ingarden - the work of music and the problem of its identity.pdf

8/9/2019 Ingarden - The work of music and the problem of its identity.pdf

1/9

Yale University epartment of Music

The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity by Roman Ingarden; Adam Czerniawski;Jean G. HarrellReview by: Stephen DaviesJournal of Music Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 169-176Published by: Duke University Presson behalf of the Yale University Department of MusicStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/843390.

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2/9

NOTES

1. Karl

van

Jan,

Musici

scriptores

graeci

(1895;

reprint,

Hildesheim:

Olms,

1961),

pp.

252.17-253.3

2.

Inexplicably

the

Greek for

syntonic

is

given

in the

masculine,

plural,

accusative,

syntonous.

3. This

anomoly

was

pointed

out

by

Giovanni

BattistaBenedetti

in

a series of letters

to

Cipriano

de Rore written

in the

early

1560s

and

printed

in

Benedetti's

Diversarum

speculationum

mathematicarum

t

physicorum

liber

(Turin,

1585).

Apparently

the

gradual

change

of

pitch

in a

just

tuned

vocal

performance

was not uncommon

during

the

sixteenth

century.

See Claude

V.

Palisca,

"Scientific

Empiricism

in Musical

Thought,"

Seventeenth

Century

Science and the

Arts,

ed.

Hedley

Howell

Rhys

(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1961),pp. 113-120.

The Work

f

Music and the Problem

of

Its

Identity

by

Roman

Ingarden

Berkeley:

University

of California

Press,

1986.

Translated rom the

original

Polish

by

Adam

Czerniawski;

Edited

by

Jean G.

Harrell.

Includes

(pp.

159-173)Max Rieser's"Roman

ngarden

nd His Time", e-

printed

rom The

Journal

of

Aesthetics

and Art

Criticism39

(1971)

xvi,

181

pp.

REVIEWER

Stephen

Davies

This book

by

the

Polish

aesthetician

Roman

ngarden

who

died

in

1970)

was first

published

n

Polish

morethan

twenty

years

ago,

but the

present

edition

is

the first

English

translation.

Originally

he work was

intended o

be

part

of

the

book

known

n

English

as

The

Literary

Work

fArt

(first

pub-

lished

in

Polish

in

1931;

n

English

in

1973)

in

which

a

unified

theory

of

the

arts

was

to be

presented,

but

eventually

t

appeared

eparately.

As the

title

suggests,Ingarden's

main

concernhere lies

with the

ontological

tatus

of the musical

work.

In addition

o

his

text,

the

book containsa

Preface

by

the

translator,

Adam

Czerniawski,

nd a reviewof

Ingarden's

ontribution

to aestheticswrittenby Max Rieser.

In

general Ingardendistinguishes

he

musical

work

both

from

"ideal"

and

"real"

objects

(whether

mental

or

material).

In

particular,

e distin-

guishes

the

musical work

from

its

performances,

he

composer's

or the

listeners'

mental

experiences,

and

from

the

score. The

strategy

of the

argument

s the same in each case-he tries to show that statements rue

169

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3/9

of the musical

work

are

true neither

of

"ideal"

bjects

nor of the

"real" b-

jects

in

which the musical work

might

be concretised.

The essentialsof

Ingarden's

iew of

intentional,

"ideal",

nd "real" b-

jects

would

appear

o be

this:

An intentional

bject

is one which

depends

for its existenceon conscious minds and

upon

real

objects

from whichits

presence

can

be abstracted

r

inferred.

This

is not

to

say

that intentional

objects

are

"subjective"

n

the

sense that

heir

properties

re

determined

y

the beliefs or

desires

of

any particular erson;

heir

properties

re

subject

to

inter-personal

erification.Intentional

bjects

would cease to exist

if

conscious

beings

were

expunged

rom

the

world,

or

if

the

real

objects

through

whichtheir

presence

s detectedwere

destroyed.

ntentional

bjects

are

abstract

n

that

they

are not

presented

directly

o

perception,

but

they

are located n time in thattheymaybe createdor destroyed.By contrast,

"ideal"

objects

(such

as

numbers,

universals nd the

like)

depend

or their

existence neither on conscious minds nor on their

instantiation.

Ideal"

objects

are

abstract

n

that

they

standoutside

space

and

time;

they

can

be

neither

created

nor

destroyed,

although

hey

may

be

"discovered."

Real"

objects,

which

are

given

immediately

o

perception,

lso do

not

depend

or

their

existenceon consciousminds.

They

are

autonomous,

whereas nten-

tional

objects

are

heteronomous.

But,

in

contrast o

"ideal"

bjects,

"real"

objects

exist

concretely

n

space

and time andcan be created

or

destroyed.

Ingarden'serminology

and treatmenthere derivesfrom Brentanovia

Husserl,

but the

distinction

whichhe drawsdoes not

rely uponany particu-

lar

metaphysical

ystem.

A

philosopher

s

far n

spirit

romHusserlas Karl

Popper

has madea similardistinction.His notion

of "World

Three"

bjects

corresponds

losely

to

Ingarden's

ccount

of intentional

bjects.'

Ingarden

haracterizes

he musicalwork as

an

intentional

bject.

If all

conscious

beings

were to be

removed

rom the

world,

musical

works

(as

opposed

to successions

of

sound)

would cease to

exist. Like other inten-

tional objects, the continuedexistenceof a musical workdepends upon

"real"

objects

from which the work

may

be

inferred-notations,

perfor-

mances,

and the like.

Clearly

he musical

work is not

an

"ideal"

bject

in

that t is created

at a

particular

ime andcould

be

destroyed y

the destruc-

tion of the real

objects

upon

which ts existence

depends including,

s well

as

scores,

recordings

nd accurate

memoriesof

them).

Neither s it

a

"real"

object,

since

it is

not

given

directly

o

perception

ndhas

no

spatial

ocation.

Strictly

speaking,

take

t

thatthe score

and

any

performance

would

be

classed

by

Ingarden

s intentional

bjects,

in

that

their existence

depends

uponthe consciousrecognitionof theirsignificanceas a notationor per-

formance.

But

clearly

he believes

hat,

as an intentional

bject,

the musical

work

is

more

abstract

han its score

or

any

performance

f it.

I

take the

point

to

be this: The

score,

as

a

notation,

ranscends

he marks

on

paper

with which it is correlated.

Similarly,

he

performance

its

themes,

etc.)

transcends

he sound-basiswhich

is

given

directly

to

perception.

The

170



4/9

musical

work,

though,

is

yet

more abstract n that t

transcends hese

tran-

scendences.

Moreover,

whereas coresand

performances

re

determinate

n

their

qualities,

musical

works

are indeterminate

n

permittingmany

pos-

sible,

but

equally

faithful,

performances.

hus,

the

musicalwork s

doubly

removed rom the realworld.

But,

in its ultimate

dependence

on realob-

jects,

the

musical work is not so

abstractas

"ideal"

objects

are.

SUMMARY

The

musical

work

is

distinguished

n

a

numberof

ways

from

(A)

its

performances

Chapter

One),

(B)

an

auditory

xperience

of a

performance

Chapter

Two),

and

(C)

its

score

(Chapter

Three).

(A)

It

per-

sists

in

time

(although

a

temporal

tructure s

immanent

within

it)

without

a spatial ocation,whereas ts performancestartandend, and takeplace

at

particular

ocations.

The

musical work is

unique, by

contrast

with

the

multiplicity

of its

possible

performances.

A

performance

manifests tself

directly

n the

auditory

xperiences

f

the

listenerand s

univocally

andulti-

mately

determined

y

its

"lowest" ound

properties,

whereas

he

perception

of

the

musicalwork s

mediated

by

its

performances

nd

many

of

the

quali-

ties

of

the

musical work

are

indeterminate

for

example,

its exact

pitch,

tempo

and

colouring

are

not

determined

y

the

musical

notation).

B)

The

performance

f a work

contains

hemes and

the

like,

but

auditory

xperi-

ence is fluid.No theme is the contentof auditory xperience,

although

he

auditory

experience

of

sound refers

he

listener

to

the

theme. And

just

as

the

properties

f

the

performance

ranscend

he

auditory

xperience

of the

performance,

o

the

properties

f the

musicalwork

ranscend

he

properties

of its

performances.

C)

Not all

musicalworks

have

been

notated.The

nota-

tion

has

properties

whichthe

musicalwork

acks

(for

example,

a

page

size).

The

score is a

set of

signs

with

imperatival

mport,

and

ust

as a

sign

differs

from

its

referent,

so the

score differsfrom

the

musical work.

Whatfeaturesaredisplayedby musicalworks(ChapterFour)?Musical

works

arenot

to be

distinguished

rom

other

sound-constructs

for

example,

bird

songs)

in

having

a

specific

ordering

f

soundsor in

giving

rise

to

mel-

odic

gestalts,

since

sound-constructs

may possess

these

properties

also.

Whereas

music

may

be

expressive

or

representational

n

intent,

hese

prop-

erties

are

extra-musical

henomena

n

their

natureand

origin

and, so,

do

not

distinguish

music

from

mere

sound-constructs.

either s

music

distinct

in

possessing

"meaning".

Music

(unlike

literature

or

example)

acks

the

stratificationn

which

signification

epends.2

ather,

music s

distinguished

frommeresound-constructsnbeinganintentional ndnot a "real" bject.

Unlike

"real"

bjects,

a

musicalwork

has no

spatial

ocation.

The

musical

work

is

not a

particular

s

are material

objects

of

perception;

he

musical

work

s

a

supra-individual

n

that ts

particularity

rises roma

selection

rom

real

modesof

existence.

Moreover,

musical

work s

supra-temporal

n

that,

whilst

it has

an

"immanent"

emporal

tructure,

t

exists

as

a

totality

n

real

171



5/9

time from the

momentof its

creation;

he

temporality

f

its structure

s

revealed

n

real

time

only

through

he work's oncretization

n

performance.

The

opening

and the close

of a

musical

work

are

not

datablemoments

n

real time

and

there s no

"before"

r "after" musical

workas

there

always

is with datablemomentsnreal ime.Thus,a musicalworkand ts structure

stand

outside

the

spatio-temporal

rameof the real

world.

Only

wherethe

musical

work

is

expressive

or

representational

oes

the

question

of a con-

nection

with the real

worldarise.

A musical

work

is

comprised

of

both

sounding

and

non-sounding

le-

ments

Chapter

ive).

Amongst

he

sounding

lements

displayed

in

at least

some)

musical

worksare

melody,

harmony, hythm

nd instrumental

olor.

Amongst

he

non-sounding

lements

displayed

n

(at

least

some)

musical

worksarea quasi-temporaltructure,movement lusa quasi-spacewithin

which

this

movement

occurs,

form,

emotional

qualities

inherent

n the

music

itself,

emotions

(or

persons)

and

representational

lements.

Where

the "owners"

f

emotions

expressed

or

the

subjectsrepresented

must

be

supplied maginatively

y

the

listener,

he

expressed

motion

or

the

repre-

sented

subject

belongs

to,

without

being

part

of,

the

music.

Both

sounding

and

non-sounding

lements

may

contribute

o the

aesthetic

value of

the

work,

but

no

such elements

possess

inherent esthetic

value.

As we have

already

seen,

the

musical

work,

according

o

Ingarden,

s

an intentional bjectwith its originalsource n a specific"real" bject(the

markswhich

comprise

he

score)

and

its

ground

of continued

xistence

n

a

series

of other

"real"

bjects

the

sound-bases

f

performances)

Chapter

Six).

A

recording

f the work

as

given

or directed

by

its

composer

s a rec-

ord

of a

performance,

nd not of

the work tself.

As

an intentional

bject,

the musical

work

depends

for

its

existence

on certain

"real"

objects-the

intentional

cts

of

composers,

means of

preserving

a schema

of the

work

and

making

that

schema

concrete,

and the

experiences

of listeners.

The

musicalworkis, therefore,heteronomousather han autonomous.But it

is distinct

rom

and

referred o

by

the

"real"

bjects

on which

its existence

depends.

The

musical

work is a

supra-individual

ith

a

supra-temporal

structure

with

purely

qualitative

ndividuality.

t

generates

ndexists

within

its own

spatio-temporal

rame

withinwhich

"real"

bjects

are

located.

How does

a musical

work

consisting

of

many products

and

parts

form

a unified

whole

(Chapter

Seven)?

Ingarden

eadily

allows

that not all

mu-

sical

works

are unified

and

is

here

concerned

only

to

explain

the

unity

of

those

which

are.)

A

condition

of

hearing

a

phrase

of the work

as

part

of

a whole is thatit be heardreachingboth intothe work'spastandfuture.

In a

unified

workthe

parts

not

only

succeedeach

other,

they

may

dovetail

intoeach

other,

heymaycomplete

eachother

hrough

armony

r

contrast,

and

they may

sharethe same emotional

quality.

Similarly,

he

movements

postulate,

ompleting

and

fulfilling,

each

other.

The break

between

move-

ments

is

a

part

of the

work,

revealing

he

unity

of that

which it

divides.

172



6/9

The breakshould

be

long enough

o allow

the "after-sound"

f the

previous

movement o

dissipate,

but

not so

long

as to erase

the

memory

of the

pre-

vious movement. n

order to fulfill its function he break

should

be

filled

with

silence

and neither

with

applause

nor the

eating

of

sweets

How is

the

identity

of

a

musical

work

maintained

hrough

ime

in

the

light

of

changing

styles

of

performance Chapter

Eight)?

The

score

of

a

work

is

indeterminate

ith

respect

o

many

aspects

and concretedetails

of

performance,

so

many

equally

faithful

performances,

each

differently

revealing

he

piece

as

possessing

aesthetic

value,

are

possible. Every per-

formance

which

matches

he

score and

does

not extend

beyond

he

possi-

bilities

of the work

as contained

n

the score

is

"proper".

o,

historical

changes

in

styles

of

performance

o not

challenge

he

work's

dentity,

or

there is no single objectwhich is the work. If we mistakenlybelieve that

the

identity

of

the work

is

altered

when it is

given

a

"proper"

ut

unortho-

dox

interpretation,

his is

only

because we tend to

identify

the

work

with

some

possibleperformance

which

strikesus as

high

in

aestheticvalue.

Yet

some new

interpretation

f the

work,

whilst

losing

that which was aesthet-

ically

valuable

n

the

orthodox

reading,may

reveal

in

the

work hitherto

unperceived

lementsof

equal

aestheticvalue.

Modem

recordings

y

com-

posers

allow us

to return o the work

not as the

"original"

ut

rather,

o

one

of

its

possible profiles.

And

the

work,

as

under-determined

y

its

score,

contains he

possibility

of

quite

different,

but

equally

"proper"

nd aesthet-

ically

valuable,

performances

which,

by

virtue of

being "proper",

ill

be

performances

f the

same,

enduring

work.

GENERAL

EMARKS ND

CRITICISMS.

here

is

no

doubt that this

is a fine

book,

rich

n

detailand

nsight,

which

will

be

of

considerablenter-

est to

those

with

a

concernwith

the

philosophy

of

music.

The

arguments

are clear and easy to read (for which, no doubt, thanks s owed to the

translator

s

well as

the

author).

In

particular,

he

discussion in

the

first

three

chapters

s

uncommonly

horough

nd

perceptive,

and

the final

chap-

ter

cannot

fail to

be

of

interest

n

view

of

the

current

oncernwith

authen-

ticity

in

performance-practice.

Nevertheless,

he

treatment

f

some

issues is

(unavoidably)

ated. For

example,

Ziffs

provocative

discussion of the

identity

of

musical works

could not

easily

be

accommodated

y

Ingarden.3

nd

the

interested

eader

should

compare

ngarden's

iews with recent

accounts f

the

ontology

of

the

musicalwork.'In general,Ingarden'sssertion hata musicalworkstands

apart

from

the

real world

and

is

to be

understood

xclusively

on

its own

terms

sits ill

with the

(now

predominant)

iew

thatthe

aesthetic

properties

of

works

of

art

are

determinedn

part

by

their

historical

context.5

He

discus-

ses

the

issue

on

pp.

55-61,

butI

find

his remarks

nconvincing.)

n

the

same

vein,

his

tendency

o

dismiss musical

expressiveness

nd

representation

s

173



7/9

extra-musical

henomena

s

cursory,

and it is a shamethat he did not

ad-

dress the

problems

of

accounting

or the

way

in which music

may

present

expressive

and

representational

ualities.6

The remarks bove

bear

upon

a

worry

I

haveabout

he

views

presented

in ChapterEight.Ingarden uitecorrectlyrecognises hat different-sound-

ing

performances

may

be

equally

authentic

or

"proper")

nd

equally,

but

differently, evealing

of

aesthetic

value.

But he

implies,

I

think,

that

"pro-

priety"

allows

more

latitude

o the

performer

han

normally

we would

be

prepared

o

concede.

The scoreof

a musicalwork s

a

convention-governed

notational

ystem

and that

which

is

determined

y

the score

depends

upon

the conventions

n

terms

of

which

it is to be read.

These

conventions

have

changed

hrough

ime

and,

so,

the

identity

of

the

work

s

called

into

ques-

tion if the score is performedn accordancewith conventionsotherthan

those

in

terms

of whichthe score

was

written.'

n

suggesting

hat

stylistical-

ly

very

different

performancesmight

be

equally

"proper",

ngarden

ails

to

take

account

of the

fact that a

score

must be understood

n

its social

and

historical ontext

f

a

reading

of

the score

is to lead to

a

performance

which

is

undeniably

a

performance

f the

composer's

work. If

Ingarden

overs

himself

against

his

objection,

he

does so

in

insisting

hat,

as

well

as

ac-

cording

with the

score,

all

the

remaining

qualities

revealed

n the

perfor-

mancemust

not extend

beyond

he

possibilities

of

the

workas

a

schema

p.

150).Unfortunately,hisqualificationf his main ine on "propriety"s not

expandedupon.

One obvious

objection

o

Ingarden's

iews is

mentioned

both

by

Czerni-

awskiand

Harold

Osborne.8

he

objection

s

invited

by

Ingarden's

oncen-

trationon

pre-1950's

music

in

the

European

radition.

t

is this:

Whereas

the

identity

of

the worksdiscussed

by

Ingardenmight

be determined

n

part

by

their

scores,

not all music derives

its

identity

n this

way.

Czerniawski

notes

that,

for

jazz

and

pop

music,

the

work is constituted

by

the

perfor-

mance; n suchcases the musicis, as it were,but anexcuse for theperfor-

mance.

Osborne

makes a similar

point

with

respect

to Indian

classical

music and

folk music.

Further,

he observesthat

some

electronicmusic

is

composed

on

recordwithout

urther

performances

eing envisaged

and,

as

such,

is

fully

determinate

nd

unique.

And

he

notes,

to

turn

the coin

over,

thataleatoric

music allows

for an

indeterminacy

for

example

n

the order

of the

movements)

which

goes

beyond

hat which

Ingarden

llows.

It

seems

to me that

Ingarden,

who

acknowledges

hat

not all music

depends

for its existence

on a

score,

might

go

some

way

to

meeting

this

criticism.Whatmatters,on his account,is the fact that a musicalwork

depends

upon,

whilst

transcending,

real"

bjects,

and this

will

be

equally

true

of the cases

of score-less

music mentioned

bove.

However,

he

objec-

tion retains ome

force.

Ingarden

writes

as

if

a musical

work

always

ran-

scends a

performance

f

it,

and the

examples

cited

above

suggest

that

this

is not

universally

rue

not all musical

worksare

doubly

removed

rom

the

174



8/9

real world. Where

he

objection

amounts

o the

charge

hatmusical

works

show

more ontic

variety

han is

acknowledged

y

Ingarden's

reatment,

t

continues

o hold.

Osborne

also

disagrees

with

Ingarden's

laim that

musical works

lack

reality.Thisobjection s perhapsmisplacedonce it is noted hatIngarden's

use

of the notionof

"real"

bject

s technicaland

somewhat

estrictive-he

means

by

it

something

ike "thatwhich

may

be

givendirectly

o

perception".

(It

is

because

I

regard

ngarden's

se of

'real'

as

technical

hat,

unlike

him,

I

have

placed

the term in

scare

quotes.) Certainly

ngardenmight

reason-

ably reject

Osborne's

suggestion-that

the

work

is

a

continuing

set

of

performances

uided

by

a

score-on the

grounds

that this

set

has

many

properties

which

cannot

truly

be

predicated

f the work

and vice versa.

A

related

objectionmight

have more

force:

In

Chapters

Five and Six

Ingarden

writes of the

musical

work as a

supra-individual

ith

melodies,

instrumental

olor,

and so forth.

By

ChapterEight

the

musical

work

has

become a

set of

possibilities

which

may

be

realized

n

different

ways

in

different

performances.

Of

these

ways

of

characterizing

he musical

work,

I

prefer

he second.

The first

characterizationf the

work

misleadingly ug-

gests

that he work

s

a

kind

of

object/event,

lbeita

non-real

and

somewhat

indeterminate

ne,

whereas

he second

sees the work

more

as a

functional

relation

between he

composer,

he

score,

the

performer,

nd the

audience.

Thesewaysof characterizinghe workstrikeme as significantly ifferent,

although

Ingarden

eems

not to

share this

intuition.

Finally,

I find

Ingarden's

reatment

f

musical

unity

rather oo

phenom-

enological;

he

describes

the natureof

the

experience

of

a

musical work's

unity

rather

han

explaining

he basis

for

that

experience.

Possibly

the ex-

planation

would

have led to a

discussion

of

technicalities

which

Ingarden

did not

wish to

pursue.

But it

is

surprising, erhaps,

hat

he

did not

mention

the

theories

of

Reti

and

Schenker.

And the

issues

raised

by

the

analyses

of

the

musical

bases

for

musical

unity

are

worthy

of

philosophical crutiny.A further

oint

on

Ingarden's

iewson musical

unity:

Czerniawskis

scepti-

cal that

the

works

of

the

masters

are

so

unifiedas

Ingarden

would

appear

to believe.

Giventhe

alacrity

with

which

Mozart

and

Haydn

were

prepared

to

substitute

movements rom

work

to

work,

he

may

well

be

right

n

this.

NOTES

1.

See

Unended

Quest,

London,

Fontana,

1976

(Revised

Edition).

2. For an account of

Ingarden's

notion of stratification ee

pp.

50-54

and

the

essay by

Max

Rieser

included

in

the book.

3. See "The

Cow on the

Roof',

The

Journal

of

Philosophy,

70

(1973):

713-723.

4.

See,

for

example,

N.

Wolterstorff,

Works

nd

Worlds

f

Art

(Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

1980);

Kingsley

Price,

"What s

a

Piece of

Music?",

The

British

Journal

ofAesthetics,

22

(1982):

322-336;

James

C.

Anderson,

"Musical

Kinds", The

British

Journal

of

175



9/9

Aesthetics,

25

(1985):

43-49;

Ren6e

Cox,

'A

Defence

of Musical

Idealism",

The Brit-

ish Journal

of

Aesthetics,

26

(1986):

133-142.

5.

See,

for

example,

KendallL.

Walton,

"Categories

of

Art",

The

Philosophical

Review,

74

(1970):

334-367.

6. Recentand detailed treatmentsof these topics have been offeredby PeterKivy-see

The

CordedShell

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1980),

and Sound

and Sem-

blance

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1984).

7.

I

have discussed

such

matters

n

'Authenticity

and

Musical

Performance",

The

British

Journal

of

Aesthetics,

27

(1987):

39-50.

8.

Adam

Czerniawski,

"Translator's

reface",pp.

vii-xvi;

Harold

Osborne,

Review of

The Work

f

Music and the Problem

of

Its

Identity,

The

British

Journal

of

Aesthetics,

27

(1987):

181-183.

9.

I

have

discussed

such matters

n

'Attributing

Significance

o

Unobvious Musical

Rela-

tionships",

The

Journal

of

Music

Theory,

27

(1983):

203-213.

176

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