industrial conflict: the power of prediction

Industrial Conflict: The Power of PredictionAuthor(s): Robert DubinSource: Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Apr., 1965), pp. 352-363Published by: Cornell University, School of Industrial & Labor RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2520908 .

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INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: THE POWER OF PREDICTION

ROBERT DUBIN

TN 1953 1 predicted that industrial conflict would remain stable for the next

several decades in the United States.- Ten years later this prediction has proved to be reasonably accurate for the first of the "several" decades coverd by the prediction.

The prediction was not accidental, or a lucky guess. Nor was the shape of the future prophesied by extrapolating the past record. The prediction was based on a model of a social system and the links between it and the industrial institution. The prediction, in short, claims a rea- soned, theoretical foundation from which it was generated.

This special issue of the Review is de- voted to an examination of the value of the behavioral sciences for the analysis of industrial relations. It is my purpose to subject one sociological contribution to the most stringent test of all -the ability accurately to predict the course of industrial conflict. This should speak for itself as an example of usefulness of sociology to the disciplines analyzing industrial relations.

It is the task of this article to: (1) state the prediction as made; (2) marshal the evidence bearing on it; (3) review the model from which the prediction was generated; and (4) show how another model, developed in 1959, supplements

The author is research professor, Department of Sociology, at the University of Oregon.- EDITOR

the original one from which the basic prediction derived.

THE PREDICTION

The published prediction read as follows. "The general prediction for industrial conflict is: measured by the length and intensity of strikes it will show relative stability in the next several decades."2

My co-editors of the volume in which this prediction appeared each made separate estimates of the future, neither of which was as specific as mine.3 In intro- ducing my prediction, the following ob- servations were made.

"After taking into account all the larger influences that play on the uncertain future of industrial relations. . it is still worth making a specific prediction about the future of industrial conflict.

'Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, Arthur M. Ross, eds., Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

2Ibid., p. 527. 3Professor Arthur Kornhauser entitled his pre-

diction "The Undetermined Future of Industrial Conflict," ibid., pp. 519-526, and emphasized in his discussion the role of industrial conflict as one mechanism for resolving conflicts on social values. Professor Arthur M. Ross made a twelve- point summary of the forces playing on the industrial institution, ibid., pp. 631-633, and concluded: "Tell me whether or not peace will be kept, economic stability maintained, and demo- cratic values and institutions largely preserved, and I will make a prediction as to the future course of labor-management conflict. Otherwise I prefer to wait and see" (p. 533).

352



INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 353

Life goes on. Society has continuity. The past and present do contain at least some of the seeds of the future. While straight extrapolation may be pointless and mis- leading, a prediction based upon a model of the future social system can be very much in order. For a sociologist in particular, concerned as he is with the sta- bilities and regularities of social life, there is almost a compulsion to see the scientific task as requiring prediction. This involves 'sticking one's neck out' even at the risk of being wholly inaccurate. But if the tools of social analysis are useful, then the scientifically constructed models of the future social systems should give us the basis for predicting the state of one of the secondary sets of social practices, namely, industrial conflict."4

THE DATA

We divide the data into two segments dealing respectively with (1) the length of strikes and (2) the intensity of strikes, both features of industrial conflict in- cluded in the prediction. The prediction was made for the United States. The data, therefore, cover only this country. For each time series a break is made between the year 1953 and the year 1954, since the prediction was made when the facts were known for the year 1953, but before the data became available for the next year. For the nine-year period, 1945 through 1953, the data in each series are fitted with a least squares linear trend line. This line is projected beyond 1953 to 1963, to represent what an extrapolation of the 1945-1953 series would predict. For the period of the actual prediction, 1954-1963, a separate least squares linear trend line is fitted to the data to show the actual trend during that ten- year period. The first trend line has its origin at 1945; the second at 1954.

4Ibid., p. 527.

The pre-prediction period commences at the end of World War II. The war period and the 1930's were distinctive in the history of labor organization and collective bargaining. Most analysts, including the writer, viewed the postwar period as discontinuous with the earlier eras, in the realm of labor-management relations.

The prediction will be tested in two ways. (1) We will examine the difference between the extrapolation beyond 1953 and the actual trend for the succeeding ten-year period. This will test whether or not extrapolation would have done as well as a theoretically based prediction. (2) We will then note the slope of the trend line for 1954-1963 period to determine whether or not it conforms to the prediction of stability.

To measure the length of strikes we will use the annual number of working man-days lost due to strikes as the first index. A more refined measure will be average number of working man-days lost per striker.5

To measure the intensity of strikes we will use three measures: (1) the number of industrial disputes, (2) the number of workers involved, and (3) the proportion of working days lost due to strikes.

The data are the standard indices employed by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics and published as a continuous series in the Monthly Labor Re- view. Note is taken of the usual caveats concerning the inadequacies of these data. They are, nevertheless, the only regularly collected data available for historical comparison. The data are dis- played in the Table. The source of each

5We use here, and also to measure intensity, some of the main indices employed by Ross and Hartman in their excellent international study. See Arthur M. Ross and Paul Hartman, Chang- ing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (New York: Wiley, 1960).



354 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

Table. Work Stoppages Resulting from Labor-Management Disputes, United States, 1945-1963.*

Length of Strikes Intensity of Strikes

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) rear Noo. of Average No. No. of %0 of Estimated

Man-Days of Man-Days No. of Workers Working Time Idle Idle Per Striker Stoppages Involved Idle Due to

(thousands) [col. 1 *. col. 4] (thousands) Stoppages

1945 ............... 38,000 10.95 4,750 3,470 .47%Jo 1946 ............... 116,000 25.22 4,985 4,600 1.43 1947 ............... 34,600 15.94 3,693 2,170 .41 1948 .. ....... 34,100 17.40 3,419 1,960 .37 1949 ............... 50,500 16.67 3,606 3,030 .59 1950 ............... 38,800 16.10 4,843 2,410 .44 1951 ............... 22,900 10.32 4,737 2,220 .23 1952 ............... 59,100 16.69 5,117 3,540 .57 1953 ............... 28,300 11.79 5,091 2,400 .26

1954 ............... 22,600 14.77 3,468 1,530 .21 1955 ............... 28,200 10.64 4,320 2,650 .26 1956 ............... 33,100 17.42 3,825 1,900 .29 1957 ............... 16,500 11.87 3,673 1,390 .14 1958 ............... 23,900 11.60 3,694 2,060 .22 1959 ............... 69,000 36.70 3,708 1,880 .61 1960 ............... 19,100 14.47 3,333 1,320 .17 1961 ............... 16,300 11.24 3,367 1,450 .14 1962 ............... 18,600 15.12 3,614 1,230 .16 1963 ............... 16,100 17.10 3,362 941 .13

Source: Monthly Labor Review, vol. 87, August 1964, p. 996. *The data include all known strikes or lockouts involving six workers or more and lasting a full

day or shift or longer. Figures on workers involved and man-days idle cover all workers made idle for as long as one shift in establishments directly involved in a stoppage. They do not measure the indirect or secondary effect on other establishments or industries whose employees are made idle as a result of material or service shortages.

chart is the appropriate column of this table.

LENGTH OF STRIKES

Two measures are used to determine the length of strikes. Employing these indices, the facts for 1954-1963 closely approximate the stability prediction. Furthermore, the data for the post-prediction period more nearly conform to the prediction of stability than to the extrapolation of past trends.

The total number of man-days idle due to work stoppages does measure length

of strikes on the assumption that a crude summing of work days lost is not unduly influenced by annual variations in the number of strikes and the number of workers involved. This assumption is substantially met for the prediction period (1954-1963) on the number of work stoppages, as a glance at column 3 of the table, and Chart 3, will reveal. The assumption is not adequately met for the number of workers involved, as shown in Chart 5, where it is clear that there has been a marked decline in the number of




Chart 1. Number of Man-Days Idle Due to Strikes, United States, 1945-1963. 120

Trend - 1945-1953: Y' 65.94 - 3.803X Trend - 1954-1963; Y' 31.57 .950X

100

*Prediction mcode here

80

60

E 40 z

20 lf-wf

0

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

workers involved in work stoppages during the prediction period.

The prediction of stability in the length of strikes means that the slope of the trend line of the index of this vari- able should be horizontal and parallel to the time axis. When we examine the number of man-days idle in Chart 1, it is clear that. for the prediction period, the trend line does approximate a horizontal one. Indeed, since the number of workers involved in strikes has declined, the slight negative tilt to the trend line would conform to a stability prediction.

How much better did the actual prediction made in 1953 fare than an extrapolation of the known trend up to the point? In Chart 1 the data for 1945-1953 are plotted and fitted with a linear least squares trend line.6 When this trend line

6If a non-linear trend line was fitted to these data it would generate a rising curve beyond 1953 which would be just as far off the actual trend, but in the opposite direction, as is the linear trend line.

is projected beyond 1953 it predicts a much sharper decline in number of man- days idle than actually occurred. Further- more, the prediction much more accurately reflects reality than does an extrapolation of the trend of the pre-prediction period. We conclude that even with this crude measure of the length of strikes the prediction showed a substantial con- formity with reality.

In the second measure of length of strikes, the average number of man-days lost per striker is employed as the index. This is a somewhat more refined measure of length of work stoppages than the first and is less influenced by variations in either the number of stoppages or the number of workers involved. These data are shown in Chart 2.

For the prediction period the empirical trend line is clearly linear. It again approximates a horizontal line, with a moderate positive slope. The prediction of stability is not too far off from reality.




Chart 2. Average Number of Man-Days Idle per Striker, United States, 1945-1963.

* Prediction made here

40 ~ Trend - 1945-1953: Y' 18.5731 - .5795X

Trend - 1954-1963: Y' =14.4188 + .3044X

o 30

-o

20

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

The data clearly do not discredit the prediction.

When a comparison is made of the prediction and the extrapolation of the early period, the trend lines move in opposite directions. While the magnitude of difference is relatively small, the real trend more nearly approximates the prediction of stability than does the extrapolation of the past trend.7

There appears to be a reasonable basis for concluding that the prediction of stability in the length of strikes for the decade 1954-1963 was a pretty good one. Clearly, this prediction proved a better forecast of reality than an extrapolation of past trends.

INTENSITY OF STRIKES

On two of the three measures of intensity of strikes the data support the stability prediction with reasonable cer- tainty. For one index of intensity of work

7The annual change in the real least square trend line is +.3044, while the extrapolation of the past trend reveals a somewhat greater annual change of -.5795.

stoppages our prediction is less certainly supported, particularly since we could have done just as well in estimating reality by extrapolating the trend for this measure. On balance, however, we are still willing to claim power for the stability prediction in forecasting the intensity of strikes between 1954 and 1963.

The number of work stoppages is a good measure of the intensity of strike activity in the country as a whole. This measure is particularly useful where the number of work stoppages is substantial in any one year so that minor annual variations in number will not unduly influence the trend over a period of years. The annual number of work stoppages in the United States exceeds three thousand, and during the period from 1945 to 1953 reached five thousand. There are substantial numbers, and trends based upon them will be relatively stable in the face of unusual activity in any single year.

The prediction of stability in the intensity of strike activity is almost fully met when measured by number of work




Chart 3. Number of Work Stoppages, United States, 1945-1963. 6

5

osmh~~~~~ -a -

C 3

? | * Prediction made here

zD 2 _ 2

z Trend - 1945-1953: Y' = 4.032 ? .088X

Trend 1954-1963: Y' = 3,943 .056X

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

stoppages. The best fitting linear trend line for the prediction period is nearly horizontal. Indeed, the stability prediction is most fully and accurately met by these data. An analysis of Chart 3 and its comparison with the other charts will make this point clear.

The stability prediction is all the more remarkable for number of work stoppages since the known data at the time the prediction was made were wildly inaccurate in predicting the future. A pro- jection of that trend would have predicted a rising tide of work stoppages. Fur- thermore, the discontinuity between what went before 1953, and what came after, is so sharp as to provide no clue about the future. The stability prediction, which turned out to be reasonably accurate, must have been derived from considerations independent of the past trend in number of work stoppages.

A second measure of intensity of strike activity is the relation of strikers' man-

days idle to estimated working time. This measure determines the proportion of all time worked by the labor force that was lost due to strikes. In Chart 4 the data are presented.8

The stability prediction means that the trend line for the ten years beginning in 1954 should be a horizontal straight line. The actual trend is a straight line but with a moderate negative slope. This indicates that the proportion of working time lost due to strikes declined during the period. The actual success of the stability prediction can perhaps best be judged by comparing it with an extrapolation of trends up to the point at which the prediction was made. The extrapolated trend is more negatively sloped than the real trend for the pre-

8It will be noted that the data in Charts 1 and 4 follow a similar pattern, since both involve the number of man-days idle due to strikes. The two indices do represent, respectively, a measure of the length of strikes and of intensity of strikes.




Chart 4. Man-Days Idle as a Percent of Estimated Working Time, United States, 1945-1963.

1.4

Trend - 1945-1953: Y' .8392 - .0162X

Trend - 1954-1963: Y' -~ .2899 -.0124X

1.2

1.0

O 0.8

-n * Prediction made here

E

0 0.6

0.4

0.2

0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

diction period. Thus, the stability prediction conforms to the direction in which the actual data were moving and does considerably better than the extrapolation prediction in approximating the real trend.

A third way to measure the intensity of strike activity is to consider the number of workers involved in work stoppages. This is done in Chart 5. It should be obvious that the stability prediction was simply inaccurate in predicting the trend in number of workers on strike in a given year. Furthermore, using this measure a straight extrapolation of the 1945-1953 data would have done remark- ably well in predicting the actual trend for 1954-1963. The stability prediction plainly fails on this measure.

The evidence indicates that for two of the three measures of intensity of strike activity the stability prediction very accurately or approximately reflects the real trend in the data. For one measure of intensity of strike activity the stability prediction fails and does only about as well as a straight extrapolation of the past trend would have done. There is substantial reason for accepting the con- tinued viability of the stability prediction. It should be recognized, however, that some modification of the model which generated the prediction, or an alternate model, is necessary to make sense out of the data that produce non- conforming results.

The stability prediction forecast the course of development of industrial con-




Chart 5. Number of Workers Involved in Work Stoppages, United States, 1945-1963. 5

Trend - 1945-1953: Y' = 3.4425 - .1152X Trend - 1954-1963: Y' = 2.2311 .1084X

4 / Prediction made here

z:

.0

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1 951 1952 1 953 1954 1 955 1956 1957 1958 1 959 1 960 1961 1962 1 963

flict, acknowledging the complexity of the phenomena being considered. The prediction covered the broad end-result of interactions in union-management relations that determined the length of strikes and their intensity for the total economy. Evaluating the predi c t ion against crude measures of reality, confi- dence rests on the conclusion that the prediction was reasonably accurate for a period of an entire decade.

THE MODEL

The model from which the stability prediction was developed is based upon two related "laws" of social systems. These "laws" express, respectively, (1) the process by which group behavior becomes stabilized through institutionalization, and (2) the process by which individuals and groups involved develop an investment in institutionalized behavior.

The stability prediction depended upon an estimate by the analyst of the degree to which union-management relations and collective bargaining had, in fact, become institutionalized. When I

estimated in 1953 that there was a high level of institutionalization of industrial behavior around the collective bargaining institution, it then became possible, by the second "law," to conclude that the individuals and groups involved in union-management relations would act in the short- and middle-range future to "keep things as they are." The stability prediction may be seen then as deriving from a model of a social system which had reached a system state of institutionalized behavior sufficiently integrated that the persistence of the system state seemed highly likely.

A quotation from the original prediction will serve to make concrete the ab- stract statement of the model. In illustrat- ing institutionalization I wrote:

"In a long-run forecast of American industrial relations we must start with the knowledge that we are considering a set of institutional practices that are an integral part of an unfolding social development. It is no longer a matter of whether or not these developments can be turned on or off at will. They are




built into the organizational and social system of industry.... The advent of widespread collective bargaining in American industry has produced (1) the invention and adoption of many new sub-systems of behavior for management representatives, for union leaders, and for rank-and-file workers, and (2) the modification of existing behavior systems to bring them in concordance with what was happening in union-management relations. At any given moment in time, these behavior systems are in relative equilibrium. All the people involved in these stabilized systems of behavior have various kinds of reasons for maintaining the stability. This is another way of say- ing that, when a system of social practices becomes even partially routinized, there arise strains toward perpetuation of these practices.'

The second "law" of a social system describes the process by which individuals and groups develop an investment in institutionalized behaviors. This process of commitment has been described elsewhere'0 and may be summarized for the collective bargaining institution. The continuous interaction of a company with the particular union having exclu- sive bargaining rights for its employees

9Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross, op. cit., pp. 527-528. A more extended and detailed treatment of institutionalization of industrial relations will be found in the following publications of mine: "Power and Union-Management Relations," Ad- ministrative Science Quarterly, vol. 2, June 1957, pp. 60-81; "Industrial Conflict and Social Wel- fare," Conflict Resolution, vol. 1, June 1957, pp. 179-199; "Industrial Research and the Discipline of Sociology," Proceedings of the Eleventh Annu- al Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Asso- ciation (1958) (Madison, Wis.: The Association, 1959), pp. 152-172; and Working Union-Manage- ment Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- Hall, 1958), especially chaps. 6 and 7.

'0See, for example, my "Industrial Conflict and Social Welfare," especially pp. 187-193. What follows paraphrases several major points made there.

leads to a routinization of means of interaction between them (including their conflict interactions), and shared values about conflicting ends. Permanent positions are established (e.g., the shop stew- ard and industrial relations expert), and the functionaries who fill them "view their professional activities as respectable, legitimate, and functional in the social system." A common law of the plant develops out of past settlement of industrial disputes which is a "framework of norms, standards, and procedures into which most future dispute settlements can be fitted."11 Finally, there are latent functions served by union-management relations that are useful for both the organizations and the workers as individuals. In short, there are group and individual payoffs in the union-management relationship that are valued. The valuing of these payoffs is the process developing attachment to the institutional practices from which the payoffs derive.

It was pointed out that the stability prediction for collective bargaining pre- supposed that change in the American social system could be readily assimilated. Thus, automation was foreseen as the source of major change to which there would probably be adequate response in the society. The conclusions were drawn that:

"Should totalitarianism be the wave of the future, then industrial conflict can readily become a weapon of insurrection and, ultimately, of revolution in either a fascist or communist development. If our technology advances in an uncon- trolled fashion to produce major disloca- tions in our society (including mass un- employment and permanent obsolescence of lifetime skills), then blind revolt may be at least an initial reaction, accom-

"Ibid., both quotations are from p. 191.




panied by a much higher volume of overt conflict. But these postulates of abrupt change rather than more gradual modification in the social institutions simply represent another way of declaring that the basic institutions of our society (the governmental structure and the economic system) are so brittle and fragile that their future is uncertain. If this is so, then it becomes futile to attempt prediction of a much more secondary set of institutional practices, such as industrial relations, which are dependent upon the underlying and basic institutional ar- rangements. However, there seems to be sufficient evidence pointing to the vitality of the underlying institutions of our society to justify predictions about industrial conflict on the basis of relatively static assumptions concerning these basic social institutions."'12

These summary statements, describing the model from which the stability prediction derives, serve to outline the basis on which the prediction was made. Given the analyst's estimate that union-management relations had become institutionalized to the point where the parties were interested in maintenance of the underlying institutional structure, the prediction followed automatically - there would be stability in the length and intensity of strikes.

SUPPLEMENT: POWER AND CONFLICT

In 1959 a model was developed relating power and conflict in union-management relations.13 One facet of this model leads to the prediction that on "fundamental" issues in collective bargaining the

12Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross, op. cit., p. 530. 'Robert Dubin, "A Theory of Conflict and

Power in Union-Management Relations," Indus- trial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 13, July 1960, pp. 501-518.

amount of conflict in union-management relations is inversely related to the disparity in power between company and union.14 When power was evenly bal- anced between company and union, the introduction of a "fundamental" issue in the collective bargaining would result in much conflict, while the same issue would produce little conflict if there was a wide disparity in power between company and union. "Fundamental" issues were de- fined as "those not yet incorporated in collective bargaining."'15

The events of 1959 provide an oppor- tunity to test this prediction. It will be noted that we are now concerned with the reason for annual variations around the trend line for industrial disputes. In particular, 1959 was a year of major deviation, with markedly increased industrial conflict. Is it possible that this increase in industrial conflict was the result of (1) a power contest between two equally matched adversaries, (2) over a fundamental issue in collective bargaining?

For the year 1959 about 60 percent of the strike activity was accounted for by the steel strike (42 out of 69 million man- days idle due to strikes in the nation as a whole). The strike began on July 15 and was terminated on November 7 when the Supreme Court upheld the emergen- cy dispute injunction, obtained under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act on October 21. The labor agreement settling the dispute was not reached until Janu- ary 5, 1960. Had there been no steel strike, the number of man-days idle due to labor disputes in 1959 would have been 27 million, very much in line with 23.9 million in 1958 and 19.1 million in 1960. It is clear, then, that the deviation of 1959 from the secular trend in strike activity was the result of one major strike.

14lbid., p. 510 and Fig. 2. "Ibid., p. 509.




The balance of power between the collective steel industry and the United Steelworkers of America in 1959 can sub- jectively be characterized as exhibiting little disparity. The big twelve of the steel industry bargained jointly and re- tained a solid front, losing only Kaiser Steel, which made an early and separate settlement covering about 8,000 workers out of the 510,000 who struck the industry in July. The Eisenhower Administra- tion could be counted as firmly neutral, if not sympathetic with the industry in the struggle. On the union side it was fully expected that, if the strike con- tinued, the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act would be invoked, to insure an 80- day cooling-off period and the appoint- ment of a Board of Inquiry. The union maintained solidarity throughout the strike. Objectively, the best test of the equality of power on each side was the fact that, at the conclusion of the hearings by the Board of Inquiry on Oc- tober 18, 1959, the Board made clear in its report that neither party had moved significantly from the positions initially presented to the Board when the hearings began on the 15th.16 Thus, even under pressure of a presidential Board of In- quiry, and after a successful and total strike of the industry, neither side had bent significantly in the direction of compromise. It seems accurate to conclude that the parties were quite evenly matched and that this is a case of little disparity of power between them. To quote just one excerpt from the report of the Board of Inquiry: "The companies refused to bargain about wages and

"6See "The Steel Board's Report to the Presi- dent," Monthly Labor Review, vol. 82, December 1959, pp. 1333-1341, and also "Remarks Upon Conclusion of Steel Board Testimony," ibid., pp. 1330-1332, in which Chairman George W. Taylor summarized his impressions on the conclusion of the first phases of the Board hearings.

fringes until their demands respecting work rules had first been resolved. The union was not willing to discuss work rules provisions which it held not to be negotiable. Since neither side would ac- cept the preconditions of the other, effec- tive negotiations could not proceed."i7

The Board of Inquiry identified two basic issues, described in the preceding quotation. The final settlement reached in January established definitive provisions covering the economic issues. The work-rules' issue, however, remained un- settled at that time, with a committee established to study the issue and submit recommendaions by November 30, 1960.

In testing our prediction that fundamental issues produce much conflict when the parties have little disparity of power between them, the final step is to establish that the work-rule issue is a fundamental one.

The work-rule dispute centered on section 2-B of the existing contracts between the United Steelworkers and the individual steel companies. This provi- sion was first negotiated and incorporated in the U. S. Steel agreement of 1947. In 1952 the steel companies attempted to revise or eliminate section 2-B, but re- ceived an adverse ruling from the Wage Stabilization Board to whom the issue was presented for consideration. Thus, the language of section 2-B remained unchanged from 1947 until 1959 in the U. S. Steel agreement. There were only minor variations and modifications in the comparable clause of the other contracts with individual companies.

The practice in the industry was to recognize clearly that section 2-B "does not prevent or interfere with adjustment when 'the basis for the existence of the local working condition is changed or

'7"The Steel Board's Report to the President," op. cit., p. 1334.




eliminated,' such as the introduction of technological changes, changes in equip- ment or manufacturing process...."18 The companies, however, argued that section 2-B "is a serious hindrance in other circumstances, for example, where there has been no investment in new facilities."'9 The report of the Board of Inquiry concluded: "This issue is so diffi- cult because it may involve changes in crew size and the consequent likelihood that men would be displaced. Both parties have remained adamant."20

Thus, it seems quite clear that on the work-rules' issue management was seek- ing the contractual right to make changes in plant operations that might have employment consequences without consent of or appeal by the union. The union, on the other hand, was just as determined to hold the companies to the existing language of section 2-B and the common law of the industry that had grown up around it, to prevent management from exercising such right without jeopardy. This seems clearly to be an issue not pre- viously within the scope of bargaining,

"'Ibid., p. 1336. 19Ibid.

2OIbid.

and it, therefore, qualified as a fundamental issue in collective bargaining.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the year 1959 was an exceptional one in labor disputes because two evenly matched adversaries, the United Steel- workers of America and the collective steel industry, locked horns on a fundamental issue in collective bargaining. This is the historical example that illus- trates the power-conflict model published in 1960.

CONCLUSION

A concrete prediction was made ten years ago about the course of industrial conflict in the United States. The trend data bearing on this prediction seem to confirm the general accuracy of the prediction. This lends support to the model from which the prediction was generated. A second model, relating conflict to the power of union and company, comple- ments the first and, tested in one in- stance -the 1959 steel strike -proves viable. Judged by results, the sociological analysis of industrial conflict may be considered a positive contribution to knowledge.



industrial conflict: the power of prediction

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