industrial control system cyber security and the...
TRANSCRIPT
1
Industrial Control System Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution
Hatem Mohammed Schneider Electric Industry NOW Express
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Agenda ●What is Cyber Security and why now?
●A security incident ●Vulnerability tracking ●Vendor responsibility ●Customer responsibility
●How to Secure a System?
●The Schneider Electric 6-Step Defense in Depth (DiD) approach to cyber security
●Cyber Security demo ●Features of the Schneider Electric ConneXium Switch and Industrial
Firewall
Schneider Electric 3 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Cyber Security?
● Measures used to protect assets against computer threats.
● Covers both intentional and unintentional attacks. ● Malware or network traffic overloads can affect a control system. ● Accidental miss configuration or well intentioned but unauthorized control
system changes. ● Direct attacks by internal or external threats.
● Increasing the security of the assets also increases the integrity of the production system.
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What is a Security Incident? ●Customer site issue – attack or misuse
●Vulnerability disclosure – internal or external
●Becoming aware of an issue in our products or systems that could allow an attacker to modify the behavior, obtain information that should not be available, or impact the availability.
●US Government Agency Computer Emergency Readiness Team ● ICS-CERT disclosures up from
38 (2010) to 136 (2011) ●500 predicted in 2013
●Schneider Electric product disclosures up from 2 (2010) to 11 (2011)
● 4 in Jan 2012 alone (3 in Industry)
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●Potential risks: ● Safety of personnel (injury, fatality) ● Production, equipment and financial loss ● Loss of sensitive data
●Key security principles:
●Confidentiality – prevent disclosure of private information. ● Integrity – data cannot be modified without authorization. ● Availability – the information must be available when it is needed.
●In the industrial world the priorities are integrity, availability,
confidentiality.
Why is Cyber Security Important?
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Why Now? ● The rapidly changing world of technology makes computer systems more vulnerable
to a cyber attack. ● Increase in attacks on general IT systems and directed attacks on companies result in
an increase in threats to control systems. ● Open systems have proven to be desirable and effective but expose a control system to
greater risks.
●Government and companies are responding with cyber security standards for control systems.
●Awareness that control systems contain valuable business data and are also vulnerable has increased the focus on cyber security.
● Dedicated attacks are increasing for industrial companies. ● Researcher focus on control systems is increasing awareness and providing tools.
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What language are you speaking on Ethernet?
What is the Trend?
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Ethernet Trend in Automation
Standard in data transmission, Internet
and business networks
Fastest growing technology in
Industrial networks – Expanding from
control to fieldbus
Complete Industrial Ethernet
solutions
Past Present Future
Indu
stria
l Net
wor
k P
enet
ratio
n
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The Future is an Integrated Ethernet Architecture
● Increase plant uptime
●Network (hence data) is accessible yet secure
●Lower cost to maintain
●Ethernet will be the common link for IT, process, control, energy management and building automation
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Intrusion vulnerability points
Integrated Architectures – ICS Vulnerabilities
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What is a Cyber Security Vulnerability?
●A weakness within a product or a system that could allow the system to be attacked.
●Security researchers are exposing product vulnerabilities ●Profit, publicity ● To force improvements by vendors
●Vulnerabilities are very common
●Microsoft fixes 10-50 each month ●Over 500 vulnerabilities predicted in industrial
control systems in 2013
Schneider Electric 13 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
ICS Security Researchers ●Exposing vulnerabilities in industrial control
systems and products ●Release exploit examples to drive vendors to
improve security ●Exploit examples make hacking a system easier
●Motivation
●Desire to change the industry ●Publicity, money
●Vendors and customers share
responsibility for response
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●Provide fixes and patches to vulnerabilities
●Keep customers informed of latest fixes
●Recommend mitigations to limit the risks or
remove vulnerability ●Use industrial firewalls when needed ●Securing your ConneXium switches
●Analyze vulnerabilities to understand their
impact on a customer’s system ●A PLC command vulnerability on FTP is only
an issue for a system if FTP access is allowed from people that will send that command
Vendor’s Responsibility to a Vulnerability
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●A sound security plan and employee training
●Stay informed on vulnerabilities applicable to
their system
●Analyze risk involved with every vulnerability and understand impact on application
●Apply mitigations to limit the risks or remove vulnerability ●Use industrial firewalls when needed ●Securing ConneXium switches ●Applying vendor fixes and patches
Customer’s Responsibility to a Vulnerability
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How are Vulnerabilities Tracked? ●Vulnerabilities are tracked by US-CERT and other National CERT bodies
●Customers should watch these databases for issues with products they use
●Many vulnerabilities reported on blogs and online magazines
●Schneider Electric updates US-CERT for fixes and recommends mitigations for our products
●Schneider Electric Cyber Security Web Site
● Lists all product vulnerabilities ● Lists mitigation actions and patches
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Schneider Electric Cyber Security Website ●White Papers
●Product vulnerability data
● Vulnerability list for all products ● Mitigation recommendations ● Patches and Firmware updates
●Secure vulnerability reporting
●Cyber security news stories
● Product releases and updates ● Industry news
●RSS feed for vulnerability and news
Global Main Page: Support Cyber Security
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Security is a Risk Evaluation
●Customers and vendors should both handle security based on risk ●Evaluate the risks, take actions on the risks above a defined level ●Both systems and products can and should be evaluated for risk ●Risks on a product can be mitigated by another component of the system
●Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence
● Threat - a person or event with the potential to cause a loss ●Vulnerability - a weakness that can be exploited by an adversary or an
accident ●Consequence - the amount of loss or damage that can be expected from a
successful attack
●Mitigation - something that is done to reduce the risk ●Normally reducing the vulnerability or raising the skills needed to exploit it
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Exercise – Discuss in your group: ●Has your management asked about cyber security?
●Are you doing anything right now for cyber security?
●How are you and your team trained in security?
●Do you have an automation and operation policy?
●Are you willing to change behavior for a more secure
system?
Schneider Electric 20 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Agenda ●What is Cyber Security and why now?
●A security incident ●Vulnerability tracking ●Vendor responsibility ●Customer responsibility
●How to Secure a System?
●The Schneider Electric 6-Step Defense in Depth (DiD) approach to cyber security
●Cyber Security demo ●Features of the Schneider Electric ConneXium Switch
and Industrial Firewall
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• Developed by US Gov’t Control Systems Security
Program (CSSP)
• Multi-layer approach:
• Appliances • Architectures • Policies • Training
Security Best Practice - Defence-in-Depth
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6 key steps: 1. Security Plan
2. Network
Separation
3. Perimeter Protection
4. Network Segmentation
5. Device Hardening
6. Monitoring & Update
Schneider Electric’s Recommendation
2
3
4
5
5
The “Defence in Depth” Approach (DiD)
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Defence-in-Depth Step #1: Security Plan
●Define: ● Roles and responsibilities ● Allowed activities, actions and processes ● Consequences of non-compliance
● Full network assessment: ● Communication paths ● Audit of all devices ● Security settings ● Network drawings
●Vulnerability assessment: ● Potential threats ● Consequences ● Risk assessment and mitigation
Assessment and Design Service ConneXium Network Manager Product Alerts
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●Separate the Industrial Automation & Control System (IACS) from the outside world
● Create a ‘buffer’ network (DMZ) between the IACS network and the rest of the world, using routers and firewalls
● Block inbound traffic to the IACS except through the DMZ firewall
● Limit outbound traffic to essential and authorized traffic only
“Defence in Depth” Step #2: Network Separation
PlantStruxure Secure Reference Architectures
●DMZ host for servers ● Vijeo Historian mirror ● Web servers ● Authentication server ● Remote access server ● Anti-virus server
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Secure PlantStruxure architectures incorporating key security zones:
●Control Room DMZ ●Operation Network ●Control Network ●Device
Network/Functional
“Defence in Depth” Step #2: Network Separation Secure Reference Architectures
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●Data flows between zones
●Defines the settings for conduits/firewalls
“Defence in Depth” Step #2: Network Separation Secure Reference Architectures
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●Protect the Industrial Automation & Control System perimeter using a firewall
● Validate packets and protocols ● Manage authorization of certain data
packets ● Restrict IP address or user access
via authorization and authentication
●Protect critical parts of the process with additional firewalls within the ICS
●Secure remote accesses ● Use the VPN technology of routers
and firewalls ● Use the latest authentication and
authorization technologies. They’re evolving fast.
“Defence in Depth” Step #3: Perimeter Protection
Examples: ConneXium Firewall Configuration Remote Access/VPN
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● Firewall - a device for filtering packets based on source/destination IP address and protocol.
● Ingress and Egress filtering
● Source IP addresses should be very few
●Rule placement ● Firewalls should be configured with a default Deny All rule ● Rules that address the expected traffic
●Permit Rules should have specific IP
addresses and TCP/UDP port numbers
●Only pre-defined traffic should be allowed from the IT network to control network
“Defence in Depth” Step #3: Perimeter Protection ConneXium Firewall
Schneider Electric 29 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
● The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has provided the following guidelines: ● The base rule set should be “deny all, permit none.” ●Ports and services enabled on a specific case-by-case basis. ●Risk analysis and a responsible person identified for every permit rule. ●All “permit” rules should be both IP address and TCP/UDP port specific. ●All rules should restrict traffic to a specific IP address or range of addresses. ● Traffic should be prevented from transiting directly from the control network
to the corporate network. All traffic should terminate in a DMZ. ●All outbound traffic from the control network to the corporate network should
be source and destination-restricted by service and port. ●Control network devices should not be allowed to access the Internet even if
protected via a firewall.
“Defence in Depth” Step #3: Perimeter Protection Industrial Firewall Configuration
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●Description ● Used to provide secure communications across non-trusted networks ● Provides security through encryption and authentication, restricting access and
protects the data as it moves. ● Client VPN (telecommuter for example), or Site-to-Site
●Basics ● An extended protection of network or allow client access across internet ● Two flavors IPsec and SSL/TLS ● Can utilize RADIUS - uses several different types of authentication; examples are
username and password, digital signatures, and hardware tokens ● Can also use LDAP in making access decisions
“Defence in Depth” Step #3: Perimeter Protection Remote Access / Virtual Private Network
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●Create Security Zones ● Limit and monitor access
between zones ● Limits the effect of a
security issue, alerts when an issue occurs
●Use managed switches ● Limit access to network
packets. ● Precisely segment the
network using VLANs ● Limit rates of ‘multicast’ and
‘broadcast’ messages to protect from DoS type attacks
● Limit physical connections using port security
“Defence in Depth” Step #4: Network Segmentation and Zones
ConneXium Switches ConneXium Firewalls
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●Switches ● Limit traffic flow to prevent data gathering ● Implement VLANs to allow the logical and physical architectures to be
different (less hardware cost but more complex setup and maintenance)
●Segmenting the network is… ●Good network design but also assists with security ●Allows the creation of concentration points to move from one zone to
another, allowing a single place for security checks ● Limits the impact of a security breach
●Weakness
●Can be bypassed by flooding the switches ●Can cause difficulty when trying to connect and login
“Defence in Depth” Step #4: Network Segmentation and Zones ConneXium Switches
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●Separate security zones using ConneXium deep packet inspection firewalls
●Apply normal firewall rules
●Deep packet inspection ● Filter modbus requests to read/write ● Limit access to specific registers/ports ● Allow or disallow programming ● MAC address filtering
●Use special rules to mitigate vulnerabilities by blocking before they reach the
device ● Example: FTP buffer overflow rule for PLC, allows FTP access but prevents overflow
packets
“Defence in Depth” Step #4: Network Segmentation and Zones ConneXium Firewalls
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●On all devices ● Replace default passwords with ‘strong’
passwords ● Shut off unused ports, communication services
and hardware interfaces ● Set up broadcast limiter functions ● Use multicast message filtering ● Avoid generating requests faster than system
can handle ●On PCs and HMI terminals
● Forbid or seriously control the use of any external memory
●On Unity Pro and Vijeo Citect ● Set up all security features - passwords, user
profiles, operator action logging ●On ConneXium switches
● Restrict access on ports to assigned addresses only
●On remote I/Os ● Restrict access to authorized PACs only
“Defense in Depth” Step #5: Device Hardening
• Vijeo Citect PCs • Vijeo Historian PCs • Unity Pro PACs • Magelis HMI terminals • ConneXium switches
• Modicon STB I/O islands • Altivar speed drives
• Any I/O or instrument on fieldbus
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Password Management ● Fundamental tools of device hardening
● Passwords that can easily and quickly be implemented but are too often neglected in the control system network.
● Policies and procedures on password management are often lacking or missing entirely.
● Password Management Guidelines
● Change all default passwords immediately after installation : ●PC / SCADA / HMI user and application accounts ●Network control equipment ●Devices with user accounts
● Grant passwords only to people who need access. Prohibit password sharing. ● Do not display passwords during password entry ● Passwords should contain at least 8 characters and should combine upper and
lowercase letters, digits, and special characters such as !, $, #, % ● Require users and applications to change passwords on a scheduled interval. ● Remove employee access account when employment has terminated. ● Require use of different passwords for different accounts, systems, and applications.
● Password implementation must never interfere with the ability of an operator to
respond to a situation (e.g. emergency shut-down) ● Passwords should not be transmitted electronically over the unsecure Internet,
such as via e-mail.
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PC Hardening ● Restrict physical access to administrators or similar authorized personnel.
● Locate physical machines outside of operator access areas
● Restrict network access using a DMZ if possible.
● Disable or remove unused programs and services.
● Hardening of servers, particularly user account management and patching, should be a continuous process improvement. All file systems should be NTFS.
● Harden the PC server and its operating system via strong and unique user and administrative account passwords.
● Use enterprise grade operating systems, such as Windows 2008R2 Standard Server, maximizing the benefits of DEP (Data Execution Prevention) and UAC (User Account Controls) provided by these operating systems.
● Patch operating system to current required levels on a documented, monitored schedule.
● Implement Microsoft Windows authentication, perhaps centrally using Active Directory if possible.
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Anti-Virus ●Description
●Monitoring of the system and blocking / removal of programs matching a known virus
●Basics
●Anti Virus is a blacklisting technology – defines what is not allowed. ●Based on signatures of known bad items (software, files etc.)
●Weakness
●Processor intensive since the system must be scanned against the known signature list.
●Most system contain < 1/3 of the virus signatures that are known. ●Anti Virus vendors distribute signatures based on active viruses and location
in the world.
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Switch Hardening ● SNMP
● Deactivate SNMP V1 & V2 and use SNMP v3 whenever possible ● Change default passwords / community strings ● If SNMP V1/V2 is needed use access settings to limit the devices (IP Addresses) that can access
the switch. Assign different read, read/write passwords to devices. ● Telnet/Web Access (HTTPS)
● Both active in default state and allow full switch configuration ● Deactivate the telnet server if not using the command line interface to configure switch ● Change the default read and read/write passwords for the telnet and Web servers ● After configuration and operational verification disable the web server for highly secure systems
●Note: Disabling both the telnet server and the web server will result in only being able to access the switch via the V.24 port.
● Ethernet Switch Configurator Software Protection ● The Ethernet Switch Configurator Software protocol allows users to assign an IP address, net
mask and default gateway IP to a switch. ● Once configuration is complete disable the Ethernet Switch Configurator Software Protocol
frame or limit the access to read-only. ● Ethernet Switch Port Access
● A malicious user who has physical access to an unsecured port on a network switch could plug into the network behind the firewall to defeat its incoming filtering protection.
● Ethernet switches maintain a table called the Content Address Memory (CAM) that maps individual MAC addresses on the network to the physical ports on the switch.
● A MAC flooding attack fills the CAM table and the switch becomes a hub allowing capture of data. ● Ethernet Switch Port Risk Mitigation
● Disable unused ports ● Lock specific MAC addresses to specific ports on the Ethernet switch. ● Lock specific IP addresses to specific ports on the Ethernet switch
Schneider Electric 39 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
PLC Hardening ●Modify HTTP passwords when possible ●Block access to unused services using an external firewall
●HTTP Soap ● FTP ●SNMP (not a big issue due to read only access)
●Limit Modbus access using Access Control List
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PLC Hardening - Access Control Lists
●Description ● Limits Modbus access using a list of permitted IP addresses ●Only protection available today on the PLC for Modbus Protocol (external
protection is better)
●Basics ●Similar to a firewall but only
applicable for Port 502
●Weakness ●Easy to bypass with IP address
spoofing or “man in the middle” attack
Schneider Electric 41 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Citect Hardening
●Run Citect with non-administrative privileges only.
●Do not install developer tools on a running production Vijeo Citect server. ● These tools should be installed only on dedicated workstations
●Provide operator access to the server via Vijeo Citect Web Clients.
● Use Web clients instead of internet display clients
● Limit who can see specific information by configuring roles within Vijeo Citect.
●Prevent web and e-mail access on systems directly on or accessing the Vijeo Citect system. It is recommended that web and e-mail access be highly restricted, if not disabled entirely for any system in the control room.
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●Monitor, manage and protect service ● 24/7 remote security monitoring ● Configuration monitoring ● Reporting for audit compliance ● Network and host intrusion detection systems
●Monitor
● Authentication traps ● Unauthorized login attempts ● Unusual activity ● Windows Event Viewer ● Network load ● Device log files
“Defense in Depth” Step #6: Monitor and Update
• Monitor, Manage, Protect Service
•Citect Log Files
•Unity Pro log files
•PLC Event Viewers
•PLC Diagnostics and access lists
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● Description ● IDS monitors events occurring in a computer system or network and detects signs of possible
incidents (malware, worms, virus, attacks, etc) ● Network and Device IDS systems are possible ● Alert administrators (emails, user interface etc) and logs issues
● Basics
● Can be configured per FW rule set, or policy ● Classes of detection methodologies - signature-based, anomaly-based, and stateful protocol
analysis or some combination ● Signature – known threat, Anomaly – normal/abnormal deviations. Stateful understands and can
track state of certain stateful protocols ● Network IDS requires a concentration point to collect traffic when used in a switched network ● Can be very useful to develop custom rules to address new threats
● Weaknesses
● False positives, false negatives, true Positive, true negative ● Requires significant skill and full time effort ● Architecture placement is important
“Defense in Depth” Step #6: Monitor and Update Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
Schneider Electric 44 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
●Description ● Similar to IDS but add the ability to prevent vs detect ● Mostly end device not network ● Alert administrators (emails, user interface etc) and logs issues
●Basics ● Can be configured per FW rule set, or policy ● Classes of detection methodologies- signature-based, anomaly-based, and stateful
protocol analysis or some combination ● Signature – known threat, Anomaly – normal/abnormal deviations. Stateful
understands and can track state of certain stateful protocols ● Commonly use White Listing as a prevention technique
●Weaknesses ● False positives, false negatives, true positive, true negative ● IPS – can shut down traffic that is ok to have on the network ● Requires significant skill and full-time effort ● Architecture placement is important
“Defense in Depth” Step #6: Monitor and Update Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)
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●Monitoring and management of control system ● Devices, protocols, communications, user accounts,
product/Firmware versions, device settings ● Host intrusion detection ● Network intrusion detection
●Protection of control system
● Boundary and security zone firewalls ● Application White Listing
●Compliance audit and change management
●Partnership with Industrial Defender
● Number 1 in Smart Grid security (Pike Research) ● Hardware and service offer
“Defense in Depth” Step #6: Monitor and Update Monitor, Manage, and Protect
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Secure Products ●New products developed to Industry Security Standards
● Achilles certified for robustness, ISA Secure certified for complete security
● Legacy products
● Protected using industry-leading ConneXium Tofino application firewalls
●Partner products for advanced security ● Access to Hirschmann network infrastructure ● Access to Industrial Defender industrial security suite
●Secure network infrastructure
● ConneXium range of secure network infrastructure products.
● Includes Schneider Electric ConneXium Eagle and Tofino firewalls.
●Security Certification Center
Schneider Electric 47 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Industry Cyber Security Solution
Protect within a zone
Device Hardening
Restrict traffic between zones
Protect the perimeter Protect large zones
Securely connect zones
Protect communications
Protect the SCADA
Monitor the security and adapt
Monitor
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Industry Cyber Security Solution
Secure Solutions
Secure Products
Adaption by local project teams
Advise and Assistance PSX Competency Center
Assessment and Expertise (Americas, Europe, Asia)
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Reference Architectures (TVDA)
Provider
(Worldwide) (Americas, Europe) (Asia)
(USA, France, China)
Schneider Electric 49 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Agenda ●What is Cyber Security and why now?
●A security incident ●Vulnerability tracking ●Vendor responsibility ●Customer responsibility
●How to Secure a System?
●The Schneider Electric 6-Step Defense in Depth (DiD) approach to cyber security
●Cyber Security demo ●Features of the Schneider Electric ConneXium Switch
and Industrial Firewall
Schneider Electric 50 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Summary ●Security implementation is a solution and not a product
● People, Policies, Architectures, Products
●Security requires a multi-layer or Defense in Depth (DiD) approach ● Security Plan, Network Separation, Perimeter Protection, Network
Segmentation, Device Hardening, Monitoring & Update ● A Defense-in-Depth approach is the best approach- mitigates risk, improves system
reliability
●Vendor’s responsibilities ● Design products & solutions with security features ● Ensure they enable customers to comply with security standards ● Provide recommendations and methodologies to guide implementation
●Customer’s responsibilities
● Define security procedures (organizational security) ● Mandate responsible people (personal security) ● Ensure compliance with security standards
Schneider Electric 51 - Industrial Control Cyber Security and the Employment of Industrial Firewalls as a Partial Solution– 2012
Summary The Schneider Electric Security Solution ● Information for customers
● Web portal for guidance, vulnerabilities and information
●Secure products ● New products developed to industrial security standards ● Legacy products protected using pre-configured security appliances ● Secure network infrastructure
●Secure reference architectures
● Secure PlantStruxure architectures validated by leading security experts
●Assessment and design services ● Assessment Service – allowing security to be applied where it is needed most ● Design Service – customizing the secure PlantStruxure architecture creating a unique
solution for each customer
●Monitor, manage and protect services ● Tools and services to continually monitor a plant configuration and operation to ensure
security and production is maintained