infantry on the kansas frontier 1866 to 1880

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INFANTRY OX TH E KANSA S FRON'SIER1866- 1880

A thesis presented to the Faculty of thc U S . ArmyCommand and General Staffcollege in partialfdfillme nt of the requirements f ir thedcgrec

MASTER O F MIL.ITAKY ART AND SCIEKCE

JOl IN M . SULLIVAN, JR., MAJOR; USMCB.A., Worccstcr Stntc Collcg c, Worccstcr, Mnssnchusctts, 1978

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1997

Approvcd for public relcasc; distribution is unlimitcd.


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MASTER OF MILITARY AR T AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Nam e o f Candidatc: MAJ John M. Sullivan J r ., U S Marine CorpsThc sis Title: Infantry on the Kansas Frontier: 1866-1880

Approved by:

,Thesis Committee Chairman

- - I b Member

Accepted this 6th day of June 199 7 by:

Director, Graduate Degree ProgramsPhilip 1. Brookes, Yh.D.

Tla opinions and conclusions cxprcssed hercin are those o ft he student author and do notncw ssxily repxsent tl lc vicws of the U.S . Army Command and Gc ncn l St;f iCollcg c o r ;u~ yother govcmmcntal agency. (References to this study include the following statement.)


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ABS'I'IIACT

ISFAN TRY ON THE KAN SAS FR ONTIER, 1866-1880 by Major John M. Sullivan, Jr.,USMC, 137 pages.This thesis focuses on the Army's infantry i n Kansas during thc development of the Am ericanfrontier in the years following the Civil War until 1880. lrifa~ itry omp anies were tlic mainstayo ft he frontier ,&my during tlicsc years of westward expansion and development. Yet, twentiethcentur) literature and Holl~?voodmovies overlook the role of the infantry on thc frontier. Asmall, fiscally constrained Army could not have safeguarded the nation's fiontier without tlicem ploy ~ne nt f infantry alongside the cwa lry.'The ceritral and western portions o f the starc of Kansas enc apsulate the Army's role in thedevelo pmen t of the nation's frontier. Two overland trails. the Smok y Hill and the Arkansas,passed throu gh this: area and wcrc primary routcs for west\vard expan sion. The Ka nsas Pacificrailroad, one of two major westward lines, \\as built during thesc years. Settlement gr av in thisarea undcr the Ilomcstead Act of 1862. Thcse elements brought conflict with the Indians,Kans as was the scen c of som e of the most sustained and violent Indian attacks in the last half ofthe 1860s. To mcet the tasks of frontier development, the Army employed both cavalry andinfantry.


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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T SI we a great deal o f thanks to m any people who helped me develop and construct this

thesis. First. I ould l ike to acknoicledge and to thank m y committee; Dr. Jerold Bro wn,C o l o ~ i c lames Hawk ins, USM C, and Lieutenant Colo nel James Martin, USA . A l l weree xt re ~n cl y l ~ o ~ ~ g h t f u lnd helpful throughout [he entire p ro cs s. Dr. Brobbn, m y commirteechairman; was especially helpf ul i n outli nin g the thesis subject and mentoring me through thehl M A S process. His depth o f knowledge on the American A rm y and frontier history, as we ll ashis attention to detail, contributed immensely to the completion o f the thesis.

Imust also thank M ajo r M a n y Sheil, his wif e Carol. and Ma jor Kev in I'orter for ki nd lyass is ting a b~ ln r i~ ~ ey proofreading this tl~esis .Their colnmcnts and obscrvatio~is ere always ontarget and relevant. Equ ally deserving o f hanks are M r . George Elmore, National Park Historia nar Fort Larnc d Katio na l Historic Site, fo r recom mend ing to me the subject o f he thesis andpro vid ing advice and inform ation on source material; Mr. Robert Wilhelni , Director o f Fort HaysState His tor ic Site, for the research material and advice he provided; as w ell as M r . DouglasMcChristan, National Park Ih t o r ia n at Fort Laranlie National Historic Site. for the researchma tcrial and ad\ic e he too provided.

Finally, bu t never last in importance, 1 hank m y wifc, Oy, for her patience and supportas I pent countless hours o f our time on this thesis over the last "best year o f our lives" here atCommand and General SraffCollege . Thi s thesis cou ld not have been completed without herda ily support.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

........................................................................................................PPROVAL PAGEABSTR.4CT ..................................................................................................................ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................I.IS1..OF ILLUSTRATIONS ..........................................................................................CHAPTER

ONE INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................W O THE FRONTIEK AN D I'I-IE ARMY

T H R E E , ............................................................OMMAND AiiD CON I RO LFOUR FORTS AND LOGISTICS ..................................................................FIVE OI'ERA'I'IONS ......................................................................................

...............................IX ACTION O N THE SMOKY HILL TRAIL I867SEVEN CONCLbSlON .....................................................................................

FIGIJRES ......................................................................................................................BIDL.IOGK.4PHY ...........................................................................................................

Paec.11

...111

i v

vi

1

620

4870

98

114

12313 2

INITIAI..DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................... 137


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Figure PageI . Distribution of Arm) infantry and cavalry i n Kansas. Scpternbcr 1867 ................... 29

...................................................................... M3p of the Forts in Kansas. 1866- 1880 12 3j Distribution of Army infantry and cavalry i n Kansas. 1866-1 880 ............................ 1244 . Typical day's duty for an infantryman in garrison .............................................. 12 8

................................ Am iy infantry and ca\.alry eng agem ents in Kansas. 1866- 1880 12 9


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CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION

A man without a horse has no business on the prairieH c n n M. Stalley: h@ I~irrly ravels andAdventures.

Hollywood movies contribute to the avcmgc .hicriean's perception of the Anny's role onthc fronticr of post-Ci\ il \+jar America, The image of thc cav al n r~ dm go thc rescue ofbclcaguercd senlc rs under attack by Indians is a lasting ai d rneniorable one. Early motion picturedirector D. W. Gritfith first established this imagc in 1913 with his movie, 7'he Uallle ofI~ldrrhrirsh iiilch. By 1 939 a l d the release of Jolin Ford's Stclgecooch; the image of the ca va lnand the frontier had taken a firm hold on American folklore. \Vhile such ca v a ln rescues took placeand were certainly mc~no ruble or those rcscucd: t l w c IS anothcr element to the front1c.r Army tha thas reccivcd scant attention, the infantr).. .Along side the cavalry s e n d he in fa it n; they formedthe backbone of d ~ eost-Civil War frontier A m y . '

With thc cessation of ho st il ~t ~e sn 1865: thc nation's encrgy was channclcd into thedcvelopmcnt of the frontier. Along nit11 tlic emigrants and tlic Indians, the Army bccame one of theccntral actors in the \\cst\vard expansloll of whit2 ci \il ~z ati on From thc end of thc C n l \liar untilthe Spanish-Amcrican W ar in 1x98, the pr im an a c h i t y of the Army \\as focused on the frontier.Whilc the mission might not have been a popular one with the Armp 's Icadcrship, it wasnovenhelcss executed in a professional manner. All the ivhilc it should not be forgottcn that this alloccurr ed in a time of evtrcme fiscal restraint. A nation that considered itself at peace and one that


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n-as tradttionlilly wary of a largc Army prcfcrrcd to economize on its defense. Thu result was th atoften only a thin line of soldicrs ma uic d thc frontier posts.

Th at infantry served on the plains should not conic as a surprise. Tllc rcorganization ofthc Army after the Civil W ar au tho r~ze d ort)-five infantry and ten cavalry regiments. Before andeven during thc Civil Wa r, the regu lar Army infantry garrisoncd the isolatcd posts on thc nation'sfrontier. Aficr the na r: in even greater numbers the i n h t r ) . marched to the West to safeguardemigrants and Indians, There was almost no way the Anny; given its stmcturc, could cxccutc itsmission on thc frontier without employing infantry.'

The role of the Ann ? in the post-Ci\ il W ar Wcst is well documen ted. Journals i dnicmoirs of soldicrs, cmigrants, and ivritcrs \vcrc published by the end of the 1860s. Th c trendcontinued into tl ~ cnc nt~ eth entur). as historians documented the devdopm cnt of the West. Thecvploits of George Am str on g Custer and the Seventh Caval? account for niuch of the literatureon thc An ny of the Wcst. Because the Anny's primary adversary, the Indian, u a s most oRenmounted on ponies, it is not surprising that the c a v d n and not the infantry reccivcs thc lion's shareof attention. In Moll!~vood's portrayal of the An ny on the West: thc soldiers seen are almostesclusivcl!~cava lry. Infantry marching on a stark plain in pursuit of Indians. manning isolatcdposts, or escorting \\.ago11 trains is not matc rial for books or film. It is ironic then that the Arm y'smost succcssfiil Indian fighter: Gcncral Nelson A. Miles, was an infantryman.

Very few pub lishcd works focus on the role of the regular Army infantry in thedevelopment of thc nestern frontier of the United States. W lc n n~cntio r~cdn books, there is onlythe bricfest rcfcrcnce to sp cc ~ti cnfantry units or their leaders. l i e nfiultry's role is limited almostas an aficr thought and linked to th? acti litic s of the cavalry . \Vhcn h istorics focus on campaignsor battles of the Indian wars: thcy tend to focu s on the cavalry units and ofticcrs. It is no wondc rthen that the infantry is overlooked by many when thc subject turns to the frontier Arm y.

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Writer and adventurir Ile i~ ry t : S ti n k y a&oGp& ed dciieral *infield Scott Hancock'scspcdition in Kansas in April 1867. The column, out to intiniidatc Indians in central and western

Kansas, consisted of both infmtry and cavalry. Stanley, though, had his doubts about the misdoniof tlie inclusion of infant?. He recorded his thoug hts in his book, M y Early Travels ondAdventures:

Tho ugh o ur espericn ce on the plains has only bccn limited we think it a foolish policy totak e foot soldiers on campaign agamst mounted lndians. E\-en if dil: in fan tn were needed a sescort for [wago n1 trains still \vc are of thc opinion that they would of more liarni than go od.Four or fivcs old isrs cannot ride on loaded wagons: and the! must. thcrcfore, nccessarily nn lk .It is an old saying on the plains; and one \\.hich has pr ote n to bc tru s-vi z., that "A man nithouta horsl: has no business on the pramc." . . . .fifteen miles a day o n an average is the utmo st afoot soldier can tra\.el. T he dullest mind will pcrceive the usclcssncss of infant? traw lin g atthat rate to ovcrtakc Indians \vho tra\el fifiy or s i q milts a day.'

Stanley's comments might v c n well sununarizc a common conception of infant? on the frontier.Ho\\cv cr: they do justice to the contribution o f the combined tclun of infantry and cavalry. Eachhad a rolc to play, leaders \vho used the capabilities of each pro\-cd morc successfi~l

A combination of many clemcnts brought nhitc civdization to tlie frontier; forcniost amongthen, the scttler, farming: thc milroad. and the Army. For its part, tlic A m y fought few decisivecng agc mal ts agalnst the Indians. Cln slxs were most often thc rcsnlt of the Indian's style ofirregular warfare. A frustratcd Amiy found it d~fficuulo locate, close with, and destroy Indianwarriors. Th e subjugation of the Indian took longer than many envisioned. If it was a forcgoncconclusion, it was not settled ovcmiglit. For the Army , it was oRcn a slow, bitter assig nm alt .

T o examine the infantry's rolc on thc frontier, its rolc in K ansas offcrs an excellent cascstudy. During thc period 1x66 through 1x80: Kan sas proli des a picture of the activities that wcretaking place throughout the nation's frontier. During thcse ycars Kansas was one of the mostrapidly developing statcs in the count?. It was also onc of the major gateways for emigrantsmoving tvest\\ard. T u o major overland trails passed through the state, the Snioky Hill and Santa


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Fe. Additionally, one of two railroads towards the West coast would ultimately be laid through thestate. Writing on the Indian wars of 1867-1869, John Momett noted: ". . . .no lands on theAmerican frontier of 1867-1868 were more coveted by young farming families starting out in lifethan the rich soil of ~an sa s. '*

If the infantry's contribution to the taming of the West is given little coverage, it is almostignored in the literature of Kansas. There were almost always companies from infantry regiments-assigned to the posts in central and western Kansas during these years. The geography of westernKansas, primarily plains, would certainly seem to be an unlikely territory to employ infantry.However, as noted earlier, the Army could not execute its frontier mission without infantry. Evenif cavalry were the preferred force, there were just not enough cavalry regiments available.

The Army played an influential role in safeguarding the development and organization ofKansas. Historian Craig Miner, writing on the settlement of the high plains of Kansas in the 1860s,noted: "Historians have long been aware that western town building was so strongly related to theearly markets provided by the military that dangers were exaggerated to keep the soldiers around ascustomer^."^ Between 1867 through 1869, that threat was very real; indeed, these were the mostviolent years in the Indian-white relationship.

The Army's relationship with the local citizens was integral to the development of Kansasafter the Civil War. This was especially so between 1866 and 1880, when the state was dependentupon the Army for protection and until the frontierhad moved West beyond the state's borders.Additionally, by 1880 the Indians had seceded all their land in Kansas and been relocated toreservations in the Indian Territory. That year, the population of the state had grown to 400,000persons.

The focus of this thesis then is the question: Was the Army infantry effective in providingsecurity on the Kansas prairie from 1866 to 1880? In answering the thesis question, a secondary

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infant- units soon found themselves garrisoned on thc central plains, guarding new settlements androutes o f travel agains t a detcrmined and mountcd enemy, the Plains Indians.'

The post-Civil War Army undenvent many dramatic changcs The enormous wartimcUnion Am]! dcmobilizcd many unlts soon afte r the Civil W ar cnded. Histo rian Robcrt Athearnnotcd:

As usual: after a war, the nation was eager to reduce the accumulated debt, and the armedform s werc the most obvious subject for economy. The magnificent armies that had stoodbefore Vicksburg, Atlanta, and Richmond, now melted into history. Only a feeble,unrecognizable skelcton remained. Stretching out beyond the Mississippi for thousand s ofmiles lay the vast, unsettled west: dominated by hard-riding. hard-fighting nomadic Indians,equippcd with the frnest horses on the continent and frequently the best arm s. It was to be thejob of the little postwar A rmy to establish n c n forts and to m aintain old ones; to kccp openlines of communication: such as thc stagc and freight routes, and to protect new ones, like therailroads; and, finally; to kccp the hostile Indians from poun cing upon widely scatteredscttlemcnts that lay nestled in the mountains a nd strewn along the plains.'By 1866, most of the volunteer units were gone or mustered out of service. A war w a r y nationwas ready to channel irs energy in othcr directions. Mmnwhile: a smaller, professional regularA m ~ y ow reemerged, Thc process of demobilization of volunteer units began almost as soon a sthe war ended. As of 1 May 1865, there were 1,034,064 volunteer troops in the Union Armyawaitin g orders to muster out. The proccs s moved at a furious pacc. By Novembcr 1866, only11,043 men remained in the Army. The principal demands on the Army now w ere reconstructionduty in the formcr rebellious States and guarding the western frontier. In Congress, RadicalRepublicans were bent on a harsh rcconstm ction policy, which in turn required a large arm y toenforce policy. Those in Congress who supported President Andrcw Johnson's less severc policyof reconstruction favored a smallcr, less expensive peacetime army. Gencral Ulysses S. Grant,Comm anding Cicneral of the Army in 1866, believed the current deman ds placcd on the militaryrequired a regular Army o f approximately 80:000 m en; whilc the Secretary of W ar differed inopinion and envisioned an army end strength closer to 50,000.'


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ARer much debate, Congress passcd a m ilitary bill that I'rcsidcnt Johnson signed on 28July 186 6. Th is act set thr: regular Army stnic turc at forty-five rcgirnents, or four hundred andfifty companics of infa ntn ; tc n regimcnts or one hundred-twenty co mpanies of cavalry; and fiveregiments or sixty companies of artillen.. Tw o cavalry regimcnts and four in fa nt n regiments werecomprised of colorcd troops. Company strcngth \\ as sct at a maximum of one hundred privates,minimum of fifty privates per company: giving the Anny a m aximum end strcngth of 75.382. InKoiernber of 1866, the company strength n a s set at s ~ xt yf ou r rint cs per company. giving theArmy a strcllgth of 54,302. This set into motion the two principal formations employed a10112 thefronticr; thc and the infantry. Any plans to employ the massive \oluntecr army insubj,jugating he western fronticr passed with the enactm ent of this restructure. Th e once mightyUnion Army, which had dcfeatcd tlic Confederacy in battlc; nas now strretchcd thin along thc\vestern frontier and on reconstruction duty in the Sou th Solid leadership \\.as now csscntial if theXnny \vas to meet all its ta s k i~ y .'

Th e Arm y's leadership in 1866 included many combat vctcrans The regular Army officercorps of 1866 ~ v a s mixturc of West Point graduates .and C ivil Wa r veterans. M ~ i yfficers whoheld scuior rank in volunteer units during the Civil War soon found themselves taking greatrcductions in rank with 11ic restructu re of the regular Arm y. Histor ian Robert Utley has notcd that."Gcncrals became coloncls; majors: and even somctimcs captains: nh ilc colonels and majors foundthernsclves lizu~cnants."~ndi~idualsvho once comn and cd divisions and regiments nowconunanded companies. T o makc matters nors c; promotions in the postwar army ne rc few and farbet\vcen. One benefit of this, though probably not appreciated at the time, was that in an area\vherl: only a company or tno comprised the local garrison, comn~anderswere often experienced,professional, and combat veterans Howcver, the downsizing of force structure iu ~dhe rcductionsin rank for most officers affected the morale of thc fronticr army: egos aRcr a11 were very fmgilc.

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On the whole, though, they essentially performed their duties in a professional and competent~ n m n e r . ~

The post-Civil War soldier differed in niaiy \vays from the citizen soldicrs of the Army ofthe Potomac, e w n though many were ex-Umon ai d Confcderarc soldiers. The lndian Warssoldicrs canle from v cn diverse backgrounds. I\.Iany were poorly educated ai d a good percentageof the enlistees came from the bonom of the cconornic scale Ho\vc\cr; it was not uncomm on tofind wll-ed uca ted men who joincd for the adventure or to escape from a past. A large percentageof enlistees nc re recent ininiigrants, prim ar~ ly f German and Irish descent.' tlisto riar ~Don kck y ,nriting on tlic frontier A m y , noted:

Since the bcginnins of national standing annies: voluntary cnlistccs ha w entered their ranks fora wide variety of reasons, h.lilitarism was not a dominant national ideal in the l!nited Statesfrom 1865 through thc 1890's. and thus iden tification with such .an ideal \vas conspicuouslylacking as a motive for joining the regular Army. The rc was no national conscription tocompel scrvicc: and the rank and file arniy life attracted few n h o possessed a i y first handknowledge of it as a way of life. Ncv erthdc ss~many types of men d ~ dnlist, volunteering fora tlircc or five-year tcnn of scrvicc, at a basc pay of thirteen dollars a m onth.'Pcrhaps this po ints out that soldicrs thcn joincd the Ann ? fo r man!. of the same reasons as youngmen do today. I t seems a rite of passage thcn as today: and certainly not for the money, perha psfor the escltement

Instead of excitemen t, the soldicrs found instead isolation and an often very dull routinc.Located on thc stark and inhospitable plains, thc soldicrs occupied dreary and p rimitivc posts.From tlicse forts, the Arm) \vould attempt to accomplish its mission of providing security to thedeveloping frontier. Their task very much resembled what today is tcmicd operations other than

war (OO TW ). hluch to the chagrin of many senior off ~cc rs,he Army can ie to closely rcsemb lc afrontier police force. Ncver enough of them to guard the entire frontier, the men w r e marchedfrom one point to another. nherevc r the curren t crisis dcninndcd. In 1866, frontier duty became


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even busier as Llic \Vest came al i\ x with new emigrants. With these emigrants c, m c increasedsecurity missions for the Army.

With the end of thc Civil War , Am ericans and recent immigrants renewed in earnest then e s t~ v a r dmigration that had been s l o w d by that recent conflict. Many of the travelers \\-erelicadcd for California , Nen- Mexico, Oregon, and the Colorado and Montana goldfields. Othe rs;attracted by the possibilities of o\vning their o m and as a result of the Homestead Act of 1862,settled on the central plains. Th e Hom estead Act, signed by President ..Zbrahani Lincoln dur ing theCivil War: opened govcnlmcnt land in plots of 160 acres to cit~ zc ns r intended citizens over theagc of t\vcnh-one . Claimants wcre required to quickly build a house ai d Pam? the land for five?cars. aRcr which the land \\.as theirs, in fee simplc. Historian Roben Utley has noted: "The surgcof migrat~onvould add a million citizens to tls census roles of the western states and tcrritoricsbctne en 1860 and 1870, and another nvo and one half-ni ill~on y 1880."' A high percentage oftlicsc immigrants passed through Kansas and man) settled in ncn toivns or on their ownhomestead."

Th e cidvancc of the railroad West was one of thc significant niilestoncs in the dc\e lopm cntof the frontier. l i e continuation o f railroad co nstruction follo\ving the cessation of the \varbrought furth er population rno\cment througliout the frontier. Tv.0 great bands of tracks wcre laid\vcst\vard from the M issouri River, \\M e still another expanded east\vard from the Pacific.Kailroad construction brought with it new scttlemaits which soon developed along the rail\vayroute. Th e railroad also brought \vhitc civilization increased access to the \rest. Con structio n ofthe \vcst\vard railro ads, for a period in 1 866, averaged o \c r a mile each day. Thi s expansion tookplace under the wa tch ti~l ye of the Ann y, to whom protection of the railroad was a priority."

In late 1866, shortly after a two-montli tour of his new co~mnluid,General WilliamTccumseh S herm m. commander of the Division of the Missouri, rcponcd to the Sccrctary of Wa r

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his observa tions of the \vest. Hc found the frontier generally peaceful, but sa u cr isis brcwingbe tw en the whites and the Indians. Sherman found that the people on the frontier regarded theIndians as hostile, and demanded Anny protection. Since the Army \\a s responsible for protectingscttlerncnts and t r a \ d routzs, he recommended then that military should too view the lndians a shostile and that forces should be arrayed accordingly. Shcn nan also made the first of manyrequests to return the lndian Burea u; since 181 9 the responsibihty of the Dcpartmcnt of theInterior, back to the War Department. The mil itan ofien vi ew d with skepticism the Indian agent's.attitude towards the Indians and felt they lacked control over their cbargcs."

Thi: civil government in Washington established In d~a n ohcy. Ac cord ~ngo Russell

From the conc lusion of the Civil \Var throug h the end of the Rutherford B. Hayesadministration, the national ob je c ti w of the United States were to promote economicdcvelopment a i d settlement in the Western rcgibns. Accomplishment of these objectivesrequired the federal g o w r m n t o formulate an lndian policy that would deal with theinevitable contlict of the t\vo cultures. T o acconiplisl~ hese objectives, three goals wereincorporated into Indian policy: first: the rcnloval of Indians from the major cast-westirnlnigrat~on rails where they \\e re an obstacle to thc dcvelopment of the transco nt~nen talrailroad routes; second, the increase of the reservation system to reduce contact between theraces; and third. the use of thc resen ation system to assirn~latche Indians into mainstreamAmerican culture. This Indian policy focused Ann). operations and became a cornerstone innational security policy during the pcriod.l'

The f ic t that the lndian Bureau and not thc War Dcpartmcn t developed Indian policy con ti nu all^frustrated senior Anny leadership, since the Arniy's response to the Indians n a s reactive ratherthan proacti\ e

The S tate of Kansas \\ as still a frontier statc in 1866. Howevcr, the nest fifteen yearswould see major transformations take place in the statc. Thc Civil W ar had brought thcdcvelopnicnt of the statc to a near standstill. With the Civil War over: the statc became a gatewayto the w s t . Emigrant traffic increased along the overland trails that passed through Kansa s asnh it e settlers migrated \vestward from the eastern United States. This in-turn acerbated problems


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\\it11 the 11ldlans Th e trails over which thc emigrants passed and tcrrito? that they sometimesscttlcd on wcrc. until rcccntly, primarily occupied by thc nomadic lndlans.

Kan sas is part of an arca knon n a s the Ccntral Plains. The Ccntral Plains wcrc part of aIxger tcrritor). that strctchcd frorn the Missouri River wcst to the foothills of thc RockyI\,lountains. Once portrayed as the inhospitable, '%real American Desert." curly pioncers headingw s t travcrscd this area nit11 much trepidation and as quickl!. as possible. 'The terrain consi sts ofrolling grassl;ulds and a treeless plain. Several rivers, primarily the Arkansas, Smoky Hill, Saline.and Solomon: provide \\atc r as ~ vcll s transportation routes and subscqucntly thc areas of aroundthcse rivers became homesteads. Durinz thc summer months; the plain \\a s co \cred by nutritiousgrass that providcd an abundnnt food source for a multitude of \vildlife. Great herds of buffaloroarncd this area however, making this prinlc hunting tcrritor). for t l ~ cocal i n d ~ mribes."

Politici;uns in Kansas. anxious to devclop thc state aftcr f our years of war , distributedparnphlcts'in the states cast of thc Mississippi River extolling the agricultural prospects in Kansns.Gradually emigration shifted from Mimlesota and the North\vest to Kansas. Thesc new scttlcrssteadily expandcd in a \vcst\vard direction across thc state; ncw to\\n s emcrged a i d ncw countieswcre organized; covering the state by IXYO. Kan sas Govcrnor Samuel C ran fo rd saw greatprosperity ahcad for Kansas in 1866, a land that was safc frorn marauders and 1ndims.l'S h c r~ d m iffered somcwhat in his opinion. Attcr touring the plains in the sununcr of 1 866, henoted:

Thcsc plains can ncver be cultivated like Illinois, ncvcr be filled with inhabitants capableof self-govcmrncnt and self-dcfensc as against Indians and m arauders, but at best can becomea vast pasture field; opcn and frcc to all for the rcaring of hcrds of horses, mules; cattle andshccp S

I h e eastern portion of Kansas compriscd the na r~on'sprc-Civil Wa r fronticr. While thcCivil Wa r had clearly slowcd the devclopmcnt of this ncw state, pcace ch a n g d all that. As the


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frontier continued to mow \vest\vard through Kansas, traffic increased dramatically along twoearlier tmils. the Santa Fe and Smoky Hill. Thcsc w st\ va rd movenicnts brought cncroachmcntonto lai d that until recently was the homeland a i d hunting grounds of lndinns As more and morewhites passcd through or sc ttled into these area s, Indian resistance increased ensuring con flicts.Tlic local citizenry looked to the Anny to p r o ~ i d chem protection a id security.

During the Civil Wa r, the Anny in Km sas continued to provide escorts to passengers andfreight along the S anta Fc and Smoky Hill Trails. Somc of these Am ); troops were formerConfederate soldiers who chose service in the West rather than r e m ~ inn a prison crimp. The!were kno nn a s "Gahanize d Yankees." Almost si s thousand total. these "Gdvanized Yankees"\\ere fo nned into si s regiments of U.S. Volunteers in late 1864 Ultimately three of the sixregiments, the Second; Third: and Fifth: saw a c ti x sen-ice in ccntral ai d westcni Kan sas durinz1865 into late 1866. Following the end of the Civil War , thcsz soldiers manned the frontier untilthe Regulars returned."

Other niil itan units: local, state. or territorial militias, w r c miscd in response to India1attac ks, These units covcrcd for the regular Ann y that was concentrated in the eastern portion ofthe United State s 1ndi;ms routinely menaced travel along these two routes: perhaps a ttracted bythe absu ice of the Ammy. Thcse raids prompted r eta liat on expeditions in Kansas and in casternColorado Tc rr it on in 1864 and 1x65. Most Indian dcprcdations were usually the acts of a fewmarauding bands of warriors rather th a i a general clash be tw en whites aid Indians. As usual inguerrdla warfare. the militan \\.as frustrated in identifling tlic perpetrators and often lashed out atthe first Indians they encountered. T he situation soon deteriorated as a result of the excesses o f themilitias a s they sought to repress local uprisings. An expedition in 186 3 in particular: whichincluded a dubious volunteer unit from Colorado. ended with tlic massacre of a band of Cheyennesin western Colorado along the Sand C m k , This incident was to have far reaching effects later on

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for n ~ i l i t a ~ ~clat~on s rth the Indians and t i~l urc ttempts at placing ln d~ an s n rcscrvations. Tlussame incident had repercussions in Eastern newspapers and left a v c n negative and lasting imageof the Ann y to many of the citizcns brrck East. Actions of this type by militias imbued a relucta ncein tlic Army to acccpt volunteer units from the States during fi ~t ur endian cam paigns."

Thc lndians ~v ho opulated the arca of central and \vcstenl Kansas were nomadic bynature . Principally of die Chcycnne, Arapahoe; Kiowa, and the Conim che tribcs, thzy werepredominantly buflhlo hunters. 7liesc lndians roamcd over tlie plains follon ing thc shifting hcrdsduring the spring and summcr months. The a rm betwccn the Arkansas Kivcr in ihe south 'and tl icPlane h v e r in tlie north cncompasscd the pr m e hunting arca for thcsc four tribcs. During the coldwinter months. thc Indians n-ould move south of the Ark;uisas Rivcr into present day O k la h o m ~l'hcrc they rcmaincd until the spring . With the onset of spring the Incl~ans eturned to Ka nsas tohunt. Th e nliite incursions into this area disrupted the Indian's ability to roam at will

Thc introduction of the horse to the plains in the early eighteenth century increased thcrange a i d mobility of these lndian s. Th e ncM mobility meant tlie Indians now moved morc oftenand covcred a much greatcr d~s tanc e.Th c horse also had another tlicn unforeseen cffcct. It rnadcthe Indian a morc formidable thrcat to thc wliitc scalers and a m orc clusivc foe for tlic ~ r r n ) .' "

These Indians \\er e also hardy \ra rriors As historian Robert Utley noted.The tribcs also shared a long history of Ivarfarc and, accordingly, \\.ell-dcvcloped militarytraditions m d ins t~tution s. Above all else, societ:tv rcwarded tlic succcssful w r r i o r. He foughtprincipally for the honors o r war, both individual cmd group, fo r plunder and revenge, and fordcfcnse of homc and family against the aggressions of cncmy warriors similarly motivated.This war con~ plexargely governed hostilities with nh ite s as \yell as other Indians. Wh itesoffered opportunities for plundcr and honor and somctimcs presented a thrcat to home andfarnil!. tha t required defensive action or retaliation.'"

Slicnnlui proposed II I 1866 to rcstrict the lndians ( ni th the conscnt of Sccretar). of the lntcrior) tothe ttr ri to v south of the Arkansas Rivcr and east of Fort Union (Nc\v Mexico). Any lndians


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found outside these reservations \vithout a written pass by a militan authority clearly defining theirp urpo se ~ o u l de sub ject to immediate military action."

Thc increase in \vcstern migration by thc whites decreased thc area in nh ich the Ind ianscould mo\,e ficcly, l i e "Great .h e r ic a n Desert" \\-as no longer a barrier to westward whitees pm sio n. As previously noted, thc area bctween the Plane River in the north and the ArkansasRiver in the south \\-as a favorite Indian hunting ground. The two o\.erland trails in Kan sas , theSmta Fe and Smoky Hill, passed through this prime hunting area of the Indians and brought theminto increascd contact with the white travelers, 0 t h with prcdictltble results: conflict. Mistrus tand misunderstanding were \ e n conunon between thcse t\vo cii il~za tions .Sherman: the militancomm;u~der esponsible for maintaining peace, predicted trouble betwen the Indians and whitesettlers and emigrants. By the winter of 1866, he bcgan plans for the Army 's em ploynicnt inprotecting strategic sites on the frontier. Foremost Sherman deemed protection of railroadconstruction ;I priority for the ~r m y .' :

Construction of the Union Pacific. Eastern Di\.ision (U .P.E .D. ) railroad: interrupted by thena r: resumed at a greater p:ice through K ~ l s a sn its na y to tllc Pacific. In January of 1x65: there\\ere forty miles of railroad complete in Kansas. In J a m a n of 1868, Kansas governor S a n dCrawford proudly notcd in his annual message that the U.P.E.D. railroad was complctcd fromWyandotte, Kansas; to within thirty-five miles of thc state's nestem boarder, a total of 335 miles.The railroad increased access to the intx ior of the state."

The impact on population growth. economics, and politics in Kansas and throughout thecountn was inlmensc. The railroad brought homesteaders ,and contributed to the success ofhomestead fanning ; brought in the goods and se~ vi cc sequired to expand the fron tier, 'and madeKansas a centcr of the large-scale cattle ind us tn , hlilitarily, the railroad would save thegovcn~mcntmoney in supplying the westcni garrisons and immeasurably increase the efficiency of

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the Aniiy on tlic fronticr by increasing its mobility. Shzrman bslievcd that the U.I'.E.D. railroad\ u s the most important projcct then in development on the frontier. Me knew that in the fuhlre itwould facilitate thc military's interests on the frontier. In turn: thc Army played a major role in theprotecrion of the con stn ~c tion nd operations of thc railroad. However, in 1866, thc shortage ofregular Army units in Kansas put the soldiers in a defensive posture . Not untd the spring of 18 67\\odd enough soldiers be present in the state to allow tlic Ann). to go on the offinsive."

The A m y maintained its presence in Kansas through a scries of forts; that \\ere part o f asystem that stretched 0 t h haphuzardly over the nation's frontier. Six forts \vcrc located in theccntral and n-cstcrn portion of the statc and \verc cstablishcd to provide security to the frontier a sboth the Indian ;md the scttlcrs made contact with each other. These fo rts were locatcd primarilyalong the San ta Fe and Smoky Hill trails . Shennan considered thc protection of these routcs as anessential task of the m ili tan. I'ort Zarah (est3hlishcd 18 6J ), Fort Lamed (established 1859). a i dFort Dodge (cstablishcd 1864) nc re locatcd along rlic route of thc Sant a Fc Trail. Fort Ellsworth(cstablishcd in 1x64 and renamed Fo rt Hnrker in 1866): Fort Fletcher (cstablishcd 1865 , laterra ia ne d Fort H ays in 1866); and Fort Wallacc (established 1865) followcd the Smoky Hill Trailand the gcr~eral icinity of the Union Pacific h il ro a d . For thc ncxt fifteen years these posts werethe focal point of infantry activities tliroughout ~ a n s a . . ~ '

From tlicse posts, the infantry units carried out their various fronticr missions: primarilycscort duties for wagon trains, emigrants, and railroad constniction parties. Often each post \vascommanded by a captain and it \\as a rare occurrence whcn more than t\vo or thrcc companicswcrc stationed at one post a t an!. given time. T o further complicate administration of these forts,the commanding officers of these posts changed oAin a s companies mo\.ed from one post toanother. ORen undcrstrcngth, the co~n pan iesw r c burdcncd nith tasks that left them little time fortraining.

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9Utlcy: 21 0 ~ t l c y :.; Junction City WecklJ; Union, 15 Junc 1867.

"Utlcy. 7. Control of the Indians \\.as originally the responsibility of the military. Th cBureau o f Indian Affairs was crcatcd in I8 24 for this purpose. and k11 undcr thc War Department;Secretary of War: Annucrl Reportji1rlY66, 20.

" ~ u s s c lD. Santala: The tire (:h npa ign of 18% Srudy in rhe Use ofthe M ilitarylnsrrrtmenr (Fort Le a~e n\ro nli:SACGSC, 1994). 1 1'''In 1820, Maj or Stephen H . Long led an expedition to discover the source of thc Red

river. Long statcd in his report that thc m a e co\crcd between the Missouri river to tlic easternbasc o f thc Rocky hlo ulitain s \\;is in his opinion, ". . . . almost w holly unfit for cultivation, 'and ofcourse. unin hab~ table y a people depending upon cigriculturc for their subsistence." T h e o f f ~ c i dmap of his espedition labeled rhc plains arca, \vhich includcd Kansas, "l'lis Great AmericanDesert." 'This designation ~ v a s opid by map makers for the next half centur).. Ray AllenBillington. IVemvard Exptmsion (N en York- hlricrnillan; 19-19),452. 1.icutcnant Colonel GcorgcCustzr descl.ibed the arca bounded on the north by the uppcr M ss ou ri; on the east by the lo ncrMissouri arid M ississippi, on the south by Tcx as, and the ne st by the Rocky Mountains; GeneralGeorge A. Custcr, hly Li/e on the IJlriin.r (Ch icago . Lakcside Press, 1952. Reprint; Nonuan :University of Oklahoma: 1966). 3-5; Timoth! Z\vink, IG rr Lar nc d (Ph.D . diss., Oklahoma StateUnivcrsity: 1980). 36." ~ a i l u c l . Crawford: Kansas in the .%xties (K:uisas: A .C. hlcClurg & Co.. 191 1;Kansas Heritage Press, 1991), 228

'%ecretan. of War: Annua l Rcporr/or 1866. 2017Sccritary of War, Annual llepurt/i ,r 1865; 1 12 The xin ual rep on noted that in July1865 tmw lers a lo ~ighe Snioky H ~ ll tagc rou k from D cnvcr to Fort Leaven\\onh \\.ere ne\ er out

of sight of wagon trains belonging either to emigrants or mcrchants; Secretary of Wa r, Annu alI k y ~ o r t j i ~ r866; 2W . Gcneral Grant rcported in his annual report in 1866 to the Se cr et an of W arthat: "With a frontier constantly cxtcnding and encroaching upon the hunting ground s of theIndian, hostilities, opposition at least, frequently occur;" Sec reta n of War, Annual Report/i)r1867; 34. Lieutcn.ant Gcncral W illiam Tccumseh S l ~ e m l w oted in his report to the Se cretaryof Wa r in 1867, thrit Chcyerme, Kio\ra, and Ara pdi oe bands had notified conunm ders of posts andtllc stage drivers and agcnts along the Sm oky Hdl and Santa Fe trails that as soon a s the grassgrcw; thcy [the Indians] \\ o d d insist on the whitcs \virhdm\ving from these roads: Dcc Brown:Galvaitlzed Yunirees (Urbana: Uni\crsity of Illinois, 1963, Lincoln- Lhi vcr s~t y f h'ebmska,19x6); I20

I $ Robert h l. Utlcy, l.>unriersmen in BIIIC New York: hlaeniillm , 1967. Reprint, Lincoln:Univers ity of Ne brask a, 198 1): 2 12-2 13. Utlcy notes tha t few Regular A nn y units rcmain cd out


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West: most notably the Fifih and Ninth Infantry, and statc and territorial volunteer units took obcrthe Rcgular's rcsponsibilitics The Regular Arm>-units in thc Wcst recorded engqements inColorado, Kansas. atid N c n Mes ico in 1861; Ncw M esico in 1862; and i n Arizona in 1865.

lg\VillimiM. cckic, The Military Conquest of'thf,Sourhern Plains (Norman: Univcrsityof Oklahoma, 1963): 6-8.'"tlcy. Frontier Regulars: 6."Secretary of Wa r; Annual Reportfi,r 1866, 21"Lcckie; 6; Sc cr et an of War, Annual Report j i ~ r 866, 20.23.1unctionC f [y f irkl j Union. 25 Januan 1868."Homer E. Socolofsky and Iiube r Sclf. Hi.stur;cal Atlas (Jf'k'unSa~Norman: Univcrsityof Oklahoma, 1972); 32. By 1867, terminal Facilities were dcvclopcd at Abilcnc ;Ind this town w ~ sthe primary markct during tlic nest four p r s or T e u s longhorns coming up the Chisholrn trail.El lsw m h and Dodge City becarnc thc primar). railllwds for cattle in 1875, and rc ~nain ed o for thcncxt ten years. Estiniatcs of five million longhonl cattle wcrc driven up the trail to Kan sas in thistwenty )-car period. The census bureau noted that Kan sas' population in 1860 was 107,206, by1870 population had risen to 362.872. an increasc of 238 5 pcrccnt, the third highest percentagegro\\.th in the nation Th e Interior Dcplrrtmcnt notrd for 1867 that Knnsas had produccd40,000,000 bushels of corn, 2:500.000 bushels of \vhcat, and 1,000,000 bushels of potatoes.Junction City U'cekly [hion; 25 Fcbruary 1871 and 30 iioveriiber 1867; Robert Ci. A t l ~ c a n ~ :4.

2 " ~ y . rontiersmen in Blue: 348


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Sherm an since 1865) comprised the Departmen ts of Arkansns, the Missouri. the Platte, andDakota. Th e division hcadquartcrs was located in St. Louis, Missouri. The Depa rtmen t of theMissouri, the largest department in the division, ericornpassed the states of Missouri, Kansas, a ndthe territories of Colorado and New Mexico. Its headquarters was located at Fort ~ ea ve nw or th .3Historian Robcn Utley noted:

The department com~nan der, 's i t~~a tedigh enough to gain pcrspcctivc \\ ithout losing focusbn local conditions, was the key link in the fronticr ~ i r m ~ ' shain of com man d. I-lc kept intouch \\it11 post comm andcrs, set st a n d rd s and guidelines, and usually provided positiveleadership.4

The Departmen t of the Missouri was fi~rtlier ubdividcd into four districts: Kansas,headquartered at Fort Leavcnwortli; Upper Arkansas, h~ ad ~u ar te re d' aton Harker; NewMex ico; 1ieadqu;inercd in Snnta Fe; and the Indian Territory. headquartered at Fort Gibson. TlicDistrict of i!pper Arkansas consisted of the territory i n Kansas wcst o f a north-south linc drawnthrou gh Fort Harker. ~I'lirough his district, the Smo ky I l i l l route, the Santa Fc Trail, and thcU.P.E.1). railroad passed and thc area encompassed the frontier settlements of Kansas. Withinthis area were thc principal posts in Kansas that guarded tlie frontier, Forts Harker, Zareh ,1-arned, Dodge, Hays, and Wallace. From the lalc 1860s until 1880, this district was the sce ne oftlie most active service of the infantry units in ~ a n s a s . 5: ,

In 1866, !lie ~ e p a rt m c n t f Missouri. comma nded by Major General Winfield S cottHancock, was charged with the protection of the Smo ky Hill and Arkansas (Santa Fe Trail)routes and settlements on the tributaries of the Upper Arkansas a nd sm ok y I j i l l Rivers. Thismission required protecting and assisting the construction of the U.P.E.D. railroad, whichstrctchcd from Wyandottc. Kansas, to Fort Riley and was on contract for 250 more miles oftrack. T o cover the dopurtmcnt's arca of responsibility. Hancock had at his disposal Battery B,Fourth A rtillcry, tlie Third, Seve nth, and Tcnth (colored) R egiments o f cavalry, the Third. Filih,


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Thirty-scve nth, and Thirty-eighth (colored) Re gimcnts of infantry, and 150 Indian scouts. 'I'hislimited n umber of soldiers ensured that the units w r c spread thinly throughout the departmen t.6

In his annual rcport to the Secretary of War in 1869, Sherma n noted that, "While th enation at large is at peace, a state of quasi war has existed: and continues to exist, over one-halfits extent, and the troops therein are exposed to labors, marches, tights, and dangers that a mo untto war."7 He most certainly was speaking of the Army's activiiies in both the Division andDepartment of the Missouri. For that year alone, the Army recorded over thirty-eightengagc~ncnts ith Indians throughout the L)ivision's arca of responsibility, including fourteen inKansas. I'roni 1 January rhrougl~ 5 O ctober 1869, just in the Dcpar trne~ n f Missouri alone,Sheridan reported numerous skirmishes in which six soldiers and ninety-two lndians were killed,and seventy-ninemcn, women, and children murdered by the lndians.8

Following the cessation of hostilities at the end of the Civil War, the regular Armyunderwent a reorganization il l structure and in personnel strength. War Dcparlment Gcneral .Order N o. 92, dated 23 Novcmbcr 1866, providcil for the expiuision of thc num ber of infantryrcgiments from nineteen to forty-tivc. This required mo re of a rcorganizatio n than the creationof all new regim ents. Th e first, second, and third battalions of regiments 11 through 19 bccameregimcnts 1 1 through 19, 20 through 28, and 29 through 37, respectively. For exampl e, thesecond battalion, Eighteenth Infantry became the new Twen ty-sc renth Infalltry. Regirncn ts 3 8through 41 were to be made lip of colored soldicrs, while regiments 42 through 45 were knownas Vetcrans R eserve Corps regiments, which were led by wounded officers and soldicrs of the

Volunteer Service and the regular ~ r m y . 9Th e regular Army infantry regiments would g o through one more reorganization before

the turn of the century, in 1869. How ever, this time around the Army gre w smaller rather thanlarger. War D epartmen t General Order No. 17, dated 15 March 1869, reduced thc numb er of


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reginicnts froni forty-five do\ \n to twcnty-five. l'liis reorganization affectcd scveral infantryregim ents located in Kansas. Th e Thirty-seventh Infantry was broken up, half going to tlic ThirdRc gi~ ne nt nd thc other half going to the Fifth Regiment. The Thirty-eighth Infantry wa slikewisc divided. half going to the Twenty-fourth Regime nt and the remainder t o tlie Tw enty-lifth Regiment, which wcre now the only two colored regiments of infantly.lo

By the beginning of 1866, most of thc volunteer units had becn transferred froni Kansasor mustered out of scrvice. Regular Arm y infantry and cavalry regiments now took up poststl~roug hont oth K ansas and the remaining frontier area in tlie West. Howevcr, while the Armyrcstructurcd its infantry and cavalry regiments most o ft he units rcniaincd undcr strength. Evenas the units rcccivcd new recruits. conipanics rcniained understrcng th. All the while, tlie onc ortwo com pany post rcrnained tlie norm. Th e Arniy soon discovered that the wide area ofresponsibility assigned to each post grcaily taxed the capabilities of thesc iom pan ies . Isolatedsettlem ents and wagon trains rcmaincd vulnerable to Indian attack. Fortunately for the Arm yand the local population in Kansas, there werc relatively few incide nts with tlie Indians that ycar .

Karcly did rcgin~ents. nf an ty o r cavalry, ever assemble all of thcir compa nies togetherat onc post or in the field. No longer did thc Arniy leadership think in ternis of organizations,s i~ c h s divisions or corps, both o f which \verc some common i n the Civil War. Tlic com panybccame , defacto, tlic basic unit on thc frontier. Most opcrations were at the comp any lcvel or acombination of companies. A rcvicw of the thirty-threc official enga gem ents by the rcgularA m y infantry in Kansas for the years 1866 through 1880 reveals that twen tye igh t involved onlyone or two companies of infantry. The one or tw o coillpany post was familiar to most of theinfantr).men il l Kansas. Thus it is not hard to understand how tlie lik of a soldier rcvolved;iround his compan y, rathcr than tlic regim cnt. E\ en the development of the Thirty-sevcnth

, Infantry from thc Nineteenth Infantry in 1867. and the breakup oTthe Thirty-seventh Infantry23


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into th e ~ h i r dnd Fifth Infantry Rc gimen ts in 1869, did nothing to help foster regimentalidcntity. I

The company structure reniairied fairly constant from 1866 to 1880. Each infantrycompany w as authorized one captain, one first lieutenant; and one second lieutenant.Noncomm issioned officers (NCOs ) comprised a first sergeant, a quartermaster krge an t, foursergeants, and eight cbrporals. Additionally, a company was authorized fifty privates, thoughthat numbcr could be increased up to one hundred based on the nature of the servic e at variousstations. Minimum strcngth for an hifantry regiment was set at 836 nicn: while maximum

. .strengtli for n regime nt was set at 1,196 men. Thi s structure did not always match ac tual Lroopstrengths of'companics employed on the frontier. The Third Infantry's strength in September1866 was 783 soldiers, whilc thc Fifth Infantry stood at 959, of whom 666 were recent recruits.By 1879, these two regiments strcngth stood at 544 and 465 rcspectively.12

The strength o f a ~o m p an y ften lluctuatcd. Company strength at Fort Hays during 1867averaged one officer and tifty-five soldiers. On any given day, only some of t l i m soldiers wereavailable for duty whilc others were abscnt on detached duty, which might be within or outsidethe District of Arkan sas. Additional duties could quickly overw helm these comp anies. Escortsto overland mail stage, paymasters: and wood trains would often lcwc barely enough soldiers forgarrison duties.13

Brigadier General John Pope, cornniariding the Department of the Missouri, no ted i n his.annual report for 1871: "The system of small posts, however, so ~ i d e l ycattered and in such-

remote p laces, is very prejudicial to any high stati of discipline and 1norale."14 Desertio ns werea serious problcrn to the already under strength con ~p an ies nd garrisons in Kansas and the Arm yas a whole . For exam ple, from Octob er 18 66 to Septembe r 1867 the following infantry.regime nts recorded these totals for desertion: Third Infantry-l 19, Fifth Infantry-1 14,


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Thirty-seventh Infantry-170: and Thirty -eigh th Infantry-1 50. Du rin g this same period, theSixth Cav alry had 327 m en desert, w hi lc the Seventh Cavalry had an astounding 512 soldiersdesert. The Tenth Cavalry had only thirty-eight men dcsert during this period. The mo bi li w o fthe cnvalrymcn and their frequent fie ld dut y must have contributed to this difference. On theother hand, for the black troops there \\ere fewer opportunities outside o f the Ar m y and theywcre easier for the Provost Marshal to track down.15

There were man y dif fr re nt reasons for thcse desertions. Poor pay was the most oftencited reason. A private in 1873 was paid only thirteen dollars a month. This compared poo rly\\hen matched against the civ il ia n employees at a post; blacksmiths averaged one hundreddollars a month, carpenters ninety dollars a month, and cven teamsters nc re pa id for ty-fi vedollars a month. A l l werc prin ccly sums o f money to a privale. \bho in-addition often foundliim sclf performing man? o f similar type duties. The proxim ity o f the goldliclds in Colorado andMontan a tcrnpted many soldicrs loo. An d if al l that as not enough, the quality and variety o ftlie food \%,asgenerally poor and the liSc at spartan po sh often dull. W it h so many o bopportunities, most o f whic h paid better than tlie Army, the grow ing West tempted many soldiersto dcsert. Whatever the reasons: desertion was a serious business for the juni or oft ice rs o f anycompany.l6

Solid company grade leadership is key to un it discipline. In 1869, the ofticer-soldierratio in the in fantry company na s one oftic er to t\\.enty-three soldiers; in 1871, this ratio droppedto one to twenty-one; the number dropped cven lower in 1876, one offic er for every sixteen

soldiers. As noted earlier, even as Arm y manpower dropped due to reorganization, therequirements for the numbcr o f officers reniaincd constant. Add itiona lly. the demand foroffice rs for detaclled scrvice outside the department contributed to the drain on company l e x lle;ldersliip. Rathe r than thc three officers the structure called for, often only one or two, and

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sometimes none at all, wcre available for duty at the post \\it11 their company. A rcvicw o f tlieroster of officers availablc tbr duty contained i n the official Post Kcturns for Fort Hays betwe cnOct ober 1866 and Septem ber 1865 reveals, with few cxceptions, one oflice r for each infantrycom pany assigned to tlie post. On c of tliesc officers, at one point a tirst lieutenant, was al so tliepost coniniandcr in addition to comm anding a company. This Incant that relatively juniorofficcrs werc for the most pan directing the execution of government policy in the wide areaenco mp assin g thc post, far from the dircct supervision of their scniors. This shortagc of officersplaced additional rel iance on the leadership of N c O S . ~ ~

The olllcers oftlii s Army wcrc a ~ n i s c dot. In 1868 , tlicre v.erc t hirty- four officersassigned to tlic Third lnfiintry. O fth es e, six \\.ere forcign born, si s wcrc West Point graduatcs,:uid three had bccn ni;ijor generals of volunteers in tlie Civil War (one, William Penrose, was acaptain in 1868). Thc Fifth infantry officers expericnced a similar situation. Out of thirty-fourofticers. five wcre forcign born, fivc were Wcst Point graduates. two had been breveted t o majorgcncral and one. H enry Danklicad, a Brigadicr General of Volnnteers (back to captain in 186 8).130th tlic Thirty-sev enth and 'Sliirty-eighth Infantry were sim ilar. With the csce ption of a fewsccond lieutenants, all officcrs on the fronticr were Civil W ar veterans, and m ost held ranksduring that \var that werc often tw o or three greater than tlieir current grade in 1866.18

On c should note that the distribution of W est Point graduates in the infantry regimentsrcmaincd lower than the cavalry rcgiments for tlic same periods. For instance, i n 1873: the Sixthand Scventli Cavalry had ten of twelve second lieutenan~s \,lie graduated from West Point, while

the Third and Fifth Infantry had three and two, respectively: of ten second lieutenants. I-lowcver,.l'liese two infantry rcgiments did erijoy onc advan tage however. During this same tinic the Th irdInfantry had five second lieute~iantswho were Civil W ar combat vcterans, the Fifth Infantry hadh c c , wliilc the two cavalry regiments had only one each. It appears that during this period the

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Arm y was weighting the cavalry, and that West Point graduates found duty in the cavalry moreappealing. Cavalry, often the darling of the Army, expanded at the expense of the infantry.During Congressional hearings on the reorganization of the Army in 1877, several infantryofficers raiscd the issue of the merits of the seeming favoritism for the cavalry over the infantry.Senior Army officers, such as Winfield Scott Hancock, Nelson B. Miles, and William B. Hazen,were quick to point out to the Co ngressional committee the success stories and advantages of theinfantry during Indian operations. I t should be noted that these comments from very experiencedand capablc Indian fighters were also delivered with the intention of protecting the infantry forcestructure.19 On this infantry versus cavalry controversy, Robert Utley noted that the ". . . .cavalry remained th e arm most likely to close with Indians in combat."20 This perhapsexplained the variance o f posting m ore W est Point graduates to the cavalry.

As the spring arid summer of 1867 neared, Hancock had companies from the Third,Fifth, Thirty-seventh, and Thirty-eighth Infantry regiments in posts throughout the District of theUpper Arkansas. This was the time of year when the Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, and Kiow abegan moving northwards through Kansas from their winter camp sites to the hunting groundsbetween the Arkan sas and Platte Rivers. That year was one of constan t alerts with nineteenengagements between infantry units and hostile Indians, a significant increase over the previousyear.21

The District of Upper Arkansas was a focal point for Army activities in Kansas duringthe time fram e between 1866 and 1880. It was through this district that the Smok y Hill andSanta Fe routcs passed, as well as thc U.P.E.D. railroad. New settlem ents and isolated farmswere spreading and countics were being formcd in what was the last of the unorganized area ofKansas. It was also the area of the most intense clashes with hostile Indians in K ansas between1866 and 1880.22

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The m ajority of Indian raids in 1 866-1869 occurred in the northwestern area of Kansas.Th is encompassed an area from White Rock Creek in the east to the forks and upper reaches ofthe Sm oky Hill, Saline, Solomon, and Republican rivers to the West. To guard the Sm oky Hillroute, the developm ent o f the U.P.E.D. railroad and settlements in the area, the A rmy establishedthree posts in 1866: Forts Harker, I-lays, and W allace. Detachm ents were temporarily stationedat several other smaller posts, such as Dow ners Station, Fort Monument, and Smok y Hill S tation,to cove r the Sm oky Hill stage route, and later the construction parties o f the U.P.E.D. railroad.Along the S anta Fe Trail and the area south o ft h c Arkansas River were Forts Zarah, Larned, andDodge, each responsible for protecting settlements and kceping open the lines ofcommunicat ion.2~

Th e Department of Missouri started out the year 1866 with the following infantryregim ents stationed on the posts in central and western Kansas: Third , Fifth, Thirty-seven th, andThirty-eighth. Each regiment consisted of ten companies, lettered A, B, C, D, E, F, G, t-I. I, andK. During this sam c period, thcrc were three regiments of cavalry (Third, Seventh, and Ten th)operating in the department. The Third and Fifth Infantry regiments were long time regularArm y outfits, while the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Infantry were formed in 1866. TheThird infa ntry had a long and illustrious heritage dating back to its formation in May of 1796.The regiments participated in hcaky fighting during the Mexican War, most notably atCliapultepec and Me xico City. In the years just before the Civil War, the regiment saw activcservice against the Navajo in New Me xico. Comp anies from the regiment were moved to theEast a t the opening of the Civil War and arrived in time to participate in the First B attle o f BullRun in July 1861. The regiment saw further fighting during Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg,and Gettysburg. The Fifth Regim ent, organized in June of 18 12, was active in the West durin gthe Mexican War and against Indians in the Southw est. The Firth Infantry was one of the few

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regular Army un its to remain in the West during the Civil War. 'l'hc regiment did see actionagainst a Confe derate force at I'eralta, h'en Mexico in April 1862, a battle that ultimately drovethe Confederates back into Texas. The Fitih Regiment, though, spent the remainder of the war inthe west. As noted earlier, both the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth \rere not established untila t ier the cessation of thc Civi l ~ a r . 2 4

These four infantry regiments were spread thinly throughout Kansas by late 1866. Thesituation was the sam e throughout the rest of the Departme nt of Missouri. This thin line ofinfantry found the difficult situation of command and control exacerbated by the distancesbetween each fort. Th e Army considered the addition of cavalry the answer to these distances.Th e follo\ving year, 1867, Sh erm m reported to the Secretary of War that "We have been veryshort of cavalry all the time."2j In Septembe r 1867, the infantry and cavalry regiments weredistributed in Kansas area ofthe District of lJpper Arkansas in the following manner.

I Total I 2 l co~nnanies I 15 comn anies I

I'OSTFort DodgcFort I larker

Fort HaysFort LarnedFort Wallace

Fig. 1 . Distribution of Army infantry and cavalry in Kansas, September 1867.29

INFANTRYA & H, 3d Infantry

I, 3711 InfantryF, 3d lnfi~ntryK: 5th ln f i~ n~ryE. 37th Infantry

B & 11, 38tll InfantryG, 5th Infantry

C,E, 8r G , 38'11 InfantryR , C, & D, 3d Intintry

K, 37th InfantryE, 3d Infantry

CAVALRY13, 7111 Caval ry

A. D, G ,& M, 7th CavalryK , 10th Cavalry

E, H, & K, 711 Cav al ryF & G 10th Cav alry

A, 10tll Cava lryF & 1, 711 Cavalry


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I t is notcwortliy that tlie num ber of cornpanies assigncd to the w posts in the summ er of' I86 7(TAB LE I) reflects the seriousness of the Indian thrcat. Generally it was a rare occasion whenmore than tw o compan ies from a single regiment were assigncd to thc sam c post i n the D istrictof the tipp cr Arkansas. Com panies from the infantry regiments in Kansas were also located inColorad o Territory and New Mexico undcr similar circumstances. Several senior officers, Popeamong tlicm, believed this was dctrinicntal to unit discipline and recommended concentratingcomp anies at key posts in tlic winter niontlis. After routine ga rr is o ~ ~uties and w agon escorts,the num ber of soldiers availnblc on a daily basis for training was li n~ ited .As a result, bothcornpany and regimental tactics suffered from this shortage.

Inf;~ntry ornpanies were not permanently assigned to any on c post and often remained ata post for only a short period of time. Co mp anie s wer e sliifted around the military dcpartriientbased on thc situation as detennincd by the division or department commanders. As such,companies were oftcn shifted tlirougliout tlic departmcnts to respond to crises and requests bylocal comma nders for additional troops. l 'lie relatively small size of tlie Army also contributedto thc need to movc companies from one post to another. l 'he department co mm anders couldexpcct no additional troops from Washington, and they got none.

The fo llowing example of Fort W allace, the most western post in Kansas, and thecomp anies assigned therc is typical o f other posts in Kansas during the 1866-1 880 time fram e.On 6 Octobe r 1866, First Lieutenant Jos cp l~Hale and fifty-one soldiers from Comp any E, ThirdInfantry, arrived at Fort Wallace and assumed the duties of post garrison. I-lale also becam e thepost comman der. As a lieutenant, deep i n Indian country, he was exp ccted carr); out his d uticswith very little dircct supervision. Six wceks later, on 20 Nov cmber, two officers and fifty-cightsoldiers of Company D,Nineteenth Infantry, slio\r.ed up at Fort Widlace to reinforce tlie

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, .' , ' I , ..I:garrison. Du ring the same month, Co ii ia n y 1, seventh Ci va liy , &dc i i t o the post to oi n thegarrison and its commanding officer Captain Myles Keogh, later kill ed in action at the Lit tleBighorn with G.A. Custer, assumed the duties o f post commander.26

St ill m ore troop movements were i n store for the companies at F ort Wallace. Shortlyafter arriving at Fort Wallace. Company D, Nine tce ntl ~nfan try, was taskcd by the departmentheadquarters to provide a detachment o f one offic er and forty- five soldiers to guard thc O verlandma il stations along the Smoky Ilill oute at Cheycnne Wclls, B i g Springs, and Ho ll ow Creek,Kansas ageinst Ind ian attacks. First Lieutenant John Han inlcr and forty -fiv c soldiers marchedout o f Fort Wallace to these isolated stations and took up posts wit h thc c ivil ian station workers.About tcn to fif tee n mile s separated each ma il station. Company D soldiers were replaced atthese stations by Flak and Company E, Third Infan try in Apr il 1867. The soldiers fromCompany D (now named Company D, Thirty-seventh Infa ntry) marched back to I:orl Wallace torcjo in thc remainder o f the company and assumed post garrison duties alo ng wi th Company I,Seventh Cavalry. Du rin g thc spring and summer of 1867, the security o f he stations along theSmoky llill outc was a prim ary mission for the infantry. 'The companies her e strung out alongthe routc in sm all dctachmcnts and leadcrship remained very dccentmlized.27

Du rin g Mu ) and June 1865, Fort Wallacc was under a virtua l state of sicgc by hostileIndians. Thc isola tcd stagc stations and wagon trains on the Smok y Hill route wcre also underconstant attack. T o relie ve the prcssure on the post and to reinfo rce unit s in Kansas, Hancockmade several adjustments to in ti nt ry locations in his department. A series o f unit reassignments

took place throughout the Department o f the M issou ri and as a rcsult, more infan try took upposts in Kansas. On 8 August 1867, companies 13, E, G: H, I, nd the regimental hcadquartcrs o fthe F ift h Infantry R egi~ nen t rrived at Fort Wallace after a wcek's march o f 120 miles from FortI.yon in the Colorado Territory. Captain Henry C. D;unkhcad o f the Fif ih Infa ntry now

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the ma instays of infantry posrs in Kansas. Between 1878 and 1880, Fort Dodge was usuallygarrisoned by threc compa nies of the Ninetccntll Infantry; with cav alry comp anies only passingthrough, whilc Fort Wallace generally had two com panies of the Sixteenth Infantry on post. Fort1-arncd was closed in 1878 after almost hventy y ears as an infantry post; Forts D odge andWallace would follow suit in 1882. Only Fort Hays remained an active post until 188 9.32

By distributing these small comp anies over such a wide arca. it was impossible to givetotal coverag e lo all exposed settlements in K ansas. Since it was almost impossible to predictwherc and \vhcn hostile Indians \vould strike, the soldiers were far too fcw to cov er all points atonc c. This oftcn led to anger and fcclings of frustration by local civilians who bore thc brunt ofIndian attacks.

When the Civil War endcd in 1865, thc Army had on hand an enorm ous amou nt ofequipm ent in \varehouses throughout the Korth. The Secretary of War noted i n his annual reportto the President for 1866: "The stock ofclothing. equipage, quartermaster, subsistence, hospital.and ord nance stores. arms, ammun ition, and ficld artillery is sufficient for thc immed iateequ ipag e of large armies."33 While sufficient amou nt was on hand, the Army chose to s a wmon ey by stock ing this gear for future issue and to stop further procurcmcnt of most items, withunforeseen results. A glaring deficiency existed in the infantry rifles, which were by nowobsoletc muzzle-loaded weapons. Good , bad. or otherwise, except for minor mod ifications, thiswartimc issue was the bulk of the equipment used by the Army on the frontier for the decad efollowing the Civil War.

Stocks of the Pamiliar looking Union Arm y uniform w ere in abundanc e and would not bedepleted until 1880. The soldiers in Kansas wore d ark blue blouses trimmed \vith sky bluepiping and light blue trousers. The uniform w as o f a single \veight, which meant the soldierclcarly felt tl~c xtremes of the Kansas sumnlers and \\inters. The uniform was oftcn made of

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infer ior qual i ty mater ials which wore out quickly on frontier duty. Contemporary drawings ofinfa ntry ~n an n 1- lancock's 1867 expedit ion show a var iety o f headgear wo rn b y the soldiers. The18%-partern blac k camp aign hat was not as popular w ith the soldiers as the sma ller forage cap.A pa ir o f often sh oddily m ade boots rounded out the soldier's unifo rm. For guard mount at even11ie mos t iso lated post, the soldiers w ent to great pa ins to present a neat m ilit ar y appearance.W hile in the fie ld though, the soldiers oftcn wore t l icir oldest uniform s and companies olie npresented a n lot ley col lection o fu ni f or ni types that presented a non -mi l i tary appearance. In aletter to the Arnryancl A'uvy Jourrrul in 1867, one infantrym an recommended the Ar m y dispensew ith the bluc un iform, instead should adopt a unifo rm that was not "a promine nt color. but rathera neutral tint that w i ll not slio\v dirt."34 A cost conscious governlncnt continued to economizeon moderniz3tio11 f the soldier's un ifbn n. There were only m ino r changes in the next fewdecades. I t rcmnined an uncomfortable, but fun ctio ~ia l ni form .3j

' l 'l ic infantryman marched wit h an average load o ff i f iy pounds o f equipment. This oftc nconsisted o f sixty rounds o f anniiunition, an overcoat, \vool blanket. rubber blanket (groundsheet), extra clotl~ es: antccn, three to five days rations; and his 5 8 caliber Sprin gficld m uzz lc-loaded rif lc . The blanket ro ll was often preferred over tl ie regulation knapsack for carry ingequipment in the field . The bayonet usually remained bchinll; fo r it was unconifortable to carryand o f imi ted u t i l i t y in Ind ian f ighting.36

At t l lc end o f l ie Civ i l War, rhe 1861 Springfield r i f le was the standard infantry weapono f he norther11arniy. The rit led musket brought profo und changes to warfare and theSpringfield r i l l e proved to be a superb weapon dur ing the Civ i l War. On the fror~ ticr , l ie r i f lcrrm ain cd an ef frc tiv e \%capon onsistent wit h the poor marksmanship o f the soldier and the slo wrare o f i re o f a muzzle loader. Some Indians on the frontier were soon showing up armed with


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breech loading rifles. iiaturally . tlie soldiers themselves cagerl!. aw ai ~e dlie issue of a brccchloading riflc.

Early i n 1866, a board of A rmy officers conven ed to lest and evaluate current breecli-loading ritles and review plans to convert muzzle-loading Springfield rifle-muskets into brccch-loaders. Dascd on tcsts, and tlic fact that so many Springfield ritles w ere alrcady in tlieinventory, a rccomniendation w as madc to convert lhcse rillc-muskcts into breech-loaders. TlicSecretary of War accepted this reconimendation and the conversions were ordcred. Am ong theother cliangc to the weapons was a rcduction from .58 caliber to S O caliber and the introductionof the mctallic cartridge. During the same year, the Springfield Armory dcvoted its productionto repairing used wcapo ns and ma king preparations to cornmelice the breech conversions. TheSecretary thought the conversion so su ccessft~ l,hat he rcported to thc I'resident that the weaponwas bclicvcd to be bctter than tlie IJrussian ncedle gun . Contempo rary ordnance repo rts showedthat the average inrantry rifle lasted seven years, thus the rem aining Civil W ar era stocks ofneapons were cxpectcd lo last for a long wliile.37

A new riflc, the Modcl 1873 Springtield, wa s introduced in 1873 arid the caliber for allArniy rifles, carbincs, and pistols was fixed at .45 caliber . By the end of 1875, the infantryregiments tl~roughoutKansas and thc Army were issued the .45 caliber Springtield trap doo rritle. The ritle rcni ;hed an accurate and powcrful wcapon, which could penetrate two inches ofwood at ovcr sixteen-hundred yards. Though man y Europcan countries introduced m agazine fedweapons and smokeless powder for the cartridges, the U.S. Arniy continucd to reaffirm its

prefercnce for the singlc shot Springfield. Th is would remain the standard infantry weapon, andthc carbine vcrs ion the standard cavalry weapon. until the introduction of tlie Krng-Jorgenson in1893.38


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Companies of the Third and Fifth infantry bcgan duty 011 he Kansas liontier in 1866 stillusing the muzzle load ing 18 61 Spring field riflc. Cus ter noted sarcastically in 1867 that theIndian Bureau had graciously furnished the Indians with breech-loaders, yet the infantryman wasstill equipped with a muzzle-loading riflc. N o doubt an infantryman, facing an Indian foe whon,as mounted on horseback and better armed than him, had even more reason to be concerned.Tlic infantrymen were still required to go through the time consuming procedure of loading"minie balls" and draw ing ramrods between each shot. Tlic soldiers souglit to engage the Indiansat a distance. takin g advantag e of the weapon's great range. Thc Indians on the other handprefcrred close-in figh ting, using thcir wcapon 's sho rt range and taking advantage of the slowrate ol'fire o f the soldiers. l'li c infantryman awaited eagerly the moment in April 186 7 whcn,Captain Keogh: conimanding Fort Wallacc, riotcd that a shipment of breech-loading riflesarrived for the two infantry com panies assigned to thc pos t.j9

Accuracy had nevc r becn the forte of eithcr the soldier on the frontier or tlic Indian.Infantry units dur ing tlie Civil War relicd on the effects of massed rifle fire. Poor marksm anshipwas oftell the result of little or n o target practice, not to men tion tlie fact that many soldie rsentercd tlic Arm y without much esp crien cc \\.ith lirearms. To many of the ofliccrs,marksm anship was just not a priority. A shor tage ~Fammunit ionimited the number of round savailable each year for tlie in fan~ rym an'smarksmanship training. This only aggravated thesituation. In 1874, after reviewing the situation, the W ar Department authorized each man tenround s per month for targct practice. Givcri the maxim um effective range of tlie rifle. and tlieincre ased ratc o f fire wit11 a breech-loading rifle ovcr the old muzzle loader, Hancock felt a"thorough and liberal system of target pmctice"40 would increase the infantrym an's accu racyand help c on se n e ammunition through fire discipline. Priority for target practicc still remainedthe prerogative of the local commander.41

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l ' l ic infan try ri fle had a ma xim um range o f 1,000 yards, considerably greater than themax irnurn range o f thc cavalry carbine. Sincc the cavalrym an fought dismounted. tlieinfantryman \vi t l i h is r i f l e and bayonet was morc cffectivc than t l ic cavalrynian with his carbine,pistol. and saber, and was niorc feared by the 1ndian.42

The prim ary task o f tl ic in fantry and cava lry in Kansas was to establish new posts, andmainta in thc old ones: to kccp open l ines o f communication, such as the stagc, freigllt, andemigra nt routes. and to p rotect new ones l ike the U.P.E.D. railroad; and to preven t hos tileIndians from attacking new settlements tliat w ere spread out ovcr the plains. Tliesc tasks wcresini i lar to those o f other A nn y uni ts on thc American frontier dur ing the last hal f of thenineteenth ccntury. I n 1869, nineteen o f l ie Army's twen ty t ivc infan try regiments and a11 tencavalry regiments wcre stationed i n Texas, tl ic India n Territory, the wcstern states, and thetcrr itor ies. Tl lc Ar m y however; never produccd a set o f formalized tactics to m e t he ni iss ion o fI ti di an fi gh ti ng on the f r ~ n t i e r . ~ j

The lack o f a means to rap idly transport soldiers to a strategic p oint or isolated

settlement required a contingent o f roops bc stationed on the spot. Citizens dcmanded too, thattroops be stationed nearby. A snla ll regular Ar m y forced in turn dictated that thcse posts bcsm all. Thus, the company post became the norm to the soldiers. The necessity o f guard ing somany scattcrcd sites olten did not leave enough troops to searcll for Indians in some o f tl ic mo rere mote areas i n w estern ~ a n s a s . ~ ~

Histor ian Robert I l t ley , co mm enting on the Arn iy's Indian f ighting strategy, noted:

To rn between dispersion and concentration, the A rm y pursued an Indian strategy thatcombined dispersion for defensc with temporary concentration for offense. I t mas not asatisfacto ry strategy. The dispersed garrisons were too f c\\ and too weak to present ancff cc tive defensc. Thc offen sive expeditions, formed on ly by weakening the dcfcnses, tooktoo lo ng to asseniblc and proceeded under handicaps tliat too olte n negated thc ire fkct ivcncs s for o f fensc.4 j


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The Army , throughout its campaigns against the Indians, never developed a formalmanual o f Indian-fighting doctrine. Historian Rob ert Athearn has observed that the Army, freshfrom exp eriences in the Civil War, would learn through difficult experience "that Indian warfarewas a singularly different kind of conflict from any they had known before."46 Viewed by manyofficers, operations against the Indians were a short term a ctivity of the Army. One generalofficer with exp erience fighting Indians went as far as to tell C ongress that fighting Indians w as-of relatively little importance in determining the structure and strength of the Army. The Arm ycontinued to focu s on the next war and paid closer attention to the activities in Europe, especiallythe Franco-Prussian War. And why not, the Army considered itself the nation's defense force,not a frontier police. Similarities still exist with many of today's Arm y officers and their viewon 0 0 ~ w . 4 7

Although the soldiers stationed in the West did not have a form al Army publication onIndian op erations, there is evidence that they recognized tactics based on comm on se nse andexperience. In the summ er months, the Indians were on the move and the Arm y found it difficultto locate Indian villages. However, soldiers recognized the weakness in the Indians inability tomo ve their villages d uring the winter months. In the winter, the lack of available grass and barkweakened the Indian's ponies. The harsh climate and heavy snow cover further deterred theIndians from movement. Thus, they were vulnerable while the Army could still move.48

Through experience, the Arm y developed the combination o f the sustained offense,using m ultiple colum ns of infantry and cavalry to converge during the winter months on Indiancampsites. Sheridan determined that:

The best way for the government is to now make them poor by the destruction of their stock,and then s ettle them on the lands allotted to them. . . As soon as the failure of the grass andthe cold w eather forces the bands to come together in the milder latitudes south of theArkansas, the mo vement of troops will take place from [Forts] Bascom, Lyon, Dodge, an dArbuckle, which I hope will be successful in gaining a permanent


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Experience h; ~d hown that tlie most c f i c t iv e method of ending an uprising was to carrythe war to the hom e of the lndian.50

Infantry and cavalry units might be employed together in attempts to com bat and punishIndian raiding parties. Such tactics were usually not successful i n the spring and summ er monthson the plains. For exam ple, on 5 June 1870, Second Lieutenant Tlicodore F. Forbes with thirtysoldiers of companies E arid G, Fifth Infantry, mr~rched ut of Fort I-lays ti , cooperate wirh adetachment ofcavalrymen from the Seventh Cawlry nlio were in pursuit of Indians reported tobe in the vici r~ity f the Grinnell Station on the Saline River. After one day into the scout, thecavalry comm ander, Captain G eorge Yatcs (who was killed along with Custcr six years later)sent Forbes antl his men back in the direction of Fort Hays, while the cavalry continued o n. Th einfantrymen returned to Fort Hays on the evening of the June 6 wirhout having discovered anysign s of recent Indian encam pme nts. Forbes noted that on "the firrt day out 1 kept my men wellup with the Cavalry [sic], but the second day I found it impossible to do so. without greatpunish ment to tlie men."SI A more successful infantry-cavalry com bination took place atWasliita, Indian Territo ry in 1868 during a winter camp aign. There the infantry guarded thelogistics base which enabled tlic cavalry to mass its combat power and strike the Indianvillage.s2

Mobility, or lack of it, then was tlic primary liandicnp when the infantry went on theoffense against the Indian. Even the cavalryman suffered in this sense when compared to thelight mobility o f the plains Indian. Colonel H azen, Sixth Infantry, testified in 1877 to the Ho use

Military Co mm ittee meeting on the reorganization of the Army:After the fourth days m arch of a m ixed com m;~ nd, he horse does not march faster than thefoot soldier, and after the seventh day, the foot soldier begins to out march the horse, andfrom that time on tlie foot soldier has to cnd his march earlier and earlier each (lay, to enablethc cavalry to reach the cam p the same d; ~y t all.53


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Ilistorian George Grinnel Bird thought differently when he commented on tlancock's1867 expedition: "That he [Hancock] n~a rclie dwith infantry and a pontoon train in pursuit ofmounted Indians sho\vs how little qualiticd for tlie command of such i n expedition." On tlieprairie in the summ er, the in hn tr y was certainly at a disadvantage. Howev er, with tlie Ar my 'seniploymcnt of the winter campaign, in concert with converging infantry-cavalry colunins, theinfantry became a potent Indian fightin g force.54

Though not employed in Kansas, future large sc;lle infantry operations against theIndians became one oft he most S U C C ~ S S ~ U I Army tactics. Mile s arid his subor dinate s: FirstLieutenant Frank Ueltl\r i n and S~ xo nd ieuter iant Ja n~ es'ope of the l:ifli Infantry. were w r ysuccessful in trackin g arid defeating the Si ou s in M ontana during the 1876-1 877 campaig n. Allthree were veterans of earlier campaigns i n Kansas during the early 1870's. Miles thought that itwas a mistake not to think infantry was important in fighting Indians. Howev er, companie s ofthirty or forty men were not alway s cffrctive , especially when soldiers were engaged in otheractivities related to ga rr is o~ ~uty. Srnall infantry companies. dispersed over many smallgarrison s pcrforniirig a11 manncr o f duties military and no nm ili tar y alike, often left little time forregimental drills or other excrc ises .jj

Th e seemi ng inability of the Arm y to prevent Indian depredations ag ainst tlie civilians inKansas in 1867 alarmed the Kansas state government. In June 1867, Kansas Governor SamuelCrawfbrd: after noting tlic Arm > troops in K ansas had don e everything possible to prevent Indianattacks on tlie railroad, settlements, and tlie ow rla nd routes, offered tlic Secretary of War avolunte er force from Kansas to assist the Arm y. Th e Secretary deferred the request to tlicmilitary division commander, Sh emia n. After some initial hesitancy, Sherman authorizedCrawford to call out a volunteer battalion of six to eight com panies of cavalry . Howe ver, manycitizens of Kmsas, primarily those in the District of Upper Arkansas, were not ns understanding

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as Governo r Cra wfo rd was \\it11 the A m y efforts. A contemporary newspaper edi tor ial inJunction City, Kansas, expressed its opinio n when i t stated: "They [Kansas m il itia] have adecided aversion to: and contempt for regular Ar m y tactics in carrying on India n war andVolunteers do no t want to be under regular Ar m y officers."s6

As India n depredations increased in 1868 and 1869, so to d id l l i c demand from the lo calcitize nry fo r A rm y assistance and protection from India n attacks. The soldiers co ntinu ally foundthemselves in the unenviable position o f arrivin g on the scene o f an Ind ian attack long after theperpetrators had fled. They then were often faced the wrath o f an angry citizenry. The s hiftingpo licy o f peacc and offense against the Indians often put the A rm y in a reactive rather thanoffensive posture. Public opinion out West (and back east fo rju st the opposite reasons) couldsometimes be scathing in i t s opin ion o f the Arnmy. The Junction Cit y Weekly Union editor ial izedits frustration, and presumably that o f ts readers. in Septembcr 1867:

The proprietor o ft l i e train, after thc l igh t was ovcr, w ent to Fort Zarah for help

infantry on the kansas frontier 1866 to 1880

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