed.... nde-pendently ftheothers, nd interacts ith theotherparts nlythrough ome kind ofexternal ontact' 1980: 173). But this annotbe saidof the ivingorganism,n whicheach parttakes hape n continuousrelation o all the otherparts, uch that he formofthepart nfolds he entire ystemfrelationshipshathave made t what t s.Bohmrefers o thiskindofrelational rder n whicheverything,ltimately,s enfolded ntoeverythinglse, s the mplicaterder,ycontrast o the xplicaterderin hicheverythingis closed to everyother, ying onlyin its own particular egionofspace (and time)and outside heregions elonging o other hings' 1980: 177). Thus theorder nherentin theorganisms implicate.Goodwin refers o this ame,self-organisingroperty fthe iving tate ymeansofthenotion ofthe morphogeneticield', efined s a spatialdomain n whicheveryparthas a statedetermined ythe state fneighbouring artsso that he whole has a specific elational tructure'Goodwin 1984: 228-9). It is byvirtueof the fieldproperties f living organisms hattheycan both reproduceandrepair hemselvesn case ofdisturbance rdamage.Since eachpart nfolds he whole


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216 TIM INGOLDit s possible, hroughn inversemovement funfolding,oreconstitutehewholefromhepart.Whatgoesfor he elationsetweennternalartsf hewholeorganismlsogoesfor he elationsetweenhe rganismnd ts nvironment.rganic ormsome ntobeing ndaremaintainedecausef perpetualnterchangeith heirnvironments,not n spite f t Ho & Saunders982:343). Life, s Goodwin emarks,s lived tthe nterface,hereformsregenerated'1988: 107).What s given nitiallys acontinuousenerativeield ithin hich ormsmergesdiscernible,oundedntities.But since n environment'anonly erecognisedn relationo anorganism hoseenvironmentt s-since, nother ords,t s he igurehatonstituteshe round-theprocessf ormationf he rganismsalso he rocessf ormationf ts nvironment.As JohnDewey recogniseds long ago as 1898,the environmenthasgone ondevelopinglongwith he rganism',etweare nclinedosee t s somethinghichhadbeenthere rom he tartso that] hewholeproblem asbeenfor heorganismto accommodatetselfothat et fgiven urroundings'1976: 284;see Costall 985:39). It s preciselyhis atter iewof he nvironmenthats entailedn theDarwinianconceptionf volutions process fadaptation.To make hemetaphorfadaptationwork', ewontin oints ut, environmentsrecological ichesmust xist eforeheorganismshat ill hem' 1983: 280). Thus n neo-Darwinismhe environmentsindependentlypecifieds a set f onstraints,he rganisms ndependentlypecifiedas a set fgenes, o that evelopments viewed s the ombinedffectf hese xternaland nternalauses. eversinghis rder freasoning,e argue hat othorganismand environmentmerge rom continuousrocessfdevelopment. oreover,heinterfaceetweenhem s notone ofexternalontact etweeneparatendmutuallyexclusive omains,or nfolded ithin heorganismtselfs theentire istoryf tsenvironmentalelations.I hope havemadet learwhy eo-Darwinismoesnot, nd ndeed annotxplainlife. et mebrieflyecapitulatehreemajor easons.First,ifesaprocess,et eo-Darvinismeals nlyn vents.t strue hat hese vents,compoundedververymany enerations,ive he ppearancefgradual hange,owhichneo-Darwinismthough ot, nitially,arwinhimself hasgiven hename'evolution'. ut this volutionsnot life-process.ndeedWeismann'sarrier,epa-rating ntogenyromhylogeny,rives wedgebetweenvolution nd ife.Monodisquite xplicitbout his:For modem heory',ewrites,evolutions not propertyof iving eings,ince t stems romheverymperfectionsfthe onserving echanismwhich ndeed onstitutesheirnique rivilege'1972:113).The mportfthisemark,made n thecontext f a critiquefBergsonianitalism,s thatwhat s passed n'from enerationogenerationf iving eingssnota currentf ife utbundles fgenes, ndthat t sbecause he ompositionfthese undles raduallyhangeshatevolution ccurs. husneo-Darwinismxplainsvolutionyputtingifen brackets.Secondly,herderf ifes mplicate,et eo-Darwinismeals nlyn ermsf hexplicateorder.his saboveallevidentn ts onceptionfthe ndividuals anexclusive ndself-containedntity hose pecificitysgivennotby tspositionn a wider ystemofrelationsutbythecombinationfgeneticraitsntowhich tmay,nprinciple,be decomposed. y severing,teveryuncture,he nner onnectednessfthings,neo-Darwinismrrivest a definitionfevolution hatsstrictlytatistical-namely,changengenefrequenciesver ime npopulationsf ndividuals.


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TIM INGOLD 217Thirdly, ife uts cross heboundaryetweenrganismndenvironment,etfor eo-Dar-winismt s not he rganism-environmentelationshiphat volves. ather theenvironmentis posited as a set of exogenous factors hat undergo theirown changes,for quiteindependentreasons, o which organisms dapt through hemechanismof naturalselection.In otherwords, evolution is a matterof organisms' hangingto 'track'environmentalonditionswhose changesnecessarilyie outsideofevolution Odling-Smee 1988: 75).As an antidote o neo-Darwinism, want to prescribe n approachto evolutionthat sfirmly rounded ntheproperties f ivingorganisms. o achievethis,we haveto replace the prevailing tatisticalonceptionof the evolutionary rocesswith atopologicalone. Accordingly,volution stobe redefined s thetemporalmodulationof a total relational ield. The role of endogenous and exogenousfactors, f gene

products nd independent nvironmentaltimuli,s thento 'select', out of theset ofpossiblemodulationsof the field, hose forms hat ctually ppear.To give you ananalogy, ll theconic sections, rom llipse ohyperbola, anbe generated rom basicquadratic quation by changing heparameter alues. But the latter o not on theirown dictate he form f thecurve, inceone must lsoknow theequation. Likewise,genesdo not on their wn dictate heform fan organism,ince one must lso knowtheproperties fthegenerative ieldGoodwin 1984: 236). Genes enableus to accountfor some of the differencesetween individualorganisms, heydo not enable us toaccount for he unity hat inks hem s transformsfone another.The great rror fmoderngenetics s to assume thatorganismsre exhaustedby theirdifferences. orevery ualityn respect f which the ndividuals f a population reobserved ovary,thegeneticist osits substantiverait,dentified iththegene,andthen magines hattheorganism an be constituted ythe sum of tsgenes-a trickwhich, as Weiss hasnoted, automatically estsgeneswith exclusive responsibility'ororganisationndorder Weiss1969: 35). But organisation,s I haveshown, s a property forganisms,not ofgenes;the atter ualifyheexpression, uttheydo not determinet.Neo-Darvinism ndthe volutionf ultureThe nextstage nmy arguments to show thatwhatappliesto life n general pplies,morespecifically,o social ife.Just s life s excluded fromneo-Darwinianbiology, oalso, I submit, s social lifeexcluded fromneo-Darwiniansociobiology.Launchedunder thegrandiosebanner ofa 'new synthesis', ociobiologywas definedby E.O.Wilson (1980: 4) as thesystematictudy fthebiologicalbasisofall socialbehavior'.That assumes, fcourse,that ll social behaviourhas a biologicalbasis.My concern snot to dispute his ssumption, ut to discoverwhat tmeans.The vigorouspopulardebate bout theapplicabilityf ociobiological nalyses o our own specieshas turnedup every ne of the different eanings f thebiologicalthat outlined n the firstartof this rticle.Thus for ome,showinghow human socialbehaviourhas a biologicalbasismeansdemonstratingheexistence fa common substrate hat quallyunderliesthe social behaviourof other nimals.For others t meansdemonstratinghe existenceofuniversals f humanbehaviour, evealing he original onditionofmankindn thestate f nature.Forothers gain, t means the attributionfbehaviour o the ntrinsicdispositionsf ndividuals ather han heextrinsicmpositions fsociety.Andfinally,there are those who equate biologywith the hereditary omponentof individualbehaviour, s opposed to thecomponent ttributed o acquiredcultural radition. s


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218 TIM INGOLDwe have seen, achofthese enses f thebiological ests n an account f humannaturehatong ntedateshe dvent fbiologicalcience,nd ndeed he oncept fbiologytself.Althoughn ts ncounter ith hehumanities,ociobiologyasbeendrawn-byboth dvocatesndopponents-intonessentiallyre-biologicaliscourse,ts rojectwas originallyonceived nd continuesobepractised ithin he onceptualrame-workfurnishedythe modem ynthesis'f neo-Darwinianvolutionaryheory.Studyinghe iologicalasis f ocial ehaviour eans, or ractitioners,nvestigatingits volutionhroughariation nder aturalelection8.uchan investigationustthereforeest ponthe ame ssumptionsbout hepropertiesf iving hingshatunderwritearwinianiology,nd hat onstitutehemechanismfnaturalelectionitself hus t s supposed hat ehaviour,ikemorphology,s theoutput fa pro-gramme,ndthat hevariantlementsf his rogramme-appearingnthedifferentindividualsfa populationnuniquely ifferentombinations-areeplicablecrossgenerations.t is supposed, oo, that ehaviour asconsequences or eplication,notherwords hatvariationsn behaviourmaybe correlated ith the differentialrepresentation,nfutureenerations,ftheir nderlyingrogrammelements. c-cordingly,ociobiologistsimto show hat articularehaviours,ncludingnes hatat firstlance eemrathernpromisingith egardo the urvivalndreproductionofthe ndividualsoncerned,nfact end oincrease herepresentation,ithin hepopulation,f the lementshat iverise o them. o demonstratehat behaviourhasthis ffects sufficiento account or ts volutionynaturalelection.I have o far voided ttaching specificabelto theconstituentlementsf thebehaviouralrogramme.n early ormulationsf sociobiology heyweresimplyassumed obegenes-E.O. Wilsonhimselfrguedhat biologisedociology ouldhave o bebuilt pon evolutionaryxplanationsnthe rue eneticense' 1980: 4).Onerecent eviewerefersothe ene s the fficialnit f ociobiology'P.J.Wilson1987: 181);neverthelessany dvocates f a biological pproach o human ocialbehaviour ave trenuouslyenied hecharge fgenetic eterminism,chargehathasbeendescribeds one ofthemostwickedly ervasive'ntruthsbout henatureof ociobiologicalxplanationDunbar 987a:179)9.The denial, owever,an taketwoforms.ne istopoint utthat t east or umans, enes onotprescribepecificbehavioursutunderwritehe xtraordinaryhenotypiclasticityf the pecies hatis evidentn thegreat iversityf ife-strategies,hilst t the ame ime urnishinggeneralisedetofpreferenceshat ias ndividualsowardshe doption fstrategiesthatnhanceheireproductiveitness.heothers o rguehatlthoughhe volutionof behaviour ynatural election equireshe existence freplicable rogrammeelements, rwhatHull (1981: 33) callsreplicators,t doesnot, nfact, equire hat hesereplicatorshould e genes.For theword natural'nnaturalelectionualifiesheprocessfselection,not the units n which it operates, nd takes tsmeaningfrom tsoppositiono the rtificialelectionfvariantsn theprocessf ntentionalesign.Asreplicators,enes redistinguishedytheirocus,n the hromosomes,ndbytheir articular odeoftransmission,n theprocess f meiosis. ut t spossible oenvisaget east ne other ind f eplicatorhose ocus s the rain,ndwhosemodeof nter-generationalransmissions one or another orm f ocial earning-rangingfrom he mitationfunintentionallyodelled ehaviour o formalnddeliberatetuition. arious ames ave eenproposedor his eplicator,uch s meme'Dawkins


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TIM INGOLD 2191976: 206) and 'culturgen' Lumsden & Wilson 1981: 7). Nothing new is beingsuggested ere,for hese erms remerely eologisms or hat ime-worn nitof classicdiffusionistthnology, he culture-trait. hus the sum totalofmemesor culturgenscurrentnapopulation t a given ime s said tocomprisets culture', he dealanalogueof the gene-pool. The recognition hatboth genetic nd cultural ystemsmayevolveconcurrently,hrough Darwinianprocessof 'blind-variation-and-selective-reten-tion' (Campbell 1975: 1105), has given rise to a number of theoriesof so-called'gene-culture o-evolution',which attemptomodelwhathappenswhen both kindsofreplicator-genetic nd cultural-are usingthe same hostorganismss vehiclesfortheirown propagation1O.he crucial difference etween these theories nd moreconventionally ociobiologicalones is thattheytreat ultural ystems s analoguesfgenetic ystemsather han saspects f their henotypic xpression. ulture, n otherwords, s placed on the side of the replicators, oton the side of theirmanifest ffects.In one of the more sophisticated ersions of coevolutionary heory,Boyd andRicherson 1985) show thatbehaviourthat s optimalforgeneticreplicationmaybesub-optimal or the replication f cultural raits,nd viceversa, o thatthe predictedbehavioural utcome of a coevolutionary rocess n which genetic nd cultural raitscompeteto control he ndividuals hey nhabitwill be a compromise n between thetwo optima. do not intendto elaborateon this heory, ut I do want to make twopoints bout t. First, lthough he ncorporationfwhat s called culturalnheritance'into a general evolutionary cheme requires ertain mendments o orthodoxneo-Darwinianmodels,Boyd and Richerson remainfirmlyommitted o the Darwinianparadigm, laiming o offer othingessthan a Darwiniantheory fthe evolutionofcultural rganisms' 1985: 2). And so longas adherence o theparadigms taken o bethe distinguishingeature f a biological approach, t follows that theirs s no less'biological' for aking ulturento ccount. n these erms,ulturalvolution, ynaturalselection, sbiologicalevolution Cloak 1977: 52). Secondly, ndividuals restill eenas products hich are assembled,fnot entirely romgenetic nstructions,hen fromgenetic luscultural nstructions.nprinciple, llyouneed to know in order opredictthephenotypeof a cultural rganism s thegenotype, he analogous culture-type'consistingf earning-transmittednformation,ndthe state f the environment. hephenotype s theeffectfgenetic, ultural nd environmentalauses.Itwillsurely e agreed hat dual nheritancemodel,of the kindproposedby BoydandRicherson,neutralises heobjectioncommonly evelled against ociobiologybyhumanscientists,hat t fails o take into account thesubstantial omponentof be-havioural ncodingthat,nhumans,s transmittedon-genetically.ut does that akeus anyfurtherowards n understandingfsocial ife? f culture onsists f earning-transmittednformation,ocated n thebrains f ndividuals ndcapableof nfluencingtheirbehaviour,then as Boyd and Richersonrecognise, the relationship etweenculture nd behaviour s similar o therelationshipetweengenotype ndphenotypein non-cultural rganisms' 1985: 36). There is no lackofprecedents or hisview inthe iterature fcultural nthropology-as long ago as 1949,Kluckhohnwas insistingon the distinction etweenculture s a pattern f covert ules, cquiredby ndividualsthrough he filter f history, nd behaviour as manifest ractices 1949: 32). Thedistinctions, of course, formally nalogous to Saussure's 1959) classicdichotomybetween anguageand speaking, nd to itsmanyderivativesn anthropologicaltruc-turalism. ut does thecouple culture-behaviourill he void that s left n an account


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220 TIM INGOLDofthehuman eing ythe ouplegenotype-phenotype?egardinghe atter,haveargued hattexcludes heentire ield frelationshat ntervenesetween eneticinputsndphenotypicutputs,hat his ield orrespondsowhatwe call he rganism,andthat rganicife an only e understoodnterms f ts elf-organisingroperties.I now wish o argue, longpreciselyhe ame ines, hat he oupling f culturendbehavioureavesno spacefor he omplex sychologicalelationsndprocesseshatinterveneetween heone and theother, hat his ield f relationsorrespondsowhatwecall onsciousness,nd hatt sonly nterms f he elf-organisingropertiesofconsciousnesshatwecanreach nunderstandingf he tructuresndtransforma-tions f ocial ife.The nthropologyf ersonsI define he eatof consciousness,he ocus of ntentionalgency, s theperson.nspeakingfpersons am notconcerned,s was Mauss 1979),with ariationn theculturalonstructionf hemoralubject.t stherealityf hepersonhat amafter,not tsrepresentation.or, however, o I followRadcliffe-Brownnequating er-sonhoodwith state f ocial eing eparaterom,nd ranscending,he tatef rganicexistence. adcliffe-Brown,twillberecalled,rguedhat hehuman eing ivingnsocietys two hings',n ndividualnd person. he humanndividuals abiologicalorganism,collectionf vast umber fmoleculesrganizedn a complex tructure,within hich,s ong s tpersists,here ccur hysiologicalndpsychologicalctionsand eactions,rocessesnd hanges'Radcliffe-Brown952:193-4).This onceptionoftheorganism,s theorganisedmbodimentfa life-process,svirtuallyur own.But Radcliffe-Brownas wrong n linkingt to a conception f the ndividuals aself-contained,ounded solate, iven ndependentlynd n advance f tsexternalrelations11.have already hown hat very rganisms an open system,eneratedwithin relationalield hat uts cross he nterface ith tsenvironment.or thedevelopingumanrganism,hatieldncludeshe exus frelationsith ther umans.It is thisnexus fsocialrelationshat onstitutesimor her s a person. hustheprocessfbecoming persons ntegralothe rocessfbecomingnorganism; orespecificallyt is thatpartof theprocess hathas to do withthedevelopmentfconsciousness.he human eing, hen,s nottwothingsutone;not n ndividualand person, ut, uite imply,norganism.sthe ersonsanaspect f he rganism,so social ife s anaspect forganicife ngeneral.n that ense tmayndeed e saidto have biological asis.Bysocial ife mean heprocesseshat regoing n in therelationalieldwithinwhich ersonsome nto eingnd ndure. here annot e socialifewithoutersons,but, qually,here anbe nopersons ithoutocial ife. nusing he ermperson' orefer o the onsciousubject f ocialrelations,have o far ssumed llpersonsobe human. his s a questionablessumption,owever,s I do notthinkhere s aclear oint, nymore nphylogenyhan nontogeny, arkinghefirstppearancefconscious wareness. cannot owenternto hedebate oncerninghequestionfawarenessnnon-humannimals,hough havedone o on other ccasionsIngold1988).Sufficeosay hatwhen use the ermperson' ere,t should e interpretedas applicable,utnot n any ense xclusive,ohumanity. ymainpoint sthat heacquisitionfpersonhoodoesnot, s orthodoxocial nthropologyas t, ntailhesuperimpositionf a specificallyuman ssenceuponan undifferentiatedrganic


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TIM INGOLD 221substrate. o thecontrary, argue thatpersonhood takes hapegraduallywithinthedeveloping umanorganisml2.t s thus undamentally istaken oregard evelopmentas a process fsocialisation, s the mprintingf an exteriortructure f social relationsonto the rawmaterial' f organically reformedndividuals. or everyhuman nfantcomesintothe worldalready ituatedwithin field fsocialrelations, nd becominga person s a matter fgathering hoserelations nto thestructures f consciousness.Through thisenfoldment f social relations n consciousness, heperson emerges san autonomous agentwith his or her own identity, eady o forgenew relations utof which, in turn,new personswill come into being. Thus the true directionofdevelopment, s Vygotsky onstantlymphasised, s 'not from heindividual o thesocialized,but from he social to the ndividual' 1962: 20).Ifsocial lifepresumes heexistenceofpersons, henclearly ny account of socialevolution must tart ut from theory fhow persons repossible. n otherwords,we require theory fsociality. y sociality refer o thegenerative roperties f therelational ieldwithinwhichpersons re situated. want to make it absolutely learthat ocialitysnot a trait uilt nto the humanbiogram r ts ultural quivalent contraMaxwell 1984: 135). It snot a pre-programmedropertyfdiscretendividuals; or,however,does itreside n the force fthecollectivity s opposedo individualnatures.We should resist hetemptationo assume that ocialitynecessarilymakes referenceto thedynamics fgroups,hether hesebe conceived as mere ggregatesfindividualsor as higher-level ntitieswith emergentproperties f their own (Gordon 1987:217-19). Rather,as I have arguedelsewhere, sociality is the definitiveualityofrelationships'Ingold1989: 498-9), founded n themutualentailmentfconsciousnessand ntersubjectivity.hen we use words uch aspower, trust, ierarchy,ommunity,reciprocityndexchange, t s to features fsociality,n this ense,thatwe refer. ndinthe tudy f ocialevolution,we areprimarilyoncernedwith heprocesseswherebythesefeaturesrise nd are transformed.n short, ocial evolution hould be regardedas an exploration, vertime,of thegenerative otentials fsociality.So longaswe remain onfined o theconceptual traitjacketfgenes,culture ndbehaviour, uch an approachto social evolution s inconceivable.Transmutations fsocial form ould onlybe understood s the outcome ofchanges n thefrequency fparticular eneticand cultural ariantswithinpopulationsof individuals.That is tosay,wewould be bound toviewsocialevolution saphylogeneticrocess.Darwinism,as we haveseen, nsists n the trictegregationfphylogeny rom ntogeny, he atterhaving o do not with theevolutionofsociality utwith tsrealisation nderspecificenvironmental onditions. n our view, however,social evolution consists reciselyin transformationsfthe totalrelational ieldwithinwhich thedevelopment feveryhuman subject proceeds. Hence it is simplynot possible to separatethe studyofdevelopment rom hestudy f evolution. For ust as thegenesisoforganicformiesin the elf-organisingotentialsfthegenerativeield hatntervenes etweengenotypeand phenotype, o also thegenesisofsocial form ies in transformativeotentials fthefield, onstitutive fpersons s intentionalgents, hat ntervenes etweengenesor culture nd manifest ocial behaviour.This is an argument or ssigningopersonsan activerole in the origination f social order,rather hanrelegatinghem to thestatus fpassivevehicles for thereplication fa designwrittennto thematerials fheredity r tradition13.


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222 TIM INGOLDIt remains orme to setout the mplications f theview ofpersonhood ndsocialitythat have ust presented.Developing my argumentn parallel o what I had to sayearlierboutthenature f iving rganisms,shall irstonsiderwhat tmeans oregardthe person as the embodiment f a process; econdly shall how how the relationalorderofsocial ife s an implicate ne, andfinally shallexaminethedevelopment fthe nterface etweenpersons nd their nvironments.Recall that forneo-Darwinism, every ndividualcomes into being as a uniquecombination fhereditaryraitsmaking paprogrammehat t ives o execute.When,in the executionof this rogramme, he ndividual ommunicates r co-operateswithconspecifics,hebiologist peaksofsocial nteraction. ocial life s accordinglyeen toconsistn theaggregate f nteractionsmong ndividuals nfrequentmutualcontact.Taken together,hese ndividuals resaidto makeup a society14.n ourview,to the

contrary,ocial life s not a pattern finteractionsut an unfolding frelationships.The distinction etween interactions nd relationshipss critical. t has been mostcarefullyrawn yHinde,whoargues hat relationshipnvolves series finteractionsover time between two individualsknown to each other' (1987: 24). Thus everyinteractionn a relationship uildsupon a previoushistory finvolvement etweenthe ndividuals oncerned, ndwill in turnhave a bearingon how theyreactto oneanother nthefuture. relationship,hen,sneithern eventnor simple oncatenationofevents, ut n Hinde'swords, a processncontinuous reation hrough ime' 1987:38). To dissolve relationshipnto tsconstituentnteractionss to drain t of theverycurrent fsociality hatbindsthem smoments f a process, nd that s of ts essence.The creativeunfolding f a relationship, owever, s also a becomingofthe personsjoined by it. As the embodiments frelationships, ersonsexist and persist nlysolong as they re activelyheldwithinthe movementof social life. Hence we do notposit ndividuals n advance as ready-made, unctioning ntities,nd generate ociallifeby magininghem o associate nd to nteract nder he mpulsion ftheir eparatenatures.We rather tart ithsocial life, s a progressivebuildingup' ofrelationshipsintothestructuresfconsciousness. his 'buildingup', as we haveseen, s equivalentto thegeneration fpersons.Taking thisview of theprimacy fprocess, he connexion betweenrelationshipsand consciousness an best be characterisedy themetaphorof enfoldingnd un-folding:Consciousnessenfolds ocialrelations ndunfolds nsocialrelations' Ingold1986: 207). In otherwords, ocialityhouldbe understood s the nherent, enerativedynamic f a relational ield.Recall myearlier llusion o theconceptof themorpho-geneticfield,defined s a domain n which each partof the ivingorganisms givenby its relationswithneighbouring arts.To translatehisconcept nto the terms four current iscussion,morphogenesismaybe replacedbythegenesis f socialform,andparts y persons.Then eachperson,developing n continuous ontactwith otherpersons n thesocialfield, s constitutedyhisor her relationswith those others. norganic ife, verypartenfolds tsrelationswitheveryotherpart; ikewise n sociallife, verypersonenfoldshis or herrelationswitheveryotherperson.A phrasethatStrathernsesto describe Melanesianconception captures erfectly hatI have inmind:persons, hewrites,contain a generalized ocialitywithin' 1988: 13)15. Thesameanalogyholds n thecomparison forganicreproductionwith thereproductionof social form.Just s in the organism he whole can be reconstitutedy an inverseunfoldingfrom the part,so in social lifethe relational tructuresnfolded n the


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TIM INGOLD 223consciousnessf he ersonmay e reconstitutedhroughheirnfoldingnpurposive,social ction.However, his onceptionfsociality,s thedynamic otential f animplicate rder,s entirelyoreigno theneo-Darwinianiew nwhich ociality-commonlyendereds 'group-living'for xample, yAlexander 974: 326) ismerely resultantf the associativeroclivitiesf discretendividuals,ach nde-pendentlywired p'for o-operativer altruisticehaviour,nd nteractinghroughan externalontacthat eaves heir asicnatures naffected.ociety, or he ocio-biologist,s anexplicate rder.How, then, houldwe regardheenvironmentfthehuman ubject?n theolddays fthe ature/nurtureebate, ature as dentifiedith set finternal,ereditaryinfluencesn behaviour, urture ith setof external,nvironmentalnfluences.Depending n which ideofthedebate ou took, ither heone or theotheretofinfluencesas upposedoprevail. odern iologistsismisshe ebate, laiminghatbehaviours the ombinedroductf bothnnatend nvironmentalactors,houghinproportionshat re variable ndempiricallyifficultodetermine.utalthoughthe ebate asbeendeclaredbsolete,he ermsn whichtwasconductedbstinatelypersist. enes orculturalraits)nd environmentrestill osited s independentlygiven, ndogenousnd exogenous eterminantsf behaviour. et everytemofbehaviourspart f n nteraction,nd verynteraction,swe have een,sembeddedin the volution fa relationship.he formationf theperson,nthis volution,snecessarilyhe formationf an environmentor hat erson,whoseexistence s aboundedubjectr selfpresupposeshe othemess'hat onstituteshe nvironment.Thus he nvironmentanbenomore egardedsthe um f xogenous reconditionsthan antheperson e regardeds the umofendogenousraits.ehavioursnotsimple ffectfexogenous nd endogenousauses.Rather,t discloses momentna continuousrocess fdevelopmentithin relationalield,whoseoutcomes themutualomplementarityfpersonhoodndenvironment.Let me summarise y rgumenty presentinghree easons hy sociobiologycouched n neo-Darwinianermsannot xplainocial ife, ven f mplifiedytherecognitionf ultures ananalogousnheritanceystem orkingnparallel ith hegenetic ystem. irst,ocial ife s a process, onsistingn the creativenfoldingfrelationshipsndthebecomingfpersons. et neo-Darwinismeals nly neventsofbehaviouralnteractionmong re-constitutedndividuals.econdly,heorder fsocial ifes mplicate,et or eo-Darwinism,ocietysonly onceivables nexplicateorder. hirdly,ocial ife nvolves he volution f relationalieldhat ubsumesheinterfaceetween hehumanubjectnd hisor her nvironment.et forneo-Dar-winism,ocial ife s seen s a resultantf nternalgenetic rcultural)nd external(environmental)actors.To remedyhedeficienciesf heneo-Darwinianaradigm,recommendhatweview ocialife ot nstatisticalerms,s the utcome f large umber f nteractionsamong iscretendividuals,ut ntopologicalermssthe nfoldingfa otal enerativefield Ingold1986:244-5). have used thetermsociality'o refer o thedynamicpropertiesf this ield.Returningo an earliernalogy,hesepropertiestand ogeneticallynd ulturallyransmittednformations anequationtandso ts arametervalues.Genetic rculturalariation aybe expectedo nduce volutionaryodu-lations f thesocialfield, ut this s not to saythat ocialforms re n anysensegeneticallyrculturallyetermined.ulture nables s to account ormost f the


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224 TIM INGOLDdifferences etween social forms, ut theyare linked under transformationy theproperties f sociality.Traditional cultural nthropology, owever,has fallen ntoprecisely he sameerror s modem genetics,n supposing hat orms reexhausted ytheirdifferences.ust ike the gene', the trait' s a trick onceptthat onverts spectsorqualities fhumanconduct nto ubstantivearts rcomponents. hus it ssupposedthat uman ndividuals,ndowedby nheritance ithbundles fgenes, nd by traditionwith bundles of cultural raits, ave all theyneed to assembleorganised ocial life.Nothingcould be furtherromthe truth.The genesisof social order ies in thosedomains of consciousness nd intersubjectivityhat re simplybracketed ffby thepartition f the humanbeing ntogenes,culture nd behaviour.Towards logic frelationshipsIf I could sum up the principalburden of my argument, t would be as follows:anadequate integrationfanthropologywithinthe wider fieldofbiology requires hatthe studyof personsbe subsumed under the studyof organisms.However, thedominantneo-Darwinian paradigm n evolutionary iology has no place fortheorganism;ikewise raditionalulturalnthropologyas noplacefor heperson. ndeedthere smore than a passing imilarityetween these two paradigms, or n boththeindividual appearsas no more than a vehicle for the replication f traits,whethergenetic rcultural,whosepatterningsthecontingentutcomeofhistorical rocessesof variation nd selection.This similarityas been conduciveto theconstruction fvarious yntheticmodels ofgene-culture oevolution,whichrequire ome modifica-tionof,but no radicaldeparture rom, eo-Darwinianprinciples. n the otherhand,social anthropology as explicitly efined hepersonas itsobject ofstudy, ut onlyby settingtself p in oppositiono a biologyof organisms, hereby riving wedgeintothehumanbeing, splittingt rrevocablynto two mutually xclusiveparts-theone individual, he other ocial.The result asbeen toperpetuate separation etweenhumanity nd nature thathas had fateful onsequences in the history f westerncivilisation. he mosturgent askfor ontemporarynthropologys toovercome thisseparation,nd to re-embedthe humansubjectwithin he continuum forganic ife.The approach have sketched ut here s one that ttemptso do just that. haveshown how a theory fpersons anbe encompassedwithin moregeneral heory forganisms, ithout ompromisinghe role of humanagencyordenying heessentialcreativityf social life.This creativity, agnified thousandfoldy the work of theconsciousness,s but a specific spectof the universal apacity forganismso act, na certain ense,as theoriginatorsf their wn development. t hasbeen said that,nhistory, man makes himself , creating romwithin heveryworld nwhichhe is aparticipant. ut man (or woman) is an organism, nd organismsgenerallymakethemselves, reating s theydo a history f life. To arrive t thisconceptionof theorganism, owever,we need a newbiology, r should say noldone?-for itsholisticaspirationsre redolent f a pre-Darwinianworldview. t must e abiologythat ssertstheprimacy fprocesses verevents, frelationshipsverentities,nd ofdevelopmentover structure. rganismand persondo not then confront ne another s specificconfigurationsfmatter ndmind,two sorts f ndependent ubstances',sWhiteheadput it, 'each qualified by theirappropriate assions' (1938: 178). Both are ratherembodimentsof the total movement ofbecoming thatWhitehead so memorablydescribed s a 'creative dvance ntonovelty' 1929: 314).


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TIM INGOLD 225Let me conclude byrecalling amuelButler's elebrated phorism hat hechickenisonly n egg's way ofmaking nother gg.To this, ociobiology laims o haveaddeda new twist. The organism', .O. Wilson declares, is onlyDNA's way ofmakingmore DNA' (1980: 3). By the same token a human being, as a culture-bearingorganism,mightbe regarded s a trait'sway ofmakingmoretraits. ust uch a viewhas been suggested n all seriousness y Cloak, in whatcould at best be described sthe sneezetheory fculture. n the samewaythat hesuccessful old virus sone thatpropagatestself y causingthesufferero sneeze, selectionwill favour raits Cloakcalls heminstructions')hat ause their arriers o behave n a manner hatwillensurethat hey re copied into the heads ofasmany otherpeople as possible Cloak 1975:172). For Wilson, organisms re literallymanufactured' y theirgenes,forCloakpeople are iterallyhe slaves'oftheir ulturalnstructions. hese visions fgene-ma-

chines and culture-infectedombies are the nightmares f a scientificmaginationtormentedy ts rofoundenseofalienation rom herealworld.We stand ndesperateneedof a sciencethat, orecollect he themeofEdmundLeach's 1967ReithLectures,would only onnect...';hatwouldrecognise hat it s notthebits ndpieces thatmatterbut theevolving ystems a whole' (Leach 1967: 78). Onlywithsucha science an-thropology, iology,call itwhatyou will-can we beginto grasp he mplicationsfourparticipationn the world andthe fullmeasureof ourresponsibilityorwhat goeson in it. But torealise science of thiskindwe mustreject he ogicofbits ndpieces,ofabstractedntities,nd nstal n its tead logic f elationships.rganisms ndpersonsarenottheeffectsfmolecular nd neuronalcauses,ofgenesandtraits,ut nstancesof theunfolding f a totalrelational ield.They are formed rom elationships, hichin their ctivitieshey reate new. SamuelButlerwas right fter ll,for here s moreto an egg thana bundle ofgenes.When all is said and done, arenot organisms ndpersonsbutrelationships' aysofmakingfurtherelationships?

NOTESAs always,manyofmyideas have crystaltisedn the course of discussionswithundergraduate tudentsat the Universityof Manchester, and I should like to thank them all, especially Lorna Matheson andJanellaSllhtoe. Robin Dunbar and I shall always disagree, but I am indebted to him for his lucid and

cnticalobservations.MaryDouglas rightly arned me against onfusing he deas of Durkheim with theirsubsequent misrepresentationn social anthropology. have benefited rom he encouragement nd cnti-cism of Bnan Goodwin, Mae-Wan Ho, Deborah Gordon, John Peel, Vernon Reynolds and MarilynStrathern, one of whom, however, bears any responsibilityor the finalproduct. I am grateful o theRoyal Anthropological nstitute or nvitingme to present he Curl Lecture,and to the School ofOrien-tal and African tudies,University f London, forhosting t. The presentversion s only slightly lteredfrom he onginal text of the ecture.See especiallythe recent collections edited by Ho and Saunders (1984), Pollard (1984) and Ho andFox (1988). An important, arliercollection thatpoints in a slmilardirection s edited by Koestler andSmythies 1969). Haraway (1976) reviews the work of some majorforerunners.2 Notice how, in thissubstitution, he science has come to stand for ts subject matter.We are quiteaccustomed to thlnkingof human beings as the sites of an interactionbetween 'biology' and 'culture'.We are also used to regarding nthropology s the science of culture. But most of us, I suspect,wouldbaulk at the dea of seeinghumans as theproductsof nature' and 'anthropology'!3 Biologistsare as susceptible o thlsway of thinking bout humans and animals as are anthropologists.Mayr, for example, declares that it would be 'simple-mindedand dangerous to treatman simplyas abiological creature, hat s, as ifhe were nothlngbut an animal...Man is a umque species, n that a largeamount of cultural "inheritance" has been added to biological inhentance' (1982: 81-2). Notice theequation, here,between biologyand animality, nd thenotion ofculture s a factor dded o biology.


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226 TIM INGOLD4In fairness o Durkheim, I should emphasisethatthisview of orgamc closure was a corollary atherthan a premissof hls theoryof society, which was set up in explicit opposition to the utilitarianism fcontemporaryocial theonsts,notablyHerbertSpencer (cf.Durkheim 1982 [1895]).5Darwin, of course, was not a Darwinist, et alone a neo-Darwinist, and it is perfectly ossible toaccord a role to variationunder natural selection in the evolutionarymodification of species withoutbeing committed o everytenet of the neo-Darwinian credo. The latter s characterised y the claimthatnatural selection is not only necessarybut also sufficiento account forthe evolution of life (MaynardSmith1969).6 In fact,Dawkins immediatelymoves to qualifyhis assertion: I mustspecifywhat it means to "ex-plain life". There are, of course, many properties f living things hat we could list,and some of themmightbe explicable by rival theones... There is one particular roperty f living things,however, thatwant to single out as explicable onlyby Darwinian selection. This property s ... adaptive complexity'(1986: 288). Notice the duplicity n this argument. We are given no reason why an explanation ofadaptive complexity hould be tantamount o an explanationof ife. f iving thingshave otherproperties,explicable by other theories,then the latter have no less a claim to be explanationsof life than the

Darwinian theory.7As Haraway (1976: 196) has nghtly observed, n drawingthe distinction etween machine and or-ganismone should be sensitive o the changing meaningsof mechanism. Where once the prototypicalmachine was the clock, it is now the computer. Drawing on the metaphorsof programme,code andsystem, eo-Darwinian biologyhas been able to present mechanistic ccount ofmanyof thepropertiesof living thingswhich, in the past,had been taken to mark the contrastetween organisms nd machines,and whose explanationhad entailed recourse to notions of vitalism.At the same time, contemporaryphysics s at last becoming emancipatedfrom the shacklesof itsformerlymechanisticworld view. Theparadoxicalresult s thatpresent dvocates of a philosophyoforganism end to stress he continuitiesatherthan the contrasts etween inanimate nd animateworlds,or between physics nd biology. For them, na sense, the entirecosmos is an orgarnsm Goodwin 1988: 108). Meanwhile, it is the mechamnstshohold fast o thedistinctiveness f iving things nd to the disciplnary utonomyofbiology.8 Thus in a recent review, Harpending et al. define human sociobiology as 'the studyof humanbehavior based on a Darwinian paradigm', claimingmoreover that he basis ofhumansociobiology,as ofall biology,s population geneticsand evolutionary heory' Harpending et al. 1987: 127, 129, my em-phases).9 Sociobiology-watchersmightbe forgiven orbelievingthatthere s some confusionwithin the ranksof the soclobiologists hemselves bout the status fthe gene. The remarks hat cite hereby PJ. Wilsonand Dunbar appear in reviews of two recent books on human and pnmate sociobiology, in the sameissue of Man wherein another reviewer-of a book by Dunbar himself-praiseshlm forbeing 'a "socio-biologist" who is not really "sociobiologist"' (Sussman 1987: 179)! Elsewhere, Dunbar has elaboratedon his objections to genetic determinism:Sociobiology is concerned centrallywith the consequencesfbehaviour in termsof gene propagationand it is a serious mistake o assume that thisnecessarily mpliesanything bout the geneticcontrol of ontogenyor ... of behaviour itself (1987b: 167). I findthisobjec-tion incoherent.To show that uch-and-such behaviour has consequences forreproductive itness,ndhence forgenetic replication, s to make a purely descriptive tatement. o convert the descriptionntoan explanation,for the evolution of the behaviour in question by naturalselection,Darwinian logicrequiresus to suppose thatthereplicated lements 'genes') are among the causes of which thebehaviouris an (albeit indirect)effect. n other words, behaviour must not only be of consequence for geneticreplication, tmust also be a consequence ofreplicatedgenes. If t is not,natural election will not work.10 Apart from the work of Boyd and Richerson cited below, see for example Cavalli-Sforza andFeldman (1981), Durham (1979), Lumsden and Wilson (1981) and Pulliam (1983).11Radcliffe-Brown onsistently ompared the processesof organic ife and social life,the lattercon-sisting f an immensemultitudeof actions and interactions f human beings' (1952: 4, 178-9). But justas his view of organic closure led him to separatethe life of the individual human orgamsmfrom tssocial life with otherhumans,so also the life of thepersonwas assumed to be whollyconfinedwithlnthebounds ofsociety, ikewiseconceived as a self-contained, losed system.12 One consequence of the classical eparationof personand organism s that the developmentof thelatter s seen to be situatedwithin a domain of 'biological' relationswhich is excluded from the widerdomain of social' relationswhereinthe humanbeing, once formedorganically, cquireshis or her statusas a person. This rationale underlies attempts o isolate 'the family'as a human biological universal,constituted y relations imilar n kind to those foundamongstnon-human animals.The line thatwest-


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TIM INGOLD 227emthought raws etweenfamily'nd society'hus as ts deologicaloots ntheoppositionetweennaturendhumanity.13There s a formalarallel etween heneo-Darwinianegregationfontogenyromhylogenyndthe Saussunanegregationfsynchronyrom iachronySaussure959:80-1).Both ruleoutanycon-siderationftherelationetween gencyndstructuren historicalrevolutionaryrocessesseeGid-dens1979: 7-8).14 For examples fbiological efinitionsfsociety longthese ines, ee Dobzhansky 1962: 58),Altmann1965: 519)andE.O. Wilson1980: 7). These rereviewedy ngold1986: 241-3,275).15 It is importanto emphasisehat heviewproposed ere s quite ontraryo that xpressednthefamiliarormulafDurkheimianociology,the whole does notequalthe sum of tsparts' seeDurk-helm1982 [1895]: 128).Sinceevery art nfolds ithintselfherelationaltructuref thewhole, heyarenotdivisionsf kind hat ouldbe addedogetheroyield totalityf higherrder.

REFERENCESAlexander,.D. 1974.The evolution f ocial ehaviour. nn.Rev.Ecol. ystematics,325-83.Altmann,.A. 1965.Sociobiologyfrhesusmonkeys,I: Stochasticsf ocial ommunication.. theoret.Biol. ,490-522.Bergson, . 1911. Creativevolution.ondon:Macmillan.Bohm,D. 1980. Wholenessnd hemplicaterder.ondon:Routledge KeganPaul.Boyd,R. & PJ.Richerson985. Culturend he volutionaryrocess.hicago:Univ.Press.Campbell, .T. 1975. On the onflictsetween iologicalnd ocial volution ndbetween sychologyandmoral radition.m.Psychol.0, 1103-26.Cassirer,. 1944.Anessaynman.New Haven:YaleUniv. Press.Cavalli-Sforza,.L. & M.W. Feldman 981. Culturalransmissionnd evolution:quantitativepproach.Princeton: niv.Press.Cloak,F.T. 1975. s a culturalthology ossible? um.Ecol. , 161-82.1977.Comment nW.H. Durham:The adaptiveignificancefculturalehaviour'. um.Ecol.5, 49-52.Costall,A. 1985.Specious rigins? arwinismnddevelopmentalheory.n Evolutionnddevelopmentalpsychologyeds)G. Butterwortht l.Brighton: arvesterress.Dawkins, . 1976. The efishene. xford: niv.Press.1986. Theblind atchmaker.arlow: ongman.Dewey,J.1976.Lecturesnpsychologicalnd oliticalthics:898 ed.)D.F. Koch.NewYork:Hafnerress.Dobzhansky,. 1962.Mankindvolving.ewHaven:Yale Univ. Press.Dunbar, .I.M. 1987a.ReviewofPJ.Gray: rimateociobiology.an N.S.) 22, 179.Dunbar,R.I.M. 1987b.Darwinizingman: a commentary.n Human eproductiveehaviour:Darwinianperspectiveeds)L.L.Betzig t l.Cambridge:mv.Press.Durham,W.H. 1979. Towards coevolutionaryheoryf human iology ndculture.n Evolutionarybiologyndhumanocial ehaviour:nanthropologicalerspectiveeds)N.A. Chagnon& W. Irons.NorthScituate:uxbury ress.Durkheim,. 1960 [1914].The dualism fhumannaturend ts ocialconditions.n Emile urkheim.1858-1917 ed.)K.H. Wolff. olumbus: hlo StateUniv.Press.1982 [1895].The ulesf ociologicalethodtrans.)W.D. Halls ed.)S. Lukes. ondon:Macmillan.Eisenberg,. 1978.The human' ature fhuman ature.nThe ociobiologyebateed.)A.L.Caplan.NewYork:Harper Row.Foley,R. 1987.Anotherniquepecies:atternsnhumanvolutionarycology.ondon: ongman.Giddens, . 1979. Centralroblemsn ocialheory.ondon:Macmillan.Goodwin,B.C. 1984. A relationalr field heoryfreproductionnd tsevolutionarymplications.n

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228 TIM INGOLDHarpending, H., A. Rogers & P. Draper 1987. Human sociobiology. Yb. phys.Anthrop. 0, 127-50.Hinde, R.A. 1987. Individuals,elationshipsndculture.ambndge: Univ. Press.Ho, M-W. & S.W. Fox (eds) 1988. Evolutionaryrocessesndmetaphors.hichester:John Wiley.-~---& P.T. Saunders 1979. Beyond neo-Darwinism: an epigeneticapproach to evolution.J. theoret.Biol. 78, 573-91.

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TIM INGOLD 229Un anthropologue considere la biologie

ResumeCet article resente es fondements ourune integration dequate de l'anthropologle u seindu domaineplus vaste de la biologie. Dans le discoursde l'anthropologie sociale, le concept de 'biologie' estordinalrement ssoci6 a un c6te d'une opposition entrehumanite et nature, tablissant es personnes tdes organismes omme des objets d'etude mutuellement xclusifs. ans la biologie meme, n6anmoins,la synthese&tablie n6o-Darwinienne elimine virtuellement 'organisme comme une entitereelle, etl'extension de ce pragmatisme incorporer T'heitage culturel' elimine pareillement a personne. Unebiologie alternative st proposee qui prend 'organismecomme pointde depart, t qui comprend a viesociale des personnes comme un aspect de la vie organique en general. Ainsi une anthropologie despersonnesest contenue au sein d'une biologie des organismesdont l'int6r8t stsur es processusplutotque sur les evenements,rempla,ant a 'pensee en termes de population' de la biologle Darwinienneevolutionniste ar une loglque des rapports.

ingold - biology

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