information sharing bulletin - premudasqems.premuda.net/premuda bulletin/9.pdf · the academic...
TRANSCRIPT
Dear Premuda's fellows,
The year is quite ended and it’s time to reflec-
tions and analysis of what has been done and
what is still to be done.
The global financial market is suffering a serious
moment: the entire economic world entered into
a deep recession. The complex of vicious circles
which contributed to the crisis included high oil
prices, high food prices and the collapse of sub-
stantial housing bubble centered in the United
States. Heavily penalized is the bulk carried mar-
ket. In such a depressed time, our Company has
to give the maximum in order to keep our Cli-
ents. We have to continuously improve by using
all the available tools to render our service more
effective.
The Risk Assessment is one among those tools.
Unfortunately we have to report lacks in the use
of the Risk Assessment software installed on
board of our managed vessels and a serious
lack of commitment.
Again, another lack is to be reported for the
Safety Day: to better promote safety, Company
established one day entirely dedicated to safety
matters, not limited to drills performances but
including also reviews and explanations of Com-
pany Management System. Unfortunately, also
for this topic, we have to report lack of commit-
ment.
A relevant section of this edition is for the out-
come of the Management review carried out by
Shell at the end of September at Company prem-
ises. The result was that the management stan-
dard required by Shell is higher than the stan-
dard level our Company system is presently set
to. Therefore, our Company is not reaching the
sufficient score Shell is looking for in order to
approve its supplier. Company has now to
strongly work in order to meet the required stan-
dard Shell is requiring.
The selected closed cases
In this Issue:
Incident reports: incidents occured during drills on board
Open Letter from the General Director
The vessel in the hurricane: the Company and the out
come of the Shell Vettting at Company premises
Company System under discussion
The Academic Lesson: the concept of arrived ship and the
Notice of readiness
Information Sharing Bulletin
is published by:
Premuda SpA - SQE Dept.
Email: [email protected]
Collection of selected
Vetting Issues
Commercial issues
Remarks to be shared
Lesson‟s bearing
Information Sharing Bulletin
Summary:
§ Two cases of minor injuries happened during drills on board
§ One case of minor injury due to not use of proper PPE
§ Two cases of lack of attention by the operators, luckily procuring minor injuries
§ A damage to a very important life saving appliance: the lifeboat
§ One incident caused by having not followed properly Company procedures
§ One machinery failure involving the COT pressure monitor system
www.premuda.net Be sure, be safe
Please, send any comment
to the Editor:
Lesson Learned
Issue n° 9
December 2008
Due to the high importance of the topics dealt
with this issue, the Commercial Issue section
and the Academic Lesson have been incorpo-
rated together.
You will also note this edition has been enriched
with some cartoons which have been provided
by our Site Control Mgr/CSO.
Once again, we would like point out that it is cru-
cial everyone give the best effort and support to
our Company during these difficult times, waiting
for the rough seas to calm.
By G. Mortola
Academic lesson
This incident luckily occurred when the vessel was in port: the injured Officer was immediately hospitalized
ashore. The incident was closed as “ lack of familiarity “ and incorrect use of fire fighting technique. During
the last years, In the shipping industry a large number of incidents was noticed during the periodical drills
performed on board, mostly during the lowering of the lifeboat (new regulations were issued for this type of
drill to prevent future incidents). Prior any drill, Company reminds ships Commands to examine previous drill
reports and crew skill, organize the drill having not tired crew, plan it with the participation of other officers,
possibly perform a risk assessment highlighting the possible hazards and the controls to eliminate or reduce
them.
Selected closed cases
Page 2
The incident occurred during the performance of one drill on board, when the Chief Officer accidentally slept
down (to report that some other four slippery cases were analyzed during the period).
Pagina 3
The incident occurred on june, again during the performance of a drill on board.
This incident was caused by the defective hand flare.
Page 3
Selected closed cases
Many incidents occur because early warnings of hazards are ignored until sufficient hard evidence is ac-
cumulated. A system approach to incident analysis can help to identify points in the chain of events
where timely action may be crucial. Ships and marine systems are becoming increasingly complex and
integrated: it is now recognised that a „system‟ includes its operators. Many improvements in operational
safety can be achieved by paying close attention to the relevant systems that support operation, not
least when these systems fail. Obtaining the fullest picture therefore necessitates an effective method of
abstracting information from incident data. Company reminds to report with as much as possible details
any near miss or hazardous situation that after analysis can help to improve the prevention of incidents.
Many injuries happen because seafares are not correctly kitted out for the task in hand. Supply the correct
safety clothing has became an integral part of ship‟s managers responsibility: there is no doubt that wearing
the right PPE for the task is vital and has saved lives, but the requirement to use the PPE has to make sense
if it is going to be obeyed, if the rule does not appear to make sense is often broken (i.e: if we say that hard
hats must be worn on deck, where there are no falling objects). The best way to ensure that all crew wear
the correct PPE is to create a very strong safety culture: in doing so, it becomes second nature to work safely
and use the correct safety equipment.
Selected closed cases
Page 4
Some other similar occurrences were closed during the period, which would had lead to more serious conse-
quences if no PPE , incorrect PPE or their incorrect use were in place.
The case is a typical example of operator‟s distraction and adequate supervision. Potential hazards should
be identified and delimited on main deck: result of investigation was that no tape or warning signs were
available. Furthermore, it is to be reported that vessel was in an operative mode and it is not recommended
that both Master and C. Officer inspect together an enclosed space like the COT. The simultaneous danger-
ous task or condition for both the deck or engine senior officers should be avoided for the safety of the crew
and of the vessel. Masters and Officers should always maintain awareness of situations at all time and un-
derstand the effects of their actions and decisions.
Selected closed cases
Page 5
The incident fortunately resulted in minor burnings: we have however to remember that multiples reported
cases led to more serious consequences.
Pagina 6
The incident occurred on board on 12 December 2008 and was quickly closed, one week after the occur-
rence.
Page 6
Selected closed cases
Cadets are the future officers and their training is very important: through introductions on routine works
and activities of the daily life on board, the cadets can understand the necessity of a cooperative spirit,
environment protection, acquiring fundamental skills. They have to continuously take part in actual re-
pair/maintenance works to develop their skills for maintenance but always under the direction of a re-
sponsible Officer as an instructor. Through these maintenance works, the Cadets learn correct proce-
dures to be taken when maintenance works are in progress, inspection techniques and safety measures
to be taken for protecting themselves from injury. It is therefore important that the Cadet knows and ap-
ply the correct procedure (e.g. the correct use of PPE) and is followed always by one responsible Officer.
The crack in the hull of the free fall was only detected during an external survey: this occurrence is showing
some lacks in the safety inspection program executed on board (prior to any external survey, ship‟s crew
have to perform one deep inspection in order to be ready and rectify, where possible, any eventual deficiency
found. Without a proper maintenance and inspection, the safety equipments may not be fit for purpose. Dur-
ing external inspections, when serious defects are detected, the perception is that the ship is unsafe and
vessel can be detained, by the Port State, until she is deemed to be “safe”. Company reminds to execute all
the inspections and the maintenance to the safety equipments, immediately reporting to the Office any defi-
ciency that cannot be solved by crew onboard.
Selected closed cases
Page 7
The hazardous situation was discovered during the annual survey to the safety equipment carried out by the
Classification Society on 25/08/08.
The cargo handling is responsibility of all Officers: ISGOTT and Company procedures on this regard have to be
strictly followed, taking all steps to ensure that everyone safety and health, and the environment are pro-
tected. Improper handling can result in serious injury or death caused by fire, explosion. Cargo released into
the environment (after lines ruptures due to pressure surge) can contaminate the water around the vessel.
The consequences in terms of pollution, fines applicable to the Owner, bad image of the Company, possible
refuse by Charterers and Terminals to accept future service of vessel have to force everyone involved in
cargo operation to strictly follow the International and Company procedures: all loading plans should be well
coordinated between the ship‟s officers trained for the specific task.
Selected closed cases
Page 8
The incident (overpressure at ship‟s manifolds) is important for its significance. It should reflect to all Com-
pany staff that various procedures were not followed, causing serious damages to the image of the Com-
pany.
Pagina 9
The failure occurred on July 2007 but it was only closed on may 2008.
Page 9
Selected closed cases
The monitoring system was restored at normal condition in a short time; however, the closure of the re-
port was delayed without a clear reason. The COT monitoring is one of the sensitive equipments in-
cluded into the critical systems by the Company and it is therefore subject to a more stringent attention.
When discovered, the failure has to be immediately rectified and—when impossible—an alternative mean
to control the situation has to be be used in agreement and/or following the suggestions by Company
shore departments involved.
Open Letter from the General Manager
Page 10
To the great family of Premuda
Dear all,
The year 2008 is just ended and I would like to convey my personal greetings
– along those of Premuda’s Board – for a prosperous new year to each of you
and to your family.
I sincerely wish to thank everyone in Premuda for the great support and co-
operation, always a plus to the professional service and job demonstrated on
board of our vessels and in the office.
My message is particularly addressed to the people working on board of our
vessels.
This issue of the Bulletin, closing the year 2008, it’s a special issue as it looks
at the way the global financial meltdown of the recent few months has af-
fected the shipping market and how our Company can weather the storm.
The world economic landscape has changed radically. Companies have
seen their share values plummeted down, the banking system is in cri-
sis, business confidence has been destroyed and the Chinese industrial mira-
cle, which has been the engine of word economic growth for a number of
years, has been stopped dead in its tracks.
Especially the bulk carriers are deeply involved the crisis.
In this context, we have to offer our best services and picture to keep our Clients and be able to fix our vessels at the maxi-
mum possible. We have to be careful in the costs management , saving the maximum possible, from our side; from the
other side, we have to offer our best services and grant full respect of our procedures and international requirements to be
competitive. The modern shipping industry is improving and the demand of quality, safety and security is always and continu-
ously upgrading: we have to follow this indication, well knowing our Company, our resources and possibilities.
Our DPA, the link between vessels outputs/requests and the Board, is constantly informing, updating and highlighten-
ing problems and needs. Some of these problems are endemic and we are constantly working in order to improve: however,
our time of reaction time is not fast and immediate. We need time, probably more than required by the modern industry dur-
ing these times.
As example, we can take our jobs and resources invested in the electronic PMS. We are working since a long time,
and some discrepancies still appear. During the year 2008, our quality objective related to this matter failed.
Again, we report some problems related to the use of moderns and mandatory tools for the shipping industry as the Risk As-
sessment is. At this stage, the Risk Assessment program should be used on a regular base and could be the support for any
future investigation in case of incident: it has to be a mandatory tool before any operation and job on board of our vessels
starts. For this topic too, I understand that we need additional commitment and have to adjust our mentality in order to intro-
duce it in our daily work mentality. The Risk Assessment should be something that we feel and not something that we have
to do as it is required/ordered by the Company.
Another important issue is the record of incidents or injuries work related and reported on board of our vessels.
We have one excellent vessel, with very few incidents reported in the last two years, while all the other vessels are report-
ing cases with more frequencies. Company is really very sensitive for this argument: the mission is ZERO incident, then ves-
sels with frequencies over our standards need serious investigation in order to understand the cause. Any incident and near
miss should be reported and analyzed, but one serious selection and classification of the cases should be done in order to
report to the DPA/Board all significant cases for which a deep investigation should be done.
This time is particularly complicate and extremely difficult for the commercial/financial aspects involved: in this
rough sea, we have all to show the best of our Company in term of saving costs, thus providing the best services a at the
highest standards. We have to avoid any problem caused by the wrong application or non compliance with our Company
standard, that will only signify to be non in compliance with the modern industry requirements and international require-
ments. We have to improve our mentality and be committed in our mission: we have to share to all our people the required
standards and procedures, which are nowadays mandatory if we want to remain in the shipping business.
Even the above could seem only paper job, waste time and documentary work, each Company representative and Senior Offi-
cer has to correct the feeling and clarify that ALL required jobs and duties are important, since the vessels management is a
sort of ―orchestra‖ with one conductor…. the Company Board. Each orchestra component has to play one specific part and
has one specific duty: if only one will not follow the rules, the false note is granted!
Good job to everyone and good year 2009: Company is trusting in each of you.
Marco Tassara
General Manager
Pagina 11
Page 11
Vetting Issues
Then Chevron accepted vessel referring to Shell SIRE dd.
15 Sept. 2008, and deferring inspection to March 2009.
BP evaluated our vessel basis Shell SIRE, accepting our
vessel and deferring inspection to March 2009
Also ExxonMobil accepted vessel basis Shell SIRE.
Four Island
Vessel (Master Rainò) performed a SIRE inspection with
Shell, Singapore 03/11/2008 (10 NO) with positive result.
Chevron accepted our vessel referring to previous Shell
SIRE dd. 11 May 2008 and deferred inspection to Novem-
ber 2008, after that no request was sent.
Framura
Vessel (Master Al-
bamonte) performed
a SIRE inspection
with Shell, Singapore
23/08/2008 (6 NO),
and consequent
Chevron acceptability
based on that positive
SIRE, with inspection
deferred to February 2009.
Four Springs
Vessel (Master Castriotta) performed a SIRE inspection
with BP, Singapore 12/10/2008 (11 NO) with positive re-
sult and 6 months validity.
This was the last inspection as tank vessel.
Four Moon
No inspection performed during this period due to trade
Venezuela – Cuba.
Dear all,
Below are reported the SIRE inspections during the period
August—December 2008.
From this edition we are inserting the Master, as reference
to the performed SIRE inspection, in order to underline im-
portance of leading/instructing/checking position of the
Captain on respect of Vetting activity.
As it is possible to witness by the below short report, all the
SIRE inspections were completed with a final acceptance for
all the vessels.
From the last quarter, the most complicate situation was the
one related to the M/T Four Springs, failing last Shell/BP
inspections and so compromising the vessel trading
Although the dedicated conversion project from Tanker to
Bulk trade expecting the vessel from 12/2008, vessel was
submitted to BP inspection, recovery SIRE inspection, car-
ried out with satisfaction and acceptance of the vessel for 6
months.
We here thanks to Master Castriotta for the application and
vessel preparation to BP vetting also in consideration of not
easy task to keep an high attention and performance stan-
dard in the last period before conversion starting.
Four Bay
Vessel (Master Meneguzzi) performed Shell, Dalian
15/09/2008 (16 NO) with positive result.
Under conversion works since October
The vessel in the “hurricane”
Page 12
For this Bulletin issue, the selected vessel
in the hurricane is the fleet admiral: our
Company.
Yes! This time, we have to report and share
to all Premuda employees at sea and
ashore that during this year first quarter,
the Company (shore based office and the
Company System) is involved in a very seri-
ous hurricane: all around us the wind is
tottering and squeaking and our Company
system is under discussion after having
been examined closely and in deep detail
during the last six months.
What is happening has an explanation in
the fact that the shipping industry is quickly
changing and is becoming more and more
demanding towards ships operators and
managers as far as service quality, reliability
and safety operations are concerned.
All started up in September 2008 after the
visit Shell Quality Assessment Group repre-
sentatives carried out for the periodical Management Review to our Company offices (due yearly on account of the fact two of
our good ladies MM/TT ―Framura‖ and Four Island‖ are on sub charter to Shell) and from the list of observations arisen after
the Company management system review was completed. In order to better focus everybody’s attention on this issue, we would
like to explain that, in order to approve a Company as ― Manager of Time Chartered vessels‖ the Major Oil Companies are car-
rying out one vetting inspection not only to the vessel (this is required also for the vessel employed on voyage charters), but
also to the Company Offices and especially the Company System is examined and evaluated in detail in order to establish if the
subject Company has a management system in compliance with the requirements established by the Oil Majors themselves.
The Fleet Director comments:
Premuda, as above stated, having two vessels presently under
T/C with Shell (since a long time, expected both to remain on
Time Charter for some additional time) has been seriously ap-
proached by Shell in order to evaluate the reliability of its man-
agement standards.
The serious situation arose from the inspection carried out in
September 2008 and subsequent results discussions: in par-
ticular, the analysis pointed out that the shipping company
management standard established by Shell (and by other
MOCs) is actually requiring a higher level of procedures and
quality control than our System standard is actually set to.
In this respect, our Company seriously risks not to get to the
s u f f i c i e n t s c o r e r e q u i r e d t o b e a c c e p t e d
as Shell use, notwithstanding the fact we know and are sure
that our System and Management is already compliant with the
average level required by the industry and assessed through
the TMSA or its equivalent systems by most of the MOCs.
As a matter of fact the Quality management level required by
the ISM, Premuda is fully compliant with of course, is definitely
inferior to the Quality management level required by MOCs and
therefore it is not more to be taken as in indication of the Ship-
ping companies possessing the proper qualities required by the
market industry if Company intention is to make business with
the MOC as is the case of Premuda.
As a final comment to the present evaluation we would like to
stress the fact that the Company is now committed in comply-
ing with the additional Shell requirements arising from the
last assessment even if in this delicate economical moment
additional resources are strictly limited or not available and
we have to rely on good will and cooperation among the vari-
ous office department and vessel crews in order to imple-
ment the additional procedures and control that have been
required to us.
This is an additional effort we all are required to carry out
since failure of the Company to be accepted by Shell, when
they will verify the implementation of the additional measures
and procedures they have required, will be verified during the
closing assessment due to be carried out on April 1st
2009, will have catastrophic consequences for the Company
on the commercial point of view, putting at serious stake Com-
pany survival.
Once more we have to thank You all Company employees
ashore and at sea for the continuous commitment and efforts
carried out to constantly improve the Company management
system.
Thank You all and good work. By F. Beltrami
For information and divulgation to all Premuda people, listed
on the subsequent pages, are reported the final comments
issued by Shell:
“Is this structural failure????”
Pagina 13
Page 13
The vessel in the “hurricane”
It may be advantageous to require new Masters and Chief
Engineers to serve an initial Probationary Period in the new
rank, to ensure the persons suitability to these crucial posi-
tions prior to full confirmation of promotion.
It is recommended that specific minimum requirements are
documented for handover periods for newly promoted Senior
Officers.
The monitoring of compliance to ILO 180 regulations with
respect to rest periods is presently carried out during Super-
intendent visits. To enable early detection of any possible sys-
temic non-conformance situations, it may be advisable to re-
quire vessels to submit monthly reports of non-conformances.
Furthermore the present log book format of recording rest
periods seem to be assessing only how much rest has been
taken by the seafarer over the period midnight to midnight
and how much rest has been taken in a one week period. The
requirements of the ILO 180 regulations are much more in-
volved and stringent than these factors, and therefore it is
recommended that consideration be given to industry avail-
able software to enhance the monitoring of rest hours and
ease the burden on the seafarers.
It is noted that only Master and Officers are subject to unan-
nounced Drug and Alcohol tests from an external agency. It is
recommended that you review this procedure to ensure that
all shipboard personnel are potentially subject to such tests.
A number of external training courses are noted to have been
undertaken by Premuda Officers. However records suggest
that there is extremely limited participation by the Indian Of-
ficers. It would be well worth investigating how best to ensure
involvement of Indian Officers on such courses so as to avoid
a two-tier system in training levels of your Officers.
A documented procedure was noted to be in place for recruit-
ment of shore based personnel. Whilst it is acknowledged that
there are no recent recruits to the shore office in respect to
technical personnel, the most recent records of recruitment
were not backed up with interview records. It is recommended
that an interview checklist is developed for the interview proc-
ess, which is used to standardise the process and provide re-
cord of the process.
Office Management & Emergency Response
We suggest developing a pocket booklet to be carried by the
persons that may be contacted in case of an incident/casualty
and containing an initial contact checklist to avoid omission
of any vital information. This booklet should also provide
contact numbers facilitating a rapid activation of the emer-
gency response team.
You may consider adopting a policy for assigning an on-site
company representative in case of a crisis.
The company website is a useful tool for dissemination of in-
formation and could be used for crisis information and media
management.
While last years ship-shore drill identifies learning points,
which is a positive aspect of the drill, there is no documented
record of corrective action being taken..
************
The two major observations: 1) It was noted, in couple of instances, a complete breakdown
in the documented process on issuing hot work approval by
the office. As an example in March 2008 the Four Bay re-
quested approval to conduct hot work on the main deck (fire
station). Approval was granted without evidence of submis-
sion of a hot work permit or risk assessment by the vessel. The
review team felt that in one of the instances of failure in par-
ticular, where the Safety Superintendent was away form the
office on Company Business, the situation could be linked to
there being no back-up available within this persons depart-
ment.
2) It was noted that three lost time incidents (LTI) were re-
ported in April 2008. Whilst the crewing department had re-
ceived notification of such incidents, and had passed onto
administration staff within the SQE department for entering
into the records, members of the management team appeared
unaware of these incidents, and certainly there was no evi-
dence of any investigation having been carried out. Even fol-
lowing initial enquiries the exact circumstances of the re-
ported incidents were not known, and required further follow
up. None of these facts appeared to have been cross-
questioned during the mid year in-house management review.
The process of receiving, recording and investigating these
cases was noted to have failed. A thorough review of the sys-
tems in place in this respect needs to be undertaken.
We confirm our verbal comments as discussed in the closing
session of our review and summarise them below for your con-
sideration.
Human Resource Management
Procedures for review of the Recruiting Agencies require an
actual “physical audit” of the agencies on a two yearly basis.
It would be well worth considering, bringing your policy in line
with the industry standard by requiring annual review of Re-
cruiting Agencies.
With respect to the audits of the Recruiting agencies, it was
pleasing to note that in the examples sighted, the process had
identified action points. However there was no objective evi-
dence available to indicate that the action items had been
closed.
It was noted that the procedures for recruitment of Officers
require an interview by the Recruiting agency and “mainly for
officers” by the Crewing Manager. There was little objective
evidence available to indicate any involvement of the Crewing
Manager in interviews for prospective Officers. It is recom-
mended that investigation is made as to how best satisfy your
requirement, particularly where recruitment of Senior Officers
is concerned. Furthermore the development of a standard inter-
view checklist would be of value that it would enable like for
like comparisons of prospective candidates.
You may wish to re-consider the value in documenting require-
ments as to time required in a rank before becoming eligible
for promotion to the next rank.
“Is this structural failure????”
The vessel in the “hurricane”
Page 14
On board Safety Management and Certification
The classification of LTI’s, as with our 2005 review of the com-
pany, does not appear to be consistent with OCIMF guidelines.
Inherent medical conditions seem to have been classed as
LTI’s. The standard industry practice is to include contractors’ safety
performance, while onboard companies ships, figures within
company statistics.
We failed to see clear targets posted for safety performance
within the fleet. It is strongly recommended that clear targets
are set for specific key performance indicators (KPI) and
propagated throughout the company, particularly related to
safety performance.
It was noted that near miss / hazardous situation reporting was
being carried out on a very limited basis. Consideration should
be given to providing additional guidance to ship’s crew on
reporting requirements, and how to best motivate ship’s staff in
submitting near miss and hazardous situation reporting and the
possible gains from the learning associated with these. Addi-
tionally, the inclusion of specific targets for near miss report-
ing will indicate senior management commitment to establish-
ing an open reporting system.
You may consider a more structured approach to the daily
work planning meetings onboard to include HSSE matters and
possible posting of minute meetings. This will help to keep all
informed on planned work throughout the day and avoid any
conflicting jobs.
You may wish to clearly define at what level a shore-based
investigation of incidents is required, as opposed to a ship led
investigation.
Maintenance & Performance Management
We note that you have recently adopted a software based risk
assessment tool for use by ship and shore staff. The process of
risk assessment may be even further enhanced by the develop-
ment of a library of routine and non-routine jobs, which are
made available to all ships for their guidance.
The Amos PMS used may be enhanced by incorporating tank
inspection schedules and reports which are currently only pa-
per based. Inventory of spare parts is included within Amos but
no minimum stock keeping is highlighted for assistance in
eliminating shortages.
Critical equipment listed in the SMS is only identified within
the Amos PMS individual item page. We recommend that for
every vessel the critical equipment onboard is clearly identi-
fied/highlighted in job lists and due or overdue lists. It should
also be possible to list the status of critical items for a particu-
lar ship at any given time.
The technical department stated the companies policy towards
minimum condition of vessels. However a clear steel repair
policy, such as how substantial corrosion is dealt with and a
policy on the protection of tanks with respect to coatings and
anodes was not found documented. A clear policy would assist
in portraying the actual minimum standards of the company
and what is expected when bringing in second hand tonnage.
Navigation Procedures
It is noted that the Under-keel clearance policy refers to re-
quired under keel clearances as a percentage of the mean
draft. The review team feels that there is potential for possible
confusion in that seafarers may possibly apply the required
value of the clearance to the mean draft, which could possibly
leading to grounding exposure when the vessel is trimmed
during ballast passages. It is recommended that you consider
whether the use of the mean draft is appropriate, and if it is
decided that you wish to persist with the mean draft, it should
be made implicitly clear that the UKC requirement is actually
applied to the vessels maximum draft,
Whilst procedures take into account squat, density of water,
and tidal heights it would be appropriate to offer increased
guidance within your SMS as to other factors which can affect
Under keel clearances such as, but not limited to, any angle of
heel, hogging or sagging, accuracy of hydrographic data etc.
It was noted that in the supplied example of the passage plan,
an obsolete version of the “Port plan” was in use, which had
been superseded by a new issue in May 2008.
It is understood that new build vessels due for delivery in
2009/2010 will be fitted with Electronic Chart System, in ad-
dition to supply of paper charts. It is recommended that you
clearly document your policy as to which will be the primary
system used onboard for monitoring passage progress.
It may be appropriate to document specific geographical lo-
cations around the world, where vessels are specifically re-
quired to be steaming under manoeuvering conditions. Such
documented areas would not preclude the Master identifying
other areas where the vessel would sail under manoeuvering
condition.
Cargo Custody and Transfer Procedures
Whilst the SMS does give advice regarding dangers of Hydro-
gen Sulphide, it is recommended that procedures are devel-
oped which should be followed during the loading, carriage
and discharging of cargoes with high Hydrogen Sulphide con-
tent.
It would be appropriate to offer instructions within your pro-
cedures for the relative settings of pressure and vacuum
alarms in relation to the PV valves for vessels that use such
alarms as the SOLAS alternative means to secondary venting.
You may wish to develop a procedure for handling cargoes
with low cloud points or low pour points, with particular ref-
erence to ballast handling in such cases.
It may be worth considering purchasing complete spare sets
of portable gas detection equipment that could be located at
strategic locations. Such spare sets could then be utilized to
replace vessels standard sets when these are landed for their
annual calibration.
************
As everybody can easily understand, the situation could
not satisfy our Company.
Some of the remarks are due to having not followed our
procedures, as for the two major observations.
Pagina 15
Page 15
The vessel in the “hurricane”
Corrective action
Since the possibility to have an on-line connection with
Company mail server when out of the office is dependent
from many conditions most of which out of Company
control, thus making the possibility to provide a fast and
motivated (based on actual examination of Company
documents) reply to the vessel enquiries unlikely and
therefore in order to provide always office availability to
the enquiries, it has been decided to modify the Com-
pany Win-SAF-12 – Welding and flame cutting operations
– to include the provision and responsibility of office
back up function to the Safety Superintendent limited to
the hot works permits approval, when he is out of the
office , to be taken over by the vessel technical superin-
tendent or by the Fleet Director in case the former is ab-
sent as well. The Working in instruction in caption is be-
ing modified according to the above and its updated ver-
sion will be published into the Company SQEMS within
next week. Related office personnel will be trained ac-
cording to the new provision of the approval back up
function as specified in the updated Win-Saf-12 by the
Safety Superintendent.
B) LTIs – Incidents reports cross checks: lack of analysis
Root cause analysis
In the Marine Injury Report (April 2008), matter of the
analysis, three LWD cases are reported that result to be
wrongly reported/evaluated by Ship due to the fact that:
only one case is a real case of LWC while the other two
were not work related cases.
Additionally, to note also that the case of LWC did not
happen during the month of april, but was reported as
incident on 23/03/08 and duly analysed by Company,
as per
procedure.
For additional investigation/evidence, one copy of the
Deck Log Book (Giornale Nautico Parte Seconda), of the
Medical Log Book and of the ―Registro degli Infortuni‖
(namely Injuries record) relevant to the period will be
asked on board.
Shore - in receiving the monthly injury report - failed to
properly analyze the report and classified the three
cases as LWCs.
The above is showing:
lack of diligence and adequate control by ship side in
the preparation/management and issue of documents
related to injury/illness required by Company system,
Flag Administration and Insurance requirements;
lack of effective control by shore side done on the
mere principle of checking numbers and not in the
merit of checking consistency of the reported events;
ineffective cross checking between the involved Com-
pany departments
Corrective action
Official letter issued by the DPA has been immediately
divulged on board of all Company managed vessels to
The two major observations (those red written) were imme-
diately analyzed and the related corrective action arranged/
started to be implemented.
The Company plan was passed to Shell, as follows:
A) Hot Work Permit
Root cause analysis
Company procedure relevant to the Hot work permit au-
thorization to be given by the Company Safety Superinten-
dent upon examination of the vessel permit request and
RA can be and is properly followed when Saf. Supt. is at
Company head office. Due to the possible lack or insuffi-
cient Email/Internet connectivity, Saf Supt is not always
in a position to be able to unload/review Company docu-
ment attached to the vessel mail messages. In the specific
case therefore the Safety Supt. being out of the office on
his way to another company vessel replied to the hot work
permit request, confirm it , without having the possibility
to check the attachment, which were not actually sent by
the vessel command. Therefore besides the fact the ves-
sel command did not send to the Saf. Supt the required
supporting documentation to the hot work permit request,
the Company identifies the root cause of the system fail-
ure in the lack of proper office support when the Safety
Superintendent is away from the office.
“Will the PPE be suitable?”
Pagina 16
Page 16
The vessel in the “hurricane”
explain the occurrence and reinforce the requested atten-
tion on Company procedures/circulars related to the inci-
dents/injuries on board reporting system and to the in-
volved chains of information.
Master who was on board of the analysed vessel during
the specific period (April 2008), responsible of the issue of
all the reports related to injuries on board will be con-
vened in Office for a specific meeting with Fleet Director
and SQE Mgr.
The related Company Working Instruction (WIN-SAF-03,
Marine Injury Reporting) will be revised by better explain
responsibilities and inserting instructions related to the
cross checking/exchange of information between the in-
volved Company departments.
The shore people involved in the process of analysis of the
documents received by the ships (and subsequent data
insertion into Company system) will be indoctrinated by
specific briefing.
The Marine Injury Report form will be modified by inserting
one part related to Company analysis and eventual com-
ments.
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 1. Annual audit of recruiting agencies: we confirm we are
changing Internal procedures in order to have yearly au-
dits of Recruiting Agents carried by either Company inter-
nal or external auditors, as of 01.01.2009.
2. Evidence of Recruiting agencies audits action points clos-
ing: we agree with Your suggestion to provide objective
evidence of the closing of actions points evidenced dur-
ing the audit. These will be dealt with by the Crew Man-
ager by attaching proper evidence of the same in the au-
dit Company checklist.
3. Your suggestion well noted and we can confirm we will
develop a Company standard check list for Officers’ inter-
view that will be used internally by the Crew Manager in
case of senior officers’ interview and that will be handed
over to Recruiting agencies in case of other officers’ inter-
view.
Copy of the same will provide indication of the Company
expected level of competency required for each role, as
well, as standard reference.
4. We are working on the development of a Company crew
matrix to cover Premuda’s requirements for rank promo-
tions.
5. We noted Your suggestions anyhow believe it would be
difficult for our Company, due to the small number of offi-
cers under contract, to develop such procedure for newly
promoted Masters and Chief Engineers. On the other
hand we are currently considering eligible of promotion to
the same ranks only officers that have been in service
with our Company for long period and have acquired a
suitable number of satisfactory evaluation/eligibility re-
sults from different Company Masters and Chief Engi-
neers.
6. Crew Manager will modify the existing Company proce-
dure to cover minimum requirements for overlapping peri-
ods of newly promoted senior Officers.
7. Compliance with ILO 180 regulations: we are evaluating a
procedure aimed at getting vessels’ monthly non confor-
mance as per Your suggestion. As far as the use of a
dedicated Software to manage and check compliance of
ILO 180 rest requirements is concerned, we will evaluate
the possibility to introduce it in the Company systems.
8. Unannounced D&A test: we agree with Your suggestion
and will extend scope of current contract in order to in-
clude random test of ratings as well.
9. External training courses: we have resolved to rescind
recruiting contracts with Indian nationals due to the low
retention rate and other factors affecting their availability
to attend Company courses. We are also providing to
have Company training courses held at facilities located
at the same places of foreign recruiting agencies in order
to homogenize training levels of personnel.
10. We have passed Your recommendation to the Company
Human Resource Manager who will evaluate and take
the necessary actions to implement it.
OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
1. Company Management Members and OPS/Fleet Dept
Managers members of the EGA team have a Company
palmtop containing all data and contact numbers that
might be required to be contacted in case of emergency,
besides the EGA team members data. 2. The Company Managing Director and General Manager
are in charge of any decision in case of crisis that in-
cludes direct contact with MTI (appointed media manag-
ers ) and lawyers. Appointment of an on-site local Com-
pany representative might be decided by them according
to the need after consultation with the above persons/
organizations.
3. Crisis information is under the control of Company man-
agement through MTI, appointed media managers. Any
decision to make it available on Company website should
be evaluated by the Company Management, to whom we
have passed over Your useful suggestion. 4. Shore drill MOM: it will include evidence of corrective ac-
tions resulting from the EGA drills evaluation as well.
ON BOARD SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND CERTIFICATION
1. Classification of LTI in compliance with OCIMF guidelines:
we confirm OCIMF guidelines were wrongly interpreted
and by vessel commands in many cases and included
The vessel in the “hurricane”
Page 17
also inherent medical conditions. This is being rectified by
a proper Company Circular.
2. Contractors’ safety performance on board of Company
vessels: the Fleet Director is preparing proper safety in-
structions to contractors working on board and Company
instruction relevant to the same that will include Com-
pany record and analysis of the relevant performances. 3.
Safety Performances targets: we agree the same require
proper evidence of targets and establishment of relevant
KPI. The same will be developed during the course of the
next months and posted as year 2009 targets.
4. Near Miss/Hazardous situation reporting: we agree Com-
pany vessel commands awareness about this target
should be implemented and we are evaluating proper
action to do it that will include but might not be limited to
an extended pre boarding Company briefing to cover ad-
ditional training on the same.
5. Daily work planning: inclusion of specific HSSE matters
and MOM in daily work planning meeting is being evalu-
ated.
6. Shore based investigation of incidents: this subject is al-
ready covered in the scope of the existing system proce-
dures, anyhow we will evaluate a possible review of the
same in order to better define the same, should the need
arise.
MAINTENANCE AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
1. Risk assessment Dbase: creation of standard routine and
non routine works R.A. library is being evaluated. Cur-
rently Company is collecting R.A. reports issued by ves-
sels into a D-base from which the library could be devel-
oped later on.
2. Tank inspection schedules to be incorporated into Amos
Dbase: the Technical Department is evaluating
the change over of the tank inspection schedule and
reporting from forms based into Amos w. Minimum spare
parts stock keeping has already been planned by Com-
pany as a future extension of the Amos W D base.
3. Critical equipment listing: this issue has been already
pointed out during audits, at the moment Amos D soft-
ware flexibility is limited so that specific print outs could
not be carried out. Therefore the Company Tech Dept is
working on the current Amos D base. Possibility to modify
the Amos software is being evaluated only at the mo-
ment.
4. Company policy stating vessels’ minimum or standard
requirements: Your suggestion well noted thanks. We will
develop and issue a Company technical policy document
regarding existing and second hand tonnage to be
brought in Company fleet.
NAVIGATION PROCEDURES
1. Under Keel clearance policy: Company procedure is cur-
rently being reviewed to include provisions and evalua-
tions as per Your suggestion.
2. Under Keel clearance/squat factor: as per above, we
have taken note of Your suggestions and are working on
revision of the Company Bridge Management Manual in
order to provide officers with suitable guidelines to cover
the issues You have pointed out.
3. Port Plan: old issue was immediately replaced by the lat-
est May 2008 issue.
4. Electronic Charts System Management: proper dedicated
Company WIN and/or Bridge Team Management update
will be provided to state Company policy. This item was
already in the Company agenda.
5. Ships Maneuvering conditions in specific world areas:
The Company Safety/Navigation Supt has issued a dedi-
cated Company poster to deal with this matter.
CARGO CUSTODY AND TRANSFER PROCEDURES
1. Management of cargo containing H2S: Company Cargo
manual will be updated to include specific procedures for
dangerous cargoes, like those containing H2S, that are
already included in the system specific WIN, in order to
make reference more readily available.
2. Pressure and vacuum setting of COT pressure alarms: the
Technical Office has been already working on this issue
and will issue a dedicated technical instruction shortly.
3. Handling of cargo with low cloud/pour points: Company
cargo manual will be updated to include spe-
cific information relevant to proper handling of cargo
having the above characteristics.
4. Spare sets of portable gas detection equipment: this is-
sue is being considered even if Company procedures pro-
vide for proper number of equipment to be fitted to avoid
lack of the same when annual ashore calibration is due.
Lesson’s Bearing
Page 18
Exploring recruitment and retention
Attract Perceptions
Poor image of shipping
Criminalisation
Piracy
Pollution
Major passenger incidents
“Worse things happen at sea”
Required expectation
Responsible employer
Company branding
Happy and healthy lifestyle
Safe and secure working environment
Decent working and living conditions
Fair terms of employment
Quality of life
Health protection
Medical care
Family support
Contact with home
A job for life
Induct Perceptions
No interest in new recruits
No sense of Company brand
Required expectation
Welcome into the Company
Join the Team
You‟re a sailor now
Recruit Perceptions
Poor education
Lack of interest
Unregulated manning agencies
Required expectations
Good education
Motivation
Commitment
Ability
Self discipline
Aspirations
Professionalism and pride
Train Perceptions
Minimum training to comply with regulations
No ship/system specific training
No onboard continuation training
No career development training
Required expectation
Competency
Ship/system specific training
Company seminars
Career development
Continuous professional development
Retain Perceptions
Bad employer
Badly run ships
No support
No career development
No career prospects
Required expectations
Company branding
Happy and healthy lifestyle
Safe and secure working environment
Decent working and living conditions
Fair terms of employment
Quality of life
Health protection and medical care
Family support
Contact with home
Good career prospects
Career development
Pagina 19
Page 19
The Academic Lesson
An arrived ship and
the Notice of readiness
Traditionally, the performance of a voy-
age charterparty has been broken into
four segments: the approach voyage,
loading, carriage of the cargo and discharge.
The commencement of laytime is concerned with the
points at which the first segment ends and the second seg-
ment starts, and the third segment ends and the fourth
starts.
Laytime is the amount of time which the parties agree it
will take to load and discharge the contracted cargo.
If the time which a vessel takes to load and discharge
cargo is greater than laytime, Owners will seek compensa-
tion in the form of demurrage. If the time taken to load and
discharge is less than the laytime, then Owners may agree
to pay a bonus incentive to the Charterers, called despatch
(usual for the bulk market, not for the tanker).
Therefore, there are strong commercial reasons for the
parties to identify when laytime starts.
Laytime will start when the four following requirements are
met:
A) the vessel arrived at the agreed destination;
B) She is ready to load/discharge the cargo;
C) A valid Notice of Readiness has been tendered;
D) Any agreed preparation time has expired.
A) Arrival at the agreed destination
The agreed destination will vary depending on the type of
the charterparty. The common are:
Dock charterparty: the agreed destination is a dock. The
vessel is deemed to have arrived when she has passed
the dock gate. This type of Charter Party is very rare now.
Port charterparty: the most commonly used form. In most
cases a vessel will load at a berth, not at an anchorage.
If a vessel can proceed directly to a berth, then the arri-
val voyage will end when she is tied up at the berth. It will
not end when she is sailing through the port to the berth.
However, various factors can intervene to prevent the
vessel arriving at the berth (congestion, fog, bad
weather, etc.): in those circumstances, the vessel must
anchor. Even though she has not arrived at the berth,
she may have arrived at her agreed destination.
Berth Charterparty: when a berth is named as the place
for loading or discharge. That berth is the agreed desti-
nation. The vessel must be securely moored there to be
an arrived ship.
B) Readiness
The second requirement is that the vessel must be ready
to load or discharge all the cargo at that particular port,
when she reaches her agreed destination and/or tenders
her Notice of Readiness. Readiness can be defined as the
vessel being available for use by the Charterers. This can be
divided into three sub categories: the ship‟s holds, the
ship‟s equipment and legal documents (e.g free pratique,
custom clearance).
C) Notice of readiness
The Notice of Readiness is a statement made by the ship to
the Charterers or their agents it has arrived at the agreed
destination and is ready to load/discharge the cargo.
A Notice of Readiness:
May be written or oral;
Can be given to Charterers, their agent or anyone else the
charterers may nominate;
It is not necessary if the Charterers know the true facts of
the vessel‟s position and status;
Can be given at any time;
Must be a true statement at the time is given. If it is not, it
will be invalid.
Charterparties usually require written NOR to be given at
each loading and discharging port, to identified people,
sometimes within limited hours e.g. office hours.
If an invalid NOR is given, a new NOR must be given later,
when the statements as to the vessel having arrived and
being ready are true.
If the Charter party requires a NOR to be given within par-
ticular time limits, a NOR which would otherwise be valid,
but is given outside those time limits, will be deemed to be
given at the next first available time within those time limits.
The point here is that the statements made in the NOR were
true, so the statement was not invalid.
This will also apply to a NOR given before the laycan period.
D) Expiry of preparation time
It is common for charter parties to include express clauses
allowing a certain amount of time from the giving of (a valid)
Notice of Readiness to the commencement of laytime (this
is to allow the vessel to berth, open her hatches, etc. These
time periods rarely cause disputes as they are clearly de-
fined in the Charter Party.
Determining when laytime commences can be contentious
and will depend upon a careful consideration of the charter
party clauses in the light of the facts.
Often, the Courts favour a commercial approach over a le-
galistic approach, except for the validity of the Notice of
readiness which remains one of the important point in the
respect of the Charter party.
Selected by P. Linari
Visit our web at:
Www.premuda.net
Premuda, founded in 1907, is one of the most expe-
experienced shipping Company with the mission of
transporting oil and dry-bulk cargoes.
The Company operates also in the FPSO market.
Premuda holds the most qualified certifications in
Safety, Environmental protection, Quality and Secu-
rity standards.
Premuda S.p.A
Via Fieschi 3/21
I—16121, Genova
Tel.: +39 010 5444.421
Fax: +39 010 5444.313
E-mail: [email protected]
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